SP’s LAND FORCES4/2011

PAGE 4Fighting a Two Front WarIndian military planners feel that collusionbetween China and Pakistan which is soclearly evident in peace-time is likely to trans-late itself into active, mutually supporting,military operations, during conflict situations.

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

PAGE 6‘Any decision for induction of F-INSAS orBMS will only be taken after both the systems have been field tested’ Interview with Lt General N.B. Singh

PAGE 9For Versatile UseOne of the major weaknesses that theIndian Army currently suffers from in theirequipment profile is the lack of availabilityof a suitable HMMWV.

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

PAGE 11Why Have a Dialogue with Pak?Policy-makers in India need to turn the think-ing of the Pakistani polity, instead of engag-ing in futile dialogues and discussions.

Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi

PAGE 14Global Response to a Global IssueGlobal understanding has dawned that bybringing together our strategic capabilities,we will be able to address current andemerging cyber threats.

Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch

PAGE 15The Way AheadThe recurrent and tiring round of talks,agreements and discussions without anysignificant breakthrough or even the possi-bility of the same, seem to point that bor-derconflict has all ingredients of becoming amajor spoiler in Indo-China relations

Dr Monika Chansoria

PAGE 16Act Before It’s Too LateThe brutally-suppressed local movements ofthe Gilgit-Baltistan region and PoK can beexploited, if our government has the politi-cal will and the sagacity to think and planfor long-term.

Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi

PAGE 18Patriot’s Versatile CapabilitiesInterview with Sanjay Kapoor, Vice Presi-dent, Integrated Air & Missile Defense,Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems

Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand

PLUS

Tecknow 17News in Brief 19

‘I find a complex set of externaland internal security challengesconfronting our nation’

In an interview with SP’s Land Forces team comprising Editor-in-Chief JayantBaranwal and Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor, Chief of Army Staff GeneralV.K. Singh shared his thoughts and perceptions on several issues like transformation of the army, status of insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, offensive and defensive capabilities on two widely separated fronts, visibility of troops in Jammu and Kashmir, status of the project F-INSAS, etc.

I N T ERV I EW>>

SP’s A N S P G U I D E P U B L I C A T I O N

R O U N D U P

August-September 2011

IN THIS ISSUE T h e O N L Y j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s

Volume 8 No 4

SP’s LAND FORCES4/2011

R `100.00 (India-based Buyer Only)

WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET

1

SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): After having com-manded the Indian Army for over a year whatare your feelings regarding the combat capa-bilities of your fighting force? In which areasdo we lack the capabilities that we desire?Chief of Army Staff (COAS): It is indeed anhonour for me to be heading one of the mostprofessional armies, which is well-equippedand trained. The Indian Army is fully poisedto meet the varied security challenges con-fronting our country, both internal andexternal. Due to the rapidly changing natureof conflict, ranging from conventional toirregular warfare, including its proxy warmanifestation and the effects of emergingtechnologies, a constant reappraisal isrequired with resultant improvements.

Having laid down an all-encompassing‘Vision for the Indian Army’, we are focusingour efforts on some salient issues, namely, tomodernise our Army, while concurrentlyseeking to consolidate and address aspects ofhollowness and critical deficiencies. Mod-ernisation, based on technology upgrada-tion and induction, is an area that remainshigh on my agenda. The primary areas thatare being addressed are aimed at greater bat-tlefield transparency, increasing the lethalityand precision of firepower capabilities, over-coming night blindness and achieving network-centricity. In addition, impartingrealistic training towards all existing and emerging contingencies, as also to pre-pare our troops for the future battlefield envi-

ronment is another area of focus that we are addressing.

My main focus is presently on transform-ing the Army into an agile, lethal, versatileand networked force. This force will be pre-pared for the emerging security environmentand complex challenges of the 21st century.

SP’s: In your view which are the areas ofresponsibilities, as the COAS, which worktakes most of your time?COAS: As COAS, my areas of responsibilitiesare large. When I take an eagle’s-eye view onthe security environment prevalent in ourimmediate and extended neighbourhood, Ifind a complex set of external and internalsecurity challenges confronting our nation,

TREASURE

Turn to page 17

PHOTOGRAPHS: Anoop Kamath/SP Guide Pubns

I N T ERV I EW>>

SP’s LAND FORCES 4/20112

www.spslandforces.net

across the spectrum of conflict. The regionaland global trends show a strategic shifttowards ‘balance of interest’ rather than ‘bal-ance of power’. Our armed forces need to beextremely dynamic in measuring up to thesechallenges. Therefore, I feel the greatestresponsibility is to hone the army into a wellmotivated, operationally prepared, well-equipped force, capable of meeting the secu-rity challenges faced by the nation.

I am satisfied with the army’s role both inJammu and Kashmir (J&K) and Northeast.We are now helping the misguided elementsand youth, who have strayed away from themainstream and providing them with allopportunities to return back to the fold in adignified manner.

Transformation too is taking up a lot ofmy time. To deal with such multifariousthreats, transformation of army is focusingtowards a ‘capability-based force’ rather than‘threat-based force’. This transformed forcewill have the capability, tempered with credi-ble deterrence and the stamina to scale up thetempo of operations.

Modernisation is yet another aspect. Weare modernising our armed forces throughtechnology accretions and better manage-ment of our equipment and humanresource capital, to operate in a joint serv-ices environment.

I am aware that the whole country looksupon the Army as a highly disciplined organ-isation, and therefore, it is my responsibilityto ensure that the ‘internal health’ of thearmy is at its best, so that officers and soldiersserve with pride. Towards this, I have the‘sacred obligation’ of maintaining the trustreposed in us by our citizens. We cannot takeour eye off the ‘ball’ in matters of disciplineand personal conduct. I attach the highestpremium towards maintaining impeccablestandards of personal conduct and adherenceto our core values.

SP’s: Considering the nature of future warsand the likely future threats and challenges,you had carried out a study on the transfor-mation of the Indian Army when you were theEastern Army Commander. That study mustnow be in the stage of implementation. Canyou tell us the major changes envisaged inoperational and logistics philosophies of theIndian Army?COAS: It is an accepted fact that every mod-ern military goes through transformation tokeep pace with current and perceivedchanges in its security perspective. The aimof this transformation is to improve our oper-ational and logistics functioning as also therelated organisational structures, to makethe Army more lethal, agile, versatile and anetworked force. In the course of this endeav-our, we have examined our future challenges,military strategy, operational orientation andthe desired force capability, to provide for a‘wide range of options across the spectrumof conflict’. Essentially, it is aimed to reviewthe entire gamut of operational functionsand structures, with a view to optimise ouroperational planning and concepts. Besidesthis, some specific functional aspects of theArmy, like training audit, financial manage-ment, functioning of Corps of Military Policeand combat medical support are also beinglooked at, with the aim of incorporating ‘bestpractices’ and improving efficiency. Thesestudies have made good progress. While someof the studies are in the process of finalisingtheir recommendations, others are inadvanced stages nearing completion, the aimbeing to implement the recommendations atthe earliest.

SP’s: The Indian Army today is faced withchallenges on two widely separated fronts.While we may not anticipate a full-fledgedstate-to-state war on two fronts, yet werequire effective offensive and defensivecapabilities on both fronts to cater to a largenumber of unforeseen contingencies that mayunfold in the future. What is the state of oper-ational preparedness on this count? What are

the concrete steps being taken, which youwould like to share with the people of ourcountry?COAS: Capacity building is the cornerstone ofour modernisation and equipping policy. Thepossibility mentioned by you has been fac-tored into this calculus. While such threatswill need to be addressed by a combination ofmeasures covering all elements of state andnational power, the Army remains preparedto take on all eventualities and bring about afavourable outcome. I assure the nation,through you, that necessary steps are beingtaken in this regard.

SP’s: What is the status of insurgency in thestate of J&K at present and does this requirea review of our employment and deploymentphilosophies?COAS: Though the internal security situa-tion in Jammu and Kashmir is relatively sta-ble, proxy war continues. The terrorinfrastructure across the borders remainsintact and the terrorist threats remain real.State abetment to terrorists in terms of assis-tance for infiltration, arms/ ammunition andfinance persists. Separatists and their men-tors across the border are continuously andconsistently trying to keep the pot boiling inthe state so as to keep the Kashmir issuealive. The unwarranted incitement of mobviolence by entities across the border andinimical groups operating in J&K, as wit-nessed during the summer months of 2010,is clearly indicative of the same.

The counterterrorism strategy adopted bythe Army has resulted in effectively reducingthe infiltration from across the border in J&Kand neutralisation of a large number of ter-rorists and their leaders in the hinterland,thereby, limiting the influence of terror andlevels of violence in the state. However, indi-cators point towards renewed efforts by theterrorist organisations and their mentorsacross, to resume their activities to createunrest in the state. The Army and CentralPolice Forces as also the security apparatus ofthe state are working in unison and continu-ously reviewing their employment anddeployment philosophies, so as to counter anysuch disruptions and unrest, thereby provid-ing a meaningful environment for compre-hensive growth of the state.

SP’s: While building capabilities, the militaryhas to ensure that it is able to provide multi-ple options to the political leadership to caterto situations that may develop. This requiresnational level war gaming and close politico-military interaction and consultations. Arethere any formal arrangements in place toensure regular interaction not only with theDefence Minister but also with the Prime Min-ister who is the executive head of the State?COAS: There is an established system in placefor a regular two-way flow of communicationbetween the Army and the Ministry ofDefence (MoD). The MoD and the DefenceMinister are kept updated on all issues per-

taining to the Army, through periodic brief-ings and conferences. Regular interactionswith the National Security Agency (NSA)ensure that the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO)is kept abreast of all relevant issues. Onimportant issues the Prime Minister is alsobriefed so that he is appropriately armed withinformation and data for any contingency.

SP’s: During your first interview to SP’s Mili-tary Yearbook in April 2010, you had said thatupgradation to new generation technologyand better equipment was an ongoing processand you considered this as your thrust area.How is the delay in procurement of weaponsystems affecting the modernisation processand transformation of the army? What isbeing done to cut down this delay?COAS: Military modernisation and capabilitydevelopment is a capital-intensive venturewith very long gestation periods. Geopoliticalrealities of our region dictate that we mod-ernise rapidly to meet emerging security chal-lenges and enhance our capabilities. We havehad some slippages due to various factors overthe last two decades or so.

Currently, our focus in modernisation is onprecision firepower, air defence and aviation,future infantry soldier as a system (F-INSAS),network-centricity as also achieving battle-field transparency through improved surveil-lance, night vision and target acquisition.

A number of new projects have been ini-tiated and are in their final stages. This is thefirst year in which we have spent our entirecapital outlay for modernisation.

Specific measures have been initiated toovercome the existing shortcomings in pro-curement activities within the Army. Wehave also considered areas where there is ascope to improve the process and to carryout systemic changes in the organisationand the manner in which we conduct ourprocurement. We are also working on simplifying procedures and encouragingindigenous research and development(R&D) and production so as to speed up themodernisation process. A new Defence Pro-curement Procedure 2011 has also beenformulated, which further seeks to simplifyprocurement procedures and encourageindigenous production.

I am sure, we will make our procurementand acquisition focused and, thus, be able to

achieve our desired operational preparednessat a rapid pace.

SP’s: Army Aviation requires to be strength-ened and upgraded to include attack helicop-ters, medium lift helicopters and some fixedwing assets. Why should these importantingredients of the land battle be owned by adifferent service when the nature of futurewars demands an integrated effort and muchgreater exploitation of the third dimension towin wars?COAS: The future battlespace envisages inte-grated employment of all arms based on‘combined arms concept’. There is a symbioticrelationship between manoeuvre and fire.Combat aviation units manoeuvre, whileleveraging organic firepower to shape the tac-tical battle area (TBA) and conduct decisiveoperations as per directions of the field forcecommander. Synchronising aviation mano-euvre with ground manoeuvre allows thefield force commander to achieve a position ofadvantage in both time and space, thus fulfill-ing the tenets of manoeuvre warfare.

Unity of command and control of allweapon systems, which form part of theTBA, would be a pre-requisite to ensure thatfire and manoeuvre is conducted with cohe-sive and seamless integration amongst all thecombat elements operating in the TBA. Theintegration of all combat elements, includingcombat aviation resources, under the unifiedcommand of the field force commander;trained, administered and employed in com-bat with common operating procedures andethos, will lead to a greater degree of synergyat all levels. This is the basis of placing allcombat aviation assets as dedicated resourcesin support of the field force commander forprosecution of decisive operations.

All contemporary modern armies of theworld have felt the operational necessity ofintegrating attack helicopters with fieldarmy formations.

SP’s: What is the status of the project F-INSAS?If it is a part of the battlefield management sys-tem, which it ought to be, why is it being han-dled by the Infantry Directorate instead of theDirector General Information Systems?COAS: The project F-INSAS is progressing ata rapid pace and the Army is leaving no stoneunturned to see fructification of this presti-gious project. The induction of variousweapons and equipment of F-INSAS arebeing done in a phased manner with priorityto personal weapon and protection systems.The qualitative requirements for all systemsare being firmed after regular interactionwith original equipment manufacturers ofown and friendly foreign countries. A sincereendeavour is under way to meet all deadlines.There appears to be lack of clarity aboutscope of the F-INSAS programme. It is a sol-dier modernisation programme designed toenhance capability of an infantry soldier inlethality, survivability, sustainability, mobil-ity and situational awareness. Being a ‘sys-tem of systems’, it has the followingsub-systems as follows:l Weapon sub-system, which includes

assault rifle, CQB carbine and lightmachine gun.

l Body armour and individual equipment(BAIE) sub-system, which includes bulletproof jacket, ballistic helmet, individualload-carrying and survival equipment.

l Target acquisition sub-system, whichincludes surveillance devices andweapon night sights.

l Computer and communication sub-system.It ought to be apparent from the above

that since bulk of the programme involvesinfantry equipment procurement, it is besthandled by the Infantry Directorate. Modal-ities have been worked out to ensure coordi-nation of computer and communicationsystems with network-centric architectureof battlefield management system, withinthe ambit of larger Army communicationand net-centric warfare philosophy.

