authority and power in bureaucratic and patrimonial administration: a revisionist interpretation of...

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Authority and Power in Bureaucratic and Patrimonial Administration: A RevisionistInterpretation of Weber on BureaucracyAuthor(s): Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber RudolphSource: World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jan., 1979), pp. 195-227Published by: Cambridge University Press

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AUTHORITY AND POWER INBUREAUCRATIC AND PATRIMONIAL

ADMINISTRATION:A Revisionistnterpretationf Weberon Bureaucracy

By LLOYD T. RUDOLPH and SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH*INTRODUCTIONW EBER'S understandingfbureaucracy,espite ubstantialuali-'fl Tfication nd revision, emains hedominant aradigmfor thestudy f administrationnd formal rganizations.We continue heprocess f revision y accepting is ideal-typicaloncepts f bureau-cratic nd patrimonialdministration,ut we intend o subject hemto theoreticalnd historicaleinterpretationnd application.1

* This article was presented n an earlier and longer version at the annual meetingof the American Political Science Association at Chicago in September I974, andreceivedthe FranklinL. BurdettePi Sigma Alpha Award for the best paper deliveredat themeeting.1There is an appreciable literature hat addresses itselfto aspects of this paper. Itincludes ReinhardBendix and Guenther Roth,Scholarshipand Partisanship:Essays onMax Weber (Berkeley: Universityof California Press I97I); William Delany, TheDevelopment and Decline of Patrimonialand BureaucraticAdministration, Adniinis-trative cience Quarterly, iii (Winter i962-63), 458-50I; Lloyd Fallers,Bantu Bureau-cracy (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press i965); S. N. Eisenstadt, TraditionalPatrimonialism and Modern Neo-Patrimonialisrn, n J. S. Jackson, ed., SociologicalStudies, Social Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press I972); AlfredDiamant, The Bureaucratic Model: Max Weber Rejected, Rediscovered, Resur-rected, in Ferrel Heady and Sybil L. Stokes, eds., Papers in ComparativeAdministration (Ann Arbor: Institute of Public Administration, University ofMichigan i962), 59-96; John Armstrong, Old Regime Governors: Bureaucraticand Patrimonial Attributes, Comparative Studies in Society and History, xiv(January 972), 2-29; Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An IntellectualPortrait (NewYork: Doubleday i960); Carl J.Friedrich, Some Observationson Weber's AnalysisofBureaucracy, n Robert K. Merton and Associates,Reader in Bureaucracy New York:Free Press I952), 27-32; ErnestBarker, The Developmentof Public Services n Europe,i660-i930 (New York: OxfordUniversityPress I944); E. N. Gladden, A History ofPublic Administration, , From Earliest Times to the Eleventh Century; I, From theEleventhCentury o the PresentDay (London: Frank Cass I972); T. F. Tout, Chaptersin the AdministrativeHistory of Medieval England, 6 vols. (London: Longmans,Green I920-I933); JohnMarkoff, GovernmentalBureaucratization: General Processesand an Anomalous Case, ComparativeStudies in Society and History,xvii (OctoberI975); David Beetham, Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics (London:George Allen and Unwin I974); Wolfgang J.Mommsen, The Age of Bureaucracy:Perspectives n the Political Sociology of Max Weber (Oxford: Basil Blackwell I974).Some of theseworks contain useful bibliographiesor bibliographicalfootnotes.? 1979 by PrincetonUniversityPressWorld olitics 043-8871/79/020195-33$01.65/iFor copying information, ee contributor age


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196 WORLD POLITICSWeber's nticipationhatbureaucracyouldtriumphistoricallybecausetwas more fficientndpowerfulhan atrimonialdminis-trationndmore ermanenthan harismaticeadershiped himtopresent istoricalhange s an evolutionaryrocess f adaptationwhich,f notteleological,as at leastuniversal,nevitable,nd ac-cessibleo human nderstandingnd explanation.urreadingfhis-toricalhange s itrelatesobureaucracyeadsustoquestionWeber'sinterpretationna varietyffrontsndwith varietyf mplications.Weber's onceptualizationfbureaucracyn terms frational-legalauthoritynd formalationalityails o take ccountf the xistenceanduse ofpowerwithinndoutsideforganizationsnd oftheper-sistencef patrimonialeatures.he useofpowerproducesonflictandpathologies.hat s goodfor rganizationssnotnecessarilyoodfortheir articipantsr for society: onflictnd pathology-whentheyervehe egitimatealuesnd nterestsfparticipantsnd actorsin theorganizationalnvironment-canave benign onsequences.The persistencefpatrimonialeatures,ather hansignallinghesurvivalf dysfunctionaltavisms,an promotedministrativef-fectivenessy mitigatingonflictnd promotingrganizationaloy-alty, iscipline,ndefficiency.

IDEAL TYPES AND THE EXPLANATION OF HISTORICAL CHANGEWeber's euristicseof idealtypes o explain uthoritynd ad-ministrationelied n formal ontrasts.he formal ontrastsn turnbecamehemeans or emonstratingistoricalhange rom raditional

to modernrational-legal)uthority,nd from atrimonialo bureau-cratic dministration.atrimonialnd bureaucraticdministrationwere elated oeachother otonlyheuristically,ut lsohistorically,as less nd more volvedmeans forganization.harismandcharis-matic dministrationresentedpecialproblems.nliketraditionaland rationalegalauthority,nd patrimonialnd bureaucraticd-ministration,harismaticuthoritys notsubjectoevolutionaryis-tory.t erupts n times f severe risis rrapid hange s itsbearerattemptso establish new normativerientationnd socialorder.Succession,fit is to succeed,equiresheritual nd administrativeroutinizationf thefounder'sharisma. s a result,Weber rgued,pure harismaticuthorityackspermanence.n itsroutinizedormsittoobecomesubjectothe volutionaryistoryhat ends owardhetriumphf formalationalitynbureaucraticrganizations.Weber'snterlockingse of formal ontrastsndevolutionaryis-

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WEBER ON BUREAUCRACY 197tory ed him, ike other nterpretersf world ivilizations,o finduniquefeaturesn Western ivilizationhat eemed o explain nd,implicitly,o ustifyts ulturalndeconomic ominancemong9th-centuryorld ivilizations.heWest's niquenessndpowerhad ahistoricalignificancehat eachedwell beyond elf-understanding.A productfmodernuropeanivilization,tudyingnyproblemfuniversalistory,s bound o skhimselfWeber rites]owhat om-binationf ircumstanceshe acthould e attributedhatn Westerncivilizationnd nWesternivilizationnly,ulturalhenomenaaveappeared hichas we ike othink)ie n a line fdevelopmentav-inguniversal ignificancendvalue.2If historys understoods open-ended-and, ithin imits,man-made-and reality s pluralisticn time nd over ime, henotionthat istorys evolutionarynot n the ense fadaptationut sgoal-oriented) nd universal ecomes roblematic.n open-endedndpluralisticnderstandingfhistoryan ccommodateistoricalhangethat s cyclical nd countercyclical-notecausenecessityr designguide t,but ecause,s Weber ecognized,deal ndmaterialnterests

give ise oaffirmations,ejections,nd counteraffirmations.hisviewofhistorytressesontinuities,ffinities,ndthe evitalizationfvalues,as well s conflictver deal ndmaterialnterests.urobjective,uidedbythis ifferentnderstandingfhistoricalhange,sto use Weber'sheuristiconstructso highlighthe similaritiesnd continuitiesswell as the differencesnd discontinuitiesetweenarlier nd latermeans f administration.ecausebothhave been shapedby patri-monial ndbureaucraticnfluences,eexpecto showhow he ormalcontrasts eber sedobscure verlappingharacteristicsndmotivesandexaggerateifferencesn capabilitynd performance.Weber's seofthe ormalontrastetweenatrimonialndbureau-craticdministrationnd the lternativeseof thetypologyhatwedevelop avean objectiven common: o analyze nd explain hecauses f administrativeffectivenessndineffectiveness.eber so-lated ndorganizedeaturesfbureaucraciesn order oexplainhecauses ftheiruperiorffectivenessefficiencys well sgoal chieve-ment) nd toportrayhefuture. e identifiedffectivenessith or-malrationality-i.e.,nstrumentalrmeans-endsalculationxpressedinorganizationaltructuresndroles,nd tsuse npursuitfputa-tivelygreed-uponrganizationaloals.Weber ound hat ureaucra-

2Weber, he ProtestantEthic and the Spirit of Capitalism [hereafteritedas Prot-estant Ethic] trans. yTalcottParsons New York: Scribner ibrary958), I3; em-phasis in original.



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198 WORLD POLITICScies re formallyhemost ationalnownmeans fcarryingut m-perativeontroldomination]verhuman eings. 'He maintainedthat hedecisiveeason or headvance f bureaucraticrganizationhas always een tspurelyechnicaluperiorityver nyother ormof organization.he fully ureaucraticechanismompares ithother rganizationsxactlys doesthemachine ithnon-mechanicalmodes fproduction.We too elect,bstract,nd relate rganizationalharacteristics;utweattendasWeber idonly mplicitlyr ndirectly)oparticipants'motives.orus, he eadingharacteristicsf dministrativetructures,and a principalroblemor heir ffectiveness,s thepotentialon-flict etweenuthoritynd power.Authorityn administrativetruc-turess based n adherenceyparticipantso the xpectationsssoci-atedwith heir ormaloles,hats, n the ssumptionhatncumbents'motivesnd orientationsillbe sufficientlyongruentith heirolesto obtainhebenefitsftheformal ationalityhat uided heestab-lishmentfroles nd their elationships.hen ncumbents'otivesandorientationsrenot ongruentith ormalole xpectationsandthey arelyre),relationshipsrere-castntermsfpower.ndividu-als, solatedroups,ndalliancesmay nddousea varietyf trategies(to be exploredelow)in strugglesorealizevalues,nterests,ndgoals ftheirwnchoosinghat onflictith hose fthe dministra-tive tructure.ower trugglesre general henomenonharacteristicofboth atrimonialndbureaucraticdministration.5eber'sxpecta-tion hat he volutionndtriumphfbureaucracyouldncreasinglylead toobjectification,.e., o ncumbentsecomingheir oles whatWeber eferredo asdehumanization)as ed nsteadoa highlyon-tingentelationship.ureaucraticdministration,ikepatrimonial,asremainedependentor ts ffectivenessnsettingndrealizingoals nthedegree fcongruenceetweenuthorityndpower.Administra-tive tructuresrehuman smuch stheyremechanicalontrivances.Becausehe articipants'erformancesre ffectedy hevariabilitynparticipants'urposes,ill, nd apacities,rganizationalffectivenesss

3Talcott Parsons, ed., Max Weber,The Theory ofSocial and Economic Organization,trans.by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press 194), 337.4 Bureaucracy n H. H. Gerthand C. WrightMills, eds., From Max Weber: Essaysin Sociology (New York: Oxford UniversityPress I946), 2I4.5 Both Eisenstadt and Roth see neopatrimonialfeatures n contemporary tates.Buttheysee themchiefly s features f new nations, features hat constitute esiduesandhangovers and adaptations froma previous patrimonialcondition.Roth goes furtherand focuseson the elementof personal loyalties n modern industrial tates.See Eisen-stadt,and Bendix and Roth (both fn. I).



