an investigation into the issues impacting the media freedom in post-taliban afghanistan. bita...

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Issues of Media Freedom in Post-Taliban Afghanistan

Media Freedom in Afghanistan

An Investigation into the Issues of

Media Freedom in Post-Taliban Afghanistan

نا رد ن زا ر داز ت

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree: Master of Media and Communications (Journalism)

BITA RIAZATI

Bachelor of Multimedia (Media Studies)

Faculty of Life and Social Sciences

Swinburne University of Technology

July 2009




Declaration

I certify that, except where due acknowledgement has been made, the work is that of

the author alone; the work has not been submitted previously, in whole or in part, to

qualify for any other academic award; the content of the thesis is the result of work

which has been carried out since the official commencement date of the approved

research program; any editorial work, paid or unpaid, carried out by a third party is

acknowledged; and, ethics procedures and guidelines have been followed.

…………………..……………

Bita Riazati

Friday 10th

August, 2009




Contents

DEFINING THE MEDIA'S ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN

Thesis Introduction ......................................................................................... 7 Introduction: Defining Media Freedom ......................................................... 19 Defining Communitarian Philosophy and its Relevance ................................ 20 Defining Public Journalism in Afghanistan ................................................... 26 DEFINING THE ROLE OF “HARMFUL REMNANTS” IN THE MEDIA'S

“ENABLING ENVIRONMENT”

Introduction: Defining the Media's “Enabling Environment” ......................... 31 Defining “Harmful Remnants” ...................................................................... 33 The Role of Harmful Remnants in The Media's Environment ........................ 34 THE IMPACT OF HARMFUL REMNANTS BY POLITICISING THE

MEDIA'S ENVIRONMENT

Introduction: Ethnicity as a Political Instrument ............................................ 42 Defining Politicisation of Ethnicity ............................................................... 44 Defining Politicisation of Religion ................................................................ 50

STRATEGIES OF RESPONSE BY JOURNALISTS IN AFGHANISTAN

Introduction: Media Interviews ..................................................................... 58 Interview Categories ..................................................................................... 59 (1) Traditional Restrictions ........................................................................... 59 (2) Law Enforcement .................................................................................... 65 (3) Professional Experience ........................................................................... 69 (4) Responsible Journalism ........................................................................... 73 Thesis Conclusion ......................................................................................... 77 Bibliography ................................................................................................. 79




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Acknowledgements

Thanks to all the individuals who shared their valuable wisdom and contacts for

assisting my research which helped me gain better insight into the media freedom

issues of Afghanistan.

Thanks to the journalists and media professionals, Faheem Dashty (Chief Editor and

Political Analyst of Kabul Weekly), Mobina Khairandish (Producer of Radio Rabia

Balkhi), Najia Haneefi (women's rights activist and the owner of Radio Rabia Balkhi),

Sanjar Soheil (Chief Editor and Political Analyst of Hasht-e Sobh), Shirazuddin

Siddiqi (Director of BBC World Service Trust Afghanistan and Afghan Education

Projects) and Associate Professor Martin Hadlow (former Director of UNESCO

office in Kabul) for accepting to be interviewed at short notice and voluntarily

providing valuable insight into the issues of Afghan media.

Thanks to Aziz Hakimi and Shirazuddin Siddiqi for answering my questions through

extended email correspondence and providing documents that otherwise I would not

have been able to find.

Thanks to my supervisor Dr Diana Bossio for her patience in providing feedback

throughout the writing process of this thesis.

Thanks to my friend Vasiliky Kasidis for her efforts in reviewing my chapters and

Torben Daeneke for his assistance during the research process.




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Abstract

This thesis utilises interviews with Afghan journalists and media professionals to

develop a context for discussion of media issues in Afghanistan. I have argued the

existence of particular individuals from former regimes in post-Taliban structures

who are hindering media’s ability to critically discuss particular public interest issues.