The project F-INSAS isprogressing at a rapidpace and the Army isleaving no stoneunturned to seefructification of thisprestigious project

Sagem o� ers integrated, scalable soldier modernization solutions, allowing dismounted soldiers to carry out their missions with enhanced performance, in all conditions and environments. Totally modular, its solutions improve individual and collective capabilities, for infantry, special forces, police and public safety applications. Sagem’s experience with the French FELIN program means it can provide you with a customized solution, including full support services. www.sagem-ds.com

POWER, EFFICIENCY, PROTECTION

> OBSERVATION AND TARGETING> SCALABLE PROTECTION > AROUND-THE-CORNER SIGHTING> SITUATIONAL AWARENESS> PLATOON C4I

SP’s LAND FORCES4

www.spslandforces.net

>> MI L I TARY STRATEGY

4/2011

n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

THE CHIEF OF ARMy Staff, GeneralV.K. Singh, while delivering theinaugural address during a semi-nar on “Emerging Roles and Tasksof the Indian Army”, organised by

the Centre for Land Warfare Studies(CLAWS) on October 15, 2010, referred toPakistan and China as ‘two irritants’. In thesame vein, but more explicitly, in end-December 2009, the former Army Chief,General (Retd) Deepak Kapoor had alsostated during a seminar of the Army Train-ing Command that the Indian Army mustprepare for a two-front war. The statementof the current Army Chief coming close onthe heels of the former Army Chief ’s decla-ration indicates that our armed forces areindeed planning and preparing for a contin-gency in which they may have to confrontboth neighbours simultaneously.

The five thrust areas of the new wardoctrine as reported in the media at thattime are as follows: l Two-front capability: This is the

anchor on which India’s new war doc-trine is based which means that Indiashould be prepared to effectively meetsimultaneous threats from China on thenorthern borders and Pakistan on thewestern borders.

l Asymmetric warfare and sub-con-ventional threats: Both the adversariescan be expected to use asymmetric meansin the form of infiltrators and terroristsacross porous borders to divide our atten-tion and thus hope to militarily weakenour overall response. Our focus on fast-paced operations could be slowed downconsiderably by such threats to our linesof communications and the civil infra-structure. We therefore need to have anindependent operational capability toconfront such threats without dilutingthe main military effort. This capability isbeing referred to as half front capability.

l Strategic reach and out-of-areaoperations capabilities: The new wardoctrine also seeks to confront futurechallenges by acquiring an out-of-areacapability so as to militarily meet the roleand aspirations of a regional power.

l Tri-service operational synergy: The

key aspects of strategic planning and con-duct of future wars will be based on inter-dependence and operational synergyamong the three services. Therefore, jointoperations, space-based capability, ballis-tic missile defence and airborne, amphibi-ous and air-land operations must beaddressed comprehensively.

l Military technological dominanceover adversaries: This will be coveredby acquiring capabilities for network-centric warfare, information warfare,cyber warfare, all integrated to facilitatespeedy decision-making and exploitationof fleeting tactical opportunities.

Future Strategic Direction From a strategic viewpoint, it seems thatIndia has shifted to a doctrine of ‘active andaggressive defence’ as opposed to passivedefence in the past. However, it would bewrong to assume that these capabilitiesshow India’s growing proclivity towards mil-itary adventurism. India’s record on the con-trary shows a matured and measuredattitude towards engaging in wars. The doc-trine’s enunciation of a ‘two-front war’ andenhancement of ‘strategic reach and out-of-area operations capabilities’ carry immensepolitical and strategic significance in termsof India’s future strategic directions.

Speaking to the media on Army Day,

January 15, 2011, General Singh for thefirst time publicly revealed that the Armywould ‘reorganise, restructure and relocate’various formations to help transform into amore agile and lethal force. “We are lookingat reorganising and restructuring our forceheadquarters…for faster decision-making, sothat it becomes slightly flattened and moreresponsive,” he said. Essentially, the changesare aimed at strengthening the Army’scapacity for fighting what a serving Generalhad once described as a war on ‘two-and-a-half-fronts’—a reference to possible simulta-neous confrontations with Pakistan andChina at the same time as managing aninternal counter-insurgency effort.

Analysts often discuss the reasoning forsuch a doctrine. Are we anticipating a full-fledged war among the three nuclear armedneighbours? Nothing can be farther fromtruth. Then what is the necessity of havinga doctrine of this nature. A more pragmaticand logical explanation seems to be that byplacing a ‘two-and-a-half-front war strategy’as a top priority of the new war doctrine, itwill henceforth provide an unambiguouspolitical and military focus on strategic andoperational initiatives to ensure readiness.At strategic levels, it would cater to strategicresponses in acquiring comprehensivenational power in relation to the threats,while at operational levels it would indicatethe focus for capability building. Its inclusionwould help in blending political, economic,diplomatic, technological and military meas-ures to achieve the dynamism and synergyat national level that is currently lacking.

Let us also try to further understand thisreasoning by focusing on our two neighbours,Pakistan and China, and then examine thenuts and bolts of the capability required.

Duplicitous PakistanPakistan continues to plead pristine conductwhile its internal dynamics driven by thesupport it has extended to the Taliban andother terrorist organisations are pushing thecountry to the edge of an abyss. Late Dr K.Subrahmanyam, the renowned defence ana-lyst in his interview with Shekhar Gupta,Editor of the Indian Express, had stated,“They are playing with a venomous snake.And there is no doubt about it that one ofthese days, the snake is going to bite them.

In the backdrop of peaceful protests throughout

the country for a strong Lokpal Bill by Anna Haz-

are and his team, and the groundswell of support

for his campaign against corruption, we hope that

wisdom prevails both within the government as

well as in Anna Hazare and his team to meet the

people’s heightened aspirations by crafting a bill

which is practical, implementable and effective in

curbing corruption. The political impact of this

movement seems historic because it signifies the

awakening of the masses with regard to good gov-

ernance and which despite India’s economic

growth is conspicuous by its absence at the Cen-

tre and in the states.

While the attention of the nation is focused

these days on domestic issues, the gravity of the

existing internal and external security situation

seems to have taken a back seat. The recent spurt

in Naxal killings of policemen and the CRPF per-

sonnel and the disturbing reports of our inability to

even evacuate the dead bodies of the soldiers for

nearly 18 hours (refer to Indian Express, August

24, 2011) is a sign of apathy and inertia in the gov-

ernment and in the leadership of the security

forces. The larger issue of external security and

the inordinate delay in procurement of the much

needed weapons and other systems to transform

the military to meet future challenges is even more

distressing. Our political leadership is too busy

dousing domestic fires to appreciate the extent to

which the military would be handicapped in future

conflicts because of lack of modern weaponry.

This is at a time when India requires a two-front

capability which is the anchor on which India’s

new war doctrine is based which means that India

should be prepared to effectively meet simultane-

ous threats from China on the northern borders

and Pakistan on its western borders. In this con-

text, the Army has the maximum challenges. It

needs a new family of night capable small arms,

long-range field guns to replace obsolete equip-

ment in large numbers, fire control system with

night fighting aids for the large fleet of T-72 tanks,

new helicopters to replace obsolete equipment in

Army Aviation units, a new tactical communication

network, network-centricity for better situational

awareness and a host of other weapons and sys-

tems in order to acquire new capabilities for the

transformation that has been planned for the

Army. Modernisation to make the Indian Army a

21st century force cannot be delayed indefinitely.

This will seriously compromise the Army’s pre-

paredness to fight future conflicts.

ED

IT

OR

IA

L

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

Fighting a Two-Front WarIndian military planners feel that the collusion between China and Pakistan which is so clearly evident in peace-time is likely to translate itself into active, mutually supporting, military operations, during conflict situations. InIndian context it would imply fighting simultaneous conflicts in two widely separated theatres of operationsnamely the Western theatre (against Pakistan) and the Northern/Northeastern (against China) in the future.

GRAPHIC: Wikipedia

And Pakistanis are going to pay a high price,when the various jihadi organisations aregoing to turn on the Pakistani state and thePakistan Army. One of them has already—the Pakistani Taliban. But it is only a ques-tion of time when others also do.”

Pakistan is in the danger of being over-run and ruled by radical Islamist groups,whose ideology of death and destruction willruin whatever is left of Pakistan society.After the killing of Osama bin Laden inAbbottabad in Pakistan on May 1, 2011, thenexus between Inter-Services Intelligence(ISI) of Pakistan and the terrorist groupsstands completely exposed. While trying todeceive the whole world, they have ended upnot only deceiving themselves because theyperhaps forgot that terrorists have no friendsand do not respect their benefactors becausehatred and killing becomes a way of life andthere is no room left for any other finerhuman trait. It is a bleak future that con-fronts Pakistan and unless they decide toface the problem squarely and seek bothglobal and regional assistance, there is littlehope for them as a nation-state.

Their economy is in a bad shape. A $7.5billion (`33,750 crore) package of civilianaid over five years was approved by the US in2009. Since 2005, Pakistan has receivedmore than $1 billion (`4,500 crore) of mili-tary aid a year from the US—and receivedclose to $2 billion (`9,000 crore) for the lastfiscal year. This year again $2 billion aid hasbeen announced which the US says will payfor equipment needed in counter-insurgencyand counter-terror operations, among otherthings. This is despite the belief among theUS intelligence agencies that the Pakistanmilitary is continuing to avoid militaryengagements that would put it in direct con-flict with Afghan Taliban or Al-Qaeda’sforces in North Waziristan.

Inflation in Pakistan remains the top

concern among the public. The inflation ratein Pakistan was last reported at 12.91 percent in February 2011. From 2003 to 2010,the average inflation rate in Pakistan was10.15 per cent reaching an historical highof 25.33 per cent in August 2008. In addi-tion, the Pakistani rupee has depreciatedsince 2007 as a result of political and eco-nomic instability. Devastating floods in 2010have added to their woes. The country isbeing kept afloat by the donors.

The military in Pakistan continues to usethe radical jihadi groups to its advantage bothin its western provinces facing Afghanistanand on its eastern front against India inJammu and Kashmir (J&K). Renewed pres-sure from the US has so far had virtually noresults as far as India is concerned. Thereseems to be a consensus among military ana-lysts that Pakistan Army’s traditional Kash-mir policy and resultant proxy war is unlikelyto change. Currently, their military capabilityagainst India is not threatening because of itsown commitments. However, they are notlikely to let go of any opportunity to take mil-itary advantage in what may be perceived asa crisis for India. In this context, their rela-tionship with China needs a closer scrutiny.

China—An Untrustworthy Neighbour China has emerged as a major challenge anda possible military threat in the future. Theindicators are—China’s self-image as a pre-dominant power of South Asia; its aspira-tions to be a superpower by 2049; its fastpaced military modernisation and position-ing of missiles in Tibet; its compulsive use ofPakistan to keep India engaged on her west-ern front and off balance militarily; its dis-missive and derogatory approach to India’sdemocratic experience; its strategy of encir-cling India through her neighbours and con-fining her within the subcontinent; it’s totallycritical approach to India’s nuclear status; it’s

negative disposition in allowing India tobecome a permanent member of the SecurityCouncil; it’s duplicity in the Nuclear SupplierGroup negotiations; it’s unwillingness toresolve the border dispute; it’s claim over theentire Arunachal Pradesh being a Chineseterritory—all serve as indicators and warn-ings that India cannot afford to ignore.

Historically, China has negotiated borderdisputes with neighbours in their moment ofnational despair (Pakistan, Burma in 1960sand Central Asian Republics in the 1990s)or when the regional balance of power hasshifted decisively in China’s favour or afterthey have ceased to be a major threat (landsettlements with Russia and Vietnam in the1990s) but not with those who are perceivedas current or future threats (India, Japan,Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan). Noprogress has been made to resolve the terri-torial and boundary dispute with India sincethe two nations fought a war over it in 1962despite 14 rounds of talks between politicalinterlocutors and many meetings of theJoint Working Group. Even the line of actualcontrol (LAC) has not been clearly demar-cated on military maps and on the grounddue to China’s intransigence.

Collusive Support to PakistanThe following actions indicate the collusivesupport that China has provided to Pakistan:l Civilian nuclear cooperation between

China and Pakistan began in 1999.China has built Chasma-1 and 2 nuclearreactors in Pakistan. Now armed withthe approval by the International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) of a safeguardsplan in March 2011, China is set to con-struct the Chasma-3 and Chasma-4nuclear reactors in Pakistan.

l Direct assistance for its nuclear weaponsprogramme, including nuclear warheaddesigns and highly enriched uranium

for at least two nuclear bombs. l Dual-use technology and materials for

the development of nuclear weapons. l Assistance in building a secret reactor to

produce weapons-grade plutonium atthe Chasma nuclear facility.

l Transfer of M-9 and M-11 nuclear-capa-ble ballistic missiles followed by the trans-fer of “Taepo Dong” and “No Dong”ballistic missiles from North Korea.

l Joint development of fighter aircraft, JF-17 Thunder/FC-1 Fierce and Pakistan’smain battle tank (MBT), Al-Khalid,besides other military hardware.

l China has “guaranteed Pakistan’s terri-torial integrity” and in the words of theleaders of the two countries, their friend-ship is “higher than the mountains anddeeper than the oceans”.

l China’s efforts to develop port facilities inMyanmar (Hangyi), Chittagong (Bangla-desh), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Maldivesand at Gwadar in Pakistan are seen bymany Indian and foreign analysts asforming part of a “string of pearls” strat-egy to contain India and develop thecapacity to dominate the northern IndianOcean region around 2015-20.

l Gwadar port on the Makran Coast couldbe upgraded to a naval base for Chinesenaval vessels with minimum effort.

l During the 1965 and 1971 India-Pak-istan wars, China had made threateningmilitary manoeuvres in Tibet in supportof Pakistan and during the Kargil conflictin 1999 Chinese military advisers werereported to have been present at Skarduin Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK).

l Recent reports regarding the large pres-ence of Chinese military in PoK.

l Aggressive patrolling of the borders tokeep India on its toes and militarily com-

SP’s LAND FORCES4/2011 5

MI L I TARY STRATEGY <<

www.gdls.comContact: sbhattacharjee@india.gd-ic.com

STRYKER.THE VISION, THE FUTURE,THE SOLUTION FOR INDIA.

Continued on page 12

SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): Network-centric war-fare (NCW) is an information superiorityenabled concept at the heart of which lie thedigital communication networks and our abil-ity to process information most expeditiouslyand pass it on to frontline units and the deci-sion-makers in the rear in real timeframe thusmaking the battlefield transparent and reduc-ing the response time. How is the Indian Armyvisualising the transformation to this type ofwarfare? What is the type of framework (intraand inter-service) involved and what are thetypes of projects initiated in this regard?Director General Information Systems(DGIS): In the Indian Army, the policies fortransformation to NCW have been clearlyspelled out and the Directorate General Infor-mation System is responsible to facilitate thistransformation by developing various opera-tional information systems (OIS) along withthe associated geographical information sys-tem (GIS) including GIS ready topographicdata as well as automation of managementinformation systems (MIS). The digital net-work connecting various systems is beingdeveloped by the Directorate General of Sig-nals. The transformation of this nature alsonecessitates certain amount of restructuring,and the same was adopted by the IndianArmy by creating the appointment of DeputyChief of Army Staff, Information Systems andTraining and placing both DGIS and DG Sig-nals under him. As regards the frameworksfor NCW is concerned within the Army, weare developing systems at strategic, opera-tional as well as tactical level. The integrationwith the other two services at appropriate

level has been planned under the aegis of HQIDS. The various projects that are in differentphases of development and fielding includethe Army Strategic Operational InformationDissemination System (ASTROIDS) for pro-viding OIS at Army HQ, Command HQs andCorps HQs level. At the operational and tacti-cal level, the tactical command, control, com-munication and information systems (TacC3I) is being developed to provide net-centric-ity and at the cutting edge of operations, bat-tlefield management system (BMS) for unitsand below level is planned.

