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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 88383 February 19, 1992

HARRIS SY CHUA, petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and STATE FINANCING CENTER, INC., respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

This a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the respondent appellate court in CA G.R. No. CV-

08546, entitled "State Financing Center, Inc. v. AsiaPhil Timber Corporation, et al.," promulgated onFebruary 22, 1989 reversing the judgment of the trial court which dismissed the complaint for sum of moneyagainst petitioner.

The antecedent facts of this case are as follows:

On September 1, 1983, respondent State Financing Center, Inc. (State Inc. for brevity) filed a complaint for sum of money with the Regional Trial Court of Manila against AsiaPhil Timber Corporation, Johnny Sy PingSing, Delfin S. Lee, Philip Escolin, Lee Chi Uan and petitioner Harris Sy Chua based upon documentsattached to the complaint. These documents are the following:

1) Term Loan Agreement, 2) Promissory note, 3) Comprehensive Surety Agreement dated January 25 and

June 19, 1979, 4) Demand letters, and 5) Statement of outstanding past due account as of August 15, 1983.

On November 24, 1983, the trial court issued an order upon motion of the respondent State Inc. as plaintiff in the case, declaring in default all the defendants including petitioner Harris Sy Chua.

On December 12, 1983, petitioner Chua filed a motion for extension of time within which to file hisresponsive pleading to the complaint, which the trial court granted.

On December 21, 1983, petitioner filed his answer to the complaint with a counterclaim against privaterespondent and cross-claim against his co-defendant AsiaPhil Timber Corporation.

On December 23, 1983, respondent State Inc. filed a reply to petitioner Chua's answer and an answer to thelatter's counterclaim.

On February 2, 1984, after respondent State Inc. had presented its evidence ex parte against all thedefendants including petitioner, the trial court issued an order declaring that with the admission of theevidence adduced by respondent, the case against all the defendants is considered submitted for decision.



On February 23, 1984, petitioner Chua filed an omnibus motion praying that the order declaring him indefault as well as the ex parte proceeding insofar as he is concerned be set aside on the ground that the hefiled his answer within the extended period of time granted by the court.

On March 23, 1984, the trial court, upon petitioner's motion issued an order reconsidering and setting asideboth its order of November 24, 1983 which declared him in default and the ex parte proceeding against him.

On May 4, 1984, the trial court set the case for pre-trial on June 1, 1984. The pre-trial order issued by thecourt on the said date reads as follows:

Upon agreement, and as there is no other matters that could be agreed upon aside fromthose admitted in the pleadings and the personal circumstances, the above-entitled caseis hereby removed from the pre-trial calendar and set for trial on the merits on July 20,1984 at 9:00 o'clock A.M. (p. 77 Records).

On July 20, 1984, upon motion of respondent State Inc., with the petitioner's conformity, the hearing was

reset to another date.

On September 13, 1984, the hearing was again postponed because the witness for the plaintiff was notavailable.

On November 27, 1984, respondent State Inc. filed a formal offer of exhibits in writing, attaching thereto thedocuments enumerated therein. Petitioner filed a written opposition thereto alleging that the documentsoffered in evidence have not been properly presented and identified by any witness during any proceedingbefore the trial court and considering that the ex parte presentation of evidence against him had alreadybeen set aside, there is no more document or testimony that could be taken into account against him.

On March 6, 1985, for failure of petitioner Chua to appear for the presentation of his evidence, the trial court

issued an order considering petitioner as having waived his right to present evidence. Thus, the case wasdeemed submitted for decision based on the evidence on record.

On June 3, 1985, the trial court rendered judgment holding four of the defendants liable to pay respondentState Inc. but dismissing the complaint against petitioner Chua. The dispositive portion of the trial court'sdecision states:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff andagainst the defendants Asiaphil Timber Corporation, Johnny Sy Ping Sing, Delfin S. Leeand Lee Chi Uan, as follows:

1. Ordering said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the principal amount of P722,000.00 plus 21% interest thereon per annum and 1% penalty per month from

August 16, 1983 until fully paid;

2. Ordering said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff, the accrued interest andcharges from June 1, 1981 to August 15, 1983 in the total amount of P512,559.84;

3. Ordering said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the amount of P4,689.72as litigation expenses and other costs of the suit; and



4. Ordering said defendants, jointly and severally to pay plaintiff attorney's fees in theamount of P30,000.00, which the court believes is the reasonable amount.

