aristotle philo of science

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Marjorie Grene, Aristotle's Philosophy of Science and Aristotle's BiologyAuthor(s): James G. Lennox

Source: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association,Vol. 1984, Volume Two: Symposia and Invited Papers (1984), pp. 365-377Published by: The University of Chicago Presson behalf of the Philosophy of Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/192515.

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Marjorie Grene, Aristotle's Philosophy of Science and Aristotle'sBiologyJames G. Lennox

University of Pittsburgh

1. IntroductionDuring a period stretching from the publication of the PhoenixBooks edition A Portrait of Aristotle in the early 1960's throughthe appearance of a number of papers in the mid-1970's, MarjorieGrene turned her attention to the relevance of Aristotle'sbiological interests to his overall philosophy, and to therelevance of that philosophy to contemporary philosophy ofbiology.A Portrait of Aristotle was one among the influences whichturned me, as an undergraduate, toward Aristotle and his biology.As I re-read Professor Grene's work on Aristotle in the summerof1984, a number of key themes emerged which are relevant to herown views about the nature of biological science.1) Throughout, there is a concern for contemporary biology'sambivalence toward teleology, and a realization, not only of itscentrality to Aristotle's biology, but to its sensibly empiricalstatus there. (1963, pp. 133-152; 1972, pp. 79-87; 1964, pp.172-179; 1974c, pp. 238-239).2) The place of intelligent, trained perception as thefoundation of biological science is insisted upon, and again shefinds in Aristotle's philosophy of science the attitude of akindred spirit. In her work on Aristotle this emerges in herclaim that the apparently mysterious notions of 'the-being-what-it-is' and form (eidos) simply reflect the trained fieldnaturalist's awareness of the world as a place populated byindividuals of various kinds--a world full of information, so tospeak. (1963, pp. 34, 37, 154-155, 205, 208, 229, 242; 1972, pp.88-89, 98, 103; 1974b, p. 124).3) Finally, in Aristotle's insistence on the theoretical and

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366methodological autonomy of each science--in particular, zoology--based on subject specific principles and concepts, Marjorie findsa clear-headed refusal to be tempted by either ontological ortheoretical reductionism. (1963, pp. 85-96; 1972, pp. 90-94,103-104).

Underlying all these themes is recognition of the specialplace of living, and of living things, in Aristotle's philosophy.When Professor Grene reminds us that Aristotle is 'themetaphysician of life', she has something quite concrete in mind.Twice in Metaphysics Z. Aristotle insists that organisms areparadigmatic substances, more so than artifacts, or the organs,tissues and underlying materials that constitute them. Inbiological science, life is not something to be explained, butwhat explains everything else. Bios, the organized andcoordinated activities that make up an organism's world, standsat the explanatory center of the biology. If you want tounderstand the peculiar constellation of organs, tissues andbehaviors that make up a dolphin, find out where it lives, whatit eats, how it reproduces, how it cools itself, how it feeds itsyoung, and so on. What we would term ethology is at thefoundation of biology for Aristotle, in much the way thatevolutionists like to think evolutionary biology is today.Understanding how things work and their ultimate materialconstitution is worthwhile only within a theory that explains whyit is good that they work and are constituted thus. The crucialquestion, for Aristotle as (arguably) for us is--what (if any)adaptive role does this structure or this bit of behavior play inthe life of a creature of this sort in this particular ecologicalsetting.

I wish to explore these themes primarily in Professor Grene'sAristotelian studies, but with a steady eye on how these reflect,and are reflected in, her own concerns about the foundations ofbiology.2. Teleology

Aristotle is infamous, or famous, depending on one'sviewpoint, for insisting that organic behavior, organicdevelopment and organic structure are all explicable by referenceto what each is for. They are explicable in other, compatible,ways as well. As we read in A Portrait of Aristotle, hisexpression 'that for the sake of which' corresponds closely tothe biological concept of function (1963, p. 133).A number of contemporary philosophers and biologists,following in Darwin's footprints, have insisted that the theory

of evolution by natural selection provides the theoreticalmachinery for teleological explanation as well. Yet, whileallowing for teleological explanations in areas of biologydominated by the concepts of a 'code' or 'program' whichrepresents a goal and directs biochemical reactions accordingly,Professor Grene has been skeptical of the validity of selection

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367teleology .