SP’s: CIDSS will be the hub of the integratedcommand and control enterprise which willintegrate four functions—operations, intelli-gence, logistics and terrain. At the core of thisenterprise are three vital links, namelyASTROIDS, TAC C3I, and the BMS. What is thestate of development of these links? DGIS: Command information and decisionsupport system (CIDSS) is in effect the hubof Tac C3I Systems and the most important

component located at HQs. It is the com-mand and control centre of Tac C3I systemwith all sensor and shooter system at eachlevel of hierarchy connected to it. ASTROIDSwill be integrated with Tac C3I through theCIDSS at Corps HQs. Similarly, the BMS willbe integrated to the CIDSS through theCIDSS node at unit HQs. ASTROIDS is in thetest bed stage and the other components ofTac C3I system are already in the testbed/fielding stage. BMS is a complex and anexpansive project currently at the planningstage and the development of the same islikely to commence soon.

SP’s: What is the state of development of theartillery command and control, and communi-cation system (ACCCS); air defense control andreporting system; electronic warfare system;and battle management system in CIDSS?DGIS: CIDSS Phase 2 is an enhanced versionof the software. The user feedback receivedfrom the test bed is being incorporated in thisversion. However, the most important aspectof Phase 2 remains integration of all com-ponents of Tac C3I in this version. The devel-opment work on Phase 2 has commencedafter signing of the contract for the CIDSSPhase 2 in March 2011. As regards othersystems, all are at various stages of the devel-opment cycle. While ACCCS has alreadybeen fielded, other projects are at variousstages of development. As regards ADC&RS,we have worked with the Air Force closely toensure seamless integration as and when thesystem is fielded. Necessary aspects of inte-grating EWS with CIDSS have been identi-

fied. The aspects of integration will also beevaluated when the system is fielded in thetest bed shortly.

SP’s: The communication grid knits the entireCIDSS together. What will be the communica-tion pattern forward of the Corps headquartersand rearwards to the Command and the Armyheadquarters? Has any progress been madeon the tactical communications system (TCS)which will be an important part of the commu-nication grid established for executing NCW?DGIS: The ongoing TCS programme is beinghandled by the DG Signals. We are adoptingthe interim arrangements till the time TCS isdeveloped and fielded. Other details of thisproject are with the Signals Directorate.

SP’s: Despite regular certification by the threeservices to the effect that “Jointness” in theServices is quite satisfactory, the truth is thatthe Services are still doing operational plan-ning service wise and involving the otherservice(s) later. Single service doctrines andinsulated operational planning apart fromprecluding operational synergy, adverselyaffects the development of all systems withinthe services. Defense communications andTac C3I are two prime examples. What are themajor problems in these areas and how areyou overcoming them? DGIS: The aspects of tri-services integrationare being handled by HQ IDS with active par-ticipation of the three services. For exchangeof information between the three services,C4I2 applications have been planned whichwill be deployed at the relevant levels of hierarchy.

The required information that is to beexchanged with other two services will rideover this application after due integrationwith CIDSS/ASTROIDS. We interact regu-larly with the concerned directorates of theother two services as well as HQ IDS for aregular update on the systems and futurerequirements of integration. Our close inter-action with Air Force during the develop-ment of ADC&RS is a clear example of thiscooperation. Nevertheless, there are issuesrelated to standardisation which are beingdealt with through joint study teams underthe aegis of HQ IDS.

SP’s: In NCW, future focus of the Indian armedforces will be on leveraging the emerging tech-nologies to integrate dispersed sensors, net-works and modern weapon systems. Thistransformation requires alterations in conceptof operations, doctrine, organisations andforce structure, and above all in the psyche ofthe fighting man and the leaders. What are thefuture integrative technologies that we arelooking at; the types of sensors we are inter-ested in and what is the position of the Indiandefence industry in the design and manufac-turing of the required sensors; and the majorchanges that we should contemplate in theconcept of operations, force structuring andtraining of the soldier and military leadership?DGIS: Integration and interoperability areperhaps least understood terms when itcomes to command and control systems.

I N T ERV I EW>>

SP’s LAND FORCES 4/20116

www.spslandforces.net

‘Any decision for induction of F-INSAS orBMS will only be taken after both the systems have been field tested’SP’s Land Forces team comprising Jayant Baranwal, Editor-in-Chief and Lt General V.K. Kapoor, Editor, had a tête-à-tête with Lt General N.B. Singh, on a range of issues which impact the capabilities of the Indian Army in the future.Singh was then the Director General Information Systems (DGIS), Indian Army, and has recently taken over as theCommandant of the Military College of Electronics and Mechanical Engineering (MCEME). Excerpts of the interview:

At the operational andtactical level, the tacticalcommand, control, communication andinformation systems is being developed

PHOTO

GRAPH

S: SP Guide

Pub

ns

ABSOLUTE CONFIDENCE.

It’s what they need. It’s what Harris delivers.With more than a half-century of experience, Harris is the leading global supplier and innovator in tactical communications, trusted by customers in more than 150 countries. Thanks to our complete portfolio of fi eld-proven tactical radios, turnkey integrated systems, and best-in-class support, you can have the confi dence you need for every mission.

Count on us for all of your critical communications needs: Harris.com/Confi dence

harris.com

While integration of disparate systems istechnologically possible through translationapproach at the database level and gatewaysat the interface level, this comes at the costof time penalties, additional hardware, pro-cessing power and bandwidth. While manysolutions for integration are being evaluatedby us, we are also working on creating stan-dard data structures for essential informa-tion that is to be exchanged betweendifferent systems both for spatial as well asnon spatial data. As regards sensors, eacharm has its own requirement depending onthe role. As far as the DGIS is concerned, ourrole is to integrate any future sensor into TacC3I Systems. However, we do interact closelywith the concerned directorate to study thefeasibility of integration of any sensor beingconsidered for induction. As far as the typesof sensors are concerned, the focus of IndianArmy remains on providing all-weather 24-hour surveillance capabilities. Electro-opti-cal, electrical as well as airborne sensorsremain the focus areas. Synthetic apertureradars, thermal imagers are some of the sen-sors that are being studied by various direc-torates. We are looking forward to greaterresearch and development (R&D) in design-ing and developing these systems by theIndian industry. The Defence Research andDevelopment Organisation (DRDO) andsome of the DPSUs have done good work inthis field. As far as the operational concepts,force structuring and training are con-cerned, these are dealt by other directorates.However, we are closely involved in thedevelopment of net-centric capabilities.

SP’s: Today the reality is that the three serv-ices do not talk to each other. Neither voice ordata networks nor our radio communicationsare interoperable to the desired degree. Radiosets differ in their frequency bands, waveforms and secrecy algorithms. What are theremedies that we could adopt to overcomethese problems?DGIS: It not necessary that every networkshould talk to other networks. It is the infor-mation that requires to move between theusers. While it is true that communicationsare not at the desired level of interoperabilityat this stage, the issue is being addressedunder various projects including developmentof common wave forms for use in multi-ser-vice environment. By the time various sys-tems of the three services are fielded, I amsure that this interoperability would havebeen achieved.

SP’s: How is India’s advanced software capa-bilities being exploited by the armed forcesand the Army? DGIS: In all our projects, the Indian industryhas been an active participant either work-

ing with DRDO, defence public sector under-takings (DPSUs) or directly with us. The sit-uational awareness and tactical hand-heldinformation (SATHI) project was under-taken jointly with the industry way back in2003. All our MIS and auto projects arebeing developed by the Indian industry. Weare also actively engaging with our acade-mia by way of Army Technology Boardwhere new and innovative solutions arebeing developed.

SP’s: Is the Indian Army planning to networkall weapon platforms for ‘situational aware-ness’ or is this going to be done selectively?What would be the criteria for selective trans-formation? DGIS: In the ultimate analysis, unless all elements operating in the battlefield are ona common platform for situational aware-ness (SA), the concept of NCW will remainunexploited. However, direct integration ofweapon systems with computing deviceswill take place only when such weapon systems are developed and inducted. ProjectBMS aims to integrate all fighting and support platforms down to individualtanks/specialist or modified vehicles withvarying scales of SA capability, hence thetransformation will be selective based onour operational requirement.

SP’s: It seems that common standards andprotocols, vital for network centricity, for theservices have not been evolved. This is agigantic task that can only be solved through

outsourcing, given the levels of expertiseavailable within the services. What is beingdone in this regard? DGIS: The policies for various aspects ofstandardisation are already in place. Anumber of study groups under the aegis ofHQ IDS have been constituted to work onvarious standards. Geospatial referenceframework is one such area where muchwork has been done. Within the Army, we

have carried out certain amount of stan-dardisation already, however, much more isrequired to be done and we have not closedthe option of outsourcing. As far as the for-mats are concerned, during the integrationstage of Tac C3I, we are looking at variousoptions for a military exchange format forexchange of information. We are also work-ing on a spatial data model for geospatialinformation. In all these projects, we willrequire certain assistance from the industryin due course.

SP’s: For NCW, even the standard operatingprocedures and formats have to be synchro-nised. Has this been achieved? DGIS: The ICT branch at HQ IDS will defi-nitely help the Services by having an inte-grated approach to some of the commonissues related to the three services. Manyaspects of integration and interoperabilityare likely to be addressed at the level of IDS.There are issues related to trusted comput-ing platforms and security solutions whichcan be taken up centrally rather that eachservice pursuing the agencies involved sep-arately. This is a logical step in the ultimategoal of a joint approach towards NCW.

SP’s: Currently communications and informa-tion which cannot be segregated are beingdealt with by two separate Directorate Gener-als. How is the cohesion and integrationachieved between the DGIS and the SignalOfficer-in-Chief (SO-in-C)? DGIS: The DGIS is responsible for develop-ment of application software and relateddatabases while DG Signals handles com-munications and related aspects. The syn-ergisation of activities between the datagrid and communication grid is carried outat the apex level under the Deputy Chief ofArmy Staff (Information System and Train-ing). Both the directorates interact on a regular basis. All major issues are being discussed in periodic joint conferences and addressed.

SP’s: Infantry Directorate is supervising thedevelopment of F-INSAS project which is inthe domain of battle management systemsbeing developed by the DGIS. What are yourviews on this issue?DGIS: A decision has been taken that F-INSAS will be fielded for Infantry for levels below company. However, DGIS will beresponsible for integration of F-INSAS withBMS. This was a specific functional require-ment projected by the Infantry and as suchthis decision has been taken. However, anydecision for induction of F-INSAS or BMS will only be taken after both the systems have been field tested in an integrated environment.

>>

SP’s LAND FORCES8

I N T ERV I EW

www.spslandforces.net

4/2011

The ongoing tacticalcommunication system(TCS) programme isbeing handled by the DG Signals. We areadopting the interim arrangements till thetime TCS is developedand fielded. Otherdetails of this project are with the Signals Directorate.

SP’s

READ SP’s LANDFORCES MAGAZINE AS eBOOK!

WATCH EXCITING VIDEO FOOTAGES!

BROWSE LATESTNEWS UPDATES!

JOIN US ON

T h e O N L Y j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s

SP’s LAND FORCES4/2011 9

MULT I - PURPOSE V EH I C L ES <<

n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

KNOWN By ITS MILITARy desig-nation as the high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle, theHMMWV is defined as a light-weight, highly mobile, diesel-

powered, four/six-wheel-drive tacticalvehicle that uses a common chassis to carrya wide variety of military hardware rangingfrom machine guns to anti-tank missiles,grenade launchers air defence missiles. Itmust perform in a wide variety of terrain,from deserts to jungles, for long periods oftime and with minimal maintenance. It hasto carry its cargo and occupants in safetywhile dodging instruments of war—bullets,bombs and mines.

Indian Army One of the major weaknesses that the IndianArmy currently suffers from in their equip-ment profile is the lack of availability of asuitable HMMWV, for the plethora of vitalfunctions which have to be performed on thebattlefield. At present these functions areperformed by unarmoured light wheeledvehicles which have an open configurationand a canvas covering. They offer no protec-

tion even against small arms fire and theirmobility off the roads is also poor. The cur-rent vehicles do not have the requisite mobil-

ity, firepower and protection to survive onthe battlefield in any type of terrain. Theyare also not designed as weapon platforms or

for carriage of communication equipment. Some anti-mine vehicles have been pro-

cured for formations and units includingRashtriya Rifles functioning in insurgencyareas. However, these vehicles do not coverall types of tasks and missions that have tobe performed in conventional conflicts or inlow intensity conflicts like the counter-insur-gency environment existing in Jammu andKashmir and in the Northeast.

Indian Army requires a common plat-form for a HMMWV which could fulfill therole of all battlefield functions in conven-tional and asymmetric conflicts.

Battlefield functions for HMMWV All formations and units of the army wouldbe interested in a common platform ofHMMWV which could fulfill most of theirmissions/tasks. The Indian Navy and the IAFtoo would be interested in the vehicle in dif-ferent configurations. Some of the functionsfor such vehicles are listed below: l Command and control vehicles which

would be fitted with radio sets and highpower antennas and would be used bycommanders and staff officers for radiocommunications and for liaison duties.

l Reconnaissance and surveillance vehicles

One of the major weaknesses that the Indian Army currently suffers from in their equipment profile is thelack of availability of a suitable HMMWV, for the plethora of vital functions which have to be performed on the battlefield

PHOTOGRAPH: US Army

AM General’s Humvee in action

www.amgeneral.com

For Versatile Use

MULT I - PURPOSE V EH I C L ES>>

SP’s LAND FORCES 4/201110

www.spslandforces.net which may be fitted with various types of

sensors for route, terrain and enemyreconnaissance and surveillance.

l Weapon carriers fitted with light andmedium machine guns, up to 30 mmcannons and anti tank missiles.

l Mortar carriers.l Ambulance vehicles.l Carriage of rapid reaction teams of Spe-

cial Forces or infantry/engineer recon-naissance teams.

l Patrolling of roads/tracks and opera-tional sectors.

l NBC reconnaissance.l Weapon carriers such as air defence

vehicle by fitting a turret for firing airdefence missiles or guns.

l Carrier of small arms ammunition

l Could be modified as a light recoveryvehicle.

l Carriage of forward observation officers,Air Control Team and tentacle and theircommunication equipment.

l Air portability for airborne and helicop-ter borne operations.

Major CharacteristicsConsidering the above tasks, the major char-acteristics desired of such vehicles are safety,endurance, firepower, reliability, adaptabilityto terrain and maintainability.