I have applied Price et al’s (2002) theory of media reform to identify this group as

‘harmful remnants’ in new political structures who see media’s position as the fourth

estate a threat to their power renewal in Afghanistan. I have termed their negative

influence over media freedom, as the ‘indirect politicisation’ of media. This indirect

politicisation focuses on sensitive aspects of Afghan culture, such as ethnicity,

language and religion to politicise the media’s ability to report and consequently

hinders social change. While there are restrictions, through the interviews, the thesis

has demonstrated that many brave and courageous journalists are in fact putting their

lives at risk by strategically tackling critical social change issues.




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I have been silent too long,

But I never forget the melody,

Since every moment I whisper

The songs from my heart,

Reminding myself of

The day I will break this cage

Fly from this solitude

And sing like a melancholic.

I am not a weak poplar tree

To be shaken by any wind

I am an Afghan woman...

Afghan journalist and poetess, Nadia Anjuman (2005)

Their lives were not lost in vain




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Thesis Introduction

Brief reflection on journalism in Afghanistan

Afghan journalism has suffered under successive authoritarian regimes in the last

century. Afghan writers have been provided with little opportunity to practice and

develop a 'homegrown' understanding of free media. This oppressive period started

after the 1979 Soviet invasion, which was followed by a civil conflict between

Mujahedin groups and culminated with the rise of the Taliban (see Misdaq, 2006).

Prior to this period, Afghanistan had some exposure to relatively free media, for

example between 1911 to 1918 during Habibullah's reign, and in the 60s, King Zahir

allowed newspapers to publish views different to that of the regime for the first time

(Yarshater, 2008; see Nazemi, 2003). Journalism in Afghanistan became popularised

at the beginning of the 20th century when an Afghan intellectual, Mahmud Tarzi

started the first newspaper in Afghanistan:1Serajul Akhbar Afghanieh (Sims-Williams,

1980: 118-122). His vision was to gradually modernise Afghan thought by exposing

Afghans to various texts and voices (see Nazemi, 2003). He wanted to demonstrate

that modernism “would not mean the end of Muslim morality” (Omrani, 2007: 155).

The newspaper was closed in 1918 after it was critical of the government for its

neutrality during the First World War (Yarshater, 2008).

What is particularly significant about Afghan writing is that despite being affected by

various political upheavals throughout its history, Afghan writers and journalists have

continued their work using strategy and disguise (Lamb, 2001). For example the

Herat and Kabul 'literary circles' operated as 'sewing classes' during the Taliban reign

1 Torch of the News of Afghanistan




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(Lamb, 2001). The students were taught literary criticism, aesthetics and poetry, even

under the threat of Taliban's prosecution (Lamb, 2001). These circles were

responsible for circulating news and for educating thousands of women during

oppressive periods (Lamb, 2001). One of the women that came out of these circles,

Nadia Anjuman, became a journalist and published her first book of poetry in 2005.

She was found beaten to death at her home later that year (Lamb, 2005). Clearly,

journalists and writers in Afghanistan continue their work under the constant threat of

persecution and even death.

Since 2005, physical security and media freedom has significantly deteriorated in

Afghanistan (see Hakimi and Aziz, 2009; Mojumdar, 2005). The Reporters Without

Borders world press ranking for Afghanistan dropped from 125 in 2005 ("World Press

Freedom Index", 2005), to 156 in 2008 ("World Press Freedom Index", 2008). This

thesis aims to discuss how the contemporary Afghan media’s freedom has been

affected by political, social and cultural issues.

The primary argument of this thesis is that traditional aspects of the Afghan political

system are potentially restricting the media's ability to contribute to social change in a

transitional democracy. The existence of individuals from past regimes, defined as

'harmful remnants' (see Price, Rozumilowicz, and Verhulst, 2002) utilise traditional

cultural and religious frameworks to politicise Afghanistan's media environment. This

thesis will utilise evidence from interviews with Afghan journalists and experts to

illustrate how these threats have affected the news media's role in Afghanistan's

transitional democracy, and how journalists use particular strategies to circumvent

these restrictions.




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Theoretical framework of the thesis

Although academic research is limited in the Afghan media studies area, there were a

number of theorists who were influential in proving this argument. Mohammad

Rawan (2002) has also argued the role of particular individuals in 'traditional'

structures who have represented public opinion throughout Afghan history. I have

argued that this group are in fact renewing their influence in post-Taliban structures

with new roles and new political agendas (see Tarzi and Crews, 2008).