Professor Grene acknowledges that the selectionist account ofteleological explanation is based on the idea that certain traitsare adaptations, i.e., are selected for, and that their beingadaptations, i.e., their being relatively more advantageous totheir possessors than alternative forms of the same traitexplains either their spread through a population and/or theirmaintenance in a population. This, she has insisted, is notenough. . . .if adaptations are for no specifiable end exceptsurvival, one keeps falling back into a universal necessity whichis in turn reducible to the same old tautology (that the fittest,i.e., the animals which survive, survive). (1972, p. 87).

The assumption which lies in the background of thisskepticism is that the aim of the student of adaptation is toexplain evolutionary changes or trends by reference to a goal.When, however, such interactions are summed up, for longperiods, in algebraic formulation, the results, neatly ordered,present apparent trends and thus once more give the appearance ofteleology... . (1972, p. 86).I have, for years, missed Professor Grene's point. It wasn'tuntil I heard a hard line reductionist insist that only ifevolutionary changes evidenced some obvious orthogenic principle

would the theory of evolution meet even necessary conditions forbeing teleological, did I see fully what Professor Grene wasdriving at. She sees adaptation, as defined by evolutionists, asan achievement of populations.But I think this need not be where selectionists locateteleological explanations. Rather, it is in the domain offunctional explanations of anatomical or biochemical structures,or of bits of behavior, that there is a role for teleology, asone of the other participants in this symposium has recently beenarguing.The study of adaptation does not answer questions concerning,i.e., does not provide explanations of, the 'history' ofphylogenetic trends; rather it seeks to explain such things aswhy, given a certain set of environmental problems orconstraints, a hummingbird in a particular environment has aspecific beak or coloration. That is, hypotheses areconstructed about the relative value (here not in the algebraicsense) for an organism with a life of a certain sort ('in a givenniche') of a certain (variant of a) feature, elaborate studiesbeing required to test various competing hypotheses. There is nosuggestion in all this that an evolutionary change from

population P1 to a future population P2 is explained bypostulating that the features present in P2 and lacking in P1were the end for which the change took place. True, underlyingsuch 'adaptive design' reasoning is an assumption aboutevolutionary history: that some features of organisms areproducts of selection forces. But as Robert Brandon insists,



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368while the questions, 'How did this trait emerge and become rootedin a gene pool,' and 'For what (or 'why') do the members of thisspecies or variety have this trait?' are compatible, and evenrelated, this does not imply they are the same question or thatone is a disguised version of the other. If a trait variant isof higher fitness value than its alternatives to the organismswhich possess it, it may be continuously selected because of itsvalue. To put it in a more neutral language; the presence of acertain trait variant within a species may be explained in partby indicating its contribution to the relative fitness of itspossessors.

And here I find, rhetoric aside, an Aristotelian theme in theevolutionary program. Aristotle is among those philosophers ofscience who insist that there are as many explanations for asubject as there are irreducibly different questions about it(Physics II. 3; Posterior Analytics II.1).

Aristotle is no evolutionist. But he is an adaptationist, andinsists that an answer to the question 'For the sake of what?'identifies some of the facts responsible for, 4and thus relevantto explaining, certain biological explananda. 'Why do all theviviparous quadrupeds have an epiglottis?' 'In order to preventfood entering the windpipe and lungs.' 'Why do all the crookedtaloned birds also have hooked beaks?' 'In order to allow themto capture and eat their natural prey.'6These explanations do not take the place of ones explaininghow the part in question develops or what sort of materials theyare made from--nor are they reducible to them. (Cf. Gotthelf1976; Balme 1986; Cooper 1982). They specify the adaptive roleof the trait in the lifestyle, 'bios', the organized activities,of the animal group under investigation.

There is no principle of 'selection' in Aristotle, such asought to underwrite the adaptive design explanations so hotlydebated today. He simply insists that organisms appear to be,and to come to be, as well adapted as the possibilities allow:as he repeatedly insists, nature doesn't produce at random butthe best for each kind of being, given the possibilities. - Todisplay the ergon, the adaptive function, the what it is for, ofa particular feature; to show that an organism's overall life--its nutritive, reproductive, refrigerative, locomotive orperceptive activities--are served by a feature, is to give onefundamental reason why the organism in question has just thatfeature in just that way. Aristotle is not committed toexplaining every trait in terms of adaptive value, nor does heargue that this is the only legitimate explanation for such atrait. But as David Balme (1980) has shown, an animal's eidos orform is arrived at by determining which of its features isteleologically required: For an eye is for the sake ofsomething, but its being blue is not, unless this feature is aproperty of the kind. (De Generatione AnimaliumV 778a33-34).The color of a structure is not necessarily an incidental feature