All other claims and/or counterclaim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit, including the

complaint against defendants Harris Sy Chua and Philip Escolin, against whom noevidence has been presented.

SO ORDERED. (p. 22, Rollo)

Not satisfied with the portion of the decision absolving petitioner Chua from any liability to respondent StateInc., the latter appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On February 22, 1989, respondent appellate court rendered a decision which reversed the ruling of the trialcourt, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff-appellant State

Financing Center, Inc. against the defendant-appellee Harris Sy Chua and the order denying its motion for reconsideration, both appealed from, are hereby REVERSED.

Accordingly, the said defendant-appellee is hereby adjudged liable and ordered to payunto the plaintiff-appellant, jointly and severally with his co-defendants Asiaphil Timber Corporation, Johnny Sy Ping Sing, Delfin S. Lee and Lee Chi Uan, the amounts providedfor in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila Branch III, in Civil Case No. 83-19953, quoted earlier in this decision. Costs against defendant-appellee.

SO ORDERED. (p. 32, Rollo)

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner Chua contends that the respondent appellate court erred in rendering a decision which is notbased on the issues raised in the appeal brief of respondent State Inc. He also argues that the documentaryevidence which were formally offered by private respondent in a written offer of exhibits but which were notproperly identified by any witness during the trial cannot be considered as evidence against petitioner inorder to hold the latter liable to private respondent.

We find the petitioner's contentions devoid of merit.

From the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint against petitioner Chua, respondent State Inc.appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging in its brief that the lower court erred in dismissing the complaint asagainst petitioner Harris Sy Chua for the reason that no evidence has been presented against him. Althoughthe respondent's assigned error of the trial court in its appellant's brief was couched in broad and generalterms, the meaning which respondent intends to convey by its assignment of error is quite clear, that is, thetrial court should have found petitioner Chua liable to respondent because there was evidence which waspresented to prove said liability.

It is an established rule that pleadings should be construed liberally in order that the litigants may haveample opportunity to prove their respective claims and that a possible denial of substantial justice due tolegal technicalities may be avoided (Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. 81957, May 23,1989, 173 SCRA 544). Moreover, issues though not specifically raised in the pleadings in the appellate



court, may, in the interest of justice be properly considered by said court in deciding a case, if they arequestions raised in the trial court and are matters of record having some bearing on the issue submittedwhich the parties failed to raise or the lower court ignored (Tambunting v. Court of Appeals, No. L-48278,November 8, 1988, 167 SCRA 16). It is clear from the decision of the respondent appellate court that the

latter made a discussion on the respondent's assigned error which was allegedly committed by the trialcourt. The appellate court made the following explanation:

The appellee's unexplained denial of the term loan agreement . . . and promissory notes .. . for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief when as a party to them itis within his capacity to know their due execution and authenticity or not is evasive and isinsufficient to constitute an effective denial. Hence, it is to be deemed as an admission.With that and the appellee's admission of the existence and due execution of thecomprehensive surety agreements . . ., there is no need for the appellant to adduceevidence to establish the due execution and authenticity of the term loan agreement,promissory note and comprehensive surety agreement . . . sued upon. . . . (p. 31, Rollo)

Anent petitioner's second contention that respondent State Inc.'s written offer of documentary evidenceshould not have been considered by the respondent appellate court in finding the former liable, We find thatthe same must likewise fail.

Our rule on evidence provides the procedure on how to present documentary evidence before the court, asfollows: firstly, the document should be authenticated and proved in the manner provided in the rules of court; secondly, the document should be identified and marked for identification; and thirdly, it should beformally offered in evidence to the court and shown to the opposing party so that the latter may have anopportunity to object thereon.

The authentication and proof of documents are provided in Sections 20 to 24 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Only private documents require proof of their due execution and authenticity before they can be

received in evidence. This may require the presentation and examination of witnesses to testify on this fact.When there is no proof as to the authenticity of the writer's signature appearing in a private document, suchprivate document may be excluded (General Enterprises, Inc. v. Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., No. L-18487,

August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 733). On the other hand, public or notarial documents, or those instruments dulyacknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. There is also no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to documentsthe genuineness and due execution of which are admitted by the adverse party. These admissions may befound in the pleadings of the parties or in the case of an actionable document which may arise from thefailure of the adverse party to specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of thedocument in his pleading.

After the authentication and proof of the due execution of the document, whenever proper, the marking for identification and the formal offer of such documents as evidence to the court follow.

With respect to offer of evidence, Section 35 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which is theapplicable rule then, provides:

Offer of evidence — The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formallyoffered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.



