cases sec. 8 - 9 - cnl2

EDMUND B. PAGHARION

Rm. A338, 1730H – 2030H

Atty. Maria Luz Raneses-Raval Professor, Constitutional Law 2

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CASES: ARTICLE 3, SEC. 8 – 9

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS v. SECRETARY OF LABOR

27 SCRA 41 (1916

FACTS DOCTRINE OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

Petitioners pray for writs of certiorari and prohibition to restrain respondents,

the Secretary of Labor, the Director of Labor Relations and the Registrar of

Labor Organizations, from enforcing an order of cancellation of the

registration certificate of the Social Security System Employees Association —

hereinafter referred to as the SSSEA — which is affiliated to the Philippine

Association of Free Labor Unions — hereinafter referred to as PAFLU — as

well as to annul all proceedings in connection with said cancellation and to

prohibit respondents from enforcing Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875.

Petitioners, likewise, pray for a writ of preliminary injunction pending the final

determination of this case. In their answer, respondents traversed some

allegations of fact and the legal conclusions made in the petition.

Pending such resolution, or on December 16, the PAFLU, the SSSEA, Alfredo

Fajardo "and all the officers and members" of the SSSEA commenced the

present action, for the purpose stated at the beginning of this decision,

upon the ground that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 violates their

freedom of assembly and association, and is inconsistent with the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights; that it unduly delegates judicial power to an

administrative agency; that said Section 23 should be deemed repealed by

ILO-Convention No. 87; that respondents have acted without or in excess of

jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating, on

November 19, 1963, its decision dated October 22, 1963, beyond the 30-day

period provided in Section 23(c) of Republic Act No. 875; that "there is no

appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary

course of law"; that the decision complained of had not been approved by

the Secretary of Labor; and that the cancellation of the SSSEA's certificate of

registration would cause irreparable injury.

To be registered, pursuant to Section 23(b) of Republic Act No. 875, a labor

organization, association or union of workers must file with the Department

of Labor the following documents:

(1) A copy of the constitution and by-laws of the organization

together with a list of all officers of the association, their addresses

and the address of the principal office of the organization;

(2) A sworn statement of all the officers of the said organization,

association or union to the effect that they are not members of

the Communist Party and that they are not members of any

organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by

force or by any illegal or unconstitutional method; and

(3) If the applicant organization has been in existence for one or

more years, a copy of its last annual financial report.

The Constitution does not guarantee these rights and privileges, much less said

personality, which are mere statutory creations, for the possession and exercise of

which registration is required to protect both labor and the public against abuses,

fraud, or impostors who pose as organizers, although not truly accredited agents of

the union they purport to represent. Such requirement is a valid exercise of the police

power, because the activities in which labor organizations, associations and union of

workers are engaged affect public interest, which should be protected. Furthermore,

the obligation to submit financial statements, as a condition for the non-cancellation

of a certificate of registration, is a reasonable regulation for the benefit of the

members of the organization, considering that the same generally solicits funds or

membership, as well as oftentimes collects, on behalf of its members, huge amounts

of money due to them or to the organization.

prescribing the period within which a decision should be rendered are directory, not

mandatory in nature — in the sense that, a judgment promulgated after the

expiration of said period is not null and void, although the officer who failed to comply

with law may be dealt with administratively, in consequence of his delay — unless the intention to the contrary is manifest.

Justice Black: ―When a statute specifies the time at or within which an act is to be

done by a public officer or body, it is generally held to be directory only as to the

time, and not mandatory, unless time is of the essence of the thing to be done, or the

language of the statute contains negative words, or shows that the designation of the

time was intended as a limitation of power, authority or right.‖

The theory to the effect that Section 23 of Republic Act No. 875 unduly curtails the

freedom of assembly and association guaranteed in the Bill of Rights is devoid of

factual basis. The registration prescribed in paragraph (b) of said section 1 is not a

limitation to the right of assembly or association, which may be exercised with

or withoutsaid registration. 2 The latter is merely a condition sine qua non for

the acquisition of legal personality by labor organizations, associations or unions and

the possession of the "rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor

organizations".

The determination of the question whether the requirements of paragraph (b) have

been met, or whether or not the requisite financial report or non-subversive affidavits

have been filed within the period above stated, is not judicial power. Indeed, all

officers of the government, including those in the executive department, are

supposed, to act on the basis of facts, as they see the same. This is specially true as

regards administrative agencies given by law the power to investigate and render

decisions concerning details related to the execution of laws the enforcement of

which is entrusted thereto.

B.S.P. v. Araos, we held that there is no

incompatibility between Republic Act No.

875 and the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights. Upon the other hand, the

cancellation of the SSSEA's registration

certificate would not entail a dissolution of

said association or its suspension. The

existence of the SSSEA would not be

affected by said cancellation, although its

juridical personality and its statutory rights

and privileges — as distinguished from

those conferred by the Constitution —

would be suspended thereby.

Footnotes:

"Any labor organization, association or union

of workers duly organized for the material,

intellectual and moral well being of its

members shall acquire legal personality and

be entitled to all the rights and privileges

granted by law to legitimate labor

organizations within thirty days of filing with the

office of the Secretary of Labor notice of its

due organization and existence and the

following documents, together with the

amount of five pesos as registration fee.

EDMUND B. PAGHARION

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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMADO V. HERNANDEZ

G.R. No. L-6025 May 30, 1964

FACTS DOCTRINE /OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

I. That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously

thereafter, until the present time, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and the place which they had

chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the Philippines, the

said accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-

one (31) defendants charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 19071, 14082, 14270, 14315 and 14344 of the

Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and also with others whose whereabouts and

identities are still unknown, the said accused and their other co-conspirators, being then high ranking

officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.),

which is now actively engaged in an armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines thru

act theretofore committed and planned to be further committed in Manila and other places in the

Philippines, and of which party the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"(H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly

known as the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks), unlawfully and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the "Hukbong

Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) or the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks) to rise publicly and take arms against

the Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the purpose

of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the government and laws thereof as

in fact the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or "Hukbalahaps" have risen publicly and taken

arms to attain the said purpose by then and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks

against police, constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary

means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have

then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of

private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate

the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as. follows, to wit: (Enumeration of thirteen attacks on

government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946, August 6, 1946, April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947,

August 19, 1947, June, 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950, August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950,

September 12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29, 1950.)

II. That during the period of time and under the same circumstances herein-above indicated the said

accused in the above-entitled case, conspiring among themselves and with several others as

aforesaid, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously organized, established, led and/or maintained the

Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee on Labor Organizations

(CLO), with central offices in Manila and chapters and affiliated or associated labor unions and other

"mass organizations" in different places in the Philippines, as an active agency, organ, and

instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and as such agency, organ, and

instrumentality, to fully cooperate in, and synchronize its activities — as the CLO thus organized,

established, led and/or maintained by the herein accused and their co-conspirators, has in fact fully

cooperated in and synchronized its activities with the activities of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng

Bayan" (H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the

Philippines (P.K.P.), to thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the complete and permanent success of

the above-mentioned armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.

After trial the Court of First Instance found, as against appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the following:

The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be

considered as a criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted into an

advocacy of action. In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is

insufficient unless the communist advocates action, immediate and positive, the actual

agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to use force and

violence in an uprising of the working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize

the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or intended or

contemplated, the Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacy

of the proletariat a Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of

Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet actually considered as engaging

in the criminal field subject to punishment. Only when the Communist advocates action

and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of conspiracy to commit

rebellion.