I have not forwarded a formal literature review for this thesis, as I have critically

analysed particular arguments and theories throughout the thesis. Nonetheless it is

worthwhile to look at the major theories that have contributed to formulating my

thesis argument. There are limited books on the modern history of Afghanistan that

thoroughly present each political period of the last century, but I found Nabi Misdaq's

(2006) book, Afghanistan: political frailty and foreign interference particularly useful

for this purpose. Bernt Glatzer (2002), Conrad Schetter (2007) and José Oberson's

(2002) arguments showed that ethnicity has significance in discussing the issue of

media freedom in modern Afghanistan. However it was a United Nations Assistant

Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) report (2009) that included the opinions of Afghan

journalists dissatisfied with the increase in media freedom restrictions, that prompted

my research path (Hakimi and Aziz, 2009). In email correspondence, a UNAMA

media project staff member even referred to the media freedom situation as a “losing

battle” (A Hakimi 2009, email, 02 Mar).

Before I could examine Afghanistan's media freedom issues, the research had to




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establish a media theory appropriate for Afghanistan's early transitional phase of

democracy. My theoretical assumption is the media, like any other institution in

Afghanistan, has a role in the reconstruction of political and social life in post-

Taliban transition. The media's particular role would be to use its position in the

fourth estate to become a source of social change and to encourage information

proliferation (see "Afghan Media Reconstruction in Focus: An activity report", 2002).

With the consideration of the specific Afghan context, I have adopted Etzioni's (1998)

communitarian philosophy for discussing media's role in Afghanistan. This theory

rejects a purely objective approach to journalism and it places civic education and

public interest issues as its focus for social change. The theory suggests that

journalists have a 'public' role where they identify issues of public interest by

reflecting on the 'needs' of the community.

Other theorists that were significant in supporting the communitarian approach were

Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich (2008) and his definition of 'freedom of expression';

Raphael Cohen-Almagor (2008) and his discussion of objectivity in ethical reporting

and Jay Rosen's (1999) text What are Journalists For . The discussion of media's role

in Afghanistan was also inspired by Martin Bell's peace journalism theory (see

Thomas Hanitzsch, 2004). While this theory focuses particularly on foreign

correspondence, I found a similarity in principles with one related to the role of a

'public journalist' (see Charity, 1995). I have adopted some of the approaches

introduced for peace journalism, such as the consideration of cultural sensitivities, to

define the responsibilities of a public journalist in chapter one.

Roshan Noorzai's (2006) thesis on Communication and Developments in Afghanistan,




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A History of Reforms and Resistance has suggested a 'participatory' approach for the

media in Afghanistan (2006: 26). He has identified "empowerment" (2006: 26) of the

masses as the theory's focus. He suggests that this allows all community's

“stakeholders” (2006: 26) to participate “in the process so communities may

determine their own future” (2006: 26). While Noorzai's (2006) argument is

concerned with the issues of the disenfranchised which are crucial to Afghan society,

his theory assumes a passive role for journalists. This contrasts with my argument

which assumes an active role for journalists in Afghan society. My thesis will suggest

that it is a journalistic responsibility to represent the issues of the disenfranchised

rather than simply allowing the disenfranchised to represent themselves. This is

particularly important because the majority of rural Afghans do not have the tools and

the knowledge to express their issues and the media needs to act according to this

need. For example women who do not have the confidence nor an understanding of

their rights can speak to female journalists who give voice to their problems in the

Afghan society (N Khairandish, Interviewed, 9 Mar). Furthermore through interview

examples in chapter four I have recommended the practice of 'responsible' journalism,

this means that Afghan journalists need to actively think about the 'outcomes' of their

coverage and its interpretation by the public.

While journalists play a key role in social change, they need an environment that is

conducive to social change. The book Media Reform: Democratising the Media,

Democratising the State (2002) suggests that media requires particular factors in its

environment to enable change. One of these factors is identified as 'sufficient political

willingness' from the government where social change issues can be addressed (see

Price, Rozumilowicz and Verhulst, 2002). Price et al (2002) have laid out various




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stages for a country's democratic transition and each stage provides specific criteria

for media's environment. Using the text's (2002) model of analysis I have discussed

the political discourse between the Afghan media and its social and political

environment in chapters two and three.

