asas what does it mean operationally? on the way to asas… …airborne traffic situation awareness,...

ASAS what does it mean operationally?ASAS what does it mean operationally?ON THE WAY TO ASAS…

…AIRBORNE TRAFFIC SITUATION AWARENESS,

THE FIRST STEP

ASAS THEMATIC NETWORK SECOND WORKSHOPMALMÖ, 6-8 OCTOBER 2003

AIRBUS France

Simona CANU-CHIESACockpit HMI Designer

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ASAS WHAT DOES IT MEAN OPERATIONALLY?ASAS WHAT DOES IT MEAN OPERATIONALLY?On the way to ASAS...Airborne Traffic Situation Awareness,

the first step

Airborne Separation Assistance System concept is based on delegation of manoeuvre to the crew.

On the way to ‘full’ separation delegation, several steps shall be considered.

Airborne Traffic Situation Awareness have to be considered as the first step.

Nowadays, separation delegation already exists: visual separation procedures is the most common one.

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the first step

Traffic situation understanding is a first necessity for crew before accepting any responsibility concerning surrounding traffic.

Providing information on surrounding traffic may help crew to have a better understanding of situation.

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the first step

Through Traffic Collision Avoidance System display crew actually have some information on surrounding traffic.

Even if TCAS is not designed for that purpose, crew derives this information to build a mental picture of surrounding traffic.

Airborne Traffic Situation Awarenessis an operational need.

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the first step

OSEDOperational Service and Environment Definition

OSA

Operational Safety Assessment

OHA (Operational Hazard Assesment)

ASOR (Allocation of SafetyObjectives & Requirements)

OPA

Operational Performance Assessment

ASOR (Allocation of PerformanceObjectives & Requirements)

IAInteroperability Assessment

SPR

Safety & Performance Requirements

Interop

Interoperability Requirements

ED-78A/DO-264 Process

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the first stepOPERATIONALOPERATIONALREQUIREMENTREQUIREMENT

S S DEFINITIONDEFINITION

OPERATIONALOPERATIONALREQUIREMENTREQUIREMENT

S S DEFINITIONDEFINITION

O3P MOCK-UPSPECIFICATIONS MOCK-UP EVALS

EquipmentDevelopment

Lab EquipmentIntegration

Bench & Flight SimulatorTests

Test A/CIntegration

Flight Trials on test A/C

EquipmentUpdate

Certification Service Bulletin

Flight Trials onAirlines

Test A/C

FP6 Projects

2003/04

2005

AirbusSuppliers

EquipmentDevelopment

FP6 Projects

ATSAW Operational Service Environment DocumentATSAW Operational Service Environment Document

ATSAW Operational Hazard Analysis

ATSAW Operational Performance Assessment

NUP2NUP2

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the first stepSeveral situations - called also applications - have been identified, depending on environment, phase of flight, airspace class, air traffic services, meteorological conditions, which may be gathered into three main categories:

Visual Separation Procedures aided by ATSAW Enhanced Visual Acquisition for See and Avoid, Enhanced Successive Visual Approaches, Enhanced Visual Acquisition for Successive Take-Off, Runway Occupancy Awareness, Surface Traffic Awareness

Anticipation of Operations &Trajectories Flight Operations Improvement

Blind Broadcast Operations Enhanced-Traffic Information Broadcast by Aircraft

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the first step

The ‘See and Avoid’ application helps the Crew:

to detect and visually acquire threatening traffic to prepare avoidance

actions, if required, in due time.

Enhanced Visual Acquisition for See and Avoid

AZA557 +30

AFR257+31

AFR6512 +11

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the first step




AFR257+31


AFR6512 A320 M323 +11

AZA557 +15

Push and Turn

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the first step




AFR257+31


AZA557 A321 M 320 +15

AFR6512 +11

Turn

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the first step




AZA557 +15

AFR257A320 M312 +12

AFR6512 +11


Turn

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the first step




AFR257+31


AFR6512 A320 M323 +11

AZA557 +15

Push

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the first step




AFR257+31


AFR6512 A320 M323 +11

AZA557 +15

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the first step

Enhanced Successive Visual Approaches

AZA557 +30

The objective is to conduct cleared

successive approaches with visual separation on

a regular basis, safely and accurately.

