art-1 - food and agriculture organizationhezekiel m. mushala, ackson m. kanduza, nomcebo o....

land reform / réforme agraire / reforma agraria 1998/2

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ISSN 0251-1894Editor/Rédacteur/Redactor en JefeP. GroppoEditing, design, graphics anddesktop publishing/Rédaction,mise en page, graphiqueset édition électronique/Redacción, compaginación,elaboración gráfica ycomposición electrónica:Editorial Group, FAOInformation Division/Groupe del’édition, Division del’information de la FAO/Grupo Editorial, Dirección deInformación de la FAOEditorial Board/Comité derédaction/Comité de RedacciónS. Funes, J. Riddell,J. Dey-Abbas, J. Rouse,S. Baas

This bulletin is issued by FAO asa medium for the disseminationof information and views on landreform and related subjects tothe United Nations, FAO MemberGovernments and national andinternational experts andinstitutions. Articles are publishedin the original language (English,French or Spanish).

Readers requiring moredetailed information concerningthis bulletin or articles thereinshould write to the Editor, LandReform, Land Settlement andCooperatives, Rural DevelopmentDivision, FAO, Viale delle Terme diCaracalla, 00100 Rome, Italy.

The opinions expressed in thisdocument are the personal viewsof the individual authors and do notnecessarily reflect those of FAO.

Le présent bulletin a pour but defournir des renseignements et defaire connaître des opinions surla réforme agraire et lesquestions connexes àl’Organisation des Nations Unies,aux Etats Membres de la FAOainsi qu’aux experts etinstitutions nationaux etinternationaux.Les articles paraissent dans lalangue originale (français, anglaisou espagnol).

Les lecteurs désireuxd’obtenir des renseignementscomplémentaires sur ce bulletinsont priés de s’adresser aurédacteur, Réforme agraire,colonisation et coopérativesagricoles, Division dudéveloppement rural, FAO, Vialedelle Terme di Caracalla, 00100Rome, Italie.

Les opinions exprimées dansle présent bulletin n’engagent queleurs auteurs et ne sont pasnécessairement celles de la FAO.

La presente publicación eseditada por la FAO como mediodifusor de información yopiniones sobre la reformaagraria y temas conexos entrelas Naciones Unidas, losEstados Miembros y expertose instituciones nacionalese internacionales. Se publicanartículos originales en español,francés e inglés.

Los lectores que deseenobtener más detalles sobre esteboletín o sobre los artículos quefiguran en él deberán escribir a:Redactor en Jefe, Reformaagraria, colonización ycooperativas, Dirección deDesarrollo Rural, FAO, Viale delleTerme di Caracalla, 00100Roma, Italia.

Los artículos expresan lasopiniones personales de susautores y no representannecesariamente los puntos devista de la FAO.

Tel.: (39) 06 5705 4741Fax: (39) 06 5705 3152E-mail: [email protected]

1998/2

1 Editorial/Editorial/Editorial

Cristóbal Kay

8 Latin America’s agrarian reform: lights and shadowsLa réforme agraire en Amérique latine: ombres et lumièresLa reforma agraria en América Latina: luces y sombras

P. Mathieu,S. Mugangu Matabaro et A. Mafikiri Tsongo

32 Enjeux fonciers et violences en Afrique: la prévention des conflits en se servantdu cas du Nord-Kivu (1940-1994)Land issues and violence in Africa: prevention of conflicts, drawingfrom the case of North Kivu (1940 to 1994)Problemas de tenencia y violencia en África: la prevención de losconflictos a partir del caso del norte de Kivu (1940-1994)

Gérard Ciparisse

44 Accès à la terre pour tous en Afrique noire: une utopie?Access to land for all in sub-Saharan Africa: a utopia?Acceso de todos a la tierra en el África negra: ¿una utopía?

J. du Guerny

56 Some considerations on specific aspects of migrationConsidérations relatives à certains aspects de la migrationAlgunas consideraciones sobre aspectos específicos de la migración

Machioudi Dissou

74 A la recherche d’une meilleure concertation entre l’Etat et le monde ruralau BéninIn search of a better concordance between the State and the rural world in BeninEn busca de una mayor concertación entre el Estado y el mundo rural en Benin

Vernon R.N. Chinene, Fabian Maimbo, Diana J. Banda and Stemon C. Msune

88 A comparison of customary and leasehold tenure: agriculture anddevelopment in ZambiaComparaison entre les modes de faire-valoir coutumiers et les systèmes defermage: agriculture et développement en ZambieComparación de la tenencia consuetudinaria y de arrendamiento:agricultura ydesarrollo en Zambia

2 land reform / réforme agraire / reforma agraria 1998/2

Hezekiel M. Mushala, Ackson M. Kanduza, Nomcebo O. Simelane, Juliana K. Rwelamira andNonhlanhla F. Dlamini

100 Dual tenure systems and multiple livelihoods: a comparison of communaland private land tenure in SwazilandModes de faire-valoir et moyens d’existence: comparaison entre les modes de faire-valoir communautaires et privés au ZwazilandSistemas dobles de tenencia y medios de subsistencia múltiples: comparación dela tenencia comunal y privada de la tierra enSwazilandia

Gonzalo Flores

112 La ley INRA de Bolivia: ¿una segunda reforma agraria?The INRA law: a second agrarian reform?La loi INRA: une deuxième réforme agraire?

Fu Chen and John Davis

122 Land reform in rural China since the mid-1980sLa réforme agraire en Chine rurale depuis la moitié des années 80Reforma agraria en la China rural desde mediados de los años ochenta

land reform / réforme agraire / reforma agraria 1998/2 1

Editorial

“International peace and security are closely linked to economic development and social progress

and have a two-way effect on each other. Agrarian reform – a prerequisite for development – must also

therefore be viewed within the broader context of the most fundamental problems of contemporary

society.”

So began the Report of the Special Committee on Agrarian Reform commissioned by theConference of FAO in 1969. Now, almost 30 years on, we once again address the issue of landand the increasing number of conflicts it generates. While there is no doubt that attentionmust be paid to this issue (by de facto consensus of the major international developmentorganizations), the basic quandary is how to proceed.

For a number of years, FAO’s Land Tenure Service has sought to contribute to the debateon the basis of acceptance that agrarian societies are diverse and that solutions must comedirectly from those concerned and not derive from external visions bearing little resemblanceto local realities. The refusal to accept an “easy” answer to the land issue does not, however,mean that we should not explore ways of taking the matter forward. This volume sets out tofacilitate the debate by suggesting a methodological itinerary that has four distinct stages:

•general understanding of the issue;•in-depth analysis, requiring appropriate methodological tools;•elaboration of appropriate measures, using a participatory approach;•ongoing monitoring to introduce any modifications needed as country and regionalsituations change.

Often, we must turn to agrarian history if we are to understand the deep-rooted origins of anagrarian issue – a lesson taught to us by Marc Bloch and his disciples. The first articles takeup this theme: C. Kay provides a stimulating historical account of agrarian reform in LatinAmerica; P. Mathieu, S. Mugangu Matabaro and A. Mafikiri Tsongo share their reflections onone of the bloodiest conflicts of recent years, that of the Great Lakes Region in Africa; andG. Ciparisse analyses the historical evolution of land access rights in sub-Saharan Africa.These three articles all emphasize the notion of complexity and the intricate web of factorswhich produces a sometimes explosive mix of agrarian reform.

The fact that complexity is the key to understanding today’s agrarian societies means thatwe need methodological instruments that will take into account the structural complexity ofagrarian systems that differ hugely from one country and region to another. We must also havea clear idea of the role of agrarian reforms:

“Unlike the concept underlying most of the reforms implemented in an earlier period, it is now

considered that straightforward changes in land tenure are not sufficient and do not by themselves

constitute an objective. For reform to be carried out successfully and to produce the desired effects

on the general development process, such changes must be accompanied or rapidly followed by

others of an institutional nature and various additional measures ... Nevertheless, with a population

exerting increasing pressure on agricultural land and technological advances that open the way to

substantial rises in levels of living, reform now has the twofold aim of serving as an instrument for

equitable redistribution and as a vehicle for increasing productivity and bringing about the desired

improvement. Without this last effect, measures of a merely redistributive nature would achieve only

modest and temporary results.” (Report of the Special Committee on Agrarian Reform, FAO, 1969.)

This concept of agrarian reform requires a global, all-embracing system perspective. Thenext article describes selected tools needed for close scrutiny of the linkages betweenmigration and development. This article, although written 20 years ago, is reproduced here


because today it would seem most topical. At the time, it was already calling into questionthe dichotomous distinction between urban and rural areas. A majority of commentatorsmade a clear differentiation between these two worlds in the 1960s and 1970s when debateon agrarian reform was at its most intense. Author J. du Guerny and others with him werealready challenging this vision, affirming that the two worlds were in fact complementary.Today, while there seems to be general agreement on this matter, we need more than ever todefine methodological instruments that will provide an integrated analysis of theseterritories, given that agrarian reforms have tangible repercussions for the so-called urbanor peri-urban environment.

The next articles suggest actions to improve the agrarian structures of selected countries.Their central focus is on the role required of the different actors (the importance ofcoordination) and on the need to clarify the juridical and legal framework so as to providegreater security to the holders of land rights. We have chosen in this section to concentrateon customary rights, communal rights and individual rights, particularly in Africa (see thearticles on Benin, Zambia and Swaziland). Little or no coordination combined with a poorgrasp of the historical background and an absence of careful analysis can result in highlycontroversial actions, as seems to be the case in Bolivia.

Finally, the last part of this issue features an evaluative study by F. Chen and J. Davis onthe recent land reform experience in China, which sets out a number of concrete proposalsfor a shift in orientation.

As we prepare to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the World Conference onAgrarian Reform and Rural Development which represented the apogee of interest in thistopic, it appears to be a good time to take stock of our bulletin. The bulletin was establishedin 1963. It published a series of optimistic articles in the 1960s and 1970s, but the tonebecame more neutral in the following decade. The 1990s began with a change in format andstyle, although the difficult times of the past still left their mark. It was manifestly hard tofind researchers, experts and governments interested in a renewed debate of the land issue,despite the events of 1989 (the collapse of the Berlin Wall and of Communism in EasternEurope) which would soon attenuate the hitherto political connotations of agrarian reform.The Land Tenure Service is very pleased to be able to resume regular publication of thebiannual bulletin, which has enabled it to increase fivefold the contributions offeredannually to its readership, at a time when daily reality is becoming increasingly punctuatedwith conflicts arising from access to and utilization of natural resources.


Editorial

«La paix et la sécurité internationales sont étroitement liées au développement économique et au

progrès social et s’influencent mutuellement. La réforme agraire – préalable nécessaire au

développement – doit aussi être considérée dans le contexte plus large des problèmes fondamentaux

de la société contemporaine.»

Ainsi commençait le Rapport du Comité Spécial de la Réforme Agraire, exécuté par laConférence de la FAO en 1969. Presque 30 ans plus tard, nous en sommes à nouveau àdiscuter de la question foncière et des conflits qui surgissent en nombre croissant à ce sujet.Si aucun doute ne subsiste aujourd’hui quant à la nécessité de reprendre ce thème (unconsensus de facto existe parmi les grandes organisations internationales de développement),la discussion se concentre sur la façon d’agir en la matière.

Depuis quelques années, le Service des régimes fonciers de la FAO essaie de contribuer àcette discussion en utilisant comme points de repère, d’une part, l’acceptation de la diversitédes sociétés agraires et, d’autre part, le fait que les réponses, pour avoir une chance depouvoir être mises en application, doivent venir des acteurs directement concernés et non pasdes visions véhiculées de l’extérieur, étrangères à la réalité locale. Le refus d’une solution«facile» aux problèmes fonciers ne signifie pas, pour autant, qu’il ne faille pas rechercher uneméthode de travail pour approfondir le sujet et avancer. Avec ce numéro du bulletin, nousvoudrions apporter une contribution au débat, en suggérant un itinéraire méthodologiquedivisé en quatre étapes:

•la compréhension générale du problème;•un diagnostic approfondi, demandant des outils méthodologiques appropriés;• l’élaboration de mesures appropriées par une approche participative;•un suivi continu permettant d’apporter les modifications que requièrent les évolutions despays et des régions concernés.

La compréhension des raisons profondes qui font surgir une «question agraire» fait souventappel à l’histoire agraire, telle que nous l’ont apprise Marc Bloch et ses disciples; la première séried’articles nous donne des éléments de réponse. C. Kay nous propose une lecture historiquestimulante des processus de réforme agraire en Amérique latine. P. Mathieu, S. MuganguMatabaro et A. Mafikiri Tsongo soumettent une réflexion sur un des conflits les plus sanglants deces dernières années, celui de la région des Grands Lacs en Afrique. G. Ciparisse, quant à lui,s’interroge sur l’évolution historique des droits d’accès à la terre en Afrique subsaharienne. Untrait commun unit ces trois articles: l’accent qui est mis sur la complexité et l’enchevêtrement desaspects qui produisent le mélange parfois explosif des réformes agraires.

La complexité devenant ainsi le maître mot pour lire les sociétés agraires des tempsmodernes, nous renvoie à la nécessité de mettre au point des instruments méthodologiquesqui rendent compte de la complexité structurante de systèmes agraires fort différenciés d’unpays à l’autre, d’une région à l’autre, avec une idée claire du rôle des réformes agraires:

«Contrairement à l’idée qui inspirait la plupart des réformes mises en œuvre à une époque antérieure,

on considère maintenant qu’il ne suffit pas de modifier le régime foncier et qu’un tel changement

n’est pas une fin en soi. Pour que la réforme se fasse avec succès et produise les effets souhaités sur

le processus de développement global, les changements doivent être assortis ou rapidement suivis

d’autres modifications de caractère institutionnel et de diverses mesures supplémentaires ...

Néanmoins, étant donné la pression démographique croissante qui s’exerce sur les terres agricoles

et les progrès technologiques qui ouvrent la voie à un relèvement sensible du niveau de vie, la

réforme a désormais pour double objectif de servir à redistribuer équitablement les terres et à

accroître la productivité pour réaliser l’amélioration souhaitée. Faute de remplir cette dernière


condition, des mesures de caractère purement redistributif n’aboutiraient qu’à des résultats modestes

et momentanés.» (Rapport du Comité spécial de la réforme agraire, FAO, 1969.)

Une telle conception de la réforme agraire demande donc une vision globale et holistique.L’article suivant décrit certains des outils nécessaires à l’analyse des relations entremigration et développement. Cet dernier article, bien qu’écrit il y a 20 ans et reproduit ici,nous semble être d’extrême actualité; en effet, il remettait déjà en question la visiondichotomique entre espaces urbains et ruraux. Lors de la période la plus intense quant audébat autour des réformes agraires (années 60 et 70), la vision dominante distinguaitclairement ces deux mondes. L’auteur J. du Guerny, et d’autres avec lui, montraient déjàqu’il en n’était rien et qu’il s’agissait d’aspects complémentaires. Aujourd’hui, alors qu’unaccord semble exister sur ce sujet, il est plus nécessaire que jamais de mettre au point desinstruments méthodologiques qui permettent l’analyse intégrée des ces territoires, étantdonné que les réformes agraires ont des répercussions concrètes sur l’environnement appeléurbain ou périurbain.

Les articles suivants portent sur des propositions d’intervention en vue d’améliorer lesstructures agraires de certains pays. Les fils conducteurs sont, d’un côté, le rôle demandéaux différents acteurs (la recherche d’une concertation entre eux); et, de l’autre, la nécessitéd’éclaircir les questions juridico-légales, en vue de mieux sécuriser les détenteurs des droitssur la terre. Nous avons choisi, dans cette section, de privilégier le débat entre droitscoutumiers, droits communautaires et droits individuels, particulièrement en Afrique (voirles articles sur le Bénin, la Zambie et le Swaziland). Peu ou pas de concertation, conjugué àune faible compréhension historique et à un manque d’analyse fine, peut aboutir à despropositions fort contestées, comme semble être le cas en Bolivie.

Finalement, la dernière partie de cette publication met en lumière une étude réalisée parF. Chen et J. Davis, portant sur une évaluation de l’expérience de réforme foncièrerécemment entreprise en Chine et fournissant des propositions concrètes pour saréorientation.

Alors que l’on s’apprête à célébrer le vingtième anniversaire de la Conférence mondiale surla réforme agraire et le développement rural qui représenta le pic de sensibilité sur ce thème,il a semblé tout indiqué de tirer un sommaire bilan de notre bulletin. Créé en 1963, leBulletin publia nombre d’articles optimistes dans les années 60 et 70, pour ouvrir sescolonnes à des articles plus anonymes la décennie suivante. Les années 90 s’étaientouvertes avec un changement de format et de style de présentation, mais encore sousl’empreinte des difficiles moments précédents. La difficulté de trouver des chercheurs, desexperts, des gouvernements intéressés à la résurgence du thème «terre» était patente, malgréles événements de 1989 (chute du Mur de Berlin et effondrement du communisme dans lespays d’Europe orientale) qui allaient permettre peu après de considérer la réforme agraireavec une connotation politique moins marquée qu’auparavant. Le Service des régimesfonciers est particulièrement satisfait aujourd’hui d’avoir eu l’occasion de revenir, demanière continue, à la parution biannuelle du bulletin, ce qui a permis de quintupler lenombre de contributions offertes annuellement à nos lecteurs, au moment où, en nombrecroissant, le quotidien est ponctué de conflits liés à l’accès et à l’utilisation des ressourcesnaturelles.


Editorial

«La paz y la seguridad internacionales están estrechamente ligadas al desarrollo económico y al

progreso social, se influyen mutuamente y, por lo tanto, la reforma agraria, requisito esencial del

desarrollo, tiene que examinarse también en este campo más vasto de los problemas fundamentales

de la sociedad contemporánea.»

Así comenzaba el Informe del Comité Especial de Reforma Agraria, solicitado por laConferencia de la FAO en 1969. Casi 30 años más tarde, nos encontramos de nuevoexaminando la cuestión de la tenencia y los conflictos que surgen cada vez con mayorfrecuencia en relación con ella. Si no hay lugar a dudas ahora en cuanto a la necesidad devolver sobre el tema (existe en la práctica un consenso entre las grandes organizacionesinternacionales de desarrollo), el debate se concentra en la manera de actuar al respecto.

Desde hace algunos años, el Servicio de Tenencia de la Tierra de la FAO trata de contribuira este debate utilizando como punto de referencia por una parte la aceptación de la diversidadde las sociedades agrarias, y por otra el hecho de que las respuestas, para tener la posibilidadde que se lleven a la práctica, deben proceder de los actores directamente interesados y no deplanteamientos presentados desde el exterior, extraños a la realidad local. El rechazo de unasolución fácil para los problemas de la tenencia no significa, pues, que no haya que buscar unmétodo de trabajo para examinar el tema y avanzar en él. En el presente número del boletín,trataremos de aportar una contribución al debate, proponiendo un itinerario metodológicodividido en cuatro etapas:

•comprensión general del problema;•diagnóstico detallado, que requiere mecanismos metodológicos idóneos;•elaboración de medidas apropiadas, mediante un enfoque participativo;•una supervisión constante que permita aportar las modificaciones que exija la evoluciónde los países y las regiones interesados.

Para comprender las razones profundas de la aparición de una «cuestión agraria», muchasveces hay que recurrir a la historia de la agricultura, tal como la han presentado Marc Bloch ysus discípulos; en la primera serie de artículos se dan los elementos para una respuesta.C. Kay propone una lectura histórica estimulante del proceso de reforma agraria en AméricaLatina. P. Mathieu, S. Mugangu Matabaro y A. Mafikiri Tsongo proponen una reflexión sobreuno de los conflictos más sangrantes de los últimos años, el de la región de los Grandes Lagosen África. G. Ciparisse se pregunta por la evolución histórica de los derechos de acceso a latierra en el África subsahariana. Estos tres artículos presentan una característica común: sepone de relieve la complejidad de los aspectos que da lugar a la mezcla tal vez explosiva de lasreformas agrarias.

De esta manera, la complejidad se convierte en la palabra clave para comprender lassociedades agrarias de los tiempos modernos, siendo necesario preparar instrumentosmetodológicos en los que se tenga en cuenta la complejidad estructural de los sistemasagrarios, que presentan grandes diferencias de un país a otro y de una región a otra, con unaidea clara de la función de las reformas agrarias.

«A diferencia del concepto que predomina en la mayor parte de las reformas que se implantaron en

períodos anteriores, se considera ahora que los simples cambios en la tenencia de la tierra no

constituyen por sí mismos un objetivo ni son suficientes. Para que la reforma pueda implantarse con

éxito y genere en el proceso general de desarrollo las consecuencias que con ella se persiguen, esos

cambios tienen que estar acompañados o prontamente seguidos por otros de carácter institucional

y medidas complementarias de muy variado orden [...]. Sin embargo, con una población que presiona

en escala creciente sobre la tierra agrícola, y avances tecnológicos que abren el camino a sustanciales


progresos en el nivel de vida humano, la reforma tiene ahora el doble objetivo de servir como un

instrumento de equitativa distribución y como un vehículo para aumentar la productividad y obtener

aquel mejoramiento. Sin este último efecto, las medidas simplemente redistributivas lograrían tan

sólo modestos y transitorios resultados» (Informe del Comité Especial sobre Reforma Agraria, FAO,

1969).

Esta idea de la reforma agraria, exige, por consiguiente, una visión global y sistémica. En elartículo siguiente se describen las relaciones entre la migración y el desarrollo. Este artículo,aunque escrito hace 20 años, se reproduce aquí porque nos parece de una actualidadextraordinaria; efectivamente, se ponía en duda, ya desde entonces, la visión dicotómica entrelos espacios urbanos y rurales. Muchos autores establecían una clara diferenciación entreesos dos mundos en los años sesenta y setenta, período en el que más intenso era el debateen relación con las reformas agrarias. J. du Guerny (y otros con él) ya demostraban que noera así y que se trataba de aspectos complementarios. En la actualidad, si bien parece haberun acuerdo sobre este tema, es más necesario que nunca poner a punto los instrumentosmetodológicos que permitan realizar un análisis integrado de estos aspectos, teniendo encuenta que las reformas agrarias tienen repercusiones concretas en el medio llamado urbanoo periurbano.

En los artículos siguientes se presentan propuestas de intervención con objeto de mejorarlas estructuras agrarias de ciertos países. El hilo conductor es, por una parte, la función quehan de desempeñar las distintas partes interesadas (la búsqueda de una concertación entreellas); por otra parte, la necesidad de aclarar las cuestiones jurídico-legales, con el fin detranquilizar más a quienes poseen los derechos sobre la tierra. En esta sección hemosdecidido dar prioridad al debate entre los derechos consuetudinarios, los comunitarios y losindividuales, particularmente en África (véanse los artículos sobre Benin, Zambia ySwazilandia). La concertación escasa o nula, junto con una comprensión histórica deficiente yla falta de un análisis detallado, puede llevar a propuestas muy controvertidas, como parecehaber ocurrido en Bolivia.

Finalmente, en la última parte de este número presentamos un estudio realizado porF. Chen y J. Davis relativo a una evaluación de la experiencia de reforma de la tenenciaemprendida recientemente en China, con propuestas concretas para su reorientación.

Nos ha parecido oportuno presentar un balance resumido de nuestro boletín, ahora queestá próxima la conmemoración del 20o aniversario de la Conferencia Mundial sobre laReforma Agraria y el Desarrollo Rural, que representa el ápice del interés sobre el tema. Elboletín fue creado en 1963; publicó numerosos artículos optimistas (en los años sesenta ysetenta), pero su tendencia fue más neutra en el decenio siguiente. Los años noventacomenzaron con un cambio de presentación y de estilo, pero siempre con la impronta de losdifíciles momentos anteriores. La dificultad de encontrar investigadores, expertos y gobiernosinteresados en el renovado debate del tema de la tierra era manifiesta, a pesar de losacontecimientos de 1989 (caída del muro de Berlín y hundimiento del comunismo en lospaíses de Europa oriental), que podían haber permitido considerar la reforma agraria con unaconnotación política menos acentuada que antes. El Servicio de Tenencia de la Tierra estáahora particularmente satisfecho de haber tenido la ocasión de seguir adelante de maneracontinua con la publicación semestral del boletín, lo cual ha permitido quintuplicar elnúmero de contribuciones ofrecidas anualmente a nuestros lectores en un momento en elque la vida diaria está cada vez más marcada por conflictos vinculados al acceso y lautilización de los recursos naturales.


La réforme agraire en Amérique latine:ombres et lumières

L’auteur soutient qu’avec la diffusion ces dernières années de politiques néolibérales enAmérique latine, l’ère des grandes réformes agraires, qui a commencé avec la révolutionmexicaine au début de ce siècle, touche à sa fin sur le continent. Il est donc opportun de tenter defaire le point sur les causes et les conséquences des réformes agraires mises en œuvre dans laplupart des pays de la région. Ces réformes sont évaluées en fonction de leur impact sur laproduction agricole, la répartition des revenus, l’emploi, la pauvreté, les rapports entre les sexes,ainsi que du point de vue social et politique. Les gouvernements ont souvent sous-estimé ladifficulté qu’il y a à transformer la structure du régime foncier et se sont fait une fausse idée desmultiples processus dynamiques que déclenchent la réforme agraire et qui, dans bien des cas,ont eu des conséquences inattendues et involontaires. Les réformes agraires ont souventprovoqué des contre-réformes et néo-réformes dramatiques suscitées par les luttes politiques etsociales qu’elles ont déchaînées. C’est ainsi que les résultats de la réforme agraire en Amériquelatine ont été variés et ont donné lieu à un système agraire plus complexe et plus flou. Même si,initialement, certaines réformes agraires avaient pour objectif le bien du paysannat, elles ont,dans la plupart des cas, favorisé l’instauration d’une agriculture capitaliste. La tendance récente àse tourner vers des politiques économiques néolibérales et foncières a ultérieurement encouragél’agriculture capitaliste tout en accroissant la marginalisation de l’agriculture paysanne.

La reforma agraria en América Latina:luces y sombras

Con la propagación de las políticas neoliberales en toda América Latina durante los últimos años,se aduce que la época de las reformas agrarias importantes, que comenzó con la revoluciónmexicana al comienzo del siglo, ha llegado a su fin en el continente. Es oportuno, pues, tratar depresentar un panorama general de las causas y las consecuencias de las reformas agrarias quese llevaron a cabo en la mayoría de los países de la región. Las reformas agrarias se evalúan enfunción de sus repercusiones en la producción agropecuaria, la distribución de los ingresos, elempleo, la pobreza y las relaciones entre el hombre y la mujer, así como desde la perspectivasocial y política. Los gobiernos han infravalorado a menudo la complejidad de la transformaciónde la estructura de la tenencia de la tierra y valorado erróneamente los múltiples procesosdinámicos puestos en marcha por la reforma agraria, con frecuencia con consecuenciasinvoluntarias inesperadas. Las reformas agrarias han provocado muchas veces contrarreformas yneorreformas radicales tras las luchas sociales y políticas desencadenadas por ellas. Porconsiguiente, los resultados de la reforma agraria en América Latina han sido desiguales y handado lugar a un sistema agrario más complejo y fluido. Si bien en principio algunas reformasagrarias tenían por objeto beneficiar a los campesinos, el resultado predominante ha favorecidoel crecimiento de la agricultura capitalista. El reciente desplazamiento hacia políticas económicasy agrarias neoliberales ha dado un impulso adicional a la agricultura capitalista, marginando aúnmás la de los campesinos.


Latin America’s agrarian reform:lights and shadows

Cristóbal Kay 1

Associate Professor of Rural Development, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, the Netherlands

It is argued that with the spread of neoliberal policies throughout Latin America in recent years,the era of major agrarian reforms that started with the Mexican revolution at the beginning of thetwentieth century has come to a close on the continent. It is thus opportune to attempt a generaloverview of the causes and consequences of the agrarian reforms which were implemented inmost countries of the region. The reforms are evaluated in terms of their impact on agriculturalproduction, income distribution, employment, poverty and gender relations as well as from asocial and political perspective. Governments have often underestimated the complexities oftransforming the land tenure structure and misjudged the multifarious dynamic processes set inmotion by the agrarian reforms, which frequently had unexpected and unintended consequences.Agrarian reforms often provoked dramatic counterreforms and neo-reforms following the socialand political struggles they unleashed. Thus the outcome of Latin America’s agrarian reforms hasbeen varied and has given rise to a more complex and fluid agrarian system. While initially someagrarian reforms were intended for the benefit of the peasantry, the predominant outcome hasfavoured the development of capitalist farming. The recent shift to neoliberal economic policies aswell as land policies has given an additional impetus to capitalist farming while furthermarginalizing peasant farming.

the intricate dynamic processes set in motionby the agrarian reforms, which frequently hadunexpected and unintended consequences.Agrarian reforms often provoked dramaticcounterreforms and neo-reforms followingthe social and political struggles theyunleashed. Thus the outcome of LatinAmerica’s agrarian reforms has been variedand has given rise to a more complex andfluid agrarian system. While initially someagrarian reforms were intended for the benefitof the peasantry, the predominant outcomehas favoured the development of capitalistfarming (de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1989). Therecent shift to neoliberal economic policieshas given an additional impetus to capitalistfarming while further marginalizing peasantfarming.

The apparent end of the era of agrarianreforms does not necessarily mean that theland question has been resolved in Latin

Starting with the Mexican revolution at thebeginning of the twentieth century, agrarianreforms were implemented throughout mostof Latin America, especially from the 1950sto the 1980s. With the spread of neoliberalpolicies across the region in the past decade,the era of agrarian reforms seems to havecome to a close (Herrera, Riddell and Toselli,1997). Thus this is an appropriate momentto evaluate the agrarian reforms in terms oftheir impact on agricultural production,income distribution, employment, povertyand gender relations as well as from a socialand political perspective, and also to explorethe prospects of the neoliberal land policies.

Governments have often underestimatedthe complexities of transforming the landtenure structure. They have also misjudged

1 Useful comments by Andy Thorpe are acknowledged.


America, but that it no longer commands thepolitical support that it did during the 1960sand 1970s, when cold war concerns arisingfrom the Cuban revolution and an emergentpeasant movement put agrarian reform firmlyon the political agenda (de Janvry, 1994).Neoliberal land policies have shifted prioritiesaway from expropriation of estates, whichtypified the populist agrarian reform period,towards privatization, decollectivization, landregistration, titling and land tax issues.

The most significant symbol of theneoliberal winds sweeping through LatinAmerica has been the change in 1992 ofArticle 27 of Mexico’s Constitution of 1917,which had opened the road to LatinAmerica’s first agrarian reform and whichenshrined a principal demand for “land andliberty” by the peasant insurgents during theMexican revolution. Before 1992 nogovernment had dared to modify this keyprinciple of Mexico’s Constitution, but theforces of globalization and neoliberalismproved too strong to resist and thegovernment took the risk of tackling thishitherto sacred cow (Randall, 1996). The newagrarian law marks the end of Mexico’sagrarian reforms. It allows the sale of land ofthe reform sector and the establishment ofjoint ventures with private investors includingforeign capitalists, thereby indicatingMexico’s commitment to the North AmericanFree Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (DeWalt, Reesand Murphy, 1994; de Janvry, Gordillo andSadoulet, 1997).

The Latin American agrarian reformexperience also has lessons for countries thathave recently embarked on, or intend tointroduce, a programme of land expropriationand redistribution (such as South Africa) aswell as for those admittedly few countriesplanning to intensify and extend theexpropriation process (such as Zimbabwe) orthose where NGOs and other actors areseeking ways to revive the agrarian reformissue, as in the Philippines (Borras, 1997). Asthe pursuit of neoliberal policies by mostLatin American countries has resulted in theprivatization of the collective agrarian reformsector, the Latin American case also haslessons for the former communist countries

in transition from a centrally plannedeconomy to a market-oriented economy,particularly those countries that aredecollectivizing their agricultural sector(Spoor, 1997), as well as for countriescommitted to privatization of communalareas as in some African contries andelsewhere (Nsabagasani, 1997).

The paper begins by discussing LatinAmerica’s dismal agricultural economicperformance from the end of the SecondWorld War until the beginning of the agrarianreform period in the 1960s. The causes ofthis poor performance have been the subjectof lively debate between structuralists andneoclassical economists (Lehmann, 1978).While structuralists stressed the unequal andbimodal land tenure system, the neoclassicaleconomists emphasized public policy whichin their view discriminated againstagriculture.

Subsequently the paper analyses thecauses and objectives of agrarian reform.While governments often used agriculture’spoor growth record as a justification foragrarian reform legislation, they were mainlydriven by internal as well as externalpressures. Social conflicts escalated in thecountryside as peasants and rural workerswere less willing to tolerate poor livingstandards, exploitative working conditionsand a marginal position in society. Thespread of urban influences into thecountryside had begun to undermine patron-client relationships and increased theinfluence of political parties and other urbangroups willing to support the organization ofpeasants and rural workers into trade unionsand other associations confident enough tochallenge the landlords’ domination (Kay,1980).

The collectivist character of the moresignificant agrarian reforms in Latin Americais then highlighted, and the impact of theagrarian reforms on production, incomedistribution, employment, poverty, genderrelations and socio-political integration isdiscussed. The paper provides only a generalanalysis of these issues, because thesituation differed between countries andbecause methodological problems and the


inadequacy of the available statistical datamake the evaluation difficult even in the caseof specific country studies.

Finally, the paper explores the impact ofneoliberal land policies in those countrieswhere they have been followed for asignificant period. For countries that haverecently taken this path, it is only possible tomake informed guesses as to the likelyoutcome by drawing on the results of theneoliberal pioneers.

AGRICULTURE’S PERFORMANCE PRIOR TOAGRARIAN REFORMLatin America’s agricultural growth record inthe period following the Second World Warwas poor, especially with respect to domesticfood production. Agricultural production2

grew at an annual rate of 2.6 percentbetween 1934 and 1960 (ECLA, 1963).3

However, owing to high rates of populationgrowth, agricultural production per caputgrew only marginally, i.e. by only 0.3 percentbetween 1950 and 1964 (ECLA, 1968). Notuntil the late 1950s did agriculturalproduction per caput reach pre-war levels(ECLA, 1963).

Although agricultural exports grew fasterthan domestic food crop production, LatinAmerica’s position in the world agriculturalmarket deteriorated. Food imports increasedby 44 percent between 1948-1952 and 1965,while agricultural exports increased only 26percent (ECLA, 1968). By comparison, worldagricultural exports grew by 50 percent in thesame period, which indicates Latin America’srelative decline in world markets.Agriculture’s net contribution to foreignexchange earnings deteriorated, placing anadditional strain on Latin America’s balanceof payment problems.

Agriculture in Latin America was inefficientand wasteful of resources, mainly land andlabour. A highly unequal land tenure systemwas largely to blame, but inadequategovernment support for agriculture was also

a factor. Most agricultural growth stemmedfrom an increase in area cultivated ratherthan an increase in yields. Extensive growthwithout major technical and socialtransformations clearly predominated overintensification of agriculture. The contrastwith the developed world is striking. In LatinAmerica the area cultivated increased by 24percent and yields by 7 percent between theperiods 1948 to 1952 and 1957 to 1959,while in Europe the corresponding figureswere 3 percent and 24 percent, respectively(ECLA, 1963).4 From the 1850s to the 1930sthe hacienda system (often referred to as thelatifundio-minifundio complex) expandedand achieved a dominant position withinLatin America’s agrarian structure. Thisexpansion was often achieved by displacingthe rural indigenous population to marginalareas. In this golden age of the haciendasystem, landlords were at the height of theireconomic power, political influence andsocial prestige. Only in Mexico was thedominance of the hacienda systemsuccessfully challenged by the revolutionaryupheavals of 1910 to 1917. However, it wasnot until the era of the populist governmentof Cárdenas (1934 to 1940) that the haciendasystem finally lost its predominant influencein Mexico. The Bolivian revolution of the early1950s also dealt a major blow to the landlordsystem with the implementation of anextensive agrarian reform programme.

The Cuban revolution of 1959 signalled thefinal demise of the hacienda system in mostLatin American countries. Fearful of thespread of revolution to other countries in theregion and the spectre of socialism, theUnited States Government launched theAlliance for Progress initiative, whichencouraged governments throughout theregion to implement agrarian reformprogrammes by providing economic aid.Consequently, from the 1960s to the 1970sa number of countries in Latin Americaundertook agrarian reforms, among themChile, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia. In the

2 Including crops and livestock but excluding forestry.3 When sugar, cotton and banana export crops are excluded theagricultural growth rate falls to 2.2 percent per annum (1934 to1960).

4 It is unlikely that the differences in resource endowmentsbetween Latin America and Europe can explain such lack ofagricultural intensification in Latin America.


late 1970s and 1980s, following theSandinista revolution in Nicaragua and thecivil war in El Salvador, agrarian reforms werealso carried out in those countries. Only inArgentina has agrarian reform beencompletely absent. In Brazil strongopposition from landlords stalled anysignificant agrarian reform, but there hasbeen some minor land redistribution sincethe restoration of democratic rule in the mid-1980s (de Souza Leite, 1994; FAO, 1996).

Prior to agrarian reform Latin Americangovernments had adopted policiesencouraging the modernization of thehacienda system. The introduction of import-substitution industrialization policies afterthe Second World War had already begun totransform the traditional hacienda system.Such government measures as subsidizedcredits for the purchase of agriculturalmachinery and equipment, improvedlivestock, fertilizers and high-yielding-varietyseeds and technical assistance programmeswere intended to stimulate the technologicalmodernization of large landed estates. Thesocial relations of production had also begunto change. Labour-service tenancies and tosome extent sharecropping began to give wayto wage labour (Goodman and Redclift,1981). Some landlords sold part of theirestates to finance improvements on theremainder of their property, therebyadvancing a process of “transformation fromabove” (Kay, 1988a). This processparadoxically gained momentum with theagrarian reform. It is ironic that manyagrarian reforms in Latin America resulted inthe modernization of the hacienda systemand its transformation into capitalist farmsrather than its elimination from below byredistributing hacienda land to peasants. Inthis sense many agrarian reforms initiallyaccelerated an already established path fromlandlord system to agrarian capitalism ratherthan the development of peasant farming(de Janvry, 1981; Kay 1988a). However, aswill be seen later, the subsequent unravellingof agrarian reforms has opened up thepossibility of a peasant road to agrariancapitalism, albeit one subordinated to agro-industrial capital.

In explaining Latin America’s pooragricultural performance, structuralistsemphasize the high degree of landconcentration while neoclassical andmonetarist interpretations stress governmentpolicy, in particular price and trade policieswhich allegedly discriminated againstagriculture (Valdés and Siamwalla, 1988).Government price controls on some essentialfood commodities and an exchange-ratepolicy that overvalued the local currency andthus made food imports cheaper andagricultural exports less profitable acted asdisincentives to agricultural production(Valdés, Muchnik and Hurtado, 1990). Whileit is generally accepted today that the import-substitution industrialization policy adoptedby most governments in Latin Americadiscriminated against agriculture, the factthat large agricultural producers were oftencompensated, at least to some extent, bycountervailing policies is generally ignored(Kay, 1977). For example, landlords receivedhighly subsidized credits and benefited fromcheap imports of agricultural machinery andinputs as a consequence of the above-mentioned trade policy, and they benefitedfrom special technical assistanceprogrammes. Thus government policy wasbiased not just against agriculture but withinagriculture against peasants and ruralworkers (Kay, 1981).

While after the Second World War in manyLatin American countries landlords no longerdominated the political system, they stillexerted a major influence on governmentpolicy and could swing the power of the Statein their favour regarding relations betweenlandlords and peasants (Huber and Safford,1995). Tenants had to pay high rents (eitherin money, in kind or in labour services) andagricultural workers were paid low wages andhad poor working conditions. Rural labourwas largely unorganized and confronted aseries of legal obstacles impedingunionization. Working conditions throughoutrural Latin America were exploitative andrepressive (Duncan and Rutledge, 1977).

Latin America’s bimodal agrarian structurewas seen by structuralist and liberalreformists (largely from the United States) as


inegalitarian and inefficient and as havingdetrimental social and politicalconsequences. While structuralists tended tofavour cooperative or associative farmingorganizations, liberals championed familyfarming, although some also promotedcooperatives. It was argued that agrarianreform, by modifying the uneven incomedistribution, would widen the domesticmarket for industrial commodities,strengthen the industrialization effort byincreasing the supply of agriculturalcommodities and have a beneficial impact onforeign exchange.

A powerful case for agrarian reform wasmade by reformist analysts who stressed thatthe high degree of land concentration was aninefficient use of resources. Large farms usedland in an extensive manner which resultedin low land productivity, and much landremained uncultivated. Monoculture, whichwas generally adopted by plantations in areasof export agriculture, had deleterious effectson the environment. Extensive land use alsolimited employment opportunities andcontributed to low labour productivity.Because of the relative abundance ofagricultural workers and the high degree ofland concentration, landlords could continueto pay low wages even where labourproductivity had increased throughinvestments (de Janvry, 1981). It was alsoheld that land concentration hampered theadoption of modern technology, as landlordscould obtain high incomes withoutintensifying production given the largeamount of land they owned. Landlords alsoviewed their estates as a useful hedge againstinflation. Ownership of a large landed estatealso conferred high social status and politicalpower. Thus farming efficiency was notalways a priority for landlords. Reformistsalso blamed land concentration for the socialinequality, marginalization and poor livingconditions of the majority of the ruralpopulation in Latin America (Feder, 1971).

With respect to prices, structuralists werethe first to highlight the deterioration of LatinAmerica’s terms of trade. The decreasingpurchasing power of agricultural exports interms of industrial imports was a

disincentive. Structuralists argued that priceincentives, which were emphasized by theneoclassical economists, were unlikely toimprove agricultural efficiency and growthrate, as latifundistas reacted slowly to themand they did not often induce themodernization of the enterprise.Minifundistas also failed to react positively toprice incentives, but for different reasons,such as lack of resources and technicalknowledge. Although later studies show thatstructuralists may have underestimated thepositive effect of price incentives, it does notfollow that they would have been a betterpolicy tool than agrarian reform for achievinggrowth with equity in the countryside.Furthermore, many studies that foundfarmers to be more responsive to marketmechanisms than structuralists hadpresumed were undertaken after agrarianreform measures had been introduced. Justas it can be argued that structuralistsunderestimated the dynamic potential oflandlords, so it can be argued thatneoclassical economists underestimated thenegative effects of Latin America’s agrarianstructure for economic development. Whilestructuralists pinned their hopes on agrarianreform, neoclassical thinkers placed theirs infree markets. Following the implementation ofagrarian reform and the more recentexperiments with free markets, a consensusis emerging that both courses are needed toattain growth with equity.

THE BIMODAL LAND TENURE SYSTEMThe Alliance for Progress prompted acomprehensive study of Latin America’sagrarian structure during the first half of the1960s. In the mid-1960s the Inter-AmericanCommittee for Agricultural Development(CIDA)5 published reports on sevencountries: Argentina (1965), Brazil (1966),

5 CIDA was set up in 1961 by the Organization of AmericanStates (OAS); the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); theInter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences, known todayas the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture(IICA); FAO; and the United Nations Economic Commission forLatin America (ECLA), later renamed the United NationsEconomic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean(ECLAC).


Colombia (1966), Chile (1966), Ecuador(1965), Guatemala (1965) and Peru (1966).These were later followed by two or threeother country reports. The CIDA studies(reviewed in Barraclough, 1973; Barracloughand Domike, 1966) represent the mostambitious collective study to date of LatinAmerica’s land tenure. They had a majorinfluence on shaping a certain view of theLatin American agrarian question as well ason the design of agrarian reform policies.They conveyed a bimodal view of LatinAmerica’s land tenure system and were usedby governments to lend scientific weight tothe case for agrarian reform legislation.

Latin America had one of the most unequalagrarian structures in the world. At oneextreme were the minifundistas, who ownedvery small landholdings (minifundios); at theother were the latifundistas, who owned verylarge landholdings (latifundios) in the form ofplantations, haciendas and estancias. By1960 latifundistas owned roughly 5 percentof farm units and about four-fifths of theland, while minifundistas owned four-fifths offarm units but had only 5 percent of the land(Barraclough, 1973). The middle-sized farmsector was relatively insignificant. Althoughsubsequent studies have shown this bimodalcharacterization to be exaggerated – tenantshad a significant degree of control overresources within the estates, and mediumfarmers had access to better land and weremore capitalized and thus contributed moreto agricultural output than originallyestimated – Latin America still had one of themost polarized agrarian systems in the world.

Peasant holdings were the main providersof employment, accounting for about half ofthe agricultural labour force, of which four-fifths were unpaid family workers. Largeestates employed less than one-fifth of theagricultural labour force (Barraclough, 1973).In 1960 an estimated one-third of the totalagricultural labour force was landless and avariety of tenancy arrangements werewidespread; approximately one-quarter ofagricultural workers (or more) were tenants orsquatters (Barraclough, 1973).

This agrarian system was inefficient. On theone hand, latifundios underutilized land by

farming it in an extensive manner and leavinga significant proportion uncultivated. On theother hand, minifundios were wasteful oflabour, using too much labour on too littleland. Not surprisingly, while labourproductivity was much higher on latifundiosthan on minifundios, the reverse was the caseregarding land productivity. In the 1950s andearly 1960s, average production peragricultural worker was about five to tentimes higher on latifundios than onminifundios, while production per hectare ofagricultural land was roughly three to fivetimes higher on minifundios than onlatifundios (Barraclough, 1973).Given thatmuch rural labour was unemployed orunderemployed and land was relativelyscarce, it was more important from adevelopmental perspective to raise landproductivity than to increase labourproductivity. Proponents of agrarian reformargued that land productivity could beincreased more easily by redistributing landthan by making costly investments in moderntechnology, which might also displace labour.Furthermore, agrarian reform was likely tohave a far more favourable impact on incomedistribution than an exclusive emphasis onmodern technology.

The land tenure and labour structure hadbegun to change prior to the implementationof agrarian reforms. In the changing politicalclimate of the 1950s and 1960s, landlordsforesaw the prospect of agrarian reformlegislation and took evasive action. In orderto avoid expropriation, some landlordsreduced the size of their estates bysubdividing them among family members orby selling some land. In addition, landlordsaimed to reduce the internal pressure forland from tenants who, as agriculturalproducers, were keen to expand their tenancyand reduce rent payments. Landlordsavoided this internal pressure by reducingthe number of tenants and replacingpermanent workers with seasonal wagelabourers, who had fewer legal rights thanpermanent wage labourers and could bemore easily dismissed or laid off as thesituation demanded. Mechanization allowedlandlords to reshape the composition of their


labour force and to reduce it substantially,thereby further weakening internal pressuresfor land redistribution and higher wages.

As noted above, the mere threat of anagrarian reform can precipitate the breakupand capitalization of the hacienda. Agrarianreform legislation generally exempted farmsbelow a certain size and in some casesmodern and efficient farms that exceededthis limit. Landlords attempted to evadeexpropriation by subdividing andmodernizing their estates. Farm efficiencywas often judged by the presence ofmachinery and the use of wage labour ratherthan tenant labour. Tenancies wereparticularly frowned upon, as they wereconsidered part of a feudal and oppressivelabour regime.

The medium-sized capitalist farm sectoralso expanded, especially in those countrieswhere agrarian reform legislation allowedlandlords to retain part of their estate afterexpropriation, i.e. when they had the right toa “reserve” (reserva), as in Chile. Landlordsgenerally retained the heart of the hacienda,which encompassed the best land and themain farm buildings. In addition, landlordsoften retained their livestock and agriculturalmachinery which, concentrated on a smallerfarm, improved both the capital/land ratioand the capital/labour ratio.

CAUSES AND OBJECTIVES OF AGRARIAN REFORMThe most far-reaching agrarian reforms havetended to be the outcome of socialrevolutions. Such was the case in Mexico(1917), Bolivia (1952), Cuba (1959) andNicaragua (1979). However, radical agrarianreforms were also undertaken by electedgovernments, as in Chile during the Frei(1964 to 1970) and Allende (1970 to 1973)administrations, or even by military regimes,as in Peru during the government of GeneralVelasco Alvarado (1969 to 1975). Agrarianreforms that were less wide ranging (in termsof the amount of land expropriated and thenumber of peasant beneficiaries) were carriedout largely by civilian governments in the restof Latin America. The major exception isArgentina, where to date no agrarian reformhas taken place and agrarian reform has not

formed part of the political agenda. Theuniqueness of the Argentine case is explainedin part by the relative importance of familyfarming and middle-sized capitalist farms aswell as by the relatively high degree ofurbanization. Paraguay and Uruguay hadcolonization programmes but in neithercountry has a significant agrarian reformtaken place.

Agrarian reforms have generally been theoutcome of political changes from above.Although in some instances these wereresponding to social pressures from below,few agrarian reforms in Latin America werethe direct result of peasant uprisings.However, although the peasantry was not animportant social force behind the reformlegislation, it did significantly influence thereform process. Those areas where ruralprotest was strongest tended to receive themost attention from agrarian reform agencies.

Urban social forces and even internationalforces, as in the case of the Alliance forProgress, played an important part inbringing about agrarian reform. Technocraticand reformist governments seeking tomodernize agriculture and integrate thepeasantry often initiated agrarian reforms.Not surprisingly, they confronted oppositionfrom landlords, who sometimes succeeded inblocking or reversing the legislation. Agrarianreforms are social processes whoseunintended consequences may redirect theinitial purpose of the reform along radical orconservative lines (but usually the latter) ormay in some instances derail it completely.

In Guatemala, President Arbenz’s agrarianreform of 1952 was brought to an abrupt endin 1954 when he was overthrown by anarmed invasion which received support fromthe United States Government. Arbenz’sagrarian reform measures, which hadexpropriated about one-fifth of the country’sarable land and benefited close to one-quarter of the peasantry, were quicklyreversed (Brockett, 1988). In Chile, Frei’smoderate agrarian reform of 1964 to 1970fuelled demands from the peasant movementfor intensification of the reform process. Theradicalization of the peasant movement was afactor helping Allende to win the presidency


in 1970. Peasant radicalism in turn pushedAllende’s democratic socialist programme forexpropriations beyond its original intent (Kay,1978). The subsequent military coup of1973, which repressed and disarticulated thepeasant movement, returned only part of theexpropriated land to former owners. Despiteits political power, the military governmentdid not dare to undo the agrarian reformcompletely.

In espousing agrarian reform, governmentswere pursuing a variety of objectives. A majorobjective, and the primary one for moretechnocratic types of agrarian reform, was ahigher rate of agricultural growth. Thus onlyinefficient estates were to be expropriatedand more entrepreneurially run estates wereencouraged to modernize further. It wasexpected that as a result less land would beleft idle and land would be cultivated moreintensely, and that agricultural output wouldtherefore increase. Another economic (andsocial) objective was equity. It was thoughtthat a fairer distribution of income wouldfacilitate the import-substitutingindustrialization process by widening thedomestic market for industrial goods. A moredynamic agricultural sector would lower foodprices, generate more foreign exchange andcreate more demand for industrialcommodities. Thus the underlying economicobjective was to speed up the country’sindustrialization process.