Method of interview analysis

Scholarly research in Afghan media studies is very limited, thus my primary research

method has been the utilisation of qualitative interviews. The aim of the interviews

was to highlight issues raised by experienced Afghan journalists who have worked

from 2001 in media related projects or journalism in Afghanistan. Although the

research was looking for expert opinion, at the same time, the research goal was to

speak to media professionals who have encountered problems that are common for all

Afghan journalists, such as the issue of physical threats. The following is a list of

interviewees used for this research.

Faheem Dashty

Dashty is the political analyst and chief editor of Kabul Weekly and has experienced a

turbulent journalism career. Just days before the September 11 attacks, Dashty who

was involved in producing a documentary and in the process of writing Ahmad Shah

Massoud's biography, was injured in a blast by two terrorists who had posed as

journalists. Massoud was killed but Dashty survived, sustaining horrible injuries

(Dashty, 2004). In 1994 the newspaper's offices were closed for publishing a critical

article about the government but with the assistance of international funds, Kabul

Weekly was able to start publishing in 2002 (Dashty, 2008). During the interview,

Dashty has represented the characteristics of a fearless journalist who believes




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political issues should be scrutinised to bring government accountability (F Dashty,

Interviewed, 2 Mar).

Associate Professor Martin Hadlow

Hadlow was the director of Afghanistan's UNESCO office in Kabul between 2001-

2004 and he managed various funding and humanitarian projects during this period in

Afghanistan. For example he worked with local academics to re-establish Kabul

University and its Library that was destroyed during the war. He currently holds an

academic position as the director of Centre for Communication and Social Change at

The University of Queensland. He is also a member of the Afghan Ad Hoc

Communication and Information Commission.

Mobina Khairandish

Kheirandish is the producer of Radio Rabia Balkhi, one of the first women radio

stations established for addressing women's social issues in post-Taliban Afghanistan.

During the interviews she represented a strong persistent journalist who has no doubt

in the abilities of the women of her community.

Najia Haneefi

Haneefi is the founder of one of the first women radio stations in Afghanistan. She

has worked as a print and broadcast journalist during the communist and Mujahedin

regimes. Since 2001 she has represented Afghan women at various international

conferences, such as the 2002 and 2004 Berlin conferences on peace and

reconstruction of Afghanistan. Today she is primarily involved in women's rights

campaigns and at present she is working as a community worker for the




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disadvantaged groups in Canada.

Sanjar Soheil

Soheil is the political analyst and chief editor of Hasht-e Sobh and he suggests that

the focus of the newspaper is human rights issues (S Soheil 2009, Interviewed, 13

Mar). The newspaper has a regularly updated Website (www.8am.af) and appears to

attract international readers as well.

Shirazuddin Siddiqi

Siddiqi is the director of the Afghan branch of the BBC World Service Trust. He is

responsible for all the Trust’s initiatives in Afghanistan, including the Afghan

Education Projects (AEP) which is responsible for the bilingual radio program New

Home, New Life. Sidiqqi played a key role in mobilising MPs, Afghan journalists and

civil society organisations to take part in the debate on the Media Law and the new

concepts related to independent, free and pluralistic media (S Siddiqi 2009, email, 21

Jul).

The interview findings were discussed using theoretical evidence in chapter two and

three. The aim was to use the theorisations to provide the framework for the

interviews to discuss media freedom and restriction in chapter four. The interview

evidence in chapter four are analysed using four categories of: (1) Traditional

Restrictions, (2) Law Enforcement, (3) Professional Experience and (4) Responsible

Journalism in Afghanistan.

1. Traditional Restrictions




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The interviewees were asked about the conditions of media freedom in rural areas.

They were asked about people's perception towards the media and how media tackles

social change.

2. Law Enforcement

The interviewees were primarily asked about their perception of the Media Law, in

this regard they raised concern over the issues of ethnic and religious interference in

the legal framework.

