art 3 sec 1 cases

7/27/2019 Art 3 Sec 1 Cases

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Due Process Clause Cases

1. Corona v. United Harbor Pilots, 283 SCRA 31 (1997)

FACTS:

Pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and the pilotage profession, the PPAthrough PPA General Manager Rogelio Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-92. Providing therein that "all

existing regular appointments which have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or thePPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only" and that "all appointments to harbor pilot positionsin all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of effectivity subjectto yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a rigid evaluation of performance."

ISSUE:Whether or not, the PPA violated the respondents' right to exercise their profession and their right to dueprocess of law in issuing PPA-AO No. 04-92, limiting the term of appointment of harbor pilots to one yearsubject to yearly renewal or cancellation.

HELD: Yes. UnconstitutionalNo due process of law.

The Court is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents' right

against deprivation of property without due process of law. Consequently, the instant petition must bedenied.

Section 1 of the Bill of Rights lays down what is known as the "due process clause" of theConstitution, viz.:

Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, .. .In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is adeprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. Whenone speaks of due process of law, however, adistinction must be made between matters ofprocedureand matters of substance. In essence,PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS "refers to the methodor mannerby which the law is enforced," while SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS "requires that the law itself, notmerely the procedures by which the lawwould be enforced, is fair, reasonable, and just." PPAAONo. 04-92 must be examined in light of this distinction.

As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental requirements of procedural dueprocess, are essential only when an administrative body exercises its quasi-judicia l function. Inthe performance of its executive or legislative functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, anadministrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice and hearing.

There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right.Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practicedonly by duly licensed individuals. Licensure is "thegranting of license especially to practice a profession." It is also "the system of granting licenses (as forprofessional practice) in accordance withestablishment standards." A license is a right or permissiongranted by some competent authority tocarry on a business or do an act which, without such license,would be illegal.

It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy theirprofession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of security knowingthat after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job training, they would have alicense which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner revoked by the PPA for mental orphysical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to contend with an annual cancellation of theirlicense which can be temporary or permanent depending on the outcome oftheir performance evaluation.Veteran pilots andneophytes alike are suddenly confronted with one-yearterms which ipso facto expireat the end of that period.Renewal of their license is now dependent on a "rigid evaluation of performance"which is conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term


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"renewal." It is this pre-evaluationcancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92unreasonableand constitutionally infirm. In a realsense, it is a deprivation of property without due process of law .

2. Army and Navy Club of Manila, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 36 , April 08, 1997

Actions; Ejectment; Illegal Detainer; For violations of the lease contract and after several demands, the

lessor has no other recourse but to file an action for illegal detainer and demand the lessees eviction

from the premises.Petitioner failed to pay the rents for seven (7) consecutive years. As of October,1989 when the action was filed, rental arrears ballooned to P7.2 million. Real estate taxes on the land

accumulated to P6,551,408.28 as of May, 1971. Moreover, petitioner failed to erect a multi-storey hotel in

the site. For violations of the lease contract and after several demands, the City of Manila had no other

recourse but to file the action for illegal detainer and demand petitioners eviction from the premises.

National Patrimony; Historical Markers; Statutes; R.A. 4846; Due Process; When the classification of

property into historical treasures or landmarks will involve the imposition of limits on ownership, the Bill of

Rights demands that it be done with due process both substantive and procedural.While the declaration

that it is a historical landmark is not objectionable, the recognition is, however, specious. We take the

occasion to elucidate on the views of Fr. Joaquin Bernas who was invited as amicus curiae in the recent

case of Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS where the historical character of Manila Hotel was also dealt with. He

stated that: The countrys artistic and historic wealth is therefore a proper subject for the exercise of

police power: . . . which the State may regulate. This is a function of the legislature. And once regulation

comes in, due process also comes into play. When the classification of property into historical treasures

or landmarks will involve the imposition of limits on ownership, the Bill of Rights demands that it be done

with due process both substantive and procedural. In recognition of this constitutional principle, the State

in fact has promulgated laws, both general and special, on the subject. x x x the current general law on

the subject is R.A. 4846, approved on June 18, 1966, and amended by P.D. No. 374.

