annual report 2006-2007 - pet

A N N U A L R E P O R T 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 7

The Danish Security and Intelligence Service

Annual Report 2006-2007

THE DANISH SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE SERVICE / ANNUAL REPORT 2006-2007

In its capacity as the national security authority, the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) must prevent, investigate and counter operations and activities that pose or may pose a threat to the preservation of Denmark as a free, democratic and safe country.

In its work, PET addresses various forms of threats against Denmark and Danish interests abroad, where the most serious threat at the moment is that of terrorism.

According to PET’s ongoing assessments of the terrorist threat, Denmark faces at present the most serious threat picture in many years, and terrorist attacks may take place without any warning. There are persons and groups in this country who are planning terrorist activities here or abroad. There is increased focus on Denmark, also among leading militant extremists abroad who wish to carry out terrorist activities against Denmark or against Danish interests abroad. PET conducts operations and investigations on an ongoing basis that are directed against specific threats, and spends many resources on identifying and preventing these threats.

Effective counter-terrorism efforts are based on comprehensive prevention of radicalisation, robust measures to counter specific terrorist activities, and effective investigation and prosecution of terrorists.

Therefore, it is necessary for the Security and Intelligence Service to possess the capacity, resources and competencies that are needed in order to take effective action in these areas.

PET has experienced great changes since the terrorist attacks against the USA on 11 September 2001, and has been allocated further resources and tools.

However, counter-terrorism efforts require ongoing adaptation and adjustments, and for PET it is a dynamic process. This implies, on the one hand, that we must ensure that we integrate and use the new capacities, resources and competencies efficiently and, on the other hand, that we must have an eye to the fact that further reinforcement may prove necessary.

The decisive point for PET is to have easy and swift access to the information that is necessary for us to identify specific treats and to target our intelligence and investigative work. It is, however, equally important for us to have modern and up-to-date IT systems to ensure that we can process and analyse the information.

Combating terrorism effectively depends on the ability of the Security and Intelligence Service to use the investigative techniques and methods that are necessary. However, it is equally important that we are able to protect these techniques and methods in such a manner that they can be used effectively also in future.

The experience gained in relation to the new threats since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 is that we as a security and intelligence service must be prepared, to a much larger extent, to counter threats not only preventatively, but also to ensure that criminal investigation and prosecution measures are carried through in relation to the perpetrators.

This presents us with the classic dilemma that we in some cases cannot take action until we have a firm and solid foundation for doing so. At the same time, we must be aware of the security-related risks when dealing with people who are planning an act of terrorism. It also means that we now, to an even higher

PAGE 2 fOREWORD

Foreword


are challenges to which we must find sound solutions.

Regarding efforts at both national and international level, we who work for PET also have a clear interest in counter-terrorism being on the one hand effective and on the other hand based on a legally sound basis. We must at all times be conscious of maintaining this balance. And it is particularly important – also for PET – that the powers we have been assigned are subject to effective supervision, as these powers may often be rather intrusive in relation to the individual citizen. The supervision is of importance to our work and especially to the confidence in PET which is required.

Early prevention efforts are necessary in order to prevent young people from being attracted to extremism and violent environments. In order to contribute to performing this task, PET has established a Centre for Prevention which is responsible for the initiation and implementation of a number of specific projects that aim at preventing radicalisation and terrorism, and which through broad dialogue endeavours to involve all relevant actors in Danish society in the prevention of radicalisation at the earliest stage possible. Similarly, PET considers it an important task to provide advice and guidance that contributes to the establishment of an effective capability in Denmark for countering the threats facing Danish society.

Preventing security threats is not a task PET can perform on its own. It is, therefore, an important goal for PET to involve Danish society as such in the protection of the values on which our society is based.

The involvement of citizens requires openness and transparency on the part of PET in relation to the general public. We at PET strive to be

degree than earlier, have to conduct our investigations in a manner that makes it possible to subsequently initiate criminal proceedings and bring the criminal case to trial.

The terrorist threat is not a metropolitan problem or a big city phenomenon. It affects the entire country. PET has therefore reinforced the local and regional presence of the Security and Intelligence Service. We have done so through the establishment of two regional units covering the eastern and western part of Denmark, respectively, and by appointing local PET agents. Together with the police reform and the establishment of new and larger police districts, this will hopefully strengthen the efforts to combat terrorism through even closer collaboration between PET and the police districts.

PET’s use of sources, informants and, in some cases, civilian agents is altogether crucial if we are to be able to identify and counter specific terrorist threats. It is a focus area for us to become even better at performing this part of PET’s activities.

Another focus area for PET is our wish to strengthen and further develop international co-operation on combating terrorism. There is a need for us to become even better at working multilaterally and operationally across borders and with the incorporation of other law enforcement authorities. At the same time, it is necessary that we develop our collaboration with a number of countries with which we have not earlier had close co-operation, but which are of special importance to the fight against terrorism. This applies to, among others, countries in North Africa and the Middle East.

Developing this collaboration implies, naturally, both practical and legal challenges, but they

fOREWORD PAGE 3


as open as possible to the outside world, but in order for us as a security and intelligence service to function effectively, it is necessary to keep information secret in order to protect, among other things, current investigations, sources and partners.

As part of our efforts at showing maximum openness and transparency, the Security and Intelligence Service has publicised unclassified assessments of the terror threat against Denmark on an ongoing basis since May 2007. The objective of publicising the assessments is to give the population a greater insight into and understanding of the global threat picture and at the same time accommodate the population’s great interest in this area.

This annual report covers 2006 and 2007. To the extent it is relevant, matters from the beginning of 2008 have been included.

Let me conclude by wishing you pleasant reading.

Jakob ScharfDirector General

PAGE 4 fOREWORD


fOREWORD PAGE 5

ORGANISATIONAL AND ADmINISTRATIVE mATTERS

1.

PAGE 6 TAbLE Of CONTENTS

Table of contentsForeword 21. Organisational and administrative matters 8

Adjustment of PET’s organisation 9Better local and regional coverage 11Strengthened investigative capacity 11New IT platform 11Vision 2009 12

2. Legal matters 14Legal Department 14Access to files and records 14Legislation and supervision 15

Supervision through the Minister of Justice 16Parliamentary supervision 16Judicial supervision 16Records supervision 16Supervision through Rigsrevisionen (The National Audit Office) 17

The PET Commission and the Committee regarding PET and FE 17The Government’s Action Plan for the Fight against Terrorism 17

Anti-Terrorism Package III (2006) 18A criminal offence to recruit and train for terrorism 18PET’s collection and communication of information 18Court orders in connection with telephone interception 18Tele-observation 19Interference in radio or telecommunications 19TV surveillance 19PET’s access to passenger information 20Logging 20

Co-operation with immigration authorities 21Expulsion in the interests of national security 21

3. International co-operation 24Operational co-operation 24Administrative co-operation 24Exchange of information with foreign partners 25

4. PET’s operational efforts 285. Special Operations 32

Sources and informants 32Agents 32

Witness protection 336. Counter-terrorism 36

General features and trends 36Danish terrorism cases 39

The bookseller from Brønshøj 39The Glostrup Case 40


TAbLE Of CONTENTS PAGE 7

The Vollsmose Case 41The Glasvej Case 43

Danish-based support to illegal activities abroad 43Internet 44Non-proliferation 45Terrorist financing 47Center for Terror Analysis (CTA) 48Assessment of the Terror Threat against Denmark (VTD) 49

7. Counter-extremism 50Left-wing extremism 50

Clearance of Ungdomshuset 50Right-wing extremism 51Confrontations between right- and left-wing extremists 53Threats against public figures 54Racism and xenophobia 54

8. Counter-espionage 569. Organised crime 58 Security 60

The Special Intervention Unit 60The Surveillance Unit 61The Technical Support Centre 62The Personal Protection Unit 63The Negotiation Group 65The Physical Protection Group 65

Preventive security and civil protection 66The Preventive Security Department 66The Centre for Protective Security 66

Physical security 66Critical national infrastructure 66IT security 67Personnel security 68

The Centre for Prevention 68Radicalisation 69Counter-Terrorism Conference 2007 70Educational initiatives 71

Appendices 72A. The Danish Criminal Code – special chapters 12 and 13 72B. Act No. 378 of 6 July 1988 on the establishment of a committee regarding the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (FE) and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) 80C. Statutory Provisions regarding the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) of 9 May 1996 81D. The Wamberg Committee’s Mandate of 1964 84E. The Government’s Declaration of 30 September 1968 85F. The Danish Administration of Justice Act, Chapter 66 85


10.

11.


PAGE 8 ORGANISATIONAL AND ADmINISTRATIVE mATTERS

1.1.Organisational and administrative mattersSince 2001, PET has been allocated additional resources to strengthen anti-terrorism efforts. In 2005, PET had approx. 480 staff. A total of 140 of these were employed in relation to Anti-Terrorism Packages I and II in 2002 and 2004, respectively. In 2006, approx. 150 positions were added to PET from the National Centre of Investigation (NEC) of the Danish National Police (Rigspolitiet). Furthermore, in connection with the implementation of Anti-Terrorism Package III in 2007, PET was allocated approx. DKK 20 million that was earmarked for special purposes, including a strengthening of the Perso nal Protection Unit, the Special Intervention Unit, and the intelligence and investigation field. Today, PET has a staff of approx. 700 employees.

A total of 37 per cent of the Security and Intelligence Service staff are linked to PET’s Operational Department with 12 per cent involved in counter-terrorism, including non-proliferation; 7 per cent in counter-espionage and counter-extremism; 5 per cent in the effort against the most serious form of organised crime; 6 per cent in Special Operations (source handling, witness protection and agent activity); 6 per cent in local and regional operational

activities in Region East and Region West, respectively; and 1 per cent in operational development activities. Staff working in the last three areas (Special Operations, local and regional activities as well as operational development activities) carry out tasks in relation to the efforts against terrorism, espionage, extremism and the most serious form of organised crime. A total of 46 per cent of the Security and Intelligence Service staff are linked to PET’s Security Department with 6 per cent involved in co-ordinating staff functions; 14 per cent in personal protection; 9 per cent in the Special Intervention Unit; 13 per cent in surveillance tasks; and 4 per cent in technical support. Regarding the last three areas (the Special Intervention Unit, surveillance tasks and technical support), PET also provides assistance to the police districts. In 2007, out of the total number of cases in these areas (770 cases), as many as 39 per cent were assistance cases of this kind.

A total of 4 per cent of the Security and Intelligence Service staff are linked to PET’s Preventive Security Department, while 1 per cent is linked to the Center for Terror Analysis (CTA), which also includes staff from the Danish

ORGANISATIONAL AND ADmINISTRATIVE mATTERS PAGE 9


Defence Intelligence Service (FE), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, and the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA).

A total of 10 per cent of the Security and Intelligence Service staff are linked to the Administration Department, which is responsible for PET’s personnel administration and development, internal security, IT and communication, records and documentation as well as financial management and logistics. Lastly, 1 per cent of the Security and Intelligence Service staff is linked to the Legal Department and 1 per cent to the Management Secretariat.

Adjustment of Pet’s orgAnisAtion

PET has adjusted its organisation on an ongoing basis in order to carry out the tasks and assignments that are required of the Security and Intelligence Service. After a restructuring

process in 2007, PET consists of six departments today: the Administration Department, the Legal Department, the Operational Department, the Security Department, the Preventive Security Department and the Center for Terror Analysis. Together with the Director General of PET, the six Directors make up the senior management of PET, assisted by a Management Secretariat in charge of tasks regarding press contact, internal communication, as well as the co-ordination of the Security and Intelligence Service’s international co-operation.

The individual departments of PET consist of a number of centres, divided up into various sections. The overall organisational chart is presen ted at www.pet.dk.

The present structure of PET, which dates back to 2007, reflects a wish to achieve the necessary clarity in terms of distribution of



responsibility, and cohesion regarding the performance of tasks.

The organisational change in 2007 implied, among other things, that the source handling, witness protection and agent activity tasks of the Security and Intelligence Service were brought together in a cross-sectoral unit (Special Operations) within PET’s Operational Department. Furthermore, within PET’s Administration Department, a Centre for Finance and Logistics was set up in order to ensure efficient management and application

of the resources of the Security and Intelligence Service.

It should be noted in this connection that PET has not been granted any special appropriation from the annual Budget or allocations from the internal financial management system of the National Police. Expenditure for PET is defrayed from within the total police allocation, and operating expenses regarding PET are estimated to total approx. DKK 400 million, of which approx. DKK 310 million is spent on staff costs.




In order to handle the ever-increasing volume of information and to make it easier for staff to gain rapid access to precise information, PET set up an IT and Knowledge Centre in 2007. The Centre plays a key role in the implementation of PET’s new IT platform.

Better locAl And regionAl coverAge

With a view to strengthening PET’s local and regional coverage, the existing liaison officer scheme in the police districts was restructured in autumn 2007. The restructuring implies, among other things, that PET now has permanent staff employed in every police district. The employees concerned are attached to PET’s regional units in Odense (Region East, which covers the police districts east of Lillebælt) and Århus (Region West, which covers the police districts west of Lillebælt), respectively. The regional units, including the regional staff in the police districts, are part of PET’s Operational Department and perform local and regional tasks concerning terrorism, espionage, extremism as well as serious organised crime in collaboration with relevant police districts.

strengthened investigAtive cAPAcity

On 1 August 2006, approx. 150 staff from the National Centre of Investigation (NEC) of the National Police were transferred to PET. The objective was to strengthen the operational efforts in the area of counter-terrorism and to ensure that the most serious organised crime would be handled by a new and larger organisation.

The transfer included the Special Intervention Unit, Special Operations (Witness Protection, the Negotiation Group and Under Cover Agent Operations), the Surveillance Unit and the Technical Support Centre as well as a number

of staff from the Analysis Section and the Flying Squad.

The experience of the transfer has been very positive. The Special Intervention Unit, the Surveillance Unit and the Technical Support Centre, as well as the Negotiation Group are today a well-integrated part of PET’s Security Department. The other staff that have been transferred are part of PET’s Operational Department, where a Centre for Organised Crime has been set up. The transfer has made it possible, among other things, to provide greater flexibility with regard to the application of personnel, and also the development of core competencies and technical tools in, for example, IT investigation has been further strengthened.

In the area of counter-terrorism, PET’s operational efforts have resulted in the implementation of an increasing number of criminal investigations with a view to prosecution of persons involved in terrorism. The development has necessitated the extension and strengthening of PET’s investigative capacity. Therefore, in 2007 an actual investigation section was established within PET’s Centre for Counter-Terrorism as part of the implementation of Anti-Terrorism Package III.

new it PlAtform

Towards the end of 2006, a total of DKK 70 million was allocated towards the modernisation of PET’s IT systems, including digitalisation of records, IT support of procedures, the establishment of an overall information database, and the development of a basis for the use of new IT tools to correlate large volumes of data and carry out cross-sectoral searches in these.




In 2007, PET worked at creating the preconditions for the implementation of a new IT platform. A consultancy company has been selected, and a contract concluded. Similarly, PET is in the process of drawing up a conversion strategy for the Security and Intelligence Service’s paper archive, records and databases. In addition, bids have been invited regarding the scanning of significant parts of the paper archive, and an analysis has been carried out of whether and, if relevant, to which extent it would be advantageous for PET and the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (FE) to use a joint technical platform in connection with the implementation of new information databases.

Concurrently with this work, PET has carried out studies both domestically and abroad of IT solutions that might be considered relevant for the Security and Intelligence Service, carried through a market analysis, and finalised this work with performance specifications. Expectations are that a supplier will be appointed in the course of 2008.

vision 2009

In 2006, foreign experts conducted a major analysis of PET’s activities as part of the Government’s Action Plan for the Fight against Terrorism. The benchmarking review, which is accessible on www.pet.dk, concludes that PET’s capability, effectiveness and reputation have increased considerably since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, and that the Security and Intelligence Service must be considered one of the foremost intelligence services in Europe. The report indicates, however, that PET will face major challenges in its day-to-day work in the years ahead. Against this background, the report sets up 12 recommendations that are included in the unclassified summary of the survey, which the Ministry of Justice published on 17 May 2006.

Against the background of these recommendations, PET has formulated a set of objectives, which is to ensure that the Security and Intelligence Service, also in the years ahead, will be able to maintain its position as one of the foremost intelligence services in Europe.

The six overall aims and objectives are the following:

• PET must strengthen its capacity to collect and analyse information with a view to, at an early stage, identifying and drawing up an increasingly comprehensive picture of threats to the security of society.

• PET must strengthen its capacity to counter and prevent concrete threats to the security of society.

• PET must strengthen its capacity to provide targeted guidance and activation of partners and other stakeholders for the purpose of reinforcing overall resilience in society.

• PET must strengthen its capacity within resource and performance management and ensure the execution of and follow-up on all initiatives that have been launched.

• PET must strengthen the correlation between competencies and the performance of tasks in the short and long term with a view to further of the Security and Intelligence Service.

• PET must develop and maintain an up-to-date IT platform to strengthen and support the work processes and operational overview of the Security and Intelligence Service.

LEGAL mATTERS


2. Legal matterslegAl dePArtment

The Legal Department is responsible for legal issues regarding all parts of PET’s area of activity. In this connection, it is the responsibility of the Legal Department to implement smooth and effective procedures that ensure and supervise legality regarding all parts of the Security and Intelligence Service’s activity. The Legal Department must, furthermore, ensure that the legal processing of all the Security and Intelligence Service’s cases is effective and sound, and that the processing takes place at the necessary speed.

Ensuring and supervising legality comprises in particular the Security and Intelligence Service’s use of coercive measures in criminal procedure, the Security and Intelligence Service’s national and international co-operation, as well as the Security and Intelligence Service’s registration, processing and exchange of personal data.

In order to ensure and supervise legality on an ongoing basis in relation to the other departments of the Security and Intelligence Service, including the aspect of coercive measures in criminal procedure, Legal Department staff are, on a needs basis, attached to these departments and are involved in the planning and implementation of the Security and Intelligence Service’s operations. It is, among other things, the responsibility of the Legal Department to ensure that the Security and Intelligence Service’s cases are investigated and processed in a manner that ensures the collection of the necessary evidence to be used in any subsequent criminal proceedings.

Access to files And records

The Legal Department considers all issues in relation to file access under the Public

Administration Act and the Access to Public Administration Files Act, and in relation to researchers’ access to the records of the Security and Intelligence Service.

