Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984

By the same author

CONTEMPORARY STRATEGY: Theories and Policies (with K. Booth, J. Garnett and P. Williams)

BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY IN A CHANGING WORLD (editor) SOVIET STRATEGY (with Gerald Segal) NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR PEACE (with Gerald Segal, Edwina

Moreton and Lawrence Freedman) ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO BRITISH DEFENCE POLICY

(editor)

Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984

The Special Relationship

John Baylis

Second Edition

M MACMILLAN

©John Baylis 1981,1984

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 2nd edition 1984 978-0-333-36695-0

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission

First edition 1981 Second edition 1984 Published by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD London and Basingstoke Companies and representatives throughout the world

Typeset by Cam brian Typesetters Aldershot, Hants

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Baylis, John Anglo-American defence relations, 1939-1984. 1. Great Britain- Relations (military) with United States 2. United States - Relations (military) with Great Britain I. Title 355'.033041 DA566. 7 ISBN 978-0-333-36504-5 ISBN 978-1-349-17579-6 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-17579-6

TO MY MOTHER AND FATHER

Contents

Acknowledgements X

List of Abbreviations xii

Preface xiv

1 Introduction: The Wartime Relationship 1 The creation of the 'Common-law Alliance' 1 The Anglo-American war machine 8 The War against Germany 10

The War against Japan 13 Atomic energy IS Intelligence collaboration 20 Appendix 1 The Quebec Agreement, 19 August 1943 23 Appendix 2 Declaration of Trust, 13 June 1944 25 Appendix 3 Aide-Memoire of Conversation between the

President and the Prime Minister at Hyde Park, 19 September 1944 28

2 Discord and Collaboration 1945-1949 29 Post-war difficulties and informal links 1945-194 7 29 The Washington Agreements and the McMahon Act 30 Residual defence links 34 The 'Sequoia' Meeting 35 The Cold War Alliance 194 7-49 37 Atomic Energy Apart 41 Appendix 4 Washington Declaration, 15 November 1945 46 Appendix 5 'Groves-Anderson' memorandum, 16 November

1945 49

Appendix 6 The Modus Vivendi, January 1948 51

3 Collaboration and Discord 1950-1956 57 Security agreements, Korea and NATO 57 Growing strains in the alliance 60 Atomic energy and strategic planning 66 Suez and the ruptured alliance 72 Appendix 7 The Burns-Templer Agreements, August 1948-

January 1950 74

viii Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984

Appendix 8 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America for cooperation regarding atomic information for mutual defence purposes. Signed at Washington on 15 June 1955 85

4 ThePreferentialRelationship1957-1962 88 The Bermuda and Washington Conferences 88 The Anglo-American strategic debate 94 The Lebanon and Jordan landings 94 The 'Metallic Warrior' and the continuing saga of US Bases 96 The RB 47 incident 97 'The bolt out of the sky' 97 The Nassau Meeting 18-21 December 103 The Cuban Missile crisis 106 Appendix 9 Exchange of Notes constituting an agreement

between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland relating to intermediate range ballistic missiles. Signed at Washington, 22 February 1958 108

Appendix 10 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. Signed at Washington on 3 July 1958 (The 1958 Atomic energy Agreement) 112

Appendix 11 Amendment to 1958 Atomic Energy Agreement. Signed at Washington on 7 May 1959 121

Appendix 12 Polaris sales agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern­ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Signed at Washington on 6 April 1963 126

5 The 'Close Relationship' 1963-1969 The MLF/ANF debate 'The Thorneycroft Proposals' The Conservatives and the 'independent' deterrent Labour's alternative defence policy The Labour government and the MLF / ANF debate Labour and the 'dependent' deterrent The 'close relationship' The impact of Vietnam

137 137 139 140 141 145 149 151 153

Contents ix

Britain and Europe 157 Appendix 13 Amendment to 1958 Atomic Energy Agreement.