3. Professional Experience

The interviewees were asked how they ensure accuracy in their coverage and what

their perceptions are about the journalistic work of other Afghan media.

4. Responsible Journalism

The interviewees were asked how they measure the success of their work and what

are their plans for addressing social change issues in their communities.

All four categories have contributed to the thesis discussions, however category one

and two were most influential. Using the data, I was able to identify a link between

the traditional understandings of 'freedom' and its application in the legal and political

environments. On the other hand, category three and four complement and contradict

each other. While 'responsible journalism' correlates with my argument for a

communitarian approach, the category 'professional experience' has highlighted

insufficient 'professionalism' from Afghan media, as an area of potential study for

future research in Afghanistan.




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Chapter overview

This thesis is presented in four chapters of (1) Defining Media's Role in Afghanistan,

(2) Defining the Role of Harmful Remnants in Media's Enabling Environment , (3) The

Impact of Harmful Remnants by Politicising the Media's Environment and (4)

Strategies of Response by Journalists in Afghanistan.

Chapter One: Defining Media's Role in Afghanistan

This chapter defines media freedom and the relevance of communitarian philosophy

in a transitional democracy. It discusses the theory and its application in

understanding the role of public journalism in Afghanistan.

Chapter Two: Defining the Role of Harmful Remnants in Media's Enabling

Environment

This chapter suggests the need for an 'enabling' environment for media in Afghanistan

and discusses its issues by reflecting on the discourse between the harmful remnants

and the Afghan media.

Chapter Three: The Impact of Harmful Remnants by Politicising the Media's

Environment

This chapter utilises the discussions of chapter two to define the second component of

the thesis argument which is the discussion of indirect politicisation through

instrumentalisation of religion and ethnicity in Afghanistan.

Chapter Four: Strategies of Response by Journalists in Afghanistan




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This chapter presents the interviews with Afghan journalists and media professionals

as an analytical discussion. It concludes by reflecting on how Afghan journalists have

challenged media freedom restriction through responsible journalism in Afghanistan.



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( CHAPTER ONE )

DEFINING THE MEDIA'S ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN




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Introduction: Defining Media Freedom

The purpose of this chapter is to define media freedom and socially responsible

journalism in the context of mobilising social change within Afghanistan's

transitional democracy. This chapter does not discuss the issues that impact or restrict

the media's ability. Instead, this chapter focuses on establishing a framework,

utilising relevant media theory so that media issues affecting Afghan journalists can

be discussed in the next chapters. This framework utilises communitarian philosophy

to argue that Afghan media play an important role in defining and maintaining

democratic political and social life in Afghanistan.

In a transitional democracy the media's responsibilities count towards the

development and maintenance of democracy (Gunther and Mughan, 2000: 4-5). I am

defining this by following a communitarian philosophy which places 'public interest

issues' and 'civic education' as its primary focus (see Etzioni, 1998). This chapter

highlights that a traditionally 'Western' approach to objective journalism is not an

appropriate framework for Afghanistan's media because the change in the country's

governance did not occur as a result of gradual social change. In Afghanistan the

media has the greater responsibility of assisting democracy by utilising information

about governance to prevent a prevent a backslide into its former authoritarian state

(Price, Rozumilowicz and Verhulst, 2002: 13-19). The media undertakes this role by

becoming an 'active participator' within society (Cohen-Almagor, 2005: 80) through

information about democratic values relevant to an Afghan context.

The media's role is also defined in this context as a public servant to society. The

Afghan media act with authority as the fourth estate, to protect society's democratic




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liberties. The media shows its allegiance to democracy by contributing to social

debates that raise public awareness (see Ruigrok et al, 2006). This keeps the

government accountable and allows the public to become “responsive and

responsible” (Delli Carpini and Keeter, cited in Gunther and Mughan, 2000: 4)

towards maintaining social change (Gunther and Mughan, 2000: 4-5). A media

system that operates with limited restrictions can mobilise social change by

perceiving freedom of expression as the public's right to know information (see Zeno-

Zencovich, 2008). In the Afghan context, mobilising free media, means freedom of

expression without traditional authoritarian barriers to public opinion.