A F R 6 5 1 2 A D S - B / T C A S

B R G / D I S T R A L T / A A L T

0 0 5° / 1 5 N M + 0 1 1 / F L 3 2 3

M A C H / G S / I A S T Y P E / C L A S S

0 , 5 1 / 3 2 5 / 3 2 3 A 3 2 0 / M

R E L G S H E A D I N G

+ 2 5 K T 0 0 2°

P E R M A M E N T D I S P L A Y O F F

S E T O N *

D U A L N D T G T O N

S E T O F F *

T R A F F I C

< A S A S M E N U L I S T >

AFR6512 A320 M323 +11

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the first step

Enhanced Visual Acquisition for Successive Take-OffThis application aims at increasing frequency and safety of visual separation clearance for take-off .The goal is to:

Improve opportunity of visual separation by offering cues to locate preceding departing aircraft, Enhance safety of such operations by providing information and identification on preceding departing aircraft.

AAL1255B767 H305 -10

5

7,5

5

7,5

AFR6512A320 M

323 +09

A F R 6 5 1 2 A D S - B / T C A S

B R G / D I S T R A L T / A A L T

0 0 5° / 1 5 N M + 0 1 1 / F L 3 2 3

M A C H / G S / I A S T Y P E / C L A S S

0 , 5 1 / 3 2 5 / 3 2 3 A 3 2 0 / M

R E L G S H E A D I N G

+ 2 5 K T 0 0 2°

P E R M A M E N T D I S P L A Y O F F

S E T O N *

D U A L N D T G T O N

S E T O F F *

T R A F F I C

< A S A S M E N U L I S T >

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the first step

RUNWAY OCCUPANCY AWARENESS

The application aims at preventing runway incursions, by providing information to the Crew of potential hazardous situations due to runway occupancy.

In order to support runway operations tasks, CDTI shall display runways and the concerned traffic.

It helps crew to visually acquire threatening traffic prior to possible avoidance maneuvers.

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the first step

SURFACE TRAFFIC AWARENESS

This application provides the flight Crew with an enhanced traffic situational awareness on the airport surface for both taxi and runway operations.

The objectives are to improve safety (e.g. at taxiway crossings, or before entering a runway) and to reduce taxi time in particular during low visibility conditions or during night.

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the first step

Anticipation of Operations & Trajectories by Flight Operations Improvement

This application aims at improving aircraft operations and efficiency through:

An improved trajectory anticipation and an enhanced flight efficiency, thanks to a better knowledge of possible evolutions of the traffic situation,

Consequently, a better management of crew workload.

AAL1255B767 H305 -10

80

120

80

120

BAW515B777 H0.80 - 10

+10 + 09

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the first step

Enhanced Traffic Information Broadcast by Aircraft

This application aims at helping the Crews to monitor traffic relevant to the Blind Broadcast procedure by providing a

large range picture of surrounding ADS-B equipped traffic.

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Pilots interviewed: <<We are going in the good direction>>.

Safety increased thanks to improved onboard surveillance. See & Avoid improved thanks to the contextual information. Visual acquisition improved on final approach. Flight efficiency and performance optimized thanks to a better anticipation of flight operations. Passengers comfort increase thanks to smooth flight performance

T R A F F I C L I S T

A A L 1 1 5 5 H

< 0 1 2 ° / 0 9 N M

A F R 6 5 1 2 M

< 0 0 5 ° / 1 3 N M

A Z A 5 5 7 M

< 3 5 5 ° / 1 8 N M

A A L 1 8 5 7 M

< 1 7 0° / 1 0 N M

A F R 2 5 7 M D I S P L

< 0 4 5° / 3 2 N M A L L T R A F F I C *

R E T U R N

< M C D U M E N U A S A S M E N U >

Airborne Traffic Airborne Traffic Situational Situational Awareness Awareness Evaluations: Evaluations: Early ResultsEarly Results

AZA557 +15

AFR257A320 M312 +12

AFR6512 +11

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ATSAW

Operational Hazard Analysis

Enhanced See and Avoid :

OH_S&A1 Loss of Enhanced See and Avoid.

OH_S&A2 Untimely avoidance manoeuvre due to CDTI.

OH_S&A3 Inadvertent Enhanced See and Avoid initiation.