Nowhere in R.A. 4846 does it state that the recognition of a historical landmark grants possessory right

over the property to a lessee, and neither is the National Historical Commission given the authority to vest

such right of ownership or possession of a private property to another. It behooves us to think why the

declaration was conferred only in 1992, three (3) years after the action for ejectment was instituted. We

can only surmise that this was merely an afterthought, an attempt to thwart any legal action taken against

the petitioner. Nonetheless, such certification does not give any authority to the petitioner to lay claim of

ownership, or any right over the subject property. Nowhere in the law does it state that such recognition

grants possessory rights over the property to the petitioner. Nor is the National Historical Commission

given the authority to vest such right of ownership or possession of a private property to the petitioner.

The law merely states that it shall be the policy of state to preserve and protect the important cultural

properties and National Cultural Treasures of the nation and to safeguard their intrinsic value. In line with

this, any restoration, reconstruction or preservation of historical buildings shall only be made under the

supervision of the Director of the National Museum. The authority of the National Historical Commission is

limited only to the supervision of any reconstruction, restoration or preservation of the architectural design

of the identified historical building and nothing more.


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Even if the recognition of the Army and Navy Club as a historical landmark made by the National

Historical Commission is valid, the historical significance of the Club, if any, shall not be affected if the

lessees eviction from the premises is warranted.Even assuming that such recognition made by the

National Historical Commission is valid, the historical significance of the Club, if any, shall not be affected

if petitioners eviction from the premises is warranted. Unfortunately, petitioner is merely a lessee of the

property. By virtue of the lease contract, petitioner had obligations to fulfill. Petitioner cannot just hide

behind some recognition bestowed upon it in order to escape from its obligation or remain in possession.

It violated the terms and conditions of the lease contract. Thus, pe titioners eviction from the premises is

inevitable.

3. Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita [GR 130442, 6 April 2000]

Facts:

On 26 April 1994, a red Cortina Ford, driven by C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita, with his aide, PO2 Java, in thefront seat and his wife with two ladies at the backseat, were overtaken by a Mazda pick-up owned byCongressman Manuel Puey and driven by one Reynaldo Consejo with four (4) passengers in the persons

of Alex Edwin del Rosario, Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristina Dawa. After the Mazda pick-uphas overtaken the red Cortina Ford, and after a vehicular collision almost took place, it accelerated speedand proceeded to Hacienda Aimee, a sugarcane plantation owned by the congressman. The red CortinaFord followed also at high speed until it reached the hacienda where Torcita and Java alighted and thePO2 Java whispered to him that there are armed men around them and that it is dangerous for them tocontinue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up. Torcita,upon the arrival of the back-up force of PNPCadiz City, proceeded to the place where Capt. Jesus Puey and Alex Edwin del Rosario were. On 6 July1994,12 verified administrative complaints were filed against Torcita for Conduct Unbecoming of a PoliceOfficer, Illegal Search, Grave Abuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority andViolation of COMELEC Gun Ban. The 12 administrative complaints were consolidated into 1 majorcomplaint for conduct unbecoming of a police officer. The Summary Dismissal Board, however, did notfind sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita threatened anybody with a gun, nor that a seriousconfrontation took place between the parties, nor that the urinating incident took place, and held that thecharges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. Still, while the Board found thatTorcita was "in the performance of his official duties" when the incident happened, he allegedly committeda simple irregularity in performance of duty (for being in the influence of alcohol while in performance ofduty) and was suspended for 20 days and salary suspended for the same period of time. Torcitaappealed his conviction to the Regional Appellate Board of the Philippine National Police (PNP, RegionVI, Iloilo City), but the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Whereupon, Torcita filed a petition forcertiorari in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City (Branch 31), questioning the legality of the conviction ofan offense for which he was not charged (lack of procedural due process of law). The Board filed amotion to dismiss, which was denied. The RTC granted the petition for certiorari and annulled thedispositive portion of the questioned decision insofar as it found Torcita guilty of simple irregularity in theperformance of duty. The Board appealed from the RTC decision, by petition of review to the Court ofAppeals, which affirmed the same for the reason that the respondent could not have been guilty ofirregularity considering that the 12 cases were eventually dismissed. The Board filed the petition for

review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Issue:Whether Torcita may be proceeded against or suspended for breach of internal discipline, when theoriginal charges against him were for Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer, Illegal Search, GraveAbuse of Authority and Violation of Domicile, and Abuse of Authority and Violation of COMELEC GunBan.