Signed at Washington on 27 September 1968 159 Appendix 14 United States/United Kingdom Collaboration 161

6 The 'Natural Relationship' 19 70-19 79 164 A return to the global alliance? 164 European defence and the shifting relationship 167 Continuing nuclear cooperation 172 The tritium affair 175 The continuing defence partnership 177

7 The 'Extraordinary Alliance'? 1980-1984 181 The Trident Accords 181 Cruise Missiles and the Dual-key controversy 185 Anglo-US relations and the Falklands War 187 Britain and the Rapid Deployment Force 189 Diplomatic disputes in the early 1980s 190 Friction between the Intelligence communities 190 The Grenadan affair 191 Appendix 15 UK Dependence on the United States 195 Appendix 16 US Military Installations in the UK 198 Appendix 17 The British Strategic Nuclear Force, March

1982. Texts of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister and the President and between the Secretary of State for Defence and the US Secretary of Defense 202

8 A Stocktaking and Prospectus 206 The problems and benefits of the special defence relationship 208

Britain and the 'special relationship' 208 The United States and the 'special relationship' 213

The future of Anglo-American defence cooperation 216 Appendix 18 The Special Relationship and Propositions

on Alliances 222

Notes on Sources 228 Notes 230 Bibliography 263 Index 278

Acknowledgements This book arose out of a chapter I wrote in 1977 on 'The Anglo-American Relationship in Defence'. The chapter whetted my appetite for more research in a field which seemed to me to be of great importance, parti­cularly in the light of the growing concentration of Britain's defence effort in Europe. The subject has been dealt with, in passing, in other books but not in the direct way I thought it ought to be covered. This work is in no sense a defmitive study - it is an early contribution which in time I hope will be replaced by other more detailed and authoritative accounts. If it leads to other works on the subject, however critical of the present book, it will have achieved an important objective.

A number of individuals and institutions have been of enormous assistance to me in my research. I would like to express my thanks to my colleagues in the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth who have had to put up with what must have seemed my rather boring ramblings on the subject. In particular I am grateful to Professor Ieuan John, Robbie Purnell, Brian Porter, Pete Wright and Ken Booth for their comments and insights in discussions on various themes covered by the book; to David Steeds who read the Introductory Chapter and made a number of invaluable suggestions on various improvements; and above all to Professor John Garnett who not only listened with patience at times when I was preoccupied with various themes but who also helped refine my thoughts in frequent dialogues. The help of my colleagues has been invaluable but the mistakes and in­adequacies of the book remain my own.

I would also like to express my debt to the following individuals with whom I have either corresponded or had the privilege of an interview: Dr Andrew Pierre; Dr C.J. Bartlett; Professor Peter Nailor; Professor Margaret Gowing; Admiral of the Fleet the Lord Hill-Norton, GCB; General Sir Harry Tuzo; Air Vice-Marshal S.W.B. Menaul, CB, CBE, DFC, AFC; Sir Nicholas Henderson; Mr Philip Francis, Dr Frank Price, Mr John Thatcher and Mr Philip Hill of the Ministry of Defence; Michael G. Macdonald and John R. Miley of the American Embassy; Jay E.Hines(CommandHistorianat RAF Mildenhall); John Roper, MP; Henry Stanhope (The Times) and Peter Kellner (The Sunday Times). In particular I wish to thank Mr Harold Macmillan for an interview which ranged widely over relevant issues during his period in office. The experience was one which I shall long remember. I also wish to thank those many other people who have helped but who prefer, for professional reasons, to remain anonymous.

The author also wishes to express his gratitude to the HMSO and owners of the Churchill copyright for permission to reproduce copyright material.