In this respect, the mere fact of his giving and rendering speeches favoring Communism

would not make him guilty of conspiracy, because there was no evidence that the

hearers of his speeches of propaganda then and there agreed to rise up in arms for the

purpose of obtaining the overthrow of the democratic government as envisaged by the

principles of Communism.

The appellant was a politician and a labor leader and it is not unreasonable to suspect

that his labor activities especially in connection with the CLO and other trade unions, were

impelled and fostered by the desire to secure the labor vote to support his political

ambitions. It is doubtful whether his desire to foster the labor union of which he was the

head was impelled by an actual desire to advance the cause of Communism, not merely

to advance his political aspirations.

OTHER CITED DOCTRINES

Supreme Court of the United States:

In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a

status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the relationship of that

status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of

violent overthrow), that relationship must be sufficiently substantial to satisfy the

EDMUND B. PAGHARION

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(1) that he is a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and as such had aliases, namely,

Victor or Soliman;

(2) that he was furnished copies of "Titis", a Communist publication, as well as other publications of the

Party;

(3) that he held the position of President of the Congress of Labor Organizations;

(4) that he had close connections with the Secretariat of the Communist Party and held continuous

communications with its leaders and its members;

(5) that he furnished a mimeographing machine used by the Communist Party, as well as clothes and

supplies for the military operations of the Huks;

(6) that he had contacted well-known Communists coming to the Philippines and had gone abroad to

the WFTU conference Brussels, Belgium as a delegate of the CLO, etc. Evidence was also received by

the court that Hernandez made various speeches encouraging the people to join in the Huk movement

in the provinces.

The court also found that there was a close tie-up between the Communist Party and the Congress of

Labor Organizations, of which Hernandez was the President, and that this Congress was organized by

Hernandez in conjunction with other Huks, namely: Alfredo Saulo, Mariano Balgos, Guillermo

Capadocia, etc.

(1) The ultimate goal of the Communist Party is to overthrow the president government by force of aims

and violence; thru armed revolution and replace it with the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat the

Communist Party carries its program of armed overthrow of the present government by organizing the

HMB and other forms of organization's such as the CLO, PKM, union organizations, and the professional

and intellectual group; the CLO was organized by the Trade Union Division TUD of the Communist Party.

(2) A good majority of the members of the Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the

CLO were also top ranking officials of the Communist Party; activities undertaken by the TUD - the vital

undertaking of the TUD is to see that the directives coming from the organizational bureau of the

Communist Party can be discussed within the CLO especially the Executive Committee. And it is a fact

that since a good majority of the members of the Executive Committee are party members, there is no

time, there is no single time that those directives and decisions of the organizational department, thru

the TUD are being objected to by the Executive Committee of the CLO. These directives refer to how

the CLO will conduct its functions. The executive committee is under the chairmanship of accused

Amado V. Hernandez.

(3) The CLO played its role in the overall Communist program of armed overthrow of the present

government and its replacement by the dictatorship of the proletariat by means of propaganda - by

propagating the principles of Communism, by giving monetary aid, clothing, medicine and other forms

of material help to the HMB. This role is manifested in the very constitution of the CLO itself which

expounded the theory of classless society and the eradication of social classes (par. 5, Sec. 1, Art. 2, page 18 of the CLO Constitution contained in the Fourth Annual Convention Souvenir Program of the CLO.

concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Membership, without more, in an organization

engaged in illegal advocacy, it is now said, has not heretofore been recognized

by this Court to be such a relationship. ... .

What must be met, then, is the argument that membership, even when

accompanied by the elements of knowledge and specific intent, affords an

insufficient quantum of participation in the organization's alleged criminal

activity, that is, an insufficiently significant form of aid and encouragement to

permit the imposition of criminal sanctions on that basis. It must indeed be

recognized that a person who merely becomes a member of an illegal

organization, by that "act" alone need be doing nothing more than signifying his

assent to its purposes and activities on one hand, and providing, on the other,

only the sort of moral encouragement which comes from the knowledge that

others believe in what the organization is doing. It may indeed be argued that

such assent and encouragement do fall short of the concrete, practical impetus

given to a criminal enterprise which is lent for instance by a commitment on the

part of the conspirator to act in furtherance of that enterprise. A member, as

distinguished from a conspirator, may indicate his approval of a criminal

enterprise by the very fact of his membership without thereby necessarily

committing himself to further it by any act or course of conduct whatever.

(Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 6 L. ed. 782)

EDMUND B. PAGHARION

Rm. A338, 1730H – 2030H


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PEOPLE v. SIMEON FERRER

48 SCRA 382 (G.R. Nos. Li32613-14, 27 December 1972)


Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared

RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus,

dismissing the information of subversion against thefollowing: 1.)

Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the

Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and

insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men

to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being

members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and

overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating

Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is

of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.)

Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP

without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a

presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP

regardless of voluntariness.

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act

to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership

therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being

although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to

overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also

by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP

is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section

4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the

CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a

designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to

filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for

furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open

court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows

the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under

oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its

valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.

Issues: (1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto

law. (2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the

benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a

legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured

as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The

statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied

retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively

is also an ex post facto law.)

… the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy

for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of

SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also

to other organizations having the same purpose and their

successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person.

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be

shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the

goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of

MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required

proof of a member’s direct participation. Why is membership

punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the

organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4

prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of

the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given

an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in

accordance with Section 8. The statute applies the principle of

mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been

Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S.

Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Charter of

the City of Los Angeles which provided:

... [N]o person shall hold or retain

or be eligible for any public office

or employment in the service of

the City of Los Angeles, in any

office or department thereof,

either elective or appointive, who

has within five (5) years prior to the

effective date of this section

advised, advocated, or taught, or

who may, after this section

becomes effective, become a

member of or affiliated with any

group, society, association,

organization or party which

advises, advocates or teaches or

has within said period of five (5)

years advised, advocated, or

taught the overthrow by force or

violence of the Government of

the United States of America or of

the State of California.

In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the

prospective application of the Act to the petitioner

therein, thus:

... Immaterial here is any opinion

we might have as to the charter

provision insofar as it purported to

apply restrospectively for a five-

EDMUND B. PAGHARION

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R.A. No. 1700 "AN ACT TO OUTLAW THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE

PHILIPPINES AND SIMILAR ASSOCIATIONS PENALIZING MEMBERSHIP

THEREIN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

made.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to

overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of

guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The

EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise

of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before

the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble,

careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further

stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and

association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP

are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of

DEMOCRACY.

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution

under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences

of subversion, the following elements must also be established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that

the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of

the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER.

Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.

2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive

purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.

year period to its effective date.

We assume that under the Federal

Constitution the Charter

Amendment is valid to the extent

that it bars from the city's public

service persons who, subsequently

to its adoption in 1941, advise,

advocate, or reach the violent

overthrow of the Government or

who are or become affiliated with

any group doing so. The provisions

operating thus prospectively were

a reasonable regulation to

protect the municipal service by

establishing an employment

qualification of loyalty to the State

and the United States.

... Unlike the provisions of the

charter and ordinance under

which petitioners were removed,

the statute in the Lovett case did

not declare general and

prospectively operative standards

of qualification and eligibility for

public employment. Rather, by its

terms it prohibited any further

payment of compensationto

named individuals or employees.

Under these circumstances,

viewed against the legislative

background, the statutewas held

to have imposed penalties without

judicial trial.