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369of the organism--it may be part of what makes it that sort ofanimal. We determine that by determining whether the blueness ofthe snow leopard's eyes (say) plays a functional role in itslife.I find Aristotle's insistence on the centrality of answering'what for' questions in biological science a clear point ofcontact between his outlook and our own. Prof. Grene, holdingthat there is no modern analogue to Aristotle's concept ofbiological form, does not. It is, then, precisely theAristotelian concept of form, or some modern analogue thereof,which is lacking in the modern concept of adaptation, or better,of the organism as a pure aggregate of adaptive mechanisms.(1972, p. 87). If I understand her, I think this identifies amost important cleavage between the techniques of the populationgeneticist and the student of adaptation as an ecologicalphenomenon. The traditional techniques of population geneticsmodel a population in such a way that the individuals of apopulation are viewed as aggregates of more or less randomassortments of discrete traits represented by the previousgeneration; or worse, classify popu8ations abstractly as if theyconsisted of single loci effects. Even should the adaptivefunction of a trait be under consideration, it is only byimplication that the organism's overall pattern of living istaken into account in the adaptational explanation. ProfessorGrene thus reminds us of a clear and present danger that a usefulheuristic for statistically modelling the elements of a processwill carry us away from the field naturalist's, the ethologist's,or the evolutionary ecologist's experience of the complex,organized life-in-a-niche that is the real world of selection andadaptation. Which brings us to the second Aristotelian themewhich I find Professor Grene returning to time and again.3. Science, perception and form

Marjorie Grene has, on at least three occasions, returned tothe role of the concept of eidos in Aristotle's thought, and itsbiological roots. Tradition translates eidos as 'form' indiscussions of substances as unities of matter and form, and as'species' in many discussions when eide are contrasted with theirgenos, traditionally rendered 'genus'. In a paper I still findbreathtaking in scope, one delivered originally at the 1976Princeton Colloquium on Aristotle's Biology, Professor Grenesearches for the unity in the concept in these two apparentlydifferent roles. She rejects a recently popular way outsuggested by Aristotle's soietime identification of genos andhule ('genus' and 'matter'). Her work circles so closely towhat I now see as a workable solution (provided recently by ayoung French scholar, Pierre Pellegrin (1982)) that, as I rereadthis paper I found myself coaxing and cajoling the argument undermy breath. The suggested solution, not my chief concern here, isto treat the genos-eidos distinction as highly abstract,equivalent (roughly) to 'kind', 'form of a kind', where thismeans nothing more than 'unity/differences within the unity'.



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370Thus the language of 'kind' and 'form' is applicable within anycategory and can be applied at any taxonomic level. This latterfact explains David Balme's data (which Professor Grene was amongthe first to take seriously) that genos and eidos can refer tothe same animal group and to nearly any level of generality, andthat groups as extensive and heterogeneous as 'the waterdwellers' or as restricted as a local variety of cicada can becalled a genos (Cf., Balme 1962, 1975). Pellegrin insists thatthe relative pair genos/eidos, when taken as 'unity/variety ofthat unity', is univocal throughout the Aristotelian corpus.Professor Grene agrees: .. . we can apply our what-is-itquestion within a given category at a number of levels ofparticularity and generality. In this context we can use theconcepts of genos and eidos relatively to one another in anycategory. (1974b, p.121). This remark seems to anticipatePellegrin's argument. Indeed, she goes on to give an examplefrom the Topics and another from the biology to make the point ofhow widely applicable this genos/eidos pair is.

Why does she resist such a unified solution? Because, sheinsists, it is unAristotelian. Aristotle likes to approachproblems from a variety of perspectives. Pellegrin has notedthat I approached the same picture of the genos/eidosrelationship via Aristotle's claim that the Senos ismatter (1986, p. 26). Others have stressed Aristotle's view thatthe genos is mere potential, not existing except as one actualform or another. (Balme 1980, pp. 3-4; Furth 1986). ButProfessor Grene cautions us all not to reduce the variety ofAristotelian approaches to one single approach. She cautions usto remember that this is the same Aristotle that refuses to saythere is only one appropriate form of explanation. In principle,at least, these are words of wisdom.