Acknowledgements xi

I must also thank the Ubrary Staffs in the Hugh Owen Library, UCW, Aberystwyth; the National Ubrary of Wales; the National Defence College, Latimer; the cuttings libraries at Chatham House and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. In particular a special word of gratitude is due to Jane Davis who has given up a great deal of her time in an un­complaining and always cheerful way to assist with some of the research for the book. She also helped to compile the index for the book together with Trevor Mepham. Thanks are also due to the following secretaries who have typed various drafts of the manuscript; Kay Critchley, Marian Weston, and in particular Doreen Hamer who has borne the brunt of the task.

Above all I must thank my wife Marion for her understanding and tolerance in enduring my frequent absences and changing moods while at the same time adjusting to her new role as mother of our newly-arrived daughters, Emma and Katie.

Aberystwyth December 1983

John Baylis

The author and publishers wish to thank the following who have kindly given permission for the use of copyright material:

Cassell Ltd for the extract from a letter by Sir Winston Churchill; the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office for extracts from The Central Policy Review Staff Review of Overseas Representation (1977) and other government publications; Harnish Hamilton Ltd for the quotations from Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War against Japan by Christopher Thome; Michael Joseph Ltd for an extract from The Labour Government 1964-70 by Harold Wilson.

List of Abbreviations ABM ALCM ANF BAOR BCSO BDSW BSC CIA CIGS cos CPC CINCEASTLANT CINCWESTLANT DIA ECM EDC FBI GC&CS GCHQ IEPG IISS IRBM JAEC MAGIC

MARY MIRV MLF MOU MRV NID NPT NRO NSA OECS OSRD oss PES

Anti-ballistic Missile Air-launched Cruise Missile Atlantic Nuclear Force British Army of the Rhine British Central Scientific Office British Defence Staff Washington British Security Coordination Central Intelligence Agency Chief of the Imperial General Staff Chief(s) of Staff Combined Policy Committee Commander in Chief Eastern Atlantic Commander in Chief Western Atlantic Defence Intelligence Agency Electronic Counter Measures European Defence Community Federal Bureau of Investigation Government Code and Cipher School Government Communications Headquarters Independent European Programme Group International Institute for Strategic Studies Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Joint Atomic Energy Commission Code-name for the intelligence derived from the American ability to decipher Japanese codes in the Second World War Manoeuvrable Re-entry Vehicle Multiple Independently Targettable Re-entry Vehicle Multilateral Force Memorandum of Understanding Multiple Re-entry Vehicle Naval Intelligence Directorate Non-proliferation Treaty National Reconnaissance Office National Security Agency Organisation of East Caribbean States Office of Scientific Research and Development Office of Strategic Services Polaris Executive Staff

SALT SEAC SIS SLBM SPO ULTRA

USAEC VHSIC VTOL

List of Abbreviations

Strategic Arms limitation Talks South-East Asia Command Special Intelligence Service Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles Special Projects Office

xiii

Code-name for British operation to decipher enemy Codes and distribute the intelligence derived to the appropriate headquarters during the Second World War United States Atomic Energy Commission Very High Speed Integrated Circuit Vertical Take-off and Landing

Preface The focus of attention of this book is on the defence relationship between Britain and the United States from 1939 to 1984. Defence is clearly only one dimension of Anglo-American relations but it is nevertheless one of the most intimate areas of cooperation and as such is seen by many observers as the core of what is often known as the 'special relation­ship'. The aim of this study is to chart the changing fortunes of the defence partnership and to determine how far these relations have reflected the trends in Anglo-American relations in generaL For many contemporary observers the 'special relationship' is a thing of the past. For some it ended with the Suez d6bicle, for others with the Cuban Missile crisis, 1 and for others still with Britain's failure to help the United States in Vietnam and the decision to withdraw British forces from east of Suez.2 In the light of these interpretations and the generalized impressions of erosion which seem to be widely held, the study attempts to identify in what ways defence relations have been 'special' in the past, whether they remain so today, and what the prospects are for the continuation of close military ties between the two states in the future. Some consideration is also given to the various criticisms which have been levelled against the relationship on both sides of the Atlantic.