EDMUND B. PAGHARION

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RIVER BRIDGE v. WARREN BRIDGE,

11 Pet. 420, 641 (U.S. 1837)


In 1650, the Legislature of Massachusetts granted to Harvard College

the liberty and power to dispose of a ferry by lease or otherwise from

Charlestown to Boston, passing over Charles River. The right to set up a

ferry between these places had been given by the governor under

the authority of the Court of Assistance, by an order dated November

9, 1636, to a particular individual, and was afterwards leased

successively to others, they having the privilege of taking tolls

regulated in the grant; and when, in 1650, the franchise of this ferry

was granted to the college, the rights of the lessees in the same had

expired. Under the grant, the college continued to hold the ferry by its

lessees and receive the profits therefrom until 1785, when the

Legislature of Massachusetts incorporated a company to build a

bridge over Charles River where the ferry stood, granting them tolls,

the company to pay to Harvard College two hundred pounds a year

during the charter, for forty years, which was afterwards extended to

seventy years, after which the bridge was to become the property of

the Commonwealth. The bridge was built under this charter, and the

corporation received the tolls allowed by the law, always keeping the

bridge in order and performing all that was enjoined on them to do. In

1828, the Legislature of Massachusetts incorporated another company

for the erection of another bridge, the Warren Bridge, over Charles

River from Charlestown to Boston, allowing the company to take tolls,

commencing in Charlestown, near where the Charles River Bridge

commenced, and terminating in Boston about eight hundred feet

from the termination of the Charles River Bridge. The bridge was to

become free after a few years, and has actually become free.

Travelers who formerly passed over the Charles River Bridge from

Charlestown square now pass over the Warren Bridge, and thus the

Charles River Bridge Company are deprived of the tolls they would

have otherwise received. The value of the franchise granted by the

Act of 1783 is now entirely destroyed. The proprietors of the Charles

River Bridge filed a bill in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

against the proprietors of the Warren Bridge, first for an injunction to

prevent the erection of the bridge and afterwards for general relief,

stating that the act of the Legislature of Massachusetts authorizing the

building of the Warren Bridge was an act impairing the obligations of

The object and the end of all Government is to promote the

happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is

established, and it can never be assumed that the Government

intended to diminish its power of accomplishing the end for which it

was created; and in a country like ours, free, active, and

enterprising, continually advancing in numbers and wealth, new

channels of communication are daily found necessary both for

travel and trade, and are essential to the comfort, convenience,

and prosperity of the people. A State ought never to be presumed

to surrender this power because, like the taxing power, the whole

community have an interest in preserving it undiminished, and,

when a corporation alleges that a State has surrendered, for

seventy years, its power of improvement and public

accommodation in a great and important line of travel, along

which a vast number of its citizens must daily pass, the community

have a right to insist, in the language of this Court,"that its

abandonment ought not to be presumed in a case in which the

deliberate purpose of the State to abandon it does not appear."

The continued existence of a Government would be of no great

value if, by implications and presumptions, it was disarmed of the

powers necessary to accomplish the ends of its creation, and the

functions it was designed to perform transferred to the hands of

privileged corporations. The rule of construction announced by the

Court was not confined to the taxing power, nor is it so limited in the

opinion delivered. On the contrary, it was distinctly placed on the

ground that the interests of the community were concerned in

preserving, undiminished, the power then in question; and

whenever any power of the State is said to be surrendered or

diminished, whether it be the taxing power or any other affecting

the public interest, the same principle applies, and the rule of

construction must be the same. No one will question that the

interests of the great body of the people of the State would, in this

instance, be affected by the surrender of this great line of travel to

a single corporation, with the right to exact toll and exclude

competition for seventy years. While the rights of private property

Lord Stowell, whose eminent qualifications as a

judge entitle him to great reverence, on that

occasion said:

"A general presumption arising from these

considerations is that government does not mean to

divest itself of this universal attribute of sovereignty

conferred for such purposes (to be used for peace,

as well as war) unless it is so clearly and

unequivocally expressed. In conjunction with this

universal presumption must be taken also the wise

policy of our own peculiar law, which interprets the

grants of the Crown in this respect by other rules than

those which are applicable in the construction of the

grants of individuals. Against an individual, it is

presumed that he meant to convey a benefit with

the utmost liberality that his words will bear. It is

indifferent to the public in which person an interest

remains, whether in the grantor or the taker. With

regard to the grant of the sovereign, it is far

otherwise. It is not held by the sovereign himself, as

private property, and no alienation shall be

presumed except what is clearly and indisputably

expressed."

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a contract, and therefore repugnant to the Constitution of the United

States. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts dismissed the bill of the

complainants, and the case was brought by writ of error to the

Supreme Court of the United States under the provisions of the 25th

Section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The judgment of the Supreme

Judicial Court of Massachusetts dismissing the bill of the plaintiffs in

error was affirmed.

The plaintiffs in error insisted on two grounds for the reversal of the

judgment or decree of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. 1. That,

by the grant of 1650, Harvard College was entitled, in perpetuity, to

the right to keep a ferry between Charlestown and Boston; that the

right was exclusive, and the legislature had no right to establish

another ferry on the same line of travel, because it would infringe the

rights of the college and those of the plaintiffs under the charter of

1785.

2. That the true construction of the acts of the Legislature of

Massachusetts granting the privilege to build a bridge necessarily

imported that the Legislature would not authorize another bridge, and

especially a free one, by the side of the Charles River Bridge, so that

the franchise which they held would be of no value, and that this

grant of the franchise of the ferry to the college, and the grant of the

right of pontage to the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge, is a

contract which is impaired by the law authorizing the erection of the

Warren Bridge. By the Court. It is very clear that, in the form in which

this case comes before us, being a writ of error to a State court, the

plaintiffs, in claiming under either of these rights, must place

themselves on the ground of contract, and cannot support

themselves upon the principles that the law divests vested rights. It is

well settled by the decisions of this Court that a State law may be

retrospective in its character, and may divest vested rights, and yet

not violate the Constitution of the United States unless it also impairs

the obligation of contract.

are sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the community also

have rights, and that the happiness and wellbeing of every citizen

depends on their faithful preservation.

When land is granted, the State can exercise no acts of ownership

over it unless it be taken for public use, and the same rule applies to

a grant for a bridge, a turnpike-road, or any other public

improvement. It would assume a bold position to say that a

subsequent Legislature may resume the ownership of a tract of land

which had been granted at a preceding session, and yet the

principle is the same in regard to vested rights under an act of

incorporation. By granting a franchise, the State does not divest

itself of any portion of its sovereignty, but to advance the public

interests, one or more individuals are vested with a capacity to

exercise the powers necessary to attain the desired object. In the

case under consideration, the necessary powers to construct and

keep up the Charles River Bridge were given to Thomas Russell and

his associates. This did not withdraw the bridge from the action of

the State sovereignty any more than it is withdrawn from land which

it has granted. In both cases, the extent of the grant may become

a question for judicial investigation and decision, but the rights

granted are protected by the law.

"Where the mind labors to discover the design of the Legislature, it

seizes everything from which aid can be derived, and, in such a

case, the title claims a degree of notice, and will have its due share

of consideration. "

The grant remains in full force… that the thing granted shall not be

resumed or impaired by the grantor.

…the State impliedly contracts not to resume its grant or to do any

act to the prejudice or destruction of its grant.

