article xvi

7/27/2019 Article XVI

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/article-xvi 1/6

ARTICLE XVI

METRAN v. Paredes

Metropolitan Transportation Service was created by Executive Order to providethe public with a more efficient, cheaper, and faster means of transportation. Itwas also charged with the allocation of US Army trucks, vehicles, spare parts,accessories, and gasoline supplies to the dufferent private transportationcompanies and was directed by EO 28 to furnish transportation facilities to allbureaus and offices of the National Government.

The Labor Union of METRAN decided to sue because of its desire for betterworking conditions.

Held

METRAN was not a corporation but a creation of the state, a government agencythereof possessing no juridical personality of its own and therefore could not besued.

National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro

Bacolod Airport is situated in a land owned by Capitol Subdivisdion which has alease with the National Airports Corporation for its use as an airport. The NACcollects fees from airlines such as PAL in this case so PAL can use the airport. Thefees go to the payment of the airport lease.

In this case, NAC failed to pay the lease to Capitol and so Capitol sued PAL forthe payment. PAL countered, claiming it had been already paid to the NAC. PALfiled a petition to recover the money from the NTC.

Issue

Whether or not NAC is immune from suit

Held

Not all government entities whether corporate or non-corporate are immune

from suit. Immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for

which the entity was organized. The CAA is a private entity. Although it was notcreated as a corporation it was nto created to maintain a necessary function of government but to run a business even if revenue is not one of its primeobjectives but tourism.

Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Court of Appeals

The CAA was sued by the Consul General to Israel for injuries resulting from a fallwhich happened at the Manila International Airport.

According to Consul Simke, a naturalized Filipino, he was supposed to meet hisfuture son-in-law and in order to get a better view of the incoming passengers,he and his group proceeded to the viewing deck on the terrace of the airport.While walking on the terrace, he slipped over an elevation of about 4 inches andbroke his thigh bone.

He filed a claim for damages based on quasi-delict which included medical andhospital bills and other consequential damages. The Trial Court rendered a

judgment in his favor that the CA also affirmed. The CAA contends that thecourts erred in favoring Simke because they believe that the CAA cannot be suedbecause it would be equivalent to suing the State without its consent. The CAAalso said that the ruling in NAC v. Teodoro should not apply because:

1. In NAC v. Teodoro, the CAA was sued in a substitute capacity

2. The cause of action in the Teodoro case was contractual in nature

3. There was no specific law in the RA that created the CAA that would justify that the CAA was organized for business and not for governmentpurposes

Issue

Whether or not the CAA can be sued

Held

The SC said that the Teodoro case already considered and treated the CAA as areal party in issue. The SC also said that the Teodoro case did not make anyqualification or limitation as to whether the CAA’s power to sue and be suedapplies only to contractual obligations and the Court already settled that the CAAis an agency that is not immune from suit, since it is engaged in functionspertaining to private citizens and not to maintain a necessary function of government.

Santos v. Santos



This case is about a parcel of land which the respondent sold to CAA. The land isco-owned by both the respondent and petitioner having inherited the land fromtheir father. The respondent leased the land to the Americans from 1945 to 1949and sold the land to the CAA in 1949. The petitioners want their share in therental and sale of the property. They filed a case with the CAA asking for anaccounting of rentals and certain facts about the land. The CAA invoked itsimmunity from suit.

Held

When and where the state or its government enters into a contract, through itsofficers and agents, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights andobligations arise, the officers who entered into the contract may be sued. If thelaw granting contract does not provide for or name the officers against whomaction may be brought, the State may be sued.

By entering into a contract, the sovereign state descends to the level of thecitizen and its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into acontract.

A is suit against the state in the following circumstances:

1. When the Republic is sued by name

2. When suit is against an unincorporated government agency

3. When a suit is on its face against a government officer but the case issuch that the ultimate liability will fall on the government

In the above instances, liability depends on whether the State consents to besued.

PhilRock v. Board of Liquidators

REPACOM sold a rock pulverizing machine to PhilRock that was defective. TheREPACOM was abolished and EO 629 authorized the Board of Liquidators toundertake the liquidation of the remaining assets and outstanding liabilities of

REPACOM.

PhilRock filed a petition to garnish money from the account of REPACOM in PNBto satisfy its contractual obligations.Issue

Whether or not the funds of REPACOM in PNB may be garnished by PhilRock tosatisfy a money judgment in their favor

Held

The Board of Liquidators is a government agency directly under the Office of thePresident and is tasked with a special duty to administer assets and pay theliabilities of REPACOM. It was not created for profit or business and it is an

unicorporated agency which possesses no juridical personality. Hence, the suit is

against the state. The State has not given its consent to be sued. PhilRock shouldwait for a corresponding appropriation.