At the close of the above-mentioned paper, Professor Grenehints darkly at her hunch about the unity of Aristotle'sconcept of 'form', to develop which would carry her into thequestion of the ti en einai and the Aristotelian theory ofperception and its role in knowledge. She goes on, DespiteAristotle's anti-evolutionism and despite the deep differencesbetween Aristotelian and modern science, I am confident thatsomehow Aristotle has something to say to us here. (1974b, p.124).In other places this hunch is played on in a number ofinteresting directions (1963, pp. 80-96; 1972, p. 103).Aristotle has a notion of delimited domains of scientificinvestigation in which theoretical accounts of the natures of thekinds in these domains is explanatorily basic. Understanding'what it is to be' for the kinds in a domain will allow us tounderstand why they have their more familiar properties--to useAristotle's phrase, scientific understanding progresses from whatis clearer or more understandable to us or to perception towhat is clearer or more un rstandable in the nature of thingsor without qualification , while explanation accounts for the



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371former by reference to the latter. In a word, he's a realist.

Exploring what something is in zoology leads Aristotle mostoften to going after the details of an animal kind's lifestyle .What is it to be a cetacean? Well, it is to spend all one's timein water, to feed there and thus to need a means of expellingwater when feeding. Strangely enough, it is also to be air-cooled rather than water-cooled. Cetacea also bear live youngunderwater, and get about by swimming rather than by walking,flying, or crawling. . .and so on. Given that being a cetacean(i.e., a cetacean's life) is like that, they will need tohave . . .. Notice that, in biology, the account of a kind'sbeing will at least include those basic functions for the sake ofwhich structures and 'subroutines' exist. That is, what it is tobe X is what it is to live the life of an X. Also notice that,if to specify what it is to be something is to give an account ofits form, Aristotle's concept of form is as level neutral asPellegrin insists. For the cetacea is a very extensive kind.But suppose I wish to explain not a feature common to all cetacea(e.g., a 'spout') but one peculiar to whales, the baleen, forexample. I must now explore the lifestyle, the nature, of thissub-group, this form of life as opposed to that of the dolphins,or porpoises. For, if the baleen is teleologically explicable atall and it does not belong to other cetacea it must be therebecause of the life requirements of the group which has it (e.g.,their way of feeding). Today we might say, in an extensionalistmode, that the search is on for the appropriate reference classrelative to the property to be explained. Aristotle would say--whales have spouts qua cetaceans (thus find explanations forspouts by studying cetacea as a whole class and what is common toall their lives), but these whales have baleens qua whales (thusfind explanations for baleens by studying the natural history ofthe whale).4. Reductionism and the unity of science

The logical strategy just exemplified, which I believeaccounts for the function of the Historia Animalium inAristotle's zoological enterprise, is not peculiar to zoology.It is the strategy recommended in the Posterior Analytics I.5 andII.14-18, and Aristotle's favorite examples of it there are drawnfrom developments in geometry. And the strategy does make contactwith much we would recognize as sound explanatory method. Thereis, that is to say, a preferred Aristotelian way to organize adomain of entities with properties, whatever those entities maybe, so as to gain explanatory understanding why those entitieshave those properties. But the unity of science ends there.Zoology, from first to last, is zoology. We begin, as ProfessorGrene has explained with a prlema about why some kind of animalhas some feature or other. We may decide that it is not,properly speaking that kind (e.g., the whales) that has it, butrather a wider kind ( e.g., the cetacea). And ultimately it isby becoming learned in the ways of cetacea that we understand whythey (all and only the cetacea) have it. If explanation has a



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372preferred direction here, it is, (to return to my opening theme)to account for the parts, the tissues, and ultimately the'chemistry', in ethological and ecological terms.

Marjorie Grene's approach to Aristotle is not thedisinterested approach of the classical scholar. Nor is sheprimarily interested in finding Aristotle in contemporarybiology. Rather her deeply felt concerns for the epistemologicalfoundations of contemporary biology have informed and motivatedher work on Aristotle. The best among theoretical populationgeneticists have sensed the gulf between their models andtechniques and the zoologist's or botanist's experience ofadaptations as integrated around and relative to, a certain kindof organism's life. Professor Grene has been suggesting,sometimes patiently, that the Aristotelian notions of form and'what it is to be' can be resources to draw upon should thebiological theoretician be in search of new directions.