EDMUND B. PAGHARION

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CITY OF MANILA V. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA

40 Phil 349, (G.R. No. L-14355 October 31, 1919)


The defendant, the Comunidad de Chinos de Manila [Chinese

Community of Manila], answering the petition of the plaintiff, alleged

that it was a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue

of the laws of the Philippine Islands, having for its purpose the benefit

and general welfare of the Chinese Community of the City of Manila;

that it was the owner of parcels one and two of the land described in

paragraph 2 of the complaint; that it denied that it was either

necessary or expedientthat the said parcels be expropriated for street

purposes; that existing street and roads furnished ample means of

communication for the public in the district covered by such

proposed expropriation; that if the construction of the street or road

should be considered a public necessity, other routes were available,

which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense

and without disturbing the resting places of the dead; that it had a

Torrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in question had

been used by the defendant for cemetery purposes; that a great

number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if said

expropriation be carried into effect, it would disturb the resting places

of the dead, would require the expenditure of a large sum of money

in the transfer or removal of the bodies to some other place or site and

in the purchase of such new sites, would involve the destruction of

existing monuments and the erection of new monuments in their

stead, and would create irreparable loss and injury to the defendant

and to all those persons owning and interested in the graves and

monuments which would have to be destroyed; that the plaintiff was

without right or authority to expropriate said cemetery or any part or

portion thereof for street purposes; and that the expropriation, in fact,

was not necessary as a public improvement.

The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact,

under the law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may

expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court

in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question;

that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the

advisible purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions

concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere

appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and,

when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the

law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value.

"the necessity and expediency of exercising the right of

eminent domain are questions essentially political and

not judicial,"

It is well settled that although the legislature must

necessarily determine in the first instance whether the

use for which they (municipalities, etc.) attempt to

exercise the power is a public one or not, their

(municipalities, etc.) determination is not final, but is

subject to correction by the courts, who may

undoubtedly declare the statute unconstitutional, if it

shall clearly appear that the use for which it is proposed

to authorize the taking of private property is in reality not

public but private."

…what is a public use is a legislative question But, as long as there is a constitutional or statutory

provision denying the right to take land for any use other

than a public use, it occurs to us that the question

whether any particular use is a public one or not is

ultimately, at least, a judicial question.

It was then held that land already devoted to a public

use cannot be taken by the public for another use which

is inconsistent with the first, without special authority from

the Legislature, or authority granted by necessary and

reasonable implication.

The court said that it is unquestionable that the

Legislature has the power to authorize the taking of land

already applied to one public use and devote it to

another. When the power is granted to municipal or

private corporations in express words, no question can

arise.

But when the statute does not designate the

property to be taken nor how may be taken,

then the necessity of takingparticular

property is a question for the courts. Where

the application to condemn or appropriate

is made directly to the court, the question

(of necessity) should be raised and

decided in limene. (Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs.

Toledo, Ry, etc., Co. (72 Ohio St., 368 [106 Am. St.

rep., 622, 628)

The taking of private property for any use

which is not required by the necessities or

convenience of the inhabitants of the state,

is an unreasonable exercise of the right of

eminent domain, and beyond the power of

the legislature to delegate.

(Bennett vs. Marion, 106 Iowa, 628, 633; Wilson vs. Pittsburg, etc. Co., 222 Pa. St., 541, 545;

Greasy, etc. Co. vs. Ely, etc. Co., 132 Ky., 692,

697.)

The very foundation of the right to exercise

eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and

that necessity must be of a public

character. The ascertainment of the

necessity must precede or accompany, and

not follow, the taking of the land.(Morrison vs. Indianapolis, etc. Ry. Co.,

166 Ind., 511; Stearns vs. Barre, 73 Vt., 281;

Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry. etc. Co., 72

Ohio St., 368.)

EDMUND B. PAGHARION

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LEONCIO SEÑA Y MEDINA vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY and THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT

G.R. No. 15915 September 7, 1921


This is an application for the registration of a parcel of land situated in

the barrio of Palsabañgon, municipality of Pagbilao, Province of

Tayabas, containing three lots of which lot No. 2 is the only one in

question. Said lot No. 2 is composed of 35, 327 square meters, and is

occupied by the Manila Railroad Company, the same being within

civil reservation No. 3 of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas (G. L. R.

O. reservation Case No. 242). The lower court denied the registration

of said lot upon the ground that the application for registration had

not been presented within the time required by law in said civil

reservation proceedings.It appears that by Executive Order No. 112,

dated December 3, 1914, the Governor-General, pursuant to the

provisions of Act No. 648, reserved "for railroad purposes" a strip of land

30 meters wide and more than 80 kilometers long, from the

municipality of Lucena to the municipality of Caluag, Province of

Tayabas. Lot No. 2 in question is included within said reservation.

Upon being duly notified by the Governor-General of said Executive

Order, the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of

Tayabas, pursuant to the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 648, on the

21st day of December, 1914, issued the following notice to all the

parties concerned:

Whereas under the provisions of Act No. 648 of the Philippine

Commission, by executive order there have been reserved from

settlement or public sale and for railroad purposes the following

described lands the public domain the use of which has not otherwise

been directed by law.

Notice is hereby given that claims for all private lands, buildings, and

interests therein, within the limits aforesaid, must be presented in said

court for registration under 'The Land Registration Act' within six

calendar months from the date of this notice, and that all, lands,

buildings and interests therein, within the limits aforesaid not so

presented within the time herein limited will be conclusively adjudged

to be public lands, and all claims on the part of private individuals for

such lands, buildings, or an interest therein not so presented will be

forever barred. The lower court denied said petition upon the ground

that, the same not having been presented within the six months'

period provided by Act No. 627, the land in question was conclusively

presumed to be public land.

The appellant makes two principal assignments of error: That the lower

court erred (1) in not finding that Executive Order No. 112 was void

and of no effect; and (2) in finding that the right of the petitioner had prescribed.

A historical research discloses the meaning of the term 'public use'

to be one of constant growth. As society advances, it demands

upon the individual increase and each demand is a new use to

which the resources of the individual may be devoted."

It cannot be denied that a railroad is a public necessity in this

country — a factor indispensable to its economic development and

material welfare. It is in recognition of this fact that railroad

corporations are empowered by law to exercise the right of

eminent domain. … therefore of the opinion that a railroad is a

public use, for "whatever is beneficially employed for the

community is a public use."

http://philippinelaw.info/statutes/act648.html




EDMUND B. PAGHARION

Rm. A338, 1730H – 2030H


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J. M. TUASON & CO., INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-18128 December 26, 1961


The Court of First Instance, after the appellate court's decision

became final and upon return of the records in due course, issued writ

of execution of the judgment against Rosete and Dizon, as prayed for

by the landowner Tuason & Company.

the Company claiming mainly that the Republic Act was

unconstitutional, null and void, as legislation aimed at depriving it of its

property for the benefit of squatters and occupants, even if the

property had been actually subdivided, and its lots were being sold to

the public; and that respondent officers threatened to enforce said

law by initiating expropriation proceedings. At petitioner's request,

Judge Hermogenes Caluag of the Quezon City Court of First Instance

(to whom the prohibition case was assigned) issued an ex parte writ of

preliminary injunction on November 18, 1960, upon the filing of a bond

of P20,000.

The Court of Appeals (Second Division) refused to lift the preliminary

injunction; on the contrary, on February 26, upon motion of one of the

respondents, the Land Tenure Administration, it clarified the previous

writ of preliminary injunction.