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WEBER ON BUREAUCRACY 199subject owidevariationsvertime.Formalrationalityand technol-ogy) can contributeoorganizationalfficiency,utcan alsocontributeto organizationalneffectivenessy buildingup thesources f aliena-tion and resistance,nd fueling hestrugglefpower against uthor-ity.The persistencer retentionf patrimoniallementsn bureau-cratic dministrationanmitigatefnot eliminatehestruggle,ustasthepresencefbureaucraticeaturesnpatrimonialdministrationan(and did) enhance ts efficiencynd effectiveness.We have been nfluencedn the constructionf ouranalytic rame-workby the findings nd implicationsf the literaturen formalorganizations,ythe related essons hatthe historicalxperiences fmodern nd modernizingocieties aveprovided,nd byourrecentresearch n formal rganizationsnd on patrimonial dministrationinprincelyndia.6 heyhave ed us to a varietyfunderstandingshatdiffer romWeber's.Bureaucracy as not beenas efficientr as mas-terful s he thought,nd feared,t would be. Nor is bureaucracyodistinctly odern s Weber often rgued t was. Manyfeatures hathe identifieds patrimonial avepersisted nd,undera wide varietyofcircumstances,ontributedo administrativeffectiveness.ureaucra-ciesare most ffective,otas Weberthought, hentheymost loselyapproximatehe ideal-typicalheuristic)features e identified-i.e.,rationalizednd dehumanized o simulate hequalities fa machine;their ffectivenesss enhanced o thedegree hatthepathologies nddysfunctionsenerated yformal ationalitynd impersonalityandwhich re an aspect fthestruggleorpower) canbe channelledndcorrected y neopatrimonialismn the service f commonly eldorganizational oals.7

6See Rudolph nd Rudolph, ducation and Politics in India: Studies in Organiza-tions, Policy, and Society (Cambridge,Mass.: HarvardUniversity ress 972), esp.chap. i; The CoordinationofComplexityn SouthAsia,VII, Appendix of theReportbytheCommissonn theOrganizationf theGovernmentor heConduct fForeignPolicy Murphy ommission) Washington,.C.: Governmentrinting ffice975);and (withMohanSingh), A Bureaucraticineage n Princelyndia:Elite Formationand Conflictn a Patrimonialystem, ournalof Asian Studies,xxxiv (May I975).7 See Anthony berschall,mpirical Social Research in Germany,1848-1914 (TheHague: Mouton965). In a section nWeber, ntitledA Note on theNon-ideal ypeBureaucracy pp. I34-36), Oberschall bserves,It is not generally nownthat nsomeof hisspeeches nd littleknownwritings,Weber himself escribedertain ea-tures f bureaucracy hichwere eithernotmentionedr in contradiction ithhisideal type ormulation. he examples berschall rovidesnclude hecontributionfpatrimonialelationsnd personalismo the administrativeffectivenessnd efficiencyof military ospitalsn WorldWar I. Weber himselferved s a volunteer nd leftan unfinished eport f his experience,vailable n MarianneWeber,Max Weber,Ein Lebensbild (Tiibingen:Mohr 1926), 545-60.



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200 WORLD POLITICSIDEAL TYPES IN THE SERVICE OF CONTINGENT AND DETERMINED HISTORY

Scholars nterestedn theconstructionftheorynd thephilosophyof the social scienceshave given ample attention o ideal types.Wereturn o the subject otbecause t hasbeenneglected,ut becausewewant osuggestome ualificationsnd difficultieshat elate oWeber'swork on administration.Analysis nd explanationn social sciencebased on historicallye-rived deal types s like caricature r stereotypen art and literature:both mphasize yaccentuationeatureshat reconsideredrominentordistinct,nd de-emphasizeor eliminate)bylack of attentionnddetailfeatures hat re considered fminor mportanceo the mageor idea beingconveyed.The line betweendealtypes rmodels n the onehandand carica-tures nd stereotypesn the other s a fineone. It is often ifficultodiscern xceptby inquiringwhetherhecreators a scientist/scholar,an artist r writer,r a layman.The terms aricaturend stereotypeimply bstractionnd itsattendanteificationthe fallacy fmisplacedconcreteness,n A. N. Whitehead's erm)-processes hatmissor mis-representven whileconveyinghe eading,dominant,r energizingprinciples. he morecomplex hereality,hemoreabstractions re-quired, ndthemoredifficultt is tocapture nd convey heprincipalfeatures. nd when thereality eing nterpreteds subject o changeas a result fhuman hoice nd action as human s opposed o physi-cal orbiological eality s), the ikelihood xists hatbothrealityndthe causes nd processes fchange,withall their mbiguities,ronies,and contradictions,ill be lostfromview.Weber's xplicitmethodological ositionwithrespect o ideal typesmost losely pproximateshehistoricallyerivedinductive-deductive-inductive)mode of analysis.Human eventshave relationshipsZu-sammenhainge)nd regularityRegelmiissigkeit),utnot lawfulnessor necessityGesetzlichkeit). n understandingverstehende)nter-pretationfhumanevents eaches orelationshipsndregularitiesutnot to necessity;.e., t is governed y meaning, otby laws. In thiscontext,deal types re imaginative onstructs,ame plansforslicesofrealityhat ell us howtheywouldbe put togetherndwork,howtheywouldbe related nd patterned,fthelogicaland empirical s-sumptionsbouthemnfact xisted.sWeberut t:

For purposesf the causal mputationf empiricalvents, e needtherational,mpirical-technicalnd logical onstructions,hichhelpusto answerhe uestions to what behavioratternrthoughtat-



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WEBER ON BUREAUCRACY 201tern e.g., a philosophical ystem)would be like if it possessed om-pletely ational, mpirical nd logical correctness nd consistency. 8Weber explicitly ejected self-evident actuality,.e., unmediated ob-

servation. One cannot distinguish essential componentsfrom theinfinity of determining factors . . . by the simple 'observation' of thecourse of events n any case, certainlynot if one understandsby thata 'presuppositionless'mental photographof all thephysicaland psychicevents occurringin the space-time region in question-even if suchwere possible. 9A mental photograph n Weber's view does not re-veal a meaningful relationship sinnhafteBezogenheit):An understanding on through nterpretationontainsn thefirstn-stance pecific ualitative vidence fdifferingmounts. hat an inter-pretation ossesses his evidence o an especially ighdegreeproves syetnothing bout its empirical alidity. or behaviorsSichverhalten)similar n their xternal evelopmentnd result an restupon highlydifferentonstellationsfmotives f which themost mmediatelyvi-dent (verstindlich-evidenteste)s not always thatwhich was really twork. 0Elaboratingon the contingentview of reality hat nterpretationn-tails,Weber tirelessly eiteratedhepurelyprovisionalcharacter f dealtypes, heirsubjective dimension,and the limits mposed on thembythe intellectualpurpose to which a scholar addresseshimself.For ex-ample:We must, n otherwords,workout in the courseof thediscussion,sitsmost mportant esult, hebestconceptual ormulationf what wehere understand y the spirit f capitalism,hat s the bestfromthepointofview which nterestss here.This point fview .. is, further,byno meanstheonlypossible ne fromwhichthehistorical henome-nonwe arehere nvestigatinganbeanalyzed.Other tandpoints ould,forthisas forevery therhistorical henomenon, ield othercharac-teristicss theessential nes.1Yet Weber found it hard to preservethe provisionaltone of voice.The more definitiveworldview of his German historicistpaternityspeaks throughhim despitehimself. He pressedfor higher levels ofvalidityand power for his constructs, or more constraint,more law-8 The Meaningof 'EthicalNeutrality'n Sociology nd Economics, n EdwardShilsand HenryA. Finch,trans. nd eds.,Max Weber on the Methodology of theSocial Sciences (Glencoe, ll.: Free Press 949), 42; emphasisn original.9 Critical tudies n theLogic of the Cultural ciences, bid., I7I.10 Obereinige Kategorien er verstehendenoziologie, n Max Weber,Gesam-melteAujfsitzezur WissenschaftslehreTiibingen:Mohr 922), 403; our translation.11Protestant thic (fn. ), 49; emphasis dded.