Held:Notification of the charges contemplates that the respondent be informed of the specific charges againsthim. The absence of specification of the offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper


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observance of due process. There can be no short-cut to the legal process. While the definition of themore serious offense is broad, and almost all-encompassing a finding of guilt for an offense, no matterhow light, for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be countenanced without violating therudimentary requirements of due process. Herein, the 12 administrative cases filed against Torcita did notinclude charges or offenses mentioned or made reference to the specific act of being drunk while in theperformance of official duty. There is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedingsthat Torcita was also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinkswhile in the performance of his duties. The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him

guilty of the offense for which he was not notified nor charged. Further, the cursory conclusion of theDismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks while in theperformance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring to this particularoffense. Even if he was prosecuted for irregular performance of duty, he could not have been found tohave the odor or smell of alcohol while in the performance of duty because he was not on duty at the timethat he had a taste of liquor; he was on a private trip fetching his wife.

4. Estrada vs Sandiganbayan GR 148560 Nov. 19, 2001

Facts

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An ActDefining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress upon us that

the, assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the validfrom the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the PlunderLaw to the crucible of constitutionality-mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice ofvagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) itabolishes the element of mensrea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all ofwhich are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to beinformed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Specifically, the provisions of the PlunderLaw claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4which are reproduced hereunder:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or materialpossession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly orindirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by anycombination or series of the following means or similar Schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids onthe public treasury;

(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks Or any otherform of pecuniary" benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract orproject or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Governmentor any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government "owned or controlled corporationsand their subsidiaries;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form

of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise orundertaking;

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/orimplementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustlyenrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people antithe Republic of the Philippines.


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Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessaryto prove each and every criminal act done bythe accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy toamass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt apattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As conciselydelineated by this Court during the oral arguments, the issues for resolution in the instant petition forcertiorari are:

(a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague;

(b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and thereforeviolates the rights of the accused to due process; and,

(c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within thepower of Congress to so classify it.

Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on thebasic principle that a legislative measure is presumed" to be in harmony with the Constitution. Courtsinvariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutionalattack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionalitytakes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government. If there is anyreasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is

ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with fullknowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of themajority. Hence in, determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law,courts should proceed with judicial restraint and act with Caution and forbearance. Every intend of the lawmust be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. Inconstruing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain.

Issue:

Whether or not RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as amended by

RA 7659 is unconstitutional?

Held:

The Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable theaccused to determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of theacts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime withreasonable certainty and particularity. Thus

1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in Connivance with members of his family,relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;

2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of thefollowing overt or criminal acts:(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the publictreasury;

(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other formof pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or projector by reason of the office or position of the public officer;(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Governmentor any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporationsor their subsidiaries;

(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other formof interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise orundertaking;


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(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/orimplementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

(f) by' taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustlyenrich himself or themselves at the expense and to file damage and prejudice of the Filipino people andthe Republic of the Philippines; and,

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth, amassed, accumulated or acquired is

at least P50,000,000.00. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would informthose who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will besustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one chargedwith its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct.Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes is the act of apublic officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series orcombination of acts enumeratedin Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.

The Court discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous as there is obviously none that willconfuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that theelements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and theprohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is complete informed of the accusations

against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the termscombination" and "series" in the key phrase a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found inSec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word pattern in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to petitioner,render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and over broad to be informed ofthe nature and cause of the accusation him, hence, violative ofhis fundamental right due process.

The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merelybecause general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them,much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional orstatutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress isnot restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in astatute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will isclear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law."

Issues:1. WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vagueNo. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who aresubject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. Theamended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty thevarious elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have committed.We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the termscombination and series in the key phrase a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. Theseomissions, according to the petitioner, render the

Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to beinformed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental rightto due process. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are usedherein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them. A statute or act may be said to bevague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most necessarily guessat its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution intwo (2) respectsit violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted byit, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out itsprovisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.


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A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because ofpossible chilling effect upon protected speech. The possible harm to society in permitting someunprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of othermay be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overlybroad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.

2. WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder andtherefore violates the rights of the accused to due process

No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not benecessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme orconspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyondreasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme orconspiracy.In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor thepresumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds culpability lies,the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The reasonable doubt st andard has acquired such exalted staturein the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accusedagainst conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crimewith which he is charged. Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyondreasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime

chargedthe element of the offense.