When a party offers a particular documentary instrument as evidence during trial, he must specify thepurpose for which the document or instrument is offered. He must also describe and identify the document,and offer the same as an exhibit so that the other party may have an opportunity of objecting to it (Ahag v.Cabiling, 18 Phil 415). The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the judge to rest his

findings of facts and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Suchoffer may be made orally or in writing sufficient to show that the party is ready and willing to submit theevidence to the court. (Llaban y Catalan et al. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 63226, Dec. 20, 1991; U.S. v.Solana, 33 Phil. 582; Dayrit v. Gonzales, 7 Phil. 182)

Applying the aforestated legal principles to the circumstances in the case at bar, We find that thepresentation or written offer of documentary exhibits by the respondent to the court was properly made andcould be considered as basis by the court for holding petitioner liable under the contracts, set forth in thedocuments presented, for the following reasons:

When respondent State Inc. filed a complaint for sum of money against petitioner Harris Chua and severalothers, the former attached thereto, five annexes, four of which consist of 1) Term Loan Agreement

executed between respondent State Inc. as one of the creditors and defendant Asia Phil Timber Corporationas the borrower 2) Promissory Note executed by AsiaPhil Timber Corporation in favor of respondent StateInc. 3) Comprehensive Surety Agreement executed by petitioner Harris Chua and other defendants in favor of State Inc., "to guarantee in joint and several capacity the punctual payment" of the indebtedness of

AsiaPhil Timber Corp. and 4) Demand letters to petitioner Chua by respondent State Inc. (pp. 8-40Records). In his answer to the complaint, petitioner Chua admitted the allegations in the complaint withrespect to the existence and due execution of the Term Loan Agreement and Comprehensive Surety

Agreement to which he is one of the signatories, while pleading certain affirmative defenses (pp. 57-60Records). Because of this judicial admission, the due execution of the Term Loan Agreement andComprehensive Surety Agreement are already admitted by the petitioner and there is no more need for therespondent State Inc. to present witnesses to testify on the genuineness of the documents. Further, recordsshow that the aforementioned documents are all notarial instruments, the due execution of which is already

presumed and need not be proven. Records show that respondent State Inc. did not present any proof or witness to testify on the execution of the said document but it did, however, submit a written formal offer of exhibits before the court, wherein respondent State Inc. identified and marked each of the aforementioneddocuments as its exhibits. These exhibits were similar to the documents attached to the complaint. Therespondent State Inc. also specified in its written offer the purpose for which each of the documentaryexhibits was offered in evidence (pp. 91-93, Records). Despite the fact that a copy of the written offer of exhibits was furnished to petitioner Chua, thus giving the latter the opportunity to object thereon and topresent rebutting evidence, the latter failed to do so on the date set for the presentation of evidence for hisdefense. Because of this, the trial court considered him as having waived this right and deemed the casesubmitted for decision.

In view of the foregoing, We find no compelling reasons to reverse the conclusion of the respondent

appellate court finding the petitioner jointly and severally liable with his co-defendants in the trial court, onthe basis of documentary evidence presented and offered before the court.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appealsdated February 22, 1989 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.



SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 149576 represented by the Land Registration Authority,

Petitioner, Present:PUNO, J ., Chairman , SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

- v e r s u s - CORONA, AZCUNA and GARCIA, JJ.

KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

Respondent. Promulgated: August 8, 2006

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x D E C I S I O N

CORONA, J .: The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001 decision[1] and

August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 inthis petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick

Development Corporation of a concrete perimeter fence around some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air TransportationOffice (ATO) in 1996. As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228square meters of prime land. Respondent justified its action with a claim of ownership over the property. It presented Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos.135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name and which allegedly originatedfrom TCT No. 17508 registered in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.

ATO verified the authenticity of respondent’s titles with the LandRegistration Authority (LRA). On May 17, 1996, Atty. Jose Loriega, head of theLand Title Verification Task Force of the LRA, submitted his report. TheRegistrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its

ascendant title, TCT No. 5450. The land allegedly covered by respondent’s titleswas also found to be within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the PhilippineAir Force) in Pasay City.

By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), onSeptember 3, 1996, filed a complaint for revocation, annulment andcancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (asrepresented by the LRA) against respondent and Alfonso Concepcion. It was

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/august2006/G.R.%20No.%20149576.htm#_ftn1





raffled to Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where it wasdocketed as Civil Case No. 96-1144.