Requests for access to files are subjected to specific assessment. However, the point of departure is that no access is granted to any personal data that PET might have. The reason is that PET is not comprised by the Act on Processing of Personal Data and, thus, not by the rules of the Act regarding right of access (own access). Nor are PET’s activities, as a rule, subject to access under the Public Administration Act for citizens wishing to inspect documents of cases in which they are involved as these rules exclusively apply to cases in which decision has been taken or will be taken by an authority, which is not the case in the majority of PET’s cases. Lastly, the Access to Public Administration Files Act does not apply to cases within the administration of criminal justice, which means that the bulk of PET’s activities are not subject to the rules regarding access to files laid down in the Access to Public Administration Files Act.

A few researchers have been granted special access to the records of PET and the records of a number of other authorities. This has, for example, been the case in connection with the report “Danmark under den kolde krig” (Denmark during the Cold War) compiled by the Danish Institute for International Studies and Professor Bent Jensen’s research project “Den kolde krig i Danmark 1945-1991” (The Cold War in Denmark 1945-1991).

In connection with such access, the individual researcher signs a declaration of secrecy. Similarly, a number of terms are laid down for the researcher’s specific access to records. According to the declaration of secrecy, the

LEGAL mATTERS PAGE 15


researcher commits himself not to publicising classified information and documents unless the consent of the issuer of the document is obtained. Furthermore, the researcher commits himself to taking the necessary measures, including anonymisation, to protect the information in consideration of national security, the defence of the Realm, relations with foreign powers or third parties. Data about third parties may, for example, be information about individuals’ altogether private circumstances. The declaration of secrecy is meant to prevent any wrongful publication of sensitive information that may compromise the Security and Intelligence Service or very sensitive personal data about individuals. The declaration of secrecy states that persons who fail to

comply with the duty of secrecy may be held criminally liable.

legislAtion And suPervision

PET’s work and methods are regulated by the same rules laid down in the Administration of Justice Act that apply to the rest of the police. In particular areas, the Administration of Justice Act contains, however, some special rules for investigation of the offences that are subject to Chapters 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code, and with which PET is concerned. Consequently, there is no particular legislation for PET. However, on 9 May 1996, the Minister of Justice issued Statutory Provisions which set out in detail the tasks and responsibility of the Security and Intelligence Service. A reprint

Supervision of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service

LEGAL mATTERS


of the Statutory Provisions is attached as Appendix C.

PET is subject to numerous types of external supervision . In addition, the Security and Intelligence Service endeavours, through ongoing internal supervision, to ensure that work methods and case processing are in full compliance with the applicable rules.

The individual supervision measures are briefly presented in the following.

supervision through the minister of justiceOn behalf of the Government, the Minister of Justice supervises PET, and the Security and Intelligence Service is subject to the Minister’s directions. As mentioned in the above, the Minister of Justice has issued general guidelines for the activities of PET. The guidelines stipulate, among other things, that the Director General of PET is obliged to keep the Minister informed of both general and specific matters that are of considerable importance to the activities of the Security and Intelligence Service.

Parliamentary supervisionThe Folketing (Danish Parliament) has set up a special committee under Act No. 378 of 6 July 1988 for the purpose of “overseeing the Danish Defence Intelligence Service and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service” (see Appendix B).

The committee consists of five Members of the Folketing (MFs) appointed by the five major parties in the Folketing. In accordance with the Act, the committee must be informed of the general guidelines governing the activities of PET and must be kept informed of important matters of a security policy nature. The MFs are bound by a duty of non-disclosure in respect of what they learn on the committee.

judicial supervisionIn order to carry out a number of investigative measures (e.g. telephone interception), it is necessary for PET, in line with the rest of the police, to obtain a court order in accordance with the rules of the Administration of Justice Act governing this area.

records supervisionThe so-called Wamberg Committee supervises PET’s registration and communication of personal data. In this connection, the Committee must approve new files on Danes and foreign nationals resident in Denmark. The Committee members meet six to ten times a year at PET’s offices to review cases and decide whether the criteria for filing them have been met. Furthermore, the Committee also takes random samples of old files to establish whether the guidelines for records are complied with. If PET, in connection with cases regarding security clearance, wishes to communicate data on a person to other authorities, the communication must be approved by the Wamberg Committee



(for more on the Wamberg Committee, see Appendix D).

supervision through rigsrevisionen (the national Audit office)PET’s expenditures, including salaries, etc., are subject to the general audit of police accounts as undertaken by the National Audit Office in collaboration with the audit section of the National Commissioner and the auditors of the Ministry of Justice.

A minor part of PET’s accounts, for example those regarding coverage of sources’ costs are, however, subject to a special audit procedure involving a more thorough audit of the expenses. This audit is carried out by a specially authorised employee of the National Audit Office, who is assisted by an auditor of the Ministry of Justice. The specially authorised employee reports to the Auditor General regarding the audit carried out. Reports are only submitted to the members of the Public Accounts Committee in classified format if exceptional circumstances make this necessary.

the Pet commission And the committee regArding Pet And fe

In 1998, the Ministry of Justice set up a committee regarding the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) and the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (FE) – the Wendler-Pedersen Committee. The principal tasks of the Committee is to present proposals for clearer rules regarding the two intelligence services’ registration and filing of data on persons and organisations in Denmark. Furthermore, the Committee is to consider the question of citizens’ access to obtaining information on whether the persons concerned are registered in the records of PET and FE. The Committee is also to consider the possibility of establishing an information scheme granting access to

historical information. Finally, the Committee is to present proposals for a more general regulation of PET’s activities.

In 1999, a commission of inquiry, the PET Commission, was established for the purpose of examining a large number of aspects regarding PET’s activities in the period 1945-1989, including the issue of the Security and Intelligence Service’s activities in relation to the political field. The inquiry will also comprise matters relating to the Blekingegade Case.

The work of the PET Commission is expected to be completed in the course of 2008, which means that the Wendler-Pedersen Committee that has awaited the findings of the PET Commission will be able to conclude its work.

the government’s Action PlAn for the fight AgAinst terrorism

After the terrorist attacks in London in July 2005, the Government set up a cross-ministerial working group charged with undertaking a general review and assessment of Danish society’s efforts and preparedness with regard to acts of terrorism.

The working group published its report on 3 November 2005. The proposals presented by the working group included: increased exchange of information between PET and FE, further access to obtaining personal data from other authorities, access to flight passenger lists, increased investigative opportunities in the telecommunications area, as well as increased opportunity to set up TV surveillance of central public squares and major traffic junctions, etc.

On 16 November 2005, the Government published its Action Plan for the Fight against Terrorism, which contains a report on the ways in which work, according to the Government,

LEGAL mATTERS


should be taken forward to realise the recommendations presented by the cross-ministerial working group. The action plan describes a number of initiatives in relation to the Security and Intelligence Service’s organisation, co-operation and resources, investigation of terrorism, aliens residing in Denmark, civilian preparedness, dialogue with the Muslim communities, and research.

On the basis of the working group’s recommendations, a number of amendments have been made to the Criminal Code, the Administration of Justice Act and various other legislation (Anti-Terrorism Package III) to strengthen the action against terrorism. The legislative amendments came into force on 10 June 2006 (Act No. 542 of 8 June 2006).

In addition to implementing parts of the Government’s Action Plan for the Fight against Terrorism, the objective of the legislative amendments was also to enable Denmark to ratify the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism as well as the UN Nuclear Terrorism Convention.

The legislative amendments contain a number of measures that enhance the possibilities of the police to prevent, investigate and combat acts of terrorism.

Anti-terrorism Package iii (2006)A criminal offence to recruit and train for terrorismNew provisions have been inserted in the Criminal Code on recruitment and training for terrorism. The maximum penalty is up to six or ten years’ imprisonment (in particularly aggravating circumstances 16 years’ imprisonment) depending on the acts for which persons are recruited/trained. Furthermore, as a new element, persons who let themselves be

recruited or trained to commit acts of terrorism are liable to imprisonment for up to six years.

PET’s collection and communication of informationFollowing the legislative amendment, PET is in a position to communicate information to FE without being obliged, in each single case, to carry out a specific assessment and a balancing of interests in relation to the relevant piece of information. Consequently, PET may communicate information to FE, to the extent the communication may be of importance to the ability of the two intelligence services to perform their tasks.

Furthermore, a special statutory framework has been established for PET’s collection of information from other administrative authorities, which means that these authorities are not obliged, in each single case, to carry out a specific assessment and a balancing of interests in relation to the relevant piece of information. Consequently, PET may collect information from other administrative authorities to the extent the information may be of importance to the ability of the Security and Intelligence Service to perform its tasks concerning the prevention and investigation of violations of Chapters 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code.

Court orders in connection with telephone interceptionThe procedure for obtaining a court order to initiate intrusive measures in the form of telephone interception and forward-looking tele-information has been simplified through the legislative amendment. Today, PET needs only obtain one prior court order, which makes it possible to monitor a suspect, irrespective of what means of telecommunications the person



concerned chooses to use. This is a change compared with the previous arrangement according to which a court order regarding interception and tele-information was required to state the specific telephone numbers that could be intercepted or on which tele-information could be obtained. The change applies only to court orders concerning telephone interception and tele-information in connection with investigations of a violation of Chapters 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code. The general rules for when interception may take place have not been amended, and PET may therefore not carry out telephone interception and obtain tele-information to any greater extent than previously. Furthermore, the courts now have the possibility of supervising the telephone numbers at which the interception has been directed, and which have not been stated in the court order.

Tele-observationThe application of so-called tele-observation is now explicitly regulated by the Administration of Justice Act, into which provisions have been inserted concerning the conditions, including a court order requirement, that must be fulfilled in order to obtain information from suppliers of tele-net and tele-services. It concerns, among other things, information regarding which mobile masts a suspect’s mobile phone has ongoing contact with, including information on the mobile cell used and, subject to circumstances, information regarding the distance between the mobile phone and the mast.

Interference in radio or telecommunicationsFor the purpose of preventing specific, imminent terrorist acts or other serious crime, the legislative amendment has inserted a provision in the Administration of Justice Act on interference in or cut-off of radio or telecommunications in altogether special cases.

Under the provision, the police may on the basis of a court order interfere in or cut off radio or telecommunications, provided there are decisive reasons for doing so with a view to preventing the commitment of an offence which according to the Criminal Code is punishable by six years’ imprisonment or more, or an intentional violation of Chapters 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code. A further condition is that the offence may pose a danger to human life or limb or to substantial societal values.

TV surveillanceWith the legislative amendment, a provision has been inserted in the Act on TV Surveillance according to which the police may request that public authorities or private enterprises establish TV surveillance in accordance with current legislation. A request to set up TV surveillance is expected to be made in particular where it is found that this type of

Ph

oto

: sc

An

Pix

LEGAL mATTERS


surveillance may be of importance to preventing or investigating potential terrorist attacks.

A provision has furthermore been inserted in the Act on TV Surveillance which allows the police to make demands on public authorities or private enterprises regarding quality standards for the recordings on videotapes, film or the like, as well as for the storage of such recordings.

PET’s access to passenger informationIn order to give PET swifter and more effective access to standard information about flight passengers (passenger data), a new provision has been inserted in the Danish Air Navigation Act, which gives the Security and Intelligence Service access to this information from the airline companies.

The provision means that the airline companies are required to register and keep certain passenger data for one year, and to grant PET access to this information without a court order in cases regarding violations of Chapters 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code. Furthermore, rules have been laid down regarding PET’s on-line access to the airline companies’ booking systems.

Under the provision, the Minister for Transport and Energy is, after negotiation with the Minister of Justice, authorised to determine rules obliging airline companies to register and keep passenger data as well as rules regarding the practical assistance to PET in connection with the surrender of this information. PET collaborates with the Ministry of Justice on the establishment of the necessary basis for determining specific rules concerning passenger data. Similarly, work is in progress on the establishment of the necessary IT

solution with a view to collecting and processing passenger data.

LoggingThe so-called logging provision in the Administration of Justice Act was introduced through Act No. 378 of 6 June 2002. The provision made it obligatory for, among others, telecommunications companies and internet providers to “log” traffic data that are relevant to the police for the purpose of invasion of the secrecy of communication, etc. Similarly, the provision opened up for determining specific administrative rules regarding providers’ assistance to the police in connection with these invasive measures.

Against the background of this authority, the Ministry of Justice issued the so-called Logging Executive Order (Executive Order on the retention and storage of traffic data by providers of electronic communications networks and services) on 28 September 2006, which entered into force on 15 September 2007. The Logging Executive Order contains detailed rules for the types of data which telecommunications companies and internet providers, respectively, are required to retain and store for one year, and rules for how the retention is to take place.

The information is to be retained and stored in such a manner that it can be used as part of the police investigation and prosecution of criminal offences. The general rules regarding which conditions must be fulfilled for the police to have the relevant information surrendered have not been changed. PET will therefore be required, also in future, to obtain a court order to have the information surrendered, or have the information surrendered immediately, if the purpose would otherwise be wasted, and subsequently present the matter to the court



with a request that the invasive measure be approved.

co-oPerAtion with the immigrAtion Authorities

Under the Aliens Act, the immigration authorities may without consent communicate data on aliens to PET and FE, to the extent the communication of data may be of importance to the intelligence services’ ability to perform security tasks.

According to specific criteria, PET receives certain immigration-related cases (asylum, residence and visa cases) in order to carry out an assessment of whether an alien must be considered a threat to public order, to relations with foreign powers, or to national security. PET has briefed the immigration authorities on the types of information, etc. which may be of special interest to the Security and Intelligence Service. These criteria are assessed and adjusted on an ongoing basis by PET. Furthermore, matters relating to the grant of nationality are submitted to PET.

Information about an alien may in particular be of relevance to PET if there exists information indicating that the person concerned is involved in terrorist-related activities, has connections with certain foreign intelligence and security services or criminal organisations, or has been involved in war crimes, arms trafficking or the proliferation of arms.

expulsion in the interests of national securityThe existing provisions on the expulsion of aliens who must be deemed a danger to national security are laid down in sections 25 and 45 b of the Aliens Act. The provisions were given their present form through Anti-Terrorism Package I, which was implemented in 2002.

It follows from section 25 of the Aliens Act, which rests on a similar provision in the Aliens Act of 1952, that an alien may be expelled if the alien must be deemed a danger to national security. Regard for national security as laid down in section 25 comprises the interests that are protected by Chapter 12 of the Criminal Code (Offences against the Independence and Safety of the State) and Chapter 13 of the Criminal Code (Offences against the Constitution and the Supreme Authorities of the State, Terrorism, etc.). However, the wording does not rule out that also other interests of great societal importance may be taken into consideration through the application of the provision.

In 2002, section 45 b was inserted in the Aliens Act. The provision supplements, among other things, the rule regarding expulsion in the interests of national security laid down in section 25. Under section 45 b (1), the Minister for Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs shall, against the background of a recommendation from the Minister of Justice, assess whether an alien must be deemed a danger to national security. This assessment constitutes the basis for a decision by the immigration authorities on an immigration matter, including a matter of expulsion under section 25.

Number of immigration-related cases submitted to PET by the immigration authorities

2006 2007

un quota refugees 201 235

Asylum cases 115 194

visa cases 5461 10380

residence cases 955 2032

LEGAL mATTERS


alien concerned must be deemed a danger to national security, which means that the alien may be expelled under section 25 of the Aliens Act.

Since the introduction of section 45 b in 2002, the provision has not been used more than ten times, and it is generally not possible to provide further information about the specific cases. In connection with the case regarding the planning of a terrorist-related attempt on the life of one of the cartoonists behind the drawings of the Prophet Mohammed, the assessment was that, without disregarding consideration for foreign partners and sources, etc., the information could be released that two Tunisian nationals had been arrested during a police operation on 12 February 2008; and furthermore that it had been decided to expel the persons concerned as they must be deemed a danger to national security.

Two other cases regarding expulsion in the interests of national security have been publicised in the media in connection with a decision made by the Refugee Appeals Board on 1 April 2008 to the effect that two aliens expelled under section 25 of the Aliens Act cannot be deported from Denmark. The reason is that it cannot be ruled out with necessary certainty that they, upon deportation to their native country, will face the risk of the death penalty or become subjected to torture, etc. The persons concerned have, consequently, been granted exceptional leave to remain in this country and will continue to be the subject of PET’s interest for as long as they remain in Denmark.

On the basis of these cases, the Government has decided to set up a working group concerning the expulsion of aliens who must be deemed a danger to national security. PET

If, after recommendation from the Minister of Justice, it is the assessment of the Minister for Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs that an alien must be deemed a danger to national security, the Immigration Service shall decide whether the alien is to be expelled under section 25. In connection with the processing of a case under section 45 b, the Minister for Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs may furthermore, on the basis of a recommendation from the Minister of Justice, decide that the information resulting in the assessment may not, for security reasons, be transmitted to the alien assessed and to the immigration authority having to make a decision in the case, cf. section 45 b (2). The possibility of keeping information secret is of decisive importance to PET’s collaboration with other nations’ intelligence services and other partners and, thus, a fundamental precondition for effective action to prevent terrorist acts and combat terrorism. It is, among other things, regard for these matters that constitutes the basis for the possibility under section 45 b to depart from the general administrative law requirements of justification for the decision.

In general, the point of departure regarding a matter of expulsion of an alien who is deemed a danger to national security is that PET, after lengthy investigation, has obtained information that provides the grounds for suspecting the alien of violation with respect to one of the offences comprised by Chapters 12 or 13 of the Criminal Code, for example terrorism. If regard for, among others, foreign partners and sources results in PET having to abstain from seeking to bring a criminal case to trial, PET may take the initiative in asking the Minister of Justice to recommend to the Minister for Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs that the



is represented in the working group, which is expected to finalise its work in 2008.

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

3.


oPerAtionAl co-oPerAtion

The terrorist acts in recent years against the Western world have underlined the need for close and intensified international co-operation between authorities and relevant organisations that in various ways are involved in the efforts directed against international terrorism. Therefore, PET has close and ongoing collaboration with foreign partners, both in general to monitor the threat picture, and operationally in connection with the investigation of specific cases.

This co-operation takes the form of direct bilateral contact with foreign security and intelligence services. It involves, among other things, joint operations and exchange of information about persons and groups that may constitute a threat to Denmark, Danish interests abroad, foreign interests in this country, or a threat to our partners.

Furthermore, PET participates in comprehensive multilateral co-operation, which takes place primarily in the so-called Club of Berne and in the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG) of the EU member states.