Republic v. Feliciano

This case is about the ownership and possession of land by Pablo Feliciano.Feliciano contends that the land subject of Proclamation No. 90 is his private

property which he bought in 1952.

Feliciano sued the Republic of the Philippines as a defendant in the case,represented by the Land Authority.

Feliciano contends that the State waived its right to be sued in the proclamation.

Issue

Whether the State waived its right to sue in a proclamation

Held

Consent by the State can be shown either explicitly or impliedly through the useof statutory language. The consent must emanate from statutory authority andmust emanate only from the legislative body. This particular action is inpersonam and not in rem. Provisions waiving state immunity must be strictlyconstrued.

Mobil Philippines Exploration v. Customs Arrastre Service

Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on SS “Leoville”consigned to Mobil Philippines. The shipment arrived and was discharged to thecustody of the Customs Arrastre Service, handling arrastre operations. TheService later delivered 3 cases only of the shipment.

Mobil filed a suit against the Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered shipment.

Mobil contends that not all government entitites are immune from suit and thatthe Customs Arrastre Service discharging proprietary functions can be sued byprivate individuals.

Issue

Whether or not the Customs Arrastre Service, as an agency dischargingproprietary functions can be sued

Held



The fact that a non-corporate government agency performs a functionproprietary in nature does not necessarily result in it losing its immunity fromsuit, if the non governmental function is undertaken as an incident ot itsgovernment function, there is no waiver of the sovereign immunity.

The Bureau of Customs is part of the Department of Finance, with no personalityof its own and its function is to assess and collect lawful revenues from importedarticles and all other tariff and customs duties, fees, charges, and fines, and inthis function, the arrastre service is a necessary incident.

Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court

TRB entered into a loan agreement with National Media Production Centerreprecented by Gregorio Cendaña and Production Specialists, Inc. represented byits President, Romeo Jalosjos for the broadcast of the 1981 season of the PBA.

When NMPC and PSI failed to make any payments of their obligations and failedto comply with thte conditions in the agreement, TRB filed a claim to collect theloan amount and prayed for an issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.

The NMPC filed a motion to dismiss saing that it cannot be sued without consentbeing an entity under the Office of the President. They said that they merelyacted as a guarantor for PSI.

Issue

Whether or not the NMPC may be sued and whether or not its entering into aloan agreement is a function incident to its government function of publicdissemination of government information.

Held

An unincorporated government entity can retain its immunity from suit even if itis proprietary in character if the character of the non-government function takenis incident to the government function. The NMPC is tasked with the “publicdisseination of government information to assist the hastening of the sloweconomic development of the country”. However the Court found that when the

NMPC entered into the agreement in the case at bar, it was engaged in abusiness undertaking beyond its function of disseminating governmentinformation and immunity may not be invoked.

However, the Court cannot allow the garnishment of the NMPC deposits toanswer any eventual judgment against it. Being public funds, the deposits arenot within the reach of any garnishment or attachment proceedings. They mustbe covered by a corresponding appropriation as required by law.

Festego v. Fernando

The Director of Public Works, without obtaining a right of way and without theconsent of the owner of the land, Carmen Festego, constructed an irrigationcanal on Festego’s land.

Festego filed a suit for the return and restoration of the property to its formerform at the expense of Fernando. Fernando contends he cannot be held liablebecause he was acting as the Director of Public Works and is immune from suit.

Issue

Whether an officer who performs tortorious acts in the performance of his duty

can be sued

Held

An officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by law cannot hide behindthe plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability personally.

Justice Concepcion, however, in his dissent said that Fernando was being sued inhis capacity as Director of Public Works and the said canal constructed,irrespective of the manner by which it was done or built, is owned by thegovernment and constructed using government funds. The restoration of theproperty to Festego would cause government property to be removed ordestroyed. The real party in the case is the government and the suit should bedismissed because the State cannot be sued without its consent.

Ministerio v. Court of First Instance

Ministerio and other petitioners seek just compensation to which they areentitled for the expropriation of their property necessary for the widening of Gorordo Avenue in Cebu. The defendants, Public Highway Commissioner andAuditor General contend that because they are being sued in their officialcapacity as government officials, they are immune.

The said land in question was taken without expropriation proceedings,

Issue

Whether the case for just compensation should be dismissed on account of thedoctrine of immunity from suit.

Held

Government immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for injustice on acitizen. Government may expropriate private property for public use provided itgives the private owner just compensation.

Municipality of San Fernando v. Judge Firme



A driver of the dump truck employed by the municipality was on his way to theNaguilian River to get a load of gravel and sand for the repair of municipalstreets when it figured in an accident that caused the death of a person.

Petitioners contend that since the driver was performing an official duty for themunicipality, it cannot be held liable for monetary compensation.