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202 WORLD POLITICSfulness,more losure,hanhismore autiousmethodological omentsallowed.12 rovisional autionto the contrary ot withstanding,eused thelanguageof functionalelatedness,ystemic holeness,ndlogicalnecessitynwriting bout oncrete istoricalhenomena. hus,the systemogic of capitalism xpels irrational r incompatiblebehavior:

The modernapitalistnterprisean not cceptwhats popularlyalledkadi-justice :djudicationccording o the udge's senseof equityin a given ase raccordingootherrrational eans f aw-finding....The modernnterpriselso findsncompatiblehetheocraticr patri-monial overnmentsfAsia andofourownpast. *13If we takewords eriously,ne of the ostensiblemeanings f idealtype warnsus of a methodological roblem: n ideal type s, to bor-row Clifford eertz's anguage rom nother ontext, oth modelofand a modelfor eality.deal types reconstitutedf pure attributes,orreach heir purest ormwhen they re so constituted.Pure canconvey normatively eutralmeaningpertaining o unmixed tates(e.g., purepoison); but tcan also suggest desirable tate faffairs,

how things ught o be, and implies hat tsopposite,mpure, s un-desirable, ow things ughtnot to be. If Weber nsisted hatmodelsforrealitywere not what he intended, hatno normativeudgmentsweremeantor implied,he often ailedto observehis own caveats. 412 The relationship f Weber's work to thesemethodologicalproblemsvariesgreatly.Between two essays, nd sometimeswithin the boundariesof a single essay, he wouldpresentgeneralizationsat quite different egrees of abstraction.Thus the discussionof bureaucracy n the essayon typesof legitimatedominationis relativelymore sche-

matic, dogmatic,and insensitiveto contrary hemes than the same discussion in theessay on bureaucracy.These differences an in part be attributed o the differingn-tents of the two essays,and to sheer logistical considerations-number of pages. Yetthe shorterversions,which obliged him to condense, are a betterguide to what, ulti-mately, he considered critical. By contrast, the numerous caveats, exceptions, andcontrary endencies which he rehearsed in the essay on bureaucracyofferthe begin-nings of a more complex scheme for handling administration han the patrimonial-bureaucraticdiad. It is difficulto evaluate these divergences. s it to Weber's creditthathe recognized so many exceptions?Or is it rather to be deplored that theydidnot influence his constructsmore?13 GuentherRoth and Claus Wittich,eds., Max Weber. Economy and Society: An

OutlineofInterpretiveociology,3 vols. (New York: BedminsterPress i968), III, I395.14 Weber frequentlycautioned against the propensityto slide from neutral intonormativestances. In his critical review of energetical theories of culture, he de-ploredtheprevailingtendency o convertthepictureof theworld (Weltbild) providedby particular disciplines into a Weltanschauung.See EnergetischeKulturtheorien,in Weber, GesammelteAujfsitze (fn. IO), 377. Yet it is difficulto read the followingpassage (fn. 3, p. 337), without a sense thatmore than a model of reality s meantif not intended:Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of ad-ministrative rganization-that is, the monocraticvarietyof bureaucracy-is, from



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WEBER ON BUREAUCRACY 203Weber's volutionarynderstandingf historicalhange-what Rob-ertNisbet erms metaphor f growth-15coloredis deal-typicalon-structswith a modelsfor hue. His sociology f religion, ike his

sociology f authority, ovesfrompre-moderno modern.Rational-legal authoritynd bureaucracyeplace raditionaluthoritynd patri-monial dministration.he ethical trivingnd discipline equired ya transcendentnd uncontrollable od replace he ritualism nd ma-nipulativexchange equired ygodswhosemagical owers re near ohand.Likethemovementfreligiousdeology, hedrift fformsf ifegenerallys in thedirection f the mpersonal,nreachable nd uncon-trollable.his pessimisticormulationfhistoryedWeber, t someon-tological evel,to despairof modern ocialforms.At an intermedi-ate levelof udgment, owever, etween ltimate alueand concretehistory the level that was Weber's most characteristicntellectualground),he held that heseforms, oth n religion nd in organiza-tional ife,werea triumphverall previous nes.Demystification,a-tionalization,ndimpersonalizationf culture nd socialforms reatlyenhanced he apabilitiesfWestern ivilizationnd marked he ourseofuniversal istory.Weber's volutionaryerspectivelso led him totreat is deal-typi-cal constructswhichhe intended orheuristicurposes) s historicalphenomena apableof extinction nd actualization. harismaticu-thority,obe sure, as noparticular istoricalocation; tappears romtime otime nd is amongtheprincipal easons orhistoricalhange.But traditionalnd rational-legaluthority,he two types hathaveforms f administrationssociatedwiththem,have a clear unilinearrelationship;raditionaluthoritynd patrimonialdministrationresupersedednd over-runy rational-legaluthoritynd bureaucracy.

a purely echnical oint of view, capable of attaining he highest egreeof effi-ciency nd is in this senseformallyhe mostrational nownmeans of carryingout imperativeontrol ver humanbeings. t is superior o any otherform nprecision,n stability,n the stringencyf its discipline,nd its reliability.t thusmakespossible particularlyigh degree f calculabilityf results ortheheadsof the organizationnd for hose cting n relation o it. t is finallyuperior othin intensive fficiencynd in the scope of its own operations,nd is formallycapableof application o all kinds of administrativeasks.As Carl J.Friedrich otes fn. , p. 31), The verywordsvibratewith omething fa Prussian nthusiasmorthemilitaryype f organizationnd the way seemsbarredto anykind ofconsultative,et alonecooperative,attern. hat the atter ind of pat-ternmaybe a higher ype,hat tmay represent 'morefully eveloped' orm fad-ministrativerganization,otonly n terms fhumanitarianalues, utalso in termsof 'results's all but excluded s a possibility.15 Nisbet, ocial Change and History: Aspects of the WesternTheory of Develop-ment New York:Oxford 969).



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204 WORLD POLITICSAs the ogical rincipleshat haracterizeureaucracyecomemoremanifestnd ffectivever ime,s the deal ype ecomes ore pure,as it becomesmore ike tself,t can be expectedo work etter. c--cordingo Weber:When ully eveloped,ureaucracylsostandsn a specificense nderthe principlef sine ira ac studio.Its specific ature,which s wel-comed ycapitalism,evelopshemore erfectlyhemore ureaucracyis dehumanized,hemore ompletelyt succeedsn eliminatingromofficialusinessove,hatred, nd all purely ersonal,rrational,ndemotionallements hich scape alculation.his s the pecificatureof bureaucracynd its specificirtue.16

Theempiricalifficultieshat onsistencynd purity aise an beillustratedyWeber's reatmentfpersonaluthoritya formfper-sonalismrparticularism)nd the uthorityfofficea form f m-personalityruniversalism).or Weber, ersonaluthoritytandsntheway fformalationality,hemachine-likefficiencyfbureaucracy,while he uthorityfoffices a necessaryonditionortsrealization.Moregenerally,heauthorityf officegoeswith ational-legalu-thority.ut nwhat ense re hese ropositionsalid? ersonaluthor-itymayhave, o a certain egreen some ontexts,inderedhehis-torical ormationf themoderntate nd ndustrialapitalismn theperiodwhen dministrationnd production as shiftingrom omeandfamilyo bureau ndfactoryndwhen heworkerwas beingseparated . . from he materialmeans fproduction,estruction,administration,cademic esearch,ndfinance... 17 Butpersonalauthoritysnotnecessarilynimicaloorganizationalffectiveness,othe ettingnd realizationforganizationaloals.18mpersonalityashigh osts,19swell sbenefits,nd o doespersonalism.heperceived

16 Bureaucracy,n Gerth nd Mills (fn.4), 2I5.17 Roth and Wittich fn. 3), III, I394.18 Thus Tout, referringo 14th-centuryritishdministration,s sure that evelsofperformancend effectivenesserehigh.For example, ecord eeping eaves nothingto be desired n, ompletenessnd precision. ur examination,otyet complete, ftheaccount ooksofBedlathikana estate) n Udaipur, former rincely tate, ro-duces a similar mpression.ee T. F. Tout, The Emergence f Bureaucracy, nMerton fn. ), 79.19Weber n his informal, onsystematicriting ecognized hecostsof imperson-ality.According oOberschall's iscussion f Weber'sunfinishedeport n his experi-ences s a volunteernmilitary ospitals uring hefirst ear fWorldWar1,Weberattributedhe evel ofconvalescingoldiers utunder rresto the ackofa volunteerorganizationhatcatered o recreationalnd non-medical eeds not attended o bytheprofessionaltaff; e found hatwell-educatedolunteer urses romgood socialbackgrounds ere moreeffectiven handling atients han the averageprofessionalnurse because f a variedand individual pproach that ttended o] theirhumanand intellectualeeds. Oberschallfn. 7), I36.



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WEBER ON BUREAUCRACY 205qualityf the rade-offsnvolvedan varywithhistoricalnd organi-zationalontexts. conceptualtrategyhat akes hese onsiderationsinto ccountypositingpersonalism-impersonalityontinuumrmixratherhan n evolutionaryichotomy ay eveal hat ersonalism-ratherhan ppearing,tbest,s a survivalnd nany aseas an ob-stacle othe ealizationfformalationality-contributeso as well simpairs) rganizationalffectiveness.Weber ecognizedtthe mpiricalutnot ttheheuristicndex-planatoryevelhowpsychicompensationshat rise rom eopatri-monialmotivesndrelationshipsontributeo thedisciplineequiredfor strict echanization.hesubordinationf thewilland the elftoformal ationalityndbureaucraticuthorityre possible otbe-cause articipantsavebecome heir olesobjectified,ehumanized),butbecause fficialsre accordedhehonor ndprestigefa statusgroup.

Strict isciplinendcontrol,hich t the ame imehas considerationfor heofficial'sense fhonor,ndthedevelopmentfprestigeenti-ments f thestatus roup . . work n the directionfstrictmechaniza-tion. A strongtatus entimentmong fficialsot nly greeswiththeofficial'seadinesso subordinateimselfothechiefwithoutnywill of his own but [also] . . . status entimentsre the consequenceof such ubordination,ornternallyhey alance heofficial'self-feel-ing.20Presumablyuch n explanation akesmore ense orBritish,German, rench,nd Indianofficials,or xample,hanforAmericanones.]ButWeber's euristic,deal-typicalelf idnot lwaysisteno,oratleastdidnotregister,eber'smpiricalelf.What s thetheoreticalstandingf hese itallymportantatrimonialotivesf tatus,onor,andprestigendthe ehaviorhey roduce,ccordingoWeber? heattractionsfconsistencynd ogical leganceed toevolutionaryndessentialistanguagend modes fexplanationhosemplicationsthat raditionaluthorityndpatrimonialotivespersonalism)resurvivalshatwillwitherwayas bureaucracyecomes fully e-veloped y realizingts specificature ndits specificirtue.