The Land Tenure Administration avers that the issuance of the

injunction in the prohibition case (Q-5527), the denial of the motion to

dismiss the case, the refusal to dissolve the injunction, and the refusal

to have the complaint for expropriation docketed were all in abuse of

discretion and excess of jurisdiction; that furthermore, venue was

improperly laid, because an action for prohibition is personal in

character, and neither petitioner nor any of the respondents in said

prohibition case were domiciled in Quezon City. Petitioner Land

Tenure Administration, therefore, prayed that Judge Caluag be

ordered by this Court to refrain from proceeding with the prohibition

case, from enforcing the writ of preliminary injunction issued therein,

from issuing orders of demolition of the tenant's houses, and to allow

the expropriation case to be docketed and regularly proceeded with.

The Bill of Rights, in requiring that "private property shall not be taken

for public use without just compensation," and Article XIII, section 4

in prescribing that "Congress may authorize, upon payment of just

compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into

small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals," prohibit any

disturbance of proprietary rights without coetaneous payment of

just indemnity. Hence, the mere filing of the condemnation

proceedings for the benefit of tenants cannot, by itself alone,

lawfully suspend the condemnee's dominical rights, whether of

possession, enjoyment, or disposition. And this is especially the case

where final and executory judgments of ejectment have been

obtained against the occupants of the property.

…the issue of constitutionality would be like a prejudicial question

to the expropriation, as it would be a waste of time and effort to

appoint evaluation commissioners and debate the market value of

the property sought to be condemned if it turned out that the

condemnation was illegal.

It needs no argument to show that by restraining the land owner

from enforcing even final judgments in his favor to recover

possession of his property, as well as from disposing of it to persons

of his choice, he is deprived of the substance of ownership, and his

title is left as an empty shell. The land owner would then be deprived

of those attributes of ownership that give it value, and his property is

virtually taken from him without compensation and in violation of

the Constitution, particularly in view of the fact that R.A. 2616 (unlike

previous Acts of similar character) does not even provide for a

deposit of the current rentals by the tenants during the pendency

of the proceedings (Cf. R.A. No. 1126, section 5). The Bill of Rights, in

requiring that "private property shall not be taken for public use

without just compensation," and Article XIII, section 4 in prescribing

that "Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation,

the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and

conveyed at cost to individuals," prohibit any disturbance of

proprietary rights without coetaneous payment of just indemnity.

Hence, the mere filing of the condemnation proceedings for the

benefit of tenants cannot, by itself alone, lawfully suspend the

condemnee's dominical rights, whether of possession, enjoyment,

or disposition.

Cochiong vs. Dinglasan, 79 Phil. 125, this Court

quoted with approval from 28 Am. Jur. 369-371 the

rule that —

It is recognized, however, that an injunction

will lie to restrain the threatened

enforcement of an invalid law where the

lawful use and enjoyment of private

property will be injuriously affected by its

enforcement ...,

EDMUND B. PAGHARION

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EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE v. DULAY

149 SCRA 305, 311 – 312 (1987)


The question raised in this petition is whether or not Presidential

Decrees Numbered 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed and

superseded Sections 5 to 8 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court,

such that in determining the just compensation of property in an

expropriation case, the only basis should be its market value as

declared by the owner or as determined by the assessor, whichever is

lower. On February 17, 1981, the respondent judge issued the order of

condemnation declaring the petitioner as having the lawful right to

take the properties sought to be condemned, upon the payment of

just compensation to be determined as of the filing of the complaint.

The respondent judge also issued a second order, subject of this

petition, appointing certain persons as commissioners to ascertain and

report to the court the just compensation for the properties sought to

be expropriated.

The only issue raised in this petition is whether or not Sections 5 to 8,

Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court had been repealed or deemed

amended by P.D. No. 1533 insofar as the appointment of

commissioners to determine the just compensation is concerned.

Stated in another way, is the exclusive and mandatory mode of

determining just compensation in P.D. No. 1533 valid and

constitutional?

The petitioner maintains that the respondent judge acted in excess of

his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in denying the

petitioner's motion for reconsideration and in setting the

commissioner's report for hearing because under P.D. No. 1533, which

is the applicable law herein, the basis of just compensation shall be

the fair and current market value declared by the owner of the

property sought to be expropriated or such market value as

determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. Therefore, there is no

more need to appoint commissioners as prescribed by Rule 67 of the

Revised Rules of Court and for said commissioners to consider other

highly variable factors in order to determine just compensation. The

petitioner further maintains that P.D. No. 1533 has vested on the

assessors and the property owners themselves the power or duty to fix

the market value of the properties and that said property owners are

given the full opportunity to be heard before the Local Board of

Assessment Appeals and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.

Thus, the vesting on the assessor or the property owner of the right to

determine the just compensation in expropriation proceedings, with

appropriate procedure for appeal to higher administrative boards, is

…in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still

have the power to determine the just compensation for the

property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be

relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as

declared either by the owner or the assessor.

. However, the strict application of the decrees during the

proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade

as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner

and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower

of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion or independence

in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could

substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional

just compensation is concerned.

[Court ruled that under the conceded facts,] there should be a

recognition that the law as it stands must be applied; that the

decree having spoken so clearly and unequivocally calls for

obedience; and that on a matter where the applicable law speaks

in no uncertain language, the Court has no choice except to yield

to its command. We further stated that "the courts should recognize

that the rule introduced by P.D. No. 76 and reiterated in subsequent

decrees does not upset the established concepts of justice or the

constitutional provision on just compensation for, precisely, the

owner is allowed to make his own valuation of his property."

Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of

the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained.

All the facts as to the condition of the property and its surroundings,

its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases

is a judicial function. The executive department or the legislature

may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a

violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property

may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no

statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own

determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can

the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the

decreed compensation.

.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,

31 SCRA 413, the Court, speaking thru now Chief

Justice Fernando, reiterated the 'well-settled (rule)

that just compensation means the equivalent for the

value of the property at the time of its taking.

Anything beyond that is more and anything short of

that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair

and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the

measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would

accrue to the expropriating entity."

EDMUND B. PAGHARION

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valid and constitutional.

GUIDO v. RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION

84 Phil. 847, 47 Off. Gaz. 1848 G.R. No. L-2089,


This a petition for prohibition to prevent the Rural Progress

Administration and Judge Oscar Castelo of the Court of First

Instance of Rizal from proceeding with the expropriation of the

petitioner Justa G. Guido's land, two adjoining lots, part

commercial, with a combined area of 22,655 square meters,

situated in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, just outside the north Manila

boundary, on the main street running from this city to the north. Four

grounds are adduced in support of the petition, to wit:

(1) That the respondent RPA (Rural Progress Administration) acted

without jurisdiction or corporate power in filling the expropriation

complaint and has no authority to negotiate with the RFC a loan of

P100,000 to be used as part payment of the value of the land.

(2) That the land sought to be expropriated is commercial and

therefore excluded within the purview of the provisions of Act 539.

(3) That majority of the tenants have entered with the petitioner

valid contracts for lease, or option to buy at an agreed price, and

expropriation would impair those existing obligation of contract.

(4) That respondent Judge erred in fixing the provisional value of the

land at P118,780 only and in ordering its delivery to the respondent

RPA.