The phrase 'special relationship' is one which has very wide currency and yet remains somewhat ill-defmed. The word 'special' usually refers to something which is 'exceptional', 'uncommon', 'peculiar to one thing' or 'additional to the ordinary'. 3 Its use therefore to describe relations between Britain and the United States suggests a relationship which is not only very close but one which is, in some respects at least, extraordinary or 'different in kind' from those with other states.

One problem which arises from this interpretation is whether there is such a thing as a 'standard' or 'normal' relationship between two sovereign states, to which all relationships between pairs of states more or less con­form, with the sole exception of the Anglo-American relationship. A case can be made that the world is full of 'curious, interesting, particular relationships between states'. 4 Every bilateral relationship in a sense can be described as unique or special. As Arthur Campbell Turner reminds us, however, if we are going to think usefully about relations between states, some form of classification is necessary. 5 To argue that all states are unique is not particularly helpful. The nature of state relations is generally 'matters of more and less, withinftnite gradations'.6 As such, in order to understand these relationships broad classifications are not only possible and helpful but in many respects essential. Thus, as Turner has argued, 'it remains

Preface XV

broadly true, subject to this and that qualification, that certain cases of relationship between nation-states are exceptional and stand out from the ruck of the run-of-the-mill international politics'. 7 It is also his contention, and one which is accepted by this study, that there is 'something inherently different, unique and distinctive' in the Anglo-American relationship which makes it stand out and justifies the use of the word 'special'.8

If relations between Britain and the United States can be regarded as being 'exceptional' then a number of questions arise. Have Anglo-American relations always been 'special' or is this a recent phenomenon? In what particular way does the relationship stand out as being 'inherently different, unique and distinctive'? What is it that gives relations between the two countries this 'special' quality?

For most observers of Anglo-American relations the origins of the 'special relationship' lie deep in the roots of history. To writers like H. C. Allen, the whole course of relations between the two countries from the eighteenth century onwards has been 'a ripening of friendship' and a 'persistent, even steady progress from mistrust to cordiality'. 9 For those like Professor Allen who hold this 'hands-across-the-sea' view, defence has traditionally been one of the most tangible and visible forms of the wider relationship between the two countries. The United States, it is argued, was only able to promulgate the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and maintain her isolationism because of the dominance of the British fleet and the protection it afforded to the United States. British naval superiority is also regarded as being of decisive importance in allowing the Civil War of 1861-5 to be fought without the involvement of the European powers.

Another specialist observer, H. G. Nicholas, also emphasizes the long historical background of Anglo-American relations. 10 He argues, however, that it is only 'since World War I, that British governments have given the highest priority to establishing and maintaining a close understanding with the USA'. 11 Despite this emphasis on the more modern relationship, H. G. Nicholas, like Professor Allen, also highlights the important contribution of defence and security questions in bringing Britain and the United States closer together. He points to the growing awareness of the strategic inter­dependence of the two countries in the early years of the twentieth century as providing a solid base for the emerging partnership. This was particularly so in the naval fields and it was appropriate, Nicholas argues, that when the US entered the First World War in Aprill917 ajoint naval command was established under a British admiral. In this one area at least, collaboration was very close with British and American navies cooperating in convoy duties, the blockade and the war against the U-boat menace.

There are other observers of Anglo-American relations, however, such as Professor Coral Bell, who argue that despite the existence of the 'un­avowed alliance' between the two countries from the Monroe Doctrine on­wards, 1940 is a more appropriate date for the start of the especially close, 'special relationship'. 12 In this respect Professor Bell's views are similar to

xvi Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984

those of a joint British and American study produced by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute oflnternational Affairs in 1953Y In this study the authors suggest that it was during the Second World War that the intimacy of cooperation was raised to a new level 'never before realised or even approached' by other sovereign states. According to this work the post-war relationship, when each regarded the other as 'its most important ally', was a continuation, 'at a lower level of intensity, of their war-time collaboration'. 14