Agrarian reforms also had social andpolitical objectives. By distributing land topeasants, governments hoped to ease socialconflicts in the countryside and to gain thepeasantry’s political support. Landredistribution and measures assisting thecreation or strengthening of peasantorganizations were also undertaken toincorporate the peasantry into the social andpolitical system. Giving peasants a stake insociety would strengthen civil society and thedemocratic system. More radical agrarianreformers were particularly keen to organizeand mobilize the peasantry in order toweaken landlord opposition to expropriation.

Governments also aimed to increase theirsupport among the industrial bourgeoisiewhose economic interests could be furthered

by agrarian reform. However, this objectivewas more problematic, as industrialists oftenhad close ties with the landed class and werefearful that social mobilization in thecountryside could spill over into urban areas.Political links between landlords and theurban bourgeoisie were far closer thancommonly thought, and the bourgeoisgenerally placed their political interestsbefore short-term economic gains. They werewell aware that agrarian reforms could gainmomentum and spark urban unrest, perhapsleading to worker demands for higher wages,better working conditions and even theexpropriation of urban enterprises. TheChilean agrarian reform experience is a goodillustration of just such a situation. Theincreasing demands and mobilization of ruraland urban workers strengthened the allianceof the rural and urban bourgeoisie, includingsome middle-class sectors. In Peru theprogressive military government of VelascoAlvarado undertook a sweeping agrarianreform in the expectation that it would helpthe country’s industrialization process.However, the government failed to win thesupport of the industrial bourgeoisie for sucha development project and was unable topersuade expropriated landlords to investtheir agrarian reform bonds, paid out ascompensation for expropriated land, inindustrial ventures. The reluctance of theindustrial bourgeoisie was not surprisinggiven that the government was creating asocial property sector in which the Statewould control all major industrial andcommercial firms and allow a degree ofworker participation.

Although agrarian reforms were largelyinstituted from above, once expropriationwas under way conflicts in the countrysideoften escalated. Peasants demanded awidening and deepening of the agrarianreform process, while landlords opposedsuch demands and put pressure on thegovernment and in some instances on thearmed forces to suppress the increasinglybold actions of the peasants. This wasparticularly the case in countries wherepolitical parties and other organizations useda reformist opening in the country’s political


system to strengthen peasant organizationsand assist their social mobilization. Support,or lack of it, from urban-based politicalparties and urban social groups was oftencrucial in determining the outcome of thereform process.

SCOPE OF AGRARIAN REFORM EXPERIENCESThe scope of agrarian reform in Latin Americavaried greatly as regards both the amount ofland expropriated and the number of peasantbeneficiaries. The agrarian reforms in Boliviaand Cuba were the most extensive withrespect to the amount of land expropriated:about four-fifths of the country’s agriculturalland. In Mexico, Chile, Peru and Nicaraguaalmost half the country’s agricultural landwas expropriated. In Colombia, Panama,El Salvador and the Dominican Republicbetween one-sixth and one-quarter of theagricultural land was expropriated (Cardosoand Helwege, 1992). A smaller proportion ofagricultural land was affected by agrarianreform in Ecuador, Costa Rica, Hondurasand Uruguay (ECLAC and FAO, 1986). InVenezuela about one-fifth of the land wasaffected by the agrarian reform, but almostthree-quarters of this had previouslybelonged to the State and was largely in areasto be colonized. Thus Venezuela’s agrarianreform was mainly a colonization programme.

Cuba, Bolivia and Mexico were thecountries in which the highest proportion ofpeasants and rural workers benefited fromthe agrarian reform. In Cuba and Boliviaabout three-quarters of agriculturalhouseholds were incorporated into thereformed sector, while in Mexico theproportion was less than half. In Nicaragua,Peru and Venezuela the proportion ofbeneficiaries was about one-third, in ElSalvador one-quarter and in Chile one-fifth.In Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Hondurasand Costa Rica the proportion of allagricultural families that benefited from landredistribution varied from slightly less thanone-tenth to slightly more than one-tenth(Cardoso and Helwege, 1992; Dorner, 1992).In other countries the proportion was evenlower.

The fact that the agrarian reforms with the

widest scope were the outcome of revolutionsindicates the importance of the question ofpolitical power. Where landlords weredefeated and displaced from power, theagrarian reform was wide in scope. In someinstances, however, landlords have been ableto reverse some or all of the gains of theagrarian reform following a major politicalupheaval such as a counterrevolution ormilitary coup d’état.

Once the agrarian reform process has beeninitiated peasants have sometimes been ableto push it further than intended or to redirectit according to their interests. For example,peasant communities (comuneros) in Peruwhich had been excluded from land in thereformed sector, and which could only benefitfrom the profits generated by the reformedenterprises, later gained direct access to landfrom the reformed sector. As few reformedenterprises made any profits, and given theshortage of land in peasant communities andthe peasants’ historical claims (real orimagined) to the land of the expropriatedhaciendas, the peasants’ claim to a share ofthe former estates is understandable. Afterviolent clashes between comuneros and thepolice, significant amounts of land weretransferred from the reformed enterprises tothe peasant communities.

In Nicaragua, where the agrarian reformpolicy had privileged State farms since 1979,peasants succeeded in pressing theSandinista government to adopt a less State-centred reform policy. After 1984 somereformed enterprises were transferred directlyto peasant beneficiaries in either cooperativeor individual ownership. This shift in policywas also provoked by the desire to reduce theinfluence of the contras among the peasantryand to stimulate food production (Utting,1992). Following the policy change, theamount of expropriated land redistributed topeasant beneficiaries in individual ownershiptrebled from 8 percent in the period from1981 to 1984 to 24 percent in the periodfrom 1985 to 1988 (Enríquez, 1991). The newpolicy also modified the earlier advantagegiven to State farms by granting peasantbeneficiaries more favourable access toscarce inputs. However, because of civil war


and the resulting economic deterioration ofthe country, peasants still faced a difficultsituation. In Colombia, Ecuador andcurrently in Brazil, peasants have alsoresorted to land invasions which resulted inexpropriation and access to land (Petras,1997; Veltmeyer, 1997). Nevertheless theseland invasions lacked the scope andsignificance of those in Mexico, Chile andPeru.

In many Latin American countries, however,peasants were not able to extend theexpropriation process or to prevent landlordsfrom blocking or reversing the process. Inmost Latin American countries the scope ofagrarian reform remained limited in terms ofland expropriated and peasant beneficiaries.Despite an explicit commitment to agrarianreform and peasant farming, a large majorityof Latin American governments implementedtimid agrarian reforms and failed to supportpeasant farming to any significant extent.Rhetoric prevailed as governments wereeither too weak to implement a substantialagrarian reform or had the underlyingintention of promoting capitalist farming.William Thiesenhusen (1995a), the doyenamong Latin Americanist agrarian reformexperts, captures this reality well in the titleof his recent book, Broken promises: agrarianreform and the Latin American campesino.

COLLECTIVIST CHARACTER OF THE REFORMEDSECTORCollective and cooperative forms oforganization within the reformed sector were,surprisingly, far more common than onemight expect in the capitalist (with theexception of Cuba) context of Latin America.In Mexico, particularly since the Cárdenasgovernment of the 1930s, the ejido hasdominated in the reformed sector. The ejido isa collective type of organization, althoughfarming is largely carried out on a householdbasis. Until recently it was illegal to sell ejidoland. In Cuba, State farms havepredominated since the early days of therevolution, and by the mid-1980s mostindividual peasant farmers had joinedproduction cooperatives. Productioncooperatives and State farms were the

dominant farm organization in Chile’sreformed sector during the governments ofFrei and Allende (1964 to 1973). This was alsothe case in Peru following Velasco Alvarado’sagrarian reform of 1969 until the gradualdissolution of the collectives in the 1980s, inNicaragua from the Sandinista revolution of1979 until 1990, and in El Salvador duringthe Christian Democrat regime of 1980 to1989. Only a small proportion of theexpropriated land was distributed directly asprivate peasant family farms.

An important explanation for the statist andcollectivist character of Latin America’s mostimportant agrarian reforms lies in theirinherited agrarian structure. Prior to reform,large-scale farming prevailed in the form ofplantations, haciendas and estancias.Governments feared that subdividing theselarge landed estates into peasant familyfarms might lead to a loss of economies ofscale, reduce foreign exchange earnings aspeasant farmers would switch from export-crop to food-crop production, impairtechnological improvements, limit thenumber of beneficiaries and reproduce theproblems of the minifundia. Furthermore, acollective reformed sector reducedsubdivision costs, allowed more directgovernment control over production and insome instances marketing, and could fosterinternal solidarity. In those countriespursuing a socialist path of development,such as Cuba, Allende’s Chile and Nicaraguaunder the Sandinistas, a collectivistemphasis was also underpinned by politicaland ideological factors. In some casescollective forms of organization were regardedas transitory, as in Chile and El Salvador. Asbeneficiaries gained entrepreneurial andtechnical experience a gradual process ofdecollectivization was envisaged.

Agrarian reform policy-makers throughoutLatin America greatly underestimated therelative importance of peasant farming, suchas sharecropping and labour-servicetenancies, within large landed estates.National census data generally failed torecord, or to record accurately, the number ofpeasant tenant enterprises within thehacienda system (the “internal peasant


economy”). This led policy-makers tounderestimate the difficulties of organizingcollective farming and the pressure thatbeneficiaries would exercise within thecollective enterprise for the expansion of theirown family enterprises. The new managers ofthe collective reformed enterprises, generallyappointed by the State, had far less authorityover the beneficiaries than landlords had andwere unable to prevent the gradual erosion ofthe collective enterprise from within.

The enduring influence of the pre-reformlarge landed enterprises on the situation afterreform is startling. In this sense thecollectivist character of the reformed sectorshould not be overstated, as it was oftenmore apparent than real. For example, inPeru about half the agricultural land of thereformed sector (collective and State farms)was cultivated on an individual basis. InChile and El Salvador the figure was aboutone-fifth, and only in Cuba was itinsignificant. This reflects the varying degreesof capitalist development andproletarianization of the agricultural labourforce in each of these countries before theagrarian reform.

The differences between types of estates,such as plantations and haciendas, were alsoreflected in the character of post-reformenterprises, as illustrated in the case of Peru.Prior to expropriation, the large coastal sugarplantations were capitalized and employedlargely wage labour, whereas the domestic-market-oriented haciendas of the highlandsrelied much more on tenant labour. It was fareasier to set up centralized and collectivemanagement systems on the expropriatedsugar plantations than on the highlandhaciendas, and this had an importantinfluence on the subsequent process ofdecollectivization.

A feature of Cuba’s agrarian reforms (1959and 1963) that is not often mentioned is thefact that Castro’s government greatlyextended peasant proprietorship, givingownership titles to an estimated 160 000tenants, sharecroppers and squatters. Beforethe revolution, peasant farmers had onlynumbered about 40 000 (Ghai, Kay andPeek, 1988). Cuba’s agriculture was

dominated by sugar plantations and theagricultural labour force was largelyproletarian. A large proportion of seasonalsugar-cane cutters came from urban areas.The plantation sector was taken over by theState without much difficulty. Over time Statefarms were amalgamated into even largerunits, becoming giant agro-industrialcomplexes under the direct control of eitherthe Ministry of Agriculture or the Ministry ofSugar. Cuban policy-makers were greatbelievers in the tenet “large is beautiful”. Itwas not until almost two decades after therevolution that the Cuban leadershiplaunched a campaign for thecooperativization of peasant farmers.Peasants were encouraged to formagricultural and livestock productioncooperatives (cooperativas de producciónagropecuaria or CPA), having resisted joiningState farms, and within a decade over two-thirds of all peasant farmers had done so.CPAs were clearly outperforming State farms(Kay, 1988b) and they became an example toState farms, eventually leading to theirtransformation as will be discussed later.

IMPACT OF AGRARIAN REFORMSThe success or failure of agrarian reforms is asubject of much controversy. Fewcomprehensive evaluations of agrarianreforms have been undertaken to date, andin those few cases the answers are not alwaysclear-cut as a consequence of the complexityof the task. Evaluations vary according to thecriteria used, the weight given to each ofthese criteria and the period considered. Along-term evaluation can lead to a completelydifferent assessment than one carried outsooner. As the agrarian reform process isitself protracted, a long-term evaluation canonly be undertaken three or more decadesfrom the start. While a longer-termperspective might be more appropriate, thisalso is not without difficulties as other factorsintervene to influence the outcome of anagrarian reform. It is notoriously difficult toattribute a particular outcome to the agrarianreform, let alone to make any precisemeasurement of its impact. Thus anyevaluation should be treated with caution.


Agrarian reforms can be assessed in narroweconomic terms or in broader systemic andinstitutional terms. They can be evaluated interms of their impact on growth, employment,income distribution, poverty and socio-political participation as well as on the widerdevelopment context. More recentevaluations have included the impact ofagrarian reforms on gender divisions and onthe environment.

While agrarian reform may be aprecondition for sustainable development, itis not a sufficient condition. Agrarian reformshould not be regarded as a panacea for allthe ills afflicting Latin American ruraleconomies and societies, yet the initialcampaigns and proposals for agrarian reformwere often seen in this enthusiastic light.Agrarian reform was perceived as a way ofliberating the peasantry from landlordismwith its associated feudal and exploitativeconditions. It was seen as a way of achievingequitable rural development which wouldreduce rural poverty. It was also consideredimportant for facilitating Latin America’sstruggling industrialization process byexpanding the domestic market and easingforeign exchange constraints.

Given that agrarian reforms were seen as apanacea, it is paradoxical that governmentsfailed to provide the financial, technical,organizational and other institutional supportneeded to ensure their success. In manyinstances the continuation of import-substitution industrialization policies and thepersistent discrimination against agriculturein terms of price, trade and credit policymade the task of creating a viable agrarianreform sector impossible. Clearly, mistakes indesign and implementation of agrarianreforms also contributed to their eventualunravelling.

Most agrarian reforms failed to fulfilexpectations for a variety of reasons. In someinstances, agrarian reform was implementedin a half-hearted fashion by governments thatpaid lip service to agrarian reform fordomestic or foreign political purposes,whether to gain votes from the peasantry oraid from international agencies. In otherinstances fierce political opposition from

landlords, sometimes with the support ofsectors of the bourgeoisie, restricted thereforms.

Agricultural productionThe impact of agrarian reform on agriculturalproduction has been mixed. Most analystsagree that results fall well below expectations.In Mexico, agricultural production increasedby 325 percent from 1934 to 1965, thehighest rate in Latin America during thisperiod. This growth, however, was the resultof the impetus given to agrarian reform by theCárdenas government and the supportivemeasures for agricultural development; sincethat period Mexican agricultural performancehas been poor (Thiesenhusen, 1995a).Nevertheless, research has shown that farmswithin the ejido reform sector, which arepredominantly farmed as individual familyplots, are as productive as farms ofequivalent size in the private sector (Heath,1992). However, the most dynamic sector inMexican agriculture is that of private middle-sized and large-scale farmers. During the lastfew decades these farmers have been themain beneficiaries of government policywhich has favoured commercial agricultureand given little support to reformbeneficiaries. Major government investmentsin irrigation and provision of subsidizedcredits have principally favoured largefarmers and export agriculture whileneglecting the ejido food-producing sector.6

In Bolivia, marketed agricultural output inthe years immediately after agrarian reformdeclined as reform beneficiaries increasedtheir own food consumption. With respect toproduction, some contend that levels weremaintained while others argue that it tookalmost a decade for production to reach itspre-revolutionary level (Thiesenhusen,1995a). Subsequently agricultural growthwas achieved in large part through thecolonization of the eastern lowlands, aprocess encouraged by the State and

6 It was only during 1980/81 that the Mexican governmentattempted to reinvigorate peasant agriculture and the ejidos bypursuing a food self-sufficiency policy (Sistema alimentariomexicano or SAM) financed by the influx of petrodollars and theboom in Mexico’s oil export earnings.


designed to boost commercial farming andexport agriculture.

In Chile, agrarian reform under Frei (1964to 1970) initially had a very favourableimpact on agricultural production.Production increased by an annual averagerate of 4.6 percent between 1965 and 1968,three times faster than in the previous twodecades (Kay, 1978). However, growth sloweddown in the last two years of the Freiadministration. Under the Allendegovernment production increasedsignificantly in the first year, stagnated duringthe second year and declined sharply in 1973as a result of socio-political upheavals andinput shortages. It is estimated that much ofthe initial increase in agricultural outputcame from the commercial farm sector,especially the reservas. This is not surprisinggiven that landlords often kept the best landand farm equipment which enabled them tointensify production. The reformed sectorperformed reasonably well at first, receivingmuch government support in the form ofcredits, technical assistance, marketingfacilities, mechanization and so on. This isnot an insignificant achievement given thatlandlords had decapitalized their estatesbefore expropriation. However, as theexpropriation process escalated and strainedthe administrative and economic resources ofthe State, the reformed sector facedincreasing problems. Internal organizationalproblems began to arise as beneficiariesdevoted more time to their individual plotsthan to the collective enterprise.

In Peru the agrarian reform did not increaseagricultural production from its low level. Thegrowth rate of 1.8 percent from 1970 to 1976was similar to the average pre-reform rate ofthe 1960s (Kay, 1982). During the period1970 to 1980 the average annual growth rateof agriculture was negative, i.e. -0.6; adrought in 1978 and a severe economicrecession in the late 1970s had negativeconsequences for agriculture (ECLAC, 1993).During the 1980s agriculture recovered,growing by 2 percent yearly, but thisagricultural growth was still slower thanannual population growth (2.2 percent) (IDB,1993). The reformed sector, plagued with

internal conflicts between government-appointed managers and beneficiaries, waspartly responsible for this poor performance.The State exacerbated matters by its failureto provide resources or adequate technicaltraining to beneficiaries and by its continuedadherence to a cheap-food policy whichreduced the reformed sector’s profitability.Furthermore, reformed enterprisesexperienced land invasions by highlandpeasant communities as well as the violentactivities of the Shining Path guerrillamovement in the 1980s.

In Nicaragua a series of factors conspiredagainst the economic success of the 1979agrarian reform. In the decade before theagrarian reform agriculture had beenstagnant. After agrarian reform in the 1980sagricultural output declined on average by0.9 percent yearly (IDB, 1993). Armedconflict between the contras and thegovernment severely disrupted production.Other contributing factors were the insecurityof tenure which inhibited investment byprivate farmers, the mass slaughter oflivestock by farmers fearful of beingexpropriated, shortages of labour, disruptionof the marketing system and mismanagementof the reformed enterprises (Enríquez, 1991).

In El Salvador the 1980 agrarian reformwas implemented during a period of civil warwhich came to an end in 1992 (Seligson,1995; Paige, 1996). Gross domestic productdeclined by 0.4 percent yearly, whileagricultural production declined by 0.7percent yearly in the 1980s (IDB, 1993). Thecommonly held view that individual farmingis superior to collective farming is not borneout in El Salvador. Yields achieved on thecollective land of the producer cooperatives ofthe reformed sector were often higher thanyields on family plots either within or outsidethe reformed sector (Pelupessy, 1995).

Income distribution, employment and povertyThe gains in income distribution derived fromagrarian reforms have been lower thananticipated. The redistributive effects aregreater where more land is expropriated anddistributed to a larger proportion of the ruralpopulation, especially the rural poor. The less


paid out in compensation to landlords andthe less the beneficiaries have to pay for theland, especially if they include a large part ofthe rural poor, the greater will be theredistributive impact. Similarly, an agrarianreform has a greater redistributive effect incountries with a relatively large ruraleconomy and population. The redistributiveimpact is also much influenced by socialpolicy and by the performance of theeconomy as a whole. In Cuba, for example,the redistributive impact of agrarian reformwas much higher than in Ecuador, not onlybecause the agrarian reform was far lesssignificant in Ecuador but because healthand education policies in Cuba targeted therural poor. In Peru, Velasco’s agrarian reformredistributed only an estimated 1 to 2percent of national income through landtransfers to about one-third of peasantfamilies (Figueroa, 1977). Sugar workers onthe coast, already the best paid ruralworkers, benefited most while comuneros, thelargest and poorest group among thepeasantry, benefited least (Kay, 1983).

The initial positive redistributive impact ofmany agrarian reforms in Latin America wasoften cancelled out by the poor performanceof the reformed sector (collective or private)and by macroeconomic factors such asunfavourable internal terms of trade andforeign exchange policy. If agriculture and theeconomy are stagnant, only poverty has beenredistributed. In addition, by excluding thepoorest segments of the rural population –members of peasant communities,minifundista smallholders and seasonal wagelabourers – from land redistribution, manyagrarian reforms increased socio-economicdifferentiation among the peasantry. Tenantlabourers and permanent wage workers, whogenerally became full members of thereformed sector, sometimes continuedlandlord practices of employing outsideseasonal labour for a low wage or renting outpastures or other reformed-sector resourcesto minifundistas and comuneros. They couldthus be perceived by non-members as thenew landlords. This was particularly the casein Peru, El Salvador and Nicaragua but alsoelsewhere in Latin America.

The income distribution effect of agrarianreform also depends on the reform’sinfluence on employment. In Peru it isestimated that the rate of male agriculturalemployment trebled in the decade followingthe Peruvian agrarian reform but it was stillgrowing only at a modest 0.9 percent per year(Kay, 1982). The net employment effects ofthe Chilean agrarian reform were also modestas rural outmigration continued unabated.The reservas used less labour per hectarethan the former haciendas because of theirhigher degree of capitalization. In contrast,the reformed sector employed more labourper hectare, particularly family labour, thanthe former estates. However, in some reformenterprises the amount of land cultivateddeclined because of capital and inputshortages, and this reduced the employmenteffect.

Given the disappointing record of agrarianreforms with respect to agriculturalproduction, income distribution andemployment, their impact on povertyalleviation is likely to be marginal. Whilestandards of living generally improved forthe direct beneficiaries of agrarian reform,these beneficiaries were not generally thepoorest in rural society; except in Cuba,they did not include the minifundistas,seasonal wage labourers, comuneros ormembers of the indigenous communitieswho account for the largest share of therural poor and particularly of the ruraldestitute. However, the Mexican and tosome extent the Bolivian agrarian reformsdid redistribute land to indigenouscommunities. In Peru after a decade ofprotests and land invasion of the reformedsector by comuneros some land wastransferred to indigenous communities.

Any gains are easily eroded in periods ofeconomic crisis. For example, any meagreimprovements that may have benefited therural poor in the agrarian reform period of the1960s and 1970s were partially cancelledout during the so-called lost decade of the1980s when Latin America was beset by debtcrisis. Estimates of rural poverty varybecause of the inadequacy of the data andthe different methodologies and definitions


employed. At best, rural poverty remainedconstant during the 1980s, theimprovements of the previous decades havingbeen arrested (Feres and León, 1990), whilethe incidence of destitution increased from28 to 31 percent of rural households (Altimir,1994). At worst, rural poverty rose from 45percent to over half of Latin America’s ruralpopulation (The Economist, 1993).

Gender relationsIn terms of reduction of gender inequalitiesthe assessment is rather negative. Most landreform legislation ignored the position ofwomen, failing to include them explicitly asbeneficiaries, to give them land titles or toincorporate them into key administrative anddecision-making processes in thecooperatives, State farms and otherorganizations emerging from the reformprocess. Even in Cuba, women made up onlyone-quarter of production cooperativemembers and were even fewer on State farms.In Mexico 15 percent of ejido members werewomen, while in Nicaragua and Peru womenaccounted for only 6 percent and 5 percent ofcooperative members, respectively (Deere,1987). Women were excluded as beneficiariesbecause of legal, structural and ideologicalfactors. The stipulation that only onehousehold member could become an officialbeneficiary, i.e. a member of the cooperativeor receiver of a land title, tended todiscriminate against women sincehouseholds were usually headed by men(Deere, 1985). The agrarian reform in Chilereinforced the role of men as the mainbreadwinners and gave women only limitedopportunities to participate in the running ofthe reformed sector, despite some legislationto the contrary as under the Allendegovernment (Tinsman, 1996).

Socio-political integration: participation and stabilityThe greatest contribution of agrarian reformsmay lie in the stimulus given to institutionbuilding in the countryside. Governmentsfacilitated the organization of the peasantryinto trade unions and cooperatives of variouskinds, such as producer, marketing andcredit associations. This brought about a

considerable degree of integration of thepeasantry into the national economy, societyand polity. Prior to reform, insurmountableobstacles blocked peasants from creatingtheir own organizations. With the agrarianreforms, political parties began to vie for thepeasant vote and extended their networks torural areas where in the past reformist andleft-wing political parties in particular hadoften been excluded by the landed oligarchy.Peasant participation in civil society wasmuch enhanced. Many peasants, whengranted a land title, felt that only then hadthey become citizens of the country. Byweakening the power of landlords and otherdominant groups in the countryside, agrarianreforms encouraged a greater organizationaland participatory presence for the peasantryin local and national affairs. However, thisgreater voice was not shared by all categoriesof peasants or all regions of countries. Therewere also setbacks from which, in someinstances, peasants have been unable torecover until today.

Agrarian reform programmes were usuallyaccompanied by legislation or othermeasures to promote peasant organizations,through which governments often sought toextend and consolidate their influence in thecountryside. Governments were moresuccessful in gaining the allegiance ofpeasants from the reformed sector who werethe direct beneficiaries of governmentpatronage. However, they were not alwaysable to keep their allegiance. Some peasantorganizations came to regard governmentpatronage as a hindrance and sought adegree of autonomy by breaking free from thegovernment’s co-optation.

In Mexico, agrarian reform clearlycontributed to the stability of the politicalsystem (although not necessarily to itsdemocratic development). For many decadesthe ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party(PRI) successfully co-opted the peasantry,but in recent years its hegemony has beenchallenged by a variety of political forces andits grip over the peasantry has loosened, asevidenced by the Zapatista rebellion inChiapas in southern Mexico. In Cuba theagrarian reform certainly strengthened the


Castro regime, as the reform was popularand benefited a large proportion of the rurallabour force. In Bolivia the agrarian reform,by granting land to Amerindian peasants,reduced social conflicts in the countryside.The threat to political stability largely camefrom other social forces.

In the short term, however, agrarianreforms have tended to intensify socialconflicts in the countryside and in society atlarge. In Chile, strikes and land seizures byfarm workers escalated as peasants becameorganized, gained in self-confidence and hadless to fear from repression. Landlords couldno longer so easily dismiss striking farmworkers nor count on swift retribution fromthe State against a peasant movement whichwas demanding an acceleration andextension of the expropriation process. Theintensified conflicts in the countrysidecontributed to the military coup d’état whichled to the violent overthrow of the Allendegovernment and brought an end to thedemocratic system which had distinguishedChile from most other Latin Americancountries.

The agrarian reform in Chile brought abouta major organizational effort. In 1965 only2 100 rural wage workers were affiliated withagricultural trade unions; this figureincreased to 140 000 in 1970 and to282 000 by the end of 1972 (Kay, 1978).Thus about four-fifths of all rural wageworkers were members of trade unions, anunusually high figure within the LatinAmerican context. Following Allende’soverthrow peasant organizations wereweakened to such an extent that they havefound it very difficult to rebuild and torecover their influence since the end ofPinochet’s dictatorship in 1990.

In Peru the military government of VelascoAlvarado set up the peasant organizationConfederación Nacional Agraria (CNA),through the Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a laMovilización Social (SINAMOS), as a rival tothe autonomous peasant organizationConfederación Campesina del Perú (CCP)which was founded in 1947. However, CNAbecame increasingly independent ofgovernment tutelage, demanding a more

radical expropriation process and a greatersay in the running of the reformed enterpriseswhich were largely managed by the State. Asa result of CNA’s growing independence andstrength (at one point CNA had twice as manymembers as CCP), the government dissolvedit in 1978. Conflicts between agrarian reformbeneficiaries and peasant communities, inwhich comuneros invaded the land of thereformed sector, subsided when thegovernment transferred some of thereformed-sector land to the peasantcommunities. Although the Shining Pathguerrilla movement was partly spawned bythe agrarian reform, it failed to take root inthe countryside, especially in those regionswith the greatest agrarian reform activity.

In Nicaragua the Sandinista agrarianreform also provoked a major effort toorganize the peasantry (Enríquez, 1997). Thegovernment helped to set up the UniónNacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos(UNAG) in 1981, and by 1987 one-fifth of allagricultural workers had joined (Blokland,1992). UNAG also managed to wrench agreater degree of autonomy from the Stateover time, and it has remained the mostimportant peasant and farmer organization inthe countryside to this day.

Agrarian reforms were often restricted inscope and thwarted in their aims byopposition forces or by governmentmismanagement. However, in those countrieswhere agrarian transformation went deepestand where poverty and social exclusion weresignificantly reduced, social stability andpolitical integration are taking hold andfacilitating economic development. Hence it ispossible to argue that, from a longer-termperspective, agrarian reforms have promotedsocial stability, if still precarious, and made amajor contribution to the democratization ofsociety. While agrarian reforms marked awatershed in the history of rural society inmany Latin American countries, the rootcauses of social and political instability willremain as long as relatively high levels ofrural poverty and peasant marginalizationpersist.

It can be concluded from the above thatagrarian reforms provide a framework for


growth, equity and sustainable developmentin rural society only when accompanied bycomplementary policies and appropriatemacroeconomic measures. While agrarianreforms are clearly facilitated by a favourableexternal environment, internaltransformations remain critical fordetermining their outcome. Rather thanregarding agrarian reform as a panacea, it isbest to see it as an instrument oftransformation, albeit an important one, forthe achievement of these objectives.

LAND POLICY IN THE NEOLIBERAL PERIODThe neoliberal winds sweeping through LatinAmerica (and indeed the world) since the1980s have had major consequences for therural sector. Agro-industrial, marketing,technical assistance, banking and other Stateenterprises which had provided a series ofsubsidized services to farmers and peasantshave been privatized. Reforms in the foreigntrade regime and removal of price controlschanged relative prices, giving an incentive toagricultural exports. Commercial farmerswere best able to adapt to the changingcircumstances and to exploit some of theprofitable export opportunities, particularlyin non-traditional agro-exports. By contrast,peasant farmers were ill equipped to meet theneoliberal challenge, given their traditionaldisadvantage in the market, which was farfrom being a level playing field. However, aminority of peasant groups – those withbetter resource endowment, entrepreneurialskills, locational advantages (in terms ofcloseness to markets and agro-climaticconditions) or access to developmentprogrammes of NGOs – have adaptedsuccessfully.

In place of agrarian reform, neoliberalismfavours a land policy that emphasizes freemarkets and security of property rights. Anactive and free land market is seen to resultin the allocation of land to the most ableproducers. Security of tenure wouldstimulate long-term investment. A largeproportion of peasant farmers, especially inregions of colonization, had no titles orinsecure ones. International agencies such asthe World Bank and NGOs financed

programmes of land registration and titlingthroughout Latin America (Stanfield, 1985). Itwas argued that secure and transparentproperty rights would facilitate landtransactions and give producers access tocredit in the formal financial market, as theycould use their property as collateral.

Neoliberals also favour individual propertyrights over collective or communal systems,as they are seen to lead to greater efficiencyand market transparency. The neoliberalsthus encouraged governments to introducemeasures to facilitate the privatization of thecommunally held land of indigenous peasantcommunities as well as the breakup of thecollective reformed sector (Bretón, 1997;Zoomers, 1997). In some cases theseneoliberal measures formalized an ongoingunravelling of the collectivist reformed sector(and of communal arrangements withinpeasant communities). As a result ofmismanagement and inadequate Statesupport, the beneficiaries began to look forindividual solutions to the collectives’problems. This generally meant that theyexpanded their own peasant economy withinthe reformed sector. Collective agricultureencountered the familiar problems ofinadequate individual work incentives andfree riders. Beneficiaries were generally paidthe same wage regardless of workperformance. Some members did not evenbother to show up for work and many beganto work for less than five hours per day.Management controls were often lax andcollective resources and inputs were oftenmisused or privately appropriated. Profits, ifthey did materialize, were often redistributedinstead of being invested. At timesmanagement was too remote, failing toconsult or involve members of the collectivein decision-making. This pressure oncollective agriculture was exacerbated byland seizures by peasants living inindigenous peasant communities or insmallholder (minifundia) areas who had beenleft out of the agrarian reform process.

With the installation of neoliberalgovernments, be they democratic or military,the cooperative, collective and State farmswere broken up. Under the neoliberal reforms


and the parcellation of the reformed sector,the former hacienda peasants who hadbecome land reform beneficiaries nowbecame the new owners of plots of land. Thegrowth of this new group, known asparceleros after the parcel of land (parcela),has greatly expanded the peasant farm sectorin many Latin American countries. Chile wasthe first to initiate this process, in late 1973;Peru has followed in a more gradual mannersince 1980, Nicaragua since 1990 andMexico and El Salvador since 1992. Someexpropriated land has been returned toformer owners (particularly in Chile), butmost has been distributed as parcels ofprivate property to members of the reformedsector. In some countries many members ofthe reformed sector were unable to secure aparcel and joined the ranks of the ruralproletariat. The parcellation process doubledor even trebled the land area under theownership of the peasant farm sector. Theextent to which this process will lead to thedevelopment of a peasant road to agrariancapitalism remains to be seen. A number ofpeasants who initially gained access to apiece of land were unable to keep up theirrepayments or finance their farm operationsand had to sell. The process of parcellationhas turned sour for many who faceimpoverishing peasantization or completeproletarianization.

In Chile, under the counterreform ofPinochet’s military government, about 30percent of expropriated land was returned toformer owners, almost 20 percent was sold toprivate individuals or institutional investors,and about half remained in the reformedsector (Jarvis, 1992). The reformed sectoritself was subdivided into parcels orunidades agrícolas familiares (agriculturalfamily units). Less than half of the originalbeneficiaries were unable to obtain a parcelbecause the size of the reformed sector wasreduced by half through the counterreformand because parcels were relatively generous,averaging about 9 basic irrigated hectares. Abasic irrigated hectare (b.i.h.) is a unit ofhigh-quality land, so parcels with low-qualityland were larger than 9 physical hectares andcommonly varied between 11 and 15 ha.

Parcels were, on average, roughly nine timeslarger than minifundias. In the allocation ofparcels there was clear politicaldiscrimination against peasant activists whowere expelled from the reformed sector. Theparceleros had to buy the land from the State,at a price of about half its market value.Furthermore, in subsequent years abouthalf of the parceleros lost their land becausethey were unable to repay the debts theyincurred to purchase a parcel or becausethey lacked capital, management and marketexperience.

A notable difference between pre-reform(1965) and post-counterreform (1986) landtenure structure in Chile is that the 5 to20 b.i.h. farm sector has more than doubled,while the large-farm sector (more than80 b.i.h.) has been reduced by more than half(Kay, 1993). The striking growth of the 5 to20 b.i.h. farm sector, which presentlycomprises about one-quarter of the country’sagricultural land, was largely the result ofparcellation. The sector is composed ofmiddle-sized and rich peasant farmers aswell as small capitalist farmers. Theformation of reservas and the partialrestoration of expropriated estates to formerlandlords has also led to a significantexpansion of the medium-to-large capitalistfarm sector (i.e. 20 to 80 b.i.h.), whichaccounts for almost one-third of the country’sland. Large farms of over 80 b.i.h. have littlein common with the former haciendas andaccount for about one-quarter of thecountry’s land. Average farm size in thissector (about 125 b.i.h.) is much reducedfrom that of the average hacienda (235 b.i.h.)(Jarvis, 1992). More important, the social andtechnical relations of production have beencompletely transformed, and today the largefarms are thoroughly modern capitalistfarms. Many medium-sized and largecapitalist farms shifted their productionpattern to non-traditional agriculturalexports which have formed the backbone ofChile’s agro-export boom of the past twodecades. Few parceleros, let aloneminifundistas, have been able to engage inagro-export production and to reap anybenefits of this boom (Murray, 1997).


In Peru, agricultural productioncooperatives on the coast, with the exceptionof the sugar cooperatives, were subdividedinto parcels or family farms and transferredto members of the cooperative. The parcelswere typically between 3 and 6 ha in size andaveraged 4.5 ha. In the highlands part of theland of the cooperatives was transferredcollectively to adjacent peasant communities(a process referred to as redimensionamiento)and part was distributed as parcels toindividual members of the cooperative.7 Ithas taken many years to legalize this landtransfer and titling process and the process isstill ongoing. The Peruvian parcellationprocess is the largest to date in LatinAmerica. The sector comprising farms of lessthan 10 ha, of which a significant part isparcels, currently controls about one-half ofPeru’s agricultural land and about two-thirdsof the country’s livestock (Eguren, 1997). Butlack of finance, among other factors, greatlyhampers the development of the parcelerofarm sector.

Agrarian reform and the subsequentunravelling of the reformed sector has thusgiven rise to a more complex agrarianstructure. It has reduced and transformedthe latifundia system and enlarged thepeasant sector and the commercial middle-and middle-to-large-farm sector.Decollectivization has also increasedheterogeneity among the peasantry as thelevelling tendencies of collectivist agriculturehave been removed. Following theintroduction of neoliberal policies thecommercial-farmer road to agrariancapitalism is gaining the upper hand.Capitalist farmers are the ones to benefitfrom the liberalization of land, labour andfinancial markets, the further opening of theeconomy to international competition, thenew drive towards exports and thewithdrawal of supportive measures for thepeasant sector. Their greater land, capitaland technical resources, their superior linkswith national and especially internationalmarkets and their greater influence on

agricultural policy ensure that they are moreable to exploit the new market opportunitiesthan peasant farmers.

Cuba has not remained unaffected by theneoliberal consensus. With the demise of theSoviet Union and the transition of the formersocialist countries from a planned to amarket system, Cuba has also had to makesome adjustments, although still within itssocialist system. Greater opportunities andeconomic incentives have been provided forpeasant farmers and producer cooperatives.In 1994 private agricultural markets wereintroduced where prices are not controlled bythe State and where producers can sell anysurplus production that remains when theyhave met their quota for the State market(Douzant-Rosenfeld, 1997). As a result of theincrease in the achievement of thecooperative sector since late 1993, theenormous State-farm sector is beingdecentralized into cooperative-typemanagement units through the creation of“basic units of cooperative production”(unidades básicas de producción cooperativa,UBPC). The UBPC members negotiate theirproduction plans with the State but they ownwhat they produce and can distribute anyprofits among themselves. The cooperative-farm sector is now far more important thanthe State-farm sector, which once ownedfour-fifths of Cuba’s land. Indications arethat UBPCs have significantly improved theperformance of the former State farms(Deere, 1995).

CONCLUSIONSThe impact of agrarian reforms onagricultural output, rural poverty, incomedistribution and social and politicalparticipation is at best mixed. However, theinstitutional changes they involved haveundoubtedly contributed to capitalistdevelopment. Land and labour markets havebecome more flexible and investmentopportunities in agriculture have improved,thereby enhancing agriculture’sresponsiveness to macroeconomic policy andglobal market forces. The main legacy ofagrarian reform is the part it has taken –albeit since the unravelling of the reformed

7 However, some of the large-scale livestock cooperatives in theCentral Highlands have not yet been subdivided.


sector – in hastening the demise of the landedoligarchy and in clearing away theinstitutional debris which prevented thedevelopment of markets and the fullcommercialization of agriculture. Thus themain winners have been the capitalistfarmers. Although a minority of campesinosgained some benefits, for the majority thepromise of agrarian reform remainsunfulfilled.

Poverty, exclusion and landlessness or nearlandlessness are still far too common in LatinAmerica. Land issues have not yet beenresolved, as is so clearly illustrated by theChiapas uprising in Mexico (Burbach, 1994;Barkin, 1996) and the contemporary strugglefor a piece of land by landless peasants inBrazil, spearheaded by the Movemento semTerra (MST) (Petras, 1997). The Cardosogovernment has promised to grant land to280 000 peasant households in Brazil. Todate land has been distributed to over100 000 of these households under pressurefrom the MST and as a result of its campaignof selective seizure of estates and massivedemonstrations (The Economist, 1997).

The era of radical agrarian reforms,however, is over. Despite the continuingarguments by scholars and activists in favourof agrarian reform (Lipton, 1993;Barraclough, 1994; Thiesenhusen, 1995b) aswell as the recent upsurge in ethnic andpeasant movements for land redistribution inthe region, there has been a shift from State-led and interventionist agrarian reformprogrammes to market-oriented land policies.Paradoxically, such land policies have beenmuch driven from above by the State andinternational agencies. Thus future Stateinterventions in the land tenure system arelikely to be confined to a land policy thatfocuses not on expropriation but onprogressive land tax, land settlement,colonization, land transfer and financingmechanisms, land markets, registration,titling and secure property rights. However, avariety of studies are indicating that suchland policies are not turning out to be thepromised panacea. While the potentialbenefits of clearly defined property rights maybe substantial given that about half of rural

households lack land titles (Vogelgesang,1996), the economic and socio-politicalcontext in which small farmers operateconspires against them. The evidencegathered so far shows that all that is achievedis a “modernizing of insecurity” (Jansen andRoquas, 1998; Thorpe, 1997). It has to berecognized that custom-based land titles aswell as rental arrangements in ruralcommunities often offer greater security andflexibility to peasants than World Bank-typeland titling schemes. In the end peasants arethe losers from these land titling projectsbecause of their weak position in the marketas well as in the political system which isunable to protect their land rights (Shearer,Lastarria-Cornhiel and Mesbah, 1990;Stanfield, 1992; Carter and Mesbah, 1993;Vogelgesang, 1997).

While the search for agrarian reformcontinues (Thiesenhusen, 1989), factorssuch as prices, markets, credit, technicalassistance, wages, regionalization andglobalization currently exercise a majorinfluence on agriculture’s performance andthe peasants’ well-being. It is vital forpeasants and rural workers to organize andstrengthen their representative institutions sothat they can shape and secure their futuresurvival in a world increasingly driven byglobalizing forces. While major agrarianreforms, especially of a collectivist kind, areunlikely to recur, it is certainly premature toargue that current land policies andneoliberal measures are heralding the demiseof the agrarian problem in Latin America; itsresolution will still require changes in theunequal and exclusionary land tenuresystem.

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Land issues and violence in Africa:prevention of conflicts, drawing from the case ofNorth Kivu (1940 to 1994)

Since 1993, northern Kivu, in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (former Zaire) has beenthe scene of large-scale violent fighting between rural groups of differing socio-ethnic origin.Between March 1993 and early 1996, tens of thousands of civilians were killed and hundreds ofthousands displaced. This slaughter is the culmination of a long process of escalating conflictfuelled by a number of factors: the demographic and ethnic imbalances resulting from migration,the expropriation of smallholders, the uncertainties and confusion of nationality and, finally,political manipulation. This article summarizes the causes of this escalation of tension and itsviolent polarization. It suggests lines of action that might prevent or at least restrain theemergence of similar conflicts, concentrating on three intervention areas: rural development, landmanagement and governance.

Problemas de tenencia y violencia en África:la prevención de los conflictos a partir del casodel norte de Kivu (1940-1994)

A partir de 1993, en la parte septentrional de Kivu (al este de la República Democrática delCongo, antiguo Zaire) se han registrado enfrentamientos violentos entre grupos de campesinosde distintos orígenes sociales y étnicos. Esa violencia ocasionó decenas de miles de muertosentre la población civil y el desplazamiento de cientos de miles de personas entre marzo de 1993y el comienzo de 1996. Tales masacres son el resultado de un proceso histórico de agravamientode los conflictos en el cual interfieren numerosos tipos de tensiones: los desequilibriosdemográficos y étnicos derivados de las migraciones, la privación de la tenencia de loscampesinos, las incertidumbres y la confusión en relación con las cuestiones de la nacionalidady, por último, las manipulaciones políticas. En el artículo se resumen las causas de este procesode escalada y de polarización violenta de las tensiones. Luego se proponen diversasposibilidades de actuación orientadas a prevenir o limitar la aparición de tales conflictos en lostres sectores de intervención: desarrollo rural, gestión de la tenencia, gobierno.


Enjeux fonciers et violences enAfrique: la prévention des conflits ense servant du cas du Nord-Kivu(1940-1994)

P. Mathieu

Institut d’études du développement, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgique

S. Mugangu Matabaro

Faculté de droit, Université de Bukavu, République démocratique du Congo

A. Mafikiri Tsongo

Faculté d’agronomie, Université de Butembo, République démocratique du Congo

Depuis 1993, la partie nord du Kivu (est de la République démocratique du Congo, ex-Zaïre) aété le lieu d’affrontements massifs et violents entre groupes de paysans d’origines socioethniquesdifférentes. Ces violences ont fait des dizaines de milliers de morts civils et des centaines demilliers de personnes déplacées entre mars 1993 et début 1996. Ces massacres sont le résultatd’un processus historique d’escalade conflictuelle attisée par plusieurs facteurs de tension: lesdéséquilibres démographiques et ethniques résultant des migrations; la dépossession foncière dela paysannerie; les incertitudes et la confusion relatives aux questions de nationalité; et, enfin,les manipulations politiques. L’article résume les causes de ces processus d’escalade et depolarisation violente des tensions. Il propose ensuite diverses lignes d’action susceptibles deprévenir ou de limiter l’émergence de tels conflits dans trois domaines d’intervention:le développement rural, la gestion foncière et la gouvernance.

des ressources naturelles productives estloin d’être un processus généralisé.Insuffisante, car l’accroissementdémographique et la rareté des terrescultivables, entraînant une compétitionforte pour un espace rare, constituentsans doute un facteur favorisant etimportant mais, en aucun cas, unecondition occasionnant automatiquementdes actes de violence. La raréfaction desressources et l’augmentation despopulations ne suffisent pas, loin de là, àjustifier tous les conflits violents pour lesressources naturelles, et leur récentaccroissement. En effet, les densités depopulation élevées n’entraînent passystématiquement la concurrence pourles ressources naturelles, et cette

DIVERSITÉ ET ENCHAÎNEMENT DES SOURCESDE CONFLITS FONCIERSDans de nombreuses régions d’Afrique, lesconflits dont font l’objet la terre et lesressources naturelles semblent devenir plusnombreux et plus violents. Un certainnombre de causes et de facteurs structurelssont souvent invoqués pour expliquer cettesituation (Chauveau et Mathieu, 1998),notamment:

•Une réponse immédiate (et insuffisante)laisse penser que les conflits ont pourorigine le contexte écologique etdémographique difficile des pays africains:population en rapide augmentation etdégradation des ressources naturelles.Cette réflexion est à la fois simpliste etinsuffisante. Simpliste, car la dégradation


concurrence ne débouche pasnécessairement sur des conflits. Un aspectparticulier du contexte démographiqueest, sans doute plus important:l’augmentation des déplacements massifsde population. Les rapports entrepopulations autochtones et allochtonesdeviennent donc plus fréquents, alors que,bien souvent, les groupes qui entrent ainsien contact se connaissent peu ou mal, nepartagent pas une histoire et des valeurscommunes, et ne se réfèrent pas auxmêmes autorités politiques locales.

•L’emboîtement et la superposition dedroits fonciers multiples sur un mêmeespace sont une caractéristiqueimportante des systèmes foncierstraditionnels africains: différents acteursont en effet des droits fonciers spécifiques,éventuellement pour des activités et/oupour des horizons temporels différents,sur les mêmes terres. Ces systèmescomplexes reposent sur une disponibilitésuffisante des ressources et surtout surun consensus social réciproque entre lesdivers «ayants droits» fonciers. Les diversdroits des uns et des autres sont en effethiérarchisés: certains statuts sontdominants et d’autres dépendants, et unensemble de relations sociales – et nonjuridiques – de subordination, dedépendance et d’acceptation deshiérarchies doivent être respectées(Mugangu Matabaro, 1997).

•Certains changements exogènescontribuent aujourd’hui à créer desenjeux conflictuels. Il s’agit, par exemple,des projets de développement agricole oudes aménagements qui augmententsignificativement la valeur productive desterres. En de tels cas, la nécessitéd’adapter ou de créer des institutionsspécifiques (démarche souvent imposéepar l’Etat ou par l’intervenant techniqueou financier extérieur) ainsi que laredéfinition des équilibres de pouvoirlocaux (à l’occasion de l’interventionexterne et des recompositionsinstitutionnelles qu’elle suscite) créent dessituations sociales plus ouvertes etincertaines.

•Ces incertitudes ou inquiétudes foncièresaugmentent aussi lorsqu’une articulationconfuse et instable entre les troisprincipales logiques de régulation foncière(la coutume, le marché, les lois modernes)les rend toutes trois également inaptes àcoordonner la concurrence et arbitrer lessituations conflictuelles (Mathieu, 1996).Les relations de compétition pour la terredeviennent à ce moment plus tendues, etces tensions s’expriment à divers niveauxdes relations sociales: à l’intérieur de lafamille (entre aînés et cadets, résidents etémigrés, hommes et femmes, etc.), entrevillages, entre catégories sociales ou entregroupes ethniques. La confusion desrégulations institutionnelles accroîtsurtout la précarité des droits des acteurspaysans les plus pauvres. Dans lessituations de cohabitation ethniquedifficile, cette précarité globale (foncière,mais aussi économique) renforce souventles réactions de méfiance et deressentiment qui alimentent parfois lesconflits ethniques.

Les déplacements rapides et importants depopulation et les opérations d’aménagementde l’espace ont comme caractéristiquecommune de créer des situations foncièresnouvelles, et cela bien souvent sans que nil’Etat, ni les mécanismes sociaux endogènesn’aient défini la façon socialement acceptabledont les nouvelles valeurs du foncierpourront être redistribuées et gérées. Dansde telles situations, ces changements rapidesaccroissent la rareté et la valeur de la terre,tout en modifiant l’équilibre des pouvoirsdans l’espace local. Cela crée desopportunités de changement et des enjeux àdeux niveaux: manipulations et spéculationsfoncières profitables (appropriation desressources), d’une part, recompositionspolitiques (restructuration des rapports depouvoir), d’autre part. La colonisation agraireou l’aménagement technique de l’espacecréent donc nécessairement des enjeux (à cesdeux niveaux), des opportunités (surtoutpour les plus riches, les plus puissants, lesmieux informés ou ceux bénéficiant derelations et les plus rusés), et des risques(pour les plus faibles). Toute intervention


technique ou modification rapide du rapportpopulations/ressources entraîne ainsi desimplications sociales et des enjeux depouvoir.

En fait, aucune des sources de tensionsmentionnées ci-dessus ne constitue à elleseule une cause nécessaire et suffisante deconflits fonciers graves. Les processusconflictuels s’articulent selon desenchaînements variables entre diversessources de tensions qui aboutissent à laremise en cause des règles auparavantreconnues comme légitimes pour l’attributiondes différents droits fonciers. En outre, lescauses et les dimensions foncières et nonfoncières, liées à l’environnementéconomique et politique, doivent êtreégalement prises en considération pourrendre compte des différents types deconflits.