Hand in hand with the announced principle, herein invoked, that "the

promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic

security of all the people should be the concern of the state," is a

declaration, with which the former should be reconciled, that "the

Philippines is a Republican state" created to secure to the Filipino

people "the blessings of independence under a regime of justice,

liberty and democracy." Democracy, as a way of life enshrined in the

Constitution, embraces as its necessary components freedom of

conscience, freedom of expression, and freedom in the pursuit of

happiness. Along with these freedoms are included economic

freedom and freedom of enterprise within reasonable bounds and

under proper control. In paving the way for the breaking up of existing

large estates, trust in perpetuity, feudalism, and their concomitant

evils, the Constitution did not propose to destroy or undermine the

property right or to advocate equal distribution of wealth or to

authorize of what is in excess of one's personal needs and the giving

of it to another. Evincing much concern for the protection of property,

the Constitution distinctly recognize the preferred position which real

estate has occupied in law for ages. Property is bound up with every

aspects of social life in a democracy as democracy is conceived in

the Constitution. The Constitution owned in reasonable quantities and

used legitimately, plays in the stimulation to economic effort and the

formation and growth of a social middle class that is said to be the

bulwark of democracy and the backbone of every progressive and

happy country. In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts

in perpetuity, and land that embraces a whole town, or a large

section of a town or city, bears direct relation to the public welfare.

The size of the land expropriated, the large number of people

benefited, and the extent of social and economic reform secured by

the condemnation, clothes the expropriation with public interest and

public use. The expropriation in such cases tends to abolish economic

slavery, feudalistic practices, and other evils inimical to community

prosperity and contentment and public peace and order. No fixed

line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is

not can be made; each case has to be judge according to its

peculiar circumstances. It suffices to say for the purpose of this

decision that the case under consideration is far wanting in those

elements which make for public convenience or public use. It is

patterned upon an ideology far removed from that consecrated in

our system of government and embraced by the majority of the

The expropriation proceedings at bar have been instituted for the economic relief of a few families devoid of any consideration of public health, public peace and order, or other public advantage. What is proposed to be done is to take plaintiff's property, which for all we know she acquired by sweat and sacrifice for her and her family's security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees who refuse to pay the stipulated rent or leave the premises.

To make the analogy closer, we find no reason why the Rural Progress Administration could not take by condemnation an urban lot containing an area of 1,000 or 2,000 square meters for subdivision into tiny lots for resale to its occupants or those who want to build thereon.


EDMUND B. PAGHARION

Rm. A338, 1730H – 2030H


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citizens of this country.

NARRA v. FRANCISCO

109 Phil 764, 768 (1960)


Appeal on points of law from a judgment of the Court of First Instance

of Nueva Ecija (Civil Case No. 2006) dismissing condemnation

proceedings instituted by the National Resettlement and Rehabilition

Administration (NARRA).

It appears from the record that on June 11, 1955, Republic Act No.

1266 became operative. This law provided as follows:

SECTION 1. The National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) is hereby

authorized to expropriate within six months from the approval of this Act, the Hacienda del

Rosario situated at Valdefuente, Cabanatuan City, and pay the price of the land and cost

of such expropriation out of its funds. The said hacienda shall be subdivided into lots not

bigger than one hectare each and resold to bona-fide occupants thereof at such price is

may be determined by the Board of Directors of the NARRA which shall include the price

of the land and the cost of such expropriation, administration, subdivision, resale and

interests. The purchase price of the resale to bona-fide tenants and lessees shall be

payable in installments within the period of not more than ten years.

SEC. 2. This shall take effect upon its approval.

In accordance with the statute, the NARRA instituted these eminent

domain proceedings in the Court below against the heirs of the

original owner of the Hacienda (the late Judge Simplicio del Rosario,

who died in 1947) and their subsequent vendees. The lands involved

totalled 669 hectares, more or less; but during the pendency of the

proceedings, the heirs Dolores R. Concepcion Teresa R. de Francisco

and Paz R. de Tubangui agreed to the expropriation of their

respective holding; while defendant spouses Carmen R. de Ciocon

and Jaime Ciocon also agreed to the expropriation of their

corresponding share, except a portion of 85.0414 hectares, which said

spouses were occupying and wished to reserve for their seven (7)

children and sixteen (16) grandchildren. As a result, all the defendants

mentioned voluntarily ceded to the NARRA about 3891.7583 hectares.

The NARRA appealed from the decision, contending that the

authorities cited by the Court below were not applicable because

they involved condemnation proceedings under Commonwealth Act

No. 539; that in view of the terms of the Republic Act 1266, "the Court

can not inquire into nor review the action of the Legislature in

designating the paricular property it has authorizes the NARRA to

The power to expropriate, under both Republic Act 1266 and

Commonwealth Act No. 539, is predicated upon the provisions of

Article XIII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution providing:

Sec. 4. The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just

compensation, the expropriation of lands to be

subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to

individuals";

hence, the rulings of this Court as to the limits of the condemning

power in expropriation proceedings instituted persuant to

Commonwealth Act No. 539 are applicable to the case at bar.

(same rulings viz Guido and Baylosis cases)

Guido and Baylosis cases, has already ruled that,

under the quoted constitutional provision, the

government may only expropriate landed estate

with extensive areas, and that once a landed estate

has been broken up and divided into parcels of

reasonable extent, the resulting portions are no

longer subject to further expropriation, the existence

of tenancy troubles therein notwithstanding.

City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil., 350,

wherein it was stated that where the legislature has

directly determined the necessity of appropriating

private property for a particular public improvement

at a specified location, the utility, necessity and

expediency of the improvement and the suitable of

the location are questions for the legislature to

determine and the courts have no power to interfere

and substitute their own discretion. The doctrine thus

invoked is entirely inappropriate, for the question

now before the Court is not the necessity of the

expropriation but the power or authority to

expropriate under Article XIII, Sec. 4, of the

Constitution. The validity of the statute directing the

expropriation is certainly a judicial question.

EDMUND B. PAGHARION

Rm. A338, 1730H – 2030H


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expropriate."

PEOPLE v. JUAN F. FAJARDO, Et al,

G.R. No. L-12172 August 29, 1958


It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of

defendant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of

Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in

question providing as follows:

SECTION 1. Any person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before

constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor.

SEC. 2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and

P1.00 for each repair permit issued.

SEC. 3. PENALTY — Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall

make the violation liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50 or

imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24 days or both, at the discretion

of the court. If said building destroys the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any

public property, it shall be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or

house.

SEC. 4. EFFECTIVITY — This ordinance shall take effect on its approval. (Orig. Recs., P. 3)

Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor had

expired, he and his son in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a written

request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct

a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land

registered in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and

separated from the public plaza by a creek (Exh. D). On January 16,

1954, the request was denied, for the reason among others that the

proposed building would destroy the view or beauty of the public

plaza (Exh. E). On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their

request for a building permit (Exh. 3), but again the request was turned

down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the

construction of the building without a permit, because they needed a

place of residence very badly, their former house having been

destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased

property.On February 26, 1954, appellants were charged before and

convicted by the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur,

for violation of the ordinance in question. Defendants appealed to the

Court of First Instance, which affirmed the conviction, and sentenced

appellants to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as well as to

demolish the building in question because it destroys the view of the

public plaza of Baao, in that "it hinders the view of travelers from the

National Highway to the said public plaza." From this decision, the

accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the latter forwarded

the records to us because the appeal attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance in question.

We do not overlook that the modern tendency is to regard the

beautification of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and

happiness of residents. But while property may be regulated in the

interest of the general welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may

prohibit structures offensive to the sight.

the power of the municipal council to require the issuance of

building permits rests upon its first establishing fire limits in populous

parts of the town and prescribing the kinds of buildings that may be

constructed or repaired within them.