1his emphasis on the period since 1940 is also contained in Winston Churchill's famous speech at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946. In this speech, which is better known for his comments about the 'iron curtain', Churchill spoke specifically about the importance of the wartime partnership and the need for continuing instruments of coopera­tion between the two countries in the post-war period as the international atmosphere darkened. The continuance of the intimate relationship was necessary, he argued, 'as the only means whereby the safety of the parts of the world possessing free institutions could be maintained'. 15 According to Churchill:

Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organization will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. 1his means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States .... Fraternal association requires not only the growing friendship and mutual understanding between our two vast but kindred systems of society, but the continuance of the intimate relationship between our military advisers, leading to common study of potential dangers, the similarity of weapons and manuals of instructions, and to the interchange of officers and cadets at technical colleges. It should carry with it the continuance of the present facilities for mutual security by the joint use of all Naval and Air Force bases in the possession of either country all over the world. 16

1his speech is of particular significance not only because of the imagery of the iron curtain descending across Europe and the emphasis upon the importance of continuing military cooperation between the two countries, but because of the popularity it gave to the phrase 'special relationship'. Although the phrase was probably coined by some long-forgotten journalist, it was in fact its repeated and emphatic use in the Fulton speech which 'launched it effectively on the world and from that day on secured its wide circulation'. 17

The view that the Second World War is a proper starting-point for a study of the 'special relationship' is one which is accepted by the present author. Although the roots or origins of the relationship can be traced back into history, it was only during the 193945 war and afterwards that

Preface xvii

the partnership became so close, intimate and informal in such a wide spectrum of political, economic and especially military fields that terms like 'exceptional', 'unique' or 'different from the ordinary' can be applied. The relationship can be said to 'stand out' largely because of the degree of intimacy and informality which was developed during the war and which continued in somewhat diluted form in the post-war period.

Besides the dispute over which period in the history of Anglo-American relations the term 'special relationship' refers to, there is also a disagree­ment in the literature over what it is that has given the relationship its 'special' quality. For some writers the particularly close nature of the alliance sterns essentially from sentimental attachments, cultural affinities, historical traditions, similar institutions and a common language. According to this view it is the cohesion created by these 'family' bonds which have elevated the Anglo-Saxon relationship to a qualitatively different plane in comparison with most other international relationships. Sir Denis Brogan is one commentator of Anglo-American affairs who has written that 'the linguistic and cultural relationship between England and America is not paralleled in any other pair of relationships'. 18 In similar vein Arthur Campbell Turner has argued that 'the foundation of the special relation­ship between Britain and the United States is demographic, the basic fact is that to a considerable extent the population of the United States derives from British sources. . . . The common language is the basic thread of Anglo-American communion, the basis of the Anglo-American com­munity.'19 Even one of the more outspoken critics of the 'special relation­ship' in the United States, George Ball, has argued that 'to an exceptional degree we look out on the world through similarly refracted mental spectacles. We speak variant patios of Shakespeare and Norman Mailer, our institutions spring from the same instincts and traditions, and we share the same heritage of law and custom, philosophy and pragmatic Weltan­schauung .. . starting from similar premises in the same intellectual tradition, we recognize common allusions, share many common prejudices, and can commune on a basis of confidence. ' 20

While these rather intangible factors are undoubtedly of immense importance, it is also true that in terms of history, culture and language both countries have very close ties with many other states as well. The United States is peopled by many continental Europeans as well as by those of British stock. likewise Britain has particularly strong ethnic links with countries like Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa. Why then has the 'special relationship', until recently at least, only applied to relations between Britain and the United States? The answer would seem to derive from the fact that closeness is not the same thing as importance or significance. And the term 'special relationship' seems to imply this extra ingredient of importance. For Britain it is undoubtedly true that since 1940 at least the relationship with the United States has been 'over­whelmingly more important' than with any other state. Similarly, although

xviii Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984

the relationship may have been less crucial to the United States it would nevertheless seem to be true that Britain has invariably been regarded as its closest ally. 21

The question of importance is taken by some to indicate that interest is the major raison d'etre of the partnership rather than history or culture. For those who hold this view each is thought to regard its relations with the other as being closer than with any third country because of the aware­ness of the mutuality of interests between them and in particular the contribution each can make to the other's security.