COMPÉTITION FONCIÈRE ET TENSIONS POLITICO-ETHNIQUES DANS LE MASISI (KIVU), 1940-1994Le Masisi est une zone de 4 700 km2 aunord-ouest de Goma, chef-lieu de la provincedu Nord-Kivu. Ces collines fertiles, encoreboisées et très peu peuplées au début de cesiècle (12 habitants au kilomètre carré en1940) ont attiré des flux importants demigrants en provenance du Rwanda depuisplus de 50 ans: immigration massive d’abordencadrée et organisée par les autoritéscoloniales (dès 1937) puis largementspontanée, suite aux famines et auxaffrontements politico-ethniques entre Hutuset Tutsis au Rwanda voisin. Au début desannées 90, les diverses catégories depopulations d’origine rwandaise (dontcertaines, les plus anciennes, avaient obtenula nationalité zaïroise entre l’indépendance et1981) étaient devenues majoritaires,représentant au moins 70 pour cent de lapopulation totale de la zone de Masisi(estimée à 800 000 personnes début 1994) etprobablement entre 30 pour cent et 50 pourcent de la population du Nord-Kivu (troismillions d’habitants). Les densités effectivesapprochaient 300 habitants au kilomètrecarré pour les terres cultivées par lespaysans, alors que des propriétairesétrangers à la zone (politiciens, commerçants,

aussi bien zaïrois que migrants récentsd’origine rwandaise) occupaient, avec destitres fonciers officiels, de grands domainesde plantations et d’élevage extensif obtenusbien souvent en expulsant les paysans qui,auparavant, exploitaient ces terres.

Depuis 1991 et en particulier mars 1993(donc bien avant l’arrivée massive desréfugiés du Rwanda en juillet 1994), unegrande partie de cette région du Nord-Kivu,autour de la zone du Masisi au nord deGoma, a été le théâtre d’affrontementsmeurtriers entre groupes locauxanciennement implantés (Hunde, Nyanga,Tembo) et membres de divers groupesBanyarwanda1 . Parmi ceux-ci, certainsétaient établis de longue date au Nord-Kivu,particulièrement les habitants du cantontraditionnel du Bwisha, à la lisière est duNord-Kivu, inclus dans le Congo depuis lesdécoupages des frontières coloniales de1885-1910, mais qui faisait partie desroyaumes historiques du Rwanda à l’époqueprécoloniale. La plupart des Banyarwandadu Nord-Kivu sont cependant arrivés auMasisi à partir de 1937, dans lesdéplacements de population organisés parles autorités coloniales belges. Cesmigrations ont continué et sont restéesimportantes après l’indépendance du Congoet du Rwanda. Dès les années 60 cependant,la cohabitation difficile entre autochtones etmigrants dans le Masisi avait entraîné destensions sociales très vives. Celles-cis’exprimaient principalement sur deuxterrains: la rivalité politique au sein des

1 Cette appellation d’usage courant dans l’est du Zaïre servait àdésigner (depuis les années 40) toutes les personnes installéesdans la région et ayant en commun des racines culturelles et/ou géographiques rwandaises, ainsi que l’usage de la mêmelangue (le kinyarwanda, parlé au Rwanda). Cette désignationtrès englobante et apparemment évidente (les individus ainsidésignés sont en effet clairement identifiables, au moins parl’usage de la langue) recouvrait en fait des groupes sociaux trèsdivers: les petits paysans (hutus) nés au Masisi de parentstransplantés par le pouvoir colonial dans les années 40, lespaysanneries de culture rwandaise habitant le canton duBwisha depuis des siècles (historiquement rattachées auxroyaumes traditionnels du Rwanda), les migrants clandestins(agriculteurs hutus) arrivés du Rwanda à la recherche de terresavant ou après 1960, les éleveurs tutsis arrivés avec leur bétail àdiverses époques, ou encore les intellectuels et hommesd’affaires cosmopolites (souvent aussi d’origine tutsi) arrivés enplusieurs vagues à partir de 1959.


institutions politiques régionales, et deslitiges locaux d’origine foncière entrepaysans. Ces litiges étaient violents, souventavec mort d’hommes, et ils ont été de plus enplus nombreux dans tout le Nord-Kivu (pasuniquement entre les groupes autochtonesles plus anciens et les Banyarwanda) à partirde 1979 (Katuala-Kabala, 1984).

A partir des années 60, tensions etincertitudes ont créé un sentiment deprécarité économique et d’insécurisationfoncière parmi les petits paysans en butteaux vexations et à l’arbitraire tant des chefscoutumiers locaux que des autoritésadministratives zaïroises. Les discours despoliticiens des deux bords, mobilisant leurélectorat sur une base identitaire et cultivantles inquiétudes et le ressentiment réciproquede paysanneries au bord de l’étouffementéconomique et foncier, ont exacerbé uneangoisse socioéconomique croissante et des«logiques persécutrices»2 qui se sontcristallisées sur deux facteurs centraux: laterre (la sécurité foncière) et l’identité (le droità la nationalité zaïroise des divers groupesqualifiés de Banyarwanda). Au terme de laConférence nationale (1990-1992) et àl’approche d’élections inévitables, desmassacres ont été déclenchés en mars 1993par des groupes de jeunes paysansautochtones, sans doute organisés etmanipulés par les politiciens locaux. Enquelques mois, les violences perpétrées pardes milices et des bandes armées des deuxcamps ont fait entre 10 000 et 14 000 morts(suivant les estimations) et plus de 200 000personnes déplacées pour échapper auxexactions et au «nettoyage ethnique» exécutépar ces milices. Après une brève accalmiedébut 1994, les mêmes troubles ont repris etont connu une escalade continue desmoyens utilisés, du niveau de violence et dunombre de combattants avec l’arrivée desanciennes FAR (Forces armées du Rwanda)et des Interhamwe dans les camps de Gomaaprès juillet 1994. En novembre 1994, une

nouvelle «guerre du Masisi» reprend ets’étend rapidement aux zones avoisinantes(Rutshuru, Walikale), après que des membresdes FAR et ex-Interhamwe arrivés avec lesréfugiés aient commencé à intervenir dans leszones au nord de Goma (vols de bétail deséleveurs tutsis, attaques de villages hunde).En mai 1996, les associations locales dedroits de l’homme estimaient le nombre totalde morts à 70 000 et celui des personnesdéplacées à 250 0003 . Cette escalade de laviolence s’est poursuivie et étendue ensuitedans tout le Kivu jusqu’à l’entrée en scène del’AFDL (Alliance des forces démocratiques delibération du Congo) et de ses alliés finoctobre 1996.

On observe ici un cas de conflit complexe et«multidimensionnel» (Pourtier, 1996). Parmiles causes de l’escalade des tensions, il y aun malentendu foncier originel et unecompétition à la fois foncière et politiqueentre les groupes. Un autre facteur estl’insécurisation foncière structurelle etcroissante à partir des années 70, insécuritéqui s’est exprimée par de multiples conflitsfonciers locaux et violents, à partir de 1979.Dans l’histoire de ce conflit, les enjeux desécurisation et les conflits locaux, associés àd’autres sources de tensions, ont conduit àune escalade progressive qui s’est«cristallisée» finalement sous la forme decombats rangés dont le but était l’exclusionou la destruction de l’autre groupe.

Après avoir brièvement résumé les causescomplexes de l’escalade conflictuelle dans lecas du Nord-Kivu, le texte examine ensuiteles types d’actions qui auraient pu préveniret limiter ces dynamiques conflictuelles. Cespropositions présentent des axesd’interventions à prendre en compte de façonprioritaire dans une perspective deprévention des conflits liés à la terre. Ellessont bien sûr tardives et sans doute inutilesà court terme dans le cas précis du Kivu.Elles peuvent cependant être pertinentespour le futur dans d’autres contextesafricains: comment éviter la généralisationdes escalades conflictuelles violentes à partir

2 Selon l’expression de Willame (1997): ce terme indiquant quechaque groupe se voit menacé par la malveillance et le complotdes «autres» soupçonnés de part et d’autre de vouloirl’élimination du groupe rival.

3 Chiffres rapportés par le journal zaïrois Le Soft, 6 mai 1996,cité par Pourtier (1996).


de situations de rareté foncière etd’incertitudes institutionnelles qui risquentde devenir plus fréquentes. De nombreuseszones d’Afrique sont aujourd’hui, ou peuventêtre demain, dans des situations analogues àcelle du Kivu depuis une vingtaine d’années:forte pression foncière, cohabitationsethniques difficiles entre des groupesdiversifiés, administrations et Etats affaibliset instables.

L’ENCHEVÊTREMENT DES CAUSES DEL’ESCALADE DES CONFLITS: ETHNICITÉ,NATIONALITÉ ET INSÉCURISATION FONCIÈRELes processus historiques d’escalade duniveau de violence dans les conflits au Nord-Kivu résultent de causes multiples etcomplexes. Deux principaux facteursd’inquiétude et d’accroissement des tensionsont joué un rôle déterminant durant ces 25années: la question foncière et celle de lanationalité.

La question foncière peut se résumer enquelques mots:

•rétrécissement de l’espace disponible pourdes paysanneries de plus en plusnombreuses;

•dépossession foncière de ces mêmespaysanneries, en grande partie organiséepar la collusion entre chefs coutumiers,bourgeoisies urbaines et administrationscorrompues;

•incertitude et précarité croissantes desdroits fonciers paysans, résultant à la foisdes pratiques foncières clientélistes etopportunistes des chefs coutumiersautochtones et de la disqualification desdroits fonciers traditionnels par les loisfoncières modernes (promulguées en1966 et 1973), au nom de la propriétéétatique du sol (Mathieu et Kazadi, 1990).

La gestion foncière (par les chefscoutumiers et les institutions légalesmodernes en interaction) a été à la fois unlieu d’enrichissement pour ceux qui lacontrôlaient et une cause d’inquiétude(crainte d’être déracinés des terres qu’ilsoccupaient) pour ceux qui ne la contrôlaientpas, donc pour les paysans des groupescraignant d’être exclus ou minorisés dans lejeu du pouvoir politique.

La question de la nationalité a été marquéepar deux législations successives etcontradictoires promulguées à 10 ansd’intervalle (Pabanel, 1991).

•En janvier 1972, d’après la loi 72-002,«les personnes originaires du Ruanda-Urundi, qui étaient établies dans laprovince du Kivu avant le premier janvier1950 à la suite d’une décision del’autorité coloniale, et qui ont continué àrésider depuis lors dans la Républiquejusqu’à l’entrée en vigueur de la présenteloi, ont acquis la nationalité zaïroise le 30juin 1960».

•En 1981, de nouveaux textes législatifsannulent cette première loi et définissentdes conditions beaucoup plus restrictivespour l’accès à la nationalité, imposant unedémarche individuelle de naturalisationpour obtenir la nationalité qui avait étéaccordée 10 ans auparavant de façoncollective et automatique. Une ordonnancede mai 1982 précise que «sont nuls et nonavenus 1es certificats de la nationalitézaïroise ou tout autre document d’identitédélivré en application de l’article 15 de laloi n° 72-002 du 5 janvier 1972 sur lanationalité zaïroise » (art. 21).

La question de la nationalité des migrantsvenus du Rwanda (mais à des époques trèsdifférentes) a donc été marquée par uneconfusion politico-juridique inextricable, quien a fait une question littéralement«indécidable». Il était devenu impossible,dans le contexte institutionnel et politique duZaïre entre 1981 et 1993, de dire «qui étaitzaïrois et qui ne l’était pas» au Nord-Kivu. Or,pour les acteurs locaux (les paysans, maisaussi les intellectuels et politiciens liés auxpremiers), la réponse à cette question étaitd’une importance vitale. En effet, dans lecontexte de la démocratisation parachutée etassez chaotique du Zaïre (1990, autorisationdu multipartisme; 1990-1992, Conférencenationale souveraine), le règlement de laquestion de la nationalité allaitnécessairement déterminer quel serait, aprèsles élections, le groupe ethnique capable decontrôler les majorités politiques desassemblées régionales, et donc le pouvoirpolitique dans les provinces. Derrière la


question de la nationalité, il y en avait doncdeux autres: celle de la compétition pour lepouvoir politique régional, et celle de lalégitimité sociale de l’implantation desmigrants (anciens ou récents) d’originerwandaise. Cette légitimité était elle-mêmeaffaire de perceptions sociales et constituaitl’enjeu des discours et des processus dereprésentation idéologique du groupe rival.Ainsi, la compétition politique etl’insécurisation foncière s’associaient dansun contexte de clientélisme, de corruptioninstitutionnelle et de paupérisation ruraleintense pour créer un terrain favorable auxappels à l’extrémisme et à la violence de lapart des politiciens liés aux deux groupesethniques.

Trois autres facteurs ont fortementcontribué aux dynamiques d’escaladeconflictuelle entraînant une montée enpuissance des formes de violence et uneradicalisation progressive des oppositionsentre groupes socioethniques.

Absence d’espaces de communication entre groupessociaux sur la compétition sociale et foncièreLes discours de politiciens xénophobes ontpu d’autant plus facilement influencerl’imaginaire social qu’il n’y avait pas d’autresarènes de communication pour négocier ouarbitrer les prétentions politiques et foncièresconcurrentes des groupes en présence.Aucun espace institutionnel decommunication n’était disponible pour unenégociation ou un arbitrage à propos desmultiples enjeux et motifs de discorde entreles groupes sociaux: compétition pour laterre, pour les revenus, pour le pouvoir etquestion des identités nationales. Aucune deces questions n’a trouvé de lieu d’arbitragelégitime et efficace ou de confrontationdialoguée. Les seuls registres decommunication sur ces questions et cesinquiétudes ont été les discours despoliticiens et les rumeurs populaires(souvent orchestrées par ceux-ci).

Absence de régulation institutionnellede la compétition foncièreL’Etat n’arbitrait pas réellement lacompétition foncière car il n’avait ni la force,

ni la légitimité, ni la volonté, ni les ressourceshumaines et techniques pour le faire. Lesagents de l’Etat accordaient des titresfonciers en contrepartie de paiementsinformels et en collusion avec les pouvoirsfonciers coutumiers. Ceux-ci ne contrôlaientplus une compétition pour la terre quimettait en jeu des sommes d’argent et desniveaux de pouvoir qui les dépassaient. Bonnombre de chefs coutumiers locaux (bami) sesont disqualifiés par leur vénalité et leurdépendance à l’égard du politique moderne.Enfin, le marché foncier (qui est aussi uneforme possible de régulation de laconcurrence pour les ressources) étaitofficiellement absent, mais en fait présent (ouémergent) sous une forme largement occulte,imparfaite, opaque et tributaire du politique,à travers les mécanismes de corruption et lesrelations clientélistes.

Cette situation à première vue chaotiquebénéficiait en fait aux acteurs les plus richeset les plus puissants. Ceux-ci ont obtenude vastes superficies de terres sous lerégime juridique de la concession foncièreà partir du milieu des années 70. Unecaractéristique importante de cette situationétait l’absence d’institutions juridiques derecours ou d’arbitrage accessibles etcrédibles. Aussi bien dans la sphèrecoutumière que dans les institutionsétatiques, il n’y avait aucun espaceinstitutionnel crédible et accessible auxacteurs du foncier «à la base» (les petitspaysans) pour exprimer leurs plaintes ourechercher un arbitrage des litiges résultantd’une compétition foncière inégale.

Absence de développement économique et socialEnfin, la présence d’importants groupes dejeunes désœuvrés et de paysans sans terre,sans espoir d’accéder à une vie économiqueet sociale «normale», a été au Kivu, commedans d’autres cas récents de violences demasse (Rwanda, 1994; Sénégal-Mauritanie,1989), un facteur décisif des violencesmassives. Ceux qui étaient dépossédés detout (et surtout d’espoir) dans la paix ont finipar croire qu’ils n’avaient rien à perdre ettout à gagner dans la violence meurtrière etdans la guerre.


Lorsque des groupes sociaux entiers ont eula conviction d’être menacés dans leur surviematérielle (l’accès à la terre) et sociale (l’accèsau pouvoir politique), la visée d’une«élimination sécuritaire» et violente de l’autregroupe a été facilement légitimée comme unesolution évidente et nécessaire par lesdiscours de certains politiciens etintellectuels dès 1991. A partir de cemoment, la violence du massacre populaireest devenue l’option la plus facile pourapaiser l’angoisse, à défaut de résoudre lesvrais problèmes ayant provoqué celle-ci.

RECOMMANDATIONS POUR LA PRÉVENTION DESCONFLITS AGRAIRES ET FONCIERSActions structurelles en matière de politiques dedéveloppement ruralUne des causes primordiales favorisant lesconflits fonciers locaux est la pauvreté, ledénuement, le manque de terres des petitspaysans pour qui l’agriculture est synonymede subsistance.

Une des premières recommandations estdonc d’appuyer les actions de développementrural bénéficiant aux petits paysans,notamment dans les domaines suivants:création d’emplois ruraux non agricoles(diminuant la pression sur les terres),diffusion de progrès techniques agricoles(permettant de conserver les sols fragiles,d’augmenter les rendements et donc lesrevenus qui peuvent être obtenus à partir deparcelles de petite taille), et amélioration de lacommercialisation et/ou des prix agricoles(augmentant le revenu monétaire tiré d’unemême production physique).

Les recommandations sont au nombrede trois:Recommandation 1 – Un développement ruralincorporant la création d’activités nonagricoles: artisanat, transformation desproduits agricoles. Un processus dedéveloppement rural intégrant agriculture etactivités non agricoles, contribuant ainsi àalléger la pression sur la terre en créant desopportunités de revenus et des emplois nondirectement tributaires de la productionagricole et de la terre comme facteur limitant.Recommandation 2 – Un développement

agricole soutenant les possibilitésd’intensification et de diversification, par desactivités accessibles aux paysans:arboriculture, commercialisation du petitélevage, intégration agriculture-élevage,commercialisation des produits vivriers,intensification des cultures paysannes derente (café, pyréthre, papaïne, etc.). Un telsoutien au secteur de la production agricolepaysanne passe par de nombreuses actionssectorielles (innovations agronomiques ettechniques, crédit, commercialisation,formation, etc., dans une approche généraled’appui aux initiatives locales, approchesouple et adaptable aux spécificités locales,opposée aux recettes et paquetstechnologiques tout prêts et uniformes pourtoute une région.Recommandation 3 – Equilibrer les relationsentre l’agriculture paysanne et le secteuragricole capitaliste «moderne» latifundiaire(concessions de grande surface, plantationsmodernes, domaines d’élevage extensif). Lesecteur d’élevage extensif en particulier –fortement encouragé par diverses aidesextérieures – a constitué un facteurd’accroissement de la compétition foncière etde la polarisation sociale, sans générer derevenus (privés) réinvestis sur place, ni derevenus publics (taxes, impôts) qui auraientpu financer le développement régional.

Pour toute action de développement, ils’agit donc de savoir quel type d’agricultureet quelles catégories sociales sont favorisésou défavorisés par les actions de l’homme.Dans un espace rural densément peuplé,toute action technique qui accroît lescapacités d’expansion d’une utilisationspécifique de l’espace par une catégoriesociale se fera en effet nécessairement auxdépens d’autres groupes, et en entraînantdes tensions sociales accrues. Dans ladéfinition de leurs priorités, les aidesextérieures et les plans de développementrégional devraient donc anticiper et prendreen compte toutes les conséquences socialesdes options techniques et sectorielles qu’ellesenvisagent d’appuyer.

Pour éviter que le secteur de l’agricultureextensive dit «moderne» (latifundia) soit unecause de conflits fonciers et de polarisation


sociale excessive, l’extension de ce secteurdoit être contrôlée et régulée dans laperspective d’un développement régionalintégré. Cela implique l’existenced’institutions régionales de pilotage dudéveloppement, animées par desadministrations gestionnaires etcompétentes, entretenant des relations deconcertation avec les acteurs et opérateursde développement de la société civile.

Actions structurelles en matière foncièreOrientation générale. Favoriser latransparence et la communication sur les objetset enjeux d’affrontements, à partir de l’existantet non à partir de réglementations nouvelles.

Pour illustrer cette perspective, nousreprenons ici un passage des conclusionsd’une étude sur les problèmes fonciers dansle centre-ouest ivoirien, région égalementmarquée par de nombreux conflits fonciers etdes relations interethniques tendues:

•Pour rendre transparents les droits,procédures et obligations des relationsclientélistes qui s’imposent dans les faits,l’essentiel n’est donc pas de les codifier,mais de faciliter l’identification desenjeux, la clarification des règlesnormatives, la régulation des règlespragmatiques.

•Afin de clarifier les enjeux et les règlesainsi que les inflexions que les relationsclientélistes leur font subir, il convient den’exclure a priori aucune forme decoordination susceptible de contribuer àcette clarification.

•Par ailleurs, ce serait une grande erreur delimiter les conflits fonciers à leur seuledimension … foncière. La perception parles acteurs des problèmes fonciers dépenden grande partie de la vie de relationsdans son ensemble. Concernant enparticulier les rapports entre lesgroupements autochtones et immigrés,cette vie de relation existe (par exemple àpropos des groupements villageois, del’Association des parents d’élèves, desrelations de travail et de crédit, desobligations sociales à l’occasion desévénements communs à toute vie degroupe, des activités religieuses, des

élections nationale...). En dépit desnombreux motifs de friction, elle pourraitêtre améliorée non pas par uneréglementation mais par un appui despouvoirs publics ... et pour le plus grandbien des relations foncières elles-mêmes.

•Organiser les règles foncières consiste nonpas à empêcher la confrontation et leconflit mais à faciliter la communicationdans l’affrontement. La communicationdans l’affrontement implique l’actioncollective et la recherche d’innovationsorganisationnelles dans la concertationentre les différents groupes d’acteurs enconfrontation. Il est clair que noustouchons là à la dimensionfondamentalement politique desproblèmes fonciers, et en particulier àl’organisation de la confrontation politiqueau niveau local (Chauveau, 1994).

Recommandations opérationnelles enmatière foncière. De très nombreusesactions institutionnelles et foncières peuventaccroître la sécurisation foncière en limitantles facteurs d’incertitude. Il n’est sans doutepas réaliste, à court terme, de vouloirproposer de nouvelles législations foncières,puisque ce sujet est hautement politisé etconflictuel, et que la meilleure législation nevaut que par les administrations chargées desa mise en œuvre et par son adéquation avecla société où elle s’inscrit.

Sans passer à des interventions lourdes,longues et très politiques de modification deslégislations foncières, des actionspragmatiques sont possibles et devraients’inspirer de quelques principes simples enmatière foncière:

•en concevant et réalisant des actionspartant des pratiques et «demandes»paysannes en matière de sécurisationfoncière, de façon autant que possiblepragmatique plutôt que codifiée;

•en intégrant les légitimités coutumières(mais en limitant leur pouvoir d’arbitraire,notamment en ce qui concerne les «ventesoccultes» des domaines foncierscoutumiers);

•en accroissant la clarté (transparence,enregistrement) des transactions;


•en limitant de façon générale lespossibilités d’arbitraire et de corruptiondans les transactions foncières (par deslégislations simples et des procéduresaccessibles au plus grand nombre);

•en encourageant la mise sur pied demécanismes et la création d’espacesinstitutionnels plus ou moins formaliséspermettant de négocier et d’arbitrereffectivement les litiges fonciers.

Appui à la réforme de l’Etat, gouvernanceet société civileOrientation générale. La sécurisation ou lapacification du foncier et l’ensemble de ladémarche «clarification de la nationalité»n’auraient été réalisables au Kivu qu’enétant accompagnés de processus decommunication relevant à la fois du politiqueet de la société civile:

•Mise en place de lieux et de mécanismes

Favoriser l’enregistrement écrit et systématique des

transactions foncières, avec l’appui des administrations

locales, formées et équipées pour le faire.

L’enregistrement écrit des transactions foncières

(ventes, locations, héritages) est une pratique nouvelle et

en extension, émanant au départ des paysans eux-

mêmes, et qui peut certainement contribuer à diminuer

les litiges ainsi que les possibilités d’arbitraire des

autorités coutumières, ainsi qu’à accroître le niveau

général de sécurité des transactions et des droits

fonciers. De façon pragmatique et sans modifications

législatives, cette pratique peut même être systématisée

et renforcée par une «reconnaissance administrative»

des modes d’enregistrement locaux (semi-formels) des

transactions, lorsque ce sont des administrations locales

qui enregistrent ou authentifient de façon pragmatique les

documents attestant des transactions foncières entre

paysans. Au Rwanda (avant 1994), en Côte d’Ivoire, au

Burkina Faso notamment, cette pratique administrative a

joué ou joue encore un rôle significatif. (Bruce, Migot-

Adholla, et Atherton, 1994; Mathieu, 1996a).

Faciliter l’accès des paysanneries à l’information et

aux procédures relevant du droit foncier moderne, en

vue de leur permettre d’utiliser ces procédures pour

sécuriser leurs droits fonciers. Cet accès à l’information

et à une certaine maîtrise des procédures de droit écrit

peut être appuyé par l’action d’ONG locales de service,

travaillant en milieu rural avec l’aide de «juristes aux

pieds nus» se chargeant de vulgariser l’information sur

les lois foncières en milieu rural, et jouant un rôle

d’intermédiaire en dispensant des conseils en matière de

procédures. De telles actions ne sont pas possibles

dans n’importe quel contexte social et ne peuvent être

réalisées que par des personnes ou des organisations

connaissant bien le milieu social. Des actions de ce type

ont été tentées ou sont en cours dans certains pays

africains (Sénégal, Niger et Afrique du Sud).

Projets de développement agricole et gestion des

ressources naturelles, incorporant un volet de

sécurisation foncière. Dans ce type de projet, la

sécurisation des droits fonciers est liée à des

interventions communautaires pour la gestion des

ressources naturelles: actions de reboisement,

conservation des eaux et des sols et aménagement de

bassins versants. Des expériences intéressantes dans

ce sens ont été réalisées (notamment à Madagascar et

au Sahel) associant ces actions avec une sécurisation

juridique des droits fonciers paysans.

Formation, appui et suivi des administrations foncières

régionales. «Le remède efficace au problème des

spoliations des terres réside dans l’intervention du

législateur. Ce dernier doit, au sens de l’article 385 de la

loi n° 73-021 du 20 juillet 1973, définir la nature juridique

des droits immobiliers liés aux terres des communautés

locales. Cette définition devra aller de pair avec le

recensement de ce qui reste encore des terres

coutumières et de leurs détenteurs.

L’intervention du législateur ne deviendra efficace

qu’avec le recyclage et la formation tant technique que

morale de nos agents du Service des titres fonciers,

ainsi que de tous ceux qui interviennent dans le

processus d’octroi des terres, qu’ils soient cadres

politico-administratifs ou autorités coutumières. Cela

éviterait les enquêtes de vacance de complaisance.

La solution au problème des «spoliations» requiert

aussi une justice réaliste et équitable fondée

essentiellement sur les descentes sur les lieux des

concessions litigieuses et l’information juridique et

judiciaire du peuple sur ses droits» (Katuala, 1984).

Quelques exemples d’actions pouvant contribuer à la clarification et à la sécurisationdes droits fonciers des paysans


de communication entre groupesethniques (par exemple, à proposd’actions concrètes de développementsocial local: dispensaires, écoles etroutes).

•Mise en place de forums institutionnels denégociation et d’arbitrage des questionsles plus délicates (en premier lieu lefoncier) à propos desquelles les diversgroupes se perçoivent en compétition ouen insécurité.

Propositions opérationnelles. Appuyerl’Etat pour que celui-ci engage un processusde décentralisation qui contribue à saréhabilitation aux yeux des populationslocales et rende plus efficaces sesinterventions. Pour ce faire, des actions decoopération pourraient notamment:

•aider à la formation et au recyclage dupersonnel administratif communal(fonctionnaires territoriaux comme élus);

•appuyer le renforcement de la démocratielocale et de la société civile organisée (appuià la structuration des professions agricoles,appui aux associations impliquées dans ledéveloppement local, etc.);

•appuyer les différents modes d’expressiondes populations: supports decommunication (radio rurale, journaux enlangues locales), activités culturelles, etc.;

•encourager des organisations nongouvernementales (ONG) pluriethniquesqui peuvent constituer un lieu d’échangeset de discussions de toutes lescommunautés. Organisation des forumsintercommunautaires de réconciliationcomme ceux tenus au Nord-Kivu fin1993, après la première vague detroubles du Masisi4 .

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Bruce, W., Migot-Adholla, S. et Atherton, J.

1994. The findings and their policy implication:

institutional adaptation or replacement. In J. W.

Bruce et S. Migot-Adholla (éds), Searching for

land tenure security in Africa. Kendall/Hunt

Publishing Company, for the World Bank,

Dubuque, Iowa, Etats-Unis..

Chauveau, J.-P. 1994. Jeu foncier, institutions

d’accès à la terre et usage de la ressource. Une

étude de cas dans le centre-ouest ivoirien.

Colloque Crises, ajustement et recomposition en

Côte d’Ivoire, ORSTOM-GIDIS-CI. (à paraître)

Dialogue.1996. La guerre de Masisi, n° 192,

Bruxelles. 168 p.

Katuala Kaba-Kashala. 1984. Le phénomène de

spoliation. Analyses sociales – Kinshasa. 1: 5.

Laurent, P.J., Mafikiri Tsongo, A., Mathieu, P. et

Mugangu Matabaro, S. 1997. Conflits fonciers,

relations ethniques et violences au Kivu. Rapport

de recherche sous la direction de P. Mathieu.

Institut d’études du développement. UCL,

Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgique. 250 p.

Mathieu, P. et Kazadi, C. 1990, Quelques aspects

des législations et pratiques foncières au Zaïre:

ambiguïtés et enjeux pour les politiques agricoles.

Mondes en Développement, 18(69): 55-61.

Mathieu, P. 1996a. Pratiques informelles, gestion

de la confusion et invention du foncier en

Afrique. In Phénomènes informels et dynamiques

culturelles en Afrique. G. de Villers (éd.), Cahiers

africains n° 19-20. CEDAF-L’Harmattan, Paris.

p. 64-87.

Mathieu, P. 1996b. La sécurisation foncière entre

compromis et conflits: un processus politique?

In P. Mathieu, P.J. Laurent et J.C. Willame (éds),

Démocratie, enjeux fonciers, pratiques locales en

Afrique. Cahiers Africains, 1997, nos 23-24.

CEDAF-L’Harmattan, Paris.

Mugangu Matabaro, S. 1997, La gestion foncière

rurale au Zaïre: réformes juridiques et

pratiques foncières locales. Le cas du Bushi.

Institut d’études du Développement, UCL.

Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgique. Academia (série

Développement). L’Harmattan, Paris. 350 p.

(thèse)

Panabel, J.L. 1991. La question de la nationalité

au Kivu. Politique africaine 41: 32-40.

Pourtier R. 1996. La guerre au Kivu: un conflit

multidimensionnel. Afrique contemporaine,

numéro spécial. L’Afrique face aux conflits. p. 15-

38.4 Ue présentation résumée de cette intervention pacifiante de lasociété civile se trouver dans l’ouvrage de Willame (1997),p. 124-130, et dans la revue Dialogue (Bruxelles) n° 192 (1996),p. 47-49.


Access to land for all in sub-Saharan Africa:a utopia?

Where feasible, and perhaps necessary, in sub-Saharan Africa, governments could envisageallocating State-owned land directly to farmers or herders, without this in any way alienating theState’s right of eminent domain over the land thus occupied. The beneficiaries would receiveusufructuary titles from the State which would continue to hold effect so long as they or their nextof kin directly worked the land, using practices suited to local agroclimatic conditions. Having onlyusufructuary but not ownership rights, they would not be allowed to sell, divide or pledge the land.Such a land tenure strategy would establish a dual system of access to natural resources in ruralareas: the traditional system, prevailing in lineages and clans, whereby all members of the grouphave the imprescriptible right of access to these resources, in proportion to the needs of theirnuclear family; and a second system for the disadvantaged rural population groups and for urbandwellers willing to return to the land under the conditions imposed by the State, but withguaranteed rights of tenure.

Acceso de todos a la tierra en el África negra:¿una utopía?

Siempre que sea posible, los gobiernos del África subsahariana podrían prever el arrendamientode las tierras de propiedad pública en beneficio de los agricultores y ganaderos, sin necesidad deperder su derecho eminente de propiedad sobre las zonas cedidas a los campesinos en tenenciadirecta. Estos últimos obtendrían así del Estado el título de usufructo durante suficiente tiempopara que ellos y sus familias pudieran aprovecharlas de una forma adaptada a las condicionesagroclimáticas locales, con la prohibición de vender, fragmentar o utilizar como fianza un terrenodel que tengan el usufructo, pero no la propiedad. Este tipo de tenencia crearía en el medio ruralun doble sistema de acceso a los recursos naturales: el tradicional, en vigor en las tribus yclanes, en el que todos los miembros de un grupo tienen un derecho imprescriptible de acceso alos recursos, de acuerdo con las necesidades del núcleo familiar, y un segundo en el que, paralos campesinos desfavorecidos y los urbanizados obligados a regresar a la tierra, aunque elEstado les garantice los derechos de tenencia, lo hace con arreglo a las condiciones propias.


Accès à la terre pour tous en Afriquenoire: une utopie?

Gérard Ciparisse

Coordonnateur, Service des régimes fonciers, Division du développement rural, FAO

En Afrique subsaharienne, les différents gouvernements de la région pourraient envisager, s’ils lejugent opportun, d’allouer des terres de leur domaine national à des cultivateurs et à des éleveursdirects, sans pour autant aliéner leur droit absolu de propriété sur les zones rétrocédées auxpaysans en faire-valoir direct. De cette manière, ces derniers, ainsi que leurs proches, tiendraientde l’Etat des titres d’usufruit aussi longtemps qu’ils mettraient directement en valeur et d’unefaçon adaptée aux conditions agroclimatiques locales – avec interdiction de vendre, defragmenter ou de mettre en gage – une terre dont ils ne seraient que les usufruitiers, et non pasles propriétaires. Ce genre de stratégie foncière créerait en milieu rural un double systèmed’accès aux ressources naturelles: celui, traditionnel, en vigueur dans les lignages et clans, c’est-à-dire celui où tous les membres du groupe ont un droit imprescriptible à cet accès auxressources, selon les besoins de leur famille nucléaire; et un second pour les rurauxdésavantagés ou les urbanisés qui seraient prêts à retourner à la terre, pour peu que les droitsde tenure leur soient garantis par l’Etat, aux conditions de ce dernier.

pourraient mettre en valeur les ressources enquestion. De plus, un terrain libre decontestations acquiert de la valeur et facilited’autant l’obtention de crédits, surtout ceuxportant sur le long terme.

Toutefois, une plus grande sécurité de latenure, à elle seule, ne garantit pas à coupsûr une amélioration des performancesagricoles, car les lois de l’offre et de lademande, les circuits de commercialisation etle contexte économique international, entreautres, concourent eux aussi à la productionsoutenue et profitable.

Référée telle quelle aux contextes fonciersd’Afrique noire, cette définition de la sécuritéquant à la tenure n’est applicable qu’auxcentres urbanisés et aux villes, peu ou prouaux zones rurales dont on veut évoquer iciles contraintes foncières: les conditionsd’obtention de la sécurité mentionnées ci-dessus se réfèrent à une sécurité d’utilisationdes ressources propre aux mentalités dedroit écrit, droit inexistant dans les zonesrurales d’Afrique subsaharienne. Il est clair

La sécurité de la tenure comporte la stabilitédes droits, l’exclusion de restrictions oud’interférences en ce qui concerne laressource en question; pour le tenant, lajouissance du bénéfice de son travail et deson investissement soit lors de sonutilisation, soit lors du transfert de ses droitsà un autre tenancier (Place, Roth et Hazell,1994). Cette définition de la sécurité de latenure repose sur la nature de cette dernière,sur sa durée ainsi que sur ses composanteslégales et économiques.

Dans un cadre institutionnel occidental,une plus grande sécurité de la tenureavantage la production agricole. D’une part,elle permet au tenant de prendre des risquesfinanciers – intrants divers et technologiesaméliorées par exemple – et d’employer laforce-travail appliquée à la fertilité du solavec plus de constance. D’autre part, ellesupprime bon nombre de disputes foncières,libérant le temps et l’énergie des acteurs enprésence pour la production, et non pour lestatu quo et la paralysie de ceux qui


qu’aucun concept de droit de propriétéprivée, tel que l’entend le système juridiqueoccidental tiré du Code romain, n’est comprisdans le système de droits d’accès à la terresusmentionné. Seuls les droits d’utilisation etd’usufruit peuvent être associés; quant auxdroits abusus, on n’en concède jamais (FAO,1993a). Il reste à préciser que ce qui rendencore plus déroutantes les questionsfoncières en Afrique noire est le fait qu’unemême ressource peut être gérée parplusieurs groupes de personnes, tour à tour,selon sa nature et selon des modalitésreconnues de ces mêmes groupes: au Sahelpar exemple, il arrive souvent que despaysans possédant des terres n’exercentleurs droits de propriété que durant la saisonhumide et jusqu’à récolte engrangée. Durantla saison sèche, l’entrée en possession de cesmêmes terres passe aux nomades qui y fontpaître leurs troupeaux, en quête de fanes etde paille sèche (FAO, 1997a).

La plupart des sociétés rurales d’Afriquenoire, en effet, basent leurs systèmessocioculturels, religieux et économiques surle culte des ancêtres et, pour une bonne partd’entre elles également, sur la loi coranique etnon sur le droit de la personne dans unesociété donnée. Un double processus dansles relations sociales, affectives et religieuseslie les membres vivants et morts d’une mêmefamille élargie, clan ou lignage: la protectiondont sont assurés les vivants de la part desancêtres et la crainte permanente de ne pasadopter les comportements socialementattendus dans le groupe.

Dans la vie du groupe ou du clan, chaquemembre est tenu de veiller à la prospérité dela collectivité, telle que l’interprète le chef defamille. Dans cette perspective, les avantagespersonnels, les intérêts de l’individu ou sespropres initiatives doivent s’effacer devant lesimpératifs dictés par la survie de lacollectivité. De même, la nécessité d’unecohésion interne du groupe, qui assure lerespect du patrimoine indivisible légué parles ancêtres explique l’emprise d’un pouvoirunique s’exerçant sur chaque individu envue d’assurer la prospérité générale et lerespect des coutumes.

Par exemple, chez les Yakoma, en

Centrafrique, l’esprit Kanda estaffectueusement appelé Kotra que l’onpourrait traduire par grand-père. Ce dernierprotège ses descendants sur tout l’espacesous sa protection, dont ils connaissent leslimites; il a également le pouvoir desanctionner par des maladies ou d’autressignes ceux qui ne se comportent pas selonles normes de la société (FAO, 1996).

La superposition d’abord etl’interpénétration consécutive de plusieurssystèmes juridiques et sociaux rendent lesquestions de terre d’autant plus complexesqu’à ces droits et devoirs traditionnels enmatière foncière s’est surimposé le droit desdiverses puissances coloniales et des Etatsmodernes, une fois qu’a eu lieu ladécolonisation.

La relative sécurité de la tenure traditionnelle En Afrique noire, nombre de sociétéstraditionnelles sont régies par des systèmesculturels et économiques basés sur ladifférenciation des droits et devoirs au seindu groupe considéré, en fonction del’extraction sociale. Par exemple, les groupesSoninké et Toucouleurs, comme la plupartdes groupes ethniques maliens et sénégalais,ont une structure sociale traditionnelle quicomprend les nobles, les libres hors-caste etles catégories inférieures. Dans les sociétésstratifiées, les droits à la main-d’œuvre sontinfluencés par la classe ou par la caste plutôtque par la durée du séjour dans le village oul’ascendance du membre. En principe, lesmembres de castes professionnelles et lesesclaves doivent consacrer un certainnombre d’heures au travail dans les champsappartenant aux maîtres ou aux nobles.Ainsi, chez les Soninké et les Haalpulaar (ouToucouleurs) des Futa Toro de la vallée duSénégal, les esclaves doivent travailler lematin pour leur maître et, l’après-midi, il leurest permis de pratiquer des cultures desubsistance sur leurs parcelles de petitesdimensions et peu fertiles. Des structures etdes pratiques assez semblables ont étéobservées chez les Songhaï-Zarma au Nigeret au Mali (FAO, 1993a).

L’extraction sociale fonde et justifieégalement la répartition des bénéfices du


labeur selon que l’on appartient à la classeen possession des terres ou à une des autrescatégories de la société rurale considérée, cesdernières n’ayant pas de droits d’utilisationdes ressources indépendamment du bonvouloir des familles possédantes.

Pour les membres à part entière du lignageou du clan, ni l’accès à la terre ni la sécuritéde la tenure ne posent de sérieux problèmes:les chefs de terre ou de lignage, les anciens,les chefs de village ou les «maîtres de la terre»ou «du feu» sont tenus de mettre le patrimoinefoncier à la disposition des membres dugroupe pour leur permettre la survie et ce, enfonction des besoins de chaque famillenucléaire et de sa capacité de mise en valeur.Dans ce contexte – ici retracé de façon trèsschématique – la terre est indivisible et doitêtre transmise dans son entièreté aux futursmembres de la lignée. Point donc de divisiondes possessions foncières, point de gestiondes ressources de façon individuelle: le chefou le conseil des aînés gère en indivision sansêtre propriétaire mais dépositaire desressources, et tous les membres du lignagepeuvent accéder à ces ressources en tantqu’usufruitiers, à condition de cultiver ou demettre en valeur les ressources qui leur ontété allouées pour une période donnée; aprèsquoi, le plus souvent, ces mêmes ressourcesretournent en friche1 pour être dévolues àd’autres plus tard2.

Les terres du lignage ne peuvent êtrevendues ou aliénées définitivement. Il s’agit,comme le note Dissou (FAO, 1993b)d’empêcher tout transfert dont la finalitéconsisterait à faire sortir même un lopin deterre du domaine de la communautéparentale au profit d’un tiers appartenant àune autre communauté. L’application strictede ce principe a entraîné l’incapacité de toutmembre de la communauté parentale, ycompris son chef, d’aliéner tout ou une partiedes terres communautaires et l’incapacité desmembres de sexe féminin d’hériter des biensfonciers communautaires, au niveau d’unménage, par exemple; tout au plus, prête-t-ondes terres à des quémandeurs, à des alliés, àdes étrangers. Mais les parcelles cédées ne lesont jamais qu’à titre précaire et provisoire.Comme le fait remarquer Bodo (FAO, 1996),l’accès à la terre se fait essentiellement parhéritage à l’intérieur du clan et donne un droitd’accès à la terre libre et non limité dans letemps. Il peut également avoir lieu sous formede don d’une partie des terres à un groupeallié, vu le caractère sacré de l’alliance qui setisse pour des générations, et il n’est paslimité dans le temps. Cependant, il arrive quele clan possesseur de la terre accueille desindividus issus d’autres groupes souhaitantvivre avec lui. Dans ce cas, il leur est attribué,après un conseil, une portion de terre. Encontrepartie, ils demeurent tributairesmoralement à l’égard du clan bienfaiteurqui peut toujours revenir sur sa décision,même après des générations, en cas demanquement. La cession d’une portion de laterre à un étranger ne lui confère donc qu’undroit de jouissance qui est limité par latransgression de sa part des normes de lasociété propriétaire des terres. En outre, ladisposition des terres, que ce soit pour lesmembres du lignage ou pour ceux à qui lesdroits d’usufruit sur certaines terres ouparcours ont été concédés, continue d’êtresubordonnée aux règles d’usage préétablies,qui imposent une mise en valeur correcte dela ressource.

Le groupe a en outre les moyens decontrôler, éventuellement de sanctionner, lenégligent coupable de mettre en péril lesressources léguées par les ancêtres pour les

1 Le terme couramment employé dans les contextes rurauxafricains est jachère et non pas friche. On suit cependant ici ladistinction stricte indiquée par Mazoyer et Roudart (1997), quidéfinissent la jachère comme étant «... une terre de culture enrotation, non ensemencée durant plusieurs mois, soumise aupâturage des animaux domestiques et, par définition, jachérée,c’est-à-dire labourée, par opposition à la friche boisée demoyenne ou de longue durée et défrichée par abattis-brûlis, quiest le cas le plus fréquent lorsqu’on parle de “jachère” dans lescontextes ruraux africains».2 C’est la raison pour laquelle la méthode d’individualisationdes droits sur la terre selon la méthode cartographiqueappliquée récemment par la Banque mondiale en Côte d’Ivoireréclame toutes les réserves: on ne peut baser la délivrance detitre à la propriété, dans les sociétés rurales traditionnelles, surle fait de cartographier les champs d’un terroir villageois et delier le nom du cultivateur de chacun des champs mis en cultureet saisi comme tel, au moment du passage de l’équipecartographique. En effet, une fois les divers champs retournésen friche, plusieurs années s’écouleront avant que les parcellescartographiées ne soient redistribuées, et ce, pas nécessairementaux mêmes cultivateurs (Bassett, 1995).


vivants d’aujourd’hui et de demain. Lesdépendants du lignage ont un droitsubordonné d’accès aux ressourcesnaturelles. On ne peut dire qu’ils soient sansterre, mais ils dépendent du chef coutumierpour l’attribution précaire de terres. Au Nigerpar exemple, le système des castes esttoujours en vigueur dans les zones rurales del’ouest du pays; l’extraction sociale continue àdéterminer et le statut de la personne et qui,dans le groupe, a pouvoir de décision. Enmilieu rural, la distinction majeure porte sur lenoble (borcin) par opposition à l’esclave(bannya). Bien que l’esclavage ait été aboli, desconsidérations d’ordre socioculturel continuentà régir les rapports personnels, car l’accès desesclaves à la terre dépendait de leurs anciensmaîtres et chefs de terre (FAO, 1997a).

Pour ce qui est des catégories socialesn’ayant pas droit à l’accès direct auxressources (les paysans sans terreprincipalement, les femmes dans une mesuremoindre et les jeunes démunis de moyens deproduction), il convient d’établir desmécanismes d’accès à la terre et à la sécuritéde sa tenure3 si l’on veut rompre le cerclevicieux de la nécessité d’une productionvivrière accrue4 (ne serait-ce qu’eu égard à lacroissance démographique). Lesditsmécanismes devraient être associés à unsystème où les possesseurs de terroirspeuvent, dans une certaine mesure, entraverla production en refusant, à qui n’est pas deleur famille, l’accès à une partie desressources qu’ils contrôlent, forts du pouvoirque leur reconnaît la tradition.

Qui est à la merci du bon vouloir despropriétaires fonciers n’a en effet d’incitationà produire ni plus ni mieux s’il doit avanttout produire pour le groupe qui gère enmaître les ressources dont il dépend pour sasurvie et celle de ses proches. Dans ce genrede contexte, son intérêt serait d’échapper à lalogique socioculturelle et économique danslaquelle il se trouve et d’obtenir l’accès à desressources naturelles qui ne dépendent pasd’un groupe dominant mais d’une entité luigarantissant la jouissance aussi complète etdurable que possible des fruits de son travailet de son esprit d’entreprise sur un ensemblede ressources naturelles.

L’exode rural et la multiplication degrandes métropoles sont dus en grandepartie à cette recherche d’autonomie descouches rurales les moins favorisées sur leplan social ou économique. En Afrique del’Ouest, le pourcentage de populationurbaine, par rapport à celle des campagnes,est passé de 14 pour cent en 1960 à 40 pourcent en 1990, et ce pourcentage pourraitatteindre plus de 62 pour cent en 2020(OCDE/BAD/CILLS, 1994). Une donnée decette même recherche prospective indiqueque pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest, le nombre devilles ou centres urbains passerait de 2 500en 1990 à 6 000 en 2020 (FAO,1998).

L’agriculture extensiveLes pratiques agricoles et pastorales les pluscourantes en Afrique subsaharienne relèventde l’utilisation extensive des ressourcesnaturelles, à savoir leur usage temporairepour les laisser ensuite au repos durantplusieurs années, le temps qu’elles sereconstituent. Ce type d’exploitation desressources requiert peu d’intrants maissuppose de vastes étendues que lespopulations locales peuvent se permettreparfois de ne pas utiliser pendant denombreuses années.

Les terres retournées en friche ne sont paspour autant abandonnées, mais jouent unrôle important dans la gestion correcte dupatrimoine foncier des populationspratiquant la culture itinérante ou lenomadisme pastoral. Il serait donc incorrectde prétendre que les terres en friche, les blocs

3 Selon Mathieu (1996), en pareil cas, la nécessité et l’urgencede trouver des mécanismes d’accès et de sécurité de tenureproviennent du fait qu’en situation de rareté ou de pressionaccrue sur les terres, la sécurisation des droits fonciers, si lestechniques agricoles restent à peu près les mêmes, se fait deplus en plus souvent par exclusion des concurrents fonciers etla sécurisation des uns implique l’insécurisation foncière oul’exclusion des autres.4 D’après la FAO (1997b), 17 pays d’Afrique subsaharienne ontune moyenne de disponibilité énergétique alimentaire (DEA) parhabitant inférieure à 2 100 calories par jour. Douze autres,entre 2 100 et 2 300 calories et six autres encore, entre 2 300 et2 500 calories, alors que la moyenne mondiale se situe auxalentours de 2 720 calories/habitant/jour. En outre, 22 des 35pays dont il est ici question devraient augmenter leursprélèvements en énergie d’origine végétale de plus de 4 pour centpar an d’ici à 2050.


forestiers ou les anciens champs retournés àla brousse puissent être qualifiés de «terresvacantes»: en Afrique noire, toutes lessurfaces ont un maître, que les démarcationsterritoriales soient visibles ou non, que dessignes d’occupation et de mise en valeursoient présents ou non.

La théorie des terres vacantes dans laplupart des colonies européennes d’Afriquenoire constitua avant tout un puissantinstrument d’occupation du sol par des non-autochtones et non pas la formulation desdiverses situations réellement vécues par lespopulations locales de l’époque5.

Selon la loi française, par exemple, touteterre qui n’est pas enregistrée ou possédée enconformité avec le Code civil revient à l’Etat(Article 539). Sur cette base juridique,l’administration coloniale française putconsidérer les domaines coloniaux commepropriété de la France qui, en retour, accordaitde larges concessions, dont ne se privèrentpas de bénéficier nombre de sociétéseuropéennes de mise en valeur, dépouillantainsi les communautés indigènes d’une bonnepart de leurs terres, surtout les plus fertiles etles mieux adaptées aux cultures de rente. Dela sorte, dans les zones considérées commenon occupées, les Africains de souche nepouvaient se faire reconnaître de droits surdes terres que s’ils les avaient enregistrées,quelle que soit la durée de leur permanencesur le sol avant la mainmise française.