Defining Communitarian Philosophy and its Relevance

Freedom of expression is defined as a basic human right in the Universal Declaration

of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations in 1948, article 19 states that:

“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right

includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive

and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of

frontiers.”

Whilst this is a basic human right, journalists also need to view freedom of expression

as the 'right of the audience' (Alexander, 2005: 8). This suggests that journalists who

undertake responsible reporting acknowledge that their reportage has the 'potential to

affect other people's lives' (Cohen-Almagor, 2005:1). On one hand the right to

express opinions is an individual right, one that might be motivated by personal

'financial gain, ambition and self exhibition' (Zeno-Zencovich, 2008: 12); and

personal expression is an “aspect of humanness which requires actualisation” (Price,

Rozumilowicz and Verhulst, 2002: 13). On the other hand the media is an institution

which helps in protecting this basic human right (see Zeno-Zencovich, 2008; see




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Macharia, 2008) through responsible reportage.

The press emerged in 19th century Britain, Australia and the US as a central

communication institution that aimed to speak with authority on behalf of an

otherwise disenfranchised public (Schultz, 1998 : 47). The media in this model is

understood as the 'voice of the public' with reportage constrained by what is in the

public interest (Cohen-Almagor, 2005). The role of a journalist is described by

William Stead, a 20th century British theorist, as someone who:

“speaks with an authority far 'superior' to that possessed by any other

person; for he would have been the latest to 'interrogate' the democracy”

(Stead, 1886).

In contrast Zeno-Zencovich (2008) does not believe journalists have the 'superior

authority', because they are business employees who work within a hierarchical

business structure and as such, restricted by professional responsibilities. For example

they cannot exercise the 'natural right' to freedom of 'personal' thought and expression

(Zeno-Zencovich, 2008: 11-12). In Zeno-Zencovich's (2008) view journalists are

further constrained by clear editorial obligations and their lack of freedom to decide

on the subject or the tone of voice of their report (Zeno-Zencovich, 2008: 43).

Besides the media's role as an information provider, their role as a watchdog is

particularly important in transitional democracies where the media should reflect

public concerns and keep authorities accountable for their decisions that impact

public life (Stapenhurst, 2000: 1-5). Journalists in transitional democracies also have

an added responsibility to advocate for human rights by acting as a “conduit for

information, ideas and opinions [of others] to assist in good governance of society”




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(Schultz, 1998: 52). This means that journalists should monitor government activities

to ensure human rights violations or corruption is exposed (Brunettia and Wederb,

2003: 1802-1805) while a country 'transits' from an authoritarian regime to a working

democracy.

The ideal of the fourth estate positions the media as a 'watchdog' (see Stapenhurst,

2000) because its role and function is separate to the role of the judiciary, church and

government (see Schultz, 1998:). As a result of this separation the media can open

government actions to the public's external scrutiny and critical evaluation (Norris, P.

2008). The fourth estate as an independent authoritative voice (Stead, W.T. 1886)

consequently has authority to break down power monopolisation in society (Norris,

2008: 5). As media maintains its responsibility of 'interrogating' democracy (Stead,

1886), this is one of the ways that a society can transit from an authoritarian system

to a democratic state (Price, Rozumilowicz and Verhulst, 2002: 13). However the

media's interrogation of government performance sparks public debate which can be

disruptive to the government's vision of the 'establishment and maintenance of

political order' especially envisaged more dogmatically by authoritarian governments

(Gunther and Mughan, 2000: 4).

Public opinion and democracy are linked if the media is successful in maintaining a

positive impact on the 'level of democracy' in society (see Hocking, 1947). Hocking

(1947) argues that democracy is connected to the media's influence and maintenance

of public opinion. While 'public' refers generally to a social consensus, 'public

opinion' refers more to majority agreement on certain issues (see Zeno-Zencovich,

