atc ny friday-talk_slides_20080808

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System Support for Rapid Recovery and Attack Resistance A Friday ATC-NY Talk by Todd Deshane

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Page 1: Atc ny friday-talk_slides_20080808

System Support for Rapid Recovery and Attack

Resistance

A Friday ATC-NY Talk by Todd Deshane

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Overview

Motivation

Goals

Background

Architecture

Evaluation

Plan of Work

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Motivation

Computers on the Internet are vulnerableEven with latest updates and virus definitions

Zero day exploitsMalware effects

User data compromisedSystem controlled by attacker

Restoration of system and user dataTime-consumingDifficult for usersNot always possible (i.e. digital photos)

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"New methods are being invented, new tricks, and every year it gets worse... We are losing the battle... Most companies don't know they have been attacked." - Bruce Schneier

"The average top executive doesn't understand security, but we have to change that... Security is an imperative. It's no longer just a good idea." - Allen Kerr

"Virus incidences had surged between 2003, when they detected just over 10,000, and 2006, when they found 80,000. Criminal activity accounted for most of that increase." - Kaspersky Labs

Motivation

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"Very sophisticated tools are commercially available in black markets... This has made [the Internet] more attractive for organized crime: [criminals] no longer have to be geeks." - James Lewis

"Although security awareness continues to improve, hackers and malicious code authors are releasing threats faster than ever before, with approximately 200 per cent more malicious threats per day than two years ago." - Stuart McClure (2006)

"Over one third [of IT Companies] were hit by a denial-of-service attack while over 44 percent had experienced either a pharming or cache poisoning attack." - 2007 Secure64 Survey

Motivation

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Ooooh! I got some pics from my buddy Joe :)

John is a typical desktop user that uses his computer to communicate with friends on IM and email, and surf the web.

Motivation

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Without the Rapid Recovery System

010010000100000101000011010010110100010101

Credit Card Numbers, Email Contacts, Passwords

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With the Rapid Recovery System

John tries to load the pictures in his photo VM, but the action is denied, since the “pics” are actually executables. An error message is displayed to John.

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With the Rapid Recovery System

John really wants to see the pics, so he ignores the error and copies the “pics” to his Internet VM and clicks on them. The executable runs and it instantly tries to run its built-in IRC server and starts scanning for personal data.

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Either of these actions cause the Internet VM to be reset. The built-in firewall of the Rapid Recovery System disallows the Internet VM to create a server. An error message appears when the Internet VM restarts. John finds out that these were not pics.

With the Rapid Recovery System

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THE MINEFIELD OF PERSONAL COMPUTER USE

Scenario: Open an attachment containing a mass emailing virus

Without the Rapid Recovery System

Notice a slow down of the machine, unsure of cause.

Reboot machine, still slow.

Look in process list, attempt to kill suspicious process,

regenerates itself.

Call tech support, make an appointment to take the computer to

be fixed.

Newest backup is 1 month old, some recent reports and

pictures lost.

3 weeks later get the machine back with the OS re-installed.

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With the Rapid Recovery System

Scenario: Open an attachment containing a mass emailing virus

THE MINEFIELD OF PERSONAL COMPUTER USE

The attachment is written into the email log.

The NET-VM flags a violation of the network contract and

pauses the VM.

The system asks the user if they want to rollback to the last

known good image.

Rollback and remount personal data store.

Some system data (logs, etc.) in VM appliance is lost, but no

personal data is lost.

The machine is back in working order in less than 1 hour.

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Scenario: Surf to the wrong website

Without the Rapid Recovery System

THE MINEFIELD OF PERSONAL COMPUTER USE

A malicious program scans the hard drive for credit card numbers.

The user does not notice any sign of trouble.

The program sends out a small amount of data containing the

information discovered.

The program installs a backdoor for later use by the attacker.

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With the Rapid Recovery System

Scenario: Surf to the wrong website

THE MINEFIELD OF PERSONAL COMPUTER USE

The malicious programs begins to read the hard drive for credit card numbers.

The FS-VM triggers a violation of the data access contract and

pauses the VM.

The system asks the user if they want to rollback to the last

known good image.

Rollback and remount personal data store.

The scan is not completed, the information is not sent, the

backdoor is prevented.

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Scenario: Install a required software update

Without the Rapid Recovery System

After the update, several applications cannot find some required components.

The user calls tech support and they confirm the problems with

the patch.