Held

Distinction should be made between suability and liability. Suability depends onthe consent of the State to be sued and liability on the applicable law and theestablished facts. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State whenengaged in government functions and enjoy immunity from suit. They exerciseboth political and governmental functions as well as private and proprietaryfunctions. They are liable if it can be proved that they were acting in theirproprietary capacity.

The driver was acting in an official capacity, therefore the municipality was notliable.

DA v. NLRC

The DA entered into an agreement with Sultan Security Agency. Sultan says thatwhen the DA entered into the contract, it waived its immunity from suit.

Held

A State may be said to have waived its immunity from suit and descended to thelevel of an individual citizen when it enters into business contracts which areproprietary in nature and does not relate to the exercise of its governmentalsovereign function. In the case at bar, when the DA entered into the agreement,it performed a governmental function.

PNR v. IAC

State by virtue of its sovereign nature, is insulated from suits without its consent. The State, however, may be sued when it manifests its consent through a specialor general law or indicated implicitly, as when the State commences litigation forthe purpose of asserting an affirmative relief or when it enters into a proprietarycontract. When the State enters into contracts that are necessary in theperformance of its governmental functions, it is immune from suit. In this case,following the case of Malong v. PNR, the Court specified that the PNR does notperform any governmental function and is therefore not immune from suit.

Republic v. Sandoval

On Jan 22 1987, farmers rallied on Mendiola Bridge for land reform and fell victim

to police action. 12 rallyists died. The families of the victims of the so-called

Mendiola Massacre sued the government for damages and claimed thegovernment waived its immunity from suit when the Mendiola Commissionrecommended that compensation be given to the families of the victims andwhen President Aquino promised that the government would redress thegrievances of the rallyists.

Held

The Mendiola Commission only has recommendatory powers and the statementof President Aquino was merely an expression of solidarity with the rallyists anddid not mean that the State waived its immunity. It did not automatically makethe state liable. Although consent may be made impliedly, in this case, suchconsent still cannot be maintained.

Immunity from International Law

Sanders v. Veridiano

Sanders was Special Service Director of the US Naval Station in Olongapo.Respondents are suing the petitioners for libel in their private and personalcapacity. The petitioners and respondents were having problems that led to theantecedent facts of the case. Petitoners contend that the acts complainedresulted from the performance of their official duties and that the Court had no

jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of State immunity

Held

Petitioners were being sued in their capacity as officers of the USA by the natureof the letters. The mere allegation that the government functionary is being suedin his personal capacity does not automatically make him suable. Immunity of the state from suit is also part of international law.

US v. Reyes

Respondent Montoya is an American citizen employed as an ID checker in the USNavy Exchange at JUSMAG HQ in QC. She is married to a US Navy serviceman.Petitioner Bradford is also an American citizen and is the Activity ExchangeManager. After work, Montoya shopped and on the way to the car was searchedby another employee at the order of Bradford. Feeling aggrieved that she wasthe only employee searched, she filed a petition.

Issue

Whether Bradford can be sued and whether these acts were committed outsidethe scope of her official duty.



Held

Doctrine of State Immunity cannot be applied to officials being sued in theirprivate individual capacity and for acts done beyond the scope and place of official function.

M. H. Wykie v. Rarang

Petitioners actively participated in the POD as part of their official functions.Under the rule that US officials are immune from suit when performing officialfunctions, they should not be held liable for the questioned publication. It mustbe noted, however, that petitioners pursued in their personal capacity fortortorious acts in publishing libelous articles.

Issue

Are American naval officers who commit a crime while in the discharge of officialfunctions still covered by the principle of state immunity? Does the grant of rights, power, authority to the US under the Bases Treaty cover immunity of its

officers from crimes and torts?

Held

No. The killing of a person while on patrol duty, running over a child with recklessimprudence on an official duty cannot possibly be covered under ImmunityAgreements and State Immunity from Suit.

EOG Construction v. Vigilar

In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlements, through the BLISS DevelopmentCorporation, initiated a housing project on a government property along the eastbank of the Manggahan Floodway in Pasig City. The Ministry of HumanSettlements together with the Ministry of Public Works and Highways by virtue of an MOA entered into several individual contracts with construction companiesincluding EPG Construction. Under the contracts, the scope and construction andfunding therefor covered only 2/3 of each housing unit.

After complying with the contracts, EPG agreed to undertake and performadditional constructions upon the verbal request and assurance of DPWHUndersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds would be available. EPGConstruction completed the construction of the housing units by virtue of this“implied contract”.

EPG and the other contractors received payment for the work covered by thecontract but the expenses for “additional constructions” were left unpaid.