On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was

purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for respondent.

Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served withsummons, the trial court ordered the issuance of an alias summons by publication against him on February 19, 1997.

The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents relative tomodes of discovery, pre-trial, postponements or continuances, motions todismiss, motions to declare defendants in default and other procedural matters.

During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee andCommittee on Justice and Human Rights conducted a hearing in aid of

legislation on the matter of land registration and titling. In particular, thelegislative investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused onhow respondent was able to acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606.

During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998, one of those summoned was Atty. Garlitos, respondent’s former counsel. He testifiedthat he prepared respondent’s answer and transmitted an unsigned draft torespondent’s president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature appearing above hisname was not his. He authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he didnot know who finally signed it.

With Atty. Garlitos’ revelation, the Republic promptly filed an urgentmotion on December 3, 1998 to declare respondent in default,[2] predicated on

its failure to file a valid answer. The Republic argued that, since the person whosigned the answer was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known tohim, the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to Section 3,Rule 7 of the Rules of Court,[3] it was a mere scrap of paper and produced nolegal effect.

On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting theRepublic’s motion.[4] It found respondent’s answer to be sham and false andintended to defeat the purpose of the rules. The trial court ordered the answerstricken from the records, declared respondent in default and allowed theRepublic to present its evidence ex parte .

The Republic presented its evidence ex parte , after which it rested its

case and formally offered its evidence. Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February 19, 1999

resolution but the trial court denied it. Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a

petition for certiorari[5]seeking to set aside the February 19, 1999 resolution of


















the trial court. Respondent contended that the trial court erred in declaring it indefault for failure to file a valid and timely answer.

On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It

found Atty. Garlitos’ statements in the legislative hearing to be unreliable sincethey were not subjected to cross-examination. The appellate court alsoscrutinized Atty. Garlitos’ acts after the filing of the answer[6] and concludedthat he assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his stead. Thissupposedly cured whatever defect the answer may have had. Hence, theappellate court granted respondent’s petition for certiorari. It directed the liftingof the order of default against respondent and ordered the trial court to proceedto trial with dispatch. The Republic moved for reconsideration but it wasdenied. Thus, this petition.

Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court’s order whichdeclared respondent in default for its failure to file a valid answer? Yes, it did.

A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify another’sstatement.[7] Where it appears that a party clearly and unambiguously assentedto or adopted the statements of another, evidence of those statements isadmissible against him.[8] This is the essence of the principle of adoptiveadmission.

An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to treat the party’s reaction as anadmission of something stated or implied by the other person.[9] By adoptiveadmission, a third person’s statement becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur when a party:

(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another;[10]

(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;[11] (c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another;[12] (d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another

but ignores further points which he or she has heard the othermake[13] or

(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another.[14] Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and

built its case on them. At no instance did it ever deny or contradict its formercounsel’s statements. It went to great lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos’

testimony as well as its implications, as follows: 1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact was that

the answer was signed. Hence, the pleading could not beconsidered invalid for being an unsigned pleading. The fact thatthe person who signed it was neither known to Atty. Garlitos norspecifically authorized by him was immaterial. The importantthing was that the answer bore a signature.






































2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or his counsel, it does not prohibit a counsel from givinga general authority for any person to sign the answer for himwhich was what Atty. Garlitos did. The person who actually signed

the pleading was of no moment as long as counsel knew that itwould be signed by another. This was similar to addressing anauthorization letter “to whom it may concern” such that any person could act on it even if he or she was not knownbeforehand.

3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he neverdisowned its contents and he resumed acting as counsel forrespondent subsequent to its filing. These circumstances showthat Atty. Garlitos conformed to or ratified the signing of theanswer by another.

Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its motion for

reconsideration of the trial court’s February 19, 1999 resolution. And again inthe petition it filed in the Court of Appeals as well as in the comment[15] andmemorandum it submitted to this Court.

Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos’ statements asits own. Respondent’s adoptive admission constituted a judicial admissionwhich was conclusive on it.

Contrary to respondent’s position, a signed pleading is one that is signedeither by the party himself or his counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on thismatter. It requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him .

Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counseloperates to validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to one that issigned.

Counsel’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. Hemay not delegate it to just any person.

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he hasread the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief,there is a good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed fordelay .[16] Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature,

who can certify to these matters. The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving

practice of law which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legalprofession. Counsel may delegate the signing of a pleading to anotherlawyer[17] but cannot do so in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:















Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualifiedperson the performance of any task which by law may only be performedby a member of the Bar in good standing.

Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualifiedpersons,[18] something the law strongly proscribes.

Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitosentrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos’ subsequent acts.

Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing showsthat Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of the answer by another “as long asit conformed to his draft.” We give no value whatsoever to such self-serving

statement.

No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign the answer. The trial court correctly ruled thatrespondent’s answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsignedpleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic wasrightly allowed to present evidence ex parte .

Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains thateven if it were true that its answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, thedefect was a mere technicality that could be set aside.

Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled asmere technicalities have their own valid raison d’ etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them aside may result inarbitrariness and injustice.[19]

The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeal s [20] is relevant: Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication

of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly bythe rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation inthe application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge abastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality

in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is truethat litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that everycase must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure toinsure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, forthe most persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an















injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in notcomplying with the prescribed procedure.[21] In this case, respondent failed toshow any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.

As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he shouldbe made to account for his possible misconduct.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31, 2001decision and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SPNo. 52948 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the February 19, 1999resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 declaringrespondent in default is hereby REINSTATED.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline

of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the commencement of disbarmentproceedings against Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. for his possible unprofessionalconduct not befitting his position as an officer of the court.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 149576 represented by the Land Registration Authority,

Petitioner, Present:

PUNO, J ., Chairman , SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

- v e r s u s - CORONA, AZCUNA and GARCIA, JJ.

KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,

Respondent. Promulgated:







August 8, 2006 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

D E C I S I O N CORONA, J .:

The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001

decision[1] and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition for review

under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This case stemmed from the construction by respondent

Kenrick Development Corporation of a concrete perimeter

fence around some parcels of land located behind the Civil

Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO)

in 1996. As a result, the ATO was dispossessed of some

30,228 square meters of prime land. Respondent justified its

action with a claim of ownership over the property. It

presented Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 135604,

135605 and 135606 issued in its name and which allegedly

originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in the name of one

Alfonso Concepcion.

ATO verified the authenticity of respondent’s titles with

the Land Registration Authority (LRA). On May 17, 1996, Atty.






Jose Loriega, head of the Land Title Verification Task Force of

the LRA, submitted his report. The Registrar of Deeds of Pasay

City had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title,

TCT No. 5450. The land allegedly covered by respondent’s

titles was also found to be within Villamor Air Base

(headquarters of the Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City. By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General

(OSG), on September 3, 1996, filed a complaint for revocation,

annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of

the Republic of the Philippines (as represented by the LRA)

against respondent and Alfonso Concepcion. It was raffled to

Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where it

was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1144.

On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer whichwas purportedly signed by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel

for respondent. Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and

served with summons, the trial court ordered the issuance of

an alias summons by publication against him on February 19,

1997. The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents

relative to modes of discovery, pre-trial, postponements or



continuances, motions to dismiss, motions to declare

defendants in default and other procedural matters. During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon

Committee and Committee on Justice and Human Rights

conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land

registration and titling. In particular, the legislative

investigation looked into the issuance of fake titles and

focused on how respondent was able to acquire TCT Nos.

135604, 135605 and 135606. During the congressional hearing held on November 26,

1998, one of those summoned was Atty. Garlitos, respondent’s

former counsel. He testified that he prepared respondent’s

answer and transmitted an unsigned draft to respondent’s

president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his

name was not his. He authorized no one to sign in his behalf

either. And he did not know who finally signed it. With Atty. Garlitos’ revelation, the Republic promptly

filed an urgent motion on December 3, 1998 to declare

respondent in default,[2] predicated on its failure to file a valid

answer. The Republic argued that, since the person who

signed the answer was neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor

even known to him, the answer was effectively an unsigned

pleading. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of

Court,[3] it was a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal

effect.










On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution

granting the Republic’s motion.[4] It found respondent’s answer

to be sham and false and intended to defeat the purpose of the

rules. The trial court ordered the answer stricken from the

records, declared respondent in default and allowed the

Republic to present its evidence ex parte . The Republic presented its evidence ex parte , after which

it rested its case and formally offered its evidence. Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the

February 19, 1999 resolution but the trial court denied it. Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of

Appeals via a petition for certiorari[5]seeking to set aside the

February 19, 1999 resolution of the trial court. Respondent

contended that the trial court erred in declaring it in default

for failure to file a valid and timely answer. On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the

assailed decision. It found Atty. Garlitos’ statements in the

legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not

subjected to cross-examination. The appellate court alsoscrutinized Atty. Garlitos’ acts after the filing of the

answer[6] and concluded that he assented to the signing of the

answer by somebody in his stead. This supposedly cured

whatever defect the answer may have had. Hence, the














appellate court granted respondent’s petition for certiorari. It

directed the lifting of the order of default against respondent

and ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch.