OH_S&A4 Possible continuation of Enhanced See and Avoid.

Enhanced Successive Visual Approach on same runway :

OHESVA1 ESVA application initiation failed.

OHESVA2 Loss of ESVA application.

OHESVA3 Infringement of separation by the trailer due to CDTI.

OHESVA4 Continue to fly according to the clearance.

1. Operational Hazard List

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1.1. Enhanced See and Avoid

REFOperational

HazardDescription Phase Operational Failure Scenarios Examples of causes Severity

Severitywith REC

OH_S&A2 Misleading traffic situation. Display frozen or delayed 3 4Trafficacquisitionon CDTI. Misleading correlation with two different a/c. 3

Important traffic around the A/C. Overload of display traffic information. 3 4

Misleading ADS-B communication with equippeda/c.

Misleading of ADS-B emission from threat. 3

Cross Checkwith CDTI.

Misleading ADS-B a/c situation. Misleading ADS-B data 3 4

Traffic situation not available to the A/C. Display frozen or delayed. 3 4

Misleading ADS-B communication with equippeda/c.

Misleading of ADS-B emission from threat. 3 4

Untimelyavoidancemanoeuvre

The F/C may bemisled during crosscheck or analyse withCDTI. The F/C maydetect visually thethreat with delay ormay performavoidancemanoeuvre withdelay.TCAS is operativeand provides trafficadvisories asnecessary.Significant increasein crew workload.

Crewanalysespotential

conflict aidedby CDTI. Misleading data communication for A/C. Misleading Threat horizontal position or

Speed.3 4

REQ/PROCE 1REQ/PROCE 2REQ/PROCE 3REQ/PROCE 4REQ/PROCE 5REQ/PROCE 6REQ/PROCE 8REQ/TECH 3REQ/TECH 4REQ/TECH 5

ASS 1ASS 6ASS 7ASS 8ASS 9OP 2OP 9OP 8

REC/PROCE 1REC/TECH 1REC/TECH 2REC/TECH 3

The flight crew must be trained for the procedures and must be familiarized to the CDTI.Use of CDTI is not intended for traffic separation. Capability for CDTI to deliver an information level sufficient to perform separation shall be assessed in specific separation.In case of visual acquisition inability, the flight crew will make ATC and/or nearby a/c aware.The F/C must be trained to not perform a “See & Avoid” manoeuvre based only on CDTI information.If CDTI seems erroneous or does not give relevant information, then the flight crew shall disregard it and continue the See & Avoid, as long as visual contact is established.If the flight crew does not have the visual contact, he may try to get information on CDTI in order to improve a second attempt for visual acquisition.In case of ATC detection of ADS-B corruption, the ATC Controller must contact the surrounding a/c.In case of ADS-B reception data not available, the concerned aircraft should be displayed as non-equipped to ATC display.In case of loss of ADS-B data transmission, the symbol of the concerned aircraft should not be displayed on the CDTI as ADS-B a/c.The ATC Controller shall be advised of the integrity resulting from ADS-B data and surveillance data correlation.Non-equipped a/c are detected by the Ground Station radar.TCAS is mandatory in European airspace for IFR a/c.The See & Avoid application aided by CDTI does not modify TCAS procedure.If the flight crew assesses a conflicting situation only on CDTI, he will try to contact the ATC and/or nearby a/c for information and will prepare for TCAS action.The conflicting a/c displayed on CDTI is an ADS-B and/or TCAS equipped a/c.Is the interpretation of data on the CDTI and the visual acquisition of conflicting a/c to be made by both pilot and co-pilot of the aircraft ?What is the flight crew behaviour and the mitigation means to apply in case of spurious miscorrelation of one aircraft between ADS-B and TCAS data ?What is the flight crew behaviour and the mitigation means to apply in case of misleading data correlation of two different aircraft ?If one member of the flight crew uses CDTI during the “See & Avoid” application, the other member should continue the external visual scanning.CDTI information should be available for both pilots.To limit misleading information of traffic situation, the ADS-B and/or TIS-B receiver system should be real-time monitored by Airborne system.The flight crew should be able to turn off the CDTI if necessary.

ATSAW


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OH_S&A2. Untimely avoidance manoeuvre due to CDTI.