The best recommendation is to completely uninstall and re-

install the applications.

It takes a few hours to assemble the installation media, to find

the product keys, and to follow the instructions.

THE MINEFIELD OF PERSONAL COMPUTER USE

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With the Rapid Recovery System

Scenario: Install a required software update

THE MINEFIELD OF PERSONAL COMPUTER USE

After the update, several applications cannot find some required components.

The user calls tech support and they confirm the problems with

the patch.

The user decides to rollback to the last known good image.

The machine is back up in running in minutes.

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Goals

Provide attack resistance and rapid recovery

Isolate and protect user data from attacks

Provide automatic and user-triggered checkpoints

Safe testing of system and application updates

Facilitate forensic analysis

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Background: Security

Early Internet based on openness/trustFirst documented Internet worm – 1988Malware: large scale problem – late 1990sCriminal malware networks (botnets)

DDOS, digital blackmail, account/credit infoAttack defenses

Antivirus softwareFirewallsIntrusion detection systems

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Background: Virtualization

Virtual Machine Monitor Pioneered by IBMSoftware/hardware co-evolution

Intel VT and AMD-VSoftware/hardware co-evolution (again)Next generation virtualization hardware

Xen hypervisor (VMM)Paravirtual guests (i.e. Linux, *BSD)HVM guests (i.e. Microsoft Windows)

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Background: Virtualization+Security

VMs used as sandboxes VMs can be monitored from below System security and fault tolerance

Replicate system state to a backup VMSecure logging and replayBacktracking intrusionsSafe testing/integration of untrusted codeProtection against root kits

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Background: System Reset Facilities

DeepFreezeRestore to trusted checkpoint on each boot

Windows System RestoreKeep checkpoints of system state for rollback

Both of these lack:User data protection/rollbackAttack prevention/detection

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Hardware

Xen Hypervisor

NIC

NET-VM

Internal Network

VMA 1 VMA 2 VMA N

Isolated Network FS-VM

Disk

Domain 0 ManagementM

anag

emen

tMan

agem

ent

System Architecture

Internet

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Benefits

Intrusion detection and attack prevention

Protection of user data

Checkpoint and restart of virtual machine appliances

Rapid first time installation

Model for software distribution

Complement and enhance backups

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Evaluation

Resistance/protection against attacksCategorize attacksDefense strategies against attacks

Performance overheadOverhead of virtualization technologyOverhead of file system virtual machine

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Evaluation: Attacks

Backdoor attacks Initiate/listen for connectionsSend and receive data

Malicious attacksCopy infected executables to shared foldersAttempt to destroy data

Spyware attacksHarvest email addresses and other personal data

Vulnerability attacksExploit vulnerability in specific server software

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Evaluation: Defenses

Block unused portsBackdoor attacks can't access the InternetVulnerable services are not running

Restrictions on read, write, and/or append accessMalicious attacks can't write/delete user dataSpyware attacks can't read user data

Detect unexpected behavior and rollbackAnomalies raise errors/warningsPrompt user or automatic rollback

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Evaluation: Performance

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Plan of Work

Construction and integration of a separate NET-VM componentTight integration of NET-VM and FS-VM into virtual machine support layer of XenA comprehensive virtual machine appliance contract systemEvaluation of system

PerformanceFunctionality

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Hardware

Xen Hypervisor

NIC

NET-VM

Internal Network

VMA 1 VMA 2 VMA N

Isolated Network FS-VM

Disk

Domain 0 ManagementM

anag

emen

tMan

agem

ent

System Architecture

Internet

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Plan: Construct and Integrate NET-VM

Network Intrusion Detection System (snort)Firewall (iptables)Xen driver domain

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NET-VM already possible (driver domain)FS-VM granted file system access/controlXen communicates rules to NET-VM and FS-VM when new domain createdNET-VM and FS-VM detect violations

Violations enforced/communicated to XenAppropriate actions taken by Xen

ShutdownRestartRestore guestNotify userPrepare guest for forensic analysis

Plan: Xen Support for NET-VM/FS-VM

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Plan: Comprehensive Contract System

Virtual machine appliance contractsSpecify the behavior of appliances

Network access File system access

Use existing NIDS and firewall rulesBuild upon existing Xen configuration file

Add file system and network rule support

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Plan: Evaluation of Modified System

Performance I/O: read, writeNetwork: send, receiveCPU overhead

FunctionalityResistance to attackRecovery from attack

Construct virtual machine appliances

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Related/Proposed Projects at Clarkson

Log-Structured File System (LFS) for FS-VMEnable rollback of writes with LFS

Isolation testing of virtualization systemsPerformance isolation testing methodology and results

Power testing of virtualization systemsRecommend/improve power-friendly VMMs

Tools for forensic analysisCapture/export compromised VMRecommend defense strategies

Tools for contract inspectionVisualize access granted by contract

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Questions/Comments?