Relative to petitioners contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that pattern is avery important element of the crime of plunder; and that Sec. 4 is two pronged, (as) it contains a rule ofevidence and a substantive element of the crime, such that wit hout it the accused cannot be convictedof plunderWe do not subscribe to petitioners stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culledand understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no morethan prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purelyprocedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused butonly operated in furtherance of a remedy.What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitudeexacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

3. WON Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within thepower of Congress to so classify it.

No. It is malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Precisely because the constitutive crimes aremala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that theamended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed willfully, unlawfully and criminally.It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.In support of his contention In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement ofmens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks ofSenator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No.733 Senator Taada was only saying thatwhere the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and everycriminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable

doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far asthe acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved andthe requisite mens rea must be shown.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutionsunder the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since thedegree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent.Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have beenresolved in the affirmativeby the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimespunishable by reclusion perpetua to death.The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimesthat are, by their very nature, despicable, either because lifewas callously taken or the victim is treated


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like an animal andutterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal courseof his or her growth asa human being.There are crimes however in which the abomination lies in thesignificance andimplications of the subject criminal acts in thescheme of the larger socio-political and economic context inwhich the state finds itself to be struggling to develop andprovide for its poor and underprivilegedmasses.The legislative declaration in R.A. No.7659 that plunder is aheinous offense implies that it is amalum in se. For when theacts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, theyare mala in seand it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunderthe predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.

Held: PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080otherwise known as the Plunder Law, asamended by RA 7659, isCONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the lawunconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit

5. GONZALES V NLRC (ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY) 313 SCRA 169

FACTS

- Lorlene Gonzales was a Grade 6 teacher in Ateneo de Davao University from 1974 to 1993, when shewas terminated. In 1991, the Grade School Headmaster sent her a letter informing her of 2 complaintsfrom parents of her students for alleged use of corporal punishment. She demanded to know who theparents were because Ateneo wouldnt tell her. When she found out that Ateneo was soliciting complaintsfrom parents of her students, she demanded an investigation.

- Ateneo sent her a notice of investigation, schedule, Committee composition, affidavits of the parents,and the rules of procedure. She refused to take part in the investigation unless the rules of procedurewere revised. The committee, under advise of counsel, did not revise the rules, since it had been used fora different teacher in the past. The investigation went on, without her participation. In 1993, she wasasked to tender her resignation, otherwise she would be considered resigned.- Lorlene filed for illegal dismissal with the LA. The LA found that she was indeed illegally dismissedbecause although she was afforded due process, Ateneo failed to establish substantial evidence as toLorlenes guilt. It was established that she is a very good teacher, equipped with the appropriateeducational qualifications, trainings, seminars and work experiences. Such fact was affirmed by herpresent and former students, their parents, colleagues and the former headmaster of the grade school.As a matter of fact, 6 out of the nine 9 students and their parents/guardians retracted and withdrew theirstatements.

- NLRC reversed LAs decision, saying the dismissal was valid and legal.

ISSUEWON dismissal was valid and legal

HELDNO- In view of the foregoing, the conclusion of the NLRC is unwarranted.

No due process The committee refused to revise the rules of procedure. As a result, Lorlene wasntafforded a chance defend herself and to examine / cross-examine the accusers. Failure to prove bysubstantial evidenceThe evidence of Ateneo didnt measure up to the standard laid down in Ang Tibay v CIR: "substantial

evidence is more than mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as areasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

Lorlenes evidence She was able to prove that shes a competent and dedicated teacher of Ateneo for17 years. - Employment is not merely a contractual relationship; it has assumed the nature of propertyright. It may spell the difference whether or not a family will have food on their table, roof over their headsand education for their children. It is for this reason that the State has taken up measures to protectemployees from unjustified dismissals. It is also because of this that the right to security of tenure is notonly a statutory right but, more so, a constitutional right.

Disposition NLRC decision reversed and set aside. LA decision reinstated, affirmed and adopted.


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6. YNOT VS. IAC G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURALDUE PROCESS: (1) notice; (2) hearing; exceptions

SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS: (1) public interest requires government interference; (2) reasonablemeans necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose

FACTS:Petitioners6 carabaos were confiscated bythe police for having been transported from Masbate to Iloiloin violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin, challenging the constitutionality of said EO.The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law onthe ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this petition forreview.

ISSUE:Whether or not the confiscation of the carabaos amounted to arbitrary confiscation of property withoutdue process of law.