Whether history, language, sentiment or common interests are at the root of the 'special relationship' is, however, something of a sterile argu­ment. Both have clearly played their part. The exceptional nature of the relationship is in itself a product of the particular mix of these factors rather than any one on its own. A common outlook towards the world and common values which derive from history and culture have helped to produce what one writer describes as 'a shared capacity to see the elements of common interests in whatever international storms the time may bring'.22

Thus political calculation has often provided the compelling impetus for cooperation while a common history and culture have contributed to the interpretation of that calculation and provided an added dimension of warmth and intimacy which has helped to cement the alliance. 23

This 'shared capacity' has been particularly evident in the defence relationship between the two countries with which this book deals.

The term 'defence relationship' is also one which needs some clarifica­tion. In general it may be said to cover the myriad of different forms of cooperation in those areas relating to the security of Britain and the United States. It could no doubt be argued that almost every aspect of joint diplomatic and economic policy has been, in part at least, designed to en­hance the security interests of each state and as such could quite properly be included in a study of this sort. This was obviously the case during the Second World War when almost every aspect of Anglo-American relations was directly or indirectly geared to achieve the war aims of defeating the Axis powers. There is a need, however, to be more specific. Although an attempt will be made to deal with some of the more important areas of the wider relationship as far as they relate to the security of both countries, attention in the main will be centred more sharply on four main areas of defence relations. These include:

(a) The Strategic Relationship involving discussions and negotiations, particularly at the highest levels, designed to coordinate and harmonize the strategic policies of both countries (bilaterally and within a multilateral context like NATO).

(b) The Technical Relationship covering the exchange of information and cooperation in the procurement of conventional, chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and associated equipment.

(c) The Operational Relationship between the Services, Defence Depart-

Preface xix

ments and the Intelligence agencies, involving the conduct of military and security activities in both peace and war.

(d) The Economic/Commercial Relationship involving financial assist­ance and sales of defence equipment and weapons between the two countries.

Some of the wide range of contacts included under these headings have been the result of formal arrang~ments and binding agreements between the two governments. Many others, however, have been of a more informal nature. Indeed one of the characteristic features of the 'special' defence partnership (as of the 'special relationship' generally) has been the pre­ponderance of 'gentlemen's agreements', 'secret unwritten arrangements', and 'Memoranda of Understanding' (MOUs) which have reflected the close personal working relationship which has been established. Henry Kissinger has noted that 'the ease and informality of the Anglo-American partnership has been a source of wonder - and no little resentment -to third countries. Our post-war diplomatic history is littered with Anglo­American "arrangements" and "understandings", sometimes on crucial issues, never put into formal documents.' This informality also characterised the Second World War when the 'special relationship' in its purest form was developed.

The Introduction deals with the evolution of the partnership both before and after the United States entered the war in December 1941. The first section charts the development of the 'common-law alliance' between the two countries before Pearl Harbour. During this period a 'gradual mixing-up process' took place with cooperation involving such things as the lend-lease arrangements; the destroyers-for-bases agreement; the Tizard mission; the joint Staff Talks; and the beginnings of intelligence collaboration: all of which laid the foundations for the 'full marriage' to follow. The second part of the Introduction describes the formation of the joint war machine which developed rapidly after the American entry into the war. This began with the 'Arcadia' conference and the confirmation of the 'Germany-first' strategy, followed by the formation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Boards which together played such a crucial role in the direction and coordination of the allied war effort. By considering briefly the war against Germany, the war against Japan and two specific areas of Anglo-American cooperation in the fields of Atomic Energy and Intelligence, the attempt is made to highlight the extraordinary degree of cooperation which was achieved: 'the most complete unification of military effort ever achieved by two allied states.' 24 Despite the re­markable nature of the partnership, however, the Introduction also identi­fies various differences and strains which existed in certain areas (especially in the war against Japan). 'Special' the relationship may have been, but it is argued that this should not obscure the fact that Britain and the United States remained separate sovereign states whose interests could and did differ and conflict as well as.coincide. 25

XX Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984

A certain amount of friction also characterized the immediate post-war period. Chapter 2 considers the rapid break-up of the integrated war machine in 1945-6 with the abrupt cancellation by the United States of lend-lease, the winding up of the Combined Boards and the unilateral ending of nuclear cooperation by the United States. The chapter goes on, however, to describe the restoration of the military relationship with the forging of a wide range of defence links as the Cold War gathered momen­tum and a growing identity of view was established between the two countries about the Soviet Union and the emerging threat to their security. Despite this emerging partnership, one area in particular in the late 1940s remained outside the trends towards a greater harmonization of defence policies. This was the field of atomic energy. Despite minor amendments to the 1946 McMahon Act little was done to restore the range of co­operation which had existed in the wartime Manhattan project.

Chapter 3 considers the period from 1950 to 1956 when there were important movements towards even greater cooperation but also difficulties which at the end of the period shook the bilateral alliance to its founda­tions. In the early 1950s the pattern of progress towards greater intimacy in a range of defence fields, established in the late 1940s, was continued. Gradually, however, as the chapter attempts to show, problems arose in various areas with the difficulties over the recognition of China; the nuclear question during the Korean War; different interpretations over the Indo­China War; the EDC problem; and misgivings over the Baghdad Pact. The worst of these differences came with the traumatic clash over the Suez invasion in November 1956. Such was the hostility engendered by the crisis that the alliance between the two states which had been so carefully built up since the Second World War came close to collapse. Despite these areas of friction culminating with Suez, ironically, the one area of co­operation which had proved so difficult since 1946 began to show signs of improvement in the rnid-1950s. In 1954 the McMahon Act was further amended, opening up, to a much greater extent than before, the flow of information on the characteristics of nuclear weapons and laying the foundations for more far-reaching legislation later.

Chapter 4 describes how, after Suez, this cooperation in the nuclear field became an important symbol of the desire by both countries to mend their fences. Important agreements followed the Bermuda and Washington Conferences in 1957 which helped to recreate the atmosphere of trust and spawn other agreements and a closer working partnership between the res­pective defence communities. The chapter also describes how the renewed intimacy was demonstrated by operational cooperation between the British and American Armed Forces in 1958 (with the landings in Lebanon and Jordan) in the very region where the partnership had recently so nearly foundered. Despite these close and intimate ties which had been forged by the late 1950s frictions and difficulties still remained. The chapter discusses the Skybolt crisis and tries to show that despite the favourable 'solution'

Preface xxi

reached at the Nassau Conference in December 1962, the growing disparity in power and diverging interests which were becoming evident between the two states at this time provided pointers to the future of the bilateral relationship.

The gradual cooling of Anglo-American relations in general during the middle and late 1960s is dealt with in Chapter4. Despite the wide spectrum of cooperation, in the defence field as in other areas of the relationship difficulties were occurring with increasing frequency. Problems arose over such issues as the MLF and ANF, the war in Vietnam and the decision by Britain to withdraw most of her military forces from the east of Suez region.

Chapter 6 charts the continuation of this erosion in the intimacy of the partnership in the 1970s. Some attempts were made in the early 1970s tore­store relations but the continuing divergence of interests and increasing inequality between the partners helped to further slacken the bonds between the two countries as the decade progressed. As the US became more and more preoccupied with great-power problems such as relations with the Soviet Union and China as well as ending her disastrous war in Vietnam and the growing domestic difficulties with which she had to deal, so the close relationship with Britain must have seemed less and less im­portant to American interests. For her part Britain had her own pre­occupations, including severe economic problems and the determination to join the EEC after the two French vetoes in the 1960s. The chapter tries to show that as a consequence the attention of both countries tended to be deflected away from the traditional post-war priority given to relations with each other. In the defence field, this relative weakening of the bi­lateral relationship was reflected in such things as Britain's active role in the Eurogroup, her contribution to the creation of the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG), and the increasing collaboration with other European countries in the procurement of weapons systems. It is argued that the United States has also demonstrated a growing interest in dealing with the Western European states as a whole, especially over the question of burden-sharing in the alliance and the 'two-way-street' in weapon purchases.

Chapter 6, however, goes on to suggest that, despite the erosion of the defence relationship in certain areas, cooperation in a number of other important aspects of defence have continued throughout the 1970s as well. In the nuclear and chemical warfare fields, laser technology and intelligence, collaboration remained very close indeed. The chapter also argues that in many other areas, including the Services and defence communities generally, the long-standing close and intimate ties remained largely unaffected by the changes in Anglo-American relations in general.

Chapter 7 argues that the ambiguities of Anglo-American relations in the 1970s have continued into the 1980s. The new chapter written for the second edition of the book charts the rise of a certain amount of anti-

xxii Anglo-American Defence Relations 1939-1984

American feeling and discusses disputes which have arisen over the Falklands war, steel exports, the Soviet gas pipeline and difficulties in the defence field associated with spy scandals and a failure of Britain to make a signific­ant contribution to a western rapid deployment force. At the same time the 1980s have witnessed Mrs Thatcher's reaffirmation of 'the extra­ordinary alliance' symbolised in particular by the Trident agreements of July 1980 and March 1982 and the government's firm commitment to deploy American cruise missiles in Britain. The chapter concludes by arguing that although the overall health of Anglo-American relations is somewhat difficult to interpret it would be premature to write off the 'special relationship' especially in the defence field.

The final chapter reflects on the Anglo-American defence relationship over the period covered and considers the prospects for future cooperation. In general it is argued that defence relations have mirrored the trends in other areas of the relationship between the two countries. It is also sug­gested, however, that there have been times when defence has been some­what out of line with the wider relationship and even that certain areas of military cooperation have on occasions been out of tune with the more general defence relationship itself. On the basis of a discussion of the advan­tages and disadvantages of defence collaboration the chapter suggests that on balance the benefits seem to have outweighed the difficulties for both states; although undoubtedly Britain has gained more and the relationship has, as a consequence, been regarded as relatively more important in Britain than in the United States.

In another new section written for the second edition of the book chapter 8 concludes by considering the future prospects of the Anglo­American defence relationship. It is suggested that the future health of the bilateral military partnership depends to a certain extent on Britain's commitment to defence in the years ahead. In particular, given the pressures on the defence budget, the government's commitment to Trident is likely to cause dilemmas for British governments in the middle and late 1980s. If the government retains its commitment to continue the nuclear partnership by spending 10 billion pounds on Trident it seems highly likely that other aspects of Britain's conventional defences may suffer. Cuts will almost certainly have to be made in Britain's conventional contributions to Alliance defence and there will be little left over to contribute to a western rapid deployment force. At a time when American eyes are particularly focused on the global threat this may cause further frictions in Anglo-American relations. On the other hand if the British government decided at some point to cancel the Trident Agreement on cost grounds the core of the special nuclear partners'Iip built-up so carefully since the late 1950s might disappear, significantly eroding the intimate cooperation between the defence establishment of both countries.

These, however, are clouds on the horizon. The Anglo-American defence relationship (like Anglo-American relations in general) has

Preface xxiii

suffered many ups and downs in the past forty years and survived. For the moment as the Trident Agreements and the help during the Falklands war demonstrated both governments continue to see great value in sustaining a close partnership in the military field.

John Baylis