Accès aux ressources naturelles pour tousComme le montrent de récentes études, ilsemble qu’en Afrique noire il n’y ait pas decorrélations significatives entre la sécurité dela tenure et la productivité. Il faut donctrouver ailleurs que dans la transformation

éventuelle des modalités traditionnelles detenure foncière une solution aux problèmesde production alimentaire insuffisante,notamment dans l’augmentation des surfacescultivées. L’Afrique ne manque pas de terrescultivables non cultivées, comme le montrentles pourcentages de terre effectivementrécoltée dans les 12 mois par rapport à lasurface totale. Il apparaît ainsi que l’Afriquenoire (tropicale pluvieuse) récolteeffectivement chaque année 6 pour cent de sasurface totale (les surfaces désertiques etsubdésertiques étant bien entendu exclues),tandis que l’Asie tropicale en récolte 35 pourcent; la seule comparaison de ces deuxpourcentages donne évidemment à penserqu’il ne manque pas de surfaces cultivablesnon cultivées en Afrique noire (Gourou, 1979).

Une des voies à envisager pour augmenterles surfaces cultivées pourrait être de répéterl’expérience tentée au Sénégal avecl’approbation de la Loi no 64/46 du 17 juin1964 sur le domaine national, revue etcorrigée. Cette loi stipulait que toutes lesterres qui n’étaient pas encore enregistréesou n’auraient pas été enregistrées dans lessix mois de sa promulgation feraient partiedu domaine national. Après cette période degrâce de six mois, de nouveauxenregistrements de propriété sur des terresdevenaient du même coup impossibles.Environ 98 pour cent du territoire sénégalaistomba ainsi sous le coup de cette loi6.

La loi de 1964 divisait le domaine nationalen quatre catégories: les zones urbaines,classées, de terroir et les zones pionnières.Avec l’introduction de la loi sur le domainenational, les droits traditionnels de tenureétaient en principe supprimés, et les conseilsruraux investis du pouvoir en matièrefoncière, y compris celui d’allouer les droitsd’usage de terres disponibles selon lacapacité de mise en valeur des paysans enquête de terre7.

Les différents gouvernements pourraientenvisager, s’ils le jugent opportun et faisable,

5 «... en établissant son monopole sur les terres conquises,(l’Etat colonial, en Centrafrique) s’est réservé la possibilité deson octroi aux compagnies concessionnaires et aux capitalistesindividuels. Ainsi les bonnes terres ou les endroits du sous-solriches en minerais seront accaparés par ces affairistes qui lesferont fructifier dans l’intérêt de leurs commanditaires.L’introduction de la propriété privée et, partant, sagénéralisation s’est faite par l’application du Code civil français,selon une procédure qui considère la terre comme un élémentdu capital pouvant être l’objet de possession, d’appropriation,de vente et d’exclusion; ce qui la distingue de la notiontraditionnelle» (FAO, 1996).

6 Le délai de six mois expirant en mars 1965, il a fallu lereconduire puis en reporter l’application. A partir de 1978, cinqdécrets ont autorisé l’immatriculation en 1978, 1981 et 1983(FAO, 1987).


d’allouer des terres de leur domaine nationalà des cultivateurs et à des éleveurs directs,sans pour autant aliéner leur droit absolu depropriété sur les zones rétrocédées auxpaysans en faire-valoir direct8. De cettemanière, ces derniers, ainsi que leursproches, tiendraient de l’Etat des titresd’usufruit aussi longtemps qu’ils mettraientdirectement en valeur et d’une façon adaptéeaux conditions agroclimatiques locales – avecinterdiction de vendre, de fragmenter ou demettre en gage – une terre dont ils ne seraientque les usufruitiers, et non pas lespropriétaires. Cette manière d’accéder auxressources naturelles et de les mettre envaleur avec la garantie de tenure reconnuepar l’Etat – pour autant que les conditionsposées à leur cession et mise en culturesoient respectées – répondrait à un doublesouci d’équité (de justice sociale) et deproduction agropastorale accrue.

Le droit d’obtenir de la terre venant dudomaine national ne devrait être accordéqu’aux hommes et aux femmes n’ayant pasun accès direct et privilégié aux ressourcesnaturelles du groupe social dont ils fontpartie, qu’ils viennent de zones rurales ou decentres urbanisés et désirent retourner à laterre. Les dimensions de chaque lotvarieraient en fonction des conditionsagroclimatiques et écologiques locales, maisdevraient suffire à assurer la survie del’exploitation familiale en faire-valoir direct.

Compte tenu de la très grande diversité desstructures sociales des paysanneriesafricaines et des multiples contextes

agroclimatiques, écologiques etdémographiques dans un même pays, il n’estpas question ici de prôner un modèle uniquepar Etat. Plus modestement, il s’agit ici desuggérer qu’une stratégie nationale utiliseavec imagination et sens de l’adaptation auxcontextes locaux les terres du domainenational pour répondre au besoin denouvelles terres et de production accrue. Parlà même, la solution des problèmes de justicesociale, d’accès aux ressources pour tousceux qui le désireraient et,vraisemblablement, le retour à la terre pournombre de ceux que la vie citadine n’a pusatisfaire serait alors possible.

Les titres de tenure concédés par l’Etatseraient libellés au nom de la familleexploitante et pas seulement au nom du chefde l’exploitation, et ce pour éviter que lesépouses ne soient lésées lors de lasuccession, comme c’est bien souvent le cas.L’exploitation pourrait être tenue en usufruitpar les survivants au chef de l’exploitation,avec le bénéfice des améliorations apportéesde son vivant à l’entreprise familiale.

Ce genre de stratégie foncière créerait enmilieu rural un double système d’accès auxressources naturelles: celui traditionnel, envigueur dans les lignages et clans, c’est-à-dire celui où tous les membres du groupe ontun droit imprescriptible à cet accès auxressources, selon les besoins de leur famillenucléaire, et un second pour les rurauxdésavantagés ou les urbanisés qui seraientprêts à retourner à la terre, pour peu que lesdroits de tenure leur soient garantis parl’Etat, aux conditions de ce dernier. Toutcultivateur a besoin de la sécurité de tenurequi lui garantisse le bénéfice de sesinvestissements et du soin qu’il aura pris àcultiver la terre de façon appropriée. Demême, les communautés rurales ont besoinde pouvoir veiller à l’application des règles debonne gestion des ressources. Quant auxEtats, il leur incombe de mettre au point uncadre juridique pour le fonctionnement desstructures qui déterminent et protègent lesdroits d’usage des individus comme descommunautés, compte tenu de ceux de l’Etat(Lawry, 1990). Il est clair que, pour réussir,cette stratégie foncière a besoin et d’un appui

7 L’évolution des textes juridiques touchant la loi de 1964 sur ledomaine national indique: «... une double transformation de lapolitique foncière étatique: dans une première phase, quiculmine avec la réforme territoriale de 1972, l’Etat sénégalaisassure son monopole foncier sur les terres du domaine nationaldont, en 1964, il n’assurait que la “détention”. Par le contrôledu fonctionnement des communautés rurales, l’Etat va orienterles pratiques foncières locales. A partir de 1981,l’administration sénégalaise a préféré favoriser la libreentreprise et l’émergence d’une catégorie de petits propriétairesagraires» (FAO, 1987).8 Au Rwanda, depuis 1960, toutes les terres non enregistrées –que ce soit sous le régime des droits coutumiers ou sous celuides droits d’occupation – font partie du domaine de l’Etat. Quia des droits sur ces terres domaniales ne peut en être privé sanscompensation adéquate.


politique total de l’Etat qui l’envisagerait etdes moyens appropriés pour la mettre enœuvre et lui faire produire tous les bénéficesthéoriques que l’on peut attendre de cettepolitique.

En milieu rural africain, la terre esttoujours perçue comme une sécuritééconomique et sociale du groupe, notammenten prévision de temps qui pourraient êtredifficiles. En outre, la terre est symboled’autorité et source de pouvoir politique; eneffet, qui peut attribuer des champs ou unparcours de transhumance, par exemple,possède un moyen de pression et unemonnaie d’échange aussi bien politiquequ’économique. Pour les chefs, le contrôledes terres villageoises signifie le contrôle despersonnes, car d’eux dépendent les moyensde production des cultivateurs qui ont peuou pas de terre du tout, alors qu’elle estindispensable à leur survie. Pour lesménages ruraux, la possibilité de produiredépend en grande partie des terres dont ilspeuvent disposer et des terres auxquelles ilsauraient accès en cas de besoin (FAO,1997a).

Là où l’Etat voudrait entreprendre larétrocession de terres du domaine national, ilest impératif que soient parfaitementreconnus les droits traditionnels des chefs deterre et des lignages ainsi que la consistancedes ressources naturelles respectives desdiverses communautés rurales (champs,brousse, forêts, cours d’eau, berges etsources, parcours ou points d’eau et droitsd’usage variés, sans oublier les terreslaissées en friche ou en réserve). Encontrepartie, les mêmes autorités locales etleurs communautés devraient reconnaître lesdroits de l’Etat sur les terres domaniales quiavoisinent les leurs.

Sans reconnaissance claire et définitive desdroits respectifs des chefs de terretraditionnels et de ceux de l’Etat souverain,tout l’échafaudage d’une stratégie reposantsur la rétrocession de terres domaniales àceux qui en ont besoin pour des raisonséconomiques et sociales s’effondre.

Dans la perspective développée ci-dessus,il ne s’agit pas d’exproprier les grandspropriétaires traditionnels – sous le prétexte,

par exemple, du non-enregistrement de leursressources foncières – mais de créer, pourdes raisons d’équité, de lutte contre lapauvreté rurale et de production accrue, unréseau parallèle d’agriculture et d’économierurale, basé sur la rétrocession sousconditions de terres domaniales, avecl’accord de ces mêmes autoritéstraditionnelles locales et ce, pour des raisonsd’utilité publique9.

L’Etat pourrait assortir les accords locauxentre chefs traditionnels et administration dela garantie d’un effort accru en ce quiconcerne la mise en place d’infrastructures etde services sociaux en faveur despopulations de la zone concernée. Un autremécanisme permettant de faciliter l’obtentionet le respect d’accords réciproques entrepouvoirs traditionnels sur les terres ruraleset l’Etat, par le truchement de sonadministration locale, serait la mise au pointd’un système de taxation du fonciertempérant les contestations éventuelles àl’encontre du domaine national; l’Etatpourrait en effet alléger la pression fiscaleexercée sur les communautés ruralesdétentrices de droits coutumiers sur despropriétés collectives là où serait reconnu àl’Etat le droit de faire jouer les clauses dudomaine national dans la perspective d’uneredistribution de parcelles en faire-valoirdirect, qu’elle soit précaire ou prenne laforme de baux emphytéotiques. Ou encore,l’Etat pourrait étudier un système de fortetaxation sur les ressources naturelles nonmises en valeur qui ne rentreraient pas dansla catégorie des terres en friche.

La distribution de parcelles du domaine del’Etat – par le biais des titres aux familles descultivateurs directs bénéficiaires et ladescription de la consistance des ressourcesconfinantes – crée l’équivalent d’un

9 «... les colonisations spontanées ... conservent en certainesparties de l’Afrique leur vivacité: encore faut-il que la puissancepublique fasse son devoir à l’égard de ces colonisationsspontanées: bonnes routes, contrôle sanitaire, semis d’écoles. Ilest vrai que les avantages dont bénéficieraient les colonsspontanés pourraient conduire assez vite à l’encombrement dela surface colonisée et obliger la puissance publique à organiserle morcellement de l’espace à coloniser en vue d’empêcher lesconflits fonciers et l’accaparement spéculatif des terres»(Gourou, 1979).


enregistrement de fait du droit d’usufruitd’une part et de propriété collective, d’autrepart, sinon même un embryon de cadastre(Riddell, 1998).

De plus, si la distribution se réalisait pargrands blocs, ces entités pourraientengendrer des pôles de développement, pourpeu qu’ils soient bien choisis et pourvus d’unminimum d’infrastructures et de servicessociaux. Dans bien des cas, lesgouvernements ne se sont pas suffisammentsouciés de doter les zones sujettes à laréforme agraire d’infrastructures et deservices sociaux nécessaires, de mettre enplace une organisation efficace d’assistancetechnique, de garantir un accès équitable aucrédit à des coûts abordables et de limiter lesdistorsions en faveur des grandes propriétésterriennes (Conseil pontifical Justice et Paix,1997).

Cette redistribution de terres domanialesaurait également l’avantage de maintenir enproduction d’importantes surfaces mises envaleur grâce à une main-d’œuvre abondantequi trouverait ainsi dans les zones rurales dequoi vivre et cesserait de rêver d’échapperaux contraintes des collectivités rurales oùelle se trouve à l’étroit, en allant grossir le lotdes marginalisés dans des centres urbains. AMadagascar, par exemple, une politique degestion locale des ressources renouvelablesappartenant à l’Etat a été récemmentformulée et proposée notamment pour freinerles actes de dégradation et de destruction desressources naturelles renouvelables. Lescommunautés rurales s’engagent en effet «àassurer la pérennité des ressources dès lorsque la propriété de ces ressources naturellesrenouvelables est celle de l’Etat» (Bertrand etWeber, 1995). Il n’en reste pas moinsnécessaire de se mettre à l’abri desingérences politiques et pressions de tousordres en ce qui concerne la sélection desbénéficiaires des parcelles de terresdomaniales.

L’accès aux terres du domaine national: unedangereuse utopie?Il peut sembler paradoxal et mêmecontradictoire de reconnaître la vanité de lathéorie des terres vacantes, d’une part, et

d’affirmer qu’aucun espace, en Afrique noire,n’est sans maître et, d’autre part, de proposerde faire jouer le mécanisme juridique dudomaine national, importé d’Europe à la findu siècle dernier, afin de procurer l’accès auxressources naturelles au nom de l’équité etd’une production accrue.

On peut affirmer sans ambages qu’il y acontradiction, ou plus exactementinstitutionnalisation d’une dualité qui existedans les sociétés rurales d’Afriquesubsaharienne et préexistait aux équipéescoloniales du XIXe siècle.

L’administration d’immenses territoiresafricains a introduit les institutions et le droitoccidental dans des milieux essentiellementruraux où le droit écrit des colonisateursn’avait aucun sens. Les appareils coloniauxont permis la création de nations africainesdevenues indépendantes les unes après lesautres avec, comme héritage, desinstitutions, des cadres législatifs et desconstitutions «modernes» ainsi que les diversapanages des domaines nationaux avec, ensus, un mode de représentation du peuplequi n’était pas en mesure de promouvoir devraies concertations nationales au sein desjeunes Etats. D’ailleurs, nombre d’entre euxont négligé leurs ruraux, tout absorbés qu’ilsétaient par la consolidation de l’appareilétatique.

De l’héritage colonial et du reliquat de sesinstitutions inadaptées provient le dualismedes approches foncières dont il est iciquestion. Il serait vain de vouloir renier cethéritage ou de revenir à des situationsex ante, sans institutions modernes quipermettent de faire naître et croître des Etatsreconnus comme tels dans le concert desnations grâce à ce legs colonial, aussi ambiguqu’il puisse paraître aux yeux de noscontemporains.

Toutefois, même avant la période coloniale,un dualisme socioculturel, politique etéconomique était présent dans les sociétésrurales d’Afrique noire: celui de l’inégalitéentre les membres de plein droit du lignageou du clan et «les autres», situation qui aperduré tout au long de l’ère coloniale et quisubsiste encore dans les zones ruralessubsahariennes.


CONCLUSIONSOn peut affirmer, en conclusion, que cettedouble stratégie foncière entérine le dualismedénoncé ci-dessus et se répercute dedifférentes manières sur les sociétés ruralesoù elle serait introduite.

Le fait de trouver des terres situées hors ducontrôle des chefs coutumiers et des anciensdes grandes familles prélude à unediminution du nombre de jeunes disposés àtravailler sur des terres communales enfaisant passer le profit des chefs et de leurlignage avant le leur.

Les femmes, elles aussi, pourraient espérertirer avantage de l’accès à des ressourcesnaturelles à régime domanial. En effet, lesrapports éventuels de sujétion socioculturelleet économique de la femme par rapport à sonmari – là, bien sûr, où ils sont dus au fait deterres mises à la disposition de la femme parla famille du mari, dans le contextecoutumier d’origine – ne devraient plus, enprincipe, prévaloir sur des terres domaniales,celles-ci n’étant ni du ressort du mari, ni dela famille de ce dernier.

Cette modification du lien à la terrepermettrait – si elle était systématiquementpoussée dans ses conséquencessocioculturelles et économiques – uneévolution favorable pour la femme, tant dupoint de vue de son autonomie financière quede sa parité sociale.

La distribution de lots de terre du domainenational, ou de ce qui en tient lieu, selon lesEtats, à des cultivateurs directs entameraitun processus politique, économique et socialoù est promue la famille nucléaire. De plus,l’héritage en ligne directe au conjointsurvivant et à ses propres enfants introduitun nouvel élément de société qui ne doit pasêtre sous-estimé: c’est le point de départpour la création d’une nouvelle couche deruraux bâtie sur l’autonomie de la cellulefamiliale restreinte, de plus en plus détachéedes liens habituels existant dans les sociétésrurales traditionnelles.

Il convient de peser le pour et le contre dece changement fondamental avant des’engager sur la voie d’un accès garanti à desressources naturelles provenant du domainenational.

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Considérations relatives à certains aspectsde la migration

Plusieurs organisations internationales s’intéressent de plus en plus à la dichotomie urbaine etrurale (la dimension «périurbaine»). Le Comité de rédaction de Réforme agraire, colonisation etcoopératives agricoles examine l’analyse effectuée dans cet article, publié il y a 20 ans dansMigration et développement rural – sélection de thèmes aux fins d’enseignement et de recherche,(Etudes FAO: Développement économique et social no 3, Rome, 1979), particulièrementd’actualité étant donné ce problème «nouveau». L’étude de ce qui fait la différence entre deuxpoints (distance) est présentée avec quelques propositions concrètes qui méritent d’êtreexaminées par les décideurs en matière de développement rural, qui souhaitent véritablementéviter les effets de la migration. L’ouvrage porte sur le Programme de population et dedéveloppement rural réalisé par l’auteur pour le compte de la FAO avec l’Association des nationsde l’Asie du Sud-Est (ANASE). L’ANASE comprenait alors cinq pays (l’Indonésie, la Malaisie, LesPhilippines, Singapour et la Thaïlande), chacun étant chargé d’un domaine particulier. L’un d’euxa analysé les liens qui se nouent entre la migration et le développement rural. L’objectif desprésentes considérations est de montrer comment ces liens peuvent être perçus sous desperspectives très différentes et avec autant de justifications, et que même les aspects quiparaissent le plus clairement définis (comme la distance entre deux points) sont complexes etdépendent des attitudes et des objectifs de ceux qui examinent la question.

Algunas consideraciones sobre aspectosespecíficos de la migración

Diversas organizaciones internacionales manifiestan un interés creciente por la dicotomíaexistente entre zonas urbanas y rurales (la dimensión «periurbana»). El Comité de Redacción deReforma agraria, colonización y cooperativas estima que el análisis que se ofrece en esteartículo, publicado originalmente 20 años atrás en Las migraciones y el desarrollo rural: temasconcretos de enseñanza e investigación (Colección FAO: Desarrollo económico y social, No 3,Roma, 1979), es muy pertinente para la comprensión de un asunto «emergente» y nuevo. Sepresenta un debate acerca de las causas que explican las diferencias entre dos puntos–distancia– y se formulan propuestas específicas que merecen la atención de los responsablesde la adopción de decisiones en materia de desarrollo rural interesados en evitar los efectosnegativos de la migración. Este trabajo se llevó a cabo en relación con el Programa de poblacióny desarrollo rural, organizado por el autor para la FAO con la Asociación de Naciones del AsiaSudoriental (ASEAN). La ASEAN estaba formada entonces por cinco países (Filipinas, Indonesia,Malasia, Singapur y Tailandia), cada uno de los cuales estaba al frente de un sector. Uno deéstos se concentró en las relaciones entre la migración y el desarrollo rural. El objetivo de estasreflexiones es señalar que las relaciones entre la migración y el desarrollo rural se puedenconsiderar desde perspectivas muy distintas con igual justificación, y que incluso los aspectosque parecen más definidos (como la distancia entre dos puntos) son complejos y dependen delos puntos de vista y objetivos de quienes examinan la cuestión.


Some considerations on specificaspects of migration1

J. du Guerny

Chief, Population Programme Service, Women and Population Division, FAO

Several international organizations are increasingly interested in the urban-rural dichotomy (the“peri-urban” dimension). The Editorial Board of Land Reform, Land Settlement and Cooperativesconsiders the analysis carried out in this article, originally published 20 years ago in Migration andrural development – selected topics for teaching and research (FAO Economic and SocialDevelopment Paper No. 3, Rome, 1978) extremely relevant to this “new” emerging issue. Thediscussion about what makes the difference between two points (distance) is presented withsome concrete proposals deserving consideration by those decision-makers in rural developmentgenuinely interested in avoiding negative migration effects. The work was carried out in relation tothe Population and Rural Development Programme organized by the author for FAO with theAssociation of Southeast-Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN then comprised five countries(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand), and each country took the lead inone area. One of these focused on the interrelations between migration and rural development.The objective of these considerations is to point out that the interrelations between migration andrural development can be seen from very different perspectives with equal justification and thateven the aspects that seem the most clear-cut (such as the distance between two points) arecomplex and depend on the attitudes and objectives of those examining the question.

ideas and of rural agents’ objectives. Oneshould also be wary of generalizations fromprevious successes or failures.

Facts in isolation have little meaning; theymust be given a meaning by observation andanalysis and this influences considerably thepicture which emerges. Their significancedepends both on the interpretation of theobserver, as will be seen in the remarks onurban biases, and to some extent on the levelat which one wants to examine them, as isillustrated by the role of cash. Finally, thetranslation of this knowledge into actiontends to be influenced by the norms withwhich the entire question of the mobility ofpeople is judged.

THE URBAN BIASThis section sets out to show that thequestion of migration is invariably perceivedfrom an urban viewpoint and that this urban

The objective of these considerations is topoint out that the interrelations betweenmigration and rural development can be seenfrom very different perspectives with equaljustification and that even the aspects thatseem the most clear-cut (such as thedistance between two points) are complexand depend on the objective one may have inmind when examining the question and one’sown attitudes.

The considerations illustrate the fact that inthe field of migration interrelations with ruraldevelopment, there are no simpledeterministic mechanisms and thereforecaution and flexibility in the use ofknowledge are as necessary as anunderstanding of people’s resistance to new

1 Originally published in Migration and rural development –selected topics for teaching and research, FAO Economic andSocial Development Paper No. 3, Rome, 1978.


bias has far-reaching consequences. It caninfluence the structure of research or otheractivities and also the interpretation of thefindings of studies.2 In the latter case, thismay not only result in the dissemination ofincorrect information to rural developmentpersonnel, but can also lead to their makingwrong decisions in the field – decisions whichwould, however, be correct within theframework of an urban-biased view of ruraldevelopment.

The development of the urban biasIn many ways it is an extremely ancientphenomenon. Throughout history thedevelopment of cities and towns has givenrise to a sense of superiority on the part ofurban inhabitants – an assertion thattownspeople are somehow more worldly andsophisticated and that rural people have alower status. This has become so deeplyrooted in people’s thinking that it isexpressed in everyday language such as, forexample, the use of the word “peasant” in apejorative sense.

In the last 200 years the bias has beenreinforced by the advent of industrializationand the fact that, as a result of the experienceof the Western countries, industrializationhas been regarded as the key to developmentwhether this is taken to mean economicgrowth or development in the widest sense. Inany event it meant the growing importance ofurban areas with their industries and astrong orientation towards the Western typeof urban world with all the implications ofthis.

Thus, with development being generallyindustrial and urban-based, the rural areasare perceived by planners and scholars in asupportive role and in many cases receiveonly residual resources for development.Even many measures which appear to berural-development oriented are implementedbecause they are also of direct urbanconcern. For example, the building of damsprovides water for irrigation but also providesadditional power for city lighting and urban-

based industries. This is also why in manycases rural development, which is concernedwith overall living standards of ruralpopulations, is confused with agriculturalproduction, which is oriented primarily tonational development (e.g. the growing ofcash crops for export), although it is hopedthat at the same time increased agriculturalproduction will foster rural development.However, the respective roles and objectivesof rural development and agriculturalproduction need to be correctly perceived.Over the last few years the area of populationand rural development (i.e. theirinterrelations) has indeed begun to beperceived and charted.

Thus, the forms of urban bias in nationaldevelopment most directly relevant tomigration appear both in the spatialdistribution of developmental resources andefforts and in the models of lifestyle andvalues upheld.

Some manifestations of the urban perspective inmigration and rural developmentThe foregoing remarks may lead us to expectthat studies in this area will tend to focus onquestions which are directly or indirectlyrelevant to cities.

The focus of studies. Although indeveloping countries the rural populationgenerally constitutes more than 50 percent ofthe population, priority is generally given torural-urban migration studies. Any rapidlook through a bibliography of migrationstudies confirms this. Such studies examinethe flow of migrants, their characteristics andtheir problems of adaptation in the urbancentres, but tend to ignore the repercussionson the areas from which they migrate whichare of particular interest to rural developmentplanners. The basic difficulty is that thesestudies have a fragmented approach tomigration and do not see it as a completesystem. This means that planners haveconsiderable difficulty in interpreting anddrawing conclusions from the findings forrural development purposes. For example,studies show that one reason for migrating tocities is to further one’s education. How can

2 For a general study of the urban bias (although from adifferent perspective) see Lipton, 1977.


such a result be utilized for ruraldevelopment? Does it mean that betterschools in rural areas would slow downemigration? This is probably not the answer.To be of use for rural development suchstudies need to examine the conditions whichhave led to this result, the conditions underwhich a person would have opted not to go tothe city to further his education or, if he didgo, the conditions under which he wouldreturn to a rural area once this furthereducation is completed, etc.

This type of partial approach resulting fromthe urban bias has serious drawbacks whenone wants to consider the interrelationsbetween migration and the sending areas. Forexample, in the case of male migration tocities, the studies do not relate thisphenomenon to the change of status ofwomen in rural areas or its effects on themodernization process, questions which areof direct interest to rural development. If thestudies carried out up to now had been on abroader basis and had asked this type ofquestion, they would be far more useful.

However, it has been realized that the focusof studies was unbalanced and that therewas indeed a form of urban bias. Greaterimportance has been attached more recentlyto the study of rural-rural and urban-rural(or “return”)3 migration. But these two areashave been studied in the same partialapproach and the defects of this haveresulted similarly in inadequate information.What is now needed is comprehensive andpenetrating research in the original area ofrural-urban migration.

The implicit value judgement. Studies ofmigration often reflect a desire to protect thecity from an “invasion”. There is often a basicassumption which is a value judgement thatrural-urban migration is essentially an evilwhich should be checked. Such studies areconcerned with avoiding the overburdening ofurban services, a drop in their quality andthe necessity of spreading investmentresources which could otherwise be used

exclusively for the existing urban inhabitants.However these studies often show anambiguity because it is also realized thatcities do need some immigration for theirdevelopment and therefore the findings of thestudies tend to encourage measures whichfavour migrants being selected according tothe quantitative and qualitative needs of thetowns, regardless of the consequences in therural areas. It is therefore not easy for ruraldevelopment planners to benefit from thefindings of these studies. Moreover, theirapplication to the urban areas might evenlead to a widening of the gap between urbanand rural areas and could theoreticallyaggravate the problems, actually increasingrural-urban migration which they implicitlyaim to reduce.

A distorted perception of families andindividuals. Because of the previoustendencies, migration studies often highlightthe economic and particularly the cashaspects. The concepts elaborated and thetools utilized to observe reality are thusinfluenced. The primordial importance of theeconomic sphere in cities tends to betransposed to migration studies. But, inorder to achieve a better understanding of thephenomenon a more refined approach isnecessary.

For example, it is well established thatmany migrants come to cities in order to findjobs and this fits in perfectly with theeconomic approach. However, one has seenthat migrants are not homogeneous: thosewho are educated are mostly familiar with theurban world and are very different from thoseuneducated ones who come for survivalreasons (for instance, if they have becomelandless) or to earn cash to spend in ruralareas. In these two cases the significance ofemployment and a cash income is not thesame. There is more to it than just adifference in level of income between thegroups; it also involves the meaning ofmoney, particularly in its cash form. Supposefor example that the wages of these migrantswere paid only in kind. How would this affectmigration and the selection of migrants? Itseems that besides wanting employment or

3 I.e. the return of comparatively recent rural-urban migrants toa rural area.


the “city lights”, migrants appreciateparticularly the options opened up by theavailability of cash. Cash gives them a choiceof uses for food, entertainment, clothes, etc.This type of freedom is generally not availablein rural areas and is not shown in the usualeconomic approaches. The urban bias doesnot enable us to take directly into accountthe non-economic aspects of the mode ofpayment which are connected more with thiskind of difference between the rural andurban way of life. The role of cash inmigration has not yet been explored in asystematic way although it is important in theunderstanding of the phenomenon ofmigration, especially as it is related to theemergence of the notion of a person as anindividual economic unit4 which is part of theprocess of change from a rural to an urbanway of life.

These remarks may seem somewhatabstract, but they do have a sound basis ifthey are examined further. For example,although the disappearance of the extendedfamily has often been predicted it stillsurvives in many forms, some of themdisguised, and surveys may describe asseparate households what is in fact onefunctional unit. This is a serious difficultywhen carrying out economic and socialsurveys.

In a certain sense rural families functionlike a multinational firm: althoughindividuals (like subsidiary firms) mightappear to be disconnected, they still operateas a family entity. Many situations whichappear irrational are thus madecomprehensible, such as maintaining a lowerstandard of living than would otherwise benecessary in order to send home remittances(like operating at a loss) or decisions to sendchildren out to the city (like creating asubsidiary firm). In this situation theuneducated individual migrant to the cityonly appears to be an individual, whereas themore educated migrant who leaves his ruralenvironment and cuts the links with his rural

origins operates much more as a realindividual unit. The usual survey methodsare geared to describing separate statisticalunits and the more educated migrant istherefore relatively well described. However,these methods give a distorted picture of theuneducated migrant by classifying him as anindividual unit whereas he is, in fact, acomponent of the traditional network ofrelationships (extended or joint family, etc.).

Implications for action. Another example ofthe difficulty of interpretation and utilizationof the findings of studies can be shown in thecase of education. Studies always point to theeffects of education on rural-urbanmigration.5 This is true, but what is the roleof education? It is in fact a training for theurban type of life and therefore migration is amanifestation of its success. It is then saidthat this could be corrected by a more rural/agricultural oriented type of education.Should rural development encourage such achange? From the production point of view,most probably, but it may not have mucheffect on migration because it is not so muchthe topics covered in the education which areimportant, but the fact that the “education”normally promoted is part of a differentworld. In such a context a “rural education”would have the same philosophy as an urbanone. Development has been criticized forbeing the imposition of a technical,impersonal, economic world on an older oneoften called “traditional”, “archaic”, etc. Thisis perhaps true, but it can also be seen as anattempt to facilitate the integration of urbanand rural areas – that is, to close the gap thatseparates them. Expressions such as“extension” or “rural outreach” can beinterpreted in both ways and probably reflectboth aspects.

Some remarks on the urban-rural dichotomyIn spite of the foregoing discussion in whichthe differences between the urban and ruralworlds have been stressed, they should not

4 As distinguished from the person in the rural world, who isdefined more within a system of family, religious, ethnic andother group relations.

5 For an approach aimed at eliminating some of these effects,see FAO, 1969.


be perceived as essentially different andseparate. Population studies in general andrural-urban migration studies in particularhave created (partly for the sake ofconvenience) the urban-rural dichotomy.This fits in nicely with the “push” and “pull”analysis and has many advantages exceptperhaps that it might be misleading for ruraldevelopment because rural and urban areasare interrelated. Besides the normaldescriptions of the difference between ruraland urban areas, one of the drawbacks is theimplication that rural areas arehomogeneous. Differences in populationdensity, its spatial distribution and thelocation of areas (for instance, in relation totheir distance from towns) tend to beoverlooked. There are differences betweenrural areas themselves which might beimportant for their implications for ruraldevelopment programmes. For migrationstudies to be really useful for ruraldevelopment planning, a positive effort topromote in-depth studies of rural areas isnecessary.

It is also a fact that the definition of “urban”varies from country to country, but mostdefinitions tend to put any area which is not“urban” into the rural category, i.e. it is aresidual category. This kind of definition alsoinfluences the usefulness of standards ofmigration for rural development. However, ifone takes into account the variety ofdefinitions and the fact that rural areas arefar from homogeneous, one realizes that thereare all kinds of intermediate stages betweenthe most “urban” area and the most “rural”one. Added to this is the fact that manyurban areas can have what amounts to ruralpockets of population. Finally, the situationis far from stable; in most countries bothcities and rural areas are changing rapidly.

The conclusion is that to be really useful forrural development policy, a migration studyshould:

•take all these considerations into accountand should not ignore, even for rural-ruralmigration (since this kind of migrant may,in fact, have resisted the urban pull), theinterrelations between the urban and ruralworlds;

•consider urban and rural areas ascomplementary and that thiscomplementarity can be modified by ruraldevelopment and migration.

Therefore one of the key variables as far asmigration is concerned in the ruraldevelopment context is the accessibility ofgoods and services. For example, since itseems that in certain kinds of rural areas(probably those not too far away from urbanareas), providing amenities such as ruralhospitals might accelerate out-migration, onemust ask oneself why this happens. It ispossible that the rural person, once he isaware of this amenity of the urban world, isno longer satisfied with what he mightconsider to be the second-rate quality of therural hospital compared to the urban one.The rural development problem should thenbe reformulated from “Can we build (andshould we build) small hospitals in ruralareas?” to “Should one ensure that ruralpeople have easy access to urban hospitals?”This question is based on the premise thatone cannot distribute all the equipment andspecialists evenly over a whole country.Should one have health and educationalscreening systems – for instance, via ruralmedical centres – which are a function of thedegree of accessibility of the hospitals andschools? This kind of approach andreformulation of problems might haveimplications for migration. These implicationsneed to be identified and quantified.

The urban-rural continuumBy creating the urban-rural dichotomy which,as has been seen, is a useful statisticalconvenience (up to a certain point), socialscientists tend to fit reality into thisqualitative classification. Persons or objectsbelong or do not belong to the urban (or therural) category; there is no intermediate stateand as a result the notion of the distancebetween the categories tends to be ignored.Therefore a person belonging to a rural areacontiguous to an urban district receives thesame treatment in studies as one far fromany urban centre. Studies might look into thedifferent characteristics of rural people butnot into how far away, or how isolated they


may be. The next section looks into thisquestion in some detail and points out someof the implications.

Social studies might be more relevant torural development problems if they discardedwhen possible the urban-rural dichotomyand used the notion of an urban-ruralcontinuum which might be closer to realityand therefore more significant. Such acontinuum has to be defined in each countrybecause it changes over time and isinfluenced by cultural and developmentalaspects. Furthermore, the concentrations ofinhabitants in space also change both asregards their density and their location. In athree-dimensional representation they wouldlook like a countryside with scattered hills(see Figure 1). In developing countries withprimate cities, the configuration wouldresemble a mountain with some foothills andplateaux.

However, in the present case it is more

useful to represent the various types ofurban-rural continuum in a simpler, two-dimensional manner (Figure 2). In thisrepresentation a country with most of itspopulation in rural areas would have adistribution as in A. In a country with aprimate city and no other important urbanareas the distribution would be as in B andin a more balanced case it would be as in C.Therefore change over time tends to make thecurves shift from A to C.

The final shape and the shapes the curvesgo through depend to a certain extent onboth the type of development approaches thecountry opts for and the impact of these onthe related patterns of population growth andmigration. It can be seen from these curvesnot only that general migration rates changeover time but that the differentials in theselection of the migrants also change. Certaintypes of curve favour the differentials working

Figure 1A three-dimensionalrepresentation of theurban-rural continuum

Figure 2A two-dimensional representation of the

urban-rural continuum

Urban concentration

Rural areas

Urban

Rural

A

B

C


more for skilled labour or unskilled labour,etc. The next section examines some of theseaspects through the particular concept ofdistance.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF “DISTANCE” 6

The usual approach to the study of migrationThe “traditional” approach is extremelysimple since it involves three factors only:place of origin, place of destination and thedistance between the two (Figure 3). Thedistinction between these three factorsappears to be clear but, as this sectionshows, the distinction may be somewhatdeceptive once one begins to discuss what ismeant by duration of stay, change ofresidence, exact location of residence, andhow these can be measured, if indeed theyare quantifiable. This discussion focuses onwhat appears to be the simplest factor of all:distance.

The relevance of distance and migration to ruraldevelopment agentsLet us take two rural areas, one close to a cityand one far away and isolated. Theagricultural production of the area close tothe city is influenced by the proximity of thecity (e.g. production of fruit and vegetables forcity consumption, cash crops, etc.) and arural agent has to take this proximity intoaccount in suggesting changes in agriculture.

Most probably one of the tasks of the agentmight be to encourage agricultural change inorder to better meet the needs of the city. In asimilar way the proximity of the cityinfluences the rural population: some peoplemight commute, others will opt for a try atcity life. The mobility (i.e. the propensity tomigrate) of people living near cities might bequite high, although it most certainly will bedirected towards the city rather than to aremote rural area. The rural agent has to takesuch factors into account: it means, for

instance, that in the case of families witholder children, these will be working orstudying in town and unavailable for work onthe farm, etc.

In an isolated rural area, on the other hand,the agricultural patterns might be quitedifferent, with little capital available formodernization and a concentration onsubsistence farming. As regards themigration aspect, the situation might be thereverse of that of an area near a city: therewill be little movement between the rural areaand the town, i.e. there is a low propensity tomigrate.

It is obvious from these two cases thatmeasures taken to overcome the barrierscreated by distance (such as building a roadto the isolated area in the second case) willinfluence both agriculture and migration, andthat rural agents must take these intoaccount. But is distance such an obviousobstacle which can simply be measured inkilometres, even automobile kilometres, as indeveloped countries?

Some approaches to “distance”Almost all authors agree that distance is afactor in migration.7 It is also agreed that itfunctions as an obstacle to migration, but,this said, the real problems start: What isreally meant by distance? How does onemeasure it or what are the aspects of it whichcan be measured and how should we dealwith those that cannot?

The approaches that are described mayappear at first glance to be either overlapping

Figure 3The three traditional factors of migration

6 The aim of this section is also to encourage research. As thediscussion on distance points out, there can probably be nouniversal model and many of the components of distancecannot be quantified directly. However research carried out inthe countries can perhaps find ways of arriving at estimates ofthe components relevant in the local context which would besufficient to satisfy local planning and implementation needs.

7 However, manuals on demography such as the United Nations’(1971) Methods of measuring internal migration and Shryock andSiegel’s (1971) Methods and materials of demography hardly payany attention to distance.

DISTANCE

PLACE OF ORIGIN PLACE OF DESTINATION


or mutually exclusive. This is due to the factthat distance, which appears to be a simple“pure” concept, is in fact a complex onebecause it is always related to other factors.The confusion derives from the fact thatresearchers focus on different facets of thesame reality. In the four approachesdiscussed, two cases attempt to partlysynthesize the reality of distance, one byhighlighting the physical aspect, the other bysingling out the social aspect (the physicalaspect is absorbed in the treatment of thesocial factors). In the third approach distanceand other factors are broken down into amultitude of items and in the fourthapproach a general synthesis is attempted bysome authors. Our purpose is not to criticizethe approaches in a general manner or topoint out the strengths and weaknesses ofthe models; it is limited to analysing the wayin which each one deals with distance.

Whether these approaches can bereconciled or not is discussed in a latersection. For the purpose of this discussionwe shall borrow heavily from several authors:Lee (1969), Courgeau (1970), Klaassen andDrewe (1973) and Amselle (1976). We shalldistinguish the four approaches: physical,sociological, itemized and global-comprehensive.

The physical approach to distance. Thisis the most obvious one and is based on E.G.Ravenstein’s benchmark work in 1885 onThe laws of migration (quoted in Lee, 1969).He first pointed out the fundamental role ofdistance:

“The great body of our migrants only proceed a

short distance … [and] … migrants enumerated

in a certain centre of absorption will ... grow

less as distance from the centre increases ...

The inhabitants of the country immediately

surrounding a town of rapid growth flock into

it; the gaps thus left in the rural population are

filled up by migrants from more remote

districts, until the attractive force of one of our

rapidly growing cities makes its influence felt,

step by step, to the most remote corner of the

kingdom.”

As can be seen by the third part of thequotation, there is a strong analogy – an

adaptation even, of Newton’s law of gravity.8

This is confirmed (see Courgeau, 1970) bythe formulation of the first models formigration where the exchange of peoplebetween two communities i and j isproportional to P

iP

j/r, where r is the distance

between them. This basic formula has beenperfected by modifying r with variouscoefficients and raising it to various powers.

The discussions around Pareto’s modelhave generally focused on the significance ofP

i and P

j and not on r

ijn.9 The distance and n

have been determined empirically. Forexample, Hägerstrand finds that the value ofn varies between 0.4 and 3.3. in Sweden.What is of interest here is that the lowervalues of n correspond to the migration ofurban people and the higher values to thoseof the rural population. What is thesignificance of this?

•Is there not a different significanceattached to an identical number ofkilometres in each case? The measuresmust cover different realities.

•Would it not be expected that n would behigher for the rural population than for theurban one? The higher power can meanthat the same number of kilometres has agreater weight for them and also perhapsthat this expresses the idea that factorsother than purely physical distance have arelatively greater importance for ruralmigrations than for urban ones.

•Why does n vary over time? The physicaldistance is not changing; therefore it mustbe influenced by another factor – themigrant’s subjective perception of distance.The existence of other factors such as thepsychological, sociological and economicones which have a bearing on the migrant’sperception of the distance to be coveredmeans that n must be modified by a powerwhich, as seen above in the case ofSweden, may vary considerably.

Hägerstrand further observed that over a

8 Any two bodies in the universe attract each other with a forcethat is directly proportional to their masses and inverselyproportional to the square of their distance (d) apart:F = Gm1m2/d2.9 r

ij is the distance between P

i and P

j in each case.


long period (one century) there was a generaldecrease in the values of n. This implies thatthe gap between rural and urban migration isclosing and that the role of distance isdiminishing.

Sociological approaches to distance. Insuch approaches physical distances are notformulated directly and other forms of“distance” appear. The emphasis is placed on“determining which variable, linked withdistance would explain the distribution law ofmigrations” (Courgeau, 1970).

Let us see how “distance” might berepresented in Hägerstrand’s model:Y

ij = kIDx/P

j

in which:•Y

ij is the number of migrants from zone i

entering zone j during a relatively shortperiod t, t + Dt;

•I is the number of contacts between thepopulations i and j at time t;

•Dx is the number of opportunities in jduring the same period;

•Pj is the population of zone j.

In fact I measures this by the previousmigrations from i to j because it is measuredas “a proportion of the total number ofmigrants from zone i having entered during aperiod of 15 years prior to t and Dx isestimated by the total number of migrantshaving entered j during the period”.

From the rural development angle severalremarks can be made:

•The opportunities, which are treatedhomogeneously in this model, without anyweights,10 have to be related tooccupations which can be filled by ruralpeople, otherwise they are falseopportunities. In a city the chance of suchopportunities corresponding to thequalifications of educated rural youthwould generally be much greater than tothe qualifications of illiterate rural people.Since the number of educated rural youthis small in comparison to those with littleor no education, the variations in cityopportunities would have much more

effect on their migration. Furthermore, theconcept of opportunity as defined in sucha model would be difficult to use indeveloping countries in the case of reversemigrations (i.e. from a city to a rural area)because most “opportunities” would verylikely not be evident at all in a socialstructure which is not job oriented: thereis a continuing adaptation without definedvacancies appearing.

•As was noted by Hägerstrand, the role ofprevious migrations from a zone isimportant because they are a source ofinformation to the potential migrants. Thisshows that I is partly, at least, a functionof the accessibility of the place ofdestination from i. Such accessibilityincludes both physical and sociologicaldistance. It can therefore be understoodthat in many cases there is a certain forceof inertia on the part of potential migrantsand that changes in accessibility do notnecessarily have immediate effects. Thisshould not be overlooked in theinterpretation of the results of studies orin evaluating the effect of measures taken.It should also be noted that this opens upopportunities for the intervention of ruralagents and that distance is a factor whichcan be manipulated by them to a certainextent; but this, to be more effective, hasto be done preferably at both i and j. Thisleads to the next remark which is closelyrelated.

•It has been noted that the model is notapplicable on a long-term basis becausethe implicit assumption of the constancyof the proportion between migrants ofdifferent origins would not be valid. Thisimplies that both the physical and socialdistances change over a longer period, e.g.by the building of a road, or by migrants’perception of the way of life in a city. Suchchanges should be taken into account inrural development planning in order toattempt to foresee their possible influencein migration so that, if necessary, a ruralagent could take action. For example, if apost service is set up in an area, this canconsiderably increase the frequency ofcontacts and increase out-migration,

10 The weights would also need to be adjusted to the differenttypes of migrant.


which might be contrary to the nationalpolicy.

These remarks show that both physicaldistance and sociological distance areimportant, that there are complex relationsand trade-offs between them and that as acontinuum, these factors can be manipulatedso as to combine them in ways which couldhelp the rural agent in implementing ruraldevelopment policy.

An itemized approach to migration:distance as one item. Lee (1969) observedthat “in the three-quarters of a century whichhave passed, Ravenstein has been muchquoted and occasionally challenged. Butwhile there have been literally thousands ofmigration studies during this period, fewadditional generalizations have beenadvanced”.

In Lee’s work, migration is defined broadlyas a “permanent or semi-permanent changeof residence”. This leads logically to slightmodification of Figure 2; the emphasis isplaced on four sets of factors, i.e. thoseassociated with the area of origin, the area ofdestination, the intervening obstacles and thepersonal factors (Figure 4). The factorsassociated with origin and destination arefigured as “+” and “–” signs (these are notweighted), and the factors to which people areindifferent figure as 0.

Lee also points out that this approach is anapproximate one as the number of factorsand the role of the personal ones, etc. make itimpossible to be deterministic or hope for anexact representation. Because the pluses atthe area of origin not only have to be morethan the minuses at the area of destination,but also have to overcome both theintervening obstacles and the force of inertia

which inhibits moving, this approach cannotbe based on balancing out exactly thevarious pluses and minuses since a greaterpush factor is needed to overcome the forceof inertia. However, it has the advantage ofsimplicity and flexibility. For example, inrural development the cost of agriculturalmachinery might be an intervening obstacle(–) which discourages migration at the placeof origin if there is no hope of accumulatingthe necessary capital; at the place ofdestination the difficulty of obtaining a workpermit can be a minus factor, and so on. Onecan break down the field of study into asmany items as one feels necessary.

What happens to the notion of distance insuch an approach? It should first beobserved that distance is implicitly defined ina purely physical manner in Lee’s model; forexample, the psychological aspects ofdistance would be part of the personal factor,and the cost of transport would be anotherintervening obstacle, etc. This is already animportant difference from the two previousmodels given as examples in which distanceis not such a separate and isolated item,either from other intervening obstacles orfrom factors in the places of origin ordestination. The major difference, however, isthe fact that in view of the number of items,distance, although always present as anintervening factor, is by no means the mostimportant one; for instance, laws restrictingmigration might be much more important.

Through his model, Lee establishes a set ofhypotheses of which three are selectedbecause of their particular relevance to ruraldevelopment and its migration aspects:

•The volume of migration is related to thedifficulty of surmounting the interveningobstacles. Therefore distance does play arole and rural areas far away from urbancentres would be expected to have a lowerlevel of migration, all the other interveningobstacles (i.e. items) being equal.

•Unless severe checks are imposed, boththe volume and rate of migration tend toincrease with time. This is due to theincreased diversity in a society, whereas ina “primitive” agricultural society which ishomogeneous there would be little

Figure 4Origin and destination factors and interveningobstacles in migration

INTERVENING OBSTACLES

ORIGIN

++++

–––

+ 00 +

+

––––

DESTINATION


migration. Advances in technology alsoreduce the impact of intervening obstacles.

•A similar result to Ravenstein: bothvolume and rate of migration vary with thelevel of development in a country or area.

It should be noted that these hypotheseslead to the same conclusion as the previousmodels, that is increased mobility ofpopulation. This is due to the fact that on theone hand development reduces theintervening obstacles – for instance, due toimproved transport and communications;but on the other hand the differencesbetween areas increase – for example, asregards the level of amenities and servicesavailable. The first part of this statementindicates that migration in developingcountries can be expected to increase andthat the role of distance should become lessimportant so that it becomes a factor whichrural agents could then ignore in most cases.To be effective in dealing with migration, theywill have to identify in each case the otherplus and minus factors and study the impactof their activities on them.

As can be seen, if one adopts the conceptsin the first two models, distance is a factorwhich development agents should seriouslyconsider, whereas in Lee’s model it becomesso integrated in other factors (reality is soatomized) that its role tends to beinsignificant. This is coherent given that themore factors there are, the less weight eachwill generally tend to have.

Now we shall look at a last approach which,instead of being an itemized one like Lee’s, isa comprehensive one, and see how theconcept of distance is dealt with here.

A global – comprehensive approach. Thisapproach tries to place migration in a globaland unifying perspective, both taken in theliteral sense (Amselle, 1976). The level atwhich migration is analysed is thereforeentirely different from the examples given upto now. In such an approach distanceappears to a great extent to lose its meaning.

In order to understand this approach andits implications, it is useful to first summarizesome of the criticisms of the classic analysisof migration made by the proponents of the

global-comprehensive approach. This willthen be briefly described and, in particular,its meaning in relation to the concept ofdistance will be explained.

Critique of classic migration studies. Thecriticism is twofold. First, it adopts a simplebinary typology which concentrates oninternal and external determinations in anarrow framework (see previous figures),whereas it is necessary to take into accountthe broad content which gives the coherenceand unity to the multitudes of forms ofmigration. For example, how can one explainin certain studies the lack of a relationshipbetween migration, density of population andsize of farms? In the studies given asexamples the authors explain this by the factthat those migrations were determined by theneed to secure a cash income – a need whichis related to the new forms of marketeconomy which prevail in certain societiesand which are independent of the localdeterminisms of factors of attraction orrepulsion (i.e. Lee’s pluses and minuses).

Second, studies explaining migration as aconsequence of the greater mobility of certainsocieties due to internal factors linked tocultural patterns overlook the history of thesesocieties and the change in their mobility.

Therefore, the critics of the classic analysismaintain, the narrow approach leads to aninfinite fragmentation of the types ofmigration and this masks the real unity of themigration process which is comprehensibleonly in a global framework.

Although they do not refer directly to theproblem of distance in their criticism, one canconclude that this is because it is irrelevantto some extent since it will either appear ornot appear as a factor according to the type ofbinary typology adopted.