Petitioners submitted a demand letter to the DPWH Secretary recommended by

the DPWH Assistant Secretary for Legal Services Dominador Madamba whorecognied the existence of the “implied contracts” as he also opined that moneyclaims should be paid on the basis of quantum meruit .

The DPWH referred the claim to COA who returned the documents, saying thatthe dunds should be first made available to the COA before the COA could passupon and act on the claims. The DPWH Secretary requested the Secretary of Budget and Management to release funds for the money claims.

Sec. Vigilar denied the claim after the money was already released by the COA.

Issue

Whether or not the implied contract is null and void, and whether the State mayinvoke immunity from suit

Held

The SC said that under the circumstances, the respondent may not validly invokeand hide under the State cloak of invisibility against suit. The rule is notabsolute.

The SC looked at prior jurisprudence in Amigable v. Cuenca and Ministerio v. CFIwhere they ruled that the “doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannotserve as an instrument for perpetuating an injustice on a citizen.” It is just asimportant, if not more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of thegovernment if the rule of law is to be maintained.

Although the Amigable and Ministerio cases tackled the issue of State immunityvis-a-vis just compensation for expropriated property, the ruling is applicable tothe case at bar. The contractors should be duly compensated on the basis of “quantum meruit” for the work done since the housing project has beencompleted and under on the basis of quantum meruit for the work done sincethe housing project has been completed and under the control and disposition of the government. The fund for the money claim has already been released andDPWH officials themselves certify that such an “implied contract” existed andinterposed no objection to its payment.

Quiloña v. The Gen. Court Martial

Quiloña is a policeman assigned at the Western Police District and is chargedbefore the respondent Gen. Court Martial with the crime of murder on (2) counts.

Quiloña wrote to President Aquino of his desire to be tried by a civilian court forthe reason that the enactment of the PNP Law (RA 6975) placed him under thesole jurisdiction of the civilian courts.

RA 6975 took effect on January 1, 1991. It provides that criminal cases involvingPNP members are under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. However, courtsmartial shall continue to try PC-INP members who have already been arraigned



according to the Articles of War and that those PC-INP members not arraignedshall be transferred to the civil courts.

Held

RA 6975 was not yet in effect on December 28, 1990 when Quiloña wasarraigned. However, the court martial should have known that the Act hadalready been signed and approved on December 13, 1990 and had already beenpublished, informing everyone that it would take effect on January 1, 1991.

The SC held that this was precisely the reason why the Court Martial decided tohave Quiloña arraigned on Dec. 28, 1990 despite Quiloña’s vehement refusal toenter a plea.

The civilian character of the PNP declared by RA 6975 is paramount and the lawmandated the transfer of criminal cases against its members to civilian courts.

By closing its eyes to the provisions of RA 6975, the respondent court committeda grave abuse of discretion.

History of the Police Force

During the Commonwealth period, we had a Philippine Constabulary as nucleusof the Philippine Ground Force, now the AFP. The PC was made part of the PGFbut its administrative, supervisory, and directorial control was handled by theDepartment of the Interior.

After the war it was renamed as the National Police under the Department of National Defense as a major service component of the AFP.

Under Martial Law, the Integration Act of 1975 created the Integrated NationalPolice under the Office of the President with the PC (Philippine Constabulary) asthe nucleus and the local police forces as the civilian components.

The PC-INP was headed by the PC Chief (FVR) who served as concurrent Director-

General of the INP.

Napolcom exercised administrative control and supervision while local executivesexercised operational supervision and direction over INP units assigned withintheir localities.

The INP was placed under the command of the military PC which severely erodedthe civilian character of the INP.

The multiplicity in governance resulted in an inefficient police service.Integration also resulted in inequities since the military component had superiorbenefits and privileges.

During the 1986 ConCom, this was changed. The civilian character of the police

force was stressed in Art. XVI §6.

Carpio v. Executive Secretary

Carpio as a taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bart assails the validity of RA6975.

Arguments:

1. it emasculated the NAPOLCOM by limiting its powers to administrative

control while control remained with the Secretary of the Interior2. it granted appointive powers to the provincial governors and mayors

3. it granted disciplinary powers to People’s Law Enforcement Boards

4. it integrated the police into the military by keeping it for some timeunder the DND acting for the President as CINC

Held

1. NAPOLCOM being an agency of the executive department and not beingone of the Independent Constitutional Commissions, had to come underthe power of control of the President which may be exercised throughdepartment heads.

2. Governors and Mayors exercised their functions as deputies of the

NAPOLCOM, who could countermand the actions of local executives.3. The decisions of the PLEB were appealable to the NAPOLCOM.

4. The President exercises over the PNP not his power as CINC but as Chief Executive with power of both general supervision and control. Even if the President were to use his CINC powers, this would not affect thecivilian character of the police because the President is CINC as acivilian.

article xvi

Documents