The Club of Berne is a co-operation forum between the national security and intelligence services of most EU Member States as well as Norway and Switzerland. The heads of the services concerned meet on a regular basis to discuss intelligence and security issues. Similarly, a number of working groups have been set up under the auspices of the Club of Berne. The objective of this forum is to foster both co-operation and exchange of information and experience between the security and intelligence services of the member countries. Denmark became a member of the Club of Berne in 1972.

The CTG was established by the heads of the security services in the EU Member States following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. The group has a rotating presidency, which follows the Presidency of the EU. Work conducted in the group focuses on Islamist terrorism and comprises in particular the drawing up of joint threat assessments as well as discussion of initiatives to strengthen the operational co-operation on combating terrorism.

In addition, PET participates in a number of working groups within the framework of the UN, the EU and NATO.

AdministrAtive co-oPerAtion

PET has had successful operational co-operation with the intelligence services in the other Nordic countries for many years. In 2006, PET took the initiative to set up similar co-operation in the administrative area (Nordic Administrative Co-operation Forum), as the intelligence services also administratively face the same problems and challenges. In spring 2007, PET hosted the first meeting of the new Forum in which the intelligence services discuss current strategic and development-related initiatives. Future co-operation areas were identified, and the co-operation will continue in three sub-groups with focus on, among other things, strategy development, competence development and IT.

Similarly, international co-operation in the administrative area has been established between PET and countries outside the Nordic region. In 2007, PET visited a number of selected European intelligence services to discuss, among other things, methods and models for competence development, specific training and educational activities, management and quality development, and IT system development. In

International co-operation

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION PAGE 25


2007, the discussions materialised in a new common training programme in the area of source handling for a number of European intelligence services.

exchAnge of informAtion with foreign PArtners

The acts of terrorism targeted at the Western world have underlined the need for close and intensified international co-operation. The nature of global terrorism has meant that the countries concerned cannot combat the global terrorist threat on their own. Therefore, PET is involved in close and ongoing co-operation with foreign partners. It takes place both at the general level to monitor the threat picture as well as operationally in connection with specific investigations. In order to ensure continued effective counter-terrorism efforts, it is also necessary for PET to develop the collaboration with a number of countries that PET has not previously had any close co-operation with, but which are of special importance to the action against terrorism. This applies to countries in North Africa and the Middle East, among others.

Co-operation between PET and foreign partners takes place in accordance with Danish law. With respect to the communication of sensitive personal data to foreign partners, PET complies with the rules regarding duty of confidentiality laid down in section 152 of the Criminal Code and section 27 of the Public Administration Act, as well as the principles governing the communication of information laid down in section 28 of the Public Administration Act. Under section 28 of the Public Administration Act, information about individuals’ altogether private matters, including information about race, religion, and colour of skin; about political, business, sexual and criminal conduct; and

information about health matters, significant social problems, and abuse of stimulants and the like, must not be communicated to another authority. Information may, however, be communicated where the communication takes place in order to safeguard private or public interests which clearly outweigh consideration for the interests that justify secrecy, including regard for the person to whom the information relates. With a view to ensuring that the communication of sensitive personal data to foreign partners takes place in accordance with Danish law, internal guidelines have been established in PET which imply, among other things, that the Director of the Legal Department or her deputy must approve the communication of sensitive personal data to foreign partners. As a further security precaution regarding the exchange of sensitive personal data with foreign partners, it is expressly stated in every exchange that the information must only be used for intelligence purposes, and that the information must not, without the consent of PET, be communicated to other authorities, including authorities in third countries. If there are grounds for assuming that sensitive personal data are to constitute the basis for the use of torture or other degrading inhuman treatment or punishment, PET will not communicate the information to a foreign partner.

In connection with ongoing collaboration with foreign partners, PET receives much information, including in connection with specific investigations. In many cases, foreign partners communicate information to PET on their own initiative because the information is considered to be of importance to PET’s work. It may be a matter of information about a specific threat to Denmark or Danish interests. In other cases,

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION


PET asks foreign partners for information in connection with concrete investigations.

When PET receives information from a foreign partner, a detailed investigation will, subject to circumstances, be carried out with a view to assessing the reliability of the information. The information will in this connection be compared with the knowledge which the Security and Intelligence Service already might be in possession of, or which the Security and Intelligence Service may obtain through other investigations. Similarly, it may prove relevant to endeavour to cast further light on the information by contacting PET’s partners. In addition, there may often be reason for making a renewed approach to the intelligence service that has communicated the information with a view to having the information further specified. In some cases it will also be relevant to seek clarification as to how the information was obtained. However, intelligence services are usually, out of regard for source protection, very reluctant to comment on how information has been obtained.

Information from foreign partners which may have been obtained through the use of torture will, like other information, be included in PET’s investigations, but PET is very much aware that such information may be lacking in reliability.

Under Danish law, it is not possible to use information obtained under torture as evidence in a case before a Danish court, unless it concerns criminal proceedings initiated against a person who is charged with responsibility for the use of torture.

It may also be in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights if information obtained through the use of torture is

presented as the basis for a court’s decision on custody, search or invasion of the secrecy of communication, or administrative decisions on expulsion. Therefore, PET does not use information with a view to, for example, invasion of the secrecy of communication if it is PET’s assessment that the information must be assumed to have been obtained through torture.

INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION PAGE 27


PET’S OPERATIONAL EffORTS


4.

PET is charged with the task of preventing, investigating and countering operations and activities that pose or may pose a threat to the preservation of Denmark as an independent, democratic and safe society.

Efficient and permanent preservation of internal national security requires sustained, wide-ranging and co-ordinated efforts by a number of authorities. It is PET’s responsibility to ensure the co-ordination of the overall action.

PET’s field of responsibility comprises first and foremost offences set out in Chapters 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code, including terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, extremism, and espionage. Through its activity, PET must provide the basis for identifying and handling such threats as early and as effectively as possible.

Consequently, PET performs its tasks through the collection of intelligence, surveillance and investigation, as well as through preventive measures.

Through balanced application of these means, the Security and Intelligence Service must ensure that a comprehensive picture of the current security-related threats to internal national security is maintained at all times. This picture is to enable relevant and adapted counter-measures against such threats.

PET’s operational tasks are embedded in the Operational Department of PET. It consists of three centres: the Centre for Counter-Terrorism, the Centre for National Security, as well as the Centre for Organised Crime), a cross-sectoral unit (Special Operations) and two regional units (Region East and Region West).

At the individual centres, intelligence staff collect and process information that is subsequently analysed by operational analysts. The operational analysis work is conducted with a view to targeting continued intelligence work and, if necessary, involving actual investigators. As part of the implementation of specific operations, special operational groups will normally be set up with the participation of intelligence officers, analysts, investigators and legal experts.

When collecting and handling information, PET must make use of all the means and methods that are at the disposal of the Security and Intelligence Service.

The means and methods at the disposal of PET in the operational field are among others: invasion of the secrecy of communication, observation, video and photo surveillance, searches, sources (informants and agents), as well as data processing and analysis. In addition, the means and methods include interviews, interrogations, records checking, the collection and communication, also electronically, of information to and from authorities or other partners in Denmark or abroad as well as the monitoring of open sources, such as newspapers, TV, electronic news bases and the internet.

The activities of the Security and Intelligence Service must be conducted in accordance with Danish law, including the rules of the Administration of Justice Act regarding the investigation of criminal offences.

Especially in connection with the use of sources, attention should be drawn to the fact that PET, in addition to covering expenses or losses incurred, may remunerate sources, including

PET’s operational efforts

PET’S OPERATIONAL EffORTS PAGE 29


for the personal risk these sources expose themselves to in this connection.

If PET’s efforts lead to a situation where a person is to be charged, PET will inform the Prosecution Service. The investigation will subsequently be conducted according to the Prosecution’s specific directions, but in understanding and collaboration with PET.

It follows from the Statutory Provisions of 9 May 1996 on PET issued by the Ministry of Justice that any invasive investigative measures, including invasion of the secrecy of communication, must in each single case be approved by the Director General

of PET or in his absence by the deputy of the Director General. If the investigative measures in question require a court order, this approval must be obtained before the matter can be brought before the court. The practical implementation regarding telephone interception or tele-information collection taking place on the basis of a court order regarding the person must, for each single telephone number, be submitted for prior approval to the Director General of PET or his deputy.

Once PET has identified a specific security threat, PET will address the threat with the means which, in the specific situation, are

When PET’s Operational

Department is to analyse the

circles surrounding potential

terrorists, among other things,

they study their networks.

PET’S OPERATIONAL EffORTS


found to be the most relevant, appropriate and effective in order to prevent the specific threat from being carried out.

It is PET’s experience regarding new threats since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 that the Security and Intelligence Service must be prepared to a much greater extent not only to counter the threats, but also, among other things for preventive reasons, to ensure that criminal law investigation and prosecution is implemented with respect to the perpetrators in situations where the Criminal Code is violated.

In certain cases, it will, however, not be possible to implement actual investigation and prosecution in the specific matter. This applies, for example, to cases where regard for the Security and Intelligence Service’s work methods, sources and partners renders it impossible to initiate public criminal proceedings.

Furthermore, PET will, for security reasons, be obliged to take steps to counter certain specific threats at so early a stage that there will not necessarily be sufficient evidence for initiating criminal proceedings and for conviction even though it may be necessary to arrest and charge individuals in connection with PET’s intervention.

In accordance with the Administration of Justice Act, it is for the Prosecution Service to decide whether to initiate criminal proceedings. This applies also to cases within PET’s field of responsibility. In certain cases, including in cases regarding terrorism, the Minister of Justice decides whether to initiate criminal proceedings subject to recommendation by the Director of Public Prosecutions.

The trial of cases within PET’s field of responsibility takes place according to the rules laid down in the Administration of Justice Act. It means, among other things, that the information which PET has produced during the investigation of the case is included in the criminal case, so that the counsel for the defence has the possibility to make himself acquainted with the material.

However, the Administration of Justice Act contains rules that are applicable to all criminal cases, and which imply that the defence counsel’s access to documents may be departed from through a court order requested by the police if required by regard for, for example, foreign powers, national security, the life and limb of third parties, and the protection of confidential information about police investigation methods. The defence counsel’s access to documents may, however, not be departed from if it would give rise to considerable misgivings with regard to the conduct of the defence of the accused. In connection with the processing of such a request, a special attorney is to be appointed to safeguard the interests of the accused. The court and the specially appointed attorney will have the opportunity to familiarise themselves with the material that constitutes part of the criminal case and the material that is requested to be excluded from the criminal case. If it is decided to depart from the defence counsel’s access to documents, the information to which this decision refers will not be included in the criminal case. It means that the court which is to deal with the criminal case, the counsel for the defence, and the accused will not learn of this information, nor will the parties concerned be informed that a decision has been taken to exclude certain information from the criminal case.

PET’S OPERATIONAL EffORTS PAGE 31


As in other criminal cases, the trial of terrorist cases takes place in the full light of publicity as a general rule, which means that for example reporters have the opportunity to attend the trial, including the opportunity to listen to the evidence given by the accused and witnesses. However, the Administration of Justice Act contains rules making it possible for police officers with special functions, for example in terrorist cases, to give evidence on special conditions. Under certain conditions, the court may decide that the name and address of a police officer who is to testify shall not be disclosed, or the court may decide that the accused must leave the court room when a police officer with a special function is interviewed, if this is required in consideration of keeping the identity of the police officer secret, and if it must be deemed of no significant consequence to the defence of the accused. In addition, the court may decide that a police officer with special functions may give evidence in camera, i.e. that the general public, including the press, may not be present in the court room while the officer testifies. If the accused has been excluded from being present during a witness statement, the accused must subsequently be informed of the substance of the testimony.

A considerable number of PET staff carry out special functions which imply that it is crucial that the identity and appearance of the persons concerned are kept secret. This applies for example to staff who carry out observation tasks and staff who are in ongoing contact with PET’s sources. If Security and Intelligence Service staff are to give evidence in connection with a terrorist case, it may therefore be necessary to ask the court to decide that the evidence should be given in camera, that the accused should not be present during the

testimony, and that the identity of the witness should not be revealed.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

5.


Special Operations are a special unit within PET’s Operational Department. The unit is responsible for source handling, undercover police agents and witness protection within all parts of PET’s activity. The unit also provides assistance to the police districts to some extent.

Within PET, the concept of “sources” comprises both informants and civilian agents as well as persons who in general provide PET with information on, among other things, networks and groups of interest to the Security and Intelligence Service.

sources And informAnts

The use of sources, including informants and, in some cases, civilian agents is altogether decisive to PET’s opportunities of identifying and countering e.g. specific terrorist threats. It is therefore a particular focus and action area for PET. This is particularly the case because it is difficult for PET in certain situations and in certain environments to collect information in any other way. PET’s use of sources, including recruitment, handling and supervision of sources, is embedded in the Security and Intelligence Service’s unit for Special Operations.

The use of sources takes place according to the principles laid down in Communication No. 2/2005 issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions on guidelines regarding informants, irrespective of the fact that these guidelines do not comprise PET’s use of informants. The Communication establishes the rules for the procedures that are to apply to the contact with informants, for the managerial responsibility, including the superviser’s role, as well as rules for documentation concerning collaboration with the informant, etc.

It is the senior management within PET that decides whether the Security and Intelligence Service is to make use of a source, and determines the specific guidelines for source handling and requires that any contact with the source must be documented, which means, among other things, that a report is to be drawn up for every meeting with an informant concerning his or her informant-related activity. The report must contain information about the time and venue of the meeting, the reason for the meeting, who was present, what kind of information the informant provided, and what agreements were made with the informant, if any.

AgentsSections 754 a – 754 d of the Administration of Justice Act contain rules regarding the police use of agents. It follows from the rules that the police must not incite anybody to commit a criminal offence. Thus, the police must not as part of an investigation offer assistance or take steps with a view to inciting somebody to commit a criminal offence or continue to commit a criminal offence, unless there is a strong suspicion that

• the offence is about to be committed or attempted,

• the investigative measure must be deemed of decisive importance to the investigation, and

• the investigation concerns an offence punishable by a minimum of six years’ imprisonment.

It also follows from the rules that the police assistance must not lead to an increase in the scope and seriousness of the offence. It follows, similarly, that the assistance or measures may exclusively be carried out by police officers. It follows, furthermore, from the rules that the assistance or the measures shall take place subject to a court order.

Special Operations

SPECIAL OPERATIONS PAGE 33


It follows, however, from section 754 e of the Administration of Justice Act that the rules governing agent activity laid down in sections 754 a – 754 d do not apply in connection with investigations of, among other things, violations of section 114 of the Criminal Code on terrorism. It means that no explicit rules in the Administration of Justice Act apply to the police use of agents if the investigation concerns terrorism according to section 114 of the Criminal Code.

It means in particular that PET may use agents in connection with the investigation of terrorist matters without having to obtain a court order in advance, and the Security and Intelligence Service may, in these cases, use civilian agents. The extent to which PET otherwise may be bound by the rules that arise out of the Administration of Justice Act is decided by the courts. There is, however, in legal literature a consensus that a ban on incitement also applies to the investigation of cases concerning terrorism, i.e. that the Security and Intelligence Service must not incite persons to commit criminal offences which they are not already committing or attempting to commit.

PET’s unit for Special Operations provides assistance to investigations where secret police agents are mobilised to combat, among other things, organised crime. A police agent is typically used to infiltrate groups or areas where the police cannot operate under normal circumstances. A police agent is, in contrast to a civilian agent, a trained police officer, but working under an assumed identity that enables him/her to move in the environments that are the subject of the investigation.

Police agents are typically used in cases where PET assists in the investigation of serious organised crime. In these cases, the use of

police agents takes place in accordance with the rules of the Administration of Justice Act governing agent activities, which implies that a court order must be obtained.

witness Protection

In some cases where a person must give evidence in connection with a criminal case, including if the person has assisted the police in solving a crime, questions will arise with respect to the protection of the witness. In the vast majority of cases, it will be sufficient that the accused is not informed of the name, etc. of the witness. In the vast majority of cases, it will be sufficient that the accused is not informed of the name, etc. of the witness. Similarly, the court may decide to impose reporting restrictions on the identity of the witness, to introduce a reporting ban, and to request a private hearing. The police and the Prosecution may, furthermore, implement a number of practical measures, such as police escort, patrolling and guarding.

It is the police districts which, if required, in collaboration with the superior Prosecution and PET, are to carry out a specific assessment in each individual case of what protective measures are required to protect the witness. In altogether extraordinary cases where the measures that can be initiated by the police districts are not considered sufficient, PET may initiate witness protection measures within the framework of the so-called witness protection programme. In its present form, the programme has existed since 2001 and is constantly being developed in the light of the experience gained. In connection with the establishment of the witness protection programme in Denmark, inspiration has been sought in a number of countries in and outside Europe.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS


The special protective measures are introduced on the basis of a careful assessment of the present threat as well as of the witness that needs to be protected.

In the most serious cases, a complete change of identity may take place and the person concerned may also be helped to start a new life in another country. In such a situation, the witness will be informed that the change of identity is only possible if the person concerned refrains from committing any criminal offences and contributes to the process personally, among other things by not contacting his former circle of friends, etc. As part of this process, the witness is informed that the witness protection programme cannot be expected to continue if the witness does not comply with these conditions.

Before a person can enter the witness protection programme, a series of investigations and assessments have to be conducted to ensure that the witness protection programme will prove a success. In this connection, PET provides, for instance, legal, psychological and medical assistance.

PET is not in a position to provide further details on the practical procedure in connection with witness protection or on the number of such cases out of consideration for the persons that are to be protected.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS PAGE 35


COUNTER-TERRORISm


6.

generAl feAtures And trends

In recent years, Denmark and the rest of the Western world have experienced an increasing threat of terrorism, and the assessment is that there exists today a general terrorist threat against Denmark. Similarly, there are indications that also leading militant extremists abroad have sharpened their focus on Denmark, and that these circles wish to carry out acts of terrorism against Denmark or Danish interests abroad.

The assessment is that the Cartoon Crisis together with Denmark’s participation in the military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq in general has contributed to raising awareness of Denmark in militant extremist circles.

The threat of terrorism against Denmark emanates primarily from networks, groups and individuals that subscribe to various forms of militant Islamist ideologies, including al-Qaida-related groups. These networks may be based both in Denmark and abroad.

Complex and spectacular attacks presuppose considerable resources and solid networks in relation to logistics and planning. These types of attacks will therefore often be difficult to implement. Simpler attacks using simpler means can be implemented with less preparation and thus need to be paid particular attention by the authorities.