..the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates

to permanently deprive appellants of the right to use their own

property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and

amounts to a taking of appellants property without just

compensation.

Municipal Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950, of the Municipality of

Baao, Camarines Sur, was beyond the authority of said municipality

to enact, and is therefore null and void.

(Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580), the State

may not, under the guise of police power,

permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of

their property and practically confiscate them solely

to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of

the community. As the case now stands, every

structure that may be erected on appellants' land,

regardless of its own beauty, stands condemned

under the ordinance in question, because it would

interfere with the view of the public plaza from the

highway.

Zoning which admittedly limits property to a use

which can not reasonably be made of it cannot be

said to set aside such property to a use but

constitutes the taking of such property without just

compensation. Use of property is an element of

ownership therein. Regardless of the opinion of

zealots that property may properly, by zoning, be

utterly destroyed without compensation, such

principle finds no support in the genius of our

government nor in the principles of justice as we

known them. Such a doctrine shocks the sense of

justice. If it be of public benefit that property remain

open and unused, then certainly the public, and not

the private individuals, should bear the cost of

reasonable compensation for such property under

the rules of law governing the condemnation of

private property for public use. (Tews vs. Woolhiser

(1933) 352 I11. 212, 185 N.E. 827)

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use

of property that it can not be used for any

reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond

regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the

property. The only substantial difference, in such

case, between restriction and actual taking, is that

the restriction leaves the owner subject to the burden

of payment of taxation, while outright confiscation

EDMUND B. PAGHARION

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would relieve him of that burden. (Arverne Bay Constr.

Co.vs. Thatcher (N.Y.) 117 ALR. 1110, 1116).

FELIPE R. HIPOLITO v. THE CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. L-3887 August 21, 1950


This is an action to compel the respondents to issue a building permit

in favor of Felipe R. Hipolito.

The petitioner and his wife are the registered owners of a parcel of

land situated at the corner of Invernes and Renaissance Streets, Santa

Ana, Manila. On March 22, 1950, petitioner applied to the respondent

Alejo Aquino, as City Engineer, for permission to erect a strong

material residential building on his above-mentioned lot. For more

than forty days, the respondent took no action. Wherefore, petitioner

wrote him a letter manifesting his readiness to pay the fee and to

comply with existing ordinances governing the issuance of building

permits.

The petitioner, who is a lawyer, replied that the said Commission and

its plans could not legally affect the construction of residential

buildings, like his own, that are not subsidized in whole or in part with

public funds, citing section 6 of Executive Order No. 98, s. 1946, which

partly reads: SEC. 6. Legal status of general plans. — Whenever the Commission shall have adopted a

General Plan, amendment, extension or addition thereto of any urban area or any part

thereof, then and thenceforth no street, park or other public way, ground place, or

space; no public building or structure, including residential buildings subsidized in whole

or part by public funds or assistance; . . . shall be constructed or authorized in such urban

area until and unless the location and extent thereof conform to said general plan or

have been submitted and approved by the Commission, . . . .

The defense to this petition is planted on the opinion that unless

Hipolito's building conforms to the new street line fixed by the National

Urban Planning Commission, the building permit will not be issued.

It is not claimed that the City of Manila has expropriated, or desires to

expropriate, that portion of petitioner's lot between the existing street

line and the new street line adopted by the National Urban Planning

Commission. No law or ordinance is cited requiring private landowners

in Manila to conform to the new street line marked by the National

Urban Planning Commission, except the section above quoted. And

…adopted a General Plan, applies only to "residential buildings

subsidized in whole or in part by public funds or assistance." The

residential building which petitioner intends to construct may not be

so classified, because he asserts, without contradiction, that his

proposed construction will be financed wholly by himself, not with

public funds or assistance. Therefore, the excuse given by

respondent is not valid.

The City has not expropriated the strip of petitioner's land affected

by the proposed widening of Invernes Street, and inasmuch as there

is no legislative authority to establish a building line, the denial of

this permit would amount to the taking of private property for public

use under the power of eminent domain without following the

procedure prescribed for the exercise of such power. (

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the question relates only to its interpretation.

REPUBLIC v. VDA. DE CASTILLVI

58 SCRA 336, 352 (August 15, 1974)


Plaintiff-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines, filed, on June 26,

1959, a complaint for eminent domain against defendant-appellee,

Carmen M. Vda. de Castellvi, judicial administratrix of the estate of the

late Alfonso de Castellvi (hereinafter referred to as Castellvi), over a

parcel of land situated in the barrio of San Jose, Floridablanca,

Pampanga. In its complaint, the Republic alleged, among other

things, that the fair market value of the above-mentioned lands,

according to the Committee on Appraisal for the Province of

Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market

value of P259,669.10; and prayed, that the provisional value of the

lands be fixed at P259.669.10, that the court authorizes plaintiff to take

immediate possession of the lands upon deposit of that amount with

the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga; that the court appoints three

commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just

compensation for the property sought to be expropriated, and that

the court issues thereafter a final order of condemnation.

1. In support of the assigned error that the lower court erred in holding

that the "taking" of the properties under expropriation commenced

with the filing of the complaint in this case, the Republic argues that

the "taking" should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue of

a special lease agreement between the Republic and appellee

Castellvi, the former was granted the "right and privilege" to buy the

property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease, and that in the

event of such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value should

be as of the time of occupancy; and that the permanent

improvements amounting to more that half a million pesos

constructed during a period of twelve years on the land, subject of

expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of permanency

and stability of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the interest of

national Security. 7

Appellee Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the "taking" of

property under the power of eminent domain requires two essential

elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by condemn or upon

the private property for more than a momentary or limited period, and

(2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and

deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. This appellee

argues that in the instant case the first element is wanting, for the

contract of lease relied upon provides for a lease from year to year;

that the second element is also wanting, because the Republic was

paying the lessor Castellvi a monthly rental of P445.58; and that the

The first (time) occupied the same pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid for the … property should not be determined on the basis of the value of the property as of that year.

the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.

It must be considered, however, that the amount fixed as the provisional value of the lands that are being expropriated does not necessarily represent the true and correct value of the land. The value is only "provisional" or "tentative", to serve as the basis for the immediate occupancy of the property being expropriated by the condemnor.

The important factor in expropriation proceeding is that the owner is awarded the just compensation for his property.

In eminent domain proceedings, in order that evidence as to the sale price of other lands may be admitted in evidence to prove the fair market value of the land sought to be expropriated, the lands must, among other things, be shown to be similar.

So many and varied are the circumstances to be taken into account in determining the value of property condemned for public purposes, that it is practically impossible to formulate a rule to govern its appraisement in all cases. Exceptional circumstances will modify the most carefully guarded rule, but, as a general thing, we should say that the compensation of the owner is to be estimated by reference to the use for which the property is suitable, having regard to the existing business or wants of the community, or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future. (Miss. and Rum River Boom Co. vs. Patterson, 98 U.S., 403).

Any lawyer with a modicum of ability handling this expropriation case would have right away though [sic] of digging up documents diligently showing conveyances of lands near or around the parcels of land sought to be expropriated in this case in the offices that would have naturally come to his mind such as the offices mentioned above, and had counsel for the movant really exercised the reasonable diligence required by the Rule' undoubtedly they would have been able to find these documents and/or caused the issuance of subpoena duces tecum. ...