AUTHORITY AND POWER IN CONFLICT AND CONGRUENCEWe now urn oa considerationfhowWeber'snalysisfbureau-cracyanberevisedn the ightf conceptualtrategyhat ighlightssimilaritiesatherhan ontrastsetweenureaucracyndpatrimonialadministration.n particular,e examineheexistencendpotential20 Bureaucracy,n Gerth nd Mills (fn. 4), 208.



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206 WORLD POLITICSincongruenceetweenuthorityndpowernall administrativetruc-tures.t was Weber's ailure otake ccount f thepotentialor on-flict etweenuthorityndpowerhatedhim ooverestimateeriouslythetechnicaluperiorityfbureaucraticdministration.t also con-tributedohisneglectfpatrimonialeaturesnd motivesnbureau-craciesndtohisfailureorecognizeowthey-by elpingoresolveconflictsetweenuthorityndpower-can ontributeo administra-tive ffectivenessnboth ureaucraticnd patrimonialdministration.Theplayofcontradictoryendencies,hichWeber's volutionaryx-planationuggests illberesolved,nfact ersists.nstead,ontradic-toryendenciesfor xample, ersonaluthorityndthe uthorityfoffice) elp o explain ow dministrativetructuresorkn a varietyofhistoricalontexts.Weber onceptualizedureaucracynterms f uthorityatherhanpower. uthoritynorganizationsxists hen articipantso what srequiredf them y virtue ftheirrganizationaloles. or nstance,incumbent'srole uthorizesim oaskof ncumbentthat e dosomething,nd ncumbent,recognizinghe equirementsfhisfor-mally ssigned ole, omplies. oregenerally,uthorityn organiza-tionsxists hen he ncumbents'otivationalrientationndbehavioris congruentith herequirementsftheir ormal oles.Unlike u-thority,hose mounts constantnd allocatedccordingocalcula-tions asedonformalationality,owern organizationss variableand mercurial.ts amountnd distributionary ver imewith hepurposesnd nterestsfparticipants;ith hedistributionfpower-relevantesourcese.g.,material,ymbolic,ndcoercive); ithhe ar-ticipants'ontrolfuncertaintynddiscretion;nd with hepartici-pants'willingnessoapply rtowithdrawfficiencyndaffect.nlikeauthorityelationships,ower elationshipsreoftennstablendcon-flictual. getsB to dowhathewants im o doby mobilizing inthe ervicef haredalues,nterests,ndgoals; hroughheuseof hepower fpersonalityndthe xercisef eadership;ndbythema-nipulationf ncentivesndsanctionsincludingocial, sychological,andphysicaloercion). haspowerver when doeswhatAwantshim odo and whatB wouldnototherwiseo. (A andB should etakenhere s collective s well as individual ctors.)21

21 Alvin W. Gouldner and Michel Crozier in particularhave recognized the prob-lematic natureof power in organizations.See Gouldner,Patternsof Industrial Bureau-cracy (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press I954). Crozier's formulation f power is cast in termsof how organizationalactorsattemptto controland manipulate uncertaintynd rules.Our formulation focuses on the participants'use of power (a multidimensionalre-source differentiallynd circumstantially vailable to organizationl actors) in the



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WEBER ON BUREAUCRACY 207For Weber, uthorityashierarchicallyistributednd flowed own-wardfrom hetopof theorganizationaltructure.e assumedthatincumbents ould nternalizeheir ormal olerequirementsnd bear

a compliant, onsensual,nd nonconflictualelation o organizationalgoals:The individualureaucratannotquirmutofthe pparatusnwhichhe s harnessed.n contrastothehonorificravocationalnotable, heprofessionalureaucrats chained ohisactivityyhis entirematerialand deal xistence.nthegreatmajorityfcases, e sonly single ogin an ever-movingechanism hich rescribeso him an essentiallyfixed outefmarch.he officials entrustedith pecializedasks ndnormallyhemechanismannot eput ntomotionrarrestedyhim,butonly romhevery op.The individual ureaucrats thus orgedtothe ommunityf llfunctionariesho re ntegratednto hemech-anism.Theyhavea common nterestn seeing hat hemechanismcontinuestsfunctionsnd that he ocietallyxerciseduthorityarrieson. . . The disciplinef officialdomeferso theattitude-setf theofficialor recisebedience ithinishabitualctivity,npublic swellas private rganizations.hisdisciplinencreasinglyecomes hebasisof all order....22One wonderswhether venthe Prussian ureaucrats ho werethesource fthis aricaturechieved uchqualities.Weber's ontemptorthem uggestshat omemayhave. n fact, ower n organizationssmoreoften hannot distributednverselyoauthority,ndflows romthebottom p.As Crozier ees t,those tthetophave a greatdeal ofauthority,utvery ittle ower.Webererroneouslyssumedfrequentand easyrole dentification;ewas wrong o believe hatprecise be-

dience wouldbecome habitual nd thebasisof all order.Men maycontext f their imited nd fluctuatingommitmentso organizationaluthority.eeCrozier, he BureaucraticPhenomenon (Chicago: Universityf ChicagoPress 964),esp.p. I58. Althoughwe havebenefited romDahrendorf'sevitalizationf conflicttheory, e cannot greethatparticipantsan be understood xclusivelyn terms ftheir rganizationalolesor that onflictan be understoodn terms f the zero-sumdistributionf authoritycross roles.RalfDahrendorf, lass and Class Conflict inIndustrial Society (Stanford: tanford niversityress 958).22 Bureaucracy,n Gerth ndMills fn. 4), 228-29; emphasisn original.Althoughthere re strong onsensualmplicationsn Weber'sbureaucraticheory,n light ofmuchof his otherworkhe moreproperlyelongswith conflictheory. is soci-ologyof religion, orexample, rounds deology n the worldview of competingstatus rders.Bertolt recht reated scene n The Caucasian Chalk Circle which llustrateshehighest opesforbureaucraticole nternalization. corporal ttemptingo recapturethewithdrawnffectf an unmilitary-lookingootsoldiereluctantlyommittedowar-likebehavior,xhorts im to exhibit rganizationaleal: Whenyouhear command,you shouldgeta hard-on;whenyouthrust our word,youshouldcome. RevisedEnglish ersionyEricBentley.)



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208 WORLD POLITICSdon their rganizationalasks utthey o noteasily rfrequentlybecome hem.Weberwouldhavebeen ess mpressed ithformalrationalitynd more ptimisticbout he human ondition ad herecognizedhis act. e feared nd rebelledgainstmakingmen ntomachines-i.e.,ubsuminghem o theirolesn formalrganizations-not becausehe thoughtoing o was inefficient,utbecausehethoughttwas nhuman:Forthe ast tage fthis ulturalevelop-ment,tmight ellbetrulyaid: Specialistsithoutpirit;ensualistswithouteart;his ullitymagineshat t hasattained level fcivi-lization neverbeforeachieved. 23Weber'sragicense f hemodern asbased nthe ssumptionhatthosenvolved ouldnotfear, esist,revadebureaucraticuthority,but hat heywouldwillinglyccepthe asks,ules,ndcommandstheiroles equiredfthem. e didnot nvisonhat heywould indandusepowergainstuthority.or didheanticipatehat heuse ofpower y lower articipantsnorganizationsouldrequire igherparticipantsofind nd usepower s wellas authorityor rganiza-tional ffectivenessndsurvival.is conceptualizationf bureaucracyfailed o take ccount fthe truggleor ower hat s endemicn ad-ministrativeelationships.Weber id, f ourse,ecognizehat ureaucracyadpower, utnotinwayswe meanhere.n hisview, thepower ositionfa fully e-velopedureaucracysalways vertowering.he political aster'indshimselfn thepositionf thedilettante'hostandsppositehe ex-pert. ' t doesnotmatterhetherhepolitical asters a people ra parliament,collegiate ody, popularlylected resident,r anabsoluterconstitutionalonarch.24utbureaucracy'sower s in-strumentalnd societal, 25ot artisanndpolitical,nd tis directedto the utside.ureaucratsrepowerfulecause ftheirxpertisendspecial nowledgend becauseheyontrolndmanipulatenforma-tion, articularlyymeans fthe officialecret - thepecificnven-tion fbureaucracy.ButWeber idnotcount ureaucraciesmong he ctors ngagedinthe truggleor ower. e did notperceivehem s pursuingheirinterestsnd valuesn alliance rconflict ith ther olitical ctors.When hey ct, hey o sobyvirtue fexpertise,ot nterest.ordid

23Protestantthic (fn. 2), I82.24 Bureaucracy, n Gerthand Mills (fn. 4), 232-33.25 According to Weber, bureaucracybecomes an instrument or societalizing'rela-tions of power when it becomes the means of carrying communityaction' overinto rationally rdered societal action.' Ibid., 228.



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WEBER ON BUREAUCRACY 209he take ccount,n his ystematicriting,f he eciprocalelationshipbetweennvironmentalorcesndactors n the nehand ndbureau-craciesntheother,ndthe mpact f this elationshipnorganiza-tional oals, esources,nd nternalower elationships.inally,s wehave lreadyndicated, eber gnoredhe ole fpower nside ormalorganizationsven hought s a necessaryonditionor ureaucraticeffectiveness.hesemisperceptionsreof a piece: fthedrive or or-mal rationalitynd instrumentalfficiencyndtherequirementsfexpert nd special nowledgere consideredheguidingmotivesfofficials,heywill notbe perceiveds engagingn thestruggleorpowerwithoutr within.Contraryo Weber's iew, ureaucratso engagen strugglesorpowerwithin rganizationsnd n thepoliticalrena. xpertises nottheir nlymotive.Men in organizationsesist,nd sometimesebelagainst,he machine-likexpectationsf formal ationalitynd thedifferentialistributionsfbenefitsnd authority.n resisting,heypursue trategiesndengagenbehaviorhats,from heperspectiveoforganizationaloals nd procedures,rrationalnd dysfunctional,but rom heir oint fview uite he everse.he results a paradox:therationalityf rrationalitynd thefunctionfdysfunction.Power trugglesrisewithin rganizationsvernterestse.g.,pay,conditionsfwork, argainingights); ver aluese.g., he nfluenceof ideology,ounter-culture,wrong ocialization,ssociationalrcommunityembership);ndfrom esistanceoappropriationf elf(alienation) nd thediminutionf autonomyhat ecognitionf bu-reaucraticuthorityntails.26ower strugglesn organizationsrecon-tinuous.hey reexpressednconflictsver eadership,oals, olicies,rules, rocedures,asks, nd so forth;27they ccurfrom he topto thebottom forganizations;nd they ftennvolve utsideorcesandactors. ower trugglesre sufficientlyommon nd sufficientlyimportantn the ife nd work f organizationshat hey annot eignored r left t theperiphery,r relegatedo a residualategory.Theymust tand t the enter fany heoryforganization.