A conflicting a/c is present. The display of CDTI is frozen or delayed. The flight crew can not detect the conflicting a/c and will be misled to assess the traffic situation aided by CDTI. The ATC may also identify a conflicting situation and/or give traffic information. The flight crew will continue his flight plan. The flight crew may apply Rules of Air with delay after detection of the conflicting a/c by visual cross-acquisition, external traffic detection or TCAS alert. 1. The flight crew will continue his flight plan. 2. The ATC Controller may give Traffic information. 3. Possible infringe of separation.

TCAS is operative and provides traffic advisories as necessary.

Display frozen or delayed.

Severity : 3Significant reduction in safety margins.Significant increase in crew workload.

Severity 4 with recommendations:

Slight reduction in safety margins or aircraft functional capabilities.

ATSAW


1.1.1. Exemple of of Operational Failure Scenario in Enhanced See and Avoid application

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HAZARDCLASS

1 MostSevere

2 3 4 5 LeastSevere

Effect onAircraft

Normally withhull loss. Totalloss of flightcontrol, mid-aircollision, flightinto terrain orhigh speedsurfacemovementcollision.

Large reduction insafety margins oraircraft functionalcapabilities.

Significantreduction in safetymargins or aircraftfunctionalcapabilities.

Slight reduction insafety margins oraircraft functionalcapabilities.

No effect onoperationalcapabilities orsafety

Effect onOccupants

Multiple fatalities. Serious or fatalinjury to a smallnumber ofpassengers orcabin crew.

Physical distress,possibly includinginjuries.

Physicaldiscomfort.

Inconvenience.

Effect onAir Crew

Fatalities orincapacitation.

Physical distressor excessiveworkload impairsability to performtasks.

Physicaldiscomfort,possibly includinginjuries orsignificant increasein workload.

Slight increase inworkload.

No effect on flightcrew.

Effect onAir TrafficServices

Total loss ofseparation.

Large reduction inseparation or atotal loss of airtraffic control for asignificant periodof time.

Significantreduction inseparation orsignificantreduction in airtraffic controlcapability.

Slight reduction inseparation or inATC capability.Significantincrease in airtraffic controllerworkload.

Slight increase inair traffic controllerworkload.

RTCA/EUROCAE matrix

ATSAW


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1.2. Enhanced Successive Visual Approach on same runway

REF Operational

Hazard Description Phase Operational Failure Scenarios Examples of causes Severity

Severity with REC

OHESVA3 Infringement of separation by the trailer due to CDTI

The flight crew has been misled by an erroneous horizontal relative position of the target aircraft. The flight crew may infringe separation minimum, to reduce target relative range. TCAS is operative and provides traffic advisories as necessary Visual minimum separation is ensured with target. Significant increase in crew workload.

Crew performs

ESVA (aided by CDTI).

Misleading data communication for trailer. Misleading Target horizontal relative position. 4

REQ/PROCE 5

ASS 6 OP 5

If CDTI seems erroneous or does not give relevant information, then the flight crew shall disregard it during ESVA execution and must continue Visual Separation as long as visual contact with the target is established. TCAS is mandatory in European airspace for IFR a/c. Are TCAS advisories completely independent of CDTI HMI ?

ATSAW


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1.2.1. Example of Operational Failure Scenario in ESVA application

OHESVA3 Infringement of separation by the trailer due to CDTI.

The CDTI does not display the correct horizontal relative position of the target aircraft (misleading data reception, display). The flight crew is misled and may believe that the target is too far. The flight crew cross check between visual cues and misleading CDTI information, but it’s difficult to evaluate the relative distance. The flight crew may infringe separation minimum, to reduce target relative range. Visual minimum separation is ensured with target.

1. The flight crew will continue to fly according to the clearance. 1. The flight crew maintains visual contact with target. 2. No effect. 3. Possible loss of separation.

TCAS is operative and provides traffic advisories as necessary.

Misleading ADS-B data reception.

Severity : 3Significant reduction in safety margins.Significant increase in crew workload.

Severity 4 with recommendations:

Slight reduction in safety margins or aircraft functional capabilities.

ATSAW


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The EVA-SA application assists flight crews to perform see and avoid tasks. It is particularly designed for Class D to G airspace.It aims support them to visually acquire threatening traffic prior to possible avoidance manoeuvres.