RULING:Minimum Requirements of Due Process: Notice and HearingThe minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not bedispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifyingcommentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of thisguaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We haveconsistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the lawof the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous DartmouthCollege Case, as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon enquiry and rendersjudgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reachof officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into aworn and empty catchword.

Exceptions to Notice and HearingThis is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a numberof admitted exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contraryevidence as long as such presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connectionbetween the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. There are instances when the needfor expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisanceper se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger itposes to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcoticdrugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for acriminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. Filthyrestaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protectthe public morals. In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of dueprocess in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general

welfare from a clear and present danger.

Due Process is a Restraint on Police Power

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraintsand is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State toregulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it extendsto all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the mostdemanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. Theindividual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he isborn and follows him still after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he


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does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, aslong as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under thepolice power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latinmaxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for thesubordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.

First Requisite of Substantive Due Process:Interests of the Public Generally Require Interference

xxx we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak, has a directrelevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosenin the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not undulyoppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banningthe slaughter of these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven yearsold if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fitfor farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.

Second Requisite of Substantive Due Process:Reasonable Means Necessary for the Accomplishment of Purpose, not Unduly Oppressive UponIndividuals

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executiveorder, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there bea lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes anabsolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabaoregardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from oneprovince to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between themeans employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missingWe do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can preventtheirindiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in oneprovince than in another.Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more thanmoving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibitionis made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simplykilling the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventingtheir slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transferas, not to be flippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have toreckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outrightconfiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities,usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained because the penalty prescribedwas fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused. Underthe challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported isimmediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

EO 626-A is unconstitutional

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, werereturned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond ofP12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered bythe trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediatelyimposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced uponthe petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty ofelementary fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensedwith notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is alsoconceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due


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process is not necessarily judicial only. In the exceptional cases accepted, however, there is a justificationfor the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to becorrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptorytreatment. The properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction.There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have beenproved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him underthe Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.

Angeles, Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have beenpronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority toimpose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused. We also mark, on top ofall this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in thequestioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed tocharitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat InspectionCommission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as theDirector of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "maysee fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilousopportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standardand the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when theymake their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunatebeneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can

supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their ownexclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that isnot "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and thereforeinvalid delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power becausethe method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the lawand, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscatedis denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. Theconferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender isa clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who aregranted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

7. Acebedo Optical Co. vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 100152, March 31, 2000Police Power as exercised by LGUs, restrictions and qualificationsPower of city mayor to grant/cancel/revoke business permitsGranting of business permits vs. granting of permit to practice profession

FACTS:Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. Permit was thereforissued, subject to certain conditions like prohibition of putting up an optical clinic, examining and/orprescribing reading and similar optical glasses, etc. When it was found that petitioner violated theseconditions, its business permit was cancelled.

ISSUE:Whether or not the imposition of special conditions by the public respondents were acts ultra vires

RULING:Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe regulations to promote thehealth, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. The State,through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to local government units, as agenciesof the State, in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Thisdelegation of police power is embodied in the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code xxxThe scope of police power has been held to be so comprehensive as to encompass almost all mattersaffecting the health, safety, peace, order, morals, comfort and convenience of the community. Police


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power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or grant business permits, ifexercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power.

Power of city mayor to grant business permitsThe authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business permits is beyond cavil. It is providedfor by law. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must always be exercised inaccordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all concerned to due process and equalprotection of the law.

But can city mayor cancel business permits or impose special conditions? As aptly discussed by theSolicitor General in his Comment, the power to issue licenses and permits necessarily includes thecorollary power to revoke, withdraw or cancel the same. And the power to revoke or cancel, likewiseincludes the power to restrict through the imposition of certain conditions.

Did the conditions or restrictions imposed amount to a confiscation of the business?

Distinction must be made between the grant of a license or permit to do business and the issuance of alicense to engage in the practice of a particular profession. The first is usually granted by the localauthorities and the second is issued by the Board or Commission tasked to regulate the particularprofession. A business permit authorizes the person, natural or otherwise, to engage in business or someform of commercial activity. A professional license, on the other hand, is the grant of authority to a natural

person to engage in the practice or exercise of his or her profession.

In the case at bar, what is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in thebusiness of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice ofoptometry as a corporate body or entity, although it does have in its employ, persons who are dulylicensed to practice optometry by the Board of Examiners in Optometry.

art 3 sec 1 cases

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