We considerhe mportancefthe truggleor ower more un-damentalodiciloWeber's xiom fbureaucraticfficiencyhan therqualifyingtatementsbout he imits f formal ationality,uch s26 Robert Blauner's dimensions of alienationsupply another account of these areas ofconflict; ee Blauner, Alienation and Freedom (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Pressi964) .27 We do not mean to suggest that the issues beneath such conflicts re lacking inindependent validity.



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210 WORLD POLITICSMarch ndSimon's erm satisfycing,rWarren lchman's venmorequalifyingall to relyon optimal gnorance. 28hese terms nvokethemuch moremodest laims thatscholars f formal rganizationsmakewhenthey ecognize he mperfect,imited,ndhigh-costatureof information; he variability nd uncertaintyf commitmentsostrict bedience nd organizationaloals; the mpactof conflictinginterestsnd values withinorganizationsnd in their nvironmentson organizational erformancend goals; and theeffectfunknownand unintended onsequences.The moremodest iewofformal ationalitynd organizationalffi-ciency hatmuchof the recentiteraturen formal rganizationsug-gests rises o a considerablextent rom methodologicaltrategyhatsimulateshe ogicaloperationsfeconomics,mposing eality-approxi-matingmodificationsn rational-actor odels.Assumptionsoncern-ing perfectationalitynd informationre constrainedo bring hemin line withknown imitationsf realactors.A focus n power trug-gles,bycontrast,epresents morefundamentalmodificationecauseitstarts ith political ather han n economicmodel. t takespowerrather han formal ationalitynd economizing ehavior s its pointofdeparturend presses ubstantiveather han nstrumentaloalstotheforeground.ahrendorfbecausehe emphasizes onflict,ot be-cause he features uthoritynd formal oles), Etzioni,Allison, nd,notably, rozier eadus closer omodelsofformal rganizationandsociety) hat eature ower ndthe truggleorpower. n conceptuali-zations forganizationshatfeature ower, uthoritiesan pursue r-ganizational oalsandgain compliancewiththerequirementsffor-malrolesonly fthevalues, nterests,nd purposes f theparticipantsapproximatehoseof theorganization a conditionhatWebertookforgranted utwhichwe find nlikely ndinfrequent),r fthey anmarry rganizationaluthority ith ufficientower o insure fficientcompliance yparticipants.29ecausethe atter ondition s extraordi-narily ifficulto realize thigh evels rfor ery ong,we findWeber'sclaimsfor he technicaluperiorityfbureaucracy nconvincing. d-ministrativeffectivenessn patrimonialnd bureaucraticdministra-

28 James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: Wiley I958);Warren Ilchman and Trilok Dhar, Optimal Ignorance and Excessive Education: Edu-cational Inflation n India, Asian Survey,xi (January 971), 523-43.29 Graham T. Allison,Essence of Decision (Boston: Little, Brown I970I); Ralf Dahr-endorf (fn. 2I); Amitai Etzioni, A ComparativeAnalysis of Complex Organizations(New York: Free Press I975); Crozier (fn. 2I).



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WEBER ON BUREAUCRACY 211tion holding echnologyonstant) epends,ather,n thedegree owhichuthorityndpower re n conflictrcongruence.30BUREAUCRACY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER: THE ENVIRONMENTWeber ailed oappreciatehedegree o which ureaucraciesndtheir articipantsngagenstruggleor ower, otonly-as we havealreadyndicated-withinrganizations,ut lso as actorsn politicalarenas utside. s he saw t,bureaucraciesidnotpursueheirwnsubstantiveurposesnthe truggleor ower. simpersonalnddis-embodied ehicles f societal ower, heirwill and actions ere ri-

ented o motivesfefficiencynddominationn the ervice f otheractors' aluesnd nterests.heir oals ame romutsiden the ormof aws ndpoliciesobe mplemented,rproductsndservicesobesupplied:bureaucracys suchs a precisionnstrumenthich anputitselft thedisposalfquite aried-purelyoliticals well s purelyeconomic,rany therort-of nterestsn domination. 3'Addingnenvironmentalimensiono the tudyfformalrgani-zationsreateswhollyifferentnderstanding.ormal rganizationsareprofoundlyffectedyenvironmentalorces hat ry o nfluenceorcontrolheir oals, olicies,ndresourcellocations,ndbypartici-pants' ffortsouse environmentalorces obenefitheorganizationor their wnpositionsithint. Environmentsrenot, fcourse,o-mogeneousrmonolithic.hey recomposedf a varietyfactors:friendlyndunfriendlyublics; eferenceroupsfdifferingeightandsignificance;lientsndcustomers;ublic uthoritiesndprivateinterests.ogether,heyonstituteconstellationfdistantnd mme-diate ctorswhose ower ndstrategiesarywith ime ndcircum-stance.Formalrganizationsarynthe egreeowhichheyre ongruentorincongruentith nvironmentalorces.he more ongruenthepurposesforganizationsnd theirnvironmentsre, he ess ikelyis conflictetweenhem.At thesametime, ongruenceowers hechances ororganizationalutonomy. onversely,ncongruencee-tween rganizationalnd environmentaloals,values,nd interestsraises he ikelihoodoth forganizationalndependencendconflictwith nvironmentalorces.ince rganizationalelf-sufficiencys rare

30 Because conflict ftenarises out of struggles gainst alienationor exploitation ndforautonomyor equity,conflictmay be judged as desirable when weighed against thebenefits f efficiencynd social order that congruencemakes possible.31 Bureaucracy, n Gerthand Mills (fn. 4), 23I.



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212 WORLD POLITICSand somemeasuref dependencendmutualnfluenceetweenr-ganizationsndtheir nvironmentss common, eregardtas a seri-ous lacuna n Weber's nalysisf bureaucracyhatheneglectedheenvironmentalimension.32It s notonly hewisdom f hindsightased nknowledgereatedby cholarsf nterestroups,he egislativend administrativeroc-ess, ublic olicy,conomicnstitutionsndfirms,nd ndustrialoci-ology hat ighlightseber's eglectf he nvironmentalimension.EvenbeforeWorldWar ,onedidnothave oagreewith heMarxistview hat he tatemighte an executiveommitteefthe ulinglasstorecognizehat ublic uthoritiesad more han legal elation-ship o their nvironments,r firmsmore han market elationshiptotheirs.33ndeed,Weber idrecognizehe nfluencef nvironmentalforcesn bureaucraticotivesnd behavior henhe turned romheuristico empiricalnalysis.f, tthemacrosocialevel, hemotivesofbureaucracyreuniversalndahistorical;f,that s, bureaucracydisplays horrorfprivilege,' principledejectionfdoing usi-ness from asetocase,' andgenerally ursuesevelling nd equaliz-ingobjectivesthus arallelingndreinforcinghemotivesndeffectsofdemocracy),34hen,t theempiricalevel, nvironmentalircum-stancesndnot hese niversalendenciesecomeecisive.ureaucracydoesnot,tseems,evel verything-onlyhatwhich heneeds fthemomentequire. ccordingoWeber,tstrivesmerelyo evel hosepowers hat tandn tsway nd n those reas hat,n the ndividualcase, t seeks ooccupy. nd under bsolutisttate tructures,ni-versalmotivesremodifiedy nvironmentalnes: Bureaucratizationof administrations deliberatelyonnected ith theformationfestatesinthe ense fStand, r statusrder], r is entangled iththembyforce fexisting roupingsf socialpower. Moreover,theexpress eservationfofficesorcertaintatus roups s very requent,and actual eservationsvenmore requent. 35heseobservationsring

32 Carl J.Friedrichdevelops at some lengththepropositionthatadministrative taffscannot be understood apart from the environments to which they are responsible( responsible bureaucracy ); see ConstitutionalGovernment nd Democracy (Boston:Little, Brown; various editions), chap. xix. For a graphic account of relations betweena bureaucratic agency and its clienteleand other environments,ee Arthur A. Maass,Muddy Waters: The Army Engineers and the Nation's Rivers (Cambridge: HarvardUniversityress 951).33JohnKenneth Galbraith has done much to restoresome balance in the under-standingof economicbehaviorby suggestinghow much of it relies on political ratherthan economic motivation;see Economics and the Public Purpose (Boston: Hough-tonMifflin973).34 Bureaucracy, n Gerth and Mills (fn. 4), 224.35 bid., 23I.



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WEBER ON BUREAUCRACY 213himvery lose oa Marxian iewofthe tate s the xecutiveommitteeoftheruling lass-to recognizing,hats,theextento which nviron-mental orces an co-opt r appropriateureaucraticrganizations.