Terrorist attacks can take place without the availability of prior intelligence-based indications, i.e. without warning. The attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 are clear examples of such attacks.

The attacks also show that terrorists are able, through the use of easily accessible materials, to cause quite serious damage not just directly in the actual attacks, but also indirectly through the psychological effect on the general public.

In Denmark, there are individuals and environments that sympathise with and/or support groups that are engaged in terrorist activities. Similarly, there are individuals and environments in Denmark that are ready and willing to participate in terrorism-related activities.

This is underlined, for example, by the terrorism case from Vollsmose, in which three individuals in 2007 were convicted of attempted terrorism.

Other examples are the so-called Glostrup Case, in which one of the accused was sentenced in February 2007 to seven years’ imprisonment for attempting to commit terrorism, and the trial in April 2007, in which a Moroccan-born Danish citizen was sentenced to three years’ and six months’ imprisonment for, among other things, offering general advice to terrorist groups and for propagating

Counter-terrorism

The task of PET is to monitor relevant individuals and environments with the aim of preventing the planning and execution of terrorist acts in Denmark or against Danish interests as well as preventing Denmark from being used as a base for planning terrorist acts abroad. Investigations take their point of departure in Section 114 of the Criminal Code, which deals with a number of serious criminal offences (e.g. homicide, arson, kidnapping, and hijacking of aircraft) that are committed by groups, organisations and individuals with the intent to frighten the population, destabilise the order of society or seek to coerce Danish and foreign public authorities and international organisations into undertaking or omitting to undertake an act.

COUNTER-TERRORISm PAGE 37


materials suitable for recruiting members to such groups.

Even though the threat of terrorism has increased in recent years, it is important to note that, when disregarding certain conflict zones, such as parts of Iraq, the risk of becoming a random victim of a terrorist attack in Denmark or abroad is still very small.

There exists no unequivocal profile of individuals that become radicalised and subsequently recruited for terrorism.

However, experience from Denmark and other European countries in recent years shows that a substantial and increasing proportion of the militant extremists are young or very young men born and raised in the West.

These so-called “home-grown” extremists have often undergone a rapid radicalisation process, in which the internet, established extremist ideologues and charismatic individuals in combination with friends and personal networks have played an important role. These individuals do not necessarily have connections to a certain conflict area, but rather regard themselves as part of a worldwide Muslim community which in their eyes is under attack.

On a small set of shelves in the bathroom belonging

to one of those convicted in the Vollsmose Case,

the police found triacetone triperoxide – TATP – at

the shelf with towels. The small glass bottle with a

clear liquid contained approximately 50 grams of the

high-explosive. This explosive is also called “Mother

of Satan” and is often used by terrorists due to it

being relatively easy to fabricate. TATP is extremely

unstable and even little bumps or blows can trigger

an explosion.

COUNTER-TERRORISm


The intensified efforts by the authorities to combat terrorism have meant that in recent years it has become more difficult for terrorists to strike high-profile, protected targets. At the same time, the preferred modus operandi of terrorists continues to be attacks in unprotected places targeted at crowds of people with the aim of causing maximum loss of human life. There are also examples of simple attacks carried out against soft targets with a clear symbolic and political objective. This was the case with the murder of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands in 2004 and with the plans to

murder one of the cartoonists from the Danish Cartoon Crisis.

Experience from abroad shows that attacks against public transport systems are often preferred by terrorists. This is not least because means of transportation are easily accessible targets, where many people are congregated. Furthermore, attacks against public transport systems and major traffic junctions have great psychological effect on the general public, because these are places where a very large proportion of the population often comes and where many people therefore can see themselves as potential targets.

In the West, there are relatively few examples where terrorists regard critical national infrastructure, such as the transport sector, as a target in itself. Often, it would appear that the determining factor is the presence of a large number people in a single place. Therefore, attacks directed at other targets where many people congregate, such as shopping centres, bars, public squares and sports events, in principle could just as well be contemplated. Terrorists typically use home-made bombs in their attacks (often referred to as Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)).

The type of terrorist attack witnessed in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005, i.e. IEDs targeted at public transportation, will probably continue to be a principal method used by terrorists. At the same time, it is clear that terrorist groups are constantly seeking to develop new, surprising and thus unpredictable methods for carrying out attacks.

The terrorist attacks in recent years in a large number of Western and non-Western countries have underlined that terrorist attacks may take

A handwritten note with chemical designations

from the Vollsmose Case.



place without warning and strike individuals at random.

There are indications that the reprinting of the Mohammed cartoons has led to an increased focus on Denmark today also among leading militant extremists abroad, and that such circles desire to carry out acts of terrorism against Danes and Danish interests abroad. This applies particularly in regard to Danes and Danish interests in places where al-Qaida-related groups operate, especially in countries in North Africa and the Middle East as well as in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

dAnish terrorism cAses

Since the insertion of new anti-terrorism provisions in the Criminal Code in 2002, the

Prosecution Service has brought terrorism charges on several occasions. In the three terrorism cases from Glostrup, Vollsmose and Glasvej, charges were brought under the most serious provision on terrorism in section 114 of the Criminal Code, whilst in other cases criminal proceedings were initiated against those suspected of financing terrorism.

the bookseller from BrønshøjIn September 2005, after lengthy surveillance, PET arrested an individual (the bookseller from Brønshøj) who was subsequently charged with violation and attempted violation of the former provision in section 114 b of the Criminal Code concerning the advancement of the criminal activity or common purpose of a terrorist organisation.

In the Copenhagen City Court’s judgement of 11 April 2007, the accused was sentenced to three years’ and six months’ imprisonment after being found guilty as charged. On the principal charge, the Court made the following statement:

“In summary, the Court finds it proven that the defendant’s activities may be described as providing professional general advice to terrorist groups in relation to al-Qaida and groups inspired by al-Qaida whose intention is to commit terrorist acts, and that the defendant was aware of such intention. The defendant is also deemed to have been aware that the dissemination of his materials was suitable for recruiting members to the groups and suitable for strengthening the resolve of the members of the groups to commit terrorist acts. Based on the evidence presented, it is deemed that the defendant has widely distributed the materials and thus is guilty of having committed a criminal offence under section 114 b of the Criminal Code…”

“Silence, do not tell anybody what you want to

do, then you will be prevented from doing it”.

In the terror cases we have seen in Denmark, the

convicted individuals have often used closed chat

rooms on the internet to discuss bomb manuals

and exchange Islamist views. The above advice

to keep silent was given to one of the convicted

individuals from the terror case in Vollsmose.

COUNTER-TERRORISm


For the first time during the criminal case, a claim was made that the accused should be deprived of his Danish nationality. The Danish Nationality Act contains a provision whereby a person convicted of violation of one or more provisions of Chapters 12 and 13 of the Criminal Code may be deprived of his or her Danish nationality by judgement unless such deprivation causes the person concerned to become stateless. This provision was applicable in the trial of the accused, because the charge related to violation of a provision of Chapter 12 of the Criminal Code and because the individual concerned had Moroccan nationality in addition to his Danish nationality.

However, the Copenhagen City Court acquitted the accused of the claim for deprivation of nationality. The Court placed emphasis on

the length of time the person had lived in Denmark as well as the time that had elapsed since he had last been to Morocco in 1989. Furthermore, the Court felt unable to disregard the possibility that based on the nature of the crimes for which the accused had been convicted, he might be subjected to harm on his return to Morocco.

the glostrup caseIn the terrorism case from Glostrup, it was intelligence received by PET that led Glostrup Police to arrest four individuals on 27 October 2005. The case from Glostrup had connections to arrests in Bosnia, in which two individuals, including a young Turkish national, who was born and raised in Denmark, were arrested and found in possession of, among other things, explosives and weapons. The individuals arrested in Denmark had been kept under surveillance by PET for a long period of time and were subsequently charged with attempted violation of section 114 on terrorism.

In an Eastern High Court judgement on 15 February 2007, three of the defendants were acquitted. The professional judges applied the so-called “double guarantee” clause contained in the Administration of Justice Act and overturned the jury’s decision, according to which all four accused were found guilty as charged.

The convicted individual who had just turned 16 years of age was sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment. As the offence was committed before he had reached the age of 18, the maximum sentence that could be given under the Criminal Code was eight years’ imprisonment. On 3 October 2007, the Supreme Court upheld the sentence that had been pronounced, placing emphasis on the fact that the convicted youth had been found guilty of

A Danish-Turkish national and a Swedish-Bosnian

national were given lengthy prison sentences

in Sarajevo after being caught red-handed in an

apartment with 20 kgs of explosives, a suicide

video and a bomb belt. The person who has been

convicted in the Glostrup Case was punished for

co-operating with the two individuals in Sarajevo.



attempting to perpetrate the most serious form of terrorism. At the same time, however, the Supreme Court did take his young age into account.

In so far as the professional judges overturned the jury’s verdict in regard to three of the accused, it followed from the then provisions in the Administration of Justice Act that there should be a re-trial in front of a new jury, unless the Prosecution would drop the charges. In the Glostrup Case, the Prosecution decided to drop the charges against two of the accused, whereas the Minister of Justice, following a recommendation by the Director of Public Prosecutions, decided that the case against the third defendant should be re-tried before a new jury. On 10 March 2008, the accused person was acquitted after the case had been considered by a new jury.

The Glostrup Case shows that it can often be difficult to secure the necessary evidence for use in prosecuting cases of this nature due to the necessity of making arrests before the suspects have carried out their plans.

the vollsmose caseIn the terrorism case from Vollsmose, PET initiated surveillance of a group of young men in the urban district of Vollsmose in Odense after receiving information from an informant. After lengthy surveillance and investigation, several individuals were arrested on 5 September 2006 and charged with attempted violation of section 114 of the Criminal Code on terrorism. The Prosecution Service subsequently decided to institute criminal proceedings against four of the arrested individuals.

In an Eastern High Court judgement of 23 November 2007, three of the accused were found guilty, whilst the fourth was acquitted. The three convicted men were found guilty of preparing one or more bomb devices for use in a terrorist act that was to be carried out at a non-specified location in Denmark or abroad.

Metal splinters and nails, for instance, are often

used in terror bombs to increase the lethal effect

of the bomb. This bag containing 5 kgs of metal

splinters was found in the apartment of one of those

convicted in the terror case from Vollsmose.

COUNTER-TERRORISm


The convicted men had, among other things, procured fertiliser, chemicals, metal fragments and laboratory equipment. In addition, in the apartment of one of the convicted men 50 grams of the explosive TATP was found, which the occupier of the apartment had produced.

Two of the convicted were sentenced by the High Court to 11 years’ imprisonment, and one of them, an Iraqi national, was also expelled from Denmark and given a life-time ban from re-entry. The third of the convicted persons was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment.

Regarding the sentence, the High Court stated:“In determining the sentence, emphasis has been placed on the fact that MZ, AK and AA have been found guilty of attempting to perpetrate

the most serious form of terrorism, namely terrorism in connection with homicide and explosion, cf. section 114 (1) (i) and (vii) of the Criminal Code. In regard to MZ, emphasis is also placed on his leading role in connection with the planning process, including in the manufacture of TATP. In regard to AK, emphasis is placed on his considerable activity, including downloading bomb-making manuals and procuring fertiliser, chemicals, equipment, etc. In regard to AA, emphasis is placed in a mitigating direction on the secondary nature of his involvement and on his attempt to withdraw his involvement, albeit not a matter of voluntary abandonment of an attempt.”

The Eastern High Court’s judgement was appealed to the Supreme Court by the three

Ph

oto

: sc

An

Pix

Police scenes-

of-crime officers

carrying out a

search at Glasvej

in Copenhagen.



accused and also by the Prosecution Service. On 10 April 2008, the Supreme Court increased the sentence for all three convicted persons, which meant that two of them were sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment and the third was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. At the same time, the Supreme Court upheld the expulsion of one of the convicted persons.

the glasvej caseOn the night of 3-4 September 2007, PET carried out a large-scale operation in the Copenhagen area, which saw eight people arrested and charged with preparing an act of terrorism using explosives. At the same time, searches were carried out in 11 localities. The arrests were carried out by PET’s Special Intervention Unit with help from forensics officers and explosives experts from the military. During the searches, it was necessary to evacuate residents on a stairway in Copenhagen’s North-West district for security reasons, as there was the presence of unstable explosives in the building.

Prior to the arrests, the arrested individuals had been kept under surveillance. The surveillance and PET’s other investigations showed that persons among the arrested had procured materials for use in manufacturing one or more bomb devices. In addition, a test explosion of the explosive TATP had been prepared and carried out.

The arrested were all men aged between 19 and 29 years of foreign extraction. Six of the arrested were Danish nationals, while two were foreign nationals with a permanent Danish residence permit. They were all charged with attempted violation of section 114 of the Criminal Code on terrorism.

Two of the arrested were presented before a magistrate the same day and thereafter remanded in custody. No request was made to remand the other six arrested persons in custody and the charges against them were subsequently dropped.

In March 2008, charges were brought against the two detainees. They have both been charged with attempted terrorism under section 114 (1) (i) and (vii) of the Criminal Code, cf. section 21. The trial is scheduled to take place at the Court of Frederiksberg in front of a jury in autumn 2008.

On 11 November 2007, PET also arrested a 22-year-old man with connections to the two detained men. This youth was suspected of incitement to kidnap Danes abroad for the purpose of coercing the Danish authorities to release the two detainees. In March 2008, the 22-year-old was charged with attempted terrorism under section 114 (1) (iii) of the Criminal Code, cf. section 21. The trial of this individual is scheduled to take place at the Court of Frederiksberg during 2008.

dAnish-BAsed suPPort to illegAl Activities ABroAd

PET’s investigations show that a number of individuals with a Danish residence permit are involved in, or in other ways provide support to, terrorism-related activities in a number of countries, including Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen and Somalia. The tendency can also be observed in other EU Member States, where individuals undergo militant Islamist radicalisation. This radicalisation may entail, for example, that the individuals in question are willing to travel to conflict zones in order to receive military training, participate in hostilities or take part in performing various forms of logistic support functions.

COUNTER-TERRORISm


In 2006 and 2007, a number of individuals with connection to Denmark were arrested in conflict zones in the Middle East and Africa. A proportion of these individuals were released from prison after shorter or longer periods of time, whilst others await court trial and can expect to receive long prison sentences in the countries concerned. PET has increased its awareness of this tendency because individuals who have taken part in hostilities and gained operational experience from conflict zones abroad may constitute a security risk in Denmark.

At the same time, PET’s investigations show that in Denmark there are also individuals who provide various forms of assistance with the aim of facilitating acts of terrorism abroad. The Danish networks collaborate with, for example, foreign networks in efforts to recruit and radicalise individuals abroad who are willing

to take part in hostilities in conflict areas, primarily Iraq.

Investigations in this area are often hampered by the fact that the activities take place abroad. However, this is a problem of which PET is extremely aware and which the Security and Intelligence Service through its investigations endeavours to uncover and counter by means of relevant measures.

internet

PET’s investigations in 2006-2007 documented the important role that the internet plays not only in the environments investigated by the Security and Intelligence Service, but also in the international communication and dissemination of messages that have relevance for the threat picture in Denmark.

Ph

oto

: sc

An

Pix



The internet plays an increasingly important role for terrorist groups and networks which utilise this medium to spread their messages, to communicate, to provide virtual training and to provide logistic support and operational planning.

The terrorism cases from Glostrup and Vollsmose as well as other investigations in Denmark show that individuals in militant networks in Denmark regularly visit militant websites and access violent material such as film clips from conflict zones, execution videos as well as religious speeches by Islamist ideologues and al-Qaida leaders.

At the same time, the Danish terrorism cases have shown that using the internet does not require special skills when it comes to obtaining information on how to plan and carry out a terrorist attack. Effective bomb-making recipes and manuals are easily accessible for individuals wishing to carry out a terrorist act.

The international challenge that Denmark faced at the beginning of 2006, partly as a result of the Cartoon Crisis, confirmed not only that the internet is a well-suited medium for quickly raising public awareness of a certain issue, but it also served as an illustrative example of how the medium can be used to present threats.

The targeted efforts in connection with uncovering extremist activities on the internet are an integral element of PET’s work.

non-ProliferAtion

A number of countries and certain terrorist organisations continuously endeavour to develop and produce chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological substances that can be used as weapons of mass destruction. Consequently, there is a strong focus in Denmark and a number of other countries to enforce the international agreements and rules that are designed to prevent and minimise the export of weapons of mass destruction and products that can be used to manufacture them.

In particular after the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001 and due to the increased threat of terrorism that has existed since then, considerable attention is paid to the risk presented by chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons and thus also to the question of what actions can be taken to monitor and control the export of weapons and products that can be used in the development of weapons of mass destruction.

Depending on the circumstances, weapons of mass destruction can be used to carry out a terrorist attack. At the same time, the fear

PET’s investigations within the field of non-proliferation (of weapons of mass destruction) aim at gathering, processing and analysing information in order to obtain an overview of which countries could be suspected of wanting to develop weapons of mass destruction, and of which individuals and groups are involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

COUNTER-TERRORISm


that these weapons might fall into the wrong hands could in itself give rise to concern and insecurity. This fear was evident, for example, in connection with the anthrax letters in the USA in 2001 and 2002, which caused deaths and at the same time spread insecurity and gave cause for concern. Genuine nuclear weapons are so complicated to develop that it is probably still only a handful of countries

which have the capability and capacity to manufacture them. In contrast, the technology needed to make biological and chemical weapons can be used by both governmental and non-governmental actors. Similarly, both governmental and non-governmental actors have the ability to produce primitive radiological weapons.

The high technological level in Denmark means that many of the products and technologies as well as much of the expertise that are necessary in order to develop and build weapons of mass destruction programmes can be acquired in Denmark or through Danish companies.

Therefore, it is important that Danish companies and research institutions are aware of the risk of disseminating products and knowledge that can be used in connection with the manufacturing of chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological weapons, particularly when these companies and institutions have contact with partners in countries that are suspected of actively seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction. It is important to be aware that attempts will often be made to acquire proliferation-related products by indirect means, such as front companies and middle-men, in order to mask the real identity of the end-user of the products.

As part of PET’s efforts within the field of non-proliferation, PET has paid a number of visits to Danish companies and education institutions, some jointly with the Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority. Similarly, regular studies and investigations have been carried out of various transactions relating to the export of dual-use equipment to critical countries.