Application aims1. The main purpose of this application is to increase the likelihood to earlier visually acquire threatening traffic in order to avoid potential conflict situation 2. and nevertheless a conflict occur, to increase the probability to solve the conflict 3. and decrease the time of conflict resolution

Example of OPA - Enhanced Visual Acquisition for See and Avoid FG(EVA - SA)

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In order to perform the OPA, it is provided a detailed description of each application. This detailed description is performed via a modeling in which each application is described in terms of phases, sequences and actions.

The application is divided in four phases which are :1. Identification phase.2. Evaluation phase.3. Decision phase.4. Manoeuvre phase.

At each phase is associated the corresponding metric.


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The application is characterise by two metrics :

The probability of failure of the application (Pp). The global time to realise the application (T).

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the first step

CONCLUSIONSCONCLUSIONS

Traffic situation understanding is a first necessity for crew before accepting any responsibility concerning surrounding traffic.

Airborne Separation Assistance System concept is based on delegation of manoeuvre to the crew.

On the way to ‘full’ separation delegation, several steps shall be considered and...

...AIRBORNE TRAFFIC SITUATION AWARENESS have to be considered as

THE FIRST STEP !

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This document and all information contained herein is the sole property of AIRBUS S.A.S. No intellectual property rights are granted by the delivery of this document or the disclosure of its content. This document shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without the express written consent of AIRBUS S.A.S. This document and its content shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied.

The statements made herein do not constitute an offer. They are based on the mentioned assumptions and are expressed in good faith. Where the supporting grounds for these statements are not shown, AIRBUS S.A.S. will be pleased to explain the basis thereof.

AN EADS JOINT COMPANYWITH BAE SYSTEMS

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the first step

What is existing in 2003• Surveillance:

FANS 1/A ADS-C Mode S Transponder with

– Elementary & Enhanced Surveillance– 1090 ADS-B out Extended Squitters (DO260)

Surveillance functions needed, but not launched

on Airbus:

• Surveillance: ADS-B out

– update for DO260A MOPS compliance (XPDR)

– ADS-B out mandate (1090 Ext Squitters) GS & ASAS Package 1 applications:

– ATSAW /CDTI,

– Runway Incursion/occupancy detection & alerting

– Spacing

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the first step

• ADS-B out : Need and mandate to be decided by states: Market demand (Airlines) -

• DO260A : worldwide agreement as first standard (ICAO process)

• ASAS : Institutional & regulatory framework - Benefits assessment - Market for Industry: no business case

Applis selection by ATS providers and Airlines for Benefits,

P1 Applications harmonization, Steps for implementations

SPR interop, standardisation

Integration in current ATM procedures (gnd tools update)

Transition phase management

• Runway incursion: Where is the detection and alerting? Is Airport Nav Display needed ?

• TIS-B : Role & real need of TIS-B to be clarified

What is missing for launch?

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the first step

Mainly PSR and SSR Radar.Mode S Tracking.Initial downlink/CAP services.Cockpit aids for:- TCAS,- Terrain Awareness, - Weather Radar, PWS, Initial Multilateration on airports.Gnd Safetynet: MSAW, STCA,

Enhanced Mode S + 1090 Extended Squitters:

ADS-B & CDTI ASAS applications: Traffic Computer, FMS, EIS,

New ASAS procedures + CPDLC for full automation

Multilateration for both airport and airborne use

…………….Implementation of TIS-B

- Increase ATM efficiency- ASAS procedures to reduce separations- Delegation of airborne separation tasks: cruise, approach, airport

- Self separation (low density)

- Optimise current procedures- ADS-B out for Ground use (non radar)- Cockpit Situational Awareness- Spacing for current procedures optimisation (VMC & IMC)- Improved Aman (Gnd)- Ground Multilateration- On-board runway incursion alerts- STCA improvement

Status Quo2003-2005

Long Term:2015-2020

Short Term Mid Term2010

asas what does it mean operationally? on the way to asas… …airborne traffic situation awareness,...

Documents

step asas thematic network

operational need

document confidentiel

step osed operational

tous droits rservs

separation delegation

airlines test ac fp6

visual separation procedures