Weber lso recognizedhe xistencef advisoryodies electedromamongprivatend nterestedircles, hich refrequentlyoundn themodern tate nd whosenucleus s notformed fofficialsrof formerofficials. 36The thoroughlyationalizedystemfdepartmental in-isters nd prefects,s in France, s supplemented y thecalling nof interest roups s advisory odies recruited rom mongthe eco-nomicallynd sociallymost nfluentialtrata. 37avingcome thisfarin recognizing ow environmentalorces resumablyngage n strug-glesforpower oinfluenceureaucracies, ebertook t all back. Thecalling n of interest roups,he found, s increasinglyrequentbut it furtherncreaseshepowerofbureaucracy s the relationshipis ordered o put the concrete xperiencef interestroups nto theservice fa rational dministrationfexpertlyrained fficials. 38heremark uggestshat, s is appropriateo his German ontext,Weberinterpretednterest roupsmore n theframeworkf statecorpora-tism hanof iberal or societal) orporatism,nterest-groupluralism,or class conflict.39Economic orporations,

. . . thebureaucratictructuresfthemodern rivateconomy,completehemselvesy drawingn notableson boards f control]frommong isinterestedirclesor he akeoftheirxpertnowledgeor in order o exploit hem orrepresentationnd advertising.or-mally,uch odies o notunite oldersfspecial xpertnowledgeutrather he decisive epresentativesf paramountconomic nterestgroups, speciallyhebankcreditorsftheenterprise-anduchmenbynomeans oldmerelydvisoryositions.heyhave t least con-trolling oice, ndvery ften ccupyn actually ominantosition.36 Ibid., 37. 37Ibid.,238-39- 38 Ibid., 39.39Ibid.,237-38. Here and elsewhere,Weber anticipatedrecent work on state cor-poratism.For an interpretationf interestgroups in the contextof state and liberal(or societal) corporatism, ee threearticles n Comparative Political Studies, x (April

I977): Philippe Schmitter, Modes of Interest ntermediationand Models of SocietalChange in Western Europe, pp. 7-37; Leo Panitch, The Development of Corpora-tism in Liberal Democracies, pp. 6i-90; and Gerhard Lehmbruch, Liberal Cor-poratism and Party Government, pp. 9I-I22; also see Schmitter'searlier Still theCenturyof Corporatism, ReviewofPolitics, xxvi (January 974), 85-I3I.The literature n interest-group luralismis critically valuated in J. David Green-stone, Group Theories, in Fred Greensteinand Nelson Polsby, eds., The HandbookofPolitical cience,I (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley 975), 243-3I8.40 Bureaucracy, n Gerth and Mills (fn. 4), 237-38. German banks and bankerscontinue to play a critical role in investmentdecisions of firms and industries asmembersof boards of directors nd apex bodies' governingcommittees.See Andrew



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214 WORLD POLITICSAgain, having come this far,he did not-as did ThorsteinVeblen,for example-recognizethat such arrangementsreatedarenas forstruggles etween hose nterestedn speculative rofitnd those nter-ested n formallyational roduction.We are left, hen,withdeductions nd inferences romWeber'sheuristic efinitionf bureaucracyhatdo notrecognize ow strugglesforpowergenerated y environmentalorces nfluence rganizationalmotives nd actions, nd with ntimationst the empirical evel thatenvironmentalorcesmayact contraryo formal ationalitynd thesettingforganizational oals by political nd economicmasters. tthisuncture,Weber eft he ubject p in the irwith heremark hatdiscussionftheposition forganizednterestroupswithin he ad-ministration,hichmaybe in theoffing,oes not belong n this on-text. 4

BUREAUCRACY AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER: APPROPRIATIONCentral oWeber's nalysis fbureaucracys theall-importantco-nomicfact f the separation'ftheworker rom hematerialmeans

ofproduction, estruction,dministration,cademicresearch, nd fi-nance... . Suchseparationis thecommonbasisof themodern tate. .. andoftheprivate apitalist conomy.n bothcasesthedispositionover hosemeans s in thehandsofthatpowerwhom thebureaucraticapparatus. . directlybeys rtowhom t s available n case ofneed. 42The difficultyiththisviewis that t is onlyhalf of the truth. heotherhalf ieswiththecontinuoustruggleore-appropriateoththematerialmeans nd thepowerofthebureaucraticpparatus.Appropriationf the resourcesnd authorityfbureaucraciesas amanifestnda latent imension. he manifestimensionncompassestheappropriationfpublicauthorityy bureaucracies-i.e., henbu-reaucracieshemselvesecomepoliticalmasters y seizing powerorexercisingt in their wn interest.atentappropriationncompassesthosemanifoldtrategiesfresistanceoorganizationaluthorityhatresult n theparticipants'singortaking ontrol forganizationale-sources, ules, r goalsfortheir wn substantiveurposes.Manifestppropriationan occurunderconditions fbothmodernand traditionaluthority;t is not an exclusive haracteristicfpatri-monial dministration,nwhichWeber dentifiedppropriationnon-Shonfield, odern Capitalism: he ChangingBalanceof Public and PrivatePower(New York: OxfordUniversityress 969), chap.XI, 239-64.41 Bureaucracy,n Gerth nd Mills fn.4), 239.42 Rothand Wittichfn. 3), III, I394; emphasisn original.



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WEBER ON BUREAUCRACY 215separation)s a distinguishingeaturefvariouseudalndprebendalforms. arx, n The EighteenthrumairefLouisNapoleon, ormu-lated he ssue fmanifestppropriationnthemoderntatewhenheobservedhat, or time t least, the xecutiveower ubordinatedsocietyo tself. heclass truggleadproduced stalemate,nequi-libriumf orts hateft oclass ominant,hichnabledhebureau-cratic tate nder he eadershipfNapoleon I to rule n its owninterest;t wasneithern instrumentfa ruling lass the otherMarx),nor theneutralnstrumentf the RechtsstaatWeber), heabstractearer f sovereignrerogativesnd the creatorf legalnorms.'43 Other xamplesf manifestppropriationn which hefunctionalnd egaldifferentiationf thepoliticalnd administrativerealmss obscuredan befoundncoups y militarynd/or ureau-cratic tructuresnd nterests,uch s thosen 1952 inEgypt,n 1958inPakistan,r n therecord fHimmler'sS in theThirdReich sitexpandedts cope romnternalecurityomilitary,dministrative,andpolitical unctions.he inabilityf Presidentsruman, isen-hower, ennedy, ohnson,ndNixon o replace .EdgarHoover sDirectorf he ederal ureau f nvestigationespitedministrativeregulationsnd statuteshat,nter lia, required isretirement,nddespite ompellingoliticalndpersonaleasons ordoing o-pro-vides dramaticnstancef how n individual'soliticalnd bureau-cratic ower an result n thepersonal ppropriationfpublic u-thority.Examplesfmanifestppropriationnder atrimonialdministra-tions ome asily o hand:the hogunf theEmperornJapan; heRanas f heKing nNepal;theNizam nHyderabad,ndmanyikehim, nder heMughal mperorsn India.As theMughal nstancessuggest, anifestppropriationnder atrimonialuleoccursmorecommonlyt theperiphery-aesultelatedo extantechnology.utfeudal atrimonialism,swell s other ormsfprebendaldministra-tion,whereuthorityndresources-particularlyhe ontrolfphysi-calforce-are ighly ecentralized,nd oyaltyndobediencerebasedona formallyoluntaryontractualism,ay roduceeizuresfpublicauthoritytthe enterswell;the eignsf heDukesofBurgundynFrance ndHenry udor n 15th-centuryngland re exampleshatcome omind.Theextentowhichatentppropriationnvolvestrugglesor oweris ess pparentecauset s not xplicitlyolitical. evertheless,trug-

43 Bureaucracy, in Gerth nd Mills (fn. 4), 239.



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216 WORLD POLITICSgles o nsureob security,etirementndwelfarechemes,romotionby eniority,hemanipulationfaffectndefficiencyndotherormsof retreatism,ork-to-rulend other orms f ritualism,ndtheselectiveathering,uppression,nd release f nformationiasecrecyand leaks, onstitutearious orms fstruggle ithin rganizationswhich re designed o appropriaterganizationaluthorityndre-sources.44ecurityf tenurend promotiony seniorityreregardedasnecessaryf careerervicesreto performndependentlynd to at-tractalent. oth reusually onceptualizeds an aspect fprofession-alism.At the ame ime, hey rethemoderndministration'squiva-lent fhereditaryfficend arryhe amemplicationf ppropriationthat ereditaryfficeoes.Our researchnprincelytatedministra-tion n India ndicateshathereditarylaims o officerovidedesssecurityn thefaceof thecontradictoryorm f service t the ma-haraja's leasure hando the tatutoryrovisionsnd the upportingpoliticalower fcareer-servicenterestsnder onditionsfrational-legal uthorityndbureaucraticdministration.45Operationaloutinesrovideertileroundor articipants,articu-larly hose tthemiddlend ower evels,oappropriaterganizationalgoals, uthority,nd resources.asterynd applicationf operationalroutinesot nly ontradictrationalctor ssumptionsbout rgani-zational erformance,ut lso putpower n thehands f thosewithlittle r noauthority.perationaloutinesonstitutesignificantar-rier otheformulationr mplementationf newgoalsorpolicies rtechniques.ikethe puriousompliancenvolvednworkingorule;selecting,ithholding,ndreleasingnformation;ndusing discre-tion nsituationsfuncertainty,he pplicationfroutinesonstitutesa realm fpowerhat nables unctionariesndsometimesigher-upsto ppropriaterganizationalurposesndmeansatentlyy xercisingpowergainsthosenauthority.John hrlichman'sccusationomestomind hat .B.I. Director . EdgarHoover paperedhefile ncomplyingithWhiteHouserequestso nvestigateheEllsbergasebecauseheDirector as an oldfriendfEllsberg'sather-in-law.)

44Aspects of thesephenomena re dealtwith, nter lia, in MortonH. Halperin,Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institutioni974); David Wise, The Politicsof Lying: GovernmentDeception, Secrecy, nd Power(New York: Random House I973); Harold Seidman, Politics, Position, and Power:The Dynamics of Federal Organization (2d ed., New York: Oxford UniversityPressI976); and Hugh Heclo, A Government f Strangers: Executive Politics n Washington(Washington,D.C.: BrookingsInstitution 977).45See Rudolph nd Rudolph, A Bureaucraticineage n Princelyndia (fn. 6).



