anaxagoras. predication as a problem in physics i.pdf

12
8/11/2019 Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/anaxagoras-predication-as-a-problem-in-physics-ipdf 1/12 Anaxagoras: Predication as a Problem in Physics: I Author(s): A. L. Peck Source: The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Jan., 1931), pp. 27-37 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/637098 . Accessed: 06/10/2014 19:57 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Cambridge University Press and The Classical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Classical Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 2 00.37.4.27 on Mon, 6 Oct 201 4 19:57:27 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Upload: karlojqg

Post on 02-Jun-2018

219 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

8/11/2019 Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/anaxagoras-predication-as-a-problem-in-physics-ipdf 1/12

Anaxagoras: Predication as a Problem in Physics: IAuthor(s): A. L. PeckSource: The Classical Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Jan., 1931), pp. 27-37Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Classical AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/637098 .

Accessed: 06/10/2014 19:57

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Cambridge University Press and The Classical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserveand extend access to The Classical Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 2 00.37.4.27 on Mon, 6 Oct 201 4 19:57:27 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 2: Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

8/11/2019 Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/anaxagoras-predication-as-a-problem-in-physics-ipdf 2/12

Page 3: Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

8/11/2019 Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/anaxagoras-predication-as-a-problem-in-physics-ipdf 3/12

28 A.L. PECK

he uses it in his own system.' This is, of course, exactly what we should expect, andit is what we find.

First of all, let us hear what substa;zces Aristotle denoted by r7 btoo4orpp.He gives

us a convenient list in

Meteor. 388a 13-2o0: Xyo 6' dpto/oLEp7 (a) 7 d r E er a XX e v 6 L e v a, o ov XpvO6v, XCXK'V,6pyvpov, Tcarriepov, itrl7pov, XiOovr,

Ka1T&Xa T& TOL?LT0, Kail bnT K r0rjWV

y•VyEraTLdKKptV6/.EVe,

Kai (b) rT El Tro I• o oL Kal UVrTOi, O~oz OidpKEi, 6TrE, VEUpOV, 8•pua, aTrXcyXvov, rpLXes, Zvel,

4XgEP &, IWy2r)3

ouVvlTTrl(TKE

Tb

aVOfOLO/op7p,OlOV rrpTOWrrOV, XEP,

70•0,,

Kai TXCa TtrTOa1,a7,

Kil(c) 4v c

pvro s tXov, Xotb6, ?iXXov. pitia, KG2 0a TOt0a7a.l

It will be seen that in the passages soon to be quoted when Aristotle uses the term

rdO1LOLOiLEp~

he explains its denotation by mentioning some of the substances namedin the list just rehearsed-especially the animal substances. As there is really noroom for disagreement upon this point, we may pass on to the question to which itimmediately leads, name y-WThat substances were elements in Anaxagoras' scheme ?

TWHAT SUBSTANCES WERE ELEMENTS IN ANAXAGORAS' SCHEME ?

For our answer to this question we are largely indebted to Aristotle; and thepertinent passages are the following:

(a) de gen. et corr. 314a 18: 6 PZ' y&p ['Ava(. ] rd 6olooAepOoro•IeXa

7iOr)tKv, oto v r7 o0 vK i• O p K Kal ,LUv• X6 v, KC1 T Vv XXWV• KiTv GKoTO-r UV1

)vVUov TOb fppo ETI-lV

. . a 24

ivavVios 64 1paivovraTXtoVr,7E

o0 r7epi 'Avafiay6pav roi rwep 'EL7pre•o~K\a' 6 tV yipYdp ITOL

lri0p KCai •wp Kail dlpa Kai•y7V OTOaIXEa 1K7ilapa Kai

•rXaEiVaCL ftaXXov T

o" d p Ka Kl0 00 r o U V

K1aL 7l 7L aTiiTo

TWV i}OLOJfEpWV, OL 6&TrarTa

/IV &V~rX K ItTOLXER•C,

yjV 8& KCil lrpait i6bwp ial ipa icTVOETra

7ravKrT-Ep/cLaY'yp EVCPL 707L6WV.

1,ode caelo 3o2a 28: 'Avit. 8'

'Ey/rlOKXE60K avriw1 XyTEL rEpi TWv TOLrXEdwv . . . a 31

'AVa. 6iTobvavrlov"

7T y&p6y.otoijepi

oroTXEt (X47yw 8' oov cdpK KaiiTl ov

Ka1L TWVTOL7 7OW VlKaCrTOV),

CLcpC & ial 7rTp [Zypta TO6TWV aili TV CtXXWyV

(T71EpL/LrTV7rmivrv.

e1var y&p bKdi7EpI1Tov bL-di opCrewV botoloieplV r7virVW (6potrfydov [var. wv]. 8•6

K•a TyiYVEaOe 71TV KTO•b oTWV r6 yep irp K~aiLV aiL6pCi ripoKayope6L 7Ta76.

In these two passages Aristotle is telling or reminding his hearers what things,in Anaxagoras' system of philosophy, were elements. And in order to do this heuses a term with which, if they know their Aristotle, they ought to be quitefamiliar, the term r- 8.OLoplEp0c.

He says that, according to Empedocles and hisschool, Earth, Air, Fire, Water were the elements of all things, whereas, accordingto Anaxagoras, ra blOJoLEpi were the elements of all things. And as a reminder ofthe sort of substances he means by -r 6OtLOluOp

, he mentions by name Bone, Flesh,Marrow. Thus his answer to the question,' What things were elements in Anax-

agoras' system ?' is, ' T& 1•oLobop (i.e. what we in this school call "the homoeomerousthings "--e.g. Flesh, Bone, Marrow) were elements in Anaxagoras' system.' This isthe straightforward meaning of Aristotle's words, and I believe it is the only onewhich makes sense of what he says.

Let us now notice what Aristotle does not say:

(i) He does not say that Anaxagoras affirmed anything to be 'homoeomerous.'

r bl•oEoP•pePis not grammatically predicate, nor is it adjectival.

(2) He does not say that Anaxagoras' elements were infinitely divisible intopieces like the whole.2

(3) He does not say, and his words do not imply, that Anaxagoras had classesof

thingswhich he called

'homoeomerous,'or

ro IwLOLolP ; and further

that according to Anaxagoras things in these classes were elements.These passages can be explained on the straightforward assumption that Aristotle isusing the term r&

b/ILOoLopJEas a convenient one of his own (and therefore readily

1 There is no conclusive evidence that Aristotleincluded Fire, Air, Earth, and Water under rT6ofoLopep7.2 Though no doubt this is true. But if they

were divisible at all, then, being elements, itfollows ex hypothesi that the pieces are like thewhole.

This content downloaded from 2 00.37.4.27 on Mon, 6 Oct 201 4 19:57:27 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 4: Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

8/11/2019 Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/anaxagoras-predication-as-a-problem-in-physics-ipdf 4/12

ANAXAGORAS: PREDICATION AND PHYSICS: I. 29

intelligible to his hearers), to denote the substances it regularly denotes in his ownphilosophy. Nothing further need be assumed.

At this point, then, we are able to see that, as far as Anaxagoras' system is

concerned, it does not matter in the very least what Aristotle meant by the actual word6poLoPEp@, r why he called certain substances by that name, though in view ofcurrent opinions it will be our duty to examine the meaning of @OLOLEpfhSater on.As students of Anaxagoras, studying him through Aristotle's notices of him, all thatconcerns us is what substances Aristotle denoted by 1rh ,oAoL?pEp. When we know thatwe are able to evaluate Aristotle's statements that in Anaxagoras' system theelements were 'r 6/otobEpE'.

What, then, is the information which we receive from Aristotle's statements?That Anaxagoras conceived things like Flesh, Bone, Marrow to be elemental(o-roLXEa) nd simple

(•-X•).Those (and others like them) were his elements.

Aristotle in another passage suggests how possibly Anaxagoras may have cometo the conclusion that these substances were elemental.

de caelo 302b II : 7rpoTo0v /1V brT ObK•TLIV

~T7ELCpa [SC. r3 0LTtxE'a], Kacilrep otovTat 7LcEs,

OeEWprlov,, KL lrrproV 706s RdTvaroo6VL

p7 OLOp TOLXEIa irotouvraS, Kacdcrep 'Avagay6pas. oOdiry&p 7iv ob'rws dLLtobvrov 6p63s Xc~Laivs6 Eb T

otorXEov 6ppErv y&dp 7roXXI Kal TWV pLKTd'TOWd4TWJVs

6oiotoIxeps 6Lacpod•eva,•dyuo c'

oyo odpKraKa

lr dTOUvK f Xov KLaL XO. I ,TE iire p 7

evOerove obiK IOL T77OLXyEO, OoK C ,rav ETraL 7,66O[OLOJIEps OrTOLXEZov,

XX& r d ticdperov eisrepac 4jEt6E.

Anaxagoras, as well as Aristotle, could see that Flesh, Bone, Wood, etc., woulddivide up dls pLOELoEPi i.e. into pieces similar to the whole in their formation), and,Aristotle suggests, that led him to take the further step and to say that these thingswere similar throughout not only in formation, but also in substance-i.e., to say theywere elements. But, says Aristotle, he was misled. On a point of fact Anaxagoraswas mistaken. He said (e.g.) that Flesh was an element, but as a matter of(Aristotelian) fact it is a buKabv o4Lpa. Now many

-LKTI -O;ara-will divide up ELs

6(LOLO~LEpp; which shows that, although a thing divides up Els61xototpEP

, it will not invirtue of that be a simple substance and an element. Anaxagoras, poor man, did notknow that things like Flesh and Bone were themselves composed of Earth, Air, Fire,and Water; he thought they were simple substances-elements.3

Thus the upshot of this passage is simply that Anaxagoras was mistaken aboutthe facts of the case, in thinking Flesh, etc., were elemental; and it would not detainus, were it not that Aristotle seems here to imply that, according to Anaxagoras, all

'the homoeomerous things' were elemental, including Stone (ro70r0 aTr a6o~o~Tiooepir7o•oXtcLa

roeovvras, KaOdaEp Avao.), though we should notice that he does not in so

1 An additional indication that (as usual) Aris-totle is speaking his own language when discuss-ing the philosophy of others is that at the end ofpassage (b) above (p. 28) he adds a little noteto justify himself in using irOpwhere Anaxagorashad used ai8ip.2 Note that-regarded as' composed' of EarthAir Fire Water Flesh etc. are o6v6era (here);regarded as'not composed' into organs, theyare ocLvO~era hist. an. 486a 5, see p. 34,

infra).SIt will be seen that this, too, is one ofAristotle's regular criticisms from his own pointof view, and in his own language, of anotherphilosopher, and we are not to take his sug-gestion of how Anax. came to hold the viewhe did as intended to be an historically accurateaccount. Thus, e.g., we are not entitled toargue from his words that Anax. thought, e.g.,

any actual lump of flesh consisted of flesh in anelementary state and nothing else (see below,p. 36), or even that Aristotle supposed he thoughtso. Similarly, we cannot argue from this passagethat Anax. used the word 6psotogepuSsr the phraseElIS

6/oLogepi. Any one of us can see that stonecan be broken and wood can be sawn into pieceswhich are still stone or wood; and without theadvantage of modern knowledge we might even

saythat for that

reason stone and wood areelemental. That does not prove that we callthem 'homoeomerous.' Cf. Stocks' note ad loc.in the Oxford translation.

4 Contrast howevero xe I)bv yip &ravra 71&

yOLOfLLEWIt. 984a 13, and his instancing of anima6OlotoL/ep? (r

&o70ta a 7irv O/.otoLEpWv) in the

passages quoted on page 28 above.

This content downloaded from 2 00.37.4.27 on Mon, 6 Oct 201 4 19:57:27 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 5: Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

8/11/2019 Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/anaxagoras-predication-as-a-problem-in-physics-ipdf 5/12

30 A.L. PECK

many words state that Anaxagoras said Stone was elemental; he only cites it asbeing (in his own system) a /LKTOV 0-6)•a

which will divide up El 6OLOLEpj. But theproblem here presented needs examination; and we must now proceed to discuss it

more fully.Aristotle, in the two passages above quoted (p. 28), states that, in Anaxagoras'system, 'the homoeomerous things,' such as Bone, Flesh, Marrow, etc., wereelements. These are the ones he actually names, but on three occasions in thesepassages he adds 'etc.,' which apparently is intended to stand at least for all the restof the substances mentioned in the list of 'animal

6loLoO[lEp' (meteor. 388a 13 sqq.)-

vEvpov, &pfpLa, rwXcayXvov, 7plXE, ~XEs,A~flE, and others.' In the third passage quoted(de caelo, 3o2b II sqq.) Aristotle seems indirectly to imply that, according toAnaxagoras, all the three classes of Aristotelian LtooLEpi~ were elements. Furtheron he specifies ordpKa and oroJ~0v, which would represent the' animal

6ootpLEP,'$iXov,

which would represent the 'vegetableatototep•,'

and XtAov,2 which would representthe ' mineral 6/otopep-.' Now if, according to Anaxagoras, animal substances areelements, it will not surprise us to hear that vegetable substances also are elements,especially as Anaxagoras was chiefly interested in the behaviour of living creatures.But a doubt arises about the third class, that of the mineral

8/oto/pp,in which Aris-

totle included the metals. Some assume that these also were elements according toAnaxagoras.3 But surely this is most unlikely. For (a) we must realize thata priori there is no reason why Anaxagoras' elements should coincide exactly with allthe things classed as

-i 4/•LOtoxppby Aristotle; it would indeed be a remarkable

coincidence if they did. Further, (b) Aristotle tells us quite plainly twice4 that inAnaxagoras Fire, Air, Earth, and Water were not elements, but mixtures of tiny bits

of all the elements; i.e., there is in Nature no such thing as (e.g.) Earth: it ismerely a conglomeration of all kinds of different things, none of which is Earth.This is generally agreed. Now Anaxagoras himself tells us something about Fire,Air, Earth, and Water.5 He says:

TO fLEJ7JruKV~5

KaI BLEPbvalp

v•

pvuXpIv

7ai 7•oeepbiv bv'9de auve X$pt7ev, •vea viv, rd &i dpauo'vKic T6 typdv dpexcrppev eis rd 7rp6ow 70o aiO~pos.

We shall be concerned with his statement about these components later; but theremarks which follow interest us here. Simplicius proceeds almost at once: o7-osydp frvo-v.

(frag. 16):

a'rd T'oUWV d&rOKptVOtVWV

oUpvr7'TvuTaCLy' •K ,iv yp 7iv ve/e wv 6w0p

d7OKplveTat,eK &

70T Ib'rLTOS y?7, CK ?5 T sy s i~ oc ovgtrtlywVvvaL br- 700o IvXpOU.

Here we see Anaxagoras himself classing Xtlot with Water and Earth; which iswhat we should expect. He seems to be describing a process of solidification, andno doubt the series in full would be: Ether, Air, Water, Earth, Stones.6 Now thefirst four of these are rwvorwEplt~da-conglomerations of little bits of all the elements,and Stones must be so too. Further, I suggest that Minerals and Metals, which arefound in the earth, must also be placed in this category. This will give us a consis-tent scheme, in which organic (animal and vegetable) substances will be elemental,while inorganic substances (the old Earth, Air, Fire, Water category-cosmologicaland mineral substances) will not be elemental, but will consist of tiny bits of all the

1 See de part. an. 647b io.SAs has been pointed out (p. 29), these sub-

stances are cited by Aristotle as instances of/ILKT& a

•0arawhich will divide up eis 6~p~o~oiepiI,

not explicitly as instances of Anaxagoreanelements.

3 This assumption is the only evidence broughtforward by Mr. Cornford (G.Q. XXIV. 19, 20)against the straightforward interpretation of iv

•ravrn7ravr6s [Loipa r~aErT.

4 See p. 28.5 In frag. 15, preserved by Simplicius.6 Cf. the version given by Simplicius (phys.

460): Fire, Air, Water, Earth, Stones; Fireagain. NecpXat in fr. 16 stand for c&p, which inthe philosophy of this and earlier date meantMist (thick air) as against aiOlp (bright air,fire).

This content downloaded from 2 00.37.4.27 on Mon, 6 Oct 201 4 19:57:27 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 6: Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

8/11/2019 Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/anaxagoras-predication-as-a-problem-in-physics-ipdf 6/12

ANAXAGORAS: PREDICATION AND PHYSICS: I. 31

elements mixed together. To put Stones and Minerals and Metals into the organiccategory spoils the consistency of the scheme, besides being (at least as far as Stonesare concerned) contrary to Anaxagoras' own words.'

We therefore conclude that among Anaxagoras' elemental substances wereincluded at least:

(a) The animal substances (Flesh, Bone, Marrow, etc.);(b) The vegetable substances (Bark, Wood, etc.);

and that the following did not appear among them:

Fire, Air, Water, Earth, and Stones, Minerals, and Metals.

To this conclusion it will be objected that we have testimonies on all handsaffirming that, according to Anaxagoras, gold was an elementary substance. Strictly,this is not true; we have, however, a few testimonies

describingthe

8LdKpr Osofthe

original mixture, and the formation of masses large enough to become recognizable,by a process of aggregation of 'like to like.'" And the testimonies which tell us thatvisible masses of gold were formed in this way (namely, by the aggregation of littlebits of gold, which had all along been gold, though too small to make themselvesnoticeable) tell us in the next breath the same about earth.3 If this implies, as isalleged, that gold is a simple and elemental substance, it implies the same of earthTherefore no one who is not prepared to accept the statement in this sense aboutearth is justified in urging acceptance of the statement about gold; especially in viewof the evidence which has already been brought forward.4

We have next to consider whether this is a complete tale of the elements ofAnaxagoras, or whether there are other substances that should be included.

Now there are certain things mentioned by Anaxagoras which do not seem tobe compounds of substances such as Flesh and Bone, and appear to have existed inthe original mixture.5 These are the things which Anaxagoras calls ?

&Eepvv, 7v

,•pdv,

ib

OptLov, rbbvXpdYv, -b Xaapcwp6v, 7b (ocEpdv (all in Frag. 4), 7• dpa•vV, vr 0vKvv(Frag. 12; cf. Frag. 15).6 These, of course, were at that time the names of actual

substances, or kinds of matter, not of 'qualities,' and are found as such in earlierphilosophical systems and in the medical writings.7 Thus the nearest translation inmodern speech of e.g.

r OEp1tLv would be 'hot substance.'8 It has been maintained

by some9that these substances were in fact the

onlyelements in

Anaxagoras'system. But then Flesh, Bone, etc., would not be elements: they would be meremixtures or combinations of simpler substances, whereas the evidence of Aristotle is

1 For a discussion of this matter, I may referthe reader to my article in C.Q. XX., especiallyPP. 59, 60, 63, 67, where this same conclusion isreached (p. 70).

2 This process will be fully examined later.3 Simplic. phys. 27. I1i; Lucr. I. 834 sqq.

These passages will be examined later.

4 It may be remarked in passing that the

passage in Plato's Protagoras 329d, which issometimes cited in support of the hypotheses(a) that

6/toLopep5s=simple(i.e. which will always

be found similar in substance throughout, how-ever far divided), and (b) that in Anax. goldwas 6/oLo/Leps in this sense, lends no supportwhatever to either of them. Neither the nameof Anax. nor the word o/ioLo/.ep7s appears in thepassage or its context.

5 Frags. 4, 12, 15.

6 That is, what are commonly known as' theOpposites.'

7 E.g. in r. ipX. l7TrpLKjS, 7r. s~Ct1S; see tooPlato's Timaeus and elsewhere. In these worksthe ones they mention are called vvdiecs, ' strongsubstances.'

8 There is, so far as I know, no evidence in

favour of the 'collective' meaning of thesenames-e.g. Trd eppt6v=

'the sum of hot (or com-paratively hot) things, which things may haveany number of other properties, and agree onlyin being hot' (Mr. Cornford, C.Q. XXIV. 84;cf. ib. 25, 30).

Y Notably by Burnet (following Tannery; seeed. ii. [1930], pp. 296 ff.) and virtually by Mr.Cornford.

This content downloaded from 2 00.37.4.27 on Mon, 6 Oct 201 4 19:57:27 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 7: Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

8/11/2019 Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/anaxagoras-predication-as-a-problem-in-physics-ipdf 7/12

32 A.L. PECK

explicitI that Anaxagoras held Flesh, Bone, etc., to be elements. The solution seemsto be that Anaxagoras held 'the hot,'' the cold,' etc., to be elements equally withFlesh and Bone. We know (from Frag. io) that one of the problems whichconfronted him was how hair could come out of what was not hair and flesh out ofwhat was not flesh; and the Scholiast who tells us this says that just as Anaxagorasconsidered o-c4a-a to be all mixed up with one another, so he considered

Xpa/ra~to

be: ', XEVK4V as inT•

D•Xav and -b l •Xav was in b XEvKdVy." The same was truealso of 5b Papi and ib K0oVov. This is supported by a testimony which says heaffirmed snow to be black." Indeed, one who was troubled by the problem of howflesh can 'come into being ' out of what is not flesh would be equally troubled by theproblem of how black could come out of 'not-black' and hot out of' not-hot.'

We must include then in Anaxagoras' list of elements:

(c) The so-called Opposites (' the hot,' etc.),

however many of them there may have been. The ones named by Anaxagorashimself we have already noticed; but there is no reason to suppose that this is anexhaustive list. One of the things that Aristotle complains of is that Anaxagoras'

rTOorXoEawere unlimited in number;' so we need not suppose that Anaxagoras could

have given a complete list of these ' Opposites' any more than he could have givena complete list of all the elementary animal or vegetable substances. The pointwhich he made was that, however many such substances there were, they were allelementary.5

It may be worth noticing that this conclusion is supported by Aristotle. Wehave already seen (p. 31) that Aristotle includes the vegetable and animal substancesamong Anaxagoras' elements; and in other passages he completes his statement.

Phys. 187a 24: 7(. .. rdvy ~iv [viz. 'Avaay6bpavC] 7retpa [sc. irotev] rd r e 6oIot/epai 7ciavara.

Which is followed by the fuller statement, describing the tenets of Anaxagoras andhis school:

Ibid. 187a 36: iv'o/rav. 6vrwv /iv Ka vvrapX6vr70v yzve~Oat, GrL&/t.Kpd'rq77a

cTrv

6yKWvir dvatOr8hjwv

$?txYv.&6

aCfCrLo iv7rr'

' t EtxaL,E OLrc' EKrcLvJ'6Era

jpwv•My7evov.W

cVacvT•r-a

t61

&caupovroTKal

7rpocacyopf•i•Eta t ~'frpci. XX?5Xzv EK rOi fLciXLoO'

r7J-pXo7svros&t&

rX•0osEiv r

"ILi~Ev

' 7rEipwv"EIXLKpLVWS /.EV "icp oXO' XEVKOZ

?ILCaZv 1i yXUKi

V oapK"u0

"r o o v OUKETyLat, 6T0U 8 7rX • TOV EL,

TO"TO80OKWeV ET'VL rT v

O6tLVToUrpdyi /YTOS.6

In these passages we find Aristotle putting 'the white,' 'the black,' ' the sweet' (that

is, 'the Opposites') on a par with 'flesh' and 'bone' (that is, 'the homoeomerousthings'); and Burnet, though the interpretation of Anaxagoras which he himselfgives contradicts his statement, agrees that 'Aristotle himself implies that theopposites of Anaxagoras had as much right to be called first principles as the"homnoeomeries." 7

Our conclusion is therefore that Anaxagoras' elemental substances were:

(a) The animal substances, Flesh, Bone, Marrow, etc. Included in Aristotle's

(b) The vegetable substances, Bark, Wood, etc. i 'homoeomerous things.'(c) The so-called Opposites, the hot, the cold, etc.

We shall not be in a position to take a full review of the effect of the conclusion

1 tooXEtov must be used of Emrnpedocles andAnaxagoras in the same sense in de caclo 3o2a, b.

2 Schol. in Greg. XXXVI. 911 (Diels B io).Cf. Achill. Isag. 30. 2 (Diels A 77) and Philo-ponus 87. 12.

3 Sext. pyrrh. hypot. I. 33 (Diels A 97).SArist. phys. 187-8. Cf. r. dpX. irTp., ch. 14.

SSee also for these substances Theophr.de sensu 28, where he says that rd OePy6v, r7

•l'vXp6v,7yXvK6, rd d~6, etc., are in animal bodies.

6 Cf. ibid. i88a 5 sqq.' E.G.P., ed. iii., p. 263. Burnet himself does

not admit what he calls the ' homoeomeries ' asfirst principles.

This content downloaded from 2 00.37.4.27 on Mon, 6 Oct 201 4 19:57:27 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 8: Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

8/11/2019 Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/anaxagoras-predication-as-a-problem-in-physics-ipdf 8/12

ANAXAGORAS: PREDICATION AND PHYSICS: I. 33

here reached until after we have discussed the further question of the meaning of theadjective

&/oLopEpiS.But we may notice the position of Anaxagoras as here presented

in relation to other philosophers and theories, so far as his elementary substances areconcerned.

A great deal of Anaxagoras' system is of course inherited, as any such systemmust be. He accepts as he finds them the substances called the Opposites, andgives them a place among his elements. The old name for these substances, beforeAristotle proclaimed them 'qualities' and called them ra hvav1-La, was 8vvr/Les, and assuch they figure as the components of the human body 1 and its foods (or at leastsome of them do) in ?r. Jpalcy lTrptLK7S: they appear too (under the same name) in?r. S&arls and in Plato's Timaeus. They are in fact claimed by the author of the first-named treatise as the regular stock-in-trade of the 'ancient' art of medicine, and herebukes Empedocles2 for his interference with them. The author is especiallyopposed to those who attach paramount importance to the two 8vviC4ELs, OEp/Lv and,bvXpov.3 This of course does to some extent represent what Empedocles did, for he

did little more than single out these two and rb gypov and rb iypo'v and call them bydifferent names.

Anaxagoras, however, seems to retain the old 8vvfulELs as they were; but heintroduces as additional elements the substances found in animal and vegetableorganisms. This is clearly a deliberate correction of theories such as that ofEmpedocles, who said that his four

,L•d,ara, 'mixed' in different though regular

'proportions,' would give rise to flesh, bone, etc.5 But, thought Anaxagoras, fleshcannot arise in this way, because none of its components would be flesh: flesh wouldhave arisen out of not-flesh. Flesh must therefore be pronounced an Element in its

own right, not a mere mixture of ~Au?ra or vvwl•Ces.It is herein, then, that his originality lies; not in his accepting the Opposites aselements.

OBJECTIONS TO THE HYPOTHESIS THAT THE 'OPPOSITES' WERE ANAXAGORAS'

ONLY ELEMENTS.6

The following objections may be brought against the hypothesis that in Anaxa-goras' scheme the 'Opposites' were the only elemental and ultimate substances :

I. It contradicts Aristotle's repeated statement (see p. 28) that Flesh, etc., areElements (ur-oLXE&a,irXa), which it then becomes necessary to ignore or to explain away.

2. It involves the admission that Flesh 'comes out of what is not flesh,' viz. the

Opposites. We are back at Empedocles.3. It produces a double set of 'things within things.' On Mr Cornford's view7we have

(i.) All the Opposites (inseparable) in all the kinds of Seeds.(ii.) Some kinds of Seeds (separable, p. 83) in some objects.s

" Cf. p. 32, note 4.2 Ch. 20. SCh. 13.SCf. those incorporated by Democritus,

Theophr. de sensu 6s sqq.6 Frags. 96, 98.8 For all practical purposes this is the hypo-

thesis maintained by Burnet and Mr. Cornford(see p. 36, note 4).

7 Cf. Mr. Bailey's version:(i.) All things (inseparable) in all the kinds of

Seeds.

(ii.) All the kinds of Seeds (separable, pp. 545,548) in all objects.

Burnet's first stage coincides with Mr. Corn-ford's, but he does not seem to get as far as the

second. The difficulty in all these interpreta-tions is caused by their reluctance to admit in-separability.

8 A further objection might be brought againstthis hypothesis, viz. that it does not allow forvariation (e.g.) of temperature. For if 'thenature of the tissue

depends on the balance orproportion of the mixture' (C.Q. XXIV. 94), asit must, then if flesh is raised from 970 F. to980 F. it must cease to be flesh, for the pro-portion on which the existence of flesh dependsis altered. There is more of 'the hot' in it.The theory which I hope to put forward belowis not open to this objection.

C:

This content downloaded from 2 00.37.4.27 on Mon, 6 Oct 201 4 19:57:27 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 9: Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

8/11/2019 Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/anaxagoras-predication-as-a-problem-in-physics-ipdf 9/12

34 A.L. PECK

It has already been shown that it is not necessary o the understanding ofAristotle's notices to assume anything more than that he was using the term

1- /Oo/OOEp)as a technical term from his own system, denoting the classes of things

specified by him.It now remains to show that no further assumption in this connexion is possible.

FIRST HYPOTHESIS:•fLotoL•Elj

5 HAS THE SAME MEANING IN ANAXAGORAS AND

IN ARISTOTLE.

For this purpose we return to Mr. Cornford's first statement: '6potoEpj ...as the same meaning in both systems' (C.Q. XXIV. 17; see p. 27 above).

What is its meaning in Aristotle ?

THE MEANING OF o/IotoLolEp? IN ARISTOTLE.

The form regularly used by Aristotle is the substantival form,r-& oLoEpe,

' thehomoeomerous things.' In his system we have the series:

(i) Elements, which are 'material' for-(2) r&

O/,•OOLEfl,,, ,,

(3)7" ,rvoolo~opp•,

,, ,, ,,(4) The organism as a whole.

In his system, i- 6/oLocpeP re contrasted with i- dcvo,.Loo/pEpand a clear illus-

tration of the difference is that a bit of flesh is flesh, but a bit of a heart is nota heart.2 Similarly, we might illustrate the difference in this way. Any piece ofcloth taken from a roll will be cloth, and so will what is left; but if you cut a pieceof cloth out of the seat of a pair of trousers, neither that piece nor what you leavebehind will be a pair of trousers. Thus i- davo[LoLoJEpp re (e.g.) organs of the body,while

r-& •,LoLopEP are as it were the raw material out of which the organs arecomposed.

That this is what Aristotle means by the terms i- d1otolpp,ra

,vo/Looppe,when

he uses them in his own system, is made clear in the following passage, to which weshall have to refer again presently. He says

Hist. an. 486a 5: "r v roZ qot~s iophiov r& JLVE7rtV &6EvOera~, a6gp &,~r 2scopotoprE,owov •dpKEs ets cpKa~s, 7•

6 o6vOerc, iac els aJvo/oto.epfl, ofovi X(ep o•K eis XrE'pa

6LtLpET•L

ou6."r6b pb6warov els 7rpb6wra.

The words have nothing to do with the substance as such. 'Face' is not a com-

pound substance s against a simple one; the point is that it is an organ. Similarly,on the other hand, 'flesh' is not an organ; any lump of it is like any other, and noorganic unity or structure is marred when it is cut up

Surely, therefore, the meaning of6/LoLop?EPs

annot be considered apart fromAristotle's entire fourfold scheme, and in particular it cannot be considered apartfrom the meaning of dVOjuotoLEpp.

THIS MEANING CANNOTAPPLY N ANAXAGORAS.

Is it then to be supposed that Anaxagoras held the whole of this doctrine of thefourfold scheme? That cannot be; if proof is needed, it is supplied at once by thefact that he had not Earth, Air, Fire, and Water for his elements. He did not thenhold this doctrine. But if he did not, then the word 6Lotot•uLpg, hether he actuallyused it himself or if others represent him as having done so, cannot have the same mean-ing as it has in Aristotle's system; for that meaning is necessarily bound up withAristotle's fourfold scheme and especially with the meaning of •o~otoLp•plj Itsmeaning is, in fact, cr-•vOErosn the sense of 'simple in formation.'

I Arist. de gen. an. 715a Io; cf. 734b 27 andde part. an. 646a 12 sqq., 647b 22 sqq.

2 See hist. an. 486a 5, infra.: Cf. p. 29, note 2.

This content downloaded from 2 00.37.4.27 on Mon, 6 Oct 201 4 19:57:27 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 10: Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

8/11/2019 Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/anaxagoras-predication-as-a-problem-in-physics-ipdf 10/12

ANAXAGORAS: PREDICATION AND PHYSICS: I. 35

ANOTHER HYPOTHESIS: 'OIoooppUEPS= -' SIMPLE AND ELEMENTARY IN SUBSTANCE.'

Mr. Cornford, however, in common with some other interpreters, takes the wordin another

sense, which, as we shall see, cannot be legitimately deduced fromAristotle's usage.Mr. Cornford thus describes the meaning which he attaches to

6oto/Epijs:' The principle of Homoeomereity, as (following Lucretius) I propose to interpret it,

asserts the existence of a class of substances (called 6rolowepi~) such that, however far theyare subdivided, the pieces will always be like one another and like the whole of which theyare parts. The subdivisions of a piece of flesh or a piece of gold will always be fleshor gold.'

This description can only be understood as intending to equate 'homoeomerous'with'elemental,' for elemental substances alone can fulfil the conditions specified.That this is intended is borne out by Mr. Cornford's describing such classes of

substances as 'simple 2 natural substances.' 3This interpretation can be tested by means of the passage of Aristotle quoted

above (hist. an. 486a 5 sqq.). In this passage occurs the phrase bo'a &atpitEaL ELS6O/otoJpEP On the interpretation now being considered, this phrase has to be takenapart from its correlation with &'a &atpedram lsd

vototoLepp,and treated as if it

meant 'such as are divisible into portions like the whole, having regard to thesubstance of the thing divided.' Similarly, dJilvOse'a4 as to be construed as if it hadreference to the substance of the thing in question, and not to its formation, whereasthe context shows clearly that the reference is to the formation (or lack of formation)into organs.

If there were any doubt on this point, it would be clearedaway by

Aristotle'sown statement in another place, where he tells us that the fact that a thing is

O•LOto/LEp3Sand fatpEram Els

o/LOtooELpPby no means proves that it is an element rather

than a1i--hv

o-ui4a, for many ~ui-a o-4aa 8&atpdi--t

ElsApolo/p .gain, we know that the 'elements' in Aristotle's system were Earth, Air,

Fire, and Water, and these alone would answer to the description of 'simple andelementary substances.' Even Aristotle's 'homoeomerous things' are composed ulti-mately of the four elements Earth, Air, Fire, and Water.

THIS MEANING CANNOT APPLY IN ARISTOTLE.

We conclude, therefore, that the terms 'homoeomerous,'' anhomoeomerous' inAristotle have reference not to the substance of matter, but to its formation, or lack offormation, into organs; and that the meaning 'simple and elementary in substance'has no place in Aristotle.6 This meaning is in fact an entirely fictitious one, inventedby modern commentators on Anaxagoras.7

SC.Q. XXIV., p. 16.2 'Simple' Mr. Cornford explains to mean

that, 'like Aristotle's "simple bodies," theycannot be actually divided into any substancesof a prior order, but are themselves "elements" '(p. I7, note 4).

3 P.i7.SCf. p. 29, note 2.

, De caelo 302b 15 sqq. (quoted on p. 29).6 The distinction on which I am here insisting

may be expressed by contrasting 'division' or'section' with ' analysis.' In Aristotle's usaged/oMotoFepswill then be concerned with 'section 'only, and not with 'analysis.'

7 I am not here calling into question Mr.

Cornford's assertion that in Anaxagoras 'everynatural substance is a simple body and an ele-ment' (p. 17), but it seems to me that,even if thepremisses were correct, the argument by whichthat conclusion is reached must be fallacious.The argument is difficult to follow, but it seemsto be this:

Anaxagorashad a class

of substancescalled6 LoLo~Lpie. 'Ototo tep~s

means 'divisibleinto parts that are like the whole' (p. 16).'O/hoto/Lepq denotes 'simple natural substances.'Therefore every natural substance is a simplebody and an element (p. I7). It is the equationof oIoto/uep? with 'simple natural substances,'which Aristotle would never have agreed to.

This content downloaded from 2 00.37.4.27 on Mon, 6 Oct 201 4 19:57:27 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 11: Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

8/11/2019 Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/anaxagoras-predication-as-a-problem-in-physics-ipdf 11/12

36 A.L. PECK

ANOTHER HYPOTHESIS:dooOEppj•-=

'SIMPLE AND ELEMENTARY IN SUBSTANCE AND

DISSOCIATED FROM EVERY OTHER SUBSTANCE.

But we are not through the wood yet. There is yet another meaning whichsometimes tacitly, sometimes explicitly, is superadded to 'homoeomerous,' and itis this. When one says that (e.g.) flesh 'is homoeomerous,' one is supposed to meannot only that flesh is a uniform, simple substance (i.e. an element), but that in actualfact flesh is found in an isolated state, separate from every other elementarysubstance. In other words, any bit of actual lesh we see is flesh pure and simple, andthere is nothing else in it.'

This view has only to be clearly stated, and its falsity is immediately evident.For, because a substance is an element, it does not therefore follow that it is alwaysfound in isolation from other elements, nor indeed that it can be isolated. Its statusof element is not

prejudiced merelybecause it cannot be isolated. That would be

prejudiced only if it were composed of substances more ultimate than itself, not by itsassociation with other substances that are on an equal footing with itself. We, thanksto modern knowledge, may possibly have the idea that any element can be isolated:that does not prove that Anaxagoras had the same idea. His own words2 clearlyindicate that he had not; and on this denial he bases his whole system.

But there is a practical objection too. Surely, if 'homoeomerous' means this, no'homoeomerous' substance can serve as food for any animal body. Our only foodsshould be Fire, Air, Water, and Earth, which are not 'homoeomerous,' but consistof all substances. Even things like grains of corn, which, being the seeds of aplant, we may suppose to consist of tiny bits of straw, leaf, husk, etc. (all of them'homoeomerous' on this hypothesis), cannot be food for flesh, blood, bone-if ' homoeo-merous' has this alleged implication. The hypothesis is of course in practice untenable,and it becomes necessary to admit 3 that there is flesh and bone in a grain of corn.But are they in the straw, or the leaf, or the husk, or where ? Whatever they are inceases to be 'homoeomerous' in this alleged sense, for we can no longer say of it that,however far it is subdivided, its pieces will always be like one another and like thewhole. The same objection applies even more obviously to foods which are notseeds of plants, but consist of one only of the 'homoeomerous' substances.

There is a corollary to this hypothesis, which is, that if a substance cannot beisolated, then it cannot be an element.4 But, here again, a substance is no less anelement because it cannot be isolated from other substances which are on the

samefooting as itself; it fails to be an element only if it consists of other substancesmore ultimate than itself. The impossibility of isolating it does not destroy theimpossibility of analyzing it, either actually or in thought; and it is this whichmakes it an element.5

1 This hypothesis seems to have its origin inLucretius' description of the ' like-to-like' processunder the name of 'reruzm homoeomeria,' and afailure to apply to it the necessary complementmentioned by Aristotle (see phys. 187a 36 sqq.,p. 32 above), Simplicius (Diels A 41, to be quotedlater), and by Lucretius himself (I. 861-866).

2 Frags. 8, 12.3 As Mr. Cornford does (C.Q. XXIV. 20, 21).4 It is upon this axiom that Mr. Cornford's

view that, e.g., Flesh is 'actually . . . composedof portions of' the Opposites (C.Q. XXIV. 92)really depends. This leads on to the conclusion(see C.Q. XXIV. 95) that, just as Aristotle's

'simple bodies' consisted of four fundamentalopposites unable to exist except in a substrate'matter,' so Anaxagoras' 'simple bodies' con-sisted of the fundamental opposites unable toexist except in a substrate 'matter.' But wecannot transplant Aristotle bodily back into

Anaxagoras. Besides, if such were Anaxagoras'meaning, we should expect Aristotle to drawattention to so remarkable an anticipation of hisown position.

5 Cf. Arist. Met.IoI4a 26, orotXetov .

ci•alperor7T Er&eL El ~7TEpov

e680•;IoI4b 14,

d&rdvrowv 6~ KOLVbv r6 EZVaL OTOLyXdOV KdiTTOU TO

7rpwrov elvvrrdpXov iKdcTTr•.

This content downloaded from 2 00.37.4.27 on Mon, 6 Oct 201 4 19:57:27 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 12: Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

8/11/2019 Anaxagoras. Predication as a problem in physics I.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/anaxagoras-predication-as-a-problem-in-physics-ipdf 12/12

ANAXAGORAS: PREDICATION AND PHYSICS: I. 37

Thus we have seen (I) that neither Anaxagoras' own words nor the testimoniesof Aristotle give ground for asserting that Anaxagoras said any substances were'homoeomerous'; and (2) that, even if this had been possible, the word aIoLo&pjMs

does not bear the meaning or meanings attached to it by those theories whichassume he did. As, however, it is sometimes held that the meaning'simple andelemental' is deducible from, or is consonant with, what Lucretius says aboutAnaxagoras, it will be well to clear him of the imputation.

A. L. PECK.CHRIST'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

(To be concluded.)