The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was

denied. Thus, this petition. Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court’s

order which declared respondent in default for its failure to file

a valid answer? Yes, it did. A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt

or ratify another’s statement.[7] Where it appears that a party

clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the

statements of another, evidence of those statements is

admissible against him.[8] This is the essence of the principle of

adoptive admission.

An adoptive admission is a party’s reaction to a

statement or action by another person when it is reasonable to

treat the party’s reaction as an admission of something stated

or implied by the other person.[9] By adoptive admission, a

third person’s statement becomes the admission of the party

embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur

when a party: (a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement

made by another;[10]



















(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats

it;[11] (c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of

another;[12] (d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points

raised by another but ignores further points which

he or she has heard the other make[13] or (e) reads and signs a written statement made by

another.[14]

Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty.

Garlitos and built its case on them. At no instance did it ever

deny or contradict its former counsel’s statements. It went to

great lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos’ testimony as well as its

implications, as follows: 1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the

fact was that the answer was signed. Hence, the

pleading could not be considered invalid for being

an unsigned pleading. The fact that the person who

signed it was neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor

specifically authorized by him was immaterial. The

important thing was that the answer bore a

signature. 2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading

must be signed by the party or his counsel, it does


















not prohibit a counsel from giving a general

authority for any person to sign the answer for him

which was what Atty. Garlitos did. The person who

actually signed the pleading was of no moment as

long as counsel knew that it would be signed by

another. This was similar to addressing an

authorization letter “to whom it may concern” such

that any person could act on it even if he or she was

not known beforehand.

3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer;

he never disowned its contents and he resumed

acting as counsel for respondent subsequent to its

filing. These circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos

conformed to or ratified the signing of the answer by

another. Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos

in its motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s February

19, 1999 resolution. And again in the petition it filed in the

Court of Appeals as well as in the comment[15] and

memorandum it submitted to this Court. Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos’

statements as its own. Respondent’s adoptive admission

constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on it.







Contrary to respondent’s position, a signed pleading is

one that is signed either by the party himself or his counsel.Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a

pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing

him . Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself

or his counsel operates to validly convert a pleading from one

that is unsigned to one that is signed. Counsel’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are

personal to him. He may not delegate it to just any person. The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by

him that he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his

knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to

support it; and that it is not interposed for delay .[16] Under the

Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature,

who can certify to these matters. The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal

work involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively for

the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate

the signing of a pleading to another lawyer[17] but cannot do

so










in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional

Responsibility provides: Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any

unqualified person the performance of any task which bylaw may only be performed by a member of the Bar in goodstanding.

Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to

signing by unqualified persons,[18] something the law strongly

proscribes. Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty.

Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was void. Any act taken

pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no

way it could have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos’

subsequent acts. Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998

Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos consented to the

signing of the answer by another “as long as it conformed to

his draft.” We give no value whatsoever to such self-serving

statement. No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given

blanket authority for just anyone to sign the answer. The trial

court correctly ruled that respondent’s answer was invalid and

of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading. Respondent







was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly

allowed to present evidence ex parte . Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules.

It maintains that even if it were true that its answer was

supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere

technicality that could be set aside. Procedural requirements which have often been

disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have their own

valid raison d’ etre in the orderly administration of justice. To

summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness and

injustice.[19] The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of

Appeals [20] is relevant: Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the

adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus[enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court,in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge abastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity.The liberality in the interpretation and application of therules applies only in proper cases and under justifiablecauses and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is

not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that everycase must be prosecuted in accordance with theprescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedyadministration of justice.










Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except

only when, for the most persuasive of reasons, they may be

relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate

with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with

the prescribed procedure.[21] In this case, respondent failed to

show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from

strictly abiding by the rules. As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts

committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation of the ethics of the

legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his

possible misconduct. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The

May 31, 2001 decision and August 20, 2001 resolution of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the February 19, 1999

resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch

114 declaring respondent in default is hereby REINSTATED. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission

on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for

the commencement of disbarment proceedings against Atty.

Onofre Garlitos, Jr. for his possible unprofessional conduct

not befitting his position as an officer of the court. SO ORDERED.





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