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WEBERON BUREAUCRACY 217PATRIMONIALISMN BUREAUCRATICDMINISTRATION: DIFFERENTIATEDVIEW OFNATIONAL ISTORIES

We have uggestedhatn allocatingttributesopatrimoniald-ministrationndbureaucracy,eber enerallyssignedliving, hu-man motivesopatrimonialism,ndmachine-likenes such spre-cise, abitual bedience) o bureaucracy.e have lso suggestedhatit is the resistancef organizationalarticipants-theirssertionfvalues nd nterests;heir ffortsot obe subsumedyorganizationalroles; heir trugglesor utonomy-thatreates power-authorityn-congruencendgeneratesonflict. e nowwant o suggesthat atri-monial eaturesre ommonotraditionalndmoderndministration,and that hey an resolveas well as exacerbate)onflictshat risefrom he ncongruenceetween owerndauthority.If administrativenstitutionsnder onditionsftraditionalrra-tional-legaluthorityreconceptualizeds a dual systemf authorityandpower elationships,ffectivenessecomesess matterfformalor nstrumentalationalityholdingechnologyonstant)han fthedegree fcongruenceetweenuthorityndpower elationships.nother ords,dministrativeffectivenessn the ettingndaccomplish-ment fgoalss moreikelyobe optimal hen he aluesnd nterestsoffunctionariesnd authoritiesrecongruent.hisfindingsas truefor he servants fdynastic,bsolute,r constitutionalonarchssit sfor orporatexecutivesn ndustrialconomiesnd civil ervantsin modern tates. atrimonialismxpressedn thepersonaluthorityof eadership,he harismafoffice,47nd n the ppropriationf par-ticipantnfluencever rcontrolf) organizationalules, oals, ndresourcesan 'save omethingfformal ationalityy ounteringhesense f alienationnd/or xploitationhat reeds esistanceo tsre-quirements.t is in this ense hat atrimonialisman correct he

46 We are temptedto use theword neopatrimonialismwhen examininghow personalauthority,personalism,particularism, nd appropriationcan close the gap betweenpower and authorityn modern bureaucraticcontexts, nd we shall occasionallydo so.Such usage raises theoretical difficultiesecause it bears the imprint of the very di-chotomywe are attempting o revise. Daniel Edwards suggeststhat theremay be prob-lems to employingthe word patrimonialism n modern contexts because of the intel-lectualbaggage it carries. Our decision to use it is based on the beliefthat a rhetoricaldevice of this kind will break throughthe persistent elief that patrimonial featureshave a traditional ocation only. See Edwards's Bureaucracy n Nepal: Developmentsin Administration rom the Rana Years to Present, Ph.D. diss. (Department of Po-litical Science, Universityof Chicago I977).47For this concept and its application,see Etzioni (fn. 29), chaps. xii and xiii.



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218 WORLD POLITICSdysfunctionsndpathologieshat regeneratedyresistanceo au-thorityndpowertrugglesver tsuse.A re-examinationfthe eading ases hat iguren thehistoryfmodernization,ombined ith ttentiono ome ecentoncernsf heliteraturen organizations,uggestshat raditionalndpatrimonialfeaturesreboth videntn and mportantor ffectivedministration.Weber'snalysisfbureaucracyand politics)s most ompellingnthe ontextf continentali.e.,FrenchndparticularlyrussianndGerman)historicalxperience.t is less o in thecontextfEnglishand Americanxperience.Situatedn themiddle fEuropewith penfrontierso eastandwest, russia'survivalndexpansionromhe ate 7th hroughhei9th enturyequiredn enormous ilitaryfforthat xposedmostofthemalepopulationomilitaryraining.he result as to mili-tarize ot nly russiandministration,ut lsoPrussianocietyndculture.he revivalndapplicationfthetraditionf Roman ivillawto statedministrationomplementednddeepened, ore hantcontradicted,heorientationsreatedymilitarization.he habitualandpreciseisciplinehatWeber ook or hebasis fall social rder,andthe entralization,pecialization,ndhierarchyhat e identifiedwith ormalationality,ere s much productfPrussia'smilitaryand egal nstitutionsnd historicalxperiences theywere lementsofa universalistoryfculturehat evealedheessential ature fthemodern.48Despitehisastonishingomparativeeach,WeberultimatelyookGermanys theground romwhich o constructis idealtype fbureaucracy.n the ace fBritain'sre-eminentndustrialndpoliticalrole nthe 9th entury,eperceivederpatrimonialdministrativefeaturess ags nthe rocessf chievinghe echnicaluperiorityhatbureaucracyanbring, atherhan s possible xplanationsfwhatmade he ystemork owell:The dvancef he ureaucratictructureestspontechnicaluperior-ity. hisfacteadshere,s inthewhole ield ftechnique,o thefollowing:headvance as beenrealizedmost lowly here lderstructuralormsave een echnicallyelldevelopedndfunctionallyadjustedotherequirementst hand.Thiswasthe ase, ornstance,inthe dministrationfnotablesnEnglandndhence ngland asthe lowestf llcountrieso uccumbobureaucratizationr,ndeed,is still nlyntheprocessfdoing o.48 See, for example,Hans Rosenberg, ureaucracy, Aristocracy,and Autocracy(Boston:BeaconPress 958).49 Bureaucracy,n Gerth ndMills (fn.4), 228; emphasisdded.



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220 WORLD POLITICSwasgrounded orenpatrimonialhan n bureaucraticeatures,n thedisciplinefhonor nddecency,fduty,eferencend manners-notthedisciplinef thebarracks,he aw,or theofficeasedon orders,commands,nd expertuthority.American atternsf administrationivergerom oth heformalrationalitypproximatedy he russianaradigmndthe atrimonialarrangementsf Britain-althoughemocratictructures,uriouslyenough,reserve ore atrimonialeatureshan newould xpect. nexaminationftheAmericanatternonfirmshat heBritishasesuggested:hedisproportionatenfluencef thePrussianxample nthe mage fbureaucracynWeber'shought.Civil ervantsnGermany,rance,ndBritainenefitedrom hehistoryndmystiquefthe tate nd the tandingonferredn thosewho ervedt. n Americahere erenostatusrders, o lords ftherobeor thesword, o educated nd cultivatedrofessionalshoseserviceopatrimonialrabsoluteulers asa source fhonor, restige,and ay nnoblement.he dominanteffersonianradition,ncontrastwith herecessiveamiltonian,aughthat he east overnmentasthe bestgovernment.ndependentnd producingandownersndfarmersn a societyree f thecorruptionnddegradationfurbancommercend ndustryould ndshouldivewith s little ublic u-thorityspossible.heJacksonianegacy ompoundednddeepenedthenegativettitudeoward tate ervice. y democratizinghestandards,ompetence,ndknowledgeequiredor tateerviceo thepoint fdistrustingndattackingntellectndexpertise,ndby es-tablishingrotationn office o counterhealleged rivileged,elf-serving,ndmonopolisticonsequencesfpermanency,heJacksonianlegacy elped o establishhedoctrinehat to thevictorelong hespoils foffice.otationndspoils, hen ombined ith heJeffer-sonianndJacksonianendencyo belittlenddisesteemhe tate,edtothe venmore xtremeiew hat tateervice eantfeedingt thepublic rough.Weber nderstoodheJacksonianegacy,uthebelievedhat ivil-serviceeformad,n the atterart f he entury,etAmerica ntheroad o bureaucraticationalization:TheUnitedtates till ears he haracterfa polity hich,t leastin the echnicalense,s not ullyureaucratized.ut hegreaterhezones ffrictionith he utsidendthemore rgentheneeds oradministrativenityt home ecome,hemore his haracters in-evitablyndgraduallyiving ay oformallyureaucratictructure.5'51lbid., 2II.



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WEBER ON BUREAUCRACY 221He did notrecognizehe xtento which opulistndanti-statede-ology ontinuedodifferentiatehe tatusnd uthorityf ivil ervantsin America romhosen Prussia rBritain. ordid herecognizeheextentowhichAmericanederalismndtheBritisherivedffectionfor ocalgovernmentustainedarticularities,ariations,ndamateur-ism hatwere bsentromarallel ermanettings.His beliefhat dministrationnAmerica asmoving oward fullbureaucratizationrose n part rom istechnocraticisreadingftheword machine hen pplied oAmericanarties:... the ise f he machine,s it ssignificantlyalledn theUnitedStates,nd thegrowingmportancef officialdomverywhere. .areall stagesf . . [bureaucratization].hepartlynbureaucraticformfthe tate tructuren theUnitedtatessmateriallyalancedby hemoretrictlyureaucratictructuresfthoseormationshich,intruth,ominateolitically,amely,he artiesnderheeadershipofprofessionalsrexpertsnorganizationndelectionactics.52In thedispersed,iscontinuous,ndpatrimonialaroniestaffedyfull-timemateurshat haracterizedmericanarties,ethoughtesaw thebureaucratizederman ocialDemocraticarty s depictedbyRobert ichels:Democraticass artiesave ompletelyrokenith raditionalotablerule ased npersonalelationsndpersonalsteem.. . Democraticmass artiesre ureaucraticallyrganizednderheeadershipfpartyofficials,rofessionalartynd trade nionecretaries,t cetera...In theUnited tates,oth artiesince ackson'sdministrationavedevelopedureaucratically.53Tworecentevisionistorks rovideome upportorWeber's ead-ing of partymachinesn America.Martin hefterrgues hat ythe 88o's,New York'spoliticallubsweremorebureaucratichanprioriteratureuggested;54nd raKatznelsontresseshat he epa-ration fworkplacerom thnic ommunitiespened hewayforworking-classrganizationsven f t did notovercomehenegativeeffectsfethnicityn classformationnd organization.55utsuchnewwork npartyndethnicityoesnot ustify eber'snterpreta-tion fpartyn Americasparallelingurope's ureaucratizedork-ing-classarties.twasa mistakeobelievehat he moonlighting52 Roth ndWittichfn. i), I398; Bureaucracy,n Gerth ndMills (fn. 4), 2I.53lbid., 225.54Shefter,The Emergence f the PoliticalMachine: An Alternative iew, inWillis Hawley and MichaelLipsky, ds.,Theoretical Perspectiveson Urban Politics(EnglewoodCliffs, .J.:Prentice-Hall978).55See aspects fKatznelson's ity Trenches (New York: Pantheon, orthcoming).