Design: The design of HMMWV shouldbe such that they have a compact profile, tothe extent possible, and are transportable byaircraft, helicopter, large transporter trucksand by rail for rapid deployment. Their bodyshould be so designed that it enables rapidexit of the crew when required.

Optional equipment: Depending uponthe role and tasks envisaged, optional equip-ment may include electrical self-recoverywinch, nuclear, chemical and biological(NBC) protection kit, infrared driving lamps,smoke grenade dischargers, night-vision-goggle-compatible (NVG) glazing, fire sup-pression system, night-vision periscopes for driver and commander and daytimeperiscopes for driver and commander.

Fording: All vehicles could be designedfor shallow fording of 2.5 feet and deep ford-ing (with kit) up to five feet if required, insome cases.

Armament: Depending upon the rolesand tasks, various types of weapon stationsincorporating 7.62mm or 12.7mm machineguns, 40 mm automatic grenade launcher,anti-tank missiles and air defence missilescan be adapted to such vehicles. Sightingsystems with night vision capability or ther-mal imaging could also be made available ifa turret is designed for a weapon.

Self-protection: The structure of thehull should be so optimised that the vehiclehas a low silhouette and optimised forincreased survivability. Run-flat tyres are astandard feature, allowing the vehicle tocontinue its mission with deflated tyres.The vehicle should also provide protectionagainst small arms fire, anti-personnel andanti-tank mines and indigenous explosivedevices (IEDs). Add-on armour kits andadditional composite flooring can be pro-vided, if required, to increase the protectionof crews.

Propulsion: Such vehicles should bepowered by turbo diesel engines which havethe power to weight ratio in excess of 30 togive the vehicle a good cross country performance. A four/six wheel design withautomatic transmission, which is electroni-cally controlled would be an advantage. Themaximum range without refuelling shouldbe in excess of 500 km across the countryand more than 800 km by road.

Common Platform: The vehicle shouldform a common platform, which can beadapted for various roles and missions. Inaddition, we could also think of using thesame platform for a turreted vehicle for 12.7mm machine gun, 30 mm cannon, anti-tank guided missiles such as the tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire commanddata link, guided missile (TOW) missile orsurface-to-air missiles.

Some Global Market Trendsl Humvee, the high mobility multipurpose

wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), is a military4WD motor vehicle created by AM Gen-eral. Primarily used by the United StatesArmed Forces, it is also used by numer-ous other countries and organisations.Thousands of these vehicles in differentversions have been produced for thedomestic and the global market. Civilianadaptation called the Hummer series wasalso inspired by the HMMWVs.

l Stryker is a family of eight-wheel-drivecombat vehicles, transportable in a C-130 aircraft, being built for the US Armyby General Dynamics Land Systems

(GDLS) Canada (formerly GeneralMotors Defense) and General DynamicsLand Systems Division of USA. Stryker isbased on the GDLS Canada LAV III 8x8light armoured vehicle, in service sinceearly 2001. The LAV III is itself a versionof the Piranha III built by Mowag ofSwitzerland, now part of GDLS Europe.

l The Australian light armoured vehicle(ASLAV) is a highly mobile, amphibiouseight-wheeled armoured vehicle that isideally suited to conduct reconnaissanceand surveillance operations.

l General Dynamics Canada worked withGDLS Canada to supply the CanadianArmy with light armoured reconnais-sance vehicles (LAV Recce). This vehicle,designated by the Army as the “Coyote”,is the first to be fitted with such an inte-grated surveillance system and isregarded as the baseline capabilityagainst which modern armed forces willevaluate their requirements for futurearmoured reconnaissance vehicles.

l Oshkosh Defense and GDLS Canadateamed for the TAPV programme, whichwill replace the 4x4 RG-31 mine pro-tected armoured patrol vehicle (APV)and the light armoured vehicle LAV-26x6 Coyote reconnaissance vehicle.

l Textron Marine & Land Systems, anoperating unit of Textron Systems, a Textron Inc. company, and MDT ArmorCorporation, a division of Arotech Cor-poration, has announced a teamingagreement to market, design and manu-facture the Tiger light protected vehicle.Based on a commercial off-the-shelf(COTS) Dodge RAM 5500 platform, theTiger is a cost-effective, light protected

class all terrain vehicle with proven,highly reliable armour for a crew of sixto nine. The Tiger is ballistic and mineblast protected with various add-onarmour options and is designed with aspacious, versatile cabin and large pay-load capacity allowing the Tiger to be tai-lored to many missions.

l Oshkosh mine-resistant ambush-pro-tected (MRAP) all-terrain vehicle (M-ATV) is an armoured vehicle withimproved mobility. In June 2009,Oshkosh Corporation received an initialorder to deliver 2,900 M-ATVs to the USArmed Forces for deployment inAfghanistan. The M-ATV is based on theOshkosh medium tactical vehiclereplacement (MTVR) platform and is fit-ted with patented TAK-4 independentsuspension system for utmost mobilityand survivability.

l GAZ-2330 Tigr (Tiger) light utility vehi-cle was designed by the famous Russianautomaker GAZ for military and civilmarkets. The GAZ-2975 is a military ver-sion of this high-mobility vehicle. It isbroadly similar to the US HMMWV. Thefirst prototypes were revealed in 2002.Production commenced in 2005. Cur-rently, it is in service with the RussianMinistry of Defense and Ministry ofInternal Affairs. These vehicles are usedto deploy rapid-reaction teams, escortconvoys and conduct patrols. Somesources claim that by 2010 over 350 ofthese vehicles were delivered.

The Indian Army requiresa common platform for aHMMWV which could fulfill the role of all battlefield functions inconventional and asymmetric conflicts

Oshkosh mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) all-terrainvehicle (M-ATV)

Stryker is based on the GDLSCanada LAV III 8x8 light armouredvehicle, in service since early 2001

GAZ-2975 is a military version ofGAZ-2330 Tigr high-mobility vehicle

PHOTOGRAPHS: Oshkosh, Wikipedia, US Army

SP’s LAND FORCES 11

NE IGHBOURHOOD <<

4/2011

n LT GENERAL (RETD) VIJAY OBEROI

WE ARE ONCE AGAIN trying todo the impossible—makingpeace with Pakistan. This isdespite the Mumbai carnageof November 26, 2008, and

the recent serial blasts in Mumbai on July 13,2011, which everyone knows is the handi-work of Pakistan and its Jihadi cohorts. Theonly exception seems to be our government.It seems to have its head buried in the sand,ostrich-like. The leadership is so firm on con-tinuing the dialogue with Pakistan that it hasbrushed aside all opposition to these talks aswell as the mounting evidence that it is con-trary to the sentiments of the overwhelmingnumber of the populace. Even in the case ofthe latest terrorist attack in Mumbai on July13, the government is working overtime tosomehow prove that it was neither Pakistannor any other Jihadi outfit that did the das-tardly work, so that the talks are not inter-rupted. How naive?

When will we learn that the ruling hier-archy in Pakistan that matters, viz. the Pak-istani Army, does not want peace with India?On the contrary, it continues to nurture andtrain the Jihadis, who have publiclyannounced that as soon as the Americantroops are out of Afghanistan, their cadreswill turn their full focus on India.

Formal Dialogue Benefits PakistanIt suits Pakistan that we keep the dialoguegoing with them, as it serves a number ofpurposes of that country.

Firstly, it reduces the pariah image of Pak-istan internationally, which has plummetedto a nadir after Osama bin Laden was foundby the US Special Forces from under the verynose of the Pakistan Army. It was India’sunthought-of announcement that it will notaffect the ongoing talks/dialogue that wentagainst near-unanimous international oppro-brium of Pakistan, following the Osama binLaden killing. Pakistan fully understands thatit is only a continuing dialogue with Indiathat will somewhat retrieve its image and noamount of hobnobbing with the West, espe-cially the United States, as also with theIslamic countries, will be able to. These coun-tries, for their own national interests, wouldactually like to shore up Pakistan, for whicha continuing dialogue with India would behelpful even if it produces no results.

Its second aim is to keep the Kashmir potsimmering and bring it to a boil when neededfor domestic or other compulsions, to keepIndia and especially the Indian Army com-mitted in costly, time-consuming and futile

counter-insurgency/counter terrorist (CI/CT)operations, with the twin aim of slowingdown the economic growth of India andreducing the war-waging capabilities of theIndian Army. A third important aim is to getmilitary concessions, which it has not beenable to get by force, e.g. demilitarising Siachin.Fourthly, by exerting pressures of varioustypes through China; USA; the Islamic coun-tries of West Asia; and the other westernnations, Pakistan wants to negotiate from aposition of strength. Lastly, the resumption ofthe dialogue with India dilutes the latest hor-rendous terrorist act in which a score of inno-cent Indians have been killed and hundredsinjured. The end result is the continued desta-bilising of India, despite its bigger size, econ-omy and larger and stronger military.

On the other hand, India has nothing togain out of such a dialogue. Our experiencewith many past talks, dialogues and discus-sions that were started and then abandonedat various stages should be sufficient pointerto any government that has the interest of thecountry at heart. Why then does this govern-ment persist? No doubt there is pressure fromthe United States, but what has the US givenback to us for going out of our way andagainst public opinion; other than meaning-less verbiage. The US Secretary of State, dur-ing her recent visit to India, has againrepeated the same words and assurances andour government has again gone into over-drive, through its official public relationsorganisation and a committed media. Mean-while, the citizens of the country and not justthose of Mumbai will wait for the next terrorstrike, hoping that they do not become targetsand this pattern will be repeated ad nauseam.

Sole Decision-MakersLet us first be clear about who are the deci-sion-makers in Pakistan. It is neither thePakistan People’s Party (PPP) nor any otherpolitical party, and certainly not the civilsociety. The last word on decisions on secu-rity (including nuclear aspects) and foreignpolicy affairs in Pakistan is that of the Pak-istan Army. Hence, the Pakistan Army, for allpractical purposes, is the government ofPakistan. This has been so since the early1960s, if not earlier and is continuing. Pres-ident Zardari and company are mere puppetsto showcase the so-called democratic face ofPakistan to the world.

It also needs to be highlighted that the

Pakistan Army has always perpetuated themyth that India is out to gobble up Pakistanand it is only that they stand as a bulwarkagainst these perfidious ambitions of India.This is such an oft-repeated statement thatmost Pakistanis, if not all, believe it to betrue. Following the Osama bin Laden killing

at Abbottabad, many well-meaning inde-pendent analysts, non-resident Pakistanisand journalists have tried to change thethinking of the Pakistani Army, urging it toabandon its support to the various jihadioutfits like Lashkar-e-Toiba, but to no avail.

Pakistan’s Military Preparations Besides nurturing the jihadi card, the Pak-istan Army continues to bolster its conven-tional forces by inducting state-of-the-artweaponry from the funds generously pro-vided by the United States as well as its otherfriends. In addition, it is rapidly adding to itsnuclear arsenal, including inducting the so-called tactical nuclear weapons. All this isbeing done with the overt and covert supportof its all-weather friend China. The UnitedStates is also tacitly accepting this and hasbeen closing its eyes to both nuclear prolifer-ation and the diversion of its massive fund-ing to Pakistan to fight the terror war. Thecurrent withholding of $8 billion in aid isonly a temporary phase. Both the countriesknow it, but it suits them to enact the dramafor some time.

On account of its nefarious activities,either through non-state actors, which Pak-istan has nurtured over decades and whichare still its trump cards or brandishing its ille-gally acquired nuclear weapons and missiles

Why Have a Dialogue with Pak?It is not peace dialogue and talks but the whittling down of the Pakistan Army’s predominant position as thesole policy formulating organisation that will bring eventual peace between the two countries. Policy-makers inIndia need to turn the thinking of the Pakistani polity, instead of engaging in futile dialogues and discussions.

The inputs from the military, which has beendeliberately kept out ofthe policy-formulationloop, are consideredinconsequential, espe-cially when strategic andother external policiesare formulated ALLISON TRANSMISSION INDIA PVT. LTD., 411 ELEGANCE TOWERS, 8 DISTRICT CENTRE, JASOLA, NEW DELHI-110025, INDIA T. +91 11 4315 5555 F. +91 11 4315 5566

PLANT : A-21, SIPCOT INDUSTRIAL PARK, ORAGADAM, SRIPERUMBUDUR TALUK, KANCHIPURAM DISTRICT- 602105, TAMIL NADU, INDIA. T. +91 44 3718 3718 F. +91 44 3718 3309

Key Advantages :

•

•

•

•

•

•

•

No clutch plate to get burnt.

No rollback on mountain grades.

Faster acceleration for hot pursuit and exiting ambushes.

Superior braking with retarder.

Prognostics for preventive maintainence.

Safe, smooth, easy and reliable drive.

Very easy for drivers to learn and drive.

Tough automatic transmissions

approved for action

ALLISON TRANSMISSION INDIA PVT. LTD., 411 ELEGANCE TOWERS, 8 DISTRICT CENTRE, JASOLA, NEW DELHI-110025, INDIA T. +91 11 4315 5555 F. +91 11 4315 5566PLANT : A-21, SIPCOT INDUSTRIAL PARK, ORAGADAM, SRIPERUMBUDUR TALUK, KANCHIPURAM DISTRICT- 602105, TAMIL NADU, INDIA. T. +91 44 3718 3718 F. +91 44 3718 3309

PHOTOGRAPH: PIB

External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna with ForeignMinister of Pakistan Hina Rabbani Khar

and threatening to use them, Pakistan is peri-odically dubbed the fountainhead of globalterrorism and an unstable state. In the past,with deft diplomacy, threats and cajoling, thePakistani leadership has managed to retrievethe situation, but it is now becoming difficult.

India’s Simplistic DiplomaticResponsesIn this game, India is perhaps the only majorcountry that succumbs to such blandish-ments and has been unable to generatecounter-strategies to put Pakistan on thedefensive. There are two main reasons for this.Firstly, our strategic thinking is abysmallypoor, resulting in continually diluting ourstand. Secondly, our political leadership hasbeen unable to correctly gauge the true feel-ings of our citizens towards Pakistan. It isunfortunate that a few persons with vestedinterests are able to convince the leaders totake the line of least resistance, despite theutter failure of such policies.

In the past our leaders have tried to ratio-nalise the continuing dialogue by sayingthat if we do not talk, should we then fight awar? What a simplistic statement from thecountry’s leaders who are supposed to bepersons of great intelligence and sagacity.They probably do not know that there are ahost of other options between the twoextremes. What we need to do is to take amuch-needed break from any kind of formalnegotiations (like a composite dialogue) withPakistan. Let us continue with routine,impersonal and correct relationship withPakistan, so that the Pakistani leadership—political, civil, bureaucracy and military—fully understands that we mean businessand we will not succumb to its threats, cajol-ing and blandishments, or pressure fromother countries. This will require not only adrastic change in our policy but also buildingup our military and internal security appa-ratus for meeting the challenges posed by thePakistan Army.