Since she began making these suggestions, new directions havebeen forged, some of them Aristotelian in spirit. But I amdoubtful a careful reading of Aristotle's biology has had much todo with it.1 It is much more likely that Marjorie Grene has notlet biology forget its originator and one of its foremosttheoreticians. She has been the Aristotelian conscience of thescience of life, and it is a better science as a result.5. Postscript--June, 1985

As those present at the PSA session devoted to MarjorieGrene's contribution to the philosophy of science will recognize,the tone of her written comments on my presentation is quitedifferent from that displayed at that session. Nonetheless, thefundamental misunderstandings of Professor Grene's originalresponse remains. The reader will note that more than half ofher remarks are devoted to a brief concluding section of mypaper. In those comments, Professor Grene attributes a motive tome which was never present, and both misreports andmisunderstands me: though when I reflect on it, I'm afraideverything he (Lennox) has said has been meant to bear on thisculminating theme: Aristotle's philosophy of science, if one cancall it that, does he (Lennox) says make contact with much wewould recognize as sound explanatory method. My actual wordswere (and are): The logical strategy exemplified here (theprevious examples), which I believe accounts for the function ofHistoria Animalium in Aristotle's zoological enterprise, is notpeculiar to zoology. It is the strategy recommended in thePosterior Analytics. . . and the strategy does make contact withmuch we would recognize as sound explanatory method. Thisclearly was (and is) a reference to the immediately precedingdiscussion of Aristotle's notion of locating predications at theappropriate level of generality prior to searching for theircausal explanation. It was not a blanket claim about hisphilosophy of science. Thus most of her commentary, whilesalutary for those wishing to read Aristotle ahistorically, has



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373little to do with mydiscussion (or mywork).

What is perhaps more distressing to me, however, is thefailure to comment on the primary focus of my discussion. Thecentrality to Aristotle's metaphysics of living things, thecentral place given to their bios--their active pursuit of life-sustaining and life-generating actions--in his account ofanimals, the careful comparative study of functionaladaptiveness, these were the themes at the core of mydiscussion.And they were ideas to which (judging by the quotes andreferences I provided) Professor Grene would once have beensympathetic.



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374Notes

1Thus Aristotle's regular insistence that, in biologicalsystems, we must always show that what takes place isnecessitated by the materials interacting or being combined asthey are, and why just those materials are combined andinteracting in just that way, i.e., for the sake of what, servingwhat good? Cf. De Partibus Animalium (PA) I.1 642a3O-642b4; II.1646b10-30 for the general program and, as a few examples, PAIII.2 esp. 663b21-64a3; III.3 665a2-25; II.i14 658b2-10.

2Commenting on the significance of Darwin's work, Asa Graywrote: Let us recognize Darwin's great service to NaturalScience in bringing back to it Teleology: so that instead ofMorphology versus Teleology, we shall have Morphology wedded toTeleology. (1874, p. 81). On reading this, Darwin responded:What you say about Teleology pleases me especially, and I do notthink- any one else has ever noticed the point. (letter June 5,1874). On the relationship between selection, adaptation, andteleological explanation, cf. Brandon (1981); Wright (1976);Ayala (1970); Wimsatt (1972). Contra this cf. Mayr (1983). Theone thing about which modern authors are unanimous is thatadaptation is not teleological, but refers to something producedin the past. Unless one defines teleology more narrowly thanmanymodern biologists do, this is clearly false.

3Cf. the discussion of developmental teleology in 1972, pp.77-79, vs. her problems with a selection teleology from pp. 80-87.4Cf. Physica (Ph.) II.3 194b33-195a3, II.7 198a20-21, II.8199a7-8; PA I.1 642a1O-13, a31-33; I.5 645b15-20, 645b28-646a2.5Cf. PA III.3 664a2O-665a9.6PA III.1 662a34-662bl4; IV.12 693b27-694a6.7E.g., PA 658a9, 661b24, De Generatione Animalium (GA) II741b5, 744a3. At GA V 788b20-22 and De Incessu Animalium (IA)704b15 it is said to be an arche of natural investigation whichwe postulate (a hypothesis). At De Juventute (Juv.) 469a28-30,De Respiratione (Resp.) 471b25 and GA V 788b20-22 it is said tobe something we see.8For a clear presentation of the problem with this view, cf.Mayr 1983.9Found in Rorty (1973); Lloyd (1962); Balme (1972); Lennox

(1980); and cf. footnote 10 of (1974b, p. 125).10Cf. Posterior Analytics (Post. An.) I.2 71b33-72a5; Ph., I.1184a16-184bl3; Topica (Top.) VI.4 141a26-142a21; Ethica



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376References

Ayala, F. (1970). Teleological Explanation in Evolutionary Biology.Philosophy of Science 37: 1-15.