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Backup Slides

This won't fit in the presentation, but if there are questions, some of these slides might help

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Virtualization Motivation Backup Slides

More virtualization basics and why to use virtualization

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Terminology

Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM)Also know as: hypervisorThin software layer between the hardware and “guest” operating systemFirst to the hardware

Examples of VMMs:VMware, Xen, Parallels, Z/vm, MS Viridian, Qemu, KVM, ...

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VMM with a Picture

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Virtualization Predictions

9 of 10 enterprises will have virtualization by 2007 - Yankee Group (August 2007)Physical servers growth near zero within 2012 - Bernstein (August 2007)Over 50% physical servers will be virtualized in 2011 - IDC (July 2007)Virtualization services market to reach $11.7 billion by 2011 - IDC (July 2007)Server market to hardly grow over 2% annually through 2011 because of virtualization - IDC (July 2007)

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Virtualization Predictions

25% of enterprise data center servers to be virtual by 2010 - Intel (July 2007)A Microsoft hypervisor for Vista expected in mid-2009 - Gartner (July 2007)Virtualization will be part of nearly every aspect of IT by 2015 – Gartner (May 2007)3 million virtual machines expected in 2009 - Gartner (May 2007)

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Virtualization Predictions

Virtualization and multicore will cost $2.4 billion in customer spending between 2006 and 2010 - IDC (March 2007)OS Virtualization to become mainstream by 2010 - Gartner (December 2006)Virtualization market to grow to $15 billion worldwide by 2009 - IDC (October 2006)

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Performance Backup Slides

Xen vs. VMware performance

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System Performance

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Guest Configuration File Backup Slides

More details of the syntax

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Plan: File System Rule Language

# Example file system rule set for an email client.

fs_rule = [ 'id=1, read, 1024, 5' ] # read at most 1024 bytes of data in 5 seconds

fs_rule = [ 'id=2, append, 1024, 3' ] # append at most 1024 bytes of data in 3 seconds.

fs_rule = [ 'id=3, write, 320, 3' ] # write at most 320 bytes in 3 seconds

# The email mount point is accessible to the email client, and fs_rules # with id=1 and id=2 are applieddisk = [ 'fsvm:/mnt/email, /home/user/mail,fs_rule=1:2' ]

# The email mount point is accessible to the email client, and fs_rules # with id=1 and id=3 are applied.disk = [ 'fsvm:/mnt/email, /home/user/attachments,fs_rule=1:3' ]

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Plan: Network Rule Language

#Email client example continued

network_rule = ['id=1, iptables, file=/etc/iptables/email_client']

network_rule = ['id=2, snort, file=/etc/snort/rules/email_client']

vif = [ 'rate=2Mb/s, network_rule=1:2' ]

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Attacks Backup Slides

More details/example attacks looked at

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Evaluation of Prototype: Attacks

Category/Behavior: Backdoor attacks initiate and listen for connections to send and receive dataExamples: W32.MyDoom, W32.BagelDefenses:

Block unused ports Detect unexpected behavior and rollback to trusted image

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Evaluation of Prototype: Attacks

Category/Behavior: Attacks that copy infected executables to shared folders or attempt to destroy dataExamples: W32.Netsky, W32.NetadDefenses:

Restrictions on write access to personal dataDetect unexpected behavior and rollback to trusted image

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Evaluation of Prototype: Attacks

Category/Behavior: Attacks that harvest email addresses and other personal dataExamples: W32.Zafi.D, PWSteal.Ldpinch.EDefenses:

Restrictions on read access to personal dataDetect unexpected behavior and rollback to trusted image

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Evaluation of Prototype: Attacks

Category/Behavior: Attacks that exploit vulnerability in specific server softwareExamples: MySQL UDF, Blaster, SlammerDefenses:

Block unused ports (if not running the server software)Detect unexpected behavior and rollback to trusted image (if running the server software)

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