EDMUND B. PAGHARION

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contract of lease does not grant the Republic the "right and privilege"

to buy the premises "at the value at the time of occupancy."

PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE v. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA

22 SCRA 1334, 1341 (1968)G.R. No. L-24440 March 28, 1968


Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of

Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga

Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved

converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec.

50 of the Act also provided that — Buildings and properties which the

province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another

place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a

price to be fixed by the Auditor General.

The properties and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots and

some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of

Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in

the name of Zamboanga Province.

Pursuant thereto, the Auditor General, on January 11, 1955,

apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of

Zamboanga as follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61%

for Zamboanga del Sur. Zamboanga del Norte therefore became

entitled to 54.39% of P1,294,244.00, the total value of the lots and

buildings in question, or P704,220.05 payable by Zamboanga City.

On March 17, 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of the

President, issued a ruling 4 holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a

vested right as owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the

properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39, and is

entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga City. This ruling

revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution of July 13, 1951 conveying all the said

50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as of 1945,

when the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province was transferred to

Dipolog.

The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner of

Internal Revenue to deduct an amount equal to 25% of the regular

internal revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for the quarter

ending March 31, 1960, then for the quarter ending June 30, 1960, and

again for the first quarter of the fiscal year 1960-1961.

all the properties in question, except the two (2) lots used as High

School playgrounds, could be considered as patrimonial properties of

the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital

and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered

patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall under the

phrase "public works for public service" for it has been held that under

theejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and

indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated

For, the matter involved here is the extent of legislative control over

the properties of a municipal corporation, of which a province is

one. The principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the

municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and

governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress

has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private

or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no

absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without

due process and payment of just compensation. 6

Even the capital site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the

school sites will be considered patrimonial for they are not for public

use. They would fall under the phrase "public works for public

service" for it has been held that under theejusdem generis rule,

such public works must be for free and indiscriminate use by

anyone… …to be considered public, it is enough that the property

be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local

administration, public education, public health, etc.

…that provincial funds were used, still the buildings constitute mere

accessories to the lands, which are public in nature, and so, they

follow the nature of said lands, i.e., public. …buildings, though

located in the city, will not be for the exclusive use and benefit of

city residents for they could be availed of also by the provincial

residents. The province then — and its successors-in-interest — are

not really deprived of the benefits thereof.

…this Court is not inclined to hold that municipal property held and

devoted to public service is in the same category as ordinary

private property. The consequences are dire. As ordinary private

properties, they can be levied upon and attached. They can even

be acquired thru adverse possession — all these to the detriment of

the local community. Lastly, the classification of properties other

than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under

Art. 424 of the Civil Code — is "... without prejudice to the provisions

of special laws." For purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining

under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as

"special laws". Hence, the classification of municipal property

Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of

Lands, 8 and in Municipality of Tacloban v. Director of

Lands, 9 it was held that the capitol site and the

school sites in municipalities constitute their

patrimonial properties. This result is understandable

because, unlike in the classification regarding State

properties, properties for public service in the

municipalities are not classified as public.

(1) HINUNANGAN V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS, 11where it

was stated that "... where the municipality has

occupied lands distinctly for public purposes, such as

for the municipal court house, the public school, the

public market, or other necessary municipal building,

we will, in the absence of proof to the contrary,

presume a grant from the States in favor of the

municipality; but, as indicated by the wording, that

rule may be invoked only as to property which is

used distinctly for public purposes...."

(2) VIUDA DE TANTOCO V. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF

ILOILO 12 held that municipal properties necessary for

governmental purposes are public in nature. Thus,

the auto trucks used by the municipality for street

sprinkling, the police patrol automobile, police

stations and concrete structures with the

corresponding lots used as markets were declared

exempt from execution and attachment since they

were not patrimonial properties.

(3) MUNICIPALITY OF BATANGAS VS. CANTOS 13 held

squarely that a municipal lot which had always been

devoted to school purposes is one dedicated to

public use and is not patrimonial property of a

municipality.

EDMUND B. PAGHARION

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properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. 7 The playgrounds, however,

would fit into this category

devoted for distinctly governmental purposes as public should

prevail over the Civil Code classification in this particular case.

VICENTE NOBLE v. CITY OF MANILA

G.R. No. 44142 December 24, 1938


Under a contract entered into between Jose Syquia and the City of

Manila on October 18, 1926, the former constructed on a piece of

land of the latter on Tayuman Street, Tondo, Manila, a school building,

containing twenty compartments, pursuant to the instructions,

specifications and conditions imposed by the city.

On April 25, 1935, the court rendered its decision declaring that the

City of Manila has no right to expropriate the building and that it

should comply with the terms of the contract of October 18, 1926, and

to pay to the plaintiff, for the price of the building, the sum of P46,000,

plus the rentals thereof, corresponding to the month of February, 1934

and following, until the final and absolute conveyance of the building

is made, with legal interest on the rentals due an unpaid.After the filing

of the complaint and the answer, the court, upon petition of the

defendant and by virtue of the cross-complaint, ordered, on June 11,

1934, that, upon the deposit of the amount of P46,000 by the

defendant, the latter take immediate possession of the building for the

purpose of the expropriation thereof, convoking and hearing the

parties on the appointment of the commissioners to appraise the

building. On March 21, 1933, the then mayor of the city, Tomas

Earnshaw, proposed to Vicente Noble that, in order to comply with

the rules of accounting then existing, the contract be amended in the

sense that, the lease be made renewable every year, instead of every

three years (Exhibit 1), and for this purpose it was agreed, by the

document Exhibit J, that it be renewable from year to year until the

leased building is purchased in accordance with the original contract

of July 22, 1927.The City of Manila failed to pay the stipulated rent

corresponding to the month of February, 1934, and following,

whereupon Vicente Noble, on April 10, 1934, filed the complaint which

gave rise to this case, wherein he asks that the city be ordered to

purchase the building for the price of P46,600, with legal interest

thereon from the filing of the complaint, and to pay the rentals at the

rate of P600 a month, corresponding to the month of February, 1934

and following, until the purchase of the building is effected and the

price thereof paid.Under the terms of these transfers, all the rights of

Syquia flowing from his contract with the city, were fully transferred,

first, to Sandoval, and, thereafter, to Noble.

The contract, therefore, in so far as it refers to the purchase of the

building, as we have interpreted it, is in force, not having been

revoked by the parties or by judicial decision.

Expropriation lies only when it is made necessary by the opposition

of the owner to the sale or by the lack of any agreement as to the

price. There being in the present case a valid and subsisting

contract, between the owner of the building and the city, for the

purchase thereof at an agreed price, there is no reason for the

expropriation.

Expropriation, as a manifestation of the right of eminent domain of

the state and as a limitation upon private ownership, is based upon

the consideration that it should not be an obstacle to human

progress and to the development of the general welfare of the

community. In the circumstances of the present case, however, the

expropriation would depart from its own purposes and turn out to

be an instrument to repudiate compliance with obligations legally

and validly contracted.

It is said that the contract should be rescinded as unfair and against

morals, not because it was so when it was entered into, but

because after what has already been paid by way of rentals for the

lease, if the sale is now made, the same would be excessively

favorable to the plaintiff and prejudicial to the defendant. But if this

state of things is the result of too much delay in effecting the

purchase, this is attributable to the defendant itself, for it was up to

it entirely to make the purchase at any time since the contract was

entered into.

cases sec. 8 - 9 - cnl2

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