Ph

oto

: sc

An

Pix



terrorist finAncing

Even though the acts of terrorism carried out in Europe in recent years have been “inexpensive” actions, transfers of funds can be an important indicator in investigations of individuals or networks that are planning to commit a terrorist act. At the same time, investigations of, for example, fund transfers can yield important information about individuals affiliated to a group of persons suspected of terrorist activity.

PET is aware to what extent financing networks evolve from primarily being a support function in connection with terrorism to having a more operational role in relation to the planning and execution of terrorist acts. With their resolve, international connections and experience in operating covertly, the financing networks can play an important role in activities that may have direct importance for the threat to Denmark and Danish interests abroad.

Both in Denmark and in the rest of Europe, the groups of persons that are suspected of involvement in terrorist activities have, by and large, been self-financed. This means that the money is often procured by means of personal income, simple offences against property or credit card fraud, which complicates investigative possibilities. In addition, it can be difficult to prove the direct connection of the money transactions to terrorism, partly

because terrorist networks often make use of several intermediate stages in, for example, fund transfers.

PET’s focus on the field of terrorist financing is targeted at financial resources that are exported out of Denmark to different conflict zones in, for example, the Middle East. Each year, therefore, PET in co-operation with other authorities carries out a number of control actions in airports, etc. The combination of PET’s control actions and other security activities that are carried out in Danish airports reveals that many travellers export considerable cash sums to countries in conflict zones.

If in connection with a control action suspicions are raised, more detailed investigations will be initiated, and there may also be grounds for confiscating values, including cash sums.

The unit co-operates with a number of institutions, primarily in the state and financial sectors, including banks, electronic payment services (PBS), the Public Prosecutor for Serious Economic Crime (SØK) and the Danish tax authorities (SKAT). Similarly, in 2006 and 2007, the unit paid a number of visits to companies in which awareness presentations were given with focus on suspicious money transfers – both into and out of Denmark.

PET’s efforts within the field of terrorist financing aim at preventing the transfer or passing on of funds to individuals, organisations, groups or associations that are involved in terrorism.

Since 2004, PET has had a special unit – the TEFINE (Terror Financial Networks) Unit – which investigates suspicious financial transactions, which may be in violation of Section 114 a of the Criminal Code with respect to terrorist financing.

COUNTER-TERRORISm


center for terror AnAlysis (ctA) CTA’s analyses can be divided into three categories:

• Threat assessments in relation to specific individuals, events and threats, but also more general national threat assessments.

• Analyses of terrorist groups or threats abroad of importance for Denmark or, for example, tourist destinations abroad which Danes travel to.

• Analyses of tendencies in the terrorism field, such as how terrorism is financed and how individuals become involved in terrorist activity.

CTA’s analyses are used by the Government’s security organisation as a basis for decisions in connection with counter-terrorism. In this respect, principal recipients of the analyses are the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Defence and the Danish Emergency Management Agency.

However, the analyses are used also by, for example, the police in connection with tackling specific tasks relating to terrorism cases and in connection with street-level efforts to prevent terrorism.

Some CTA analyses are published. This applies, for example, to an analysis on radicalisation that describes the different phases that a person might undergo – e.g. in Islamist circles in Denmark – toward steadily increasing acceptance of undemocratic and violent means to achieve political and religious ends. Another analysis deals with Islamist ideologues’ use of a violent interpretation of the jihad concept in their effort to motivate Muslims to participate in violent activities. In addition, CTA’s

PET’s Center for Terror Analysis (CTA) was established in October 2006 and became fully operational on 1 January 2007.

CTA’s task is to conduct analyses and assessments of the threat of terrorism in relation to Denmark and in so doing contribute to improving the ability of Danish authorities to prevent and investigate acts of terrorism.

CTA comprises staff from the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (FE), the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark and the Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA), respectively. Staff are seconded to CTA on a rotation basis.

Affiliated to CTA, a reference group has been established, comprising representatives of the participating authorities.

Since its creation, CTA has produced more than 100 analyses on a wide range of topics concerning the threat of terrorism to Denmark and Danish interests abroad



assessment of the nature and scale of the threat of terrorism to Denmark is published on PET’s website.

Assessment of the terror threAt AgAinst denmArk (vtd)

In May 2007, CTA presented for the first time the document, Assessment of the Terror Threat Against Denmark (VTD), which describes and assesses the general nature and scale of the terrorist threat against Denmark and Danes abroad. The VTD is compiled on the basis of information from numerous sources, including CTA’s other analyses, material from the participating authorities, reports from partners as well as open sources. The assessment is presented to relevant authorities, including the Government’s security organisation, and determines the national threat level.

The VTD is updated at regular intervals or in the event of sudden and significant changes in the threat picture.

As a point of departure, the VTD is classified. However, an unclassified version is published on PET’s website at www.pet.dk/CTA

The purpose of publishing an assessment of the terror threat against Denmark is to provide citizens with a more extensive and better understanding of the threat from terrorism. Furthermore, the purpose is also to meet the increasing interest of the public for this area and at the same time to avoid the formation of myths and misunderstandings. Therefore, it has been decided to publish a summary of the current terrorist threat and a lengthy report describing the elements in further detail. The assessment, however, includes no specific recommendations for the citizens. In case the threat assessments should give rise to specific recommendations, these will be given directly by the authorities responsible, e.g. the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Danish Emergency Management Agency and the national police districts.

COUNTER-ExTREmISm

7.


left-wing extremism

The left-wing extremist environment in Denmark appears today more as a united front, in a way not seen since Denmark held the EU Presidency

in 2002. This is primarily the result of the conflict surrounding the youth centre, Ungdomshuset, at Jagtvej 69 in Copenhagen.

In the period leading up to the clearance of the house on 1 March 2007, there was massive national and international support and backing to the youth centre environment in the form of support actions and demonstrations. In this connection, 137 incidents involving vandalism, demonstrations, placard posting, etc. against Danish Missions abroad were observed.

As a result of the clearance of Ungdomshuset, which resulted in several days of massive street disturbances in Copenhagen, the environment around Ungdomshuset launched a new strategy to acquire a new building, which partly involved holding weekly “Thursday demonstrations”. In addition, on 6 October 2007, activists attempted to occupy a disused pumping station in Copenhagen. Demonstrations, vandalism, violence and other initiatives instigated in support of Ungdomshuset resulted in approx. 1,600 arrests, including of foreign nationals, in the period between mid-December 2006 and the beginning of October 2007. The disturbances required an extremely resource-demanding effort on the part of the police.

In June 2007, individuals from the left-wing extremist environment participated in demonstrations in connection with the G8 summit in Heiligendamm in Germany. A number of the tactics that the demonstrators used during the G8 demonstrations were employed in the attempt to occupy a disused pumping station in Copenhagen on 6 October 2007.

clearance of ungdomshusetThe illegal occupation of the youth centre, Ungdomshuset, at Jagtvej 69 in Copenhagen was terminated on 1 March 2007. In the months

Counter-extremism

One of PET’s principal tasks is to prevent groups or individuals from employing extremist and undemocratic methods – e.g. violence, vandalism or threats – to achieve political, ideological or religious objectives. Characteristic of the steadily increasing polarisation and radicalisation of the extreme wings of the political spectrum is the steadily increasing internationalisation and collaboration between likeminded individuals outside Denmark in connection with demonstrations, etc. Within the field of counter-extremism, extensive efforts are carried out, as in other parts of the Security and Intelligence Service, to prevent right- or left-wing extremists from committing criminal offences or disturbing public peace and order. One of PET’s key tasks is to inform the police in Denmark and abroad about extremist threats, so as to enable the relevant police authorities to tailor the response to the current threat.

Ph

oto

: sc

An

Pix

COUNTER-ExTREmISm PAGE 51


leading up to the clearance, Ungdomshuset had been heavily barricaded by the youth centre’s users, who had no intention of leaving the building voluntarily. Together with the Copenhagen Police, PET was involved in, among other things, the planning and execution of the clearance operation. The actual operation to clear Ungdomshuset was carried out very quickly and without causing serious personal injury. In connection with the clearance, a large number of chrysanthemum bombs were found, among other things.

For many years, Ungdomshuset had been a popular venue for a number of activities in the Copenhagen activist environment. The loss of the building led to violent protest

demonstrations, primarily in Copenhagen’s Nørrebro district. In the days and months following the clearance of Ungdomshuset, demonstrations on several occasions resulted in violent riots in which, for example, cars were set alight and Molotov cocktails were thrown at the personnel carriers used by the police. Similarly, the clearance has been used by extremist environments as a pretext for further radicalisation.

right-wing extremism

In relation to the right-wing extremist environment in Denmark, PET has in recent years observed a continued high level of activity. Both internationally and nationally within the last few years, fronts have been

Ph

oto

: sc

An

Pix

COUNTER-ExTREmISm


sharply drawn up on the extreme wings of the political spectrum. In Europe, terrorist attacks have struck, among other places, Madrid and London, and the rolling up of terrorist cells in a number of European countries has reinforced the perception and belief among certain groups on the extreme right wing that the West is in conflict with the Muslim world. In Denmark, the Cartoon Crisis and the ongoing terrorism cases have had a similar effect.

The various groups continue to engage in active efforts to recruit new members and sympathisers. Between the groups there is a certain degree of mutual co-operation, which is reflected, for example, in the form of frequent meetings at concerts, demonstrations and other events.

Also internationally, there continues to be co-operation between right-wing extremist

groups in Denmark and abroad, and persons from the right-wing extremist environments in Denmark have participated in manifestations outside the country’s borders.

A concrete example of international co-operation could be seen at the annual Rudolf Hess March in 2007, which took place in Kolding. The demonstration was scheduled to take place in the German town of Wunsiedel, but was banned by the German authorities, which is why it was held in Kolding instead.

Approx. 150 neo-Nazis from several countries, including Denmark, Sweden and Germany, took part in the march. A further 50 right-wing German extremists were detained at the Danish-German border. In connection with the event, clashes occurred between the participants in the march and the police.



Disseminating and promoting racist and derisive messages on the internet, through the media, through posters and fliers continue to be one of the means systematically used by right-wing extremist groups and individuals. The aim of these messages is to recruit and retain supporters as well as create antagonism between the general public and ethnic minorities.

It is the assessment that the group of persons responsible for the more general propagation of right-wing extremist messages is also involved in acts of intimidation and harassment of persons of another ethnic origin.

In the efforts to promote polarisation, there is a constant awareness in right-wing extremist circles in relation to how the public agenda can best be utilised as a platform for delivering right-wing extremist messages. In this context, the right-wing extremist environment retains a considerable focus on the Cartoon Crisis. However, in connection with the propagation of right-wing extremist views, there have also been several examples where efforts have been made to exploit the publicity surrounding arrests and trials concerning planned terrorist attacks in Denmark and abroad.

In recent years, there have been examples where right-wing extremist networks have publicly announced an end to their activities. The persons behind the network have, however, typically continued their activities in new or already existing right-wing extremist groups.

The organisation Dansk Front, which used to be a strong force in the right-wing extremist environment, dissolved itself in July 2007. Prior to its dissolution, the organisation was characterised by internal discord. The organisation’s spokesman was expelled in

October 2006 after calling for an arson attack against the Minister for the Interior and Health. In August 2007, the spokesman was sentenced to six months’ imprisonment for this offence. Following the dissolution of Dansk Front, the extreme right-wing’s activities continued in other similar organisations and networks.

In general, it is PET’s assessment that the right-wing extremist environment contains the potential for further radicalisation and violent conflicts.

confrontations between right- and left-wing extremistsIn recent years, incidents of confrontation between individuals and groups, respectively, from the right- and left-wing extremist environments have been steadily increasing in number. The majority of incidents have involved actions, including of a violent nature, carried out by the left-wing extremist environment and targeted at the events (demonstrations, meetings, etc.) held by individuals and groups from the right-wing extremist environment. However, there have also been examples observed where right-wing extremists have been responsible for violent activities against left-wing extremists. It is PET’s assessment that within the left- and right-wing extremist environments there is an increased focus on such violent activities.

Whilst the number of violent episodes continues to be relatively low, it is PET’s assessment that there is a risk that the confrontations may escalate. In this connection, PET has observed increased efforts in right- and left-wing extremist circles to obtain weapons as part of the reciprocal violence. The use of these weapons in the confrontations will lead to a considerable escalation of the violence in such confrontations.

COUNTER-ExTREmISm


threats against public figuresIn recent years, there has been increasing focus on threats and harassment against politicians and other public figures. The extent to which a person risks being subjected to threats and harassment typically depends on the respective person’s visibility in the public arena or arises in connection with specific issues. There are examples where politicians on both the right and left wing are occasionally subjected to serious harassment. PET is kept regularly informed of this type of matter and assesses, among other things, whether the threats warrant special security-related measures.

It can be difficult to provide a comprehensive profile of the kind of person who harasses and threatens politicians. It can range from persons who are angry at “the system”, persons who are mentally ill, persons who are under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or resourceful citizens who are used to getting their own way. And then there is, naturally, the threat from extremist environments.

Certain politicians may be extremely vulnerable, but in general the level of threat against

politicians can be regarded as low. PET therefore does not believe that there has been an increase in the number of cases or that the nature of the cases has worsened. Nevertheless, even less serious forms of harassment and threats can place major stress on the politician targeted. At the same time, it is naturally a societal problem if politicians are threatened or harassed by virtue of their political activity. For this reason also, it is important that persons who in the course of their political activities are subjected to harassment or threatening behaviour report such behaviour to the police.

In spring 2006, PET collaborated with Local Government Denmark (LGDK) to produce a handbook that contains tips and advice for, among others, local politicians on how to prepare themselves to face threats and violence and how to respond in such situations.

rAcism And xenoPhoBiA

Criminal offences that are potentially racially motivated are an area that PET takesvery seriously as part of the Security and Intelligence Service’s efforts to prevent and counter extremism which, depending on the circumstances, can constitute a security threat in Denmark.

Since autumn 1992, PET has received reports from the police districts on criminal offences and incidents that are suspected of being racially motivated and are directed against foreigners. The arrangement was altered in 2001 to include any criminal offence or incident that is potentially motivated by racism or religious hostility, irrespective of whether the criminal offence or incident is directed against a person or interest of foreign or Danish origin.

PET has produced a set of guidelines for the police districts that describe in which situations

Ph

oto

: sc

An

Pix



PET should be notified of criminal offences that are potentially racially or religiously motivated. According to these guidelines, PET should be notified when the criminal offence is potentially motivated by the perpetrator’s conceptions about differences between people on the grounds of race, skin colour, descent, national or ethnic origin, or their faith/religion.

Thus, PET should be notified when one or more possible indicators point in the direction of racist or religious elements in a criminal offence, unless this is conclusively contradicted by other information. In other words, there is no requirement that the racist or religious motivation behind the criminal offence must be clearly demonstrated.

The objective of this reporting scheme is primarily to provide PET with the possibility of assessing whether there are signs of a more organised and systematic criminal activity arising out of racism and xenophobia. This assessment is made by comparing each reported offence with the rest of the stored information of PET and by comparing the various reported offences.

In 2007, PET received reports of 35 cases of a potentially racist nature. The previous year 96 cases were reported, while the figure was 87 for 2005.

The reported cases from 2007 primarily relate to various forms of harassment and vandalism, whilst only a few cases relate to threats and violence.

According to PET’s assessment, it remains uncertain to what extent the reports accurately reflect the scope and nature of criminal offences with a potential racist or religious motive. This is due to a number of different

factors, including the fact that not all criminal offences with a potential racist or religious motive are reported to the police districts, as well as the fact that it remains uncertain whether the districts actually notify PET of all relevant offences.

In the light of the above and because the information received must generally be considered relatively limited, it is, according to PET’s assessment, very difficult with even a moderate certainty to comment on the causes, correlations, developments and trends in regard to this type of cases.

The number of reports in 2005 and 2006 were quite similar, while there was a decrease in the number of reports in 2007. There was a similar decrease in the number of reports concerning violations of Sections 266 b and 266 c of the Danish Criminal Code.

Based on these observations, PET wishes to reorganise the present reporting system in such a way as to allow PET greater opportunity itself to collect, process and analyse the relevant information directly in the police’s electronic case-handling system. Such a reorganisation would in PET’s view make it possible in the future to obtain a more adequate and accurate picture of developments in an area that is still, nevertheless, characterised by the fact that not all criminal offences that are potentially motivated by racism necessarily come to the knowledge of the police.

It has, furthermore, been decided to expand the existing reporting system to include also criminal acts that may be politically motivated.

COUNTER-ESPIONAGE

8.


The threat of espionage against Denmark and Danish interests has changed in line with the international security policy developments. During the Cold War, intelligence services from the Warsaw Pact countries in particular operated actively in the West. The primary objectives of this espionage activity were to exert political influence for the benefit of the

Soviet Union and the Communist ideology as well as obtain technical and scientific products and information that, due to the embargo restrictions, could not be legally transferred to Warsaw Pact countries. Furthermore, as a result of the security policy situation, there was great interest in Western countries’ military strategies, development and mutual co-operation.

The threat of espionage against Denmark remains present – not least due to increasing globalisation, international competition and the high level of technological know-how. However, the threat today has become more multifaceted and manifests itself in other areas than actual subversive activities and the circumvention of trade restrictions. Interest is increasingly targeted at unlawfully obtaining information within, for example, research and technology.

Counter-espionage

Certain foreign intelligence services continue to be very active in Denmark, where attempts are made to obtain information about foreign and security policy matters. Also information of a more factual and technical nature is sought, such as information about vital lines of communication, utilities and research findings. Countering and preventing espionage therefore continues to be an important field of responsibility for PET.

COUNTER-ESPIONAGE PAGE 57


As espionage can be a serious threat to Denmark’s security and competitiveness, it is vital that organisations, companies, public authorities and the general public are aware that there continue to be countries, organisations and companies that attempt to gather confidential information by unlawful means.

The very few cases of espionage that have come to public knowledge in Denmark cannot be taken as evidence that espionage does not occur in Denmark. In a number of instances, PET’s preventive efforts have prevented cases from developing into serious cases of espionage. In these instances, PET has interrupted developments that have been on the brink of developing into genuine espionage, for example by drawing attention to the fact that PET was aware of activities that could constitute a violation of the Criminal Code.

In addition, it is assumed that the official figure for cases of industrial espionage does not reflect the true figure, as a number of companies for various reasons choose not to report suspicions of espionage to the authorities.