2008). Zeno-Zencovich (2008) argues that the media's assertion to represent this




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public consensus is 'not in general backed up by any scientific or in any event

procedural assessment' (Zeno-Zencovich, V. 2008:20). In addition Alexander (2005)

suggests that regardless of claims for objective reporting and presenting the 'truth',

truths come with certain assumptions (Mumtaz, 2009); facts are 'linked to other

realities and sets of circumstances that can be highlighted differently based on source

preference and selection (Mumtaz, 2009). This argument suggests that the media's

claim of representing public opinion is superficial because, as Alexander (2005)

suggests, facts on their own are not always a true representation of what is happening

(see Harcup, 2009). Moreover, “it is unethical to assume that all audiences are

rational, and that they are able to discern between values and mischief” (Cohen-

Almagor, 2005: 80). This means that people interpret facts differently and with their

own assumptions. As a result journalists have a responsibility to consider social and

cultural values in deciding which and how events should be reported to minimise

misinterpretations, even in a case where there is evidence at hand (see Wilkins and

Christians, 2008). Their approach requires flexibility towards the country's “cultural

ingredients” (Blankson and Murphy, 2007: 3) and the “elements of its deep structure”

(Blankson and Murphy, 2007: 3), these often require innovative ways of expression to

connect journalists with the communities in which they operate (see Ruigrok et al,

2006).

Merrill (interviewed by Corrigan, 2000) and Lippmann (1998) however do not

believe that journalists have a responsibility to consider the impact of their reporting

over public life or how news and coverage may be interpreted. They argue that a

journalists' job is to “stand apart and give a picture of what is going on in society”

(Corrigan, D. 2000) by reporting objectively (Corrigan, D. 2000). This perception




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towards journalism does not entail social responsibilities because a journalist's job is

solely to impart information (Eksterowicz and Roberts, 2000: 124); and people will

interpret that information within their own pre-existing “stereotypes” (Lippman,

1998: 89). Furthermore, Lippmann (1998) believes that it cannot be expected of

“average citizens to have a reliable opinion” (Lippmann, cited in Rosen, 1999: 64)

since public opinion is “irrational” (Lippmann, cited in Rosen, 1999: 64) and citizens

are not expertly qualified to participate in debates of public interest (Lippmann, cited

in Rosen, 1999: 64). As public opinion is not qualified “insiders are the ones who

know about public issues” (Lippmann, cited in Rosen, 1999: 65). This argument for

understanding media freedom does not represent public opinion and fails to define

public 'consensus' on issues of public interest; since it views media coverage as a

mere product that is not dynamic towards community's needs and therefore can not

'protect' and work towards continuous improvement of public life (see Macharia,

2008). Moreover this perception about the role of a journalist also fails to address the

media's role in representing the disenfranchised in society and could be considered

unconstructive in transitional democracies (see Mendel, 2007).

The communitarian philosophy utilised in this thesis rejects a purely objective

approach to journalism. The theory perceives journalism as a profession that

addresses community issues and is concerned with social change (see Craig, 1996)

rather than '2detached' objective reporting (see Ruigrok et al, 2006). This philosophy

puts the responsibility of social change on media institutions which suggests

journalists should be active participators of democracy rather than passive observers

2 I am making a reference to Martin Bell's 'journalism of attachment' in peace journalism,

where he believes “reporters are participants in the conflicts they report, and as a consequence take part

in the public debate about the conflict” and they need to be aware of the meanings of their reports (see

Ruigrok et al, 2006).




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who demand tolerance towards their coverage (see Coronel, 2004). The notion of

objective reporting is further rejected by the argument that journalists are subscribed

to the universal declaration of respect for humanity (Wilkins and Christians, 2008:

260) and like any world citizen they “owe democracy their allegiance” (Cohen-

Almagor, 2005: 80). This obligates journalists to take responsibility for the outcomes

of their reporting since they are contributing to debates that impact public life and

consequently they are participants of society (see Ruigrok et al, 2006). Thus they

should strive to protect the freedom provided to them by the foundation of democracy

(see Ruigrok et al, 2006). As Etzioni (1993) suggests, freedom to report is not a

freedom from responsibilities:

“It is a mistaken notion that just because we desire to be free from

governmental control, we should also be free from responsibilities to the

commons and indifferent to the community” (Etzioni, A. 1993: 247).

Following communitarian philosophy, the media in Afghanistan requires