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222 WORLD POLITICSemployeesn publicpayrolls hodispensed avors,ccess,welfaregoods, ublic steem,nd recognition,ndwhohelpedwith hemys-teries f Americanizationere heproductsf an impersonal,re-cise, ndhabitualbedienceo bureaucraticuthorityather han fthedisciplinedoyaltyopersonsnd communitieshatmarks atri-monial elations.56Thesehistoricalnstancesuggesthighlyaried istributionfpat-rimonialnd bureaucraticeaturescrossmoderndministrativeys-tems.Weber, ycontrast,ouched ischaracterizationf bureaucracyinuniversalanguage.57t theheuristicevel, niversalendencies,n-dependentf nationalrculturalontext,reatwork: t s the nnercoherencend ogic fcapitalismnddemocracyhat ccountor heinner oherencend ogic fbureaucracy.Thecapitalistystemas undeniablylayed major ole nthede-velopmentfbureaucracy....tsdevelopmentascreatedn urgentneed or table,trict,ntensivendcalculabledministration.t is thisneedwhichives ureaucracycrucialole nour ocietys the entralelementn anykind f arge-scaledministration.58

Webermade even trongertatementsbout hesymbioticelationsbetweenureaucracynddemocracy,speciallymassdemocracy. 5956 Bureaucracy, nGerth nd Mills fn. 4), 224-25. Weber dentifiedwoprinciplesthatdistinguishedpolitical parties n modern states- organizations for job patronage[Weber's mphasis],whichhe associated iththe UnitedStates nd attributedo theabsence f a parliamentaryystem,nd ideological artiesWeltanschauungsparteien),oriented o the realization f substantiveWeber's mphasis] oliticaldeals, whichhe associatedwith continental arties, re-eminentlyheGermanSocial DemocraticParty. oorstatemanagementf the economy ydilettantiouldbe toleratedn the

UnitedStates in view of the limitless bundanceof economic pportunities.heincreasing ecessity f replacing he untrained artyprotege nd sometime-officialwith thetechnicallyrained areerofficial iminishes rogressivelyheparties' ene-fices nd resultsnescapablyn a bureaucracyf theEuropeankind. Whether, hen,or to whatdegree he onditions entionedyWeberhavechanged re openquestions.His observationhat despiteheresultingorruptionof patronageppointments]hissystem as popular in theUnited tates] ince tpreventedhe riseof a bureaucraticcaste uggestst a minimumhat ureaucracyntheUnited tateswasnot nd has notbecome of theEuropeankind. Rothand Wittichfn. 3), 1397-98.5 AlvinGouldner,On Weber'sAnalysis fBureaucraticules, n Merton fn. ,p. 48), brieflyttends o the contradictionetweenmultiple istoricalmanifestationsof bureaucracynd its common eatures. ohnMarkoff'sharacterizationf theoriesof the causesofbureaucracyince Weber's ime lso makesthe case forautonomousand pluralexplanations,n Governmentalureaucratization. . (fn. ); see p. 480forhissummary.58Parsons (fn.3), 338.59Weberdid attend o the contradictionsetween emocracynd bureaucracyndcapitalismwhen he observed hatdemocracyries to prevent he developmentfclosed tatus roupsn the nterestf a universalccessibilityfoffice, hen t triesto minimize theauthorityf officialdomn the interests f expanding he sphereof 'public opinion' . . . , and when it attemptsto make a clean sweep of . . .-at



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WEBER ON BUREAUCRACY 223At the historicalnd empirical evel,Weber, s usual,qualifiedhisuniversalism. e explainedhow bureaucracy merges ndependentlyof both capitalismnd democracy. e observed, s we have already

pointedout, that absolutist tates n collaboration ith status rdersbureaucratize dministration. ore generally, e argued that,whiledemocratizationf society in its totality nd in the modern enseof the term . . is an especially avorable asis of bureaucratization,it is byno meanstheonlypossible ne. He had similar eservationswithrespect o capitalism:Earlymodern apitalismid notoriginaten thebureaucraticodelstateswhere ureaucracyas a product fthe tate's ationalism.d-vanced apitalism,oo,was at first ot imited o theseountries,n factnot ven rimarilyocatedn them.... Today,however,apitalismndbureaucracyavefound neanotherndbelongntimatelyogether.60Yet at thetheoreticalr heuristicevel-and in this ense, ltimately-Weber clung otheviewthat ureaucracyasgeneral haracteristics,structuralnd motivationaleatures,nd a logic that inks themto-gether n an ideal type n ways that re independentf nationalhis-

toricaldifferences. differentiatediewof historicalxperiencendits mprint n cultural rientationsnd institutionsndicates hatthequalities hatWeberfeaturedn hisanalysis fbureaucracyo notade-quately ndequally xplain henature f effectivedministration.ar-ticularhistoricalonstellations,s suggested y the instances f Ger-many,Britain, nd America, ather han thelogic of impersonality,calculation,evelling,ndrationalizations expressednbureaucratiza-tion and as re-enforcedy capitalism r democracy,eemto explainmoreadequatelyhow these and other)nationsbecame modern.PATRIMONIALISM IN BUREAUCRATIC ADMINISTRATION:

PERSONAL LEADERSHIPOurcomparativend historicaliewofeffectivedministration,ar-ticularlyhefinding hatpatrimonialr neopatrimonialeatures layan important art n themodernizationf economic nd political s

well as administrativeife, s consistent ithsome recent oncerns fthe iteraturen formal rganizations.6 articularlymportantn ourleast in intent-the plutocraticprivileges n administration. Bureaucracy, n Gerthand Mills (fn. 4), 226 and 225.60 Roth and Wittich (fn. IA), I465; emphasis in original.61 There is, of course, an extensive iterature n leadership in administration, omeof which is relevant to our prospectiveanalysis. Among the most influentialwritersare ChesterBarnard,The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge: Harvard University



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224 WORLD POLITICSviewhasbeen he ttentioniven opersonaleadershipndauthority,the lexible,particularistic,nd diffuseeam lay hat ccompaniesit, nd ts apacityo counterf not cure ureaucraticathology.nconstructingis dealtypesf egitimateuthority,eber ecognizedthe mportancef personaleadershiportraditionaluthority;emade t thecentral eaturefcharismaticuthority,utvirtuallyx-pelledtfrom ational-legaluthority.62ith especto his nalysisfpatrimonialnd bureaucraticdministration,e followed parallelandconsistentsage: eadershipn theform fpersonaluthority,f-fice harisma,ndother ormsfpersonalismigure rominentlynpatrimonial,utnot t all inbureaucraticdministration.eadershipand personalism,longwith ffectivend communalelationships,fallvictimofunctionalifferentiationndspecializationsimperson-alitys assignedobureaucratictructuresndroles,ndpersonalismtothevocationfpolitics.It spoliticianssdemagogues,otbureaucrats,hobring ersonal-ism ntoplayby appealingo irrational lements, attersftheheart,ndthe motionsootedn communalndhistoricalentiments.Thosewho nhabit heworld fformalationalitynd bureaucraticauthority,ine ra ac studio, ive as a race apart, nnocent fpolitics,undertheaegisof strict nd habitualdiscipline nd withoutwills orinterests.Patrimonialismnters uch a world formanyreasons. n the formofpersonal uthority,t can come ntoplayto cope withbureaucraticpathology y bringing owerand authorityntoclosercongruence.RobertMcNamara's experience s Secretary f the Department fDefense, erhapsheworld'sargestndmost ureaucraticureaucracy,suggestsustone aspectof thisprocess.63hereare at least twosidesto RobertMcNamara.There is theHarvardBusinessSchool, FordMotorCompany,DoD managementechnician, ho firstmade hismarkbysetting p a revolutionarytatisticalontrol rogram s anAir Force officeruringWorld War II and who tamed hemilitaryservice rass ndputan endtotheirwasteful,ounterproductiveivalryforresourcesnd missions ycost-effectivenessechniques. nd thereistheRobertMcNamarawhocaptainedhewhizkids a metaphorhatPress 938), and PhilipSelznick, eadership in Administration Evanston, ll.: Row,Peterson957).

62 Etzioni (fn. 47, chaps.xii and xiii) arguesthat personal (or pure) charismamay be originally chieved in organizationaloffices p. 307; emphasis in original).63 BrockBrower, McNamara een Now, Full Length, ife (May io, i968). Allsubsequentitations n McNamara re from his article.



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WEBER ON BUREAUCRACY 225invokes n unbeatable asketball eam at theUniversityf Illinois nthemid-I94os) in the Air Force and at Ford,and theirfunctionalequivalentn the DoD. It is thissecond, ess celebrated obertMc-Namarawhocontributeso an understandingfthepatrimonialimen-sionofadministrations it is expressedn themetaphorf team ead-ership.When he agreed o acceptJohnKennedy's ffer t Defense,he laiddown one condition- absoluteuthorityn his choiceof people. Hegot the peoplehe wanted: n thefirstnstance, eople ofintelligence,experience,nd wisdom;but in the final nstance, eoplehe knew.It's a verydangerous roposition, e said, hiring eopleyou don'tknow. The grouphe assembled tayedwithhim almostto a manthroughoutis sevenyears t Defense,moving rom ob to job withintellectualase and administrativeersatility. owever expertorskilled heywere-and some, t least,were-theirspecialvirtue ndstrengthay npersonaloyaltyoMcNamara nd a sensitive,ntuitiveunderstandingf his views nd style. s teamplayerswho knewtheircaptain'smind, hey tayed t leastone stepaheadof theopposition,based on a disciplined,annypre-emptive ay of thinking. Mc-Namara, we aretold, used thesemenvery ersonally,coutinghemall aroundthePentagonto bringthevarious ervices nd agenciesinto meshwith his own office, nd enablinghim to overcome heoperational outines, ested nterests,nd organizational omplexityof theDoD. They were the meansforovercominghe obstacles oadministrativeffectivenesshatformal ationality-divisionnd spe-cialization f abor, ob specifications,ndhierarchy-impose.He hadhisown linesout throughhesepeople, nd he usedthem,whenre-quired, ndependentlyftheir rganizationalocation.His team wascomposed

authority and power in bureaucratic and patrimonial administration: a revisionist interpretation of...

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