In recent years, several countries in Europe have been subjected to electronic industrial espionage (hacking) attacks targeted at the strategic and financial planning of public authorities and private companies. In several instances, there has been suspicion of espionage activity perpetrated by foreign intelligence services. Although no similar tendencies have as yet been observed in Denmark, it is an area of which PET is very much aware. Therefore, in the light of the increasing digitalisation of public institutions and private companies, among other things, PET will implement a number of initiatives to raise awareness of the risk of

electronic industrial espionage and attacks with the purpose of disrupting the operation of information systems etc.

ORGANISED CRImE

9.


During 2006, approx. 150 employees were transferred from the National Centre of Investigation (NEC) of the Danish National Police to PET. The transfer comprised, among other things, a number of staff from NEC’s Flying Squad as well as the Monitoring and Analysis Unit. This unit is now attached to PET’s Centre for Organised Crime, which comprises an Analysis Section and an Investigation Section.

The task of the Centre for Organised Crime is to analyse the most serious forms of organised crime. By the most serious forms of organised crime is meant gang and network crime, which is characterised by its international and professional nature and which is committed by use of violence, threats and weapons in hard-to-infiltrate environments where the security level is high.

Based on the analyses, PET’s Centre for Organised Crime draws up specific proposals for

investigation and forwards these matters to the appropriate police district. The investigation is subsequently anchored in the particular police district and is conducted under the normal supervision of the regional public prosecutor in question. Officers from PET can participate in the investigation by specified agreement.

Another task of PET’s Centre for Organised Crime is to contribute to identifying potential relations between the most serious forms of organised crime and the Security and Intelligence Service’s other areas of operation, including the efforts to combat terrorism.

The objective of the efforts to combat the most serious forms of organised crime is to secure a basis for proactive and intelligence-based intervention, early and precisely, in order to prevent a criminal act from taking full effect. To assist these efforts, the Centre for Organised Crime therefore makes wide use of sources,

Organised crime

Seized narcotics

ORGANISED CRImE PAGE 59


observation and other forms of technical intervention. Similarly, co-operation with the police authorities of other countries is of vital importance and therefore assigned high priority.

The co-operation between PET’s Centre for Organised Crime, the Danish National Police, the police districts and foreign police authorities, etc. has on an ongoing basis resulted in the launch of investigations into criminal gangs and networks with international branches that extend beyond Europe. The investigations have dealt with, for example, extremely serious drug and weapons violations as well as serious bodily harm crime. In the cases that at the present time have resulted in indictments and convictions, the convicted persons have received lengthy prison sentences.

In an extensive drugs case with international connections, a Danish national was convicted in December 2007 of smuggling 15 kg of cocaine and approx. 550 kg of hash into the country, and also of committing 15 counts of document forgery. The Danish national was arrested and convicted on the basis of investigations conducted with assistance from PET’s Centre for Organised Crime and in collaboration with a number of authorities. The convicted person, who has connections to a European criminal organisation, was sentenced to 11 years’ and 6 months’ imprisonment. The convicted person has appealed the judgment, but admitted document forgery and smuggling 550 kg of hash into Denmark

During 2007, PET’s Centre for Organised Crime in collaboration with Funen Police carried out an investigation into a narcotics organisation that, among other things, manufactured “skunk” (an improved form of cannabis). During a large-scale police operation in December 2007 on Funen, in Jutland and on Lolland-Falster, five skunk- Profits from a delivery

manufacturing laboratories were uncovered. The investigation also uncovered a number of criminal offences across the country related to extensive trade in narcotics. A total of nine people aged 25 to 50 were arrested, including a 27-year-old ringleader. In the same case, a further nine people had been arrested earlier.

Investigators and analysis officers from PET’s Centre for Organised Crime have also contributed to strengthening the intelligence-related efforts within the field of anti-terrorism and have provided considerable assistance in connection with the investigations regarding the Glostrup Case, the Vollsmose Case and the Glasvej Case.

Lastly, PET’s Centre for Organised Crime has provided assistance to a number of other countries as part of investigations into serious organised crime against individuals or networks that, in connection with their criminal activities, have had contact to or have resided in Denmark.

SECURITY


the sPeciAl intervention unit

PET’s Special Intervention Unit is a special unit whose task is to maintain an operational anti-terrorism preparedness and response capability and contribute to combating serious forms of crime by providing sound options for performing difficult police assignments where the standard police training and equipment is not adequate.

The Special Intervention Unit comprises a number of police officers who form part of a preparedness capability that is able to respond to sudden unforeseen events. When not engaged in operations, Special Intervention Unit police officers receive various forms of training, including tactical intervention training, target practice and other similar activities.

As a rule, officers are required to have served in the police force for five years before being eligible to apply to join the Special Intervention Unit, and the admission process itself consists of both physical and psychological tests. Besides being in good physical shape, applicants must possess composure, level-headedness and common sense, and also have good collaboration skills in order to join the Special Intervention Unit.

Once admitted into the Special Intervention Unit, officers undergo a long and intensive training programme. The training encompasses, among other things, gun battles in enclosed spaces, fire-fighting, liberation of hostages on aircrafts, in houses and on buses, advanced first-aid, assault exercises from rooftops and helicopters, as well as sea-based operations.

Special Intervention Unit tasks include, among others:

• Hostage rescue• Dangerous arrest operations • Planning, management and execution of

difficult intervention assignments• Special personal protection • Special monitoring assignments

The Special Intervention Unit engages in ongoing collaboration with units from the Danish armed forces that provide assistance in the form of personnel and ordnance as

10. Security

The Security Department provides operational support to PET’s other units as well as the police districts from the Special Intervention Unit, the Surveillance Unit, the Technical Support Centre and the Negotiation Group, respectively. In addition, the Department’s Personal Protection Unit and Physical Protection Group undertake a number of personal protection assignments. The Security Department participated with considerable manpower and equipment in the arrest operations in connection with the terrorism cases from Vollsmose and Copenhagen as well as in the clearance of the youth centre, Ungdomshuset, at Jagtvej 69 in Copenhagen.

SECURITY PAGE 61


well as support in operational assignments and in connection with training. In addition, working groups have been established to co-ordinate knowledge, technology and tactics that are used in connection with operational assignments and training where the armed forces provide back-up for the police.

The international collaboration between intervention forces in Europe is constantly extended in order to develop and utilise the technical and tactical capacities that the intervention units possess. Therefore, the Special Intervention Unit participates in meeting fora and working groups with the Nordic countries and the EU Member States.

In August 2007, Belgium, Germany, Finland, Norway and Sweden participated with observers, intervention groups, aircrafts and landing crafts in a large-scale maritime exercise at Frederikshavn, which was conducted by the Special Intervention Unit with support from the armed forces. The exercise scenario was a hijacking of the passenger ship, Peter Wessel.

the surveillAnce unit

The Surveillance Unit is a crucial support function for the Security and Intelligence Service’s operational activities, in particular in relation to terrorism, espionage, extremism and serious organised crime. The Surveillance Unit carries out shadow assignments, fixed monitoring assignments of different kinds,

photo assignments, surveillance and searches. In addition, the Surveillance Unit assists in the installation of surveillance equipment as well as equipment that supports interception of communication.

Similarly, the Surveillance Unit provides assistance to the police districts in connection with the investigation of other forms of serious crime, i.e. when the investigation requires the use of the Surveillance Unit’s special capacities and competencies. Furthermore, the Surveillance Unit provides training support for the officers in the police districts that undertake observation assignments.

The Surveillance Unit is primarily composed of police officers who undergo a special training programme in PET, which is supplemented by courses abroad. Similarly in this area, lessons learned and experience are shared with corresponding units in other countries.

If a member of the Special Intervention Unit needs

to wear all of his equipment, he is carrying around 60

kg. The above photos show the Special Intervention

Unit – with support from the armed forces – during

an exercise in northern Jutland. The passenger ship

“Peter Wessel” has been hijacked by terrorists and

the exercise is to liberate the ship.

SECURITY


the technicAl suPPort centre

PET’s Technical Support Centre performs a number of tasks within the field of technical and IT-based surveillance, tracking and security as support for PET’s operational units.

The centre’s main fields of activity are to provide technical assistance in regard to the establishment of different types of surveillance and interception. In addition, the Technical Support Centre provides assistance in connection with the tracking of individuals or vehicles. Furthermore, the Technical Support Centre performs security sweeps, for example in connection with uncovering hidden weapons, explosives and communications interception equipment at special localities. The centre also supports the operational units in connection with searches, securing of information, etc.The Technical Support Centre is typically composed of police officers who have a supplementary technical training qualification,

such as electronics or radio technicians. However, the Technical Support Centre also has engineers and civilian IT experts on its staff.

The staff are divided into function-based groups with different competencies, and they regularly receive individual competence development training, including abroad, that takes a point of departure in their current level of technical expertise. The Technical Support Centre maintains close dialogue with partners throughout the world in the development of technical surveillance equipment, etc.

The Technical Support Centre also provides a certain degree of assistance to the police districts in connection with invasion of the secrecy of communication and assists in the technical training of the staff in the districts that undertake duties relating to invasion of the secrecy of communication.

Ph

oto

: All

An

hA

ns

en

, hA

lsn

æs

ko

mm

un

e

The royal couple

during a visit in

Frederiksværk on 14

June 2007.

SECURITY PAGE 63


the PersonAl Protection unit

As a consequence of developments in the general threat picture and not least a number of specific threats, PET has in recent years been assigned a steadily growing number of tasks relating to the protection of individuals and institutions.

PET is responsible for all personal protection tasks in Denmark in the public sector, and PET’s Personal Protection Unit today protects members of the Royal Family, members of the Government, certain politicians and foreign ambassadors, as well as, under certain circumstances, foreign guests and other public figures in Denmark. Personal protection is offered on the basis of a concrete threat assessment.

The Personal Protection Unit comprises police officers that have typically served in the police force for six to seven years before being

recruited to the unit. Officers wishing to join the Personal Protection Unit undergo physical fitness tests, language tests as well as tests in weapons use and driving ability. A personal protection officer must be in good physical shape, have good co-operation skills and be able to keep a clear head in pressure situations. Each year, personal protection officers are required to pass tests in, among other things, driving skills, weapons use and physical training.

The Personal Protection Unit has command of a special unit – “Gamma 10” – which has a special mission-oriented training programme and access to special equipment. In close collaboration with the special units and personal protection officers of the armed forces, Gamma 10 undertakes personal protection assignments in connection with, for example, ministerial visits to conflict areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

As already mentioned, personal protection is an increasingly important task for the Security and Intelligence Service and through more frequent recruitment of new staff from, among other places, PET’s Special Intervention Unit, attempts have been made by PET to accommodate the steadily increasing need for trained personal protection officers. In connection with the implementation in 2007 of Anti-Terrorism Package III, PET was allocated approx. a further DKK 20 million, which was earmarked for special purposes, including a strengthening of the Personal Protection Unit.

A special office, Operational Co-ordination, provides support for the Personal Protection Unit and deals with, among other things, cases concerning threats against Ministers, Members of the Folketing (MFs) and public figures. In this respect, Operational Co-ordination conducts security briefings and, when necessary, implements relevant security measures.

Ph

oto

: All

An

hA

ns

en

, hA

lsn

æs

ko

mm

un

e

SECURITY


“Gamma 10” personal protection officers at work in

one of the world hotspots. Gamma 10 is a special unit

within PET’s Physical Protection Group that undertakes

personal protection assignments in connection with,

for example, ministerial visits to conflict areas.

SECURITY PAGE 65


In addition, Operational Co-ordination performs tasks relating to, for instance, the organisation of visits abroad by certain Ministers, and in this regard undertakes responsibility for the contact to Danish embassies abroad and foreign authorities. Operational Co-ordination also carries out security briefings of staff from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prior to their postings in certain countries.

the negotiAtion grouP

PET’s Negotiation Group provides assistance in connection with, for example, kidnapping and hostage situations. The task of the negotiators is to make contact with the perpetrators with the aim of, if possible, gaining control and an overview of the situation and thus create the basis for reaching a peaceful solution.

The Negotiation Group comprises staff who possess great maturity and considerable life experience and who are carefully selected on the basis of their personality as well as their communicative and empathetic skills. After selection, the candidates undergo an intensive training programme, partly in the UK and the USA.

In their daily work, the negotiators are attached to other police units, where they perform their normal duties. However, they can be called in when necessary and are able to travel to any part of the world at very short notice.

The Negotiation Group provides assistance to PET’s operational units and the police districts in connection with incidents that require negotiation, etc. in order to avoid use of force, avoid damage, collect information or promote surrender. This could be, for instance, when perpetrators have barricaded themselves, or in connection with police handling of suicidal or mentally ill individuals.

The Negotiation Group also provides assistance in connection with different types of kidnapping and hostage situations. This could concern, for example, family-related kidnappings and hostage-takings that have financial, political and religious objectives. The Negotiation Group also provides assistance in connection with Danes who are taken hostage abroad. In this connection, the negotiators assist, for example, with situation analyses, planning of solution scenarios and logistics in relation to the negotiation process, such as getting hold of possible ransom money. Providing advice and support to the relatives in connection with a hostage situation is also a key task of the Negotiation Group. In addition, the Negotiation Group advises Danish Missions abroad.

The Negotiation Group was, for instance, involved in the efforts to secure a non-violent outcome to the hijacking of the ship, the Danica White, off Somalia’s coast in June 2007.

the PhysicAl Protection grouP

The Physical Protection Group undertakes surveillance and personal protection assignments of a more stationary nature in relation to, for example, the Government, the Folketing and the Royal Family. In addition, the Physical Protection Group provides advice and protection in connection with special transport of valuables. The efforts include both threat assessments and operational activities.

In addition, the Physical Protection Group advises the financial sector on matters concerning security in relation to cash-handling firms and depots. In 2007, the Physical Protection Group also initiated training of a special unit that can deploy explosive detection dogs in connection with security sweeps and surveillance of special localities.

PREVENTIVE SECURITY AND CIVIL PROTECTION

11.


Preventive security dePArtment

Developments in the threat picture have emphasised the necessity of supplementing the traditional investigative approach with more multi-faceted, preventive efforts with the aim of strengthening society’s overall resilience to terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, extremism and espionage.

In recent years PET has, therefore, established a number of partnerships with public authorities and private actors that possess competencies, experience and know-how of relevance to the efforts in these areas.

In order to further enhance this co-operation, PET established a Centre for Protective Security and a Centre for Prevention inside PET’s Preventive Security Department in September 2007. The centres provide holistic and targeted advice designed to reduce the vulnerability of potential targets of terrorism and espionage in Denmark. In addition, a number of early preventive efforts are carried out targeted at preventing radicalisation and violent extremism.

the centre for Protective security

PET plays an important role as adviser in relation to Denmark’s internal security.

The Centre for Protective Security provides advisory support within the areas of physical security, IT security and personnel security. By providing holistic advisory support, the Security and Intelligence Service contributes to promoting a cross-sectoral security culture among relevant public and private actors, as well as reducing the critical national infrastructure’s vulnerability to terrorism and espionage.

PET advises public authorities and private actors in areas where protection lies in the public interest.

Physical securityIn step with developments in the general threat picture and in connection with specific events in Denmark and abroad, an increasing demand has been registered in recent years for advice on physical security matters.

PET provides security advice to among others, the Folketing, a number of ministries, agencies and organisations, as well as to individuals under particular threat. In addition, PET advises foreign diplomatic Missions in Denmark and the Royal Family.

Denmark’s presence in a number of international hotspots has led to a further demand for advice within the field of physical security. The advice is given to, among others, Danish diplomatic Missions abroad and focuses on how to secure buildings, areas and access routes.

critical national infrastructureThe requirements placed on PET to deliver security advice to a steadily wider circle of public authorities and private companies etc. have increased in the light of the heightened threat of terrorism in recent years.

The intention is to systematise the Security and Intelligence Service’s advice to the sectors that deliver essential services to society, so as to enable PET to supply targeted and holistic advice to relevant public authorities, trade organisations or specific critical sectors.

By critical national infrastructure is meant the sectors that are necessary for society to function. They include the utility sector, such as electricity, gas, water and heating, as well as

Preventive security and civil protection

PREVENTIVE SECURITY AND CIVIL PROTECTION PAGE 67


communication and IT, transport, food products and health care. The maintenance of these sectors’ activities must be secured, also after a possible terrorist attack. Therefore, the Security and Intelligence Service provides advice on measures and initiatives that can protect against terrorism and ensure a swift restoration of the supply activities in the event of a terrorist attack.

The advice is provided partly by means of a number of contact groups and partly through direct contact with relevant authorities, organisations and companies.

Since 2004, PET has had a number of contact groups comprising representatives of public authorities, trade organisations and a number of large Danish companies. The contact groups have served as a framework for dialogue and exchange of information about threats and

risks in relation to national security. The aim of the dialogue has been to help build a cross-sectoral security culture among relevant public and private actors and to ensure a measured and balanced response to any changes in the threat picture.

As regards the maritime and civil aviation authorities that regulate and supervise parts of the critical national infrastructure, the Security and Intelligence Service provides advice on securing, for example, ports, ships, shipping companies and airports against terrorist attack. The advice is based on ongoing assessments of both the maritime threat picture and the threat against civil aviation.

it securityIn conformity with Circular No. 204 of 7 December 2001 issued by the Prime Minister’s Office, PET performs the role of national security authority



in relation to the handling of NATO and EU classified information by civil authorities. This entails that PET is responsible for the approval and supervision of IT systems and networks that handle such information.

In line with the increased use of classification, particularly in relation to the exchange of EU information, there is an increasing need for the approval of authorities’ networks.

PET collaborates with the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (FE) in order to create up-to-date and flexible solutions in the field of IT security, whilst simultaneously maintaining a high level of security. In order to enhance and further develop these efforts, PET participates actively in a number of national and international co-operative fora on IT security.

The increasing dependence on internet-based providers and services has meant that PET devotes increased attention to these, particularly with regard to the lines of communication between the various authorities and also the communication between authorities and citizens. In this regard, the Security and Intelligence Service engages in close collaboration with, for example, the National IT and Telecom Agency.

In addition, PET has established co-operation with a number of relevant public authorities and private companies regarding IT security, in which, for example, experience is shared and trends within the field are discussed.

Personnel securityUpon request by the employing authority, PET undertakes security investigations into personnel who are to have access to classified material. The Security and Intelligence Service is responsible for the final security clearance of

police officers and persons performing tasks for the police, whereas other public authorities, on the basis of PET’s personnel security investigations, themselves undertake the final security clearance of their own personnel. Before initiating a security investigation, written consent must be obtained from the person to be investigated.

The scope of the specific personnel security investigation depends on the classification level the particular person is to have access to.