The concept of distance in a global-unifyingapproach. This approach considers forexample that the world economy is movingtowards a greater capitalist integration whichfavours the mobility of the work force.11 Anexample of such an approach can been seenin S. Amin’s typology of rural zones in WestAfrica12 (see Amselle, 1976):


•zones organized for the production ofagricultural exports on a large scale;

•zones constituting reservoirs of potentialwage labour for those production zones;

•zones not yet integrated into the worldmarket system and which are secondaryreservoirs of labour.

In this approach migration is not what it isusually taken to be, i.e. a movement overspace, but is a change in social condition orstatus. Migration is, then, a form of socio-economic change accompanied by amovement in space. It serves to perpetuateand transform a society in the process ofintegration into the world economy and is thusa phenomenon which cannot be controlled ata regional or district level through ruraldevelopment actions. Moreover, to someextent, it also defies control at country level.

It can be seen that in such a system,distance does not have much significance. Itcan even disappear as a concept in caseswhere the migrants maintain sufficiently goodcommunications (remittances, flow ofinformation, etc.) with their place of origin toattenuate somewhat their physicaldisplacement. In rural development thiswould for example mean that the decision asto whether a road is built has an impact onmigration only if the zone which the roadwould open up needs to be integrated, but nototherwise. If one wants to encouragemigration, assistance to cover the cost oftransport, etc. would have no significant effectunder the assumptions of this approach.

From the concept of distance through the notion ofaccessibility to the dimension of changeIt can be seen from the foregoing that theconcept of distance, which appeared initiallyas a straightforward concept, is in fact rathermore complex because of its relationship toother factors. Therefore, according, to theaspects one highlights, the logical implications

for decision-making in rural development inorder to achieve or avoid migration effects willbe different. The whole area of migration andrural development is problematic andtherefore merits much greater attention andresearch precisely because of the complexityof the relationships involved.

Therefore two simple approaches to distanceare suggested here which will facilitateunderstanding. These are related but notentirely compatible and they are based on thefact that the findings of other research workare fairly similar, so that many of the apparentcontradictions between them can be resolvedwhen seen in another perspective. Theapproaches presented here have obviouslimitations, insofar as only certain aspects canbe quantified. However, they should beconsidered as only a preliminary attempt tocover new ground; there are still manydifficulties to be overcome.

Is distance a continuum? Seen from thepoint of view of a continuum, distance issomewhat like a chemical mixture. It is notan element, as in each case the ingredientsvary in their respective quantities but do notexist in isolation. The continuum goes fromthe most physical aspect of distance (e.g.walking hours) to the most abstract13

components of distance (e.g. differences in lifestyles or values) (see Figure 5).

Let us now imagine the case of a city andtwo rural villages at different distances fromthe city. What are the respective distances ofthese villages from the city (see Figure 6)?

It can be seen that many combinationswithin a certain zone are possible. Because ofthis, measurement can only be approximateand rural agents will more or less knowintuitively what that distance is. Figure 3 canalso be used to represent the distancesbetween rural areas themselves as well asdifferences in, for example, educationbetween individuals which differentiate thepsychological distance between each of themand the city.

11 Note that the practical conclusion, in a different formulation,i.e. an increase in migration, is similar to the previous models.Klaassen and Drewe (1973) also consider the relation betweenthe integration of economies and the impact on mobility as afact.12 Here also note that this to some extent recalls Ravenstein’slaws.

13 Abstract distance is defined as a combination of social,psychological, economic and other factors which influence themigrant’s perception of distance.


Two kinds of rural development projects(electrification and road building) are used toillustrate the different elements of physical orabstract distance. Rural developmentprojects such as these change certainelements in the concept of distance, eitherprimarily from the physical or primarily fromthe abstract point of view. A road reduces thephysical distance whereas electricity, byfacilitating the advent of television, forexample, can reduce the abstract distance.One thus moves from the concept of distanceto that of accessibility. Consequently, theseprojects change the composition of theelements making up the total distance andthey therefore have differential effects on thedecision to migrate according to thecharacteristics and predisposition of thepopulation in question.

It can also be seen that the perception ofthe distance between his place of origin andthe city changes when a migrant goes to acity. He may well visualize a new abstractdistance to his place of origin, as he getsadjusted to the city. This might haverepercussions on his decision to remain in acity or on his difficulty in adjusting to hisplace of origin on return. By extending thisidea, it is apparent that the introduction of anurban-type education in a rural area has theeffect on youth of reducing the abstractdistance to the city but of creating apsychological gap, or distance, between themand their place of origin or area and whichaffects their integration into this area andtheir propensity to migrate. This leads us onto a different approach to distance.

Is distance composed of divergent factorsat several levels? If one reconsiders

together the various approaches to distancereviewed, one can make several observations:

•All these approaches shed some light onthe concepts of distance even when theydo not assign a substantive role to it.

•They all present distance as a mixtureeven when it is isolated, but define it asmade up of different elements, orcompounds, and place the stress on theingredients considered the most easilyquantifiable (kilometres, social distance,psychological, etc.).

•Distance is seen in different roles rangingfrom the low profile assigned to it by Lee(1969) to a comprehensive idea of it (e.g.Amselle, 1976).

The continuum approach is thereforeinsufficient. For example, one can immediatelyraise the objection that if, for example, onewants to attach more importance to theabstract distance, one must at the same timemove further away from the physical distancepole. At least a two-dimensional approach todistance is therefore necessary and thepossibility of a divergence between the socialand physical distance must be taken intoaccount (Figure 7).

If one uses the notion of abstract distanceone can represent distance as in Figure 7 inwhich 1 represents the presence of manyobstacles, both physical and abstract – atotal barrier; and 0 the absence of any barrierfactor. As a result there would be three typesof combinations of factors for each group orindividual: combination C for which thevalues of distance are too high for migration,

Figure 5Representation of distance as a continuum

Figure 6Variations in the components of

distance within zones andbetween zones

PHYSICAL ABSTRACT

Zone B villagesb1, b2, b3

Physical distance to the city

b2b1 b3

a3a2

Abstract distance to the city

a1

Zone A villagesa1, a2, a3


i.e. there is a combination of many obstaclesaffecting the potential migrant’s perception ofthe abstract distance, plus many physicalobstacles; combination B in which there is achoice; and combination A in whichmigration would be probable, as both thephysical and abstract distance are minimal.

In such an approach rural developmentmeasures can be decided upon. Those whichwould encourage migration would mean amove from combination C to B – for example,taking measures to overcome the physicaldistance: building a bridge, reducing thehazards of the journey; and likewise, toreduce the abstract distance, informationand motivational activities to make those incombination B decide to opt for migration(and vice versa if the objective is to reducemigration).

This representation leads to a moredifferentiated and subtle approach todevelopment measures in each case. Not onlydoes this minimize the danger of imposing ablanket solution but also it becomes possibleto combine various approaches and to studytheir compatibility or to programme them –for example Phase 1: reduce the physicaldistance; Phase 2: motivate those incombination B, and so on.

Perhaps a word is necessary to justify thecombination B zone of choice on whether amove is made or not. This is based on theassumption that migration “laws” are neverfully deterministic. They only increase the

probability of deciding to move and thisprobability is represented as an area ofchoice which is, on a general level,undetermined; whereas in zones A and C itwould require a strong decision in view of thesituation to either move (combination C) ornot move (combination A) when the factorsdetermining distance would point logically tothe reverse decision. For example, there arealways the people who would move, or refuseto move, whatever the circumstances.

If the representation in Figure 7 seemssatisfactory for the first two points set outabove, it does not answer the third, i.e. theproblem of level. In order to do this a thirddimension has to be introduced (Figure 8).For lack of a better expression we use here“change of civilization” to express the degreesin this third dimension.

In order to explain this simply, one canconsider a few examples: a move from onerural area to another rural area generallydoes not imply a basic change in a migrant’smode of living. The farmer probably remainsin the agricultural sector, although the cropsor tools might change. The difficulty oflearning how to grow a new crop is part of theabstract distance and the number of days’travelling is part of the physical one. Thisimplies that often there is no movement to arural area if the advantages in moving areconsidered too small in comparison to thedistances. In most cases, however, theagricultural population knows the type ofproblem involved in overcoming suchdistances and their interpretation of ruraldevelopment measures and their implicationsfor such a move can be discussed and more

Figure 7A two-dimensional representation of distance

Abstract distance

Physical distance

0 1

1

Combination C

Combination B

Combination A

Degree of change of civilization (from rural to urban) Abstract distance

Physical distance

Figure 8A three-dimensional representation of distance


easily understood by rural people. Thesematters relate, for example, to yields, amountof work, forms of ownership, problems ofirrigation, etc. But a move from a rural areato a city generally involves more than achange of lifestyle – it is a change ofcivilization, of world even. It means movingfrom an agricultural world to an urban onewith different norms and values. How doesthis new dimension operate in practice?

It has been observed that rural to ruralmigration tends to be undertaken by groupsrather than by individuals, whereas in thecase of rural-urban migration the reverse istrue. This can perhaps be attributed to thefact that the individual who migrates to thecity is very likely to be educated and it is thevery nature of his education that has set himapart from his group and made him into anindividual unit prepared to go the rest of theway to complete adaptation to the Western,urban lifestyle by migrating to the city. Incontrast, people who have not received thisreorientation through education stay withinthe group, which therefore remainstraditional and migrates to the areas whichare the least strange to it.

By migrating, the individual is in effectintegrating himself into the world he reallybelongs to and leaving the one from which hehas been alienated. Development in ruralareas often constitutes an attempt to changethe environment or at least to introduce intorural areas elements of the urban world; as aresult, the people who accept these changesmost easily may tend to go straight to the cityrather than wait for further change to comeabout in the village. Conversely, there arepractically no elements of the rural world incity life and this might explain why it is sodifficult to encourage city dwellers to move torural areas. This is all the more true since indeveloping countries the urban world isgenerally taken to be superior to the rural one.

However, it has also been observed thatuneducated rural people move to cities and,even after a few years’ stay, return to theirplace of origin little affected. In such cases,these migrants have probably lived in thecities with people of their area of origin and infact have not really come out of their rural

world at all. The third dimension and some ofthe abstract dimensions are thus reduced toa minimum. This is one of the reasons whymany towns in developing countries do nothave all the accepted urban characteristics,but are analysed as an agglomerate ofvillages.

It has also been observed that there is astepwise migration: from rural areas to smalltowns, then to larger ones, then to primatecities. This stepwise migration is generallyundertaken by uneducated people, whereaseducated rural youth cover greater distancesand tend to skip some of the steps. Thiscould be explained by the fact that theuneducated rural migrant, by going to asmall town tends to reduce the element ofchange of civilization incorporated in thedistance. He settles down after each changebefore moving on to the next step.

The third dimension applied to the previousexamples can also help us to understandwhy, when the physical distance is theobstacle, migration tends to be morepermanent, whereas when it is the abstractdistance, and especially the change ofcivilization, which is the obstacle, migrationtends to be temporary. It will be rememberedfrom the first model presented thatHägerstrand observed that the value of thepower modifying the distance diminishedover time and was smaller for the urbanmigrants than for the rural ones. One canthus interpret these values as representingthe third dimension just introduced. Forexample, over a long period in Europe, thecountryside has been conquered by theurban civilization model: this is translated bya reduction in the value of the power nalready discussed. In a similar way this alsoexplains why mobility increases withdevelopment.

Finally it is perhaps this third dimensionwhich explains why rural-urban migration,even if urban populations seem to haveswollen to enormous numbers, actuallyaffects only a small proportion of the ruralpopulation: the distance to be covered inchanging from a rural to an urban world isconsiderable and discourages most people. Bythe same token it shows that, if not properly


managed, migration can get out of control ifthe distance is reduced, and this consequenceis generally overlooked when ruraldevelopment activities are being planned.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Amselle, J.-L. 1976. Aspects et significations du

phénomène migratoire en Afrique. Les migrations

africaines, p. 9-39. Paris, France, François

Maspero.

Courgeau, D. 1970. Les champs migratoires en

France. Travaux et documents No. 58. Paris,

France, Institut national d’études

démographiques.

FAO. 1969. Planning for better family living. NU:

Misc/69/28. Rome.

Klaassen, L.H. & Drewe, P. 1973. Migration policy

in Europe – a comparative study. Westmead, UK,

D.C. Heath Ltd.

Lee, E.S. 1969. A theory of migration. In J.A.

Jackson, ed. Migration, p. 282-297. Sociological

Studies No. 2. Cambridge, UK, Cambridge

University Press.

Lipton, M. 1977. Why poor people stay poor. A

study of urban bias in world development.

London, UK, Temple Smith.

Shryock, H.S. & Siegel, J. 1971. Methods and

materials of demography. Washington, DC, USA,

Bureau of the Census. 2 vols.

United Nations. 1971. United Nations manuals on

methods of estimating population, Manual VI,

Methods of measuring internal migration.

Population Studies No. 47. New York, NY, USA,

UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs.


In search of a better concordance between theState and the rural world in Benin

Two types of private property are common in Benin, one based on statutory law and one basedon customary law. Although customary systems exhibit a defined direction of evolution and somedefined procedures for regulation of land transfers, they are seen to be disintegrating. Agents ofchange include intense land pressure exerted by uncontrolled population growth which has notbeen accompanied by an intensification of agricultural production. This pressure creates conflictbetween local communities and the State, as the latter attempts to maintain forest reserves andother areas where use rights of natural resources are State restricted. An additional concern is theinjustice of customary systems which deny, for example, equitable land inheritance rights towomen. It is suggested that the State initiate a dialogue with representatives of rural producerswith the goal of defining guidelines for an appropriate legislative framework that will addresscurrent shortcomings in tenure and land management systems.

En busca de una mayor concertación entreel Estado y el mundo rural en Benin

En Benin son habituales dos tipos de propiedad privada, una basada en el derecho escrito y laotra en el derecho consuetudinario. A pesar de mostrar una orientación de la evolución clara yalgunos procedimientos definidos para reglamentar las transferencias de tierras, se consideraque los sistemas consuetudinarios son desintegradores. Entre los agentes del cambio figuran laintensa presión ejercida sobre la tierra por un crecimiento demográfico incontrolado, noacompañado de una intensificación de la producción agrícola. Esta misma presión crea conflictosentre las comunidades locales y el Estado, que intenta mantener las reservas forestales y otraszonas con derechos de uso restringido de los recursos naturales. Otro motivo de preocupación esla injusticia de los sistemas consuetudinarios que, por ejemplo, niegan un derecho equitativo deherencia de las tierras a las mujeres. Se propone que el Estado comience un diálogo conrepresentantes de los productores rurales con el objetivo de definir directrices para un marcolegislativo apropiado en el que se aborden los problemas actuales de los sistemas de tenencia yordenación de la tierra.


A la recherche d’une meilleureconcertation entre l’Etat etle monde rural au Bénin

Machioudi Dissou

Professeur d’économie rurale, Doyen de la Faculté des sciences agronomiques, Université nationale du Bénin

Il existe deux types de propriété privée au Bénin, l’une fondée sur le droit écrit et l’autre sur ledroit coutumier. Bien que leur évolution manifeste une tendance bien précise et que desprocédures claires règlent les transferts de terre, les systèmes coutumiers paraissent sedésintégrer. Les facteurs du changement comprennent la forte pression exercée sur la terre parune croissance démographique incontrôlée, non accompagnée d’une intensification de laproduction agricole. Cette même pression crée un conflit entre les communautés locales et lespouvoirs publics, ces derniers cherchant à conserver les réserves forestières et d’autres zonessujettes à des droits d’usage des ressources naturelles limités par l’Etat. Un autre aspect est celuide l’injustice des systèmes coutumiers qui nient par exemple aux femmes des droits équitables àl’héritage de la terre. Il est proposé que l’Etat amorce un dialogue avec les représentants desproducteurs ruraux dans le but de définir des directives pour la mise en place d’un cadre juridiqueapproprié qui remédie aux faiblesses actuelles des systèmes de tenure et de gestion des terres.

sociaux les plus importants entre lesmembres du lignage. Mais, le plus souvent,de tels problèmes sont résolus avec plusd’efficacité à un échelon inférieur au lignage,surtout au niveau de la famille élargie ouhouéta. Le houéta est un ensemble deménages polygamiques et monogamiques(dont les chefs prennent le titre de houéto)regroupés dans un espace matérialisé par unenclos sous la direction du chef de famille ouhouétagan. Ainsi l’exercice des droits foncierscommuns appartient à un groupe depersonnes unies par le sang, c’est-à-dire unecommunauté parentale dirigée par un chef àtous les niveaux hiérarchiques, et dont ladésintégration progressive à travers le tempsa conduit à un relâchement des liens entreses membres et à l’émergence del’individualisme.

Il convient d’examiner brièvementl’évolution du système fonciercommunautaire du Bénin. Pour diversescauses (telles qu’épidémies, maladies

RÉGIMES FONCIERS COMMUNAUTAIRESET RÉGIMES DE PROPRIÉTÉ PRIVÉERégimes fonciers communautaires au BéninA l’époque précoloniale, au temps del’Afrique des royaumes et des empires, leshommes exerçaient sur la terre des droitsfonciers communs par l’intermédiaire d’unecommunauté que représentaient le clan, lelignage, la famille élargie et même, toutsimplement, le ménage africain. De nos jours,mieux que le clan, le lignage représente pourl’individu une réalité plus vivante, unestructure au sein de laquelle s’exercent bonnombre d’activités qui le mettentpériodiquement en liaison avec les autresmembres du lignage.

Cependant, le rôle contemporain dévolu auchef du lignage est strictement religieux; cedernier n’exerce pas nécessairement lafonction de chef de terre. Parfois lorsque lasituation le permet, c’est-à-dire dans le casoù la taille du lignage n’est pas trop grande,le chef peut être appelé à arbitrer les conflits


incurables, invasions guerrières ou recherched’une meilleure sécurité), le chef d’unecommunauté parentale peut quitter sonancien lieu d’établissement pour s’installeravec son groupe dans un autre endroit plussécurisant. Le nouveau site peut, parexemple, être estimé plus sécurisant parcequ’il s’y trouve des terres généralement nonoccupées par d’autres personnes dont laprésence constituerait plus tard une caused’insécurité – voire d’hostilité – ou une entraveà l’épanouissement de sa communauté.Immédiatement après l’installation, les terresoccupées sont délimitées selon des procédéstraditionnels, puis affectées aux membres dugroupe selon leurs besoins. En aucun cas, lesterres – en tant que propriétés – ne sontaffectées à des individus. Par exemple, lorsquela première occupation est le fait d’un lignage,les terres sont allouées aux communautésparentales des échelons inférieurs (famillesélargies et ménages) par l’intermédiaire deleurs chefs respectifs.

La communauté lignagère, en sa qualité depremière occupante des terres, prendpossession d’un territoire vide. Désormais lesterres délimitées et affectées aux membres deson groupe appartiennent à ce groupefondateur et ladite communauté s’opposerafarouchement aux groupes ou aux individusqui chercheraient à s’y installer. Ainsi, on peutaffirmer que le domaine dont la communautélignagère est le premier occupant, et qui esteffectivement mis en valeur par ses membres,peut être considéré comme une propriétécommunautaire. Les familles élargies et lesménages ne possèdent pas de droit depropriété sur le domaine occupé et mis envaleur par les membres de la communautélignagère, mais ils exercent un droit d’usage etde jouissance (un droit d’usufruit) sur lesterres qui leur sont affectées.

Il était interdit à tout membre du groupefamilial de faire sortir une parcelle de la terredu patrimoine foncier parental (Mensah,1971). En effet, il ne s’agissait pas d’interdireun quelconque transfert d’une portion dupatrimoine foncier communautaire – on verraplus loin que les transferts étaient, et sont,habituels – mais surtout d’empêcher touttransfert dont la finalité consiste à faire sortir

même un lopin de terre du domaine de lacommunauté parentale au profit d’un tiersappartenant à une autre communauté.L’application stricte de ce principe a entraînél’incapacité de tout membre de lacommunauté parentale, y compris son chef,d’aliéner tout ou partie des terrescommunautaires. L’incapacité des membresde sexe féminin d’hériter des biens foncierscommunautaires au niveau d’un ménage ena été un des résultats. Cela permet à lacommunauté d’éviter tout risque de perted’une parcelle au moment d’un mariage entreune femme indigène et un homme allochtone.

N’oublions pas que l’Etat colonial, et plustard l’Etat indépendant, ont institué, tant surle plan législatif qu’administratif les régimesfonciers que l’on pourrait, dans un certainsens, qualifier de «communautaires». Il s’agit:des domaines forestiers de l’Etat, desréserves cynégétiques, des terres descommunautés villageoises, des coopérativeset des fermes d’Etat. Cependant, cesinitiatives sont de nature plutôt étatique quecommunautaire et, à l’exception des réservesforestières et cynégétiques – qui sont desespaces assez vastes de restrictions imposéespar l’Etat – n’ont pas laissé de tracesmajeures et durables dans le contexte desrégimes fonciers actuels. Par exemple,l’opération des champs collectifs (dans lecadre des terres des communautésvillageoises) n’a pas duré plus de deuxcampagnes agricoles puisqu’elle a étéabandonnée en 1963 après la chute dugouvernement qui l’avait instituée; le nombrede coopératives d’aménagement rural(conformément aux lois 61-26 et 61-27votées à l’Assemblée nationale en août 1961,et dans le cadre de palmiers à huile etcocotiers sélectionnés) n’a pas dépassé 30 etla superficie totale n’a atteint que 31 800 ha;on peut y ajouter les coopératives etpérimètres d’aménagement rizicole quicouvrent une superficie de 5 000 haenviron1 ; et les fermes d’Etat n’ont jamais étéclairement définies et, en général, ne

1 Malgré la superficie limitée des sites sur lesquels les tentativesde création de coopératives se sont déroulées, cette initiative estinstructive et sera discutée plus loin.


réclamaient que de petites superficies. Parcontre, l’instauration de l’économie demarché, les structures coutumièrescommunautaires n’ont pu résister à l’assautdu modernisme et ont subi unedésintégration qui s’est traduite parl’émergence de l’esprit individualiste. Cettesituation a été à l’origine de l’avènement de lapropriété foncière individuelle.

Régimes fonciers de propriété privéeLa puissance coloniale française n’a jamaisreconnu un véritable droit de propriété auxdifférentes structures communautaires. Pourle colonisateur, les Africains ne détenaientque le domaine utile des terres, le domaineéminent appartenant à l’Etat colonial. L’Etat aintroduit le régime d’immatriculation commeunique voie de reconnaissance du droit depropriété. Au Bénin, le décret du 5 août 1900fut le premier instrument juridique à servirde support à la mise en œuvre de la techniquede l’immatriculation des terres.L’administration coloniale française mettaitainsi en place une politique foncière quiconsistait à faire admettre aux Africains queles terres de leurs ancêtres ne leurappartenaient pas et qu’elles nedeviendraient leur propriété que lorsqu’ellesauraient été immatriculées conformément àla procédure administrative.

Après l’indépendance du Bénin en 1960, lesystème du droit moderne, mis en place sousla colonisation et fondé sur le droit romain, acoexisté avec celui du droit coutumier. Ledispositif législatif organisant le régime de lapropriété foncière dans l’ex-Dahomey, puisen République du Bénin, est basé sur la loidu 14 août 1965 qui abroge le décretcolonial du 26 juillet 1932, mais reprendd’une façon générale les dispositionscontenues dans ce dernier, à savoir latransformation progressive de la situationjuridique des terres par la mise en œuvre de latechnique d’immatriculation.

Cependant, malgré l’intervention de latechnique de la loi du 14 août 1965, «lelégislateur dahoméen reconnaît toutel’importance du droit foncier de l’immensemajorité des propriétaires terriens, car il n’apas osé bousculer ces derniers, ni faire table

rase des règles dites coutumières quirégissent leurs terres (Mensah, 1971). Ainsicoexistent deux types différents de régimesfonciers de propriété privée: les régimes depropriété privée traditionnelle, et celuirégissant la propriété privée de droit moderne.

Du côté de la propriété privéetraditionnelle, on note l’existence destransferts à titre temporaire ou définitif dupatrimoine foncier d’un individu à un autrepouvant revêtir plusieurs formes: l’héritage,la vente ou la cession à titre définitif, ladonation, le prêt, le gage et la location. Lasophistication et la fréquence de cestransferts signalent le degré avancé del’évolution des systèmes coutumiers vers unsystème de propriété privée. Ladésintégration de plus en plus prononcée desstructures sociales de la paysannerie nepermet plus de soustraire les biens fonciersdes opérations de vente, et mêmel’interdiction relative à l’héritage par ladescendance utérine tend à disparaître.

Mais de toutes les formes de transfertd’accès à la propriété foncière dans lesystème coutumier, celle dont les plantationsde palmiers à huile sont le plus souventl’objet est, bien sûr, le gage. C’est unepratique très ancienne et très développéedans la société paysanne de la palmeraiebéninoise, en particulier dans la province del’Ouémé, au sud-est du pays.

Le gage est une opération par laquelle unpropriétaire (gageur) cède temporairementl’exploitation de son champ à une personne(gagiste) de laquelle il reçoit un crédit poursatisfaire à un besoin matériel urgent. Ladurée de mise en gage est indéterminée.Cependant, elle ne peut être inférieure à deuxans, même lorsque la créance est recouvréeavant cette échéance. Au-delà de celle-ci, legage prend fin dès que le créancier entreentièrement en possession de sa créance.

Dans la province de l’Ouémé, bon nombrede cas de mise en gage remontent à plusd’une vingtaine d’années. C’est la raison pourlaquelle certaines restrictions sont imposéesen matière de mise en valeur des terresfaisant l’objet de gage. Ainsi, il est interdit augagiste d’effectuer dans le domaine agricolegagé des aménagements fonciers coûteux ou


des cultures arbustives tels que le teck ou lesarbres fruitiers.

A noter que ces restrictions sont fondéessur l’existence de conflits qui surgissentparfois entre les parties contractantes. Eneffet, en cas de conflit sur l’origine de lapropriété au cours de l’exécution d’un gage,la jurisprudence dans le droit coutumier seréfère à la nature des espèces végétalesexistant sur le domaine agricole en litige et àl’auteur de leur création. En cas d’absence depreuve écrite ou de décès des témoins ayantéventuellement assisté à la transaction, lesautorités judiciaires chargées du règlementdu conflit donnent généralement gain decause à celui qui a planté les arbres sur ledomaine contesté.

Très souvent des mises en gage de troplongue durée aboutissent finalement soit àune cession définitive, en principe après unaccord intervenu entre les deux parties, soit àune simple confiscation du bien gagé auprofit du gagiste ou de ses ayants droit. Telssont généralement l’origine et le processus del’accumulation de biens fonciers par uneinfime minorité d’usuriers dans la palmeraieporto-novienne.

Dans un contexte plus large que celui dugage, on souligne que lorsque des conflitsdécoulant de problèmes fonciers surgissententre paysans, ils sont portés devantdiverses instances en vue de leur règlement.Les instances judiciaires à caractèrecoutumier sont les premières à être saisiesdans ce domaine. Par exemple, après lespartages successoraux, des désaccordssurviennent parfois entre les héritiersmembres d’un même houéta. Ces conflitssont normalement arbitrés par un conseil defamille sous la direction du houétaganassisté de quelques personnes influentes duhouéta. Lorsque les antagonistesn’appartiennent pas à un même houéta, destentatives de réconciliation peuvent êtreinitiées par les chefs de lignage des houétaintéressés. Si ces démarches n’aboutissentpas à un succès, on engage la procéduredans la voie administrative qui comprendplusieurs niveaux opérant suivant deuxsystèmes différents de juridiction: le droit ditcoutumier et le droit moderne.

Mais dans le cadre du droit moderne, on adéjà constaté que la seule voie à lareconnaissance d’une propriété privée estreprésentée par l’immatriculation.L’immatriculation conduit à une sécurisationdu propriétaire ou de l’exploitant sur sonexploitation. On peut même affirmer qu’elleconfère au capital foncier une valeur foncièreaccrue pouvant servir de garantie auprès desorganismes de crédit agricole. Mais laréalisation d’une immatriculation exige dupaysan un ensemble d’efforts et de sacrificesqui ne sont pas à sa portée.

ÉVALUATION DES MODES DE GESTION DESTERRES SOUS DIFFÉRENTS RÉGIMESRégimes fonciers communautaires traditionnelsQuelle que fût la nature de la communautéparentale (lignage, famille élargie ou ménage),la terre en tant que propriété collectivecommunautaire était soumise aux règles del’indivision. Par exemple, au niveau de lafamille élargie (houéta), les terres étaientréparties entre les chefs de ménage (houé)qui, à leur tour, les mettaient à la dispositionde leurs membres. Les bénéficiaires n’étaientpas autorisés à cultiver des plantes pérennessur les parcelles reçues car ils avaientseulement le droit d’usage, de jouissance, etd’occupation. Les terres qu’ils occupaientdans ces conditions pouvaient leur êtreretirées en cas de besoin jugé plus urgent, oulorsqu’ils enfreignaient les règles édictées enmatière d’exploitation du patrimoine fonciercommun.

Toutefois, la participation de l’individu àl’utilisation d’un moyen collectif deproduction telle que la terre n’aboutissaitnullement à son intégration dans un systèmede production collective. En effet, laproduction demeurait individuelle d’unemanière générale, même si on pouvaitobserver une certaine intégration des moyensde production au sein de la communautéparentale. Dans la mesure où le travail étaitautrefois collectif, la production collective,considérée comme une activité organisée parun centre de décision commun (chef delignage ou de famille élargie), n’était pasgénéralisée et a disparu après l’éclatementdes structures sociales communautaires.


Aujourd’hui l’exploitation de certainespropriétés collectives, conservées sous formede plantations (palmeraies, rôneraies, etc.) oud’étangs à poissons, se réaliseessentiellement au profit des chefs et desmembres influents des communautésparentales. Cette forme d’exploitation decertaines propriétés collectivescommunautaires, surtout rencontrée dans lesud du Bénin, a été considérée, sous lerégime révolutionnaire, comme uninstrument de pression et d’asservissementdes paysans. Aussi, à cette époque, des«bois-fétiche» ou forêts sacrées, des étangs àpoissons, des marécages et autres biensfonciers dédiés aux voudouns classiques oulignagers, et dont la jouissance revenait àquelques individus, ont-ils été pris en charge,c’est-à-dire confisqués, par les «Instancesrévolutionnaires». Dès la levée des interditscoutumiers qui les frappaient, lespopulations avaient eu à nouveau accès àces ressources naturelles.

Au nord du Bénin, les terres descommunautés parentales ont été mises àl’abri de ces formes d’agression. Les chefslignagers en assurent le contrôle. Elles sontmises à la disposition des postulants par lavoie du prêt ou de la donation selon laqualité (membre de la communautéparentale, autochtone ou allochtone) desrequérants.

Le mode de gestion des terres des régimescommunautaires traditionnels permet depréserver la conservation de la propriétéfoncière contre le morcellement et ladésintégration des terroirs agricoles dont lesconséquences néfastes sont la disparition oule raccourcissement des jachères,l’appauvrissement du sol, les difficultés de lamise en œuvre de techniques culturalesmodernes et la baisse de la fertilité des solset des rendements agricoles. Sur le plan del’environnement, ce mode de gestion permetune bonne conservation des ressourcesnaturelles.

Il existe cependant des aspects négatifs.Par rapport au droit moderne, ce mode degestion ne garantit pas toujours une bonnecirculation et un contrôle correct des terres.En plus, il s’oppose à l’appropriation

individuelle, condition exigée par lesinstitutions financières pour l’accès au créditagricole. Il peut constituer un facteur deblocage à l’exploitation de certainesressources naturelles (marécages, coursd’eau, etc.) qui peuvent être frappées par desinterdits coutumiers parfois rétrogrades. Parailleurs les structures communautaires, quiconstituent l’infrastructure sur laquellereposent les propriétés lignagères, sontconstamment sous la menace d’unéclatement en raison de l’accroissement del’effectif démographique, de la dispersiongéographique des membres de lacommunauté parentale et de l’expansion del’individualisme.

Gestion des domaines forestiers de l’Etat et desréserves cynégétiquesCréée sous la colonisation, la Direction deseaux et forêts et de la chasse a été chargée,en vertu du décret du 4 juillet 1935, de ladélimitation et de l’aménagement des forêtsclassées et réserves de faunes. Dans ledomaine de l’exploitation, elle était appelée àassurer l’application de la législationforestière, à délivrer les permis d’abattage etles autorisations de coupe de bois de feu.Elle était également chargée de l’exploitationdes zones cynégétiques. L’exercice de lapolice forestière et de l’exploitation des zonescynégétiques est demeuré la principaleactivité de la Direction des eaux et forêts etde la chasse.

La gestion des ressources naturelles engénéral, et celle des domaines forestiers del’Etat en particulier, est une entreprisedélicate qui ne peut être soustraite aucontrôle des pouvoirs publics, et ne doit êtresoumise à aucune forme d’exploitationcapitaliste. En effet, l’état de l’environnementen dépend fortement.

La Direction des eaux et forêts et de lachasse, rebaptisée Direction des forêts et desressources naturelles, ne saurait secantonner essentiellement dans l’exercice dela police forestière et dans l’exécution decertaines tâches administratives visant àassurer l’exploitation des ressourcesnaturelles. Encore qu’elle ne dispose pastoujours de moyens nécessaires à l’exécution


correcte de ces missions. Aussi, l’expériencede la Société nationale de développement desforêts (SNAFOR) a-t-elle montré qu’unesociété d’Etat n’est pas l’instrument adéquatde la gestion de telles ressources. Quant àl’Office national du bois (ONAB), rien nepermet encore d’assurer qu’il constitue labonne formule.

En effet, quand on exploite un domaineforestier, il faut songer à sa reconstitution parla réalisation de nouvelles plantations. Lesexploitants forestiers privés, qui exploitentaujourd’hui les essences des forêts-galeries,n’ont pas été les auteurs de la création de cesformations forestières. Nonobstant lesdispositions législatives en la matière, onn’est pas assuré que ces exploitants réalisentdes plantations dont la superficie serait égaleà celle des forêts détruites.

Malgré sa simplicité, l’explication ci-dessusmet en évidence le rôle de chacun desacteurs qui interviennent dans le domaine del’exploitation de ces ressources naturellesconsidérées comme des bienscommunautaires dont la gestion génère desimpacts importants sur l’environnement.Cette gestion se révèle comme une entreprisepérenne fondée sur des activités que seulsles pouvoirs publics, dont la pérennité estgarantie par l’existence permanente de l’Etat,sont en mesure de conduire en s’appuyantconstamment sur les populations largementsensibilisées par leurs intérêts. Ainsi, unestructure placée sous le contrôle de l’Etat,solidement rattachée aux communautés à labase, peut constituer un instrumentprivilégié pour une gestion harmonieuse desressources naturelles.

Gestion des coopératives d’aménagement ruralLes coopératives d’aménagement ruralétaient organisées en deux volets: laproduction végétale pour la palmeraie et lescultures annuelles. Au sein des coopérativesd’aménagement rural, les diverses activitésétaient supervisées par un conseild’administration de la coopérative. Au niveaurégional les coopératives étaient regroupéesau sein d’un organe dénommé Centred’appui technique et social (CATES) à la têteduquel était nommé un chef appelé à

coordonner les activités de productionvégétale pour la palmeraie (ZOPA, premiervolet) et les cultures annuelles (ZOCA,second volet) comprenant le coton et lescultures vivrières. Il existait une liaison entrel’administration de l’ensemble descoopératives et celle de l’huilerie, autrementdit entre le CATES et la Direction techniquede l’huilerie de palme. Cette structure deliaison était celle du Complexe agro-industriel (CAI).

Dans le cas de la production despalmeraies, les travaux agricoles étaientexécutés collectivement (en principe) par lescoopérateurs sous la supervision dupersonnel d’encadrement. Tandis que pourles cultures annuelles, le travail étaitindividuel. Le paysan-coopérateur devaitvenir travailler sur sa propre parcelle decultures vivrières après avoir terminé satâche journalière dans la plantation.

Dans la réalité, un nombre très infime decoopérateurs parvenait à satisfaire à cetteexigence. Aussi, la mise en valeur de la zonede cultures annuelles revenait-elle plutôt àdes paysans non coopérateurs ou àd’anciens propriétaires de terres qui neparticipaient pas aux travauxd’aménagement de la palmeraie. Il arrivaitdonc souvent que la totalité des terresdéfrichées par l’ex-SONADER ou l’ex-SOBEPALH (organismes de tutelle descoopératives d’aménagement rural depalmeraies sélectionnées) pour la réalisationdes cultures annuelles n’était pas emblavée.

Les causes d’abandon des parcelles étaientmultiples, mais deux d’entre elles surtout ontété évoquées par les coopérateurs:l’incapacité de supporter le rythme de travailqu’imposaient les agents d’encadrement(notamment la difficulté d’appliquerrigoureusement les techniques culturalesexigées), et l’état d’appauvrissement decertaines parcelles dont le niveau de fertilitén’a pas été relevé au départ par l’apportd’une fumure de fond.

Outre les huileries d’extraction d’huile depalme implantées à Houin-Agamè dans leMono, à Ikpinlé dans l’Ouémé et à Hinvi-Dôvo dans l’Atlantique, diversesinfrastructures administratives sociales ont


été réalisées. Il s’agit des bureaux descoopératives, des logements pour les cadres,des infrastructures sanitaires et scolaires,des puits, etc.

Les résultats obtenus dans tous lesdomaines reflètent les conditionsparticulièrement difficiles de l’exécution desdiverses activités au sein des coopérativesd’aménagement rural. La production et lesrendements des plantations variaient entre22 pour cent et 58 pour cent des prévisionsd’une année à l’autre et d’une coopérative àl’autre. Cette faiblesse est à attribuer à lalongue sécheresse des années 1971 et 1972,aux vols et au mauvais entretien desplantations. Les résultats du second volet (lescultures annuelles) étaient aussi modestes.La culture attelée, qui a connu un certainsuccès (notamment sur les périmètres duGrand Hinvi), n’a pas été soutenue faute demoyens. On note aussi que les coopérativesd’aménagement rural étaient appelées àabsorber une main-d’œuvre importante. Enréalité, la faible rémunération du travailconstituait un véritable frein à l’adhésion despaysans.

Privées d’entretien, la plupart desplantations se présentent aujourd’hui dansun état de forêt secondaire. Cependant, dansl’ensemble, les effets de ces coopératives surl’environnement naturel étaient négatifs. Lesdéfrichements, par leur ampleur, ont conduità l’élimination de certaines espèces végétalesdans les régions où étaient réalisés denombreux périmètres. L’accroissement dudéboisement et la réduction des jachèresarbustives, qui ont favorisé l’essor ducommerce du bois de chauffage, ont puentraîner certaines perturbations sur lapluviosité dans les secteurs où se sontimplantés progressivement les périmètresd’aménagement rural. Néanmoins l’entretiencultural a été amélioré en 1973, suite aurelèvement du prix des produits du palmier àhuile, ce qui a incité le cultivateur à effectuercorrectement le nettoyage des palmeraiesnaturelles et l’élagage des palmiers.

D’importantes transformations dans ledomaine socioculturel, dont la totalité sembleêtre positive, ont été enregistrées. L’un desnombreux aspects positifs a été le

développement de l’épargne monétaire. Desassociations de tontine ont été créées danstous les périmètres. Elles regroupaient lespersonnes des deux sexes et de divers âges,toutes salariées ou membres descoopératives. Il existait également denombreuses associations d’épargnetraditionnelle constituées uniquement defemmes et dont les membres se réunissaienthebdomadairement ou tous les quatre jours.

Le dynamisme des femmes dans ledomaine de la mobilisation de l’épargne enmilieu rural n’était pas le seul aspect de leurprésence active dans les coopératives. Enparticipant aux travaux de mise en valeurdes périmètres et coopérativesd’aménagement rural, les femmes avaientacquis des avantages matériels importantsqui leur avaient permis d’améliorer leurcondition sociale et économique. Lespaysannes travaillant sur les périmètres etcoopératives, de même que tous les habitantsdes localités situées dans la zone d’influencedes projets, ont bénéficié, sur le plan social,du programme d’éducation sanitaire etnutritionnelle ainsi que des infrastructuresqui avaient été réalisées.

La plupart des paysannes qui offraient desprestations de service dans les plantationsparticipaient, grâce aux ressourcesfinancières acquises, à l’amélioration desrecettes de leur ménage. Elles aidaientfinancièrement leur mari en supportantpartiellement la pension alimentaire. Demême, les salaires qu’elles percevaient leurdonnaient la possibilité de se constituer unpetit fonds de commerce.

Au total, il apparaît difficile de cerner tousles aspects des incidences des projets decréation de coopératives sur leurenvironnement. La comparaison des résultatsobtenus par rapport aux objectifs deproduction et de rendement des plantationset des cultures annuelles révèle uneévaluation facile, qui toutefois ne permet pasd’avoir une appréciation globale desconséquences de l’ensemble du programme.Les résultats des différentes analysesexposées ci-dessus indiquent que, malgré lefaible taux de réalisation des objectifsenregistrés dans la production végétale


(palmeraies et cultures annuelles), lesincidences des projets de coopératives (auGrand Agonvy, par exemple) (Dissou, 1972)sont relativement positives dans certainsdomaines. On doit cette situation aux effetsengendrés par la mise en œuvre duprogramme social et des infrastructuresd’accompagnement.

Gestion des terres de régime traditionnelde propriété privéeUtilisation des diverses catégories demain-d’œuvre et leurs incidences sur lamise en valeur des terres. Les conditionsd’utilisation de la main-d’œuvre agricole,notamment les formes de sa rémunération, etles modes de transfert du patrimoine foncier(ce dernier sera discuté plus loin) sont parmiles facteurs exerçant d’importantesinfluences sur la mise en valeur des terres durégime traditionnel de propriété privée. Pourla mise en valeur des terres soumises à cerégime, les paysans ont surtout recours àdeux catégories de main-d’œuvre: la main-d’œuvre familiale et l’entraide. Quant à lamain-d’œuvre salariée, elle est très peusollicitée dans le cadre des exploitationsagricoles familiales traditionnelles.

La main-d’œuvre familiale tire son origine del’organisation de la vie communautaire sousla direction du chef de lignage. La structurelignagère a fait place successivement à cellede la famille élargie et à celle du ménage:famille nucléaire qui s’organise autour duchef de ménage dans l’espace que constituele houé. Ainsi, de nos jours, la main-d’œuvrefamiliale résulte essentiellement desprestations de service du chef de ménage, deses femmes, de ses enfants non mariés vivantsous son toit et encore soumis à son autoritéet d’autres personnes à divers degrés deparenté qui sont à sa charge.

Pour l’exécution des travaux agricoles, lechef de ménage répartit le travail suivant lescapacités de chacun. L’exécution des tâchesles plus dures (défrichement et autrestravaux culturaux d’entretien ou depréparation du sol) est réservée aux hommes.Quant aux enfants, dont la capacité detravail est très limitée, ils rendent de petits

services aux adultes sur les champs et sontgénéralement spécialisés dans les luttescontre les animaux qui dévastent les récoltes.Aux femmes incombent naturellement lapréparation des mets consommés sur leslieux de travail et l’exécution de certainstravaux agricoles relativement faciles tels quela récolte des céréales, le transport desproduits des champs à la maison. C’estsurtout dans l’exercice des activitéscommerciales que le rôle des femmes est leplus important.

La principale caractéristique de la main-d’œuvre familiale est sa gratuité. Larémunération ni directe ni immédiateintervient sous des formes diverses à traversles charges compensatrices: lesresponsabilités matérielles qu’assure le chefde ménage dans l’intérêt des membres duménage. En outre, le chef de ménage fournitles repas, qui ne diffèrent pas de ceux fournisà la maison, ainsi que l’alcool local (sodabi)ou le vin de palme servi au cours des travauxchampêtres afin de stimuler les travailleurs.Le chef de ménage peut aussi, après larécolte, distribuer aux femmes une partie desrécoltes que celles-ci vont vendre au marché.Les bénéfices qui permettent de réaliser lestransactions commerciales restent acquisaux femmes, ce qui atténue déjà quelque peuleur dépendance vis-à-vis des hommes.

Les performances de la main d’œuvrefamiliale sont généralement faibles et varienten fonction de l’effectif des membres actifs duménage, de leur santé et de leur capacitéréelle de travail. Cette dernière reste trèslimitée à cause des instruments de travailrudimentaires utilisés. Dans l’ensemble, lesprogrès sont très lents en raison du caractèrediffus de l’action des services devulgarisation agricole. Aussi constate-t-onune prédominance des exploitations de petitesuperficie ou de taille modeste parmi lesexploitations agricoles familiales en raison dela faible productivité des ressources(humaines ou matérielles) engagées.

Selon un rapport d’évaluation de la Banquemondiale (Banque mondiale, 1991), la taillemoyenne d’une exploitation est d’environ1,7 ha pour une famille moyenne de septpersonnes, les superficies variant, à quelques


exceptions près, entre 0,4 et 12,7 ha. Seuls5 pour cent des exploitations dans le sud et20 pour cent dans le nord disposent de plusde 5 ha. Dans l’ensemble du pays 34 pourcent des exploitations couvrent moins de1 ha en moyenne.

La coopération agricole est représentéedans nos campagnes par une formed’organisation traditionnelle d’entraideappelée adjôlou ou adjôro. Le seul facteurmis en commun est le travail de la terre.Cette donnée implique que tous les membresde cette société coopérative soient desagriculteurs. Le fonctionnement du systèmerepose sur une rotation établie au début dechaque saison agricole conformément à uncalendrier suivant lequel chaque sociétairereçoit, à tour de rôle sur son domaineagricole, la prestation de services des autresmembres. L’ordre de la rotation est souventdéterminé à partir d’un tirage au sort.Généralement, la prestation, qui ne durequ’une journée, n’est réservée qu’àl’accomplissement de travaux champêtres lesplus durs tels que le défrichement, la coupede sous-bois ou le sarclage d’un champ enculture. Le bénéficiaire fournit à ses invitésnourriture et boissons. Le volume du travaillivré et la rémunération en nature sontlaissés à l’initiative de l’intéressé.

Le plus souvent, la tâche qu’accomplissentces coopérateurs est supérieurequantitativement et qualitativement auxprestations de la main-d’œuvre salariéeagricole. Ainsi apparaissent les aspectspositifs de cette forme de coopération agricoleoù l’émulation et l’amour du travail bien faitqui animent les sociétaires conduisent à debons résultats. Cependant, cette structureprésente des lacunes dont les causesdérivent des conditions qui ont déterminél’apparition de ce cadre d’organisation dutravail qui est la réponse à un besoin ressentiaprès l’éclatement des structures lignagèresqui fonctionnaient sous le contrôle d’uneautorité patriarcale centralisée.

En effet, avec l’avènement del’appropriation individuelle des moyens deproduction tels que la terre, le travail collectifa été perçu comme un remède pour affronterles difficultés liées à une agriculture de

subsistance. L’entraide est donc unestructure de remplacement qui prend encompte de manière imparfaite les besoinsressentis par les populations rurales dans lecadre de l’organisation d’une viecommunautaire. Faute de moyens financiersqui lui auraient permis d’envisagerl’utilisation de la main-d’œuvre salariée, oucelle des associations de manœuvresagricoles, le recours à la main-d’œuvre fourniepar l’entraide permet aux chefsd’exploitations agricoles familiales de réalisercertains travaux urgents en période depointe.

Incidences des modes de transfert desbiens fonciers sur la mise en valeur desterres. Parmi les modes de transfert desbiens fonciers, ceux ayant un impactimportant sur la mise en valeur des terres durégime traditionnel de propriété privée sontl’héritage, l’achat et le gage traditionnel.

•L’héritage. Les partages successoraux liésà l’application de l’héritage conduisentaux morcellements successifs des terresde cultures qui, à terme, se présententsous forme de minuscules parcelles,notamment dans les régions à fortedensité démographique. Il en résulte unterroir agricole émietté dont la mise envaleur par des techniques culturalesmodernes se révèle difficile en l’absenced’un regroupement ou d’unremembrement des terres. Le recours àces dernières solutions se heurtegénéralement à l’opposition des paysans.Toute tentative pour imposer ces voies atoujours conduit à l’échec2.

•L’achat. Il représente le mode de transfertle plus sécurisant. Toutefois, les caslitigieux d’acquisition de terrain, une desconséquences de l’inexistence d’un coderural clairement défini, et la surenchèredes prix de cession constituent desécueils sérieux auxquels il convient de

2 L’exception au Bénin est le cas des coopérativesd’aménagement rural, qui est un exemple vivant dans cedomaine: l’application de la loi no 61-27 a permis d’exécuter parla voie obligatoire le regroupement et le remembrement desterres dans les régions fortement peuplées du Sud-Bénin.


prêter une attention particulière lorsquel’on a recours à ce mode d’accès à la terre.

•Le gage traditionnel. Etant le moyen quipermet à un paysan sans terre d’enacquérir temporairement, et à celui quipossède éventuellement plus d’uneparcelle de se servir de cette terre commeune garantie pour acquérir des fonds encas d’urgente nécessité, le gage traditionnelapparaît comme un mode de transfert quidoit contribuer à une utilisation correctedu patrimoine foncier. Le créancier gagiste,nouveau propriétaire, est non seulementtenu, mais a également intérêt à bien gérerla propriété reçue en gage3. Le principalinconvénient de l’opération consiste en ladurée illimitée du gage traditionnel,situation qui peut conduire à la perte dedroit de propriété du gageur.

L’accès de la femme à la terre et la gestiondes biens fonciersDans les chapitres précédents, nous avonsexaminé la position de la femme eu égard àl’accès à la terre, et avons noté son incapacitéjuridique à hériter des terres de culture selonla coutume et son rôle dans la gestion desbiens fonciers dans le régime traditionnel depropriété privée. La restriction qui frappe lafemme dans le domaine de l’accès à la terresemble liée au degré et à la nature de saparticipation aux activités agricoles, enparticulier au sein du ménage. En effet,comme nous l’avons souligné plus haut, lerôle de la femme dans les activitéschampêtres consistait en des prestations deservices par l’accomplissement de travauxlégers (semis, sarclages, récoltes, transport),de travaux de transformation primaire desproduits agricoles et par lacommercialisation.

Mais, depuis quelque temps, on observe deschangements relativement significatifs. Eneffet, un nombre de plus en plus croissant defemmes cultivent elles-mêmes leur proprechamp, prennent la direction des exploitationsagricoles et règlent toutes les questions

relatives à la gestion de leur exploitation.Ces changements apparaissent comme les

conséquences de l’accroissement desresponsabilités des femmes au sein de leurfoyer. Ces responsabilités exigent uneaugmentation de la participation des femmesà la vie quotidienne des ménages, notammentpar la prise en charge de certaines dépensesnécessitant des sorties de fonds en raison dela monétarisation de plus en plus marquéede l’économie rurale. En effet, certainesprestations de services (achats d’eau de puitsprivés, mouture du maïs, réalisation destravaux agricoles) sont rémunérées enespèces de nos jours. Dans ces conditions, leproblème de l’accès de la femme à la terre etcelui de la gestion des biens fonciers sousson contrôle revêtent de nouveaux aspectsque nous avons examinés à travers lesdonnées de quelques études de cas réaliséesdans le sud et le centre du Bénin.