Balme, David. (1962). nGues and Eidos in Aristotle's Biology.C_lassical Quarterly N.S. 12: 81-98.------------. (1972). Aristotle's De Partibus Aimalium I and DeGeneratione nimalium I . Oxford: Clarendon Press.---I--------n (1975). Artistotle's Use of Differentia in Zoology.In Articles on Aristotle: Volume I Science. Edited by J. Barnes,M. Schofield, and R. Sorabji. London: Gerald Duckworth and

Company. Pages 183-193.------------. (1980). Aristotle's biology was not essentialist.Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosoohie 62: 1-12.----------?. (1986). Telelogy and Necessity. In PhilosophicalIssues in Aristotle's Biolozv. Edited by A. Gotthelf and J.C.Lennox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (forthcoming.)Brandon, Robert N. (1981). Biological Teleology: Questions andExplanations. Studies in the Histry AndPhilosophv of Science_

12: 91-105.Cooper, John. (1982). Aristotle on Natural Teleology. In Langua.jea,ndLogos. Edited by M. Schofield and M. Nussbaum. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press. Pages 197-222.Darwin, Charles. (1874). Letter to Asa Gray. (As printed in TheALife and Letters of Charles Darwin. Vol. 2. (ed.) FrancisDarwin. NewYork: D. Appleton and Company, 1896. Page 367.)Evans, J.D.G. (1977). Aristotle's Conce2t of Dialectic. Cambridge:Cambridge University Press.Furth, M. (1986). Aristotle's Biological Universe: An Overview.In Philosophical Issues in Aristotle's Biolo&y. Edited by A.Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.(forthcoming.)Gotthelf, Allan. (1976). Aristotles Conception of Final Causality.Review of Metaphvsics 30: 226-2544.Gray, Asa. (1874). Charles Robert Darwin. Nature 10(June 4):79-81.Grene, Marjorie. (1963). A Portrait of Aristotle. Chicago: Univer-sity of Chicago Press.---------------. (1964). Biologr and Teleology. Cambridge Review87: 269-273. (As reprinted in Grene (1974a). Pages 172-179.)



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377---------------. (1972). Aristotle and Modern Biology. Journal ofthe History of Ideas 33: 395-424. (As reprinted in Grene(1974a). Pages 74-107.)---------------. (1974a). The Understandins of Nature. (BostonStudies in the Philosophv of Science, Volume XXIII.) (eds.)Robert S. Cohen and Marx W. Wartofsky. Dordrecht: Reidel.---------------. (1974b). Is Genus to Species as Matter to Form?Aristotle and Taxonomy. In Grene (1974a). Pages 108-126.---------------. (1974c). On the Nature of Natural Necessity. InGrene (1974a). Pages 228-242.Lennox, J.G. (1980). Aristotle on Genera, Species and 'the more andthe less'. Journal of the History of Biolo-v 13: 321-346.Lloyd, A.C. (1962). Genus Species and Ordered Series. PhronAesis 7:67-90.Mayr, E. (1983). How to Carry Out the Adaptationist Program. TheAmerican Naturalist 121: 324-334.Pellegrin, Pierre. (1982). La Classification des Animaux chezAristote. Paris: Societe d'?dition des Belles Lettres .-----------------. (1986). Logical Difference and BiologicalDifference. In PhilosoDhical Issues in Aristotle's BioloRv.Edited by A. Gotthelf and J. Lennox. Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press. (forthcoming.)Rorty, R. (1973). Genus as Matter. In Exegesis and Argument.(Phronesis SuDDlementarv Volume 1.) Edited by E.N. Lee, A.P.D.Mourelatos, and R. Rorty. New York: Humanities Press. Pages393-420.Wimsatt, W.C. (1972). Teleology and the Logical Structure ofFunction Statements. Studies in the History and PhilosoDhv ofScienace 3: 1-80.Wright, Larry. (1976). Teleoloaical Explanation. Berkeley:University of California Press.

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