In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of security investigations.

the centre for Prevention

With a point of departure in PET’s overall knowledge of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, espionage and extremism, PET’s Centre for Prevention contributes to ensuring that relevant actors in Danish society possess adequate knowledge and competence to participate in tackling these threats.

The Centre for Prevention targets the preventive efforts at, among other things, violent radicalisation in particularly vulnerable groups and areas.



In addition, the Centre for Prevention supports relevant actors’ acquisition of specific knowledge of prevention measures through training materials on, for example, physical security, IT security and personnel security as well as through training programmes and awareness presentations.

Target groups and partners in these efforts include, among others, actors within the transport and utility sector, the police districts, local authorities as well as representatives of local environments, religious communities and interest organisations.

rAdicAlisAtion

The terrorism-related arrests in the Glostrup Case, the Vollsmose Case and most recently the Glasvej Case underline that also in Denmark there is a need for an early preventive effort in order to discourage young people from becoming attracted to radical messages and embarking down a path of radicalisation that could ultimately lead to actual terrorist acts.

Effective preventive efforts against radicalisation must be based on not just early action but also on a multi-faceted approach. Therefore, PET collaborates with a number of authorities with the aim of supporting their ability to identify radicalisation processes as well as independently implement preventive measures.

A key task of PET’s Centre for Prevention is also to handle PET’s dialogue with a number of representatives of ethnic and religious minorities. The focus of the dialogue is the prevention of terrorism and the local environment’s opportunities to contribute in this regard.

Based on own experience as well as experience from abroad, PET will further develop the

dialogue by widening the circle of dialogue partners with additional representatives of local Muslim environments in Denmark that enjoy social status and who are in a position to exert influence in the relevant local communities.

In so doing, PET wishes to enhance the “disagreement dialogue” by also engaging in dialogue with individuals who represent controversial views. Often, it is precisely these persons who are in the best position to influence, in a non-violent direction, the views of young people who are embarking down a path of radicalisation.

For a long time, PET has had close co-operation with the Danish Prison and Probation Service with the aim of countering radicalisation in prisons by means of targeted preventive efforts. With a point of departure in the already established co-operation, PET and the Danish Prison and Probation Service have decided to launch a systematic training programme for prison staff. The programme is designed to enable them to identify signs of radicalisation, implement preventive measures and pass on relevant information to PET.



counter-terrorism conference 2007

On 26-27 April 2007, as part of the multi-faceted counter-terrorism efforts, PET hosted a large conference for the third time. The title of the conference was “Radicalisation in Denmark – opportunities for early, co-ordinated efforts.”

A major aim of the conference was to assemble persons from various authorities and public institutions, representatives of associations and local communities, researchers, etc. who each in their own way could contribute constructively to the preventive efforts against radicalisation and thus also ultimately against the perpetration of potential acts of terrorism in Denmark. PET wished to use the conference to establish a platform for dialogue and generation of ideas in relation to common challenges and response options at various levels of society.

The conference incorporated, among other things, thematic group discussions with the aim

of identifying specific response options across the traditional areas of responsibility of the participating groups.

The conference underlined the importance of the problem being viewed from a multi-level and multi-faceted perspective, on the grounds that radicalisation occurs in broad sections of society and may be visible in different contexts, and because there are many explanatory factors, not least of a political, social and psychological nature.

The underlying potential in the establishment of genuine partnerships with local communities and environments where radicalisation may occur was also discussed at the conference. It was emphasised that religion can play a role in countering and preventing radicalisation and that it may therefore be relevant to collaborate with more controversial religious persons and environments.

At the conference, there was a general acknowledgement that broad-based dialogue and inclusion of all citizens in the community of shared values is a prerequisite for a secure and safe society, in that it is presumed that persons who feel marginalised in various ways will be more likely to act without respect for and in contradiction to the fundamental values of society. One of the general observations at the conference that arose out of this recognition was that the efforts to combat radicalisation and the efforts to promote inclusion through a number of initiatives at various levels in society are closely related and must be co-ordinated.

On the basis of the conference, an idea catalogue was produced that is to serve as a source of inspiration for authorities and public institutions as well as associations and local communities in connection with the launch of

Preventive efforts against radicalisation:

Co-operating with and advising:– Police districts and municipalities,

e.g. within the framework of SSP (schools, social services, police) co-operation

– Danish Prison and Probation Service

– Other authorities– Representatives of local

environments, interest organisations and religious communities



initiatives that can contribute to preventing radicalisation in Denmark.

The idea catalogue as well as the minutes from the conference can be found at www.pet.dk/publikationer/konferencer

educAtionAl initiAtives

In order to strengthen society’s overall resilience to terrorism and other security-related threats, PET carries out a number of educational initiatives. The initiatives comprise, for instance, targeted awareness presentations aimed at enabling relevant authorities and private actors to identify potential signs of terrorist planning. In addition, written materials are produced in the form of brochures and instructions in support of the awareness-raising initiatives and the advice provided by PET’s Centre for Protective Security.

The target groups for the educational initiatives are relevant public and private actors, including the transport sector. The initiatives are devised and tailored to the recipients on an ongoing basis, and action is also taken to ensure that these initiatives reach all relevant recipients in society.

In autumn 2005, as a special educational initiative, PET launched the project, “Police Against Terrorism”, which was designed to

activate and incorporate the police districts even more in the efforts to combat terrorism. The aim was to improve the ability of the Danish police force in general to identify terrorism-related indications in the day-to-day police work. The project has now been implemented and evaluated positively. However, the police reform in 2007 has caused the project to be adjusted in order to ensure its further development in the new police district structure.

APPendices

the dAnish security And intelligence service / AnnuAl rePort 2006-2007

Appendices

A. dAnish criminAl code – sPeciAl chAPters

Chapter 12 Offences against the Independence and Safety of the State

§98 (1) Any person who, by foreign assistance, by the use of force, or by the threat of such, commits an act aimed at bringing the Danish state or any part of it under foreign rule or at detaching any part of the state shall be liable to imprisonment for any period up to life imprisonment.

(2) The same penalty shall also apply to any person who, for the purpose mentioned in Subsection (1) above, organises extensive sabotage, suspension of production or traffic, as well as to any person who partakes in such an act, conscious of its purpose.

§99(1) Any person who commits an act aimed at involving the Danish state or any allied power in war, enemy occupation or other hostilities, such as blockade or any other coercive measure or who otherwise endeavours to bring about, by foreign assistance, a violation of the independence of the Danish state, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term up to life imprisonment.

(2) For the purpose of this Section and other Sections of Chapters 12 and 13 of this Act, enemy occupation shall mean foreign occupation of any territory of the Danish state, if and so long as it is inflicted on the country by the use of force or by the threat of force.

§100 (1) Any person who by public statements incites enemy action against the Danish state or who

brings about an evident danger of such action shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years.

(2) Any person who by public statements incites intervention by a foreign power in the affairs of the Danish state or who brings about an evident danger of such intervention shall be liable to a fine or imprisonment for any term not exceeding one year.

§101Any person who, in the face of impending war, enemy occupation or any other hostilities commits an act by which preparations are made for aiding the enemy shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 16 years.

§102 (1) Any person who, in time of war or enemy occupation, assists the enemy by word or deed or, for the promotion of enemy interests, impairs the military efficiency of the Danish state or any allied power, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 16 years.

(2) The following acts shall be deemed to be assistance to the enemy:1) Recruitment for or service in the armed

forces of any enemy power at war or in occupation, or in associated military or police forces or in any similar bodies or organisations.

2) Exercise of functions as a civil employee in the police or prison administration of any enemy power at war or in occupation, where such functions include participation in the examination or custody of prisoners.

3) Informing or similar collaboration with any enemy authority or any associated organisation or person bringing about the


PAge 72 APPendices

APPendices PAge 73


arrest or risk of arrest or injury of anybody associated.

4) Propaganda for the benefit of any enemy power at war or in occupation, including activities as publisher, editor or administrative officer of any daily paper, periodical, publishing business or press bureau working for the promotion of enemy interests.

5) Payment of substantial financial assistance to others with a view to promoting propaganda of the nature referred to in No. 4) above or to any party or organisation unduly co-operating with the enemy power at war or in occupation or promoting the interests of such power.

(3) Where informing as under No. 3, Subsection (2) above has taken place under such circumstances that the informer was aware that a person thereby incurred the risk of imminent danger of losing his life, suffering grievous harm to person or health, of being deported or being deprived of his liberty for a long time, or where Sections 245, 246 or 250 of this Act have been contravened with a view to extorting evidence or a confession or otherwise as part of any maltreatment of prisoners, imprisonment for life may be inflicted.

§103(1) Any person who, in time of war or occupation or imminent danger of such, fails to fulfil a contract relating to measures taken by the Danish state in this connection, or who otherwise counteracts such measures, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding three years.

(2) If the failing fulfilment is due to gross negligence, the penalty shall be a fine or imprisonment for any term not exceeding four months.

§104 (1) Any person who, directly or through an intermediary, unduly co-operates for commercial purpose with any enemy power at war or in occupation shall be liable to a fine or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding eight years,

(2) Criminal liability under Subsection (1) above may devolve on any person who has had a position of management in the undertaking concerned. Criminal liability may also devolve on other persons employed in the undertaking when their conduct has been particularly objectionable.

(3) In determining whether and, if so, to what extent the co-operation is deemed to be undue in this sense, account shall be taken not only of the importance of the undertaking to the enemy power at war or in occupation, but also of whether the person concerned

1) had himself taken steps to arrange for the establishment, continuation or extension of any business relations; or

2) in the interest of the enemy at his own initiative has reorganised the undertaking, or has achieved, or attempted to achieve, an increase or acceleration of production above what was necessary; or

3) had called on the assistance of the enemy in his relations with any Danish authority with a view to promoting his own interests; or

4) had prevented or tried to prevent any Danish public authority from obtaining full access to knowledge of the circumstances of the undertaking;

5) had obtained or tried to obtain an excessive profit or any other privileges not reasonably justified in the undertaking.


APPendices PAge 73


PAge 74 APPendices

§105 Any person who, in time of enemy occupation, commits an act aimed at inducing the occupying power or any organisation or person associated with that power to impair the independence of any Danish public authority, or who takes undue advantage of any connection with the occupying power or with any organisation or person associated with that power with a view to obtaining for himself or for others a special privilege, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding eight years.

§106 Any person who acts against the interests of the state in carrying out a duty entrusted to him to negotiate or settle, on behalf of the state, any matter with any foreign state, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 16 years.

§107 (1) Any person who, being in the service of any foreign power or organisation or for the use of persons engaged in such service, inquires into or gives information on matters which, having regard to Danish state or public interests, should be kept secret, shall, whether or not the information is correct, be guilty of espionage and liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 16 years.

(2) If the information is of the nature indicated in Section 109 of this Act, or if the act is commit ted in time of war or enemy occupation, the penalty may be increased to imprisonment for life.

§108 (1) Any person who, by any act other than those covered by Section 107 of this Act, enables or assists the intelligence service of a foreign state to operate directly or indirectly within the territory of the Danish state shall be liable to

imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years.

(2) If the information concerns military affairs or if the act is committed during war or enemy occupation, the penalty may be increased to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 12 years.

§109 (1) Any person who discloses or imparts any information on secret negotiations, deliberations or resolutions of the state or its rights in relation to foreign states, or which has reference to substantial economic interests of a public nature in relation to foreign countries, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 12 years.

(2) If any of these acts has been committed through negligence, the penalty shall be a fine or imprisonment for any term not exceeding three years.

§110 (1) Any person who forges, destroys or removes any document or any other instrument that is of importance to the safety of the state or to its rights in relation to foreign states shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 16 years.

(2) If any of these acts has been committed through negligence, the penalty shall be a fine or imprisonment for any term not exceeding three years.

§110a (1) Any person who, intentionally or through negligence, without being duly authorised to do so,

1) describes, takes photographs or otherwise depicts Danish military works of defence, depots, units, arms, material etc., which are


APPendices PAge 75

not accessible to the public, or who copies or publishes such description or depictions; or

2) publishes provisions relating to the mobilisation of Danish forces or other war preparations, shall be liable to a fine or imprisonment for any term not exceeding three years.

(2) Any person who, intentionally or through negligence, without being duly authorised to do so, takes photographs from aeroplanes over any territory of the Danish state or publishes such unlawfully taken photographs, shall be liable to a fine.

§110b Any person who gives his assistance to any violation of neutrality against the Danish state on the part of any foreign power shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding eight years.

§110c (1) Any person who contravenes any provisions or prohibitions that may have been provided by law for the protection of state defence or neutrality shall be liable to a fine or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding four months or, in aggravating circumstances, to imprisonment for any term not exceeding three years.

(2) Any person who contravenes any provisions or prohibitions that may have been provided by law for the fulfilment of the state’s obligations as a member of the United Nations shall be liable to a fine or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding four months or, in aggravating circumstances, to imprisonment for any term not exceeding four years.

(3) Any person who contravenes any provisions provided by or issued pursuant to regulations

adopted under the provisions of Articles 60, 301 or 308 of the Treaty on the European Union and that aims at discontinuing or reducing in whole or in part the financial or economic relations with one or more countries outside the European Union or at similar sanctions towards individuals, groups of individuals or legal persons shall be liable to same punishment as stated in (2).

(4) If any offence is committed as mentioned in (1), (2) or (3) through negligence, such offence shall be punished with a fine or with imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years.

§110d If any of the offences dealt with in Chapters 25, 26 or 27 of this Act is committed against a foreign sovereign or the head of any foreign diplomatic mission, the penalty may exceed the most severe penalty prescribed for any of the offences by up to one half, unless where the offence is dealt with in chapter 13.

§110e Any person who openly insults any foreign nation, foreign state, its flag or any other recog nised symbol of nationality or the flag of the United Nations or the Council of Europe shall be liable to a fine or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years.

§110f The offences referred to in this Chapter shall, in all cases, be dealt with by public prosecution, to be instituted by the order of the Minister of Justice.

APPendices


Chapter 13 Offences against the Constitution and the Supreme Authorities of the State

§111 Any person who commits an act aimed, by foreign assistance, by the use of force, or by the threat of such, at changing the Constitution or making it inoperative shall be liable to imprisonment for any term extending to life imprisonment.

§112 Any person who commits an act directed against the life of the sovereign or of the constitutional regent shall be liable to imprisonment for not less than six years.

§113 (1) Any person who interferes with the safety or independence of the Parliament or otherwise commits any act aimed, by the use of force or the threat of such, at extorting any resolution from the Parliament or preventing it from freely exercising its activities shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 16 years or, in aggravating circumstances, to life imprisonment.

(2) The same penalty shall apply to any person who similarly interferes with or exercises coercion against the sovereign or against the constitutional regent or against the ministers, the Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court.

§ 114 (1) Any person who, by acting with the intent to frighten a population to a serious degree or to unlawfully coerce Danish or foreign public authorities or an international organisation to carry out or omit to carry out an act or to destabilise or destroy a country’s or an international organisation’s fundamental political, constitutional, financial or social

structures, commits one or more of the following acts, when the act due to its nature or the context, in which it is committed, can inflict a country or an international organisation serious damage, shall be guilty of terrorism and liable to imprisonment for any term extending to life imprisonment:1) Homicide pursuant to Section 237 of this Act2) Gross violence pursuant to Section 245

or Section 246 of this Act3) Deprivation of liberty pursuant to Section

261 of this Act4) Impairment of the traffic safety pursuant

to Section 184(1) of this Act; unlawful disturbances in the operation of public means of communication et cetera pursuant to Section 193(1) of this Act; or gross damage to property pursuant to Section 291(2) of this Act; if these violations are committed in a way which can expose human lives to danger or cause considerable financial losses.

5) Seizure of transportation means pursuant to Section 183a of this Act.

6) Gross weapons law violations pursuant to Section 192 a of this Act or Law about Weapons and Explosives Section 10(2).

7) Arson pursuant to Section 180 of this Act; explosion, spreading of noxious gasses, flooding, shipwrecking, railway or other traffic-accident pursuant to Section 183(1)-(2) of this Act; health-endangering contamination of the water supply pursuant to Section 186(1) of this Act; health-endangering contamination of products intended for general use etc. pursuant to section 187(1) of this Act.

8) Possession or use et cetera of radioactive substances pursuant to Section 192 b.

(2) Similar punishment shall apply to any person who, with the in Subsection (1) mentioned intent, transports weapons or explosives.

APPendices PAge 77


(3) Similar punishment shall further apply to any person who, with the in Subsection (1) mentioned intent, threatens to commit one of the acts mentioned in Subsections (1) and (2).

§ 114a If one of the acts mentioned in items 1-6 is committed without the act being included in Section 114, the penalty may exceed the highest statutory penalty for the offence by up to half. If the highest statutory penalty for the offence in question is less than four years imprisonment, the penalty may, however, be increased to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years.

1) Violation of Sections 180, 181 Subsection (1), 183 Subsections (1) or (2), 183 a, 184 Subsection (1), 192 a Subsection (2), 193 Subsection (1), 237, 244, 245, 246, 250, 252 Subsection (1), 266, 288, or 291 Subsections (1) or (2) when the act is included in Article (1) of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft dated 16 December 1970, Article (1) of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation dated 23 September 1971, or Article (II) of the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation dated 24 February 1988.

2) Violation of Sections 180, 181 Subsection (1), 183 Subsections (1) or (2), 184 Subsection (1), 237, 244, 245, 246, 250, 252 Subsection (1), 260, 261 Subsection (1) or (2), 266 or 291 Subsections (1) or (2) when the act is included in Article (2) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents dated 14 December 1973.

3) Violation of Section 261 Subsections (1) or (2) when the act is included in Article (1) of the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages dated 17 December 1979.

4) Violation of Sections 180, 181 Subsection (1), 183 Subsections (1) or (2), 186 Subsection (1), 192 a Subsection (2), 192 b, 237, 244, 245, 246, 260, 266, 276, 278, 279, 279 a, 281, 288, or 291 Subsection (2) when the act is included in Article (7) of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (the IAEA Convention) dated 26 October 1979.

5) Violation of Sections 180, 181 Subsection (1), 183 Subsections (1) or (2), 183 a, 184 Subsection (1), 192 a Subsection (2), 193 Subsection (1), 237, 244, 245, 246, 252 Subsection (1), 260, 266, 288, or 291 Subsections (1) or (2) when the act is included in Article (3) of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation dated 10 March 1988, or Article (2) of the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf dated 10 March 1988.