Cas du plateau Adja dans ledépartement du Mono. Dans une étude decas, Bert (1987) a révélé que sur le plateauAdja, l’emprunt (68 pour cent), l’achat(17 pour cent), l’héritage (12 pour cent), et lemétayage et la location (représentantensemble 3 pour cent) constituent à l’heureactuelle les modes d’accès à la terre les plusfréquents pour la femme. Il convient desouligner que l’emprunt représente 68 pourcent des superficies des terres de culture desfemmes et que 73 pour cent des femmes y ontrecours. Il est surprenant que les maris,contrairement aux us et coutumes, ne prêtenten moyenne que 24 pour cent des terres deculture exploitées par leurs épouses. Hormisle cas des veuves, 25 femmes (soit 44 pourcent de l’échantillon) n’ont pas emprunté deterres à leurs maris. Quant aux femmesobligées de s’adresser à des personnes endehors du ménage, on note que 27 pour cent(principalement les veuves) s’adressent à desparents (frères, pères et fils) pour obtenir 23pour cent de la superficie totale des terrescultivées par les femmes. Enfin, 33 pour centde l’effectif des femmes ont bénéficiéd’emprunts effectués tant en dehors de leurfamille qu’en dehors de leur ménage, terresqui représentent 21 pour cent des terres

3 Tandis que le gagiste s’approprie temporairement la parcelle,on a vu plus haut qu’il a de bonnes chances d’en devenir lepropriétaire définitif.


totales mises en culture par les femmes.Il ressort de cette brève analyse que les

femmes restent, dans la majorité des cas, trèsdépendantes d’autrui dans le domaine del’accès aux terres de culture. Leur positionreste donc très vulnérable à la tête desexploitations agricoles. En effet, les terresempruntées ne présentent aucune sécuritépour la stabilité de la gestion; elles peuventêtre retirées à tout moment par leurpropriétaire, et elles sont généralement demauvaise qualité. Aussi, la mise en valeur deces terres exige-t-elle des dépenses élevées etne génère que de faibles revenus. Cettesituation est la conséquence de la pénurie deterres de culture sur le plateau Adja, maiselle défavorise beaucoup les femmes parrapport aux hommes.

Cas de la sous-préfecture de Dassa-Zoumè dans le département du Zou.Comme sur le plateau Adja, l’empruntdemeure le principal mode d’accès à la terrepour les femmes (Agossou, 1992). Sur les 43femmes interviewées, 40 d’entre elles ont eurecours à l’emprunt de terres. Commepartout ailleurs, les parcelles qui font l’objetde prêt ont généralement été cultivéespendant une longue période et leur sol nepermet pas d’obtenir de bons rendements.

Les deux cas s’accordent avec lesobservations faites tout au long du territoirenational: 76 pour cent des femmes signalentdes problèmes concernant la qualité et ladisponibilité des terres dans le Zou Nord et72 pour cent des femmes estiment que lesterres de bonne qualité existent, mais qu’ellesne sont pas disponibles. Les meilleures terressont réservées aux cultures de rente et lesexploitations dirigées par les femmes n’ontpas, en quantité, la force de travail dontdisposent les hommes pour cultiver plus, niles moyens de transport pour des terreséloignées. Il reste à prouver qu’il ne s’agit pasd’une marginalisation4 . Malgré une légèreévolution dans le domaine, l’accès desfemmes à la terre demeure bloqué par lespratiques traditionnelles en milieu rural bien

qu’elles détiennent désormais un rôle et uneplace de plus en plus importants au sein duménage, position qui les conduit à devenirdes chefs d’exploitation agricole.

CONCLUSIONSLa présente étude met en évidence ladiversité de la situation juridique des terreset les particularités des formes de gestion desbiens fonciers au Bénin. Bien que latechnique de l’immatriculation des terres aitété imposée sous la colonisation (décrets du5 août 1900, du 8 octobre 1925, du 26juillet 1932, du 20 mai 1955 et du 10 juillet1956), et que la loi no 65-25 du 14 août1965 ait été promulguée aprèsl’indépendance, le régime juridique des terresreste soumis à un dualisme évoluant sous lecontrôle des règles des droits coutumiers etmodernes.

A la suite de la désintégration desstructures sociales traditionnelles, et avecl’expansion de l’individualisme, la questionde l’appropriation foncière (par l’Etat ou parles systèmes coutumiers) apparaît commel’élément central autour duquel gravitent laplupart des problèmes fonciers dans lesdomaines juridiques et de la mise en valeur.L’évolution démographique galopante setraduit partout par un besoin accru de terresde culture qui exerce une pression de plusen plus intenable sur les domaines forestiersde l’Etat, même dans la partie septentrionaledu pays caractérisée par une faible densitéde population. Il en résulte une situationconflictuelle difficile à gérer qui concernel’appropriation collective coutumière et lacontestation des populations locales du droitéminent de l’Etat sur les terres des domainesclassés. L’absence de solutions clairesacceptables par les deux parties (l’Etat et lespopulations) constitue une sourcepermanente d’insécurité dans la gestion desressources naturelles des domaines forestiersde l’Etat et des réserves cynégétiques.

De même, le cas d’expropriation dans lecadre de l’aménagement des périmètresirrigués et des plantations de palmiers àhuile sélectionnés, suivi de la redistributiondes parcelles conformément à des normesfoncières contraires à la logique paysanne, a

4 Enquête de référence effectuée par la Direction du suivi et del’évaluation interne (DSEI) du CARDER du Zou (1988).


été à l’origine d’une véritable confrontationentre les organismes étatiques dedéveloppement et la paysannerie. Cettesituation a généré dans la gestion depérimètres d’aménagement rural depalmeraies et de riziculture une impasse quiperdure.

Quant à l’application de techniquesd’immatriculation relatives à l’appropriationfoncière individuelle instituée conformément àdes dispositions du droit moderne, elle restelimitée à la zone urbaine et rencontre, enmilieu rural, d’énormes contraintes difficiles àsurmonter. Pourtant, de nos jours, cettedernière forme d’appropriation peut permettrede sécuriser la situation foncière au niveauindividuel au sein des communautés rurales,afin de créer un cadre favorable à laréalisation des investissements qu’appelletout effort réel d’intensification agricole.

Le rôle prépondérant que jouent les femmesen milieu rural et qui leur confère uneposition privilégiée au sein des exploitationsagricoles appelle nécessairement une révisiondes conditions de leur accès à la terre. Il faut,notamment, éliminer les entravesqu’engendrent des pratiques traditionnellesrétrogrades en matière d’héritage de biensfonciers et mettre en œuvre des mesuresspécifiques permettant de leur venir en aidedans l’exercice de leurs fonctionsd’agricultrices.

Les diverses analyses qui précèdentindiquent clairement que la question foncièreest désormais un élément préoccupant dansl’ensemble des problèmes auxquels le monderural béninois se trouve confronté. C’est del’échec des solutions proposées pourrésoudre le problème foncier que résultent enpartie les insuccès et autres difficultés detout genre enregistrés dans la promotion del’agriculture, notamment au sud du Bénin.On cite surtout l’insuccès des coopérativesd’aménagement rural mobilisant unetrentaine de milliers d’hectares de terres etqui ont consommé près d’une quinzaine demilliards de FCFA d’aide extérieure. Cesfaibles performances ont été réalisées auniveau des projets agricoles placés sousl’administration des organismes dedéveloppement rural.

En milieu rural africain, les problèmesfonciers évoluent sous le contrôle de deuxfacteurs importants que, malheureusement, lapaysannerie ne parvient pas à maîtriser:l’évolution démographique galopante etl’utilisation de techniques agricolesrudimentaires exigeant la pratique de jachèresdont il est difficile, voire impossible derespecter la durée. Ainsi, il devient nécessaire,même urgent, de définir un cadre légal danslequel devront être examinés les problèmesrelatifs au domaine foncier. L’élaboration d’untel instrument juridique et technique exige lamise en œuvre d’un processus de concertationentre les pouvoirs publics et les représentantsauthentiques du paysannat.

Cette concertation, qui devra être réaliséesous forme de dialogue, devra aussi êtreappuyée par diverses compétences sous formed’apports et d’efforts multiples et multiformes,tels que les travaux de réflexion, lesconfrontations entre les expériences de terrain,les efforts financiers, etc. La présente étudeanalytique veut être l’expression d’un souhait,celui d’apporter une modeste contribution àl’effort de réflexion tant indispensable, et deposer un des jalons du long processus deconcertation que les autorités compétentesseront appelées à déclencher.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

Agossou, G. 1992. Le rôle et la place des femmes

dans les exploitations agricoles: étude de cas de

deux villages de la sous-préfecture de Dassa Zoumé.

Province de Zou. Abomey-Calavi. (mémoire)

Banque mondiale. 1991. Projet de restructuration

des services agricoles. Rapport no 9442-BEN.

Bert, L. L’accès à la terre dans un village du

plateau Adja. UNB/LUW/SVR. Abomey-Calavi.

Dissou, M. 1972. Structures agraires dans la région

d’Agonvy. Communication au Colloque

international sur les régimes fonciers en

Afrique. Université d’Ibadan, Nigéria;1983. La

palmeraie béninoise: exploitation traditionnelle et

aménagement volontaire. Université de Paris X..

(thèse de doctorat d’Etat)

Mensah, N.G. 1971 Droit et développement rural en

Afrique: l’exemple du Dahomey. Université de

Paris. (thèse de doctorat d’Etat)


Comparaison entre les modes de faire-valoircoutumiers et les systèmes de fermage:agriculture et développement en Zambie

Le système foncier en Zambie reste toujours dominé par une classification héritée de l’époquecoloniale: le domaine national, les réserves, et le fidéicommis. A la suite de nombreux abus, legouvernement a introduit, en 1975, une réforme foncière radicale qui élimine la propriété privée,ferme les agences immobilières, et met toutes les terres sous le contrôle du Président. Cetteréforme était populaire à l’époque, mais le gouvernement considère maintenant un autre type deréforme fondé sur la propriété privée. La tenure coutumière continue de dominer l’accès auxréserves et aux domaines sous fidéicommis. Tandis que les réformes pour favoriser la propriétéprivée sur les réserves et les terres sous fidéicommis sont débattues, il faut veiller à empêcher lesabus commis par des spéculateurs urbains, mieux éduqués et disposant de meilleures relations,au détriment de la population paysanne.

Comparación de la tenencia consuetudinariay de arrendamiento: agricultura y desarrolloen Zambia

El sistema de tenencia en Zambia sigue estando caracterizado por una clasificación heredada dela época colonial: propiedad pública, reservas y fideicomiso. Como consecuencia de diversosabusos, el Gobierno introdujo en 1975 una reforma radical de la tenencia, por la que se eliminó lapropiedad privada, se cerraron las agencias inmobiliarias y todas las tierras se pusieron bajo elcontrol del Presidente. Esta reforma fue popular en su momento, pero el Gobierno estáestudiando ahora otro tipo de reforma, basada en la propiedad privada. La tenenciaconsuetudinaria sigue predominando sobre las reservas y los terrenos en fideicomiso. Mientrasse debaten las reformas para favorecer la propiedad privada sobre las reservas y los terrenos enfideicomiso, hay que vigilar para impedir los abusos de los especuladores urbanos, másinstruidos y que disponen de mejores relaciones, en detrimento de los campesinos.


A comparison of customary andleasehold tenure: agriculture anddevelopment in Zambia

Vernon R.N. Chinene, Fabian Maimbo, Diana J. Banda

University of Zambia, Lusaka, Zambia

Stemon C. Msune

Ministry of Lands, Ndola, Zambia

Land tenure in Zambia continues to be classified as in colonial times, with three categories: Stateland, reserves and trust land. Because of the high level of abuse, the government introducedradical land reform in 1975, eliminating private property, closing down the estate agents andplacing all land under the control of the President. This reform was well received at the time, butthe government is now considering a different type of reform based on private ownership.Customary tenure continues to govern access to reserves and trust land. While the debate onreform to facilitate the private ownership of reserves and trust land continues, care needs to betaken to prevent better-educated and better-connected urban speculators from abusing thesituation at the expense of the rural population.

conservation and environmental issues.Following the change of government and

the liberalization of economic policy in 1991,land policy has come under review, andmajor land reforms are being advocated forseveral reasons. First, land rights in reservesand trust land are not registered and aretherefore not sufficiently secure for long-terminvestment. Second, preconditions areimposed before provision of leasehold tenurein reserves and trust land, titling proceduresare cumbersome and surveying services arelimited. Third, the State imposes compulsoryconditions on land transactions and retainsthe right to repossess land. Fourth, thecurrent system discriminates against women.Finally, amounts of unused land areincreasing because of land degradation andabuse of land resources.

This article reviews the evolution of the landtenure systems in Zambia and presents aconceptual and empirical comparison ofcustomary and leasehold tenure, with a viewtowards addressing land policy and

Zambia has complex land tenure systemscharacterized by three categories of land:State land (formerly Crown land during thecolonial era), reserves (formerly “nativereserves”) and trust land (formerly “nativetrust land”). The land tenure system in Stateland is based on the principles of Englishland law, whereas in the reserves and trustland, customary land tenure applies. In 29years of independence, the land tenuresystem on State land has undergone reforms,but it still retains the basic characteristics ofEnglish land law. The two land tenuresystems obtaining in Zambia today aredifferent both in principle and in practice.

The administration of land issues is criticalin determining the pace of advancementtowards Zambia’s long-term goal, which is tomake agriculture the mainstay of the nationaleconomy. There is general agreement that thepresent land tenure rules are not providingthe necessary enabling environment foragricultural development, particularly inrural areas. There is also great concern about


institutional constraints to agriculturaldevelopment.

LAND TENURE SYSTEMS AND THEIR EVOLUTIONPre-colonial eraIn the period before colonialism, land wasgoverned by customary law – a host of triballaws existing in different tribal customs. Landwas the most treasured possession for it wasthe basis of life itself. The amount of landunder cultivation was small. Land was neverviewed as a saleable commodity. Althoughlandownership was communal, systems ofregulation of communal rights existed. Thegeneral character of customary tenure wasmaintained during colonialism but evolvedunder the influence of population pressure,intensification and commercialization ofagriculture, improvement of farming methodsand sensitivity of the authorities to landdegradation.

Colonial eraFrom the outset, colonialists and theirinstitutions took the view that customary lawwas an inferior and undeveloped legalsystem. Custom was recognized as law onlywhen it was found not to conflict with writtenlaw.

In 1928, two categories of land werecreated: Crown land and native reserves.Crown land consisted of land reserved forEuropean settlements and mining. In theseareas, freehold tenure was applied asprescribed in English law. The reserves werevested in the Secretary of State for Coloniesfor the sole and exclusive occupation by thenatives in perpetuity. The concept of reserveswas subsequently found unsuitable for boththe Africans and the Europeans, but fordifferent reasons. The Africans resisted theconcept because the reserves wereovercrowded and impoverished. TheEuropeans wanted access to larger areas ofland, which resulted in resentment of colonialrule by the Africans.

The colonial administration responded tothe demands of the European settlers byintroducing the concept of native trust land.Under this arrangement, all unalienated land(i.e. land not categorized as either Crown land

or native reserve) that was suitable for non-native settlement or that contained mineraldeposits was brought into the category ofCrown land; the remainder was categorizedas native trust land. On both native reservesand trust land, land administration wasgoverned by customary law. The differencewas that on trust land, the Secretary of Statefor Colonies could grant rights of occupancyto non-natives, whereas reserve land was forthe exclusive settlement of native Africans.The reservation of the good fertile land for theexclusive settlement of whites provided theimpetus for the independence struggle,especially in predominantly agriculturalareas such as Southern Province.

IndependenceAt independence in 1964, Crown land wasrenamed State land and the reserves andtrust land were retained. All land in Zambia(except the Barotse reserve) was vested in thePresident for and on behalf of the people ofZambia. English law continued to apply toState land while customary law continued toapply to reserves and trust land. The policy ofland reservation through the concept ofnative reserves and trust land did not applyin Barotseland. The Barotseland Agreementof 1964 recognized and guaranteed thepowers of the Litunga, the traditional Barotseleader, over land in Barotseland as governedby customary law of the Lozi people. Thisarrangement prevailed until 1970 when thespecial status of the Barotse reserve waswithdrawn.

In 1975, President Kaunda announced far-reaching changes in landownership and landtenure in Zambia. These changes were largelybrought about against a background of landspeculation and manipulation of propertyrights. All freehold titles to land wereabolished and existing interests wereabridged to statutory leaseholds of 100 years’duration, unutilized tracts of farm land weretaken over by the State, Presidential consentwas subsequently required for dealing inland, and real estate agencies were ordered toclose down.

The President’s pronouncements werewelcomed by the people of Zambia by virtue


of their appeal to the nationalist sentimentsof the time. However, the land reformsbrought about unforeseen constraints:significant restriction of the public’s access toland and property resulted in an artificialland shortage; the introduction of therequirement for State consent broughtcomplications in the procedures of landacquisition, causing administrative delays;and less land was brought to productive useas those who have no capacity to develop itare legally inhibited from selling offundeveloped land.

Effects of government policy on land tenureThe cornerstone of customary tenure is theprinciple of usufruct, under which anyonecan have access to and use a piece of landbut cannot claim any form of ownership of it.This principle became the basis of land policyfor reserve and trust land after independence.When the Movement for Multi-PartyDemocracy government came into power in1991 it noted that the land policies inheritedfrom the previous government were a resultof an unsatisfactory colonial heritage but thatprevious reforms had not improved thesituation. The new government pledged adifferent package of reforms based on privateproperty rights. The government embracesthe notion of statutory leasehold tenure onState land, but for an automaticallyrenewable period of 99 years, if the lessee isnot in breach of any conditions and caveatscontained in the lease agreement.

Despite the vesting of all land in Zambia inthe President, land administration onreserves and trust land is by customary law.However, the President retains the right tomake land dispositions in these areas.Individuals wanting to convert theircustomary land into leaseholds are given 14-year leases. Where survey requirements havebeen wholly fulfilled, the State grants 99-yearleases to Zambians on reserve land.

The government intends to introduce auniform system of interests in land tenure onState land, reserves and trust land, but the99-year lease will be maintained. However,the reforms must ensure a way of recognizingindigenous peoples’ rights in already settled

areas currently designated as customaryland. That is, in the granting of an individualtitle deed, no forced resettlement or removalof people on that land should be permissible.After legislation making State grants of landuniform has been introduced, thegovernment intends to take measures tomake land transactions in reserves and trustland easier than they are now. This willinitially require an educational and researchcampaign all over the country.

CONCEPTS OF CUSTOMARY AND PRIVATE LANDTENURE IN ZAMBIACustomary lawMost Zambians conduct their activities inaccordance with and subject to customarylaw (Hansungule and Mwansa, 1993), butthe term is used to cover a host of tribal lawsexisting in different ethnic groups. Since thecolonial era, customary law has beenrecognized only after it has been found not toconflict with written law. Two contendingviews are held on customary land tenure incustomary law. One view suggests that landand land rights are not individual butcommonly shared. The other, increasinglyheld view recognizes individualism in landrelations and tenure (Mvunga, 1977). Bothviews are valid because they arise from thedynamism of customary tenure, which hasevolved from commonly shared land rights toindividualization of croplands with continuedcommonly shared rights to grazing land,forests and fisheries. Individualization ofcroplands is a result of agriculturalintensification, increase in populationpressure and commercialization ofagriculture. At present, cultivation rights ofindividual families are recognized on landwhere other families are excluded, butcommunal use rights may also be recognized(Hansungule and Mwansa, 1993).

Two points define the tenure of trees incustomary law: the possibility of individualownership is recognized, and trees can beowned separately from land. Trees, like landunder customary tenure, are subject to grouprights of the indigenous people. Generally,landowners have rights to the trees and cropsthey may grow on their land. Similarly, the


owner of a fruit-tree can exclude thirdpersons from its fruits. The owner can evenput a value on the fruits and sell them. Thisidea is consistent with common law in whichlabour invested in growing trees entitles thelabourer to possession of the trees and theirfruits.

The cornerstones of the customary landtenure system are reflected in the modes ofacquiring land: original acquisition, throughclearing of virgin bush, outright grants orpurchases of improvements on the land;derivative acquisition, particularly throughmarriage; or inheritance.

Statutory law and private propertyThe Conversion of Titles Act of 1975 stressestwo features: first, the distinction ofimprovements on the land versus the landitself; and second, the right of inheritance ofland. The act does not distinguish trees fromland, so trees are included in the concept ofland. The introduction of a 100-year lease asthe only form of ownership of State landmarked the cornerstone of the reformprocess. Freeholds and other types of estateswere abolished. The statute appropriated alleconomic value of land except forimprovements.

An important impediment to rights inleaseholds is the restriction on tenants’dealings in their land: all dealings in landmust follow Presidential consent. Anotherimpediment is the requirement for planningpermission before any development isattempted. The Town and Country PlanningAct is the framework for the control andregulation of all development on statutoryleaseholds. Finally, the rights and interests ofthe tenant in a statutory leasehold aresubject to compulsory acquisition of landand other property whenever the Presidentdeems it in the interest of the people ofZambia.

Comparison of the two systemsZambia has had the experience of bothfreehold and leasehold tenure. Supporters ofleasehold tenure argue that it allows Stateintervention if the tenant fails to utilize theland or damages it by mismanagement. They

find the unrestricted ownership of landoffered by freehold tenure undesirablebecause it may also result in speculation,fragmentation, underutilization or damage tothe land by irresponsible farming practices.

On the other hand, opponents of leaseholdtenure argue that it does not convey absoluteownership which the occupier needs forassurance of the security of long-terminvestments. A leasehold is essentially aqualified right to occupy land for a fixed termwhich may or may not be renewed. Theleaseholder is essentially a tenant of theState, to which rent is paid. The argument insupport of freehold tenure is that it conveysabsolute ownership to the occupier. Theowner is free to develop the land as desired orto sell part or all of it at any time. No rent ispayable. Ownership and security are virtuallyunrestricted. Occupants can invest withoutfear of dispossession. They can pass on theproperty to their designated heirs without anyrestriction.

Customary tenure has by and large beenmore successful than leasehold tenure inmeeting the needs of the people. Theadministrative procedures are simple andeasily implemented. Land issues are dealtwith efficiently and decisively. The problem,however, is that the land rights are neverregistered, although their recognition isguaranteed. No attempt has been made toreform customary tenure. However, theobtainment of title deeds to customary landmust be facilitated by a simplifiedgovernment machinery for land delivery.

In contrast, four different governmentbodies administer State land or policiesgoverning leasehold tenure. A majorcomponent of reform in the land law wouldbe to reduce administrative overlap andsimplify the registration procedures.

COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF CUSTOMARY ANDLEASEHOLD TENUREThis section presents an evaluation of thestrengths and weaknesses of the land tenuresystems with respect to a number of variablesincluding employment creation, incomegeneration, agricultural productivity, socialjustice, social cohesion and group solidarity,


environmental considerations and generalwelfare. The evaluation is supported by acase study of 52 farmers in Mazabukadistrict carried out by the authors in 1993.Half of the farmers (26) were from communalareas and the other 26 were from agovernment settlement scheme on State land.Most of the farmers in the latter group camefrom communal areas where there was a landshortage. The settlement scheme started in1975, but to date none of the 26 farmersinterviewed have title deeds to their land.

Employment creationDuring colonialism, reserves and trust landbecame the major source of labour for theindustries on Crown land. The resultingexodus of young people left behind mainlyold people, women and school-leavers. Toensure continued labour availability, thecolonial administration did not develop anyrural industries or capacity forentrepreneurship. These trends havecontinued in post-independence Zambia.Opportunities for wage employment continueto be limited on reserves and trust landbecause of small farm size, low capitalinvestment, limited incentives, limitedentrepreneurship, poor infrastructure andlimited availability of services. However,customary tenure makes it possible for allrural people to have work – in the sense oflabour – through access to land.

The scale of operation is limited on reservesand trust land. The farm sizes are related tothe amount of family labour available and theavailability of inputs. Semi-commercialfarmers use hired labour on a casual basis tosupplement the power of oxen for specificoperations. Off-farm employment is verylimited, and many factors hinder creation ofwage employment outside the tenure systemin rural areas. However, the availability ofland is virtually guaranteed.

The history of employment creation onState land is different. During the colonialperiod, Crown land was apportioned forexclusive use of the white settlers. The farmsestablished were large since the intention wascommercial crop and animal production. Thescale of operations was so large that

employment opportunities for wage labourwere created for the Africans.

After independence, settlers who chose toleave the country sold their farms to theAfricans. Some of the settlers chose to stayand are still farming today. Some of the farmsleft by the settlers were demarcated intosmallholdings and given to Zambians forsmall-scale intensive farming. Because of thishistory, State land is characterized by largefarms of 200 to 5 000 ha and smallholdings of2 to 25 ha. Almost all commercial farmsemploy workers. In short, employmentopportunities for wage labour are muchgreater on State land than on reserves andtrust land, largely because of the differences inthe scale of operations and level of investment.

Although opportunities for wageemployment are much greater on State landthan on traditional land, unemployment isalso much higher on State land, because theextensive migration of the rural populationhas outpaced the capacity for creation ofemployment. It is not clear that private tenurearrangements alone can create employment.The higher demand for wage labour on Stateland cannot be attributed to the tenuresystem per se, but more to the comparativelyhigh scale of investment which cannot bemanaged by family labour alone. Incustomary tenure, farming is not a businessbut a way of life for the people. Therefore,customary tenure only ensures a greaterutilization of available labour. The strength ofprivatized tenure is greater employmentcreation for wage labour. Its weakness is thatthe employment opportunities created are notenough to meet the high demand for jobscaused by the excessive labour migrationfrom communal areas.

Income generationLow incomes are generally associated withcustomary tenure, but they cannot beattributed entirely to the tenure system. Theyare rather the result of a host of socio-economic, political and historical factors,including the colonial bias against ruralareas in the development of infrastructure,industries and essential services, and muchslower economic growth on reserves and trust


land than on Crown land. Because of the longtradition of rural-urban labour migration, themajority of rural households have historicallysuffered from labour shortages whichconstrained their production. Limited accessto markets and technology, and controlledprices, especially for maize, further restrictedincome growth. At present, moneytransactions account for about 25 percent ofall economic activity in reserve and trust landareas, the remainder consisting ofsubsistence production.

Leasehold tenure by its nature facilitatesadoption of business approaches to farming.Because of the length of the lease, long-terminvestments are encouraged. The income-generating potential is therefore higher thanunder customary tenure. Greater access tomarkets facilitates income generation onState land.

A major advantage of leasehold tenure overcustomary tenure is that titles facilitate landsales which both generate income and moveland resources to efficient producers.However, in the settlement area of Mazabukadistrict, 62 percent of the farmers indicatedthat they have no right to sell their landbecause they do not yet have title deeds. As aresult, land accumulation by entrepreneurialfarmers is hindered. A functioning legalsystem and an effective enforcementmechanism are required to reduceuncertainty related to land transactions.Without such arrangements to reduce therisk of challenges to land rights, theincentives to invest and to work hard areweakened.

Income generation through increasedproductivity is constrained under customarytenure because of limited investment. However,while private tenure may result in increasedincome, it does not guarantee careful use of theland. Both systems of land tenure, ifaccompanied by appropriate incentives, canimprove rather than hinder income generationthrough increased productivity.

Agricultural productivityCustomary tenure has historically beenassociated with subsistence farming. Thecolonial regime did little to change this

because it saw the urban and miningeconomies as the basis of the territory’seconomic development, with agriculturefulfilling a supporting role by providing acheap supply of food and labour.Commercialization was not sought for Africanfarmers for fear of reducing the volume oflabour migration, but this view was modifiedin the 1940s when the territory lost its self-sufficiency in maize for more than a decadeand was dependent on imports. Colonialpolicy favoured the establishment of large-scale commercial farms on Crown land. Onlysuch units were seen as capable of producingregular surpluses for sale and providing thelevel of efficiency and responsiveness tomarket needs that the country’sadministrators regarded as necessary. Thebulk of the resources spent on agriculturewent to European producers on Crown land(Wood and Vokes, 1990). The land reservedfor them had the best soils, had access to theroad and railway networks and was close tothe areas with high food demand. Atindependence in 1964, the governmentmoved in quickly to redress the imbalancecaused by this dualistic approach toagricultural development by reformingservices for the communal areas. Themeasures included the creation of lendinginstitutions, expansion of extension services,development of cooperatives and provision ofsubsidies on inputs.

An increasing proportion of the populationis now found in the small- and medium-scalefarmer categories, while the subsistence andlarge-scale commercial farmers have declinedin importance. Management practices havebeen improved. The increased marketorientation of formerly subsistence farmershas not been even, but has occurredprimarily in the already more agriculturallyadvanced Central, Eastern and SouthernProvinces.

The production of livestock has notincreased as much as crop production,largely because of management constraints,some of which are induced by the customaryland tenure system. The grazing lands arecommunally owned and as a result are poorlymanaged. Since stocking rates are never


monitored or controlled, some areas areovergrazed, and excessive erosion andgeneral land degradation are the inevitableconsequences.

Customary land tenure is not conducive tolarge capital investment because it is notsufficiently secure to protect this level ofinvestment (Dorner, 1972). Evidenceindicates that those eager to be commercialfarmers have opted to leave their villages toacquire land where leasehold titles can beobtained (Chinene et al., 1993).

In post-independence Zambia, thedifferences in productivity between producerson State land and those on reserves and trustland have persisted, but these differencescannot be attributed to tenure systems alone.The advantages attributable to the landtenure system derive from the fact thatleasehold tenure facilitates adoption of goodfarm management practices. However,leasehold land has been found to beconsiderably underutilized. Leaseholds aregranted free of charge at a minimal groundrent, which is inadequate incentive toencourage optimal use of land; since landwas allocated indiscriminately in the past, itoften ended up in the possession of peoplewithout the means or intent of putting it toproductive purposes; and cumbersomeprocedures for acquisition of land constrainexpansion and limit land sales.

The association of customary tenure withsubsistence agriculture has persisted.Proponents of private property rights (Chineneet al., 1993) argue that increasedindividualization of rights empowers farmers’ability to capture returns on investment inland. However, Migot-Adholla et al. (1991), ina study on indigenous land rights, observedno relationship between land rights and yieldsin Kenya and Ghana. Customary tenure,however, is considered to offer little incentivefor investments to increase productivity. Fromthe foregoing, it is apparent that there is noconclusive evidence to indicate thatindigenous land tenure systems bythemselves are a constraint on agriculturalproductivity. More research is required toreconcile the opposing views on the impact ofthe two tenure systems on productivity.

Social justiceThe cornerstone of customary land tenure iscommunal ownership of land resources.Individuals have no right to sell landassigned to them. People have equal accessto the resources that nature has provided.Cropland is equitably distributed. Farmerstherefore feel secure in the customary tenuresystem because they enjoy long-term rightsto land without fear of dispossession of theserights.

There is a well-founded fear that proposedland reforms will make it easier for outsidersto get title deeds to land on reserves and trustland at the expense of the local people. Whentitling is introduced, wealthier and better-informed individuals may use theirinformation advantages to claim land overwhich other, less informed individuals havecustomary rights. Binswanger, Deininger andFeder (1995) observed that even when thereare no information advantages, titling basedon the on-demand principle involves highcosts that put the rural poor at adisadvantage. Thus titling has equity-reducing impacts. Bruce (1988) noted thatduring titling programmes, land grabbing byinfluential individuals who are able to use therules in their favour does more to facilitateland concentration than transactions in theland market following the issuance of title.

The case for communal titles concernscommon property resources such ascommunal pastures, forests and othermarginal lands. The preservation of commonproperty resources is desirable from anequity perspective, since these areasconstitute an important social safety net forthe rural poor. Privatization of these landstakes away this safety net. Providing acommunity title for these lands can protectcommunal rights from outside encroachmentand prevent the exclusion of the rural poorfrom community property.

From the survey undertaken by the authorsin Mazabuka district of Southern Province, itwas clearly evident that the people living onreserves and trust land are not particularlyenthusiastic about the calls for land reformor the offer to register their land rights, largelybecause they do not feel insecure with the


existing system of landownership. Calls forland reform come largely from governmentofficials, individuals on State land who stilldo not own land and others seeking toacquire more land to benefit from thelucrative land market that is evolving(Chinene et al., 1993). Although the plan toreform the land laws is well intentioned, thereis a risk that if it is not adequately explainedto the people on reserves and trust land, itwill be misunderstood and lead to theirdisplacement. Although the idea ofprivatization is now widely accepted inZambia, appropriate safeguards are neededto protect vulnerable groups.

A significant feature of both customary andleasehold tenure is discrimination againstwomen. Most of the ethnic groups in Zambiaare matrilineal societies in which women haveenjoyed a relatively high status, socially andeconomically. There is a disproportionatenumber of women in the adult population inZambia’s rural areas, with an average of 85men to every 100 women. The twoconstraints that have limited women farmersare access to land and availability of labour.In most parts of Zambia, a married womannormally receives a field separate from that ofher husband for her own cultivationactivities. Women’s first priority is to grow foodfor home consumption, after which they mayalso produce for the local or national market.

Since 1985, a procedure for obtaining titleto land in areas under customary tenure hasbeen in place (Government of Zambia, 1985).However, most rural women are unlikely totake advantage of this opportunity since theyare much less familiar with bureaucraticprocedures than men.

Married women not only contribute thebulk of the labour for household foodproduction, but often contributesubstantially to cash crop production as well.Nevertheless, wives typically do not controlthe product of their labour, since thehusbands market any surplus and make thedecisions about disposal of income.

Social cohesion and group solidarityCustomary land tenure is consistent with theAfrican traditional way of life which hinges on

strong family ties and lineage control overland. The primary landholding unit undercustomary law is the family, whose membershold land collectively. On communally ownedland, all members of the community areentitled to use a fair share of availableresources. Any attempt to replace customarytenure with individualized tenure coulddisrupt some of the basis of social cohesion.

Customary land tenure has a number ofdisadvantages, however, which limit thebenefits derived from communal ownership ofland discussed above. At independence, thetenure institutions left by colonialismcontinued, except that Zambians were allowedto settle on State land. Communities are lesscohesive and social interactions are lessstrong on State land than on reserves andtrust land. Landowners confine their activitieswithin the boundaries of their own holdings.

Environmental considerationsFrom the onset of colonialism, the BritishSouth Africa Company expressed concern overthe dangers of shifting cultivation, especiallythe chitemene system of northern Zambiapractised for centuries. The chitemene systeminvolves the lopping and sometimes felling ofindigenous trees and the burning of the cutwood to generate mineral ash for incorporationinto the soil. The resulting gardens arecultivated for about six years, during which thesoil is leached of its nutrients by the relativelyhigh rainfall of northern Zambia. The gardensare then abandoned for another area of newwoodland. Woodland can then regenerate in thevacated areas.

In 1909, the colonial administrationrestricted chitemene practices to areas close tovillages. The concentration of gardens close tovillages led to a rapid depletion of soil fertilitybecause of continuous cultivation withoutallowance of sufficient time for fallowing.Throughout the colonial period, Africanfarmers were restricted to the reserves andtrust land where soils were marginal. Thecombination of restricted land access andagricultural practices resulted in excessiveerosion. In a bid to curb the erosion hazard, thecolonial administration developed compulsoryconservation measures. While temporarily


successful, these measures provoked hostilityand resistance on the part of farmers. Afterindependence, the compulsory conservationregulations were abandoned.

Currently, the major causes of landdegradation on reserves and trust land aredeforestation, poor cattle management anduncontrolled fires. Land degradation anddeforestation in the communal areas leads toa whole cycle of environmental problems,particularly erosion. Deliberate dry-seasonburning of vegetation for hunting purposes iscommon on reserves and trust land. Innorthern Zambia the chitemene shiftingcultivation system is another major cause ofdeforestation. On the communal grazinglands, poor cattle management is the rootcause of degradation of natural resources.The numbers of cattle on the grazing landsare not controlled, and this omission resultsin overstocking in some areas, which in turncauses accelerated erosion and a reductionin palatable grazing.

After independence most of the settlerfarms, which had been in production formore than 40 years, fell into the hands ofZambians. Some of these farms relied heavilyfor many years on chemical fertilization, apractice that has continued to this day. Veryfew farmers invest in liming of the soils tocounteract the acidity buildup, which causesan eventual decline in yields.

Serious environmental problems are evidentunder both privatized and customary tenure.Most of the land degradation problems areprevalent in both systems of tenure. However,the level of severity may differ for someproblems. For example, acidification resultingfrom fertilizer use is a problem in bothsystems of tenure, but chemical landdegradation is more severe on State landwhere commercial farmers invest more heavilyin fertilizers. Overgrazing is a problemassociated with communal land and is adirect consequence of the tenure system.Under privatized tenure the problem is lessserious because control of the stocking ratesis facilitated by the enclosure of grazing areas.

Most of the other land degradationproblems result more from managementpractices than from tenure systems, as

evidenced by the fact that the problems occurnationwide, irrespective of the tenure system.Sustainable rural development involvesmanaging resources successfully to satisfychanging human needs, while maintaining orenhancing the quality of the environment andconserving natural resources. The increase inpopulation and commercialization ofagriculture suggest that for ruraldevelopment to be sustained, customary landtenure must adapt to these challenges.

The cultivation practices that existed beforecolonialism were sustainable. Shiftingcultivation was not as damaging to theenvironment as it is today because thepopulation was low and thus long fallowperiods were used, which allowed thevegetation to regenerate. The increase in thepopulation and commercialization ofagriculture demand adaptation of customarytenure to facilitate adoption of goodmanagement practices that sustain theproductivity of the land. The future of shiftingcultivation practices will be unsustainableunless innovations such as agroforestrytechnologies are introduced.

General welfare at country levelThe reserves and trust land comprised areasthat were undesirable to the white settlercommunity during the colonial era. They havetherefore less potential than State land.Development of infrastructure was muchslower than on State land. The majority of thepeople in trust and reserve areas are still aspoor as they were at independence. Whethercustomary tenure is to blame for thiscondition is debatable. Customary landtenure is not compatible with businessapproaches to farming. Farming is taken asan ordinary way of life and not as a business.Little is done to conserve the soils becausewhen their productivity declines, the farmersimply moves to another village and startsagain. Despite the constraints, customary landtenure has continued to survive because it isa product of the peoples’ culture and valuesand is consistent with the African way of life.

From the onset of colonialism to the presentday, State land has had the advantages ofbetter soil resources, better infrastructure


and high investments by both governmentand individuals and consequently has offereda much better quality of life for the people.This explains the high population drift fromagricultural to mining and industrial areas.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSThe land tenure systems in Zambia arefounded on social, cultural and economicconcepts influenced by the persistentdualism imposed by colonialism. Customarytenure is the dominant system governingland administration on 94 percent of the landmass of Zambia. To eradicate rural povertyrural farmers must be transformed intobusiness-oriented farmers. This shift willinevitably result in demands for changes intenure systems. The land laws must be ableto respond positively to these demands.

The failure to make agriculture themainstay of the Zambian economy may beattributed in part to the weakness of thetenure systems in facilitating agriculturaldevelopment. For efforts to eradicate ruralpoverty to succeed, the economic value ofland should be recognized. Nonetheless,customary tenure is dynamic. Its characterhas changed over the years because ofincreases in population and intensification ofagriculture. This process of adaptation couldbe facilitated by non-tenure measures,including the development of markets andother infrastructure and the promotion ofsustainable agricultural practices.

Despite the strengths and weaknesses ofthe tenure systems in place, both are soentrenched that substitution of one for theother is not feasible or practical. The twosystems are expected to coexist in theforeseeable future. A new land law shouldserve different interests in different parts ofZambia. It must recognize customary tenure,but the demarcation of the country into Stateland and traditional land is no longerjustified and should therefore be eliminated.

The excess involvement of the State in landtransactions is not compatible with the spiritof economic liberalization. There is thereforea need to make leasehold tenure more securethan it is now. To ensure food security, it isimportant to involve the rural people in the

land delivery process to enable them toobtain title to the land. With title, the farmerswould have opportunities for better landresource management and access toagricultural credit. Consequently, productionper unit area could be expected to improve.

To avoid undesirable effects, titlingprogrammes should be accompanied bypublicity campaigns to ensure widespreadknowledge of the rules and procedures.

The discrimination against women in bothcustomary and privatized tenure is real. Incustomary tenure, women do not inheritland. In both patrilineal and matrilinealsystems, the rights of women to land are notrecognized. In privatized tenure, women arerequired to meet some conditions notdemanded from men before they are allocatedland. The new land code must eliminate anyform of discrimination so the full potential ofwomen farmers can be realized.

The tenure systems must facilitate privateinitiatives by Zambians. Zambians employedin urban areas must be attracted to invest intheir villages of origin. At present such peopleare investing in State land where leaseholdsare obtainable, thus depriving the rural areasof both investment and expertise.

RecommendationsThe sustainable development of the ruralareas is critical to alleviation of rural poverty.Specific recommendations are the following.

•Land should continue to be vested in thePresident to protect against wanton abuse.However, presidential intervention shouldbe regulated by law to avoid the excessesof the past and to ensure judicial fairness.

•The power of the President in compulsoryland acquisition should be modified, withspecification of the conditions underwhich it will occur and the rights of theindividual landholder.

•The offices of the Commissioner of Lands,Registrar of Lands and Surveyor Generalshould be decentralized. Land allocationboards should be established at theprovincial and district levels.

•Land application procedures should besimplified to increase accessibility to land.

•An education campaign should be


mounted to inform the people about thereforms and how they may benefit and lose.

•A permanent research unit should beestablished in the Ministry of Lands tostudy the intricacies of land problems inZambia on a routine basis, and researchstudies should be mounted to study landtenure as the basis for policy-making.

•Appropriate research and extensionprogrammes should be developed tocontrol land degradation and promotegood land husbandry practices.

Recommendations for reforms on reserves andtrust land

•The concepts of reserves and trust landshould be abolished and replaced by theconcept of customary or traditional land.

•Selective issuance of leasehold titlesshould be established on land undercustomary tenure, but with much simplerprocedures.

•The provision of leaseholds in areasgoverned by customary law shouldinitially be restricted to local Zambians.However, permanent legislation to thateffect should not be made, as it would bediscriminatory.

•A simplified land registry system shouldbe established, to be managed locally.This will make it possible to compile acomprehensive land register, which wouldgreatly enhance the national resourceplanning process.

•A land development fund should beestablished to improve infrastructuredevelopment in the rural areas.

Recommendations for reforms on State land•All statutes relating to land which requireimmediate revision should be identifiedand necessary amendments should beimplemented.

•The “land without value” concept shouldbe abolished and replaced by a free landmarket, without the requirement for Stateconsent before transactions in such landcan be concluded.

•An economic differential tax on leaseholdsshould be developed to encourage moreefficient land use.

•Real estate agents should be allowed tooperate again.

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Modes de faire-valoir et moyens d’existence:comparaison entre les modes de faire-valoircommunautaires et privés au Zwaziland

Le foncier au Swaziland se divise en deux catégories majeures de tenure: le domaine national(Swazi Nation Land [SNL]) et le foncier bénéficiant d’un titre de propriété (Title Deed Land [TDL]),ou propriétés foncières libres qui, pour la plupart, furent acquises par des Sud-Africains au débutdu siècle. Les zones SNL soutiennent une population bien plus dense et, dans la perspectived’une économie de subsistance, génèrent plus d’emplois, bien que les possibilités d’emploi formelsoient plus nombreuses en zone TDL. La terre SNL est une partie inhérente de l’identité culturelledu Swaziland. Elle exerce une fonction d’équité sociale dans la mesure où elle donne aux chefsde famille le droit d’accéder à la terre. Cependant, les femmes sont généralement privées de cedroit malgré leur rôle de premier plan dans la production agricole. Des objectifs politiquesmultiples suggèrent de continuer la dualité de la tenure foncière au Swaziland, bien qu’il soitnécessaire de résoudre le problème de la fragmentation et de la surpopulation pour les terres durégime SNL.

Sistemas dobles de tenencia y medios desubsistencia múltiples: comparación de latenencia comunal y privada de la tierra enSwazilandia

La tenencia en Swazilandia se divide en dos tipos principales: las tierras públicas y la propiedadde tenencia libre, en la que el titular se beneficia de un título de propiedad, en su mayor parteadquirida por los sudafricanos al comienzo del siglo. Las zonas de tierras públicas mantienen auna población mucho más densa y, en la perspectiva de una economía de subsistencia, generanmás empleo, aun cuando las posibilidades de empleo oficial sean más numerosas en las zonasde tenencia libre. La tierra pública forma parte integrante de la identidad cultural de Swazilandia,y ejerce una función de equidad social en la medida en que confiere a los cabezas de familia elderecho de acceso a la tierra. Sin embargo, las mujeres carecen en general de este derecho, apesar de su función de primer plano en la producción agrícola. De acuerdo con los objetivospolíticos múltiples, parece conveniente mantener la dualidad de la tenencia de la tierra enSwazilandia, aunque sea necesario solucionar los problemas de la fragmentación y lasuperpoblación en las tierras del régimen público.


Dual tenure systems and multiplelivelihoods: a comparison ofcommunal and private land tenurein Swaziland

Hezekiel M. Mushala, Ackson M. Kanduza, Nomcebo O. Simelane, Juliana K. Rwelamira and Nonhlanhla F. Dlamini

University of Swaziland, Kwaluseni, Swaziland

There are two major categories of land tenure in Swaziland: Swazi Nation land (SNL) and titledeed land (TDL) or freehold tenure of land, which was mostly acquired by South Africans at thebeginning of the century. The SNL areas have much greater population density and, in the contextof a subsistence economy, generate more employment, although there are more formalemployment opportunities in the TDL areas. SNL land is an inherent part of Swaziland’s culturalidentity. It fulfils a function of social equity to the extent that it gives heads of families the right ofaccess to land. However, women are generally denied this right, despite their pre-eminent role inagricultural production. Multiple policy objectives suggest that this duality of land tenure should becontinued in Swaziland, although the problems of fragmentation and overpopulation of SNL landsneed to be resolved.

than the Highveld. Almost 20 percent ofthe upper Middleveld has good to fairarable soils, while in the lower Middleveldthe proportion is about 10 percent. TheMiddleveld is the most densely populatedpart of the country in terms of bothhumans and livestock.

•The Lowveld is relatively flat and low-lying,with a marked drought hazard but withgood soils. Most of the irrigated sugar andcitrus estates are located here.

•The Lubombo plateau rises abruptly fromthe Lowveld. About 12 percent of theregion has good or fair arable soils. Thevegetation is mainly wooded bushland.

LAND TENURE IN SWAZILAND: ITS EVOLUTIONSwaziland is characterized by two types ofland tenure: land held in customary tenure,or Swazi Nation land (SNL); and land held byfreehold tenure, or title deed land (TDL). Thelatter is sometimes referred to as individualtenure farms (ITF). The evolution of the dual

This article analyses the different types ofland tenure in Swaziland as a basis fordemonstrating the viability and efficiency ofpromoting given developmental objectives.An examination of land tenure conditions inthe country needs to take into account thegeneral physical, socio-economic, politicaland cultural background of society as awhole.

The country is divided into fourphysiographic regions whose ecologicalcharacteristics have a profound influence onland use. The regions run almost parallel in anorth-south direction.

•The Highveld, covering the western part ofthe country, is an upland area. Onlyabout 3 percent of the region is goodarable land, while a further 10 percent isclassified as having fair potential for cropproduction.

•The Middleveld, to the east of theHighveld, covers almost 28 percent of thetotal area. The region is warmer and drier


system is traced back to the early 1900s. Thecharacteristic land use patterns in the twodifferent tenure categories in the country areshown in Table 1.

There is some ambiguity in approaches toland tenure in Swaziland. Some analysesdistinguish, in addition to the two basiccategories of land tenure, a third category,Crown land (Armstrong, 1988; Mushala,1992). TDL tenure, currently accounting for37 percent of the country, recognizesexclusive rights of access to a defined piece ofland with titles held by individuals orcorporate bodies. Owners of land titles cansell or use the land as collateral. The Statecan withdraw title in land required fornational development only after makingappropriate compensation. Crown land isdistinguished as land owned by thegovernment or a section of government(Mushala, 1992; Levin, 1987). Most of theurban areas of Swaziland are on Crown landfor two reasons. First, urban property ispredominantly government estate. Second,after the suspension of the independenceconstitution in 1973, all land rights werevested in the King. The SwazilandGovernment leases urban areas toindividuals or institutions in the name of theKing.

Swazi Nation land has a more complexstructure which has never been defined bylegislation (Rose, 1992). At present 63percent of Swaziland is SNL (Low, 1986). Thisland is held by the King in trust for the nationand is allocated by chiefs to homesteadheads, who under Swazi law and custom aremen. Although many women are de factoheads of homestead, land is allocated tothem through male proxies. Membership in alocal community is the condition for the rightto receive or to be allocated land. Land canalso be acquired through inheritance. SNLincludes land bought from TDL landownersby a reigning monarchy in trust for the SwaziNation. Such land has been leased to privatecompanies to attract private capital andexpertise to SNL. The use of this land doesnot reflect the traditional and politicalrelations between chiefs and people asprovided for under Swazi law and custom.

TABLE 1

Land use in Swaziland, 1989/90

Land use category Swazi Nation land Title deed land Total

Arable land 131 713 72 415 204 128Crops 122 454 66 956 189 050Fallow 9 259 5 819 15 078

Grazing land 816 555 243 721 1 060 276Natural veld 8161 555 206 354 1 022 909Improved - 37 367 37 367

Commercial forests - 103 566 103 566

Other land 16 812 340 278 357 090

Total a 965 080 759 980 1 725 060

a Excludes 11 360 ha of urban land.Source: Government of Swaziland, 1989.

TABLE 2

Land area by district and tenure category(thousand ha)

Tenure category Hhohho Manzini Shiselweni Lubombo Total

Swazi Nation land 227 231 217 295 970

Title deed land 126 180 150 299 755

Urban (Crown land)a 4 4 2 1 11

Total 357 415 369 595 1 736

a Eight urban or village areas under the control of town councils or centralgovernment.Source: Government of Swaziland, 1989.

The amount of land under each of the tenurecategories is shown in Table 2.

The present land tenure of Swaziland is aproduct of historical forces and has beenshaped especially by those of the last 100years. Until the last quarter of the nineteenthcentury, the Swazi monarchy controlled allthe land through chiefs. Temporary landgrants, mistakenly interpreted as permanentconcessions, were first granted by Swazirulers to South Africans during the colonialera. According to Swazi customary law,however, land could not be bought or sold bySwazi rulers (Rose, 1992). A dual land tenurestructure which permeated the entireeconomic, political and social system aroseout of this misunderstanding. In 1907, landwas designated as native reserves for theexclusive use of the indigenous population.The reserves, formally known as “SwaziAreas”, constituted about one-third of thecountry. The remaining two-thirds of the landwas distributed as Crown land andconcession land. The loss of land throughcolonial legislation not only undermined thebase of the Swazi rulers, but imposed a


capitalistic system of production which wassupported by cheap, plentiful local labour(Rose, 1992).

Labotsibeni, the Queen Regent from 1899to 1921, levied funds from the people for thepurpose of buying land back from whitesettlers. King Sobhuza II revived theprogramme in the 1940s. It wascomplemented by land made available by theBritish administration for rural settlementand the efforts of the Swazi Government afterindependence. In essence, postcolonial landpolicy has been aimed at reconciling modernland developments with existing customaryland tenure procedures.

For analytical purposes three tenuresystems are recognized, but an inherentoverlap exists between SNL and Crown land.SNL is held by the King in trust for the Swazipeople, and rights in Crown land are alsoowned by the King, in whose name land isleased. Some SNL has been acquired since the1940s from individual title deed land andallocated to corporate owners such asagricultural cooperatives. The followinganalysis of government policy related to theexisting tenure systems highlights some of theintricacies that have sustained these systems.

Government policies and their impact on land tenureDuring the period of British rule in Swazilandthe sanctity of private property in land wasconsidered the basis for improved landutilization and improved productivity. TheIndependent State of Swaziland embracedthis policy and avoided wholesale landdispossession. It was also recognized that ITFfarms were a source of local employment,having provided about 50 percent of wagelabour since 1980. About 75 percent of thefarmland on title deed land is under freeholdtitle and the remainder under concessionarytitle. Government policies towards this sectorare based on laissez-faire principles.

Policies towards Swazi Nation land arenotable for their continuity. In the late 1940sthe colonial government introducedsettlement schemes and rural developmentprogrammes. From 1970 to the present,development planning has emphasizedprovision and improvement of rural

infrastructure through the RuralDevelopment Areas Programme (RDAP),rather than tenure reform. Theseprogrammes have been successful inproviding and expanding infrastructure butnot in increasing productivity or preventingenvironmental degradation. RDAP wasimplemented entirely on SNL.

A CONCEPTUAL COMPARISON OF COMMUNAL ANDPRIVATE TENURECommunal tenureThe rural Swazi homestead (umuti) is thebasic social unit. Swazis are patrilineal. Achild belongs first and foremost to its father’slineage and clan. A wife and children aretreated as constituting a “house” within thehomestead, a division especially relevant tothe allocation and inheritance of land andlivestock as well as other property. A Swaziman remains the head of the group even inhis prolonged absence. A woman byconsequence of marriage is guaranteed rightsto the means of livelihood through the umutiof her husband, which in turn belongs to aparticular chiefdom subordinate to the King.

Ostensibly, land is owned by the man, andportions of it are allocated to his sons, butsince such allocations are made only onmarriage, fields are tilled by wives whocontrol the disposal of their produce. Theeffect in practice is that the land is owned bywomen, whether married to the homesteadhead or to his sons or brothers (Ngubane,1983). The right to receive family land is notdetermined by gender per se. If the head ofthe family (the father) dies, his propertypasses on either to his sons or to his wife (orwives). Theoretically, daughters have noclaim to inheritance (Dlamini, 1989). It wasalways assumed that women would marryand therefore obtain access to land throughtheir husbands. In contemporary Swazisociety, the issue of women’s right toinheritance has become controversial, but noreforms have addressed this issue. Thedivision of landholdings through inheritanceresults in fragmentation of holdings, which isan increasingly serious problem.

All SNL land belongs to the community andthe chiefs have the right to allocate land in


their respective areas to all members. Everychief has a responsibility to the King toensure availability of land for cultivation toheads of all homesteads. The rights to land inthe community are defined principally withrespect to arable land. On the other hand, therights to graze stock, gather fruits and hunthave traditionally been unrestricted. As amember of the community, a Swazi is entitledto the nation’s resources and particularly itsproductive land. Thus a Swazi mantechnically always has a place where he canstay and he is entitled also to derive a livingfrom the land on which he resides, botharable and pastoral. Theoretically, a chief canbanish a family from his chiefdom, but suchbanishment is rare.

While there are some constraints withregard to the individual’s right to “total”ownership of Swazi Nation land, the systemdoes provide security for people. Every Swazimay (and some do) acquire TDL and stillmaintain rights to SNL, such that these twoforms of tenure are not mutually exclusive.There are also transfers of income betweenrural and urban members of the same family.

A high proportion of rural householdincome does not come from the agriculturalsector; de Vletter (1983) found that wageearnings and remittances accounted for 46.1percent of income in SNL homesteads, cropsales for 12 percent and livestock sales for26.1 percent (Table 3). These data indicatethat rural Swazis straddle two systems. It ismisleading to regard everyone in thecountryside as a farmer. Hence, in attemptsto intervene in agriculture on SNL land, itshould not be taken for granted that rural

homesteads are all using the land in thesame way. The whole range of strategiesavailable to villagers in pursuing a livingmust be considered in analysis of ruralcommunities (Lawry, 1989).

In Swaziland, reliance on communalresources is declining. Under SNL tenure,rangelands, forests and grazing lands havebeen subjected to high levels of overgrazingand extensive soil erosion in many areas inrecent years. The apparent breakdown oflocal common property managementarrangements on SNL, as elsewhere in Africa,has been attributed to a variety of factors,including the following (Lawry, 1989):

•fundamental changes in rural economies;•the increasing marginality of communalresources to the economic well-being ofmany individual rural households;

•the considerable variation in the relativeimportance of communal resources tohousehold income;

•the reduced ability of democraticallyconstituted user groups to assert controlover all users;

•the political decline of traditionalauthorities, in part because of theirreduced economic roles;

•the erosion of social and economic basesfor collective control of individual use.

The legal basis for Swazi Nation land canalso be traced to the provisions of theConcession Partition Act of 1907. About one-third of Swaziland was set aside for exclusiveoccupation by the Swazis, under the controlof the “Paramount Chief”. The Swazis felt thatthis partition was imposed on them; itresulted in the loss of vast amounts of land,and they lodged a series of protests aimed atregaining the land. Strong opposition wasdirected against foreign ownership of most ofthe land in Swaziland and against theconcept of private property, which manySwazis believed would leave a largeproportion of the population landless.

When the protests over the land occupationby whites failed, Swazis directed their effortsat land recovery towards buy-backprogrammes. The land bought under the landtransfer programme is registered in the nameof the King-in-trust and is said to fall

TABLE 3

Rural homestead income sources

Source Percentage of total income

Wage earnings of homestead-based labourers 28.4

Cash and in-kind remittances from migrants 17.7

Livestock sales and consumption 26.1

Crop sales and consumption 12.0

Homestead-based non-agricultural activities 6.9

Miscellaneous sources 8.9

Total 100.0

Source: de Vletter, 1983.


tentatively under SNL. Armstrong (1988)observed that there is a second type of SNLland, which is TDL registered in the name ofthe King but held in trust for the SwaziNation. This land is administered by eitherTibiyo or Tisuka, royal parastatal companies.

Individual tenureIn 1902, the British Administration began toformalize concessions which Swazi rulers hadgranted. The Concession Partition Act of1907 granted freehold title to concessionairesholding title to ownership of land or leases upto 99 years. The government has theauthority to sell, lease or otherwise alienatethe land that it owns, commonly referred toas Crown land. Most Crown grants haveinvolved urban land and have occurred whenthe government has extended the boundariesof a township (Armstrong, 1988). Ultimately,Crown land is said to be “owned” by the Kingby virtue of “Vesting of land in Kings” (Order45/1973). The Deeds Registry Act of 1968regulates the process of registration of rightsof ownership and other rights in title deedland. The Deeds Registry Office also keeps aregistry of land and mineral concessions andthe transfers of concessions.

It has been argued that individual tenure isnot consistent with some of the elements thatprovide cohesion in the Swazi culture – that itdoes not contribute to economic security forthe family, that the operation of the landmarket generates landlessness and thatSwazi culture is opposed to the concept ofprivatization and foreign ownership of land.

The problem of “farm dwellers”, commonlyknown as squatters, has also been cited asan impediment to production on land underindividualized tenure. A great deal ofcontroversy has centred around therelationship of farm owners and farmsquatters. Farm owners have argued that thepresence of squatters has hampereddevelopment and production on their farms.On the other hand, the farm squatters feelthat they have a moral right to inhabit landthat belonged to their ancestors. Undercommon law, farm dwellers have no legalright to live on these farms; thus the farmowners could evict them whenever they deem

fit. The Farm Dwellers Control Act of 1982tried to spell out the rights of farm dwellers,including an agreement with the farm ownerwhich outlines the conditions of the farmdweller’s tenancy, limitations on eviction offarm dwellers and provision for a districttribunal to resolve disputes between farmdwellers and farm owners. There are stillnumerous reports of conflict between the twoparties. It has been suggested that theproblem is likely to worsen as a result of thegovernment’s “back to the land” policy, whenthere is not enough rural land for those whowish to settle there (Armstrong, 1988). Thescarcity of rural land is a growing problem.

A MULTIDISCIPLINARY EVALUATION OF FREEHOLDAND COMMUNAL TENURE SYSTEMSThis section evaluates the performance ofboth ITF and SNL land with regard to variousfactors in the development of Swaziland. Theobjective is to compare the two major tenurecategories and note which promotes theachievement of given developmentalobjectives.

Individual tenure farms have beencommended for being generally highlyproductive. Arguments have been advancedfor land reform, encouraging conversion fromcustomary land tenure to individual landtenure in order to promote development.Individual tenure land in Swaziland currentlyconsists of commercial large-scale estates,medium-sized farms and urban areas.Individual tenure is said to generate quite asubstantial percentage of the country’s exportearnings. Roman-Dutch and statutory lawregulates most of the activity underindividualized tenure land. The fact thatproperty is privately owned means that it canbe developed without any externalinterference. In addition, loans can beobtained on the security of lands or buildings;the security of tenure is guaranteed; goodfarming and conservation practices and thecultivation of long-term crops are possible;and land can be fenced to obtain security fromneighbours (Hughes, 1972).

Developers have criticized Swazi Nationland on the basis of production factors. Theyargue that only 10 percent of households


produce for the market and that agriculturalproduction on SNL, which accounts for only12 percent of gross national product, cannotkeep up with the growing population. It isargued that SNL holdings are too small andfragmented, tenure is too insecure, too muchland is left fallow by migrant workers, seriouserosion results from overgrazing and moderninnovations such as fencing and credit arediscouraged (Funnell, 1991). Most important,it is argued that Swazi attitudes againstindividual experimentation on land andagainst profiting from land inhibit efforts toeffect reforms in customary tenure (Rose,1992).

Swazi conservatives would not readilyaccept changes in traditional SNL tenuresystems. They feel that widespreadconversion to individual land tenure wouldresult in the emergence of a landless groupand a loss of power by the King and localchiefs. Evidence indicates that communalland tenure practices are changing morerapidly in Lesotho and Botswana than inSwaziland, where customary norms andpractices remain relatively intact (Rose,1992).

Agricultural productivityAlthough variations over years may occur, itis estimated that individual tenure farmsgenerate about 31 percent of gross domesticproduct (GDP), contribute over 70 percent ofthe country’s export earnings and provide upto 75 percent of the employment of Swazis(Funnell, 1991). In general they arecharacterized by better technology utilization,larger land areas and greater output andincome generation. Given the well establishedinfrastructure, ITFs generally have fewermarketing problems.

On the other hand, SNL farmers are facedwith a variety of problems resulting in poorperformance. These include poorinfrastructure (inferior communicationnetworks, undeveloped feeder roads,inadequate marketing facilities) and poorproduction methods resulting in low-qualityproducts and limited quantities. The pictureis made more complicated in Swaziland bythe existence of a parallel, small but

prosperous off-farm employment sectorwhich acts as a disincentive to agriculturalproduction.

SNL homesteads devoted over two-thirds oftheir cultivated land to maize production in1989. SNL farmers prefer to grow maizerather than other crops regardless of climate,soil type and topographical variations(Dlamini, 1989). In some areas theproduction of maize amounts tounderutilization of SNL holdings, since othercrops would have higher yields per unit areaand hence be more profitable. Cotton isanother major crop on Swazi Nation land.Maize and cotton are also important crops onindividual tenure farms, as are sugar cane,pineapple and citrus. Average productionand yield data are presented in Table 4.

Table 4 clearly shows the relativeimportance of the agricultural crops innational development. Sugar cane and citrusare the main high-value crops on ITF land.By comparison, SNL produces mainly forsubsistence. Cotton is the main source ofincome. The value and yield of the two majorcrops produced on both SNL and ITF, i.e.cotton and maize, are higher on ITF than onSNL.

Farm size varies considerably between thetwo tenure systems. The average size of farmholdings is 2.75 ha on SNL, while on TDL theaverage farm size is 800 ha for the agro-industrial estates and about 25 ha for thefamily farm. TDL has a far betterperformance index than SNL for the value of

TABLE 4

Major crop production on title deed land and SwaziNation land, 1990/91

Crop Area Production Yield(ha) (tonnes) (tonnes/ha)

Title deed land

Sugar cane 36.0 3 841.8 106.7

Pineapple 1.5 32.9 21.9

Cotton 9.7 13.5 1.4

Citrus 2.7 56.6 21.0

Maize 13.1 21.1 2.4

Swazi Nation land

Cotton 17.3 13.5 0.8

Maize 98.9 153.0 1.5

Source: Government of Swaziland, 1993.


production, total yields and contribution toGDP and external trade.

Income and employmentSome 73 percent of SNL farmers earn lessthan US$200 per caput per year, while higherincomes are earned on large estates andother privately owned farms. Mosthomesteads derive income from threedifferent enterprises: off-farm employment,crop production and livestock production.These enterprises are supplemented by avariety of small-scale income-generatingactivities such as handcraft production, beerbrewing, food preparation and sales.

About 70 percent of the rural homesteadshave absentee workers. Off-farm wagesconstitute the staple source of income for themajority of the homesteads, but the modernsector is absorbing only a small portion ofthis labour. From 1985 to 1991 paidemployment in the formal sector increased atrelatively high rates, on average 4.3 percentper annum. The informal sector absorbsmuch of the remainder of the labour, but theamount is very difficult to quantify.

Flory (1987) subdivided the constraints tocommercialized agriculture and agriculturalincome on SNL into tenure and non-tenurerelated categories. Non-tenure-relatedproblems include transport and marketing,problems in the acquisition of inputs andaccess to extension services. Tenure-relatedconstraints include the following.

Fragmentation. The small average size ofthe farm plot (less than 2 ha) constrainscommercial production and is often theresult of fragmentation of holdings throughinheritance. The fragmentation of the plotslimits viable investments on the farm suchas mechanization or irrigation, resulting inlow productivity. This problem iscompounded by the fact that family landconsists of small fields scattered throughoutthe cultivation area of the community,according to how chiefs and families allocatefields. Moreover, land borrowing, eventhough not on a large scale, is practisedthroughout Swaziland. Under suchcircumstances the dispersal of the fields

reduces the efficiency of cultivation. Overtime the holdings become highly fragmentedbecause of the subdivisions among sons of afamily. The daughters do not have claims toproperty under normal circumstances.

Security of tenure. SNL is generallyregarded as lacking secure tenure. The chiefhas the power to allocate land, but he alsohas the power to take it away. The homesteadmembers can only use the land but do notown it – they only have usufruct rights.Farmers are also occasionally resettled by thechief for various reasons. Although the chiefrarely exercises the power of banishment,both banishment and the threat ofresettlement can instil a sense of insecurityamong community members and may act asa constraint on investments that mightincrease productivity.

Credit constraints. One of the mostcommon criticisms of communal tenure isthe lack of immovable assets to pledge ascollateral for loans. Farmers are unable tomortgage their land by using it as collateral.This limitation may constrain access tocommercial credit, and hence to investmentand productivity increases, but there is noconclusive evidence that it is a bindingconstraint on productivity or income.

Lack of control. The literature on land userepeatedly raises the issue of constraints offarmers’ ability to make fundamentaldecisions regarding farming practices and theuse of their land, especially concerningfencing and the timing for allowing cattle inthe fields. Under SNL tenure, farmerstemporarily lose their right to exclude othersfrom their fields after harvest, when livestockare allowed to roam freely through the fieldsto graze on the crop residues. Fencing, whichwould allow farmers to control cattlemovement over their fields, is stronglyopposed on SNL; it is viewed as a potentialinterference with communal use rights afterharvest and is thought to make the rights ofan individual over land too exclusive, thusreducing the chief’s authority over landallocation.


Social justiceThe aim of land legislation during the colonialera was clearly to exclude certain sections ofthe population of Swaziland from privateownership of land and to define clearly andlimit the land to which the Swazi populationwas entitled. Unfortunately, this limitation onland resources was extended to the post-independence era. The Land SpeculationControl Act of 1972 seeks to preventspeculation by non-Swazis but provides noregulation mechanism to prevent speculativetransactions by Swazi citizens. Armstrong(1988) rightly points out that as a result ofsuch discrimination, the long-term goal of afair distribution of land among thepopulation as a whole may be prevented bywidespread speculation by citizens. Landprices have become so exorbitant thatlandownership is kept in the hands of a fewpersons.

On the other hand, the communal tenuresystem on SNL seems sufficiently observantof the ideals of social justice, insofar asaccess to land is concerned. As noted, theactivity on Swazi Nation Land is supposed tobe legally regulated by Swazi law and custom.The Swazis are a relatively homogenousgroup culturally, socially and linguistically.The centre of Swazi culture has been andremains the monarchy, which has providedrelative political stability from colonial timesuntil relatively recently. Swazi conservativescontinue to stress that SNL land, and thepower of chiefs over its allocation, serves asone pillar of Swazi social cohesion.

The underlying requirement of Swazicommunal tenure is that each person iseligible to be allocated land as long as he orshe is a legitimate member of the community,but two problems limit access to SNL land.One is land shortage; the other is a genderissue. Shortage of land under SNL tenure isan ongoing problem and contributes to theproblem of farm squatters on ITF land.

The problem of women’s access to land isequally critical. Women control much of theprocess of production, consumption anddisposal of surplus. However, women have aninferior role in the control of land. UnderSwazi customary tenure, the power of land

allocation is almost always vested in males.The extent to which women have access tothe land is questionable. Rose (1992) foundthat women have little control over the landdistribution process and that the customaryland tenure system has very little place forwomen. Where women have to make requestsfrom the chief, they are never permitted torepresent themselves before the authorities.Women have access in that they work on theland, but it is men who have the control ofthe land (Amoah, 1978). Under customarytenure on SNL land, men assume primaryroles as members of chiefs’ councilsentrusted with important decision-makingresponsibilities regarding land, or as activeparticipants in public debate. The onlymention of women is that they can expect toreceive land from their husbands and can berepresented by their husbands in disputesituations.

Environmental considerationsSNL has been characterized by smallfragmented farm holdings, overgrazing andlow productivity. Overgrazing and poorlivestock management techniques on SNLhave resulted in very severe gully erosion andgeneral deterioration of rangelands (Mushala,1992).

SNL farmers are allocated land forcultivation and building of homesteads.Grazing land remains under communaltenure and is an open-access resource.Cattle have an important role in the Swazisociety; thus there is a traditional tendency toaccumulate as many cattle as possible,regardless of the environmentalconsequences. The situation is aggravated bythe inability of residents of SNL to fence theirareas to keep off some of the livestock. Thefragmented nature of farm holdings on SNLlimits the level of individuals’ investments onthem, including investments in conservationpractices.

The individual tenure system is recognizedfor its use of good farming practices, whichinclude the adoption of soil conservationmeasures. However, the system relies on theuse of farm inputs, including chemicalfertilizers. Recent studies have indicated a


general increase in soil toxicity which ismainly a result of increased use of chemicalfertilizers.

ImplicationsThe analysis of the two tenure systemssuggests that the individualized tenuresystem is more favourable in terms ofproductivity, income generation, employmentand contribution to GDP and external trade.The communal tenure system, although notscoring as high in terms of economicindicators, has very positive attributesregarding community welfare, social cohesionand group solidarity. It may be difficult todraw a clear boundary between the two interms of development.

A BETTER FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSISOver time, changes in land use have to beinduced so as to increase productivity andenhance equitable social development. Forthis to happen, it is necessary to effectchanges in the rules and institutionalarrangements that govern existing landtenure systems.

Swazi society is very much tied to thecommunal tenure system. Induced changesshould be gradual so that the fundamentalsocial framework is not dismantled. Most ofthe problems with SNL land or communaltenure are focused on land fragmentation. Toaddress the problem it is necessary to findmeans of increasing the size of the holdingsand to redistribute them under a localauthority (e.g. local council). Chiefs areautomatically members of the council, butother members are elected. Landholdingscould thus be redistributed in such a waythat no areas or individuals would befavoured at the expense of others. It isassumed that such an arrangement wouldminimize social dislocation.

On the other hand, the adoption of anindividualized tenure system would be basedon the assumptions that ITFs maximizeefficiency in land use and that the nationaleconomy is developing towards privateenterprises. In this scenario, the terms andconditions on which land is held would haveto be changed drastically so that community

controls over land would be reduced oreliminated. Such a system would createprivate individual ownership of land wherebyrights are adjudicated, fragmented holdingsare consolidated, land areas are surveyedand owners are determined and registered. Itwould probably allow for pledging of land ascollateral on loans, and it might assist landconsolidation. However, such a system wouldeliminate use rights of other individuals,would require an economic system biasedtowards private enterprises and wouldrequire a dramatic change in bothgovernment policy and cultural values. Itwould be likely to increase landlessness andinsecurity and might not create economicopportunities for the majority of the people.

A statutory alternative to ITF land may beleasehold tenure in SNL areas. In countriesthat have a State leasehold system, land isowned by the State and leased from the Stateby individual farmers. Such a system mayencourage industriousness amongindividuals, thus increasing productivity.However, it is likely to be bogged down bybureaucracy and creates room for corruption.Another statutory alternative might becooperative production, i.e. cooperation andmutual assistance in production undercorporate or communal ownership of land orState leasehold. However, cooperativeproduction requires a high level oforganization in division of labour and amplegroup discipline for conformity to establishedregulations in production, marketing andsharing of proceeds. Cooperative productionis likely to fall victim to land tenurearrangements if land rights are not clearlydefined at the initial stages.

The purpose of meaningful land reform isto enhance social development through moreefficient use of land, to influence anticipatedpatterns of land distribution and to enhancefuture societal ideals. There is a need for aclearer land policy in Swaziland that willensure more equitable ownership and use ofland and possibly guarantee increasedproductivity and production not only on ITFland, but on SNL land as well. With a forecastdecline in growth rate of paid employment inthe formal sector (employment is expected to


grow by 5.2 percent in 1993, by 4.5 percentin 1994 and by only 1.8 percent in 1995), theneed to stimulate labour-intensiveinvestment, especially on SNL, is becomingincreasingly urgent. It is therefore importantto examine each of the scenarios with respectto the identified parameters.

CONCLUSIONSSocial development is a complex processwhich is determined by both economic andsocial indicators. The above analysis hasshown the merits and demerits of the twosystems of tenure in Swaziland. The currentsituation was born of historical developmentsthat have tended to harmonize the twosystems. A bold decision to discard onetenure system as opposed to the other is notlikely to enhance social development in itstrue sense. There is a need to assessdevelopment objectives in their properperspectives, and this is likely to result in acompromise between the existing tenuresystems, or the continuation of a dualsystem.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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The INRA law: a second agrarian reform?

This article looks at the law on the National Agrarian Reform Service of Bolivia. On the positiveside, the law restricts the concentration of land, partially improves the administration of landresources and improves the exercise of justice. More controversially, the author claims that thelaw will prevent the formation of land and capital markets, curb the development of traditionalagriculture and lower land prices and will thereby generate excessive demand, encourageinefficiency in traditional areas, trigger the destruction of forest land, discourage foreigninvestment and produce a cumbersome bureaucratic apparatus.

La loi INRA: une deuxième réforme agraire?

Dans cet article, l’auteur étudie la loi du Service national de la réforme agraire de la Bolivie. Parmises aspects positifs, il souligne qu’il s’agit d’une loi qui établit une limite à la concentration de lapropriété foncière et améliore partiellement la gestion des ressources en terres ainsi quel’application de la justice. Parmi ses aspects plus discutables, l’auteur soutient que la loi interdirala constitution de marchés fonciers et financiers, freinera le développement de l’agriculturetraditionnelle, abaissera le prix de la terre en suscitant une demande exagérée, découragera lesactivités productives dans les zones traditionnelles, favorisera la destruction des forêts, limiterales investissements extérieurs et créera une bureaucratie complexe et inefficace.


La ley INRA de Bolivia: ¿una segundareforma agraria?

Gonzalo Flores 1

Oficial Nacional de Programas de la FAO; Gerente de Raíces, Bolivia; ex coordinador

del Programa Regional de Bosques Nativos Andinos (PROBONA)

El presente artículo examina la ley del Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria de Bolivia. Entre losaspectos positivos de esta ley está la limitación de la concentración de la tierra, una relativamejora de la administración del recurso tierra y una mejor aplicación de la justicia. Entre losaspectos discutibles, se menciona que la ley impedirá la constitución de mercados de tierras y decapitales, frenará el desarrollo de la agricultura tradicional, rebajará el precio de la tierraproduciendo una demanda excesiva, incentivará la ineficiencia en las zonas tradicionales,fomentará la destrucción de los bosques, limitará las inversiones extranjeras y generará unaparato burocrático complicado e ineficiente.

reforma agraria es necesario realizar unbalance y proponer medidas destinadas aordenar la propiedad de la tierra y darrenovado vigor a las actividades del sectoragropecuario. La ley del Servicio Nacional deReforma Agraria –o ley INRA2 –, en torno acuya promulgación se han producido lasmás grandes movilizaciones sociales de losúltimos años, ha sido llamada una segundareforma agraria. Un examen del proceso desu promulgación permite descubrir unosmecanismos sociales con sus presiones,negociaciones y representatividad, y larelación entre ética y política. Estos asuntosno son, sin embargo, el tema central delpresente artículo.

Como todas las leyes, la ley INRA refleja lasinfluencias y presiones de los sectoressociales interesados, sobre todo las de los«ganadores». Es indudable que, a corto plazo,los más beneficiados han sido los pequeñospropietarios y las comunidades campesinas eindígenas, debido a unas ventajosas medidaslegales que les brindan protección y les dan

EL DECRETO DE REFORMA AGRARIA DE 1953Mucho tiempo ha pasado desde que se firmóen 1953 en Ucureña el decreto-ley 3464,más conocido como decreto de reformaagraria. Desde entonces, en Bolivia hanaparecido los minifundios, se ha abierto lafrontera agrícola en las zonas decolonización, se ha desarrollado laagricultura comercial en el oriente y se hanpuesto en marcha diversas iniciativasagroindustriales; ha habido nuevas formasde concentración de la tierra, la producciónse ha especializado y la agricultura haestablecido importantes conexiones con elmercado exterior. Pero también se hanregistrado crisis económicas rurales,migraciones a las ciudades y proletarización;imposición y resistencia cultural,emergencias étnicas; pauperización yterciarización de la economía, protestas,movilizaciones sociales y presiones políticas.La tierra ha representado el bien de interéscomún en todos estos procesos.

Casi medio siglo después de implantarse la

1 Las opiniones personales que el autor expresa en este artículono comprometen a ninguna de las organizaciones a las que seencuentra vinculado.

2 La ley lleva el número 1715, y el nombre de ley INRA que se leda popularmente se refiere al Instituto Nacional de ReformaAgraria que fue creado por dicho texto.


acceso a nuevos recursos. Los «perdedores»han sido, principalmente, los grandespropietarios, que deberán pagar impuestos ycorrer el riesgo de perder sus tierras. Pero,sin descartar la importancia de un análisiscentrado en los ganadores y en losperdedores, es preciso estudiar esta leysegún un enfoque de tipo neoclásico, señalarsu eficiencia e indicar en qué medidacontribuirá al desarrollo y al manejosostenible de los recursos.

LOS ASPECTOS POSITIVOS DE LA LEYLa ley pone fin a un proceso deconcentración de la tierra en manos depocas personas. De 1953 a 1994, el Estadoha llevado a cabo con regularidad unapolítica de dotación de tierras sin costo. Laentrega de tierras se ha hecho por afectaciónde ex haciendas o por dotación decolonización. A fines de los años ochenta, laspropiedades pequeñas (el 80 por ciento),poseían sólo el 2,5 por ciento de la tierra; lasmedianas (el 18,1 por ciento), el 12,1 porciento, y las grandes (el 1,8 por ciento), el85,3 por ciento. Después de que las tierrasde las haciendas fueran afectadas yentregadas a los campesinos, ha habido unproceso de dotación por medio del cual lamayor parte de la tierra ha ido a parar amanos de medianos y especialmente degrandes propietarios3.

Sólo una pequeña fracción de la tierra quees propiedad de medianos y grandespropietarios es utilizada por éstos para el finoficialmente asignado (agricultura oganadería). Generalmente, estos propietariosmantienen la tierra sin explotarla, dejandosimplemente que se valorice con eltranscurso del tiempo. Por consiguiente, laespeculación es su uso económico principal.

Frente a esta actitud, la ley INRA detiene elproceso indiscriminado de entrega de tierras,establece un sistema de adjudicaciónmediante pago por concurso público y fijacausas y procedimientos para la reversión de

tierras. En un país donde era posible adquirirgratuitamente grandes extensiones de tierras,estas medidas revisten mucha importancia.Se puede demostrar que, comparadas conotras unidades de menor tamaño4, lasunidades agrícolas y ganaderas de gransuperficie son ineficientes desde diversospuntos de vista.

La ley crea un único órgano encargadode la administración de la tierra. Antesde la promulgación de la ley, dosinstituciones estaban habilitadas paradistribuir tierras: el Servicio Nacional deReforma Agraria (SNRA) y el InstitutoNacional de Colonización (INC). Aunque enprincipio el SNRA se concentraba en latitulación de las tierras afectadas a las exhaciendas y el INC en la dotación de tierraspara colonización en zonas tropicales, en lapráctica existía una dualidad de funcionesde ambas entidades, poca coordinación entreellas y a menudo objetivos de políticadistintos. La ley creó el Instituto Nacional deReforma Agraria (INRA), órgano especializadoen la administración de tierras, superando deesta manera la duplicidad antes existente.Entre las atribuciones del INRA figura unapreocupación cierta por la equidad en ladistribución de la tierra.

La ley introduce nuevos procedimientosen el juicio agrario que mejorarán laadministración de la justicia. La leyintroduce tres aspectos judicialesimportantes: la oralidad (la audiencia tendráuna importancia central en un juicio agrario);la inmediación (el juez deberá conocer elasunto directamente), y la concentración (sereducirá el número de actos jurídico-administrativos). En un sistema judicial en elque el papeleo, el detalle técnico y eldesconocimiento de la materia hanfavorecido a los más pudientes, los nuevosprocedimientos actuarán claramente en favorde los más pobres, que son generalmente

3 Comisión Nacional de la Reforma Agraria/Instituto Nacionalde Colonización: datos de 1984. En la fecha en que se escribióeste artículo, el INRA estaba consolidando la informaciónestadística correspondiente a 1995.

4 Uno de los mejores análisis sobre este tema es el de F. Ellis.1994. Peasant economics. Farm households and agrariandevelopment. Cambridge, Reino Unido, Cambridge UniversityPress.


también los menos familiarizados con elcastellano hablado y escrito.

LOS ASPECTOS NEGATIVOS O AMBIGUOS DELA LEYLa ley impedirá la plena constitución deun mercado de tierras en todo el país.El derecho de propiedad sobre un bien hacede su dueño la única persona que puedeatribuirse la propiedad sobre dicho bien; talderecho excluye a otros de su disfrute, y daal propietario la prerrogativa de venderlo,según los procedimientos de transferencialegalmente establecidos y en vigencia, y dehacer valer su derecho indefinidamente, deforma que ninguna otra persona puedaapropiarse del bien sin su consentimiento.Los derechos plenos de propiedad son unacondición esencial para el desarrollo de laactividad económica.

La ley INRA perfecciona los derechos depropiedad del mediano y gran propietario.Estos últimos podrán vender y comprartierras, excluir a otros del disfrute de supropiedad, usar la tierra como garantíahipotecaria en cualquier operación comercial,y en fin hacer valer su derecho propietario. Encambio, el pequeño productor deberá hacerfrente a una serie de limitaciones. Losderechos de propiedad del campesino y delindígena no están bien establecidos. Lospequeños propietarios, indígenas ycomunarios no podrán comprar, vender,alquilar, hipotecar y disponer libremente de sutierra, lo que ocasionará un grave perjuiciopara ellos y para el país en su conjunto.

La Constitución Política del Estado (CPE)establece que el solar y la pequeña propiedadcampesina constituyen un «mínimo vital» yque tienen el carácter de un patrimoniofamiliar inembargable (CPE, Art. 169). Esteenfoque es recogido y complementado por laley INRA, que dispone que ambos se rigenpor el Código de Familia. La ley no prohíbe laventa de la pequeña propiedad campesina ode las tierras comunales o indígenas, peroestablece que estas tierras se distribuirán deacuerdo con las normas y costumbres de lascomunidades (Art. 3, inc. III). Hay, de estemodo, una limitación indirecta al desarrollode la compra y venta de tierras.

Se conformarán, por consiguiente, dossegmentos de mercado diferentes; en uno(principalmente en el oriente del país) lastransacciones relativas a la tierra podránrealizarse más o menos libremente; en el otro(altiplano, Chaco y valles) se realizarán congran dificultad o no podrán realizarse. Losincentivos que el mercado da a la inversiónactuarán solamente en uno de los dossegmentos. Cabe suponer que en el orientese realizarán más inversiones, se aplicarámás tecnología y se generará más ingreso yempleos, mientras que en el altiplano, Chacoy valles esto casi no ocurrirá. La ley imponeasí un gran costo de oportunidad a todos lospobladores rurales: a saber, la pérdida deingresos por no poder utilizar la tierra de otromodo. En el altiplano, Chaco y valles elprecio de la tierra no reflejará su costo deoportunidad.

La ley limita la formación de unmercado de capitales, especialmente enla zona donde se practica la agriculturatradicional. La pequeña propiedadcampesina no podrá ser utilizada comohipoteca, lo que limita mucho la formaciónde un mercado de capitales y especialmentela generalización del crédito rural.Actualmente el campesino tiene acceso apoquísimas fuentes de crédito; en estasúltimas se arriesgan fondos basándose engarantías prendarias inseguras (como lacosecha) y en ellas la capacidad deoperaciones es limitada. El campesino, quesin duda tiene necesidad del crédito, terminarecurriendo al prestamista local, que leimpone intereses altísimos y condicionesextremas, entre las que puede estar lapérdida de la tierra.

La ley INRA dispone que el Estado otorgarácréditos de fomento y desarrollo a pequeñospropietarios y comunidades indígenas (Disp.Fin. IX). Es obvio que el Estado podrácanalizar algunos fondos hacia estosproductores, pero el principal suministradorde fondos –el capital financiero privado– semantendrá apartado ya que la ley hace que elmundo campesino sea automáticamente unambiente de alto riesgo para la colocación decréditos comerciales. Naturalmente, los más


perjudicados serán los pequeñosproductores.

La ley protege excesivamente al pequeñopropietario, a las comunidades y a lospueblos indígenas y originarios,produciendo efectos contrarios a losdeseados. En el cuadro se resumen lasdiferencias más importantes en eltratamiento de los distintos tipos depropiedad.

El exceso de protección al campesinoproduce efectos negativos. En la ley sesupone que el campesino prefiere seguirsiendo campesino, y que no quiere o que nole conviene vender su tierra; muchas de lasmedidas legales están dirigidas a protegerlo ya conservarlo en su estado. La mismacarencia de derechos de propiedad ensentido estricto obliga al campesino amantener su condición. Sin embargo, ladecisión de vender o de conservar su tierradebería poder tomarla él mismo; las trabasque no le permiten hacerlo deberíandesaparecer.

A lo largo de la historia republicana deBolivia, e incluso anteriormente, loscampesinos han luchado tenazmente por suderecho a la tierra. Desde las rebeliones defines del siglo XIX y principios del siglo XXcontra la expansión del latifundio, pasando

por las tomas de haciendas previas a lareforma agraria, hasta las movilizacionescontemporáneas, la tierra ha estado en elcentro de las luchas campesinas5. Si lareforma agraria les dio tierras, y si lacolonización les abrió –para bien o para mal–las puertas de la Amazonia, en la actualidadsería totalmente inadecuado impedir a loscampesinos ejercer su pleno derecho a laventa de sus tierras.

La ley reconoce los derechos de los pueblosindígenas sobre sus tierras comunitarias deorigen (Art. 3, inc. III), y pone –aunque enapariencia erróneamente– a todos los gruposétnicos en las mismas condiciones. Existenhoy ocho territorios indígenas reconocidoscomo tales y 16 en tramitación. Por un lado,los grupos étnicos, especialmente losselváticos, pueden ser excelentesadministradores de los recursos naturalesgracias a su familiaridad con el medio, a losconocimientos que han acumulado y a subajo consumo dendroenergético. Pero, porotro lado, su sociedad está perdiendocohesión. ¿Vale la pena legislar para gruposque se están desintegrando? ¿Qué debe

Diferencias en el tratamiento de los tipos de propiedad

Propiedad grande y mediana Solar campesino, pequeña propiedad, comunidades campesinas e indígenas

Puede ser revertida por abandono. El no-pago de impuestoses presunción de abandono (Art. 51).

Pueden ser vendidas o hipotecadas (Art. 41).

Pagan impuestos sobre la base del autoavalúo.

Obtienen tierras del Estado por adjudicación (a precios de mercado).

Expropiables por causa de utilidad pública (reagrupamiento dela propiedad, conservación de la biodiversidad u obras de interéspúblico) e incumplimiento de la función económico-social (Art. 59).

La dotación será preferente para quienes residan en el lugar. Será preferente sobre la adjudicación, especialmente en favor de pueblos ycomunidades indígenas, campesinas y originarias sin tierras o que la tengan insuficientemente (Art. 42 y 43).

5 Aunque no muy abundante, existe una literatura que reflejalas luchas campesinas en la historia boliviana. Una buenacompilación es la de F. Calderón y J. Dandler.1984. Bolivia: lafuerza histórica del campesinado. Cochabamba, CERES.

Solar y pequeña propiedad campesina son indivisibles einembargables (Art. 41).

Solar, pequeña propiedad y tierras comunitarias de origen no seránrevertidas por abandono o falta de trabajo (Art. 53).

Las tierras comunitarias de origen y las propiedades comunariasson inalienables, indivisibles, irreversibles, colectivas,inembargables e imprescriptibles (Art. 41).

Solar, pequeña propiedad y tierras comunitarias de origen nopueden ser hipotecadas por ser inembargables (Art. 41, inc. I).

No pagan impuestos (incluso los inmuebles de comunidadescampesinas, pueblos, comunidades indígenas y comunidadesoriginarias están exentos de impuestos) (Art. 4).

Obtienen tierras del Estado por dotación (gratuita) o poradjudicación a precios concesionales (Art. 74).

Sólo son expropiables para conservar la biodiversidad y pararealizar obras de interés público (Art. 59, inc. IV).


prevalecer en la legislación: la pertenencia auna identidad parcial o la pertenencia a unaidentidad nacional? ¿En qué circunstanciasdebe la pertenencia a una etnia crearderechos especiales? ¿Cuáles son losderechos que se asigna a los grupos étnicos?Por ejemplo, ¿estará la propiedad de la tierraen los territorios indígenas reservadaexclusivamente a los propios indígenas? ¿Seextienden los derechos de las etnias a lavegetación forestal y a los recursos genéticoscomprendidos en esos territorios? Esosderechos no están claramente delimitados enla ley INRA ni en otros instrumentos legales6.

La ley rebaja artificialmente el precio dela tierra. En un mercado sin grandesdistorsiones, el precio de los factores deproducción refleja más o menosadecuadamente su valor. En una economíade mercado es importante que los factoressean transados a sus precios reales, paraque el precio actúe como un impulso para laeficiencia. Mientras más alto sea el precio deun factor, mayor será el esfuerzo necesariopara recuperar la inversión realizada para sucompra.

En un mercado segmentado ydistorsionado como el que consolidará la leyINRA, el precio de la tierra no reflejará suverdadero valor, por las siguientes razones:

•en las zonas tradicionales especialmente,las transacciones estarán limitadas;

•en las zonas no tradicionales donde hayaposibilidades de ampliar la fronteraagrícola, los precios de la tierra estaránpor debajo de su valor, debido a que:– la dotación será preferida a la

adjudicación (es decir, entre uncomprador de tierras que desea pagarpor ellas y una comunidad que deseaque las tierras le sean dadas sin costo,el Estado deberá optar por entregarlasgratuitamente a esta última);

– la adjudicación simple a colonizadores (losprincipales responsables de la expansiónde la frontera agrícola a costa del bosque)se hará a precios concesionales, es decirpor debajo del precio de mercado.

Naturalmente, estos factores causarán unarebaja de los precios, y aumentarán lademanda de tierras.

La exención de impuestos de que goza elpequeño propietario incentivará laineficiencia. La ley INRA da un tratamientoimpositivo desigual a la propiedad mediana ygrande respecto de la pequeña propiedadcampesina e indígena: esta última no pagaráimpuestos.

Si bien la exención de impuestos puede serel reconocimiento de una situación depobreza, esta franquicia es un error:

•el pago de un impuesto valoriza la tierra;• las propiedades grandes pueden sersubdivididas (y aparecer como pequeñas)para no pagar impuestos;

•el pago de impuestos consolidaría unsentido de propiedad sobre la tierra;

•muchas pequeñas propiedadescampesinas generan un producto con unalto valor (por ejemplo las plantaciones decoca del Chapare y las de hortalizas en losvalles bajos de Cochabamba).

Por consiguiente, el pequeño propietariotambién debería pagar impuestos.Naturalmente, el costo de cobrar el impuestopuede ser alto. Pero si existen 2 500 000pequeñas propiedades y cada una pagasetan sólo 10 dólares EE.UU. al año, se podríanrecaudar por lo menos 25 millones dedólares, una cifra no despreciable. Losmunicipios podrían encargarse de unarecaudación que podría realizarse duranteun mes al año, para reducir al mínimo elcosto de recolección del impuesto.

Por otra parte, se debería considerar que elpago de impuestos sobre la tierra podríareforzar el sentido de ciudadanía, aspectoextremadamente deseable en un país dondelos campesinos e indígenas sufrensegregaciones de distinta índole.

6 Véanse, por ejemplo, los DS 23582 (territorio mosetén),23500 (territorio weeynayek), 23109 (territorio chiquitano),23109 (territorio yuki o biá), 23110 (territorio mosetén chimáno Pilón-Lajas), 23108 (territorio aaraona), 22610 (territorioIsiboro-Sécure), 22609 (territorio Sirionó) y 22611 (territorioindígena multiétnico y territorio indígena chimán).


La ley favorece la depredación de losrecursos naturales. La ley establece quelas comunidades campesinas e indígenaspodrán beneficiarse de dotaciones de tierras,es decir de entregas de tierra en formagratuita. Los particulares que deseen obtenertierras podrán adjudicárselas mediante unpago al Estado (Art. 42). Este mecanismo esredistributivo: entrega tierras gratuitamente alos pobres y las cobra a los pudientes; pero elaspecto negativo de la dotación es que es unpoderoso incentivo para la ineficiencia y parala destrucción de los bosques.

En efecto, una comunidad determinada (dealtiplano o valles) tendrá dos opciones:intensificar el uso de la tierra que ya posee(invirtiendo más, introduciendo innovacionesde tecnología, siendo más eficiente7 en el usode su recurso), o bien pedirle al Estado que leentregue nuevas tierras. Se sabe que lastierras agrícolas en el altiplano y en los vallespasan por períodos de barbecho sumamentelargos; la capacidad de carga de los pastizalesya ha sido excedida; las prácticas de manejode ganado son inadecuadas; hay pocainversión en insumos variables, y la adopciónde tecnología es mínima: es decir que elproductor es muy ineficiente. Al comparar losrendimientos por superficie en contextosagroecológicos similares, se observará que uncampesino peruano o ecuatoriano es máseficiente que un campesino boliviano.

Como la dotación de tierras será gratuita, elproductor dispondrá de una nueva parcelaen la que podrá empezar otra vez, aunque nohaya hecho todos los esfuerzos necesariospara incrementar la eficiencia en las laboresde la parcela que ya posee. En virtud de ladotación de tierras, el productor tendrá laoportunidad de «repetir» su ineficiencia en unnuevo contexto.

Además de financiar la ineficiencia, ladotación de tierras constituye una gran

amenaza para los bosques, especialmente lostropicales. Es preciso reconocer que no haytierras agrícolas para distribuir, a no ser queel Estado las expropie y que revierta grandescantidades de tierras a los medianos ygrandes propietarios, lo cual no pareceposible. Las tierras que han recibido losactuales medianos y grandes propietarios noson de vocación agrícola; las que sedistribuirán mediante dotación estaránnormalmente situadas en bosques o cerca deellos. Quienes se beneficien con lasdotaciones aplicarán de inmediato el sistemade roza, corta y quema, que acelerará el ritmode la deforestación.

La ley ha previsto que no se dotará detierras a individuos sino a comunidades,pero los efectos negativos finales de estasentregas serán los mismos, ya que lascomunidades redistribuirán la tierra entresus miembros. Donde hubiere superposicióno conflicto de derechos, prevalecerá elderecho de propiedad agrícola y ganadero(o de la comunidad campesina o pueblo)sobre las concesiones, contratos oautorizaciones de aprovechamiento forestal(Disp. Fin. II). Si se considera que estasuperposición de derechos se generalizará encasi todo el país, se advertirá que la ley INRApone los bosques bolivianos a merced de lasmotosierras de los campesinos e indígenas,anulando los esfuerzos de conservación quese han hecho gracias a otras leyes.

Cuando se pretende financiar la ineficienciay la destrucción del bosque, es preciso decirque no debe haber más dotaciones de tierras,ni en beneficio de comunidades ni departiculares. Quien quiera tener tierras debepagar por ellas. La tierra es un factor escaso,no un bien infinito, y su precio debe reflejartodos sus costos de oportunidad. Los preciosreales del factor obligarán a los compradores ainvertir e introducir innovaciones tecnológicaspara obtener un beneficio; en cambio, laaplicación de bajos precios a la tierraequivaldrá al uso de subsidios.

La ley limita las inversiones extranjerasen la agricultura. La ley establece severaslimitaciones a las inversiones extranjeras:

7 Por «eficiencia» se entiende en este contexto la situacióneconómica óptima en la cual el productor utiliza un insumohasta lograr su máximo rendimiento marginal; el nivel en que latasa de sustitución de los insumos es igual a la relación inversade los precios; y la posición que el productor ocupa en la«frontera de producción», de forma que la tasa de sustitución desus productos sea también igual a la relación inversa de susprecios.


•Según la constitución, los extranjeros nopodrán poseer tierras dentro de los 50 kmde las fronteras (Art. 46).

•Los extranjeros no podrán ser dotadoscon tierras (a título gratuito) ni recibirlaspor adjudicación (a título oneroso). (Sinembargo, la ley permite a quien harecibido tierras a título gratuito su venta aterceros –extranjeros o nacionales–, con locual la renta de la tierra, en lugar dequedar en manos del Estado, quedará enmanos de un privado [Art. 46, inc. III].)

•Para tener derecho a adquirir tierras, losextranjeros deberán residir en el país (sison personas naturales) o estarhabilitados para realizar actividadesagropecuarias (si son personas jurídicas)(Art. 46, inc. IV). (Sin embargo, ellegislador no define lo que se ha deentender por «estar habilitado».)

•Los bolivianos pueden suscribir contratos«de riesgo compartido» con extranjeros,excepto si éstos provienen de paíseslimítrofes (Art. 46, inc. II). (En otraspalabras, la ley autoriza a estipular uncontrato con un danés o un tibetano, perono con un peruano o un argentino, conquienes la asociación sería más lógica8.)Además, al boliviano le está prohibidotransferir o arrendar tierras a extranjeros,bajo sanción de nulidad y reversión.

Estas medidas, que descansan en unconcepto bastante mezquino de la soberanía,limitan inmensamente tanto las inversionesexternas como las internas. Imponen un grancosto de oportunidad en términos de empleo eingresos perdidos y limitan la generalización denuevas tecnologías. Cabría preguntarse cuálhabría sido, por ejemplo, el desarrollo de laagricultura y ganadería argentinas si, hacia1930, se hubiera prohibido a los extranjeros lainversión en las tierras de la pampa húmeda.

La ley genera un aparato burocráticoextenso, complicado, de funcionessobrepuestas y potencialmenteineficiente. El proyecto desarrolla el ServicioNacional de Reforma Agraria (SNRA), cuyacreación está prevista en la ConstituciónPolítica del Estado (Art. 175). La ley estableceque el Servicio estará formado por elPresidente de la República, el Ministerio deDesarrollo Sostenible y Medio Ambiente(MDSMA), la Comisión Agraria Nacional(CAN), el Instituto Nacional de ReformaAgraria (INRA) y la Superintendencia Agraria(Art. 6).

Los defectos principales de la ley enmateria burocrática son los siguientes:

i) En los años cincuenta y sesenta, laimplantación de la reforma agraria había sidomotivo para que el Presidente jugase unpapel en el asunto de las tierras, y quefirmase títulos: era este un hecho económico,legal, político y simbólico. Pero en laactualidad, ¿qué sentido tiene perpetuar esafunción? La ley, en lugar de mantenerinvariable el papel del Presidente o dereducirlo, lo amplía (CPE, Art. 96): ademásde presidir el SNRA y de otorgar títulos, elPresidente deberá aprobar y supervisarpolíticas, designar autoridades, dictarresoluciones supremas y ejercer otrasfunciones menores. El mandatario deberápor consiguiente firmar documentos sin tenerun conocimiento suficiente acerca de losasuntos a los que éstos se refieren.

ii) Los varios organismos que forman elSNRA tienen funciones superpuestas oreplicadas, lo cual es inaceptable desde elpunto de vista de la organización y de losmétodos. Las replicaciones más visibles sonlas siguientes:

•El MDSMA clasifica las tierras; laSuperintendencia Agraria, por su parte,lleva un registro informático sobre uso delsuelo. Ambas tareas son básicamenteidénticas (cabe suponer que el MDSMAusará sistemas de informacióngeográficos).

•El MDSMA dicta normas sobre el uso delsuelo; la Superintendencia Agraria adopta

8 El legislador no deja en claro qué se entiende por contrato«de riesgo compartido». Este concepto ha sido desarrollado paraampliar la escala de los grandes negocios en funcionamientoque requieren un capital de operaciones adicional y cuyasoperaciones pueden ser divididas, generalmente en acciones opor cuotas-parte de capital.


medidas precautorias para evitar el maluso del suelo. Ambas funciones son casianálogas; empero sería importanteestablecer una diferenciación efectivaentre un órgano normativo y un órganofiscalizador.

•El INRA expropia tierras y laSuperintendencia Agraria las revierte.¿Cuál es la diferencia efectiva entre ambasfunciones y la razón de que éstas tenganlugar en dos instituciones diferentes?

•Tanto la CAN como el INRA proponenpolíticas para asentamientos humanos.

•Cuatro funciones de la CAN a nivelnacional se repiten en las de las CAN anivel departamental: ejercer control sobreel abandono de tierras, recibir y canalizarpeticiones, coordinar y concertaractuaciones con otras instituciones, yproponer nombres de directores.

iii) En la CAN participan el Gobierno, losempresarios privados, los pequeñospropietarios y los grupos étnicos. La CAN«proyecta y propone políticas de distribucióny agrupamiento de tierras». Supuestamente,la CAN tendrá una función de concertación, yen su ámbito se encontrarán las fuerzassociales y el Estado para entablarnegociaciones sobre el asunto de la tierra yproponer políticas. Sin embargo, se ignoraque las presiones sociales se ejercen porotras vías: en la práctica, la CAN será unaestructura obstruccionista.

iv) Las prefecturas y los municipios, dosorganizaciones que podrían jugar un papelclave en relación con la planificación del usode la tierra, no han sido incorporadas en lagestión de las tierras.

De lo anterior se desprende que el aparatoa crear es sumamente grande, sus funcionesno están bien distribuidas y en buena partese repiten. Se trata, por lo tanto, de unesquema ineficiente. De acuerdo con uncriterio moderno, lo esencial es que haya unadistinción clara entre el organismo queelabora una norma, el que la aplica, el quefiscaliza su cumplimiento y el que administrajusticia. Este criterio no es respetado por laley, que por el contrario crea una estructuraen la que la duplicación de funciones esabundante, y en la que la CAN y el Presidente

de la República sobran totalmente. Además,no se debería dejar de considerar el costoque supondrá el mantenimiento de todo esteaparato: una razón más para cobrarimpuestos a todos los propietarios de tierras.

La ley consolida una cuestionablejudicatura agraria independiente. La leydesarrolla la judicatura agraria fundándose enun mandato de la CPE (Art. 176) que estableceque «no corresponde a la justicia ordinariarevisar, modificar y menos anular lasdecisiones de la judicatura agraria, cuyos fallosconstituyen verdades jurídicas comprobadas,inamovibles y definitivas». Es interesante notarque la CPE no ordena la creación de lajudicatura agraria como un órgano separadode la justicia ordinaria. En cambio, en la ley seha decidido crear la Judicatura Agraria comoun aparato independiente.

Cualquiera que haya sido el criterio usadopara su establecimiento, la judicatura agrariano debería ser una entidad separada. Conanáloga lógica se podría fundamentar lacreación de otras judicaturas (minera,petrolera, de la educación, del sectorinformal, etc.). Una judicatura deberíasimplemente fortalecer el poder judicial,creando tribunales especiales. Sin duda, elloobligaría a modificar la constitución,procedimiento que no debería desecharse.

La ley propone un difícil saneamiento dela propiedad de la tierra. La ley introduceel saneamiento de la propiedad, proceso quedebería perfeccionar los derechospropietarios sobre la tierra. Sin embargo,dichos derechos no serán perfeccionados entodo el país y en las mismas condiciones. Enla práctica, el saneamiento será sólo unordenamiento administrativo, el cualconsistirá en el ordenamiento simple (el quese haga a pedido de parte en áreas nocatastrales o de oficio); en el ordenamientointegrado al catastro legal (CAT-SAN), y en elordenamiento que se haga en tierrascomunitarias de origen (SAN-TCO) (Art. 69).Las comunidades y pueblos indígenasparticiparán en el saneamiento (Art. 72).Es preciso hacer las siguientesobservaciones:


•Debería existir un solo tipo de catastro,con independencia del tipo de propietario.

•Los propietarios (aunque fuerancomunidades o pueblos indígenas) nodeberían ser partícipes del catastro. Siéste tiene por objeto aclarar los derechosde propiedad, lo menos que se podríaexigir es que las partes conserven sucondición de tales y no ejerzan tambiéncomo dirimidores.

•Sería conveniente elevar los títulosejecutoriales actualmente existentes alrango de títulos de propiedad plenos, queconfieren un derecho de propiedadabsoluto. Si existieran conflictos, lospropietarios o pretendidos propietariostendrían que resolver sus diferenciasmediante la justicia o la compra y venta.

CONCLUSIONESSe ha intentado hacer en este artículo unbalance de los aspectos positivos y negativosmás importantes de la ley INRA. ¿Es esta ley,como se pretende, una segunda reformaagraria? Los argumentos presentadosparecieran indicar que no lo es.

Por un lado, la ley pone un límite a laconcentración de las tierras en las grandespropiedades, mejora parcialmente laadministración del recurso tierra y laaplicación de la justicia: estos son méritosindudables.

Por otro, la ley impedirá la constituciónplena de un mercado de tierras en todo elpaís, obstaculizará la formación de unmercado de capitales, frenará el desarrollo dela agricultura tradicional, rebajará el preciode la tierra produciendo una demandaexcesiva, incentivará la ineficiencia en laszonas agrícolas tradicionales, fomentará ladestrucción de los bosques, limitará lasinversiones extranjeras, y generará unaparato burocrático complicado ypotencialmente ineficiente.

El desarrollo rural y el desarrollo de lossectores agrícola, ganadero, pesquero yforestal es una necesidad urgente. Unprerrequisito clave es el buen funcionamientodel mercado de tierras y la adopción de unalegislación moderna. Ambas cosas sonposibles sustituyendo la ley INRA por otra ley

que corrija sus falencias, pero que mantengalas limitaciones impuestas por la CPE. Por lotanto, primero habría que modificar la CPE, yluego promulgar una nueva ley.

Estas acciones implicarían necesariamentela ruptura definitiva con una visiónromántica del campesinado y del mundoétnico. En el estado actual de desarrollo deBolivia, ya existen las condiciones para queesa ruptura sea posible.


La réforme agraire en Chine rurale depuisla moitié des années 80

Cet article analyse les principaux aspects de la réforme agraire en Chine rurale depuis la moitiédes années 80. Il explique le système chinois actuel de responsabilité du ménage en insistantnotamment sur ses faiblesses institutionnelles, et expose les hypothèses quant à la nature et à ladirection d’une réforme agraire plus poussée avancées par les économistes chinois. L’articleanalyse en particulier quatre modèles de réforme représentatifs et expérimentaux mis en œuvredepuis cette période. Enfin, des leçons sont tirées du passé en vue de façonner la réforme à courtet à moyen termes.

Reforma agraria en la China rural desde mediadosde los años ochenta

En el presente artículo se examinan los principales aspectos de la reforma agraria en la Chinarural desde mediados de los años ochenta. Se expone el sistema actual de responsabilidadfamiliar de China, describiendo sobre todo su debilidad institucional, así como los debatesteóricos sobre el carácter y las orientaciones de la ulterior reforma agraria entre los economistaschinos. Se analizan en particular cuatro modelos representativos de reforma experimental desdemediados de los años sesenta, ilustrando sus comienzos, funciones y resultados primarios. Porúltimo, se extraen algunas enseñanzas del pasado para definir la reforma futura a corto y medioplazo.


Land reform in rural China since themid-1980s1

Fu Chen

Professor, Deputy Dean, College of Economics and Trade, South China Agricultural University, Guangzhou, China

John Davis

Director and Research Fellow, Centre for Rural Studies, Queen’s University of Belfast, United Kingdom

This article reviews the major issues of land reform in rural China since the mid-1980s. Argumentsare provided on China’s current household responsibility system, mainly focusing on itsinstitutional weaknesses. The theoretical debates on the nature and directions of further landreform among Chinese economists are also discussed. The paper particularly examines fourrepresentative experimental reform models put in place since the mid-1980s, illustrating theirbeginnings, functions and primary performance. Finally, some lessons are drawn from the past toshape the reform in the short- to medium-term future.

reform in rural China since the mid-1980sand in particular examines four experimentalreform models. Given China’s huge size andits diversity in natural endowment andeconomic development, it is very difficult tocarry out an inclusive study. Thus this paperrestricts the analysis to some of the mainissues and cases to shed light on the currentapproaches. As institutional innovation isbeing driven by the weaknesses of theexisting agrarian system, an overview of thecurrent household responsibility system isgiven, focusing mainly on its institutionalweaknesses. Bringing about further reformsis bound to be a difficult and contentioustask. The range of ideas and suggestions hasbeen extensive. As theoretical studiesgenerally precede changes in practice, asection examines the debates andcontroversy on the nature and directions ofagrarian reform among Chinese economists.This is followed by an analysis of fourrecently initiated local reform cases which, inthe authors’ view, represent the mainapproaches to China’s agrarian reform sincethe mid-1980s. The paper concludes with adiscussion of the lessons from past reformsthat might help to shape future measures.

Land reforms are currently being pursued insocialist countries as well as in theindependent States of the former Soviet Unionand Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).However, the reforms differ from country tocountry. Typically, China’s land reform hasconcentrated on land use rights reform, whilein the former Soviet Union and CEE countriesfarmland privatization has generally been seenas a crucial component in economictransition. Although abundant literature dealswith agrarian restructuring in the formerSoviet Union and CEE countries (e.g. Csaki,1990; Csaki and Lerman, 1994, 1996;Brooks and Lerman, 1993, 1994, 1995),comparatively little has been published aboutthe reform taking place in China, particularlyin the past decade. By any standard, there aremany good reasons for watching closely overChina’s farmland reform.

This article reviews the major issues of land

1 The authors would like to thank the British Council forfinancial support for the link between the College of Economicsand Trade of South China Agricultural University and theCentre for Rural Studies of the Queen’s University of Belfast.They thank Dr Gina Gilbreath of the Centre for Rural Studiesfor her very helpful comments on an earlier draft. Any errors oromissions are solely the responsibility of the authors.


LIMITATIONS OF THE HOUSEHOLD RESPONSIBILITYSYSTEMLand reform has characterized rural Chinasince the founding of the People’s Republic in1949; there have been three major farmlandreforms. First came a radical farmlandrevolution in the early 1950s. Byexpropriating land from landlords anddistributing it to landless peasants, Chinaachieved the goal of tillers having their ownland – the dream of Chinese farmers forthousands of years – and created a stratumof private smallholders. Like other socialistcountries, China shaped its farmland policyfrom the well-known model of the SovietUnion, which was characterized by collectiveownership and unified collective operation.

To reach this target, China carried out itssecond land reform, a campaign ofcollectivization in the mid-1950s. During theprocess individual farmers were compelled tojoin collectives. The collectivization finallydeveloped an institution called the People’sCommune. With centrally controlled propertyrights and a misapplied egalitarian principleof distribution, the communes destroyedfarmers’ operational freedom and theirenthusiasm for production. Much literatureillustrates the poor performance of thecommune system (e.g. Stavis, 1982; Lin,1982; Lin, 1987; Chen, 1994).

At the end of the 1970s China launched aneconomic reform, pioneered by rural reform.China broke with the Soviet doctrine,introducing a family-based contract system,the so-called household responsibilitysystem. Since then, household responsibilityhas been the nationwide statutory pattern ofagricultural land tenure.2 Honoured as thethird land revolution in China, the householdresponsibility system has proved a greatsuccess. There is no doubt that the systemgenerates incentives for production by giving

farmers freedom of land use rights anddecision-making, linking rewards closely withtheir performance. As a result, China’sagriculture has been dramatically revived.After 30 years of stagnation, growth inagricultural output in the first half of the1980s accelerated to a rate several times theprevious long-term average. Between 1978and 1984, output of the three main crops,namely grain, cotton and oil-bearing crops,increased at annual rates of 4.8 percent,7.7 percent and 13.8 percent, respectively,compared with the average rates of increaseof 2.4 percent, 1.0 percent and 0.8 percentper year from 1952 to 1978 (State StatisticalBureau, People’s Republic of China, 1985).Production of grain, the most importantfarming product of the country, reached apeak of 407 million tonnes in 1984, whichrepresented a net increase of more than 100million tonnes within only six years. Thefundamental problem of feeding the giantpopulation, which had been a great pressurein China for several centuries, was basicallysolved. However, a big drop in grain outputwas witnessed in 1985, 6 percent off theprevious year, followed by stagnation untilthe 1990s. It appeared that the householdresponsibility system had exhausted itsbenefits, although clearly neither thedramatic growth in the first half of the 1980snor the stagnation in the second half was thesole result of land institutional reform.However, it did have an important role,alongside, for example, real grain pricechanges.

Although the household responsibilitysystem was a great success, as aninstitutional innovation it could not addresseverything. Several years of practice haveexposed a number of limitations andweaknesses inherent in the system. First, tinyand fragmented farming units emerged asfarmland was distributed to individualhouseholds that would farm it independently.The principle of land distribution was deriveddirectly from collective ownership. Farmlandin a village was owned by all of its memberscollectively. As a result, every member hadequal claim on land property rights, and thenorm for distributing land was based on the

2 While the household responsibility system has been adopted inmost rural areas since reform, about 7 000 villages (teams)(0.2 percent of all villages in China) remain in collective-runfarms, accounting for 0.3 percent of total cultivated land. Inaddition, 21 000 villages (teams) have leased farmland to carryout group-based farming while adopting the householdresponsibility system (Ministry of Agriculture of China, 1991,1993, 1996).


size of the peasant family. Given theabundant population and limited land, theamount distributed to each household wasvery small. Moreover, farmland differed fromparcel to parcel in terms of soil fertility,irrigation conditions, location and so forth. Ahousehold had to obtain parcels from each ofthe grades. Thus, the total was not onlyinsufficient but also fragmented andscattered around villages. Large areas ofcultivated land were wasted in the form ofpaths and boundaries separatinghouseholds’ holdings. A survey conducted bythe Chinese Ministry of Agriculture indicatedthat in 1986, among 7 983 sample villagesfrom 29 provinces, average cultivated areaper household was 0.466 ha (7 mu),3

fragmented into 5.85 plots, each plot onaverage 0.08 ha (1.2 mu) (Ministry ofAgriculture of China, 1993) (see Table 1).This fragmented structure of family farminghas remained largely unchanged and hasarrested the possibilities of using relativelyadvanced mechanical equipment andagricultural infrastructures.

Second, farmers were shortsighted inaction. According to the system, a person’seligibility for land depended only on his orher villager status, no matter when this wasobtained. On the one hand, babies andvillagers’ newly married spouses from othervillages were all eligible claimants, havingequal rights to share equal amounts of land;on the other, when a villager died, his or herright would automatically disappear. Aspopulation increased, villages had to readjustthe distribution structure, which furthersubdivided the farmland.4 The endlessredistribution of farmland resulted in manyproblems:

•the situation of a small and fragmentedfarming structure further deteriorated;

•worried about the risk of losing their landas well as investment, farmers had no

incentives to improve land conservationand agricultural infrastructure – irrigatedland, one of the most importantcomponents of agricultural infrastructurein China, remained almost unchangedduring the 1980s;

•farmers overexploited the soil to pursueshort-term returns;

•the process of land redistribution itselfwas costly, requiring much labour andtime in organization and implementation.

Third, farmland was generally poorlyendowed with the necessary human capital.Under the household responsibility system,egalitarianism was generally the leadingprinciple guiding land distribution, with littleconsideration given to interfamily differencessuch as labour capability, education andindividual preference.5 As a result, somelarge households with a limited labour forcecould have too much land to work, whileother smaller households, particularly thosespecialized in agriculture, could haveinsufficient land for full employment. Thiskind of problem was much worse in areasexperiencing rapid rural industrialization andurbanization. In these areas there was ageneral deterioration in the agriculturallabour force as the most able workers tended

3 15 mu = 1 ha.4 According to a survey conducted by the Chinese Ministry ofAgriculture, since the implementation of the householdresponsibility system in 1978, 65.2 percent of China’s villagesreadjusted households’ land – 37.1 percent once, 19.8 percenttwice and 8.3 percent three times. The main reason waspopulation growth (Kong, 1993).

TABLE 1

Area and fragmentation of household land

Year Cultivated area Number of plots Average sizeper household per household per plot

(ha) (ha)

1986 0.446 5.85 0.080

1988 0.466 5.67 0.078

1990 0.420 5.52 0.076

1992 0.466 3.16 0.148

Source: Ministry of Agriculture of China, 1993.

5 There were generally four methods for distributing household-responsibility land: on the basis of the total number of peoplewithin a village; on the basis of the available labour force ofindividual households within the village; by combining thepreceding two methods, whereby a fixed proportion ofhousehold-responsibility land was assigned according to thetotal population while the remainder was allotted on the basisof labour; and by assigning land to a specialized team or group.A survey conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture indicated thatthese different methods were used in 69.4, 4.4, 25 and 1.2percent of 253 sample villages, respectively (Kong, 1993). Thusland was distributed mainly on the basis of household size.


to leave the villages. Adding to the problemwas the fact that those finding off-farm workdid not renounce their right to farm butretained a part-time involvement. Many didnot give priority to cultivation and at timeseven let the land lie idle. Thus, the scarcestresource was underutilized.6

To sum up, the household responsibilitysystem maintained egalitarianism but wasless successful in terms of economicefficiency. As for the unsolved problems, thenegative aspects of the householdresponsibility system will inevitably becomemore and more of a constraint on the furtherdevelopment of China’s agriculture. Chinafaces a challenge once again.

THEORETICAL DEBATE ON FURTHER REFORMAs early as the mid-1980s, when thehousehold responsibility system began toexhibit the above-mentioned problems,China started to pursue new measures toimprove its agrarian institutions under a callfor a second stage of rural reform. During theprocess, different and even divergent ideasand suggestions have emerged. The debatebetween contrasting viewpoints exertsconsiderable influence, not only on theevolution of the theories themselves, but alsoon reforms in practice.

In the early stages, discussions mainlyfocused on whether collective ownershipshould be maintained and what form ofproperty rights could be adopted. Twodivergent ideas drew much academicattention. One group of economistsadvocated farmland nationalization. Theircentral idea was that State ownership offarmland with individual lifelong possession

could be the best solution. They argued thatcollective ownership of farmland did not existin practice in rural China: rural collectivesnever had exclusive property rights on landunder the so-called collective system. Duringthe commune era, collectives were prohibitedfrom selling the land they owned (except tothe State) or from buying land from otherowners. Farm products could only be sold toState commercial institutions atadministratively low prices; thus farmerswere denied the right to benefit from farming.Farmers’ land use rights such as productiondecisions were also weakened by the rigidState procurement system. Under thehousehold responsibility system, farmers stillfailed to have complete rights on land. Theylacked the right to transfer their contractland, and their rights to use and benefit fromthe land were further weakened byadministrative interference and continuedState procurement. As a result of theseinfringements of property rights, the Statewas the real landowner – the biggest landlordin rural China (Din and Cheng, 1994). Theseeconomists argued that if public ownershipwas a kind of dogma, it would be better toabandon the name “collective” and instituteState ownership instead, in order to live up tothe letter and spirit of the system. Throughnationalization of farmland, farmers would begranted permanent land use rights. Theycould buy, sell, mortgage and bequeath theirrights. Although peasants would not belandowners, lifelong tenancy in effect couldbe as efficient as owner cultivation (Din andCheng, 1994).

Although these arguments are persuasive,the idea of farmland nationalization was notseen as likely to find public acceptance. Thefirst objection of opponents was financial.They asked if the State would need to pay toeffect the transfer of land. Although theownership of collective farmland isambiguous, it was unlikely that the Statecould get the land free; it would have to payat least part of the price. The governmentwould then have to consider social andpolitical risks. An agreement to pay wouldentail financial embarrassment. In addition,opponents wondered whether the State would

6 In theory, land mobility and regrouping could be achievedthrough land marketing. However, in the absence of the properlegislation and mechanisms for land mobility, few land transferstook place. A survey indicated that in 1990, 2.09 millionhouseholds subcontracted 0.425 million hectares of farmland,representing only 1 percent of households and 0.44 percent offarmland under the household responsibility system. During theensuing years there were only small changes. In 1992, thefigures were 4.73 million households and 0.769 million hectaresof land (2.3 and 0.9 percent, respectively), and in 1994 thefigures decreased to 2.38 million households and 0.63 millionhectares of farmland (Ministry of Agriculture of China, 1991,1993, 1996).


be able to manage farmland as well ascollectives do. Some economists bitterlycriticized the idea of land nationalization asintending a return to the abolished communesystem; others viewed it as a kind of quasi-private ownership. Given the strongobjections, farmland nationalization isunlikely to be put into practice.

A second group of economists was willingto accept the critique of collective ownership;however, instead of farmland nationalization,they advocated individual ownership. Theyargued that only under individual farmlandownership would it be possible to overcomethe above problems. To defend themselvesagainst criticism for advocating privatization,they tried to find theoretical support. Theyargued, by the theory of Karl Marx, thefounder of socialist thought, that socialismwould rebuild the society on the basis ofsocialized individual ownership. Accordingly,some took the view that the vital differencebetween socialism and capitalism is whetherthe main production means are owned by allindividuals or by a small number ofindividuals – the former case being socialism.They argued for a break with the theoreticaldoctrine that socialist ownership could onlybe through State and collective ownership (Liand Li, 1989; Lin, 1989).

The idea of farmland individualization waspresented as a rebellion against tradition andorthodox theory. However, it is likely to bevery problematic in practice. Beyond itscurrent political impossibility, severalobjections need to be answered. First, thequestion of whether individualizedlandownership is really a new concept ofsocialism or rather capitalism by anothername is a source of much controversy; thereis certainly no consensus on this point, andmany would disagree with the above-mentioned “modern” interpretation ofsocialist ownership. Second, mosteconomists do not consider landindividualization or privatization anappropriate solution to existing landproblems in China. Bearing in mind theChinese historical experience, they argue thatunder private ownership land fragmentationcould be further worsened. Third, although

the private sector was eliminated immediatelyby decree, its re-creation would require verycareful consideration and planning: hastytransition would entail social and economicrisks. The unfortunate problems encounteredin rapid agrarian privatization in thecountries of the former Soviet Union andEastern Europe are well documented(Nikonov, 1992; Novoselov et al., 1993;Brooks and Lerman, 1995; Peters, 1995).Moreover, a 1991 survey indicated thatChinese peasants did not show muchenthusiasm for land privatization (Xia, 1992).Only 13.5 percent of the sampled peasantsagreed with the idea, 79 percent expressed anegative attitude, and the remainder did notspecify their ideas (Table 2). The reasonmight be that for several centuries mostChinese peasants greatly suffered from a lackof land. They may wish to avoid the perceivedrisks associated with privatization. However,there is probably also a feeling ofambivalence: they prefer at the moment toopt for a collective form of ownershipalthough they are unhappy with aspects ofthe current system. There is clearly a need fora more up-to-date review of peasants’attitudes on this issue.

As the theoretical debate developed, a thirdgroup of Chinese economists took the viewthat it was more feasible to improve land userights than to change ownership of land. Theyargued that both approaches, i.e.nationalization and individualization, werestill strongly trammelled by the previousdoctrine where the concept of ownership wasoverstressed and taken as the sole key pointof property rights. Following modern theory

TABLE 2

Peasants’ attitudes towards land privatization

Village income Agree with land privatization?level

Yes No Unknown

(%)

Lowest 23.1 73.1 3.8

Lower 9.6 86.5 3.9

Middle 12.8 79.1 8.1

Higher 13.3 77.9 8.8

Highest 13.9 74.4 11.7

All villages 13.5 79.0 7.5

Source: Xia, 1992.


they believed that ownership was, on thecontrary, just one of the components ofproperty rights. Other components includethe rights to consume, to obtain income fromand to alienate assets (Barzel, 1989). Thepurpose of property rights is to defineinterests and obligations among participantssharing an asset. Without the clarification ofproperty rights, participants could shoulderburdens for others and this could generateproblems such as moral hazard and freeriders. According to the theory of propertyrights, the ownership of land in rural China isclear, but the property rights of farmers arevery incomplete. Land is owned by farmerscollectively rather than individually, but theland use right is granted to farmers asindividuals. In theory, farmers should havean exclusive use right which should meanthe freedom to consume, to obtain incomefrom and to alienate the use right at their will.In practice, however, farmers’ land use rightsare insufficient. Their rights to consume andto obtain income from land are weakened bythe State procurement system and distortedprices. Furthermore, farmers are prohibitedfrom transferring their land use rights. Thesedrawbacks, in combination with the problemof frequent land redistribution, lead farmersto feel that they are only nominal owners. Asa result of the ambiguous status of land userights, farmers’ incentives to take care of theirland are considerably weakened. In addition,as land use rights are not tradable, it isdifficult for land markets to develop. Thus,the problem of land fragmentation remainshighly intractable. If there is no possibility ofchanging landownership, there exists,nevertheless, vast scope for improving theland use rights system. At present, therefore,the most important thing is to clarify farmers’property rights so as to foster theirproduction incentives and prevent furtherfarmland fragmentation.

From the above brief review, it is clear thatChinese economists all agree about the needfor further clarification of land propertyrights, but they hold different views on howthis should be done. In the absence of auniversally accepted approach, recent landreform initiatives have been guided mainly by

the ideas of the third group of economists,which are seen to be less socially andpolitically risky and more easily accepted bythe central government. Under the principleof adhering to collective ownership offarmland and reforming land use rights, thegovernment has issued a number of policiesand measures. For instance, in 1983,households were allowed to exchange theirlabour with others and to employ limitedamounts of labour for farm work. For thepurpose of providing better incentives for soilconservation and investment, leaseholdswere extended to 15 years in 1984, and thento 30 years in 1995. In the late 1980s, ruralhouseholds engaged in non-farm businesswere allowed to sublease their land to othervillagers in order to prevent land from beingleft idle. Meanwhile the central governmentalso encouraged more flexible measures to becarried out at the local level. Experimentalland reform models were initiated in selectedlocations of various provinces in the mid- tolate 1980s. Thus, China is actively pursuingappropriate models to guide further landreforms.

NEW MODELS AND RUDIMENTARY ACHIEVEMENTSAs the preceding analysis has shown,frequent readjustment of household-responsibility land has been creating bigproblems because of further fragmentation offarmland and the shortsighted behaviour offarmers. The policy-makers’ hope of basicallystable, small adjustments was based on thestrong desire to stop or slow down thefragmentation; however, the outcome inpractice has been an entire redistributionand in a structural sense has been totallynegative. The redistribution proved verydifficult to prevent because of thefundamental importance of land forsubsistence agriculture and for avoidingstarvation among the growing population inrural areas. Nevertheless, solutions are beingsought with urgency. Different regions havereacted to their own sets of economicpossibilities in a variety of ways, utilizingdifferent organizational forms anddevelopment strategies to meet their differentneeds and priorities. The government has


conducted experimental reforms in selecteddistricts to encourage localities to try differentmethods. This section examines four newmodels of land reform adopted since the mid-1980s. Most of these reforms have beencarried out in the experimental districts andtherefore have had considerable nationalimpact on the land reform process.

Meitan: fixed responsibility farmland within a contracttermLocated in northern Guizhou, Meitan is acounty with a rural economy typical of theprovince (Li and Din, 1994; Meitan RuralReform District Office, 1994). About 93percent of its population of 400 000 isengaged in agriculture. Meitan is ratherpoorly endowed with farmland. In 1987 thetotal 30 000 ha of cultivated land occupiedonly 17 percent of the territory; per caputcultivated land was a mere 0.087 ha. In theprocess of implementing the householdresponsibility system, land fragmentationemerged as a big problem because ofpopulation growth and land redistribution.The level of fragmentation was very high.According to a survey, the averagehousehold’s cultivated land was divided into15 plots, with the largest 0.13 ha and thesmallest 0.005 ha. In one extreme case, apeasant householder with seven familymembers had 128 plots of farmland. Theboundaries and paths between plotsoccupied nearly 12 percent of active landarea in the county. The fragmentation hadbecome so intolerable that farmers expresseda strong desire to stop land redistribution.

The initial local government response wasto make another distribution and then to fixthe structure for 20 years. However, mostpeasants disagreed with this idea. Aninvestigation among 510 peasant householdsshowed that 64.7 percent wanted to stopredistribution at once. Therefore, a localpolicy, extending the tenure term to 20 years(originally 15 years) and fixing contract landwithin this period irrespective of births ordeaths of household members, was initiatedin December 1987. After careful trial in twovillages the policy was extended to all ruralareas of the county. Following adoption of the

policy, farmers were granted inheritancerights on their land and the ability toexchange land with one another, to subrent,to pool land and to mortgage for credit.Meanwhile, the local government encouragedhouseholds to farm wasteland and to developsmall family businesses such as processingand animal breeding, and surplus labourwas encouraged to find work outsideagriculture.

Several years after adoption of the policysome rudimentary effects can be seen. First,most local farmers have welcomed the policy.According to an investigation, only 10 percentof households asked for land readjustment;they complained that the original landdistribution in the early 1980s had beenunfair, rather than the policy itself. Second,farmers had greater incentives for landinvestment and conservation. By 1993,100 000 ha of new land were developed(average 0.03 ha per caput), whichrepresented one-third of the per caputfarmland of the county in 1978. Land fertilitygrades were advanced and farmers increasedtheir purchases of fixed means of production.Third, land fragmentation was to a largeextent brought under control. In 1991, thearea occupied by paths and boundariesbetween plots was almost the same as it hadbeen in 1987. Land subdivision now tookplace mainly within households as childrenmatured, instead of being redistributedamong the households of a village. Inaddition, farmers’ attitudes towardsincreasing family size changed. TraditionalChinese culture equates more children withmore happiness. However, under the newland system, as new babies are not able toget land during the contract term, 41.4percent of the sampled households showed anegative attitude towards having morechildren.

In 1993, the policy of fixing contract landwas formally legislated as the provincial landmanagement law and applied in all ruralareas of the province. In 1995, when theChinese Government issued the new landpolicy, in advance of the first 15 years’ tenurecoming due, Meitan’s experiment wasincluded in the central government


document. Although the document justsuggests that appropriate villages shouldconsider the policy, its inclusion shows thatafter eight years of experimentation in a smalllocal county, the policy of fixing land isgradually becoming integrated into nationalinstitutional arrangements. This is indeed asignificant change.

Pingdu: a two-land systemThe strong desire in China for social equity inland matters may limit the applicability of thefixed land system in national terms. Analternative which seeks greater economicefficiency while attempting to maintain adegree of social equity is the so-called two-land system. The system originated inPingdu, a county-level city in ShandongProvince.

Pingdu is an area where cultivated landand collective economic infrastructure wererelatively well developed in the People’sCommune era. After adoption of thehousehold responsibility system, Pingdu wasconfronted with a growing number of issuesthat were difficult for individual farmhouseholds to handle. These includedencouragement of the use of advancedagricultural machinery and equipment andthe continuing development of agriculturalinfrastructure in order to improve productionconditions and expand output.

In 1984, Pingdu adopted the two-landsystem on a trial basis. The total cultivatedland in a village was divided into two parts:food land (kouliang tian in Chinese) andcontract land (chenbao tian). The two kinds ofland have different functions: food land is forfamily consumption and contract land forcommercial farming. All households havetheir own food land and can choose whetheror not to take contract land. Usually, part-time farmers only take charge of food land forsubsistence production; they also pay taxes,including the State agricultural tax.Households which also take contract landhave an obligation to fulfil governmentprocurement quotas and pay taxes. However,they can sell their surplus production in thefree market. This incentive enhances theirenthusiasm for production on contract land.

The key feature of the two-land system isdivision according to usage. As food land isto guarantee peasants’ living essentials, it isdistributed relatively evenly or equitably. InPingdu, it is distributed on the basis ofhousehold size and average grainconsumption. The norm reflects localconditions: 225 kg of grain per caput perannum for basic food consumption; 400 kgof grain per household per annum for animalfeed (normally two pigs and ten chickens perhousehold); and 20 kg of grain per mu of land(0.067 ha) for seed planting. A total of 350 kgof grain is estimated to be needed by eachperson. Given the local grain yield average of650 to 700 kg per mu, at least 0.5 mu (0.033ha) farmland should be granted to eachperson as food land.

As to contract land, the main concern inallocation is efficiency. Farmers bidcompetitively for this land. The bid price inPingdu normally reflects obligations towardsgovernment procurement and the collectiveas well as land tax (approximately 4 yuanrenminbi7 per mu of land). Bid prices differdepending on the grades of land. In 1988, theprice range per mu per annum in Pingdu was53 to 71 yuan (US$6.36 to $8.52), whichtypically represented 30 to 40 percent ofannual net income per mu of farmland.However, allocation of contract land is notdecided only based on price. Someintervention is still judged to be necessary toprevent excessive competition betweenfarmers resulting from the scarcity of thefarmland resource and limited employmentopportunities outside agriculture. Usually alimit on cultivated area of between 5 and15 mu (0.33 to 1 ha) per labour unit isimposed, depending on the land endowmentof the locality.

To encourage larger-scale operation and toavoid fragmentation, contract land is offeredin relatively large parcels, usually between 20and 30 mu (1.33 to 2 ha), depending mainlyon locality and land quality. Householdgroup bidding is strongly encouraged in orderto promote cooperative activity. The land is

7 1 yuan renminbi = US$0.12.


normally allocated for five years and thecontract cannot be changed within this term.However, during the term the relativeamounts of food and contract land can bealtered if changes in household size takeplace. If a household increases in size, thevillage will reduce its contract land area or,alternatively, its procurement obligations soas to increase the capacity for subsistenceproduction. If a size reduction occurs theprocess operates in reverse. Thus, thefrequency of changes in the level of activecontract farming land per household isreduced.

After only a relatively few years of operationthe two-land system has achieved someencouraging results. First, the previouslyeven allocation of land among householdshas changed considerably. Some 30 percentof 120 households surveyed in 11 villageshad increased their land areas, 50 percent ofthese by as much as 5 mu (0.33 ha) (Jiang,Chen and Jia, 1994). Just over 9 percent ofhouseholds cultivated only food land usingfemale labour; as a result, male workers wereable to concentrate on non-agriculturalbusiness. Agricultural performance wasalso much improved. Total grain outputincreased from 795 000 tonnes in 1987 to1.041 million tonnes in 1994. Grain yield perunit of land increased by 32.4 percent. Atpresent, Pingdu ranks tenth in grain outputamong 2 200 counties and county-level citiesin China.

In the short period since Pingdu adopted it,the two-land system has developed from acouple of village experiments to nationwidepractice. By the early 1990s it had become anationally accepted and popular form ofagrarian institutional innovation. Table 3shows the main results of a series of surveysconducted by the Ministry of Agriculture. In1990, there were 1.19 million villages and37 million hectares of farmland under thetwo-land system in one form or another,accounting for 26.9 percent of China’s totalvillages and 38.2 percent of total cultivatedland where the household responsibilitysystem was implemented. In 1992, the two-land system peaked at 1.7 million villagesand 39.3 million hectares of farmland, 32.3

percent of total villages and 44 percent oftotal cultivated land. By 1994, the percentageof villages under the two-land system haddecreased slightly, to 31.5 percent, but theland area had increased to 47.8 percent(Ministry of Agriculture of China, 1991, 1993,1996).

Why has the two-land system achievedsuch success in a relatively short time? Themost plausible explanation is that byseparating the household’s land into two thenew system institutes a workable means ofpreserving social equity while at the sametime allowing the pursuit of greater efficiency.

Shunyi: collective farmIn the above two cases, individual farming,the core of the household responsibilitysystem, remained largely unchanged.However, as was shown earlier, althoughindividual farming succeeded in stimulatingfarmers’ production incentives, it led to landfragmentation. Reconsolidation of farmingland has thus been regarded as one of thegoals for further reform currently underdiscussion. Perhaps surprisingly, collectivefarms reappeared in some rural areas closeto urban centres and some coastal provincesof China in the late 1980s. Considerableconcern was raised, even among Westernscholars (e.g. Reisch and Vermeer, 1992),that this development could signal a returnto the People’s Commune system.

Shunyi, a suburb county northwest ofBeijing, is one location of such collectivefarms. According to a 1994 survey, collectivefarms in Shunyi county occupied 62.8percent of total cultivated land, about 9.7 haper employee (Luo and Zhang, 1995). A very

TABLE 3

Development of the two-land system in China a

Region Number of villages Area(tens of thousands) (million ha)

1990 1992 1994 1990 1992 1994

National 119.2 170.0 117.7 37 39 42

East 58.8 115.8 n.a.b 15 15 14

Central 27.8 30.4 n.a. 16 19 20

West 32.6 23.8 n.a. 5 5 7

a Excludes Tibet.b Not available.Source: Ministry of Agriculture of China, 1991, 1993, 1996.


important factor in the successfulestablishment of these collectives was therelatively high level of rural industrialization.Shunyi’s location near a major consumptioncentre meant that it was blessed with manymarketing channels, many means oftransportation and advanced communicationfacilities. The area also had developed strongnon-agricultural rural enterprises, and manyrural people sought employment in townshipenterprises: 60 percent of the rural work forcehad abandoned farming. Part-time farminghad become the mainstream. Farmers hadgradually lost enthusiasm for farming as thecontribution of agriculture to householdincome declined. The problems of agriculturein the area are demonstrated by the fact thatthe annual growth rate of grain output was6.4 percent from 1978 to 1984 but fell to1.2 percent from 1984 to 1986 (Luo andZhang, 1995). Most part-time farmers evenwanted to return their entire land entitlementto the village cooperatives.

In response to farmers’ requests, collectivefarms were introduced in 1986 to achieve amore optimum-scale operation. However, theoperation of these collective farms issignificantly different from that in the People’sCommune era. Normally, the village providesagricultural machinery and is responsible fordeveloping infrastructure. Collective farmsare titled as the farming enterprises of thevillage with which they have signed acontract. The collective farms operateindependently. The employees of the farmsearn wages rather than the working points ofthe old commune system. After completingthe contract, which usually includes fulfillingState procurement quotas and an offering tothe cooperative, collective farms distributepart of their surplus as a bonus to employeesaccording to their performance; theremainder, as the farm’s profits, is set asideas a common accumulation fund. Those whoreturned their land use rights to the villagesare given the privilege of purchasing grain atlower prices for their own consumption.

Apparently, the collective farm is subjectedto a system of collective responsibility ratherthan an individual household contractsystem. Since the collective farm is registered

as an enterprise of the village, it is possiblefor the village to transfer some profits fromnon-agricultural enterprises to the collectivefarm. The effects of this kind of operation arecontroversial. On the one hand, agriculturalinfrastructure is rapidly improved by thefinancial support from non-agriculturalenterprises; on the other, as productivity isalso benefited by the improved infrastructure,the collective farm may be encouragedtowards free-ride behaviour. This problemwas common under the old commune systemand casts a shadow on the collective farms’future operations.

Available evidence suggests that there havebeen some major achievements in theperformance of collective farms in Shunyi.Although the total grain output and the yieldper unit of land increased modestly between1986 and 1994, grain output per agriculturalworker grew dramatically – eightfold – duringthe same period. Agricultural productivityhas been improved significantly by rapidfarming mechanization from ploughing toharvesting on the collective farms.Surprisingly, employees of collective farmscurrently earn higher incomes than part-timefarmers employed by township enterprises.The internal accumulation of the collectivefarms reached 60 million yuan in the fiveyears from 1987 to 1992 (RIDA, 1995).

Nanhai: a farmland shareholding cooperative systemThe Shunyi-style system is not the onlycollective model to re-emerge: there are othervariants of this model throughout ruralChina. However, the farmland shareholdingcooperative system has emerged as acompletely different type of collective and hasaroused strong interest. So far, it is confinedto the Pearl River Delta area of GuangdongProvince. The farmland shareholdingcooperative system was initiated at the end of1992 on an experimental basis in Xiabai, anadministrative-level village of the county-levelcity of Nanhai. Nanhai has emerged as one ofthe major growth areas in China over the pasttwo decades; it is well known as one of theso-called “four tigers” in the area because ofits rapid industrialization and urbanization.(The other three “tigers” are Zhongshan,


Dongguan and Shunde.) In the process ofrapid development, land reform emerged asan issue of great importance for two mainreasons.

First, reform was necessary to improveagricultural performance. While rapid ruralindustrialization was achieved, agriculturehad gone into decline. Increasingly, rurallabour, particularly young educated workers,found employment in non-agriculturalsectors, and agriculture suffered through lossof human capital. Workers that shifted tonon-agricultural sectors still kept theirhousehold-responsibility farmland becauseof the perceived risks associated with losingland property rights. Therefore, farming inmost villages was mainly undertaken by theelderly, females and even children.Agricultural development became an urgentissue as it was recognized that social andeconomic modernization could not besustained without agricultural development.

Second, it was necessary to develop acomprehensive land use planning system.The process of rapid rural industrializationand urbanization led to the conversion of agreat deal of land to non-agricultural uses.The rational use of land resources becamemore and more important. There were verydifficult conflicts. On the one hand it wasconsidered necessary to preserve agriculturalland, but on the other, the strategy ofpromoting rural industrialization andurbanization (called “leaving the land but notthe countryside, entering the factory but notthe city”) led to excessive growth in thenumber of small factories and towns and toenormous waste of scarce land (for a detaileddiscussion see Fu, 1995). There was a needfor land utilization to be reorganized, but itwas not clear who the responsible authorityshould be. Rural land was in the hands ofnatural villages, the basic unit in rural China,but the natural village was too small tomanage it effectively. The administrativevillage, a higher-level rural organization, hadthe capacity but was not the landowner. In anattempt to resolve the conflicts, the farmlandshareholding cooperative system, a kind ofland-as-stock system, was initiated.

In the farmland shareholding cooperative

system the first step is valuation of thefarmland. Currently, in the absence of astandard approach, three valuation methodsmay be applied: one based on the the pricespaid by government for land conversion; onebased on the net incomes of land afterdeducting input costs; and a mixture of thefirst two methods (Nanhai Rural ReformDistrict Office, 1994). Although the methodsare imprecise, this has not hindered theimplementation of the system.

The key aspect of the system is thedistribution of land shares to individualpeasants. Cooperative membership serves asthe main criterion for share entitlement. Ageis an additional consideration; children arenormally entitled to half shares. Farmersreceive their shares – paper entitlements –without any payments. When land shares areallocated, there is no actual distribution ofphysical plots. Furthermore, the sharescannot normally be withdrawn or transferred(although in some cases the shares can betransferred to the next generation). Afterreceiving land shares, farmers return theirland use right to the natural village to whichthey belong. The natural village then offersthe land entitlement to the administrativevillage to which it belongs. The administrativevillage is now in charge of land use. Usuallyan agricultural company subordinated to theadministrative village will be founded, whichbecomes responsible for agricultural land.The land is contracted to individual specialistfarmers or farming teams based on a biddingprocess. In practice, most peasants do notbid to farm the land. However, as they areland shareholders they are able to sharedividends and also to promote their ideas atshareholder meetings.

The farmland shareholding cooperativesystem is still in the early experimental stage,yet the effects are encouraging. Within onlythree years the system was introduced toalmost all villages in Nanhai and other ruralparts of the Pearl River Delta area, and it hasbeen welcomed by the local people.Agriculture is much improved. Introducingthe system has made large-scale farmingpossible. By 1993, the cultivated area perlabour unit in Nanhai had increased to


7.6 ha, ten times more than before the systemwas introduced (RIDA, 1995). In Xiabai, thebirthplace of the system, grain productionhas been contracted to a group of 30 farmers.They manage the farm independently andprovide the main source of grain for localconsumption.

Administrative villages have madecomprehensive land use plans, takingaccount of the needs of the three main landuse areas, namely agriculture, industry andcity construction. Thus it is likely that landuse will be organized in a more rational andefficient manner. In the long term, moreover,the emergence of the land shareholdingsystem may act as a catalyst for ruralindustrialization and urbanization because ofmore efficient use of land and labour.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONSAlthough it is clear that China has beenmaking substantial progress with landreform, the pace has been somewhat slowerthan expected. All the new approachesremain in the experimental stages and nomature national model has emerged. At thisstage in the process it is difficult to judge themodels’ performance relative to one anotheror to conclude which one might be moreeffective. However, four tentative conclusionscan be drawn about the experiences to date;these insights should be valuable for steeringthe reforms in the short- to medium-termfuture.

Land reform in China has emerged as adifficult issue of trade-off between socialequality or equity8 and economicefficiency. It seems apparent that landreform in China since the mid-1980s hasbeen caught in this dilemma: where socialequality or equity considerations predominate,

economic efficiency has been held back. Forexample, the fixed responsibility land inMeitan can only be maintained for onecontract term (20 years); after that,redistribution of land cannot be avoided. Theland shares distribution in Nanhai alsoillustrates the trade-off, with land sharesallocated equally and the relative contributionof labour to the collective largely ignored.

The two-land system, probably the mostsuitable for many rural areas in China as it isless restricted by local conditions, has notrealized its potential. Recently, the speed ofimplementation of the two-land system hasslowed down substantially. A key factor hasbeen that it is more difficult to pursue efficiencyunder the system than was hoped. In the caseof Pingdu, the small-scale farming structureremained largely unchanged after adoption ofthe two-land system. Originally, the contractland was intended for development of larger-scale commercial farming. However, in practice,contract land was leased to households largelybased on family size, much as under thehousehold responsibility system. Table 4shows that nationally, since the early 1990swhen the two-land system was adopted, morethan 60 percent of total contract land insampled villages has been leased on the basisof household size, around 30 percent on thebasis of household labour and only 6 to7 percent through bidding competition, theapproach most likely to secure a relativelyefficient scale of commercial farming. Thus, thesystem has not given people much newexperience.

In looking closely at the situation, animportant lesson might be learned. Currently,the goals of equality or equity are stilloutstandingly important. Thus, an effectivereform strategy in China in the currentenvironment must satisfy these criteria andthen seek efficiency incrementally. Otherwise,it is unlikely that any reform approach orprocess can succeed.

The clarification of land property rightshas proved to be still at an early stage.So far farmers have had insufficient propertyrights. For example, in the cases of Meitanand Pingdu, farmers’ land property rights are

8An important distinction can be made between equality(egalitarianism) and equity. The former is concerned primarilywith the humanity of individuals and upholds their right to ashare in resources and rewards based entirely on their humancondition regardless of their contribution to social andeconomic progress. The latter is concerned more with thecontributions that individuals make to progress; this is theprimary basis on which their share in resources and rewards isto be based.


still unstable. As the contract termprogresses to the due date there will be greatuncertainty among farmers and anexpectation of loss of productive capacity.This will tend to perpetuate the problem ofunderinvestment in land and fixed assets. Inthe case of Nanhai, the land shares are reallyjust paper entitlements, which lack the realattributes of shares in a joint stock company.In particular, farmers cannot getcompensation for their shares even when theymove to a city and are no longer active intheir village. This lack of incentive tends tomake farmers reluctant to leave their village.Thus, surplus agricultural labour continuesto grow in villages, slowing down the progressof rural industrialization and urbanization.

As the inadequacy of property rightshinders the reform process, furtherclarification of farmers’ land rights willundoubtedly be a key issue. However, thisarea is still very controversial. Study isurgently needed on the nature and extent ofland property rights that should be granted tofarmers and protected. Otherwise, it is likelythat the reform process will continue to befrustrated and may well stall.

This issue also raises questions about therole of central and local governments. To datethe central government has tended to standback and leave decisions to the localauthorities. However, the latter are calling fora clear general statement of policy; therewould seem to be some justification for thisposition, as the issues are clearly offundamental national importance.

The implementation of land reforms inChina has reflected and will continue toreflect the diversity of local conditions. Inthe early 1980s, the household responsibility

system emerged as the dominant nationalinstitution in rural China. By contrast, thedeepening of the reform process since themid-1980s has reflected much more thediversity of local conditions andcircumstances, and no universal model hasemerged. As the local conditions are hard tochange, reform will continue to reflectdiversity, at least in the medium term.Indeed, to ignore local conditions and needswould delay and even distort the process ofstructural change in the countryside.

It seems clear that the most successfulreforms have taken place where there hasbeen a clear understanding of local specificityand no excessive reliance on an imposedimported model. In addition, particularattention must be paid in the future to theprevention of unnecessary administrativeinterference and excessive rent-seekingbehaviour. There have been instances wherereform has been used as a vehicle fordifferent goals. For example, it is reportedthat the two-land system was heavilydistorted in some places; the introduction ofthe system served as a means of levying highcharges for contract land, and as a resultcontracts were disrupted and some farmerslost half their original land. The consequencehas been a change in farmers’ attitudes to thetwo-land system, from one of welcome to oneof rejection (Ministry of Agriculture of China,1996).

Successful further land reforms in Chinadepend on the creation of a dynamicenvironment. Apart from the dilemmabetween equity and efficiency alluded toabove, it is clear that the appropriateness ofparticular models and the pace of landreforms to a great extent depend on the stateof overall development of the rural economy,and particularly non-agricultural industry.For example, it is reported that in somecoastal areas of China, the two-land systemis developing towards a one-land system;local farmers are said to be abandoning theirfood land completely and this land is beingtilled by farms organized by villages (People’sDaily, 1996). However, as has been notedearlier, the Shunyi-style collective farms have

TABLE 4

Basis for leasing contract land under the two-landsystem (%)

Year Household size Household labour Bidding

1990 64.0 29.9 6.1

1992 60.9 33.2 5.9

1994 68.0 25.0 7.0

Source: Ministry of Agriculture of China, 1993, 1996.


encountered problems as well concerningproperty rights relations between the farmsand the collectives, and thus there are clearproblems in moving towards recognition forthis model.

Nanhai’s farmland shareholding cooperativesystem seems less in dispute. The system wasinitiated against a background of rapid ruralindustrialization, where either the farmerswanted to abandon farming or local villageshad considerable financial capability tosupport agriculture. As it is to be expectedthat in the next few decades rural China willbecome more and more industrialized, it maybe legitimate to ask whether this system, or afurther development of it, has the potential tobecome more popular or even adopted as anational model.

Thus, it is possible to envisage a ruralreform strategy with two main strands. Onewill be to ensure that the dynamic structuralchanges in the wider rural economy, andparticularly rural industrialization, aremaintained or quickened and more widelydistributed. The other will be to deepen theland shareholding cooperative experimentwith a view to improving the system, especiallyin the area of property rights of farmers.

Of course, agricultural policy and agrarianinstitutional innovation are not independentof one another. So far, the government hasbeen slow to develop or deepen institutionalinnovations in other areas in support of landreform. For example, market signals aredistorted, with the result that farmers’production incentives are weakened. Thedevelopment of a land market, which wouldfacilitate structural consolidation amongfragmented small farms, has been hamperedby the lack of political will to introduceeffective land rights legislation. Under suchan unfavourable policy environment, it isunrealistic to expect great achievements fromfurther land reforms in isolation.

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