Ignoring Public OpinionIn our exuberance to continue the dialoguewith Pakistan, either on account of pressurefrom foreign countries like USA, or by thefew so-called peaceniks, for whom neitherself-pride nor national pride are important,or even on account of a desire by some ofour political leaders to go down in history asthe harbingers of peace, we have truly neg-lected to take stock of how the bulk of thenational polity views the actions of Pakistan.After the Mumbai mayhem and the recentserial blasts, the anti-Pakistan feelings havehardened greatly.

The common man in India, although

wedded to non-violence, strongly believesthat Pakistan cannot be trusted and mustnot be appeased. Then, why does the govern-ment think otherwise? All political leadersare supposed to gauge the pulse of the peoplevery well. They seem to do so while respond-ing to internal situations and especiallywhen they sense an electoral benefit, buttheir ability to do so with respect to externalplayers appears to be blinkered, linear andrepetitive.

PrognosisOne does not need to be a rocket scientist tocome to the conclusion that the day India

and Pakistan succeed in bringing about arapprochement and agrees to live in peace asfriendly neighbours, will be the start of thePakistani Army losing its pre-eminent posi-tion in the power structure of Pakistan.Obviously, no one in the Pakistani Armywould like to relinquish their premier posi-tion, which abounds with power and pelf. So,where is the question of peace between Indiaand Pakistan?

India will be able to come to a genuinepeace agreement with Pakistan only whenthe Pakistan Army relinquishes or is made torelinquish their pre-eminence in Pakistan’ssecurity and foreign affairs. Consequently, itis not peace dialogues and talks but the whit-tling down of the Pakistan Army’s predomi-nant position as the sole policy formulatingorganisation that will bring eventual peacebetween the two countries. Policy-makers inIndia therefore need to turn the thinking ofthe Pakistani polity, instead of engaging infutile dialogues and discussions.

Military Policy sans Military InputsWhy does this happen in a country that hasbeen progressively improving its economyand has the strength of over 5,000 years ofculture and history behind it? The reality ofIndia is that the three policy-making entitiesof the country, viz. the political leadership,the diplomats and the civil bureaucracy havehardly any knowledge of the strategy andhave no desire to learn either. The inputsfrom the military, which has been deliber-ately kept out of the policy-formulation loop,are considered inconsequential, especiallywhen strategic and other external policiesare formulated. Surprisingly, the Indian mil-itary has long accepted this subordinate andperipheral role for itself and except in rareoccasions has made no attempts to correctthis stark imbalance in how our policies,including when the predominant focus is onmilitary issues, are formulated. So, why arewe talking?

NE IGHBOURHOOD>>

SP’s LAND FORCES12

www.spslandforces.net

4/2011

mitted along the borders in the Northand Northeast.

l China’s denial of a visa to the formerNorthern Army Commander Lt GeneralB.S. Jaswal, serving in Jammu andKashmir on the pretext that it is a dis-puted territory.

l China physically occupies large areas ofIndian territory since the mid-1950s.Aksai Chin in Ladakh accounts for38,000 sq km of Indian Territory, whilethe Shaksgam Valley comprising 5,180sq km was illegally ceded by Pakistan toChina in March 1963. Beijing also con-tinues to claim the entire Indian state ofArunachal Pradesh, which is more than90,000 sq km.Thus China’s so-called “peaceful rise” at

strategic levels, is entirely contradicted bythe political diplomatic and military aggres-siveness at functional levels against India,raising the anxiety about their intentionsespecially in light of their rapidly improvingmilitary capability. What is becoming clearerby the day is that with continued wranglingover Chinese activity in support of Pakistan,China’s overall aggressiveness, proliferatingtrade disputes, hardening positions in bordernegotiations, and growing nationalism,Sino-Indian relations is going to becomeincreasingly difficult to manage. Pakistanhas become a vassal state of China havingallowed China to even position troops ontheir soil in PoK. Hence, Indian militaryplanners have rightly concluded that bothcountries are likely to collude with eachother in any scenario that develops intoactive military operations in the future.

A Two-and-a-Half-Front CapabilityIndian military planners feel that the collu-sion between China and Pakistan, which isso clearly evident in peacetime, is likely totranslate itself into active, mutually support-

ing, military operations, during conflict sit-uations, which in Indian context wouldimply fighting simultaneous conflicts in twowidely separated theatres of operationsnamely the Western theatre (against Pak-istan) and the Northern/Northeastern(against China) in the future. If we add tothis the Army’s commitment to simultane-ously fight insurgencies, it would amount toabout two-and-a-half-front capability. Thusinstead of waiting for adverse situations todevelop, the planners feel that it would beprudent to acquire this capability involvinga conventional force level for fighting limitedconflicts/border skirmishes along with anindependently designed and equipped forcefor asymmetric conflicts simultaneously intwo different theatres of operations whichare widely separated.

It may be recalled that the 1962 Warwas thrust upon an unsuspecting nationand an unprepared Army, hibernatingunder the influence of false assertions offriendship by an unwise political leadershipwho prior to the war, had tried to politicisethe military leadership thus weakening itsmoral fibre. This weak military leadership ofan unprepared and ill-equipped Army wasordered to undertake active operations inthe high altitude regions of the Eastern the-atre. And for some strange reasons, it wasdecided not to use air power offensively inwhich India had an upper hand. Disastrousresults were inevitable. India woke up toface its own weaknesses. This defeat at thehands of a deceitful opponent led to soulsearching within the government andresulted in the raising of a fairly large num-ber of mountain divisions for constantdeployment in the high altitude regionastride the line of actual control with China.Similarly, the air force infrastructure to posi-tion a few strike squadrons was improvedconsiderably. Today, as per open source

information, India has 10 Mountain Divi-sions including the two under raisings.However, mere raising of more defensive for-mations will only boost our defensive capa-bility and will not add to our strikecapability across LAC which is vital for con-ventional deterrence. Moreover, the Armyin the east lacks long-range firepower, avia-tion resources for intra-theatre movement,air defence and electronic warfare capabil-ity, intelligence surveillance reconnaissance(ISR) resources and armour in the form oflight tanks for deployment in certain sectorsof our mountainous regions where the ter-rain allows mechanised operations.

Air power needs to be increased by fourto six strike squadrons of multi-role combataircraft for a strike capability in Tibet, to pro-tect the Indian airspace and to prevent theaggressor from concentrating troops close tothe border.

The required capability is not quiteapparent at present even though some forcesdo exist and which came as a result of the1962 War with China. The Western and theEastern theatres of the Indian Army and theIndian Air Force and the Western and East-ern fleets of the Indian Navy are independ-ently equipped and postured. However, largeoperational voids including infrastructuraldeficiencies exist which need to be remediedurgently. The need to prepare our forces fora two-and-a-half front confrontation mustbe recognised and in turn must drive ourfuture national and military strategy,warfighting doctrines, technology induc-tion, force structures and equipment pro-curement/development.

Asymmetric ThreatsIndia’s rapid economic growth will impactfavourably on its strategic capabilities andboth state and non-state actors are likely toadopt asymmetric warfare means against

India to achieve their aims. Such threats willtend to bypass India’s conventional militarycapabilities as seen in J&K and in the North-east and will need separate force structuresand a doctrine for asymmetric warfare. Con-ventional military capabilities do not andwill not deter asymmetric threats.

Areas of ReformThe security threats and challenges facingIndia have increased enormously. ThusIndian military stresses the need to prepareitself for the full spectrum warfare. Thedilemma is only regarding the extent ofemphasis that should be laid to acquire eachtype of capability. After years of focusing onPakistan-centric plans mostly based on oper-ations in the plains and desert terrain of Pun-jab and Rajasthan, respectively, the Armynow wants to also build its capability foroffensive mountain warfare with China.Transformation also entails major forceaccretions and modernisation for the easternfront along with the simultaneous strength-ening of capabilities on the western one.

Recent Initiativesl A new South-Western Command has

been created as the Army’s sixth opera-tional command at Jaipur in 2005, toprovide a greater offensive punch on theWestern front. It also provides an addi-tional command headquarters to takecontrol of the offensive operations onthe Western flank, if required. Similarly,in the Eastern flank, two new mountaindivisions have now been raised atZakama (Nagaland) and at Misamari(Assam) respectively. Other improve-ments are under way including `10,000crore plan cleared last year for militaryinfrastructure development in theNortheast, with a new mountain strikecorps and a third Artillery Division also

PHOTOGRAPH: ininb.com

Continued from page 5

SP’s LAND FORCES 13

MI L I TARY STRATEGY <<

4/2011

sion also on the anvil.l The Indian Air Force, much smaller

than the Indian Army, is also takingsteps to bridge the gaping military asym-metry with China. After Tezpur, it is nowbasing Sukhoi-30 MKIs at Chabua(Assam) as well as upgrading Easternsector advanced landing grounds(ALGs) like Pasighat, Mechuka, Walong,Tuting, Ziro and Vijaynagar and heli-pads in Arunachal Pradesh. Plans arealso under way to progressively base sixsurface-to-air Akash missile squadronsin the Northeast to counter Chinesefighters, helicopters and unmanned aer-ial vehicles (UAVs). The above initiatives though delayed are

appropriate. However, the main problem isthat the Army’s modernisation is lagging,with critical deficiencies in artillery, airdefence, aviation, night-fighting and strate-gic/ tactical intelligence, surveillance andreconnaissance capabilities. India’s compli-cated, lengthy and controversy-ridden mili-tary procurement process, coupled with theembarrassing lack of a robust domesticdefence-industrial base, are enormous prob-lems in the planned modernisation.

Capabilities RequiredOur current force level and our operationalposture allows for the development of a two-and-a-half front capability. Keeping in mindour adversaries capabilities on both flanks,some of the key areas in which we will needto acquire capability are briefly discussed insucceeding paragraphs.

Strategic Levell Nuclear deterrent to include delivery sys-

tems with a strike range of up to 5,000

km range to cover the entire region up tomainland China.

l Tri-Service network-centricity through adefence communication network toattain greater synergy between the threeServices on land, air, sea and space.

l Tri-service, cyber warfare capability. l Missile and anti-missile capability at tac-

tical, operational and strategic levels.l Induction of unmanned combat aerial

systems (UCAS).l Induction of precision (denoting accu-

racy) and intelligence, surveillance andreconnaissance technologies intomanned and unmanned systems.

l Establishing a National Cyber Command

and a Joint Services Cyber Command

Operational Levell A potent offensive and defensive capabil-

ity in the Eastern theatre is on similarlines as obtaining in the Western theatreagainst Pakistan. A mountain strikecorps will be a vital addition for conven-tional deterrence of Eastern theatre.

l IAF’s strike resources will mandate anincrease of about four to six squadronsof multi-role combat aircraft in theEastern theatre capable of striking any-where on the Tibetan plateau thusdenying the attacker entry into Indianair space and a capability of destroying

concentrations of his ground forcesalong LAC and international border andits vital targets inland.

l The Indian Navy’s Eastern fleet willrequire a more robust force level includ-ing one/two carrier task force(s) andadditional submarines to deny intrusionsand for sea control in the SouthernIndian Ocean.

l Ballistic and cruise missile capability toengage targets in Tibet with conven-tional munitions should the adversaryindulge in missile warfare.

l A Tri-Service Special Forces Command forspecial operations, both overt and covert

National War Gaming FacilityUnder the existing circumstances, it wouldbe prudent to assume that the situationsdemanding a two-and-a-half-front capabil-ity are likely to arise irrespective of our per-sonal convictions. War gaming at nationaland military strategic levels will throw upthe likely situations which would mandatesuch a capability. Currently, this is one ofour greatest weaknesses because despitehaving a large military force we do not havea national war gaming facility to validateour concepts, force structures and doc-trines. Moreover, unlike Western democra-cies, we have a polity totally ignorant ofmatters military and a self-serving bureau-cracy unmindful of operational issues andunderstanding of the need to modernise theforces at a much faster pace to face futurechallenges. The trust deficit between theservices with the Ministry of Defence (MoD)can only be removed by a well-informedand competent political leadership andproper integration of the MoD with thethree services.

Infi nite opportunities. One world-leading event.

MOREVisiting Naval Ships than the 2009 show

NEW Static Vehicle Display for

Land, Air & Naval Sectors

NEW Robotics & Unmanned

Systems Showcase

REGISTER AT WWW.DSEI.CO.UK/EARLY FOR EARLY BIRD DISCOUNT

Platinum Sponsors

With 1,300 exhibitors and a host of exciting features, DSEi is the world’s leading Defence & Security exhibition, allowing you to meet the whole supply chain in four productive days; 13-16 September 2011, ExCeL London.

NEW Security Demonstrations & Showcase

Imag

e C

opyr

ight

of B

AE

Sys

tem

s

Imag

e C

opyr

ight

of

Forc

e P

rote

ctio

n E

urop

e Im

age

Cop

yrig

ht o

f Lo

ckhe

ed M

arti

n C

orpo

rati

on

Imag

e C

opyr

ight

of S

mit

hs D

etec

tion

NEW FOR 2011

PHOTOGRAPH: asociallyconstructedlife.wordpress.com

Indo-China border at Nathu La, Sikkim

SP's Landforces 04-2011 final:Layout 1 02/09/11 4:39 PM Page 13

CYBER SECUR I TY>>

SP’s LAND FORCES 4/201114

www.spslandforces.net

n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

THE BOUNDARIES BETWEENCyBER crime, cyber terrorism andcyber warfare are blurred. The 21stcentury living is already dependenton the internet and hence cyber

threats will only multiply. It is increasinglyapparent that other than individual and syn-dicated cyber crime, cyber terrorism andcyber warfare are being conducted by nationstates, often through so called non-stateactors. Cyber threats have been expandingexponentially over the years and have becomeas dangerous as nuclear war. As far back as1998, Russia had proposed a treaty to ban theuse of cyberspace for military purposes butgiven the difficulty in identifying the sourceof attack, it did not come through. A reportin the US talked of 25 million new strains ofmalware created in 2009 itself. That equals anew strain of malware every 0.79 seconds.The report underlined how the current cyberthreat environment is dramatically changingand becoming more challenging as the clockticks. Despite cyber threats magnifying overthe years, it is only sometime in the middle of2010 that some semblance of collectiveefforts became visible in bringing order tocyber space and in confronting the scourge ofcyber terrorism. Last year, therefore, may bepaged as another modest beginning towardsa global cyber security mechanism when a USled 15 nation group reached an agreement tomake collective recommendations to theUnited Nations in July 2010. Consensuswithin this group itself ironically took fiveyears of deliberate efforts commencing 2005.The recommendations clearly indicated thewillingness to engage in reducing the threatof cyber attacks on computer networks, call-ing upon the United Nations to create normsof accepted behaviour in cyberspace,exchange information on national legislationand cyber security strategies as alsostrengthen the capacity of less-developednations to protect their computer systems.

Homeland Security & Cyber Security The US and the world at large realised theglobalisation of terror post 9/11. However,cyber crime, cyber terrorism and cyber warrequired no specific incident like this. Cyberthreats were borderless, omni-directionaland omni-present from the very outset. Indiathat has been facing cross border terrorismsince over past two decades has also beensubjected to cyber attacks, mainly fromChina and Pakistan. Osama bin Laden hadbeen giving calls for strikes “through all pos-sible means”, obviously also targeting eco-nomic centres, infrastructure and the like. Itwas perceived that while Laden had his fin-ger on the trigger of his AK-47, his succes-sor’s future lineage will have the finger onthe mouse. The focus would be to attack theeconomy of a country. Therefore, homelandsecurity has to go far beyond than merelyproviding physical protection of life andproperty. Cyber security may be consideredthe flip side of homeland security and mustnow be synonymous to both economic secu-rity and homeland security. Without ade-quate cyber security, it may not be possibleto enjoy the full benefits of globalisation anda developing economy. Homeland securitywill not be effective without protecting ourcyber space in order to enjoy our freedom athome and advance our interests abroad.

Therefore, steps need to be taken from thenational level right down to the communityand individual levels to protect us againstcyber threats.

Critical infrastructureProtecting critical infrastructures from dis-ruption is not a new concept. The need tomanage the risks arising from physicalattacks and service disruptions has existed foras long as there have been critical infrastruc-tures. The change that has taken place now isthat as a result of advances in informationand communications technology, there is athreat to critical infrastructures that goesbeyond that of physical attacks. Critical infra-structure assurance is an essential element ofour overall approach to homeland security.Industries, institutions, and distribution net-works that provide a continual flow of goodsand services essential to the nation’s defenseand economic security, the functioning of itsgovernment, and the welfare of its citizensconstitute the critical infrastructure. It wouldinclude information and communications,transportation, electric power, oil and gasstorage and distribution, banking andfinance, transportation, water supply, emer-gency assistance, etc. These are deemed criti-cal because they are the enablers of economicactivity as well as essential to the delivery ofvital government services. Their disruptioncan have a debilitating regional, national, oreven international impact. Information sys-tems and networks of the infrastructure sec-tors that facilitate commerce also areincreasingly vulnerable to cyber attacks andheightened services disruption, the cascadingeffect of which can even bring daily life to astandstill and cause grievous damage to oureconomy. Cyber attacks on critical infrastruc-tures can cause mass disruption at regional,national and even international levels. Accessto the internet has the potential throughcyber attack to wreak havoc on an entire net-work or infrastructure. This requires unprece-dented partnership between private industryand government especially since there are noboundaries in cyberspace and because a largepart of the nation’s critical infrastructures areprivately owned and operated. There is arequirement of off-the-shelf solutions inmanaging risks posed to critical infrastruc-tures and raise awareness that massive dis-ruptions due to deliberate cyber attacks are arisk management problem that companiesmust solve with government playing a sup-porting role. Organisations must institution-alise the process of identifying critical assets,assessing their vulnerabilities, and managing

the risks associated with these vulnerabilities.Cyber security is essential to business assur-ance and continuity. Regulations by them-selves cannot ensure proper implementationof cyber security within complex organisa-tions. The private sector must play a majorrole in securing our economy from cyber-based attacks.

Global EffortsThe International Multilateral Partnership

Against Cyber Threats (IMPACT) waslaunched in 2006 in USA at the end of the15th World Congress on Information Tech-nology (WCIT). Its Global Headquarters waslaunched in May 2009 at Kuala Lumpur,Malaysia. IMPACT is a global public-privatepartnership alliance against cyber threats;positioned to assist partner countries focus-ing on developing nations in broadeningtheir cyber security capabilities and capacity.It is a politically neutral platform, bringingtogether national governments, academia,industry leaders, international organisation,think tanks and cyber security experts toenhance the global community’s capacity toprevent, defend against and respond to cyberthreats. Since 2006, the ITU PlenipotentiaryConference, ITU Secretary General had setcyber security as one of his top three priori-ties. In May 2007, the GCA was launchedaimed at a framework for international coop-eration in cyber security. In September 2008,IMPACT signed an memorandum of under-standing (MoU) with the InternationalTelecommunications Union (Leading UN spe-cialised agency for Information and Commu-nication Technologies—founded in 1865)under which the Global Headquarters ofIMPACT the focal point of the Global CyberSecurity Agenda (GCA), providing the 192members of ITU (including India) expertise,facilities and resources to effectively addresscyber threats. In 2010, the ITU World Con-ferences and the Plenipotentiary Conferencefurther strengthened the role of ITU in cybersecurity and endorsed the GCA as the ITU-wide strategy on international cooperation.Then is the East West Initiative (EWI), whichis working with leading corporations, special-ists and governments around the world tomobilise cooperative approaches to cybersecurity. EWI is working with the numerouscountries including the US, Russia, Chinaand India to address thrust areas—createnew and effective international collaborativemechanisms and trust; reframe issues anddevelop consensus proposals for new agree-ments and policies; champion and mobiliseresources necessary to implement high-

impact proposals. This initiative combinesEWI’s established process—conveningdiverse parties, reframing security challengesand mobilising resources to implement solu-tions— with the technical expertise of ourpartners to build trust and reduce the senseof vulnerability that dominates cyber secu-rity policies in most countries.

The recent visit of Hillary Clinton to Indiasaw signing of an Indo-US accord on cybersecurity cooperation between the ComputerEmergency Response Teams of the US andIndia, these being the lead agencies in respec-tive countries to respond to virtualattacks. The accord will enable India and theUS join hands to secure their cyberspacesamid increasing attacks on sensitive recordsfrom hostile elements, including the terror-ists. The accord will permit exchange infor-mation on cyber strikes, cooperation intechnology and exchange information oncyber security policy, capacity building andexchange of experts, enabling mutualresponse to cyber security incidents. Expertisewill be shared in artifact analysis like studyingtraces of virus and worm, network traffic, etc.CERT-India functioning under the Ministry ofCommunications and IT raises securityawareness among India’s cyber communityand provides technical assistance and adviceto recover from computer security incidents.Similarly, US-CERT is the operational arm ofthe National Cyber Security Division in theDepartment of Homeland Security.

RequirementThe primary international requirement obvi-ously is successful execution of the GlobalCybersecurity Agenda (GCA). GCA isdesigned for cooperation and efficiency,encouraging collaboration with and betweenall relevant partners, and building on existinginitiatives to avoid duplication. The five pillarson which the GCA is being built, compriselegal measures, technical and proceduralmeasures, organisational structures, capacitybuilding and international cooperation. Therequirements are colossal to say the least andinternational cooperation is not somethingthat comes easy, especially when roguenations may be pursuing their own secretagendas. As part of the GCA, ITU has also ini-tiated the Child Online Protection (COP) ini-tiative as an international collaborativenetwork for promoting online protection ofchildren and young people worldwide by pro-viding guidance on safe online behaviourwith key objectives to identify risks and vul-nerabilities to children in cyberspace, createawareness, develop practical tools to helpminimise risk and share knowledge and expe-rience. This too will need international coop-eration for accelerated implementation.

Join HandsGlobal understanding has dawned that onlyby joining the forces and bringing togetherour strategic capabilities, we will be able toaddress current and emerging cyber threats.Cyber security is a global issue and itrequires a global response. The GCA is thefirst truly global multi-stakeholder and pub-lic-private alliance against cyber threats.Cooperation and coordination betweenmember states through the United Nations,is indispensable to reach a consensus onglobal strategies and involve all relevant bod-ies and stakeholders. The world has littletime to lose.

Global Response to the Global IssueGlobal understanding has dawned that by bringing together our strategic capabilities, we will be able toaddress current and emerging cyber threats. Cooperation and coordination between member states throughthe United Nations, is indispensable to reach a consensus on global strategies and involve all relevant bodiesand stakeholders.

Homeland secu-rity will not beeffective withoutprotecting ourcyber space inorder to enjoy ourfreedom at homeand advance our interests abroad

SP’s LAND FORCES4/2011 15

NE IGHBOURHOOD <<

n DR MONIKA CHANSORIA

CHINA’S MILITARy CONVENTION-ALLy HAS been dominated by itsland troops, traced back to thetime when the ‘Red Army ofworkers and peasants’ was

founded in 1927. Ever since becoming thefirst constituent element of the People’s Lib-eration Army (PLA), till assuming the role ofthe PLA as it is today, Chinese armed forceshave borne the stamp of their revolutionaryorigin and combat experiences while trans-forming into a tri-service military force.

The historical status of China’s militaryhas traditionally been influenced by itsground forces given that it was known to bea land power. China has put forth a justifica-tion of its military modernisation campaignas a reasonable chain of actions undertakenby a nation that seeks to update antiquatedweapons systems and equipment and thusrationalise an outdated military structure.The policymakers in China have frequentlynoted its history of vulnerability to externalaggression as the primary reference point.

Despite the modernisation effort focusingmore upon the PLA Navy, Air Force and Sec-ond Artillery Corps, the PLA ground forcescontinue to bear the stamp of being the keyauthority that ensures sustenance of theproverbial rule of the Chinese CommunistParty (CCP) throughout China. PLA Army(PLAA) remains committed to guardingChina’s nearly 22,000 km-long-land bound-ary. Given that China has sought territorialdispute resolution with 12 out of 14 landneighbours including the Central AsianRepublics, Russia and Vietnam, the ongoingland boundary dispute that Beijing shareswith India and Bhutan remains a source ofconcern. China’s military modernisationcampaign, especially its readiness to fight alocal border war, raises caution for India. Thiscan be attributed to Chinese military’s doctri-nal strategy of fighting local limited borderwars under informationised conditions.China recognises the McMahon Line as itsboundary with Myanmar, but refuses to do sowith India. Prior to Chinese Premier WenJiabao’s visit to India in December 2010, anofficial Xinhua news agency report describedthe Sino-Indian border to be about 2,000 kmlong. However, the official Indian count of theoperational border stands at nearly 3,500 km(not taking into account the line separatingPakistan occupied Kashmir [PoK] and China).This appeared to be a tactical strategy of exer-cising pressure against India since the dis-crepancy in the figures is too large to betreated merely as an inadvertent error, thattoo coming from an official news channel.

PLA ArmyAddressing the often conferred to ‘bloated’size of the army, the PLA has streamlined itsmilitary to create a more professional andefficient fighting force having undergonetwo large reductions in force in the pastdecade, starting with about 5,00,000 per-sonnel from 1997 to 2000 and another2,00,000 from September 2003 to 2005.The past decade has also witnessedenhanced focus on improving the system ofleadership and command; streamlining thestaff offices and the affiliated organs at theCorps level and above, so as to directly com-press the command chains and furtherimprove the operational command system tostrengthen the command functions.

To accommodate the loss of over5,00,000 troops and to prepare for new mis-sions, the PLA Army has changed its struc-ture greatly since the mid-1990s, when themain combat force was organised into 24Group Armies (equivalent to a Corps),approximately 90 manoeuvre (infantry andtank) divisions, around 15 brigades (mostlytank), plus scores of artillery, anti-aircraftartillery (AAA), combat support, andlocal/border defence units. Interestingly, abook published by the National Defense Uni-versity titled Zhanyi Xue (On Military Cam-paigns), provides a detailed insight as to howthe PLA proposes to conduct operations atGroup Army and higher levels in future mili-tary campaigns i.e. the operational level ofwar. The book defines campaigns as “combatoperations comprising a series of battles con-ducted by army corps-level units under a uni-fied command to achieve a local or an overallobjective in a war.”

That the ground forces’ Generals are thedominant lot in the present structure of thePLA’s Generals cream of the crop is not sur-prising. As stated in a China Brief report,ground forces’ represent a lion’s share or 71per cent of the total. Reportedly, 45 per centof Hu’s Generals are non-ground forces,compared to 25 per cent and 24 per cent tothat of Jiang Zemin’s and Deng Xiaoping’s.

Defence White Paper 2010In its latest White Paper, China’s NationalDefense 2010, released in March 2011,China has categorically referred to theground troops as the “PLA Army”. Thisunderlines the ongoing transformation ofthe PLAA. China has stressed upon thestrategic requirements of mobile operationsand tri-dimensional offence and defencestrategies from regional defence to trans-regional mobility. In further advancement ofthe overall transformation of the service, thePLAA has invested in reform, innovationand development.

According to the White Paper, the PLAAplaces emphasis upon the development ofnew types of combat forces, optimising itsorganisation and structure, strengtheningmilitary training in conditions of informa-tionisation, accelerating the digitisedupgrading and retrofitting of main battleweaponry, organically deploying new typesof weapon platforms, and significantly

boosting its capabilities in long-distancemanoeuvres and integrated assaults. Cur-rently, the PLAA’s mobile operational unitsinclude 18 combined corps plus additionalindependent combined operational divi-sions. The combined corps, consisting ofdivisions as well as brigades, remains underthe seven military area commands ofShenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing,Guangzhou and Chengdu.

The 2010 White Paper underscores thatthe PLAA has made great progress instrengthening its arms with the armouredcomponent strengthening the developmentof digitised units, accelerating the mechani-sation of motorised units and improving itscombat system, which combines heavy, light,amphibious and airborne assault forces.

Insofar as the artillery component is con-cerned, the focus primarily has been uponnew types of weapons, equipment andammunition, with higher levels of informa-tionisation, forming an operational and tac-tical in depth strike system, and developingthe capacity to carry out precision opera-tions with integrated reconnaissance, con-trol, strike and assessment capabilities.

The air defence component has steppedup the development of new types of radar,command information systems, andmedium- and high-altitude ground-to-airmissiles. It has formed a new interceptionsystem consisting of anti-aircraft artilleryand missiles, and possesses enhanced capa-bilities of medium- and low-altitude air andmissile defence operations.

The aviation wing of the PLAA has madea significant transition from being merely asupport force to becoming the main-battleassault force, further optimising its combatforce structure, and conducting modularisedgrouping according to different assignedtasks. It has upgraded armed helicopters,transport and service helicopters, andimproved its capabilities in air strike, force

projection and support considerably.The engineering component of the

PLAA has accelerated its transformationinto a new model of integrated and multi-functional support force which is rapid inresponse and can be used both in peacetimeand in war. It has also strengthened its spe-cial capabilities in emergency rescue opera-tions as well as during disaster reliefoperations. This in turn has resulted in theenhancement of capabilities of integralcombat support and military operationsother than MOOTW missions.

The chemical defence component hasworked to develop an integrated force fornuclear, biological and chemical defencewhich operates both in peacetime and war,combines civilian and military efforts, andintegrates systems from various arms andservices. It has developed enhanced perma-nent, multi-dimensional and multi-terraindefence capabilities against nuclear, biologi-cal and chemical threats.

Effective Border Control China considers rapid defence modernisationa logical priority in the backdrop when itstates, “Taiwan independence separatist forceand its activities are still the biggest obstacleand threat to the peaceful development ofcross-Strait relations… separatist forces work-ing for East Turkistan independence and Tibetindependence have inflicted serious damageon national security and social stability.” Thecentral leadership of China has accredited anoteworthy build-up for the PLAA both interms of scope and scale. The ground forcesare training and equipping task-organisedbrigades as well as divisions to fight anisland-landing campaign in a Taiwan con-tingency scenario. More importantly, therole of the PLAA would be at the forefront asand when it readies to fight a local limitedborder war under informationised condi-tions—with the border dispute vis-à-visIndia. New Delhi in the short-term needs toensure that there are no violations of theline of actual control (LAC) through effectiveborder control and management whilemaintaining a forceful conventional posture,in order to meet the Chinese threat in thenorthern and eastern sector.

The writer is a Senior Fellow at the Centre forLand Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

The Way AheadThe recurrent and tiring round of talks, agreements and discussions without any significant breakthrough oreven the possibility of the same seem to point that the border conflict has all the ingredients of becoming amajor spoiler in Indo-China relations

PLAA is committed toguarding China’s nearly22,000-km-long landboundary

PHOTOGRAPH: Wikipedia

NE IGHBOURHOOD>>

SP’s LAND FORCES 4/201116

www.spslandforces.net

n LT GENERAL (RETD) VIJAY OBEROI

WE HAVE TWO MAJOR adver-sarial relationship with ourneighbours – China and Pak-istan. Both are related to ourinternational borders in one

way or another and both are legacies of theBritish in India. In the case of China, theBritish colonial power gave only passingimportance to India’s borders with Tibet andChina. Although they wanted the continu-ance of Tibet as a buffer state between Indiaand China, they never placed it at the samelevel as the so-called Great Game—the fear ofCzarist Russia initially and later the SovietUnion getting access to the warm water portsof the Indian Ocean. They did make anattempt in 1913-14, when a tripartite treatybetween British India, China and Tibet wasnegotiated at Shimla, which established thealignment of the border between British Indiaand Tibet in the eastern sector. The McMahon

Line was drawn by the British negotiator,Henry McMahon on a small scale map, witha broad-nib pen and was attached to theagreement. All three representatives initiatedthe agreement, but it was not ratified byChina and the border was never demarcated.

In the west too, the border between theerstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kash-mir (J&K) with Tibet as well as the small por-tion with the Xinxiang province of Chinawas left vague and was referred to as ‘unde-fined’ and treated as a traditional border,implying that both sides could cross it at willfor grazing cattle, religious pilgrimages ortrade. Soon after the communists came intopower in China, Tibet was invaded andannexed by China. China also constructed aroad in the west, in the Aksai Chin area(claimed by India) in the 1950s, linking itsXinxiang province with Tibet and presentedit as a fait accompli to India and the world.

After fighting a war in 1962, the twocountries are negotiating for decades to cometo a resolution about the border, but have notsucceeded, mainly because it suits China tocontinue with an uncertain border that canbecome a cause célèbre whenever China feelsthat it is in its interest. China is in illegal occu-

pation of 40,000 sq km of Indian territory inthe west. In addition, it is coveting additionalterritory in the eastern sector.

In the case of Pakistan, although theinternational border with India has beendemarcated, the line of control (LoC) and theactual ground position line (AGPL) in thestate of J&K and in the Siachen Glacier arearespectively continue to be militarily activeand flare up at the least provocation. TheLoC (modified version of cease fire line) cameabout when Pakistani troops were thrownback by the Indian Army from a large areaof J&K, but when a ceasefire came into forcein January 1949, some parts of the stateremained with Pakistan. These are nowknown as Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK)and the Gilgit-Baltistan area.

The AGPL came into existence when theIndian Army thwarted a Pakistani plan tooccupy the Siachin Glacier in 1984. Despitea number of attempts by the PakistaniArmy to regain the Glacier, the Indian

Army stands firm.It can thus be seen that in case push

comes to shove and the security situationdeteriorates, India would find itself in theunenviable position of dealing with morethan one front, which must be avoided by allmeans by our leadership.

With the recent reports of the presence ofChina’s People’s liberation Army (PLA) troopsin the Gilgit-Baltistan areas of Pakistan, thesituation for India has become even more sen-sitive in the Ladakh district of J&K.

Compulsions of GeographyWhile assessing the impact of the PLA pres-ence in Gilgit-Baltistan, one needs to studythe geography of the area in great detail. Inthe Ladakh region, India has been squeezedby both Pakistan and China over the years.China is under illegal occupation of 35,000sq km area in the Aksai Chin area, as well as5,120 sq km in the Shaksgam Tract.

In the west, Pakistan is in illegal occupa-tion of 78,000 sq km of Indian territory.This includes the northern portion of PoK aswell as the entire tract of real estate nowknown as Gilgit-Baltistan.

Gilgit-Baltistan is the northernmost polit-

ical entity in Pakistan today. It borders Pak-istan’s Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province (ear-lier NWFP) to the west; Afghanistan’sWakhan Corridor to the north-west; China tothe north and north-east; J&K state of Indiato the east and south-east and PoK in thesouth. It covers an area of 72,971 sq km andhas an estimated population of 1.5 million. Itis highly underdeveloped and is sparsely pop-ulated. A part of this area, called the Shaks-gam Tract, was illegally ceded to China byPakistan in 1963.

On the eastern flank, China is in illegaloccupation of the entire area known asAksai Chin. This has resulted in the reduc-tion of the length of the border with Tibetfrom 2,615 km to only 1,568 km andbrought Chinese troops much closer. It willthus be clear that the northern portion ofLadakh has been hemmed in from both theeast and the west. In addition, the ShaksgamTract under illegal occupation of Chinaexerts pressure from the north.

China’s Military in Gilgit-BaltistanChina has denied the presence of troops inthe Gilgit-Baltistan area, but it appearsquite certain that while combat troops maynot have been deployed, there are largenumbers of combat support troops fromconstruction, engineering and communica-tion units of the PLA there. They are underthe command of the Xinjiang military dis-trict and have strength of 7,000. On theChinese side of the Khunjerab Pass, thereare many more PLA troops.

Such a large foreign presence in a thinlypopulated, undeveloped region has a pro-found impact, both at the local level and inthe adjoining countries. For India, itamounts to the opening of a new front. Sim-ilarly, Afghanistan should be equally wor-ried, with its Wakhan corridor immediatelynext door. It is also a challenge for the UnitedStates, as all its strategic plans in West Asiaand the Central Asian Republics (CARs) mayget negated. The CARs will also get affected.Can this add up to a creeping process of defacto Chinese control over this region? Thereis certainly a strong possibility, if this moveis left unchallenged. It must not be treated asan innocent move for assisting a friendly

country or as an alibi for China’s true inten-tions in the region.

An important point for India is that itmarks a major change in China’s Kashmirpolicy, especially when this development fol-lows in the wake of the well-known ‘visacontroversy’. Till recently, China was a neu-tral observer as far as the Kashmir issue wasconcerned and espoused the bilateralapproach between India and Pakistan tosolve the issue. China seems to have radicallychanged its stance with an obvious biastowards Pakistan. This development is inim-ical to the interests of India and needs to becountered vigorously.

The presence of the PLA, whether ofcombat troops or combat support troopsdoes serve China’s strategic interests inSouth Asia? Besides questioning India’s sov-ereign right over J&K and highlighting it asa ‘disputed territory’, it is deliberately inter-nationalising the issue. Although the Shaks-gam Tract has been ceded to China long timeback, China can fully incorporate it only ifthese areas become a permanent part ofPakistan in any future settlement over Kash-mir. China may also want additional terri-tory in adjoining areas that abut theXinxiang Province, with a view to keep itsrestive Uyghur population as far away aspossible from the jihadi elements of Pak-istan. China has recently publicly blamedPakistan for Uyghur “militants“ trained inPakistan for the deadly violence in its restiveXinjiang province, including in Kashghar,which left at least 22 people dead.

China’s Long-Term StrategyIn the last two decades, China has chalkedout an ambitious plan to link its hinterlandin mainland China to the Indian Ocean. It isattempting to do so from both its south-west-ern and south-eastern flanks. In the south-east, it is carrying its road-building activitiesfrom yunnan through Myanmar towardsthe Bay of Bengal with vigour. It wants asimilar opening on its south-western flank.It is already building a rail link betweenKashgar in Xinjiang province and Haveliannear Rawalpindi. Combined with the roadlinks already under way, it would become apotent and visible stranglehold of India,which it sees as its main rival in Asia in themedium- and long-term. With this infra-structure, Chinese oil tankers, using the Pak-istani ports of Gwadar, Pasni and Ormarawill be able to move oil and other commodi-ties to China’s hinterland in a few daysinstead of a few weeks as at present and in amuch secure manner.

China has recently obtained deep-seamining licence in central Indian Ocean fromthe International Seabed Authority forexploration and mining licences in theSouthwest Indian Ridge. This is part of itsgrand design of having its presence in theIndian Ocean, both naval and commercial.

In the next few years, China wouldachieve what neither Czarist Russia nor theSoviet Union could do and if the plans ofChina succeed, it will do so both in the Ara-bian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. This hasbecome possible mainly on account of itsall-weather friendship with Pakistan, whichincludes surreptitiously transferringnuclear and missile technology to Pakistanand their support for the military junta inMyanmar, which ensures the latter’s con-tinuing rule, in the face of highly adverseworld opinion.

Act Before It’s Too LateWe need to quickly make up for the years lost in procrastination and starving the military and the Army in particular of funds. The brutally-suppressed local movements of the Gilgit-Baltistan region and PoK can beexploited, if our government has the political will and the sagacity to think and plan for the long-term.

PHOTOGRAPH: Wikipedia

PLA soldiers marching through Lhasa in Tibet region

PrognosisThese moves by China indicate that the lead-ership of China views India as a weak nationin military terms. China’s perception maywell be that it is a good time to increase pres-sure and force India to negotiate the borderquestion from an advantageous position.

This overt and sensational enterprise byChina is bound to adversely affect our strate-gic position in J&K in general and in the highlysensitive area of Ladakh in particular, espe-cially when the PLA is already deployed onour eastern flank in the Aksai Chin area. Thiscomes at a time when there are renewedmoves by Pakistan and its proxies to ‘settle’ theSiachin issue. Unfortunately, there are manyin India who either do not understand thedeeper implications of this move, or are sodriven by their personal agendas that they arewilling to sacrifice the interests of the country.

What then should India do? First andforemost, the long talked about modernisa-tion of the Indian military, especially theArmy, must now move to the sphere ofaction. We need to quickly make up for theyears lost in procrastination and starvingthe military and the Army in particular offunds. At the same time, we now need to getour other instruments in an action mode, asthe brutally-suppressed local movements ofthe Gilgit-Baltistan region and PoK can beexploited, if our government has the politicalwill and the sagacity to think and plan forthe long-term, instead of the fire-fighting itends up doing in most strategic situations.

The Army must not accept any more tasksrelating to internal security, where the longdeployments in counter-insurgency opera-tions have been at the expense of its primarytasks. There is no insurgency in the Northeaststates now; it is only a law and order problem,with extortion as its main manifestation. TheArmy must de-induct from the entire North-east and re-commence training of thesetroops in their primary tasks. The Army hasunequivocally turned down the proposal to

get involved with the Maoist insurgency. Theymust not dilute their stand.

China, like any other bully, respectsstrength. In the real world, ‘the meek do notinherit the earth’. It is our strength, buildingup relationships with like-minded countriesand above all political will, which will get usdividends. Let us act before it is too late.

Well-thought PlansHaving done extremely well in economicterms, China seems to be confident of takingrisks in the frontier areas of its borders, aspart of its overtly resurgent phase. Besidestrying to slowly marginalise the traditionalUS role in the Asia-Pacific region and WestAsia, it wants to increase its pressure onIndia. Its presence in Gilgit-Baltistan needsto be seen as a strong message, not only toIndia but also to the international commu-nity, that it is pursuing its strategic goalsaccording to a well-thought-out plan.

In the Ladakh region, the earlier configu-ration has now changed, as the two distinctfronts seem to have merged. The separationbetween the two no longer exists. Instead ofthe erstwhile dispensation of dealing with theeast and the west as separate entities, we needto now plan on the contingencies whereadvertently or inadvertently the Army mayget involved in dealing with both the frontssimultaneously. This is not at all a happy state.

The stakes of the Indian Army have notonly become much greater, the importance ofholding on to our positions on the SiachenGlacier has also become critical. The IndianArmy must have undoubtedly factored thisnew situation in their planning. However,what is even more important is that the polit-ical leadership; the pundits of the foreignoffice; and those do-gooders who want tohand over the Glacier on a platter to Pakistan,also wake up to these evolving realities. The writer is the former Vice Chief of ArmyStaff and the Founder Director of the Centre forLand Warfare Studies (CLAWS).

SP’s LAND FORCES4/2011 17

T ECKNOW <<

www.spsmilitaryyearbook.com

4 0 t h I s s u e

QinetiQ has unveiled its latest microunmanned ground vehicle (MUGV)based on its Dragon Runner plat-

form. The new Dragon Runner 10 (DR10)is built around the basic Dragon Runnerdesign and is intended for military and firstresponder duties. At just 15 inches (38 cm)long, 13.5 inches (34 cm) wide and 5.8inches (15 cm) tall, and weighing justunder 10 pounds (4.5 kg), the DR10 issmall and light enough to be carried in astandard-issue pack and be thrown intobuildings and hostile environments forreconnaissance and surveillance missions.

With the ability to carry payloads of upto five pounds (2.3 kg), the DR10 is com-patible with DR20 payloads and can be fit-ted with a variety of sensors, radios,cameras and a robotic arm. Its day andnight sensors allow it serve as a team’s for-ward eyes and ears, while also deliveringremote sensors, setting counter-IEDcharges, gathering intelligence and con-

ducting surveillance. It is controlled by awearable controller at distances of up to2,130 feet (650 m) and can be fitted withtracks or wheels dependent on the terrainto be covered.

When thrown, the DR10 has the abil-ity to automatically flip video images,antennae and controls upon landing andit will travel at speeds of four mph (6.4kmph) on slopes of up to 45 degree. Itsstandard battery will provide up to twohours of power, which can be supple-mented by an external battery pack toprovide over six hours of operation and aquick in-service recharge capability.

Mission Scenariosl Checkpoint security l Under-vehicle inspection l Reconnaissance inside buildings,

sewers, drainpipes, caves, courtyardsl Perimeter security using onboard

motion and sound detectors l Inspecting interiors of buses, trains or

planes l Hostage barricade reconnaissance and

negotiating l Route clearance of IEDs l Explosive ordnance disposal

T E C K N O W

PHOTO

GRAPH

S: Qinetiq

The Dragon Runner 10 has the ability to automatically flip video images, antennae and controls upon landing

Micro Unmanned Ground Vehicle

SP’s LAND FORCES 4/201118

www.spslandforces.net

INTERVIEW>>

SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): What is Configura-tion-3? What does it include?Sanjay Kapoor (Kapoor): Basic Patriot Bat-talion Unit configuration consists of a multi-function radar, engagement control station,launchers (PAC-2 and PAC-3), an electricalpower plant, Patriot missiles consist of a bat-tery maintenance centre, an antenna mastgroup, small repair parts and large repairparts trailers, communication relay groups,and an information coordination centre.

Configuration-3 is enhancements to theselected hardware and software in the Config-uration-2 Patriot system. Examples includebut are not limited to improvements insearch/detection/track capability, improveddiscrimination of TBMs, increased battlespacecoverage, improved communications betweenbattalions, enhanced lethality, remote launchand communication, launch point determi-nation, joint TMD interoperability, enhancedlauncher electronics and PAC-3 missile.

SP’s: Patriot modular is under constructionand thus can it be upgraded to counter futureair threat?Kapoor: Patriot system is considered verymodular and is being constantly upgraded toimprove its purpose and capability. SinceDesert Storm, Patriot system has undergonemultiple cycles of planned improvements toinclude QRP configuration, PAC-3 Configura-tion 1, PAC-3 Configuration 2 and PAC-3Configuration 3. The US Army and interna-tional Patriot partners continue to identifynew requirements for the system to be addedas planned product improvement increments.

SP’s: Does Patriot system fit into high tomedium Air Defense of the US Army?Kapoor: Patriot is classified as a lower tierATBM weapon system capable of engagingthe complete air defence threat set, includingair-breathing targets (high performance air-craft and unmanned aerial vehicles), shortand medium range tactical ballistic missilesand cruise missiles. Patriot is currently theonly fielded weapon system that satisfiesmedium- to long-range requirements for theUS Army.

SP’s: What about its role as an anti-ballisticmissile system? Kapoor: Patriot provides a robust capabilityagainst short- and medium-range tacticalballistic missiles.

SP’s: Which version of the Patriot missile sys-tem can perform the above roles?Kapoor: Patriot employs a family of intercep-tors to permit TBM engagements with themost effective interceptor. The combinationof GEM-T and PAC-3 missiles is needed todefeat various threats at various ranges.

SP’s: Can Patriot engage UAVs?Kapoor: yes. Patriot has been tested andproven to be very effective against the UAVthreats.

SP’s: Can you give some details of the config-uration of the Patriot system including itsmobility, control elements and radars?Kapoor: Patriot is considered a highly mobileair defence system. Its capability was suc-cessfully demonstrated during both Opera-tions Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. Itcontinues to support various air and missiledefence missions around the globe.

Patriot battalion has various distributed

control elements to coordinate the air defencemission. Information Coordination Central(ICC) correlates tracks, resolves conflicts, pro-tects friendly A/C, assesses threats, assessesengagement priorities, and coordinates fireunit engagements. Higher echelon interfaceswith other services provide early warning

data, disseminate defence readiness condi-tions, evaluate air defence warning andweapons control status and protect friendlyA/C. At the fire unit level, search, detect, iden-tify, engage and destroy functions are carriedout in the engagement control station.

The radar antenna is an electronically

steered array. Patriot radar is made up ofmain array, auxiliary arrays, IFF antenna andtrack-via-missile array. The main array hasthe capability of search and track, missiletrack and command uplink capability. PatriotMulti-function Phased Array also includesauxiliary arrays for the side lobe cancellation,the IFF antenna to perform target identifica-tion functions and the track-via-missile arrayto assist in terminal guidance.

SP’s: Indian Army needs both Quick ReactionSAM (QRSAM) and Medium-Range SAM(MRSAM). Does Raytheon have plans to offertheir systems to the Indian Army?Kapoor: Raytheon, as an OEM, has indeedresponded to both Air Force MRSAM andArmy QRSAM and SRSAM RFIs with Patriotand HAWK XXI system solutions.

SP’s: Is it possible for the Patriot system tocombine the role of QRSAM and MRSAM as itwill reduce the cost? Kapoor: Patriot is a battle-proven systemdeployed globally for various air and missiledefence missions. As stated earlier, it hasbeen combat proven in support of both areaand manoeuvre air defence missions. Specific weapon system solutions should be based on India’s requirements and mission needs.

Patriot’s Versatile CapabilitiesRaytheon recently bagged a $1.7 billion contract to upgrade Patriot for Saudi Arabia. Sanjay Kapoor, Vice President, Integrated Air & Missile Defense, Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems, gives details of Patriot to Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand of SP’s Land Forces.

PHOTOGRAPH: Raytheon

PHOTO

GRAPH

: US Arm

y

Patriot is a battle-proven systemdeployed globally for various airand missile defence missions

CHINA DEMANDS US TO HALT SPY PLANES FLIGHTSChina has demanded that the US halt all itssurveillance flights near the Chinese coast ina move to maintain good relationshipsbetween the two countries. The call followsafter two Chinese fighter jets intercepted anUS U-2 spy plane over the Taiwan Strait. ThePentagon, however, has rejected the warn-ing and said that the US would continue tofly operations in international airspace. Mil-itary ties between the two countries con-tinue to be strained, having grown followingthe US arms sales to Taiwan.

TEXTRON TO SUPPLY ADDITIONALASVS TO US ARMY

Textron Marine and Land Systems has beenawarded a contract to supply the US Armywith 65 additional M1117 armoured secu-rity vehicles (ASVs).The $49.6 millionaward is a contract option exercised by theUS Army Contracting Command under a

previous contract. The ASV is a 4x4 wheeledarmoured vehicle that provides protectionagainst small arms fire, artillery projectilefragments, improvised explosive devices(IEDs) and land mines. The vehicles performa variety of missions including scout, recon-naissance, command and control and main-tenance as well as field artillery combatobservation and lasing teams (COLT) withthe M1200 Armoured Knight configura-tion. Vehicles will be manufactured at thecompany’s facilities in New Orleans, US. Thecompany has produced 3,161 ASVs till date.

BOEING AWARDED US ARMY APACHEMODIFICATION CONTRACT

Boeing has been awarded a $189.2 millionfirm-fixed-price contract by the US ArmyContracting Command to provide 16 AH-64D Apache aircraft and related support. TheAH-64 Apache Longbow is a twin-engine,four-blade attack helicopter equipped with atail wheel-type landing gear arrangementand a tandem cockpit to accommodate a crew of two. The helicopter features open sys-tems architecture and 26 advanced technol-ogy improvements, including level fourunmanned aerial vehicle control forincreased situational awareness.

TURKEY TO EXPORT ARMOURED VEHI-CLES TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTANTurkey-based BMC is to export its Kirpimine-resistant ambush-protected armouredvehicle to Iraq and Afghanistan. The com-bat-proven Kirpi, in use with the Turkisharmed forces, is a 4x4 wheel configuredvehicle that provides protection against bal-listic threats. The vehicle is equipped with a350 PS engine, a central tyre inflation sys-tem, an automatic fire suppression systemand a run-flat system. BMC executive NadiPosto?lu said that the company was alsoworking on different versions of the vehiclewith special focus on a smaller, multipurposeplatform onto which different weapons sys-tems could be integrated.

US ARMY AND LOCKHEED LAUNCH HALE-D

The US Army and Lockheed Martin havelaunched the first high-altitude long-endurance-demonstrator (HALE-D) in Akron,Ohio, US. The aircraft could not reach its tar-get altitude of 60,000 ft due to a technicalproblem and the flight was terminated at analtitude of approximately 32,000 ft. TheHALE-D team demonstrated a number of keytechnologies critical to the development ofunmanned airships. The HALE-D is anunmanned solar-powered lighter-than-air

vehicle designed to demonstrate advancednew technologies and capabilities to protectthe US soldiers through improved communi-cations in remote areas. The airship will actas a stationery long-term overhead platformfor a telecommunications relay system thatwill expand the range and reliability of battle-field communications. Lockheed will conducta full evaluation once the airship is recovered.

NEW RADAR TO DETECT SUICIDEBOMBERSScience, Engineering and Technology Corpo-ration (SET) has developed a new radar sys-tem for the US Army to help reduce the threatof suicide bombers. The counter bomber fea-tures three radar detectors and uses an algo-rithm to detect possible bomb materialsunderneath clothing, at a distance of up to100 yard. The radar automatically detectsand tracks the threat and alerts soldiers bywirelessly transmitting pictures or live videoof the threat through a hand-held device,such as a smart phone.

INDIA TO AWARD FICV CONTRACT The Indian Defence Ministry will soon awarda $10 billion contract for the supply of futur-istic infantry combat vehicles (FICVs) for theIndian Army. Tata Motors, Mahindra &Mahindra (M&M), Ashok Leyland (ALL),Larsen & Toubro (L&T) and Bharat Forge havealready submitted their bids for the contract.The Ministry will shortlist two vendors andfinalise the winning firms by the end of thismonth. The order to build 70 per cent of thevehicle will be awarded only to Indian firms,with options for technology tie-ups with for-eign companies. The FICV is expected to behalf-tracked and half-wheeled designed tomove infantrymen to the battlefield to followup after tanks and capture combat areas. TheIndian Army requires 2,610 FICVs as theexisting Sarath BMP-II combat vehicles willbe phased out from 2017.

INDIAN ARMY TO ORDER ADDITIONALARJUN MBTSThe Indian Army is set to place orders foradditional Arjun main battle tanks (MBTs)MkII version, P. Sivakumar, Director, CombatVehicles Research and Development Estab-lishment, has said. “We are definitely expect-ing more orders, at least a minimum of 248tanks of the MkII version. The Ordnance Fac-tory Board has been instructed by the Min-istry of Defence to initiate action for theprocurement of the MkII version,” he added.The MkII version is currently undergoing crit-ical summer trials, while winter trials areexpected to take place later in the year. Thetank will undergo testing for a further 40technological improvements, including a newtransmission control system and new fueltanks. The order could be placed in late-2011and production is expected to be performed atthe Heavy Vehicles Factory in Chennai, India.

INDIAN ARMY TO FLIGHT-TEST AGNIMISSILESThe Indian Army will conduct flight tests ofAgni I and Agni II in the next 45 days fromthe launching complex IV of the integratedtest range (ITR) on Wheeler’s Island, off theDhamra coast, Orissa, India. The 700 kmrange Agni I missile is planned to be tested inthe third week of September, while the 2,000km range Agni II will be tested in the lastweek of August. The tests have been aimed todetermine the performance and effectivenessof the weapons in real time conditions and toallow military personnel to explore the capa-bilities of the weapon. The Strategic ForcesCommand (SFC) will launch the missiles withlogistic support from the Defence ResearchDevelopment Organisation (DRDO).

SP’s LAND FORCES4/2011 19

News in Brief Publisher and Editor-in-ChiefJayant Baranwal

Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

Assistant Group EditorR. Chandrakanth

Senior Technical Group EditorLt General (Retd) Naresh Chand

Contributing EditorAir Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia

Sr. Copy Editor & CorrespondentSucheta Das Mohapatra

ContributorsIndia

General (Retd) V.P. Malik, Lt General (Retd)Vijay Oberoi, Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra,

Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar, Air Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patney, Major General(Retd) Ashok Mehta, Major General (Retd)G.K. Nischol, Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra,

Rohit Sharma

Chairman & Managing DirectorJayant Baranwal

Administration & CoordinationBharti Sharma, Survi Massey

Senior Art DirectorAnoop Kamath

DesignVimlesh Kumar Yadav, Sonu Singh Bisht

Sales & MarketingDirector Sales & Marketing: Neetu Dhulia

Head Vertical Sales: Rajeev Chugh

SP’s WebsiteSr. Web Developer: Shailendra P. AshishWeb Developer: Ugrashen Vishwakarma

Published bimonthly by Jayant Baranwal onbehalf of SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd. Allrights reserved. No part of this publicationmay be reproduced, stored in a retrieval

system, or transmitted in any form or by anymeans, photocopying, recording, electronic,

or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers.

Printed in India by Kala Jyothi Process Pvt Ltd© SP Guide Publications, 2011

Annual SubscriptionInland: `600 • Overseas: US$180

Email: subscribe@spguidepublications.com

Letters to Editoreditor@spslandforces.net

For Advertising Details, Contact:guidepub@vsnl.com

neetu@spguidepublications.com rajeev.chugh@spguidepublications.com

SP GUIDE PUBLICATIONS PVT LTDCorporate Office

A 133 Arjun Nagar, Opp Defence Colony, New Delhi 110 003, India

Tel: +91(11) 24644693, 24644763,24620130

Fax: +91 (11) 24647093

Regd OfficeFax: +91 (11) 23622942

Email: guidepub@vsnl.com

Representative OfficesBENGALURU, INDIA

Air Marshal (Retd) B.K. Pandey534, Jal Vayu Vihar, Kammanhalli Main Rd,

Bangalore 560043, India.Tel: +91 (80) 23682534

MOSCOW, RUSSIALAGUK Co., Ltd, Yuri LaskinKrasnokholmskaya, Nab.,

11/15, app. 132, Moscow 115172, Russia.Tel: +7 (495) 911 2762, Fax: +7 (495) 912 1260

www.spguidepublications.comwww.spslandforces.net

RNI Number: DELENG/2008/25818

6-7 SeptemberFuture Artillery AsiaSwissôtel Merchant Court Hotel, Singaporewww.futureartilleryasia.com/Event.aspx?id=494266

13-16 SeptemberDSEi - Defence and Security Equipment InternationalExCeL, London, UKwww.dsei.co.uk

26-28 SeptemberJoint Simulation and TrainingAmerica Square Conference Centre,London, UKwww.jointsimulationandtraining.com

26-29 SeptemberCyber Warfare EuropeBerlin Marriott Hotel, Berlin, Germanywww.cyberwarfare-europe.com

27-29 SeptemberMilitary AirliftThe Royal Garden Hotel, London, UKwww.milairlift.com

26-28 SeptemberInfantry Weapons 2011Copthorne Tara Hotel London Kensing-ton, London, UKwww.infantryweaponsconf.com

4-5 OctoberSoldier Modernisation IndiaThe Oberoi, New Delhi, Indiawww.soldiermodindia.com

19-21 October Armoured Vehicles AsiaSwissôtel Merchant Court, Singaporewww.ArmouredVehiclesAsia.com

26-28 October Military Radar 2011Sheraton Park Lane, Piccadilly, London,UKwww.militaryradarconf.com

>> SHOW CALENDAR

DRS Technologies, which has a long heritage of providing solutions to military

forces worldwide, has developed C4ISR and RSTA tools for gathering,

integrating and delivering real-time battle�eld data. Which means leaders

in the �eld can make highly informed decisions and keep war�ghters safe.

Enhanced Situational Awareness: That’s Go To.

DRS.com/GoTo

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. NOW FOR EVEN MORE SITUATIONS.