6) Violation of Sections 180, 181 Subsection (1), 183 Subsections (1) or (2), 183 a, 184 Subsection (1), 186 Subsection (1), 192 a Subsection (2), 193 Subsection (1), 237, 244, 245, 246, 250, 252 Subsection (1), 266, or 291 Subsection (2) when the act is included in Article (2) of the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings dated 15 December 1997.

§114bAny person who1) directly or indirectly provides financial

support to;2) directly or indirectly procures or collects

means to; or

APPendices


3) directly or indirectly places money, other assets or financial or other similar means at the disposal of: a person, a group or an association, which commits or intends to commit acts of terrorism as included under Section 114 or 114 a of this Act, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding ten years.

§114c(1) Any person who recruits another person to commit or advance actions included in Sections 114 or 114 a of this Act or to join a group or association in order to encourage that the group or association commits acts of this nature shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding ten years. Under particularly aggravating circumstances, the penalty may be increased to any term not exceeding sixteen years. It is considered particularly aggravating circumstances especially in cases involving violations of a systematic or organised nature.

(2) Any person who recruits another person to com mit or advance actions included in Section 114 b of this Act or to join a group or association in order to encourage the group or association to commit acts of this nature shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years.

(3) Any person who lets himself/herself be recruited to commit actions included in Sections 114 or 114 a of this Act shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years.

§114d(1) Any person who trains, instructs or in any other way teaches another person to commit or advance actions included in Sections 114 and 114 a of this Act, knowing that this person intends to use the skills for such a purpose, shall be

liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding ten years. Under particularly aggravating circumstances, the penalty may be increased to any term not exceeding sixteen years. It is considered particularly aggravating circumstances especially in cases involving violations of a systematic or organised nature.

(2) Any person who trains, instructs or in any other way teaches another person to commit or advance actions included in Section 114 b of this Act, knowing that this person intends to use the skills for such a purpose, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years.

(3) Any person who lets himself/herself be trained, instructed or in any other way taught to commit actions included in Sections 114 or 114 a of this Act shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years.

§114e Any person who otherwise advances the activities of another person, group or association, committing or intending to commit actions included in Sections 114, 114 a, 114 b, 114 c, or 114 d of this Act, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years.

§114f Any person who, by any act other than those included under Sections 114-114e of this Act, participates in or provides significant financial support or other significant support to any corps, group or association, which intends, by use of force, to exert influence on public affairs or give rise to disturbances of the public order, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years.

APPendices PAge 79


§114g Any person who, by any act other than those included under Sections 114-114f of this Act, participates in an illegal military organisation or group, shall be liable to a fine or imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years.

§114h Any person who, under aggravating circumstances in contravention of the legislation on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction et cetera,1) exports products with dual use without

permission;2) for the use by the authorities in making

decisions about products with dual use gives incorrect or misleading information or suppresses information of significance for the decision in the case; or

3) acts in violation of conditions which are stipulated in the authorities’ decisions about products with dual use; shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years.

§115 (1) If any of the offences dealt with in Chapters 25, 26 or 27 of this Act is committed against the sovereign or against the constitutional regent, then, unless the circumstances are covered by Sections 112 and 113 of this Act, the penalties prescribed in the above Chapters for such an offence are increased up to the double.

(2) If any of the said offences is committed against the Queen, the Queen Dowager or the heir apparent, the penalty may exceed the most severe penalty prescribed for any of the offences by up to one half.

§116 (1) Any person who prevents or attempts to prevent any holding of elections to the

Parliament, to the Assembly of the Faeroe Islands or to the municipal or any other public councils or authorities, or who corrupts the outcome of any election or renders it impossible to count the votes, shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding six years.

(2) The same penalty shall apply where such acts are committed in connection with a referendum in public affairs, as provided by law.

§117 Any person who, in the case of the elections or referendums referred to in Section 116 of this Act,1) unlawfully obtains authorisation, for himself

or for others, to take part in the voting; or2) attempts, by unlawful coercion (as described

in Section 260 of this Act), by deprivation of liberty or by taking advantage of a position of superiority, to induce some other person to vote in a particular way or to abstain from voting; or

3) causes, by deceit, some other person, against his intention, to abstain from voting or brings it about that such a person’s vote is rendered invalid or that it has an effect different from that intended; or

4) grants, promises or offers any pecuniary advantage with a view to making a person vote in a particular way or abstain from voting; or

5) receives, or demands or accepts the promise of any pecuniary advantage against voting in a particular way or against abstaining from voting; shall be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years.

§118 (1) Any person who, by the use of force or the threat of force or by exploiting a fear of

APPendices


intervention on the part of a foreign power, prevents or attempts to prevent any public authority from freely exercising its activities shall, if the act is committed for the purpose of influencing public affairs or disturbing the public order, be liable to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 12 years.

(2) The same penalty shall apply to any person who, for the purpose indicated in Subsection (1) above and by using the means indicated in that Subsection, gravely impairs freedom of speech or prevents any society or any other association from freely exercising its lawful activities.

(3) The same penalty shall again apply to any person who, for the purpose indicated in Subsection (1) above and by using the means indicated in that Subsection, commits the offence dealt with in Section 193 of this Act or any similar act detrimental to the public good.

§118a The offences referred to in Sections 111-115 and 118 of this Act shall in all cases be dealt with by public prosecution, to be instituted by the order of the Minister of Justice.

B. Act no. 378 of 6 july 1988 on the estABlishment of A committee regArding the dAnish defence intelligence service (fe) And the dAnish security And intelligence service (Pet)

Law on the setting up of a committee on the Danish Defence Intelligence Service, FE, and the Danish Security Intelligence Service, PET

BE IT KNOWN that the Folketing has enacted and We Margrethe the Second, by the Grace of God, Queen of Denmark, have given Our Royal Assent to the following Act:

§1 (1) With the purpose of supervising the Danish defence and police intelligence services, a committee is set up.

(2) The committee shall consist of five members, MPs, appointed by those parties that are members of the Praesidium of the Danish Parliament (Folketing). The committee itself elects its chairman.

(3) Each member of the committee may institute convening a meeting. Discussions in the committee may also take place upon the wish of the Government.

(4) A secretary, who is not a Member of the Folketing, shall be attached to the committee. The secretary shall be permanently employed by the Folketing.

§2 The Government will inform the committee of the guidelines established with regard to the activities of the intelligence services. Furthermore, the Government shall keep the committee informed of important security

APPendices PAge 81


c. stAtutory Provisions regArding the dAnish security And intelligence service (Pet) of 9 mAy 1996

i. the objective of Pet The objective of PET is to monitor, prevent and counter undertakings and acts which are presumed to present a threat to the independence and safety of the lawful order of society, including primarily the offences as stated in the Danish Criminal Code Chapter 12 (Offences against the Independence and Safety of the State) and Chapter 13 (Offences against the Constitution and the Supreme Authorities of the State etc.).

ii. the organisation of Pet The management and responsibility for carrying out the tasks that the Minister of Justice has assigned to PET rest on the Director of the Service.

The Director of PET is obliged to at any time keeping the Minister of Justice directly informed of all matters of importance to the national security and in general of all matters of major importance to the activities of the Service, including all important single issues and contacts with national as well as international authorities.

iii. the tasks of Pet The responsibilities of the Service follow from the above specified objective and comprise primarily the following tasks:

1. investigation regarding the offences as stipulated in chapters 12 and 13 of the danish criminal code, including hereunder:

A. Foreign intelligence activitiesAny action that attacks or threatens the safety of the state, as according to Chapter 12 of the

issues or of foreign policy issues which are of importance in connection with the activities of the intelligence services. When informing the committee, consideration will be given to the special circumstances, which apply to intelligence activities.

§3 The committee can, orally or in written form, inform the Government of its opinion of the issues, which are dealt with by the committee.

§4 The financial control of the intelligence services is not included in those matters supervised by the committee. However, in connection with the asking for information from the Government, the committee may be informed of the general guidelines for the finances of the intelligence services.

§5 The committee members and the secretary are bound by confidentiality in respect of the information acquired on the committee.

§6 The law will become effective as of 1 August 1988. Signed at Marselisborg Castle, 6 July 1988.

Given under Our Royal Hand and Seal

MARGRETHE R.

/Erik Ninn-Hansen

APPendices


Danish Criminal Code, including particularly the illegal intelligence activities of foreign powers or organisations, in accordance with Sections 107 and 108 of the Danish Criminal Code.Investigations in this respect – like in general – must be carried out with all due respect for diplomatic and journalistic activities as well as for legal political enterprise.

B. ExtremismThe actions of extremist groups that attack or threaten the national safety of the state and the democratic public order or which obstruct or undermine the duties of the democracy, as according to Chapter 13 of the Danish Criminal Code, particularly Section 114.

C. TerrorismSerious crime or the threat of any such serious crime, which – usually with an allegedly political motive – is used as a means of enforcing claims on authorities or private individuals or to bring about disturbances of the public order.

D. Organised serious crimeOrganised crime that in its gravity of the offence, with its international relations or through its purpose threatens the safety of the state or the public order, or which obstructs or undermines the duties of the democracy, as according to Chapter 13 of the Danish Criminal Code, particularly Sections 114 and 118.

E. International weapons trade etc.Serious cases regarding the violation of the offensive weapons act, particularly when it is feared that the crime is organised.

F. ProliferationIllegal spread of products and technology to be used for weapons production etc., including in particular weapons of mass destruction.G. International embargoesViolation of international embargoes etc., as in accordance with Section 110c of the Danish Criminal Code, particularly where the cases are assumed to be of intelligence interest.

2. security advice and counsellingPET provides advice and counselling to public authorities regarding security issues including computer security. Similar advice and counselling can be rendered to private individuals if it is of public interest to protect.

The advice and counselling includes the planning and implementation of measures to safeguard against espionage, sabotage, infiltration etc., in accordance with particularly the Prime Minister’s Office Circular of 1 November 19861 regarding protection of information of common interest to NATO countries or other information of interest in terms of security and protection.

Upon request from the specific ministry or agency in question, PET carries out vetting inquiries on individuals who require access to classified documents (security clearance). Classified information must only be passed upon an actual assessment of the importance of the information to the vetting inquiry. Cases regarding passing on of derogatory information must be presented to the parliamentary Control Committee regarding the registration and passing of information as in accordance with the specific regulations of 8 June 1964 as laid down for this committee.

APPendices PAge 83


3. Personal protection and other security tasks

PET currently assesses the security and safety of the Royal Family, the members of Government, leading Danish public individuals and certain foreign visitors (“VIPs”). PET participates in carrying out personal protection tasks as in accordance with specific instructions issued. PET currently assesses the security of the presence in Denmark of foreign diplomatic representations and international organisations and undertakes the contact between these and Danish authorities on security issues.

4. Aviation securityPET currently assesses the security and safety of civilian aviation in Denmark and co-operates with aviation authorities and airports on the implementation of security measures in respect of civilian aviation.

iv. the investigations of Pet PET shall exercise great caution in applying information obtained, and the correctness of the information must, wherever possible, be verified. Any investigative steps of vital importance, including interference in the secrecy of communication, shall be approved by the Director of PET or in the absence of same by his deputy. Where the specific investigative mea-sure requires a court order, any such approval must be given prior to the case being presen ted in court as in accordance with the rules of the Danish Administration of Justice Act.

Where investigations lead to charging a person, the Chief Constable of that particular district (in Copenhagen the Commissioner of Police) shall be informed, unless otherwise stipulated by the Minister of Justice. Hereafter, the investigation is carried out under the directions of the local Chief Constable, though in co-operation and with the support of PET.

v. registrationA. The object of the registrationPET gathers and processes information that is, or could be, of importance to the solution of the above-mentioned tasks.

B. Registration of personal dataThe registration of personal data shall be limited to the absolute minimum. The registration of Danish nationals cannot be made on grounds of legal political activity only. All cases regarding new files on Danish nationals shall be presented to the parliamentary Control Committee regarding the filing and passing of information.

vi. co-operation with other authoritiesA. Danish authoritiesPET shall solve the above-stated tasks in close co-operation with the relevant national authorities, primarily the police force.

B. Foreign authoritiesWhere necessary, PET co-operates with foreign police, security and intelligence services on solving the above-stated tasks.

vii. entry into force, etc.These provisions entering into force immediately shall supersede the Instructions for the Director of PET of 30 November 1953 at the same time repealing the latter instructions.

1 As amended by Circular dated 1 September 1997 and 7 December 2001.

APPendices


d. the wAmBerg committee’s mAndAte of 1964

Quote:Rules applying to the Committee that shall supervise the registration and passing of information of the Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET).

1. The Committee is set up by the Government, it consists of a chairman and three other members. In the discussions of the Committee, a representative of PET, the Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministry of Justice and of the Ministry of Defence1 participate. Decisions on matters submitted to the Committee shall only be made by its members.

2. The Committee shall supervise the registration and passing of information of PET.

3. The Committee shall be kept informed about the guidelines for the registration applying at any time.

4. When, acting upon a request from a government agency, PET intends to communicate information concerning individuals, the case shall be submitted to the Committee for approval of the communication.

Similarly, submission is conducted, if PET intends to communicate to the government agency such information obtained regarding individuals who have already been approved for dealing with classified issues.

5. In case of parity of votes on the Committee, the Chairman’s vote shall be decisive.

6. Any question regarding items 3 and 4 above may be submitted to the Minister of Justice by the Committee or by any one of its members. Unquote

Footnote:1. In practice, the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministry of Justice and of the Ministry of Defence as well as the Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have not participated in the ordinary meetings of the Committee at which meetings, issues are discussed of no fundamental importance.

APPendices PAge 85


e. the government declArAtion of 30 sePtemBer 1968

Quote:“The Government has today decided that re g-i stration of Danish nationals can no longer be made solely on grounds of legal political activity.

The fact that such registrations previously were made often gave rise to discussions under the present as well as the former Government. Naturally, it is a matter of opinion whether such registrations are necessary. In this respect, the security considerations must be balanced against the individual citizen being able to express himself freely.

In principle, it must be recognised that an enterprise which keeps within the limits as laid down by the legislation, should not give rise to registration with the police. Having balanced these opposite considerations, the Government has found it justifiable to abandon registration solely on the basis of legal political activity.

Where previously made registered information of this type still remain, any such information will be destroyed”. Unquote

f. the dAnish AdministrAtion of justice Act, chAPter 66

Chapter 66

the Accused and his counsel for the defenceSection729a. The accused has the right to choose his own Counsel for the defence, cf. Section730. A Public Counsel for the defence will be appointed according to the regulations in Sections 731 to 735.

Subsect.2. The Counsel for the defence will receive duplicates of entries in the court record con-cerning the matter from the Court. The Counsel for the defence may inform the accused of the duplicates unless anything else follows from Sections 748 and 848. The Court may order the Counsel for the defence not to hand over the duplicates to the accused or to others, if it is feared that the duplicates will be used in an unlawful manner.

Subsect. 3. The Counsel for the defence has access to making himself acquainted with the material obtained by the police for use in the case covered by the charge. To the extent the material can be duplicated without inconvenience, copies must be forwarded to the Counsel for the defence. The Counsel for the defence may not without the consent of the police hand over the received material to the accused or to others. The police gives its consent if it is deemed unobjectionable. With regard to material, covered by Section 877, Subsections 1 and 2, No. 5, consent can only be denied because of the reasons mentioned in Subsection 4.

APPendices


Subsect. 4. If considerations to foreign powers, the security of the State, the solving of the case, a third party, or the investigation of another ongoing case regarding an offence which, according to the law, may be punished with imprisonment for six years or more, or which constitutes an intentional violation of Chapters 12 or 13 of the Danish Criminal Code, render it imperative, the police may order the Counsel for the defence not to hand over the information which he has received from the police. The order can be extended until the accused has given evidence during the trial.

Section 729b. An accused without a Counsel for the defence shall upon request be granted access through the police to acquaint himself with any entries in the court record concerning the matter unless anything else follows from Sections 748 and 848. Upon request the police will hand over duplicates of the entries unless it is feared that the duplicates will be used in an unlawful manner.

Subsect. 2. Furthermore, an accused without a Counsel for the defence shall upon request be granted access to the material which has been obtained by the police for use in the case covered by the charge. However, the police can refuse the request according to the reasons mentioned in Section 729a, Subsection 4. Restrictions on the right of access to documents of the accused lapse prior to the trial at the latest, or a hearing concerning the handling of the case pursuant to Section 922, or if the case is terminated due to a withdrawal of the charge. Upon request the police will hand over a duplicate of the material to the accused if it is deemed unobjectionable. With regard to material covered by Section 877, Subsections

1 and 2, No. 5, a refusal to hand over the material can only take place according to the reasons mentioned in Section 729a, Subsection 4.Section 729c. At the request of the police the Court may decide to depart from the regulations on the accused and the Counsel of the defence’s right of access to documents, according to Sections 729a and 729b, if it is imperative in deference to

1) foreign powers2) the security of the State3) the solving of the case4) the life and health of a third party5) the investigation of another ongoing case

regarding an offence which, according to the law, may be punished with imprisonment for six years or more, or which constitutes an intentional violation of Chapters 12 or 13 of the Danish Criminal Code, or

6) the protection of confidential information concerning the investigational methods of the police.

Subsect. 2. A decision according to Subsection 1 cannot be made if it gives rise to considerable misgivings with regard to the conduct of the defence of the accused.

Subsect. 3. If considerations as mentioned in Subsection 1 apply only to a certain part of the material, the Counsel for the defence or the accused must be informed of the remaining contents of the material.

Subsect. 4. The decision is made by court order. In the court order the concrete circumstances of the case, which give the grounds for a departure from Sections 729a and 729b, shall be stated. If the Court decides that the departure is to be

APPendices PAge 87


temporary, the Court shall carry out a new assessment of the departure before the trial commences. If the Court decides that the departure is to be applied within a specified time frame, the court order may be extended through a later court order. The decision of the Court may be appealed.

Subsect. 5. Before the Court makes its decision, a Counsel for the defence must be appointed, and the attorney shall be given the opportunity to make a statement. The attorney is appointed from within the particular circle of attorneys, mentioned in Section 784, Subsection 2. The attorney must be notified of all court hearings, which are held in order to obtain a court order regarding the departure from Sections 729a and 729b, and he is entitled to being present at these and to acquaint himself with the material which has been obtained by the police for use in the case covered by the charge. Section 785, Subsection 1 (item 2-5) and 2 may be applied similarly.

Politiets Efterretningstjeneste

Danish Security and Intel l igence Service

www.pet.dk

annual report 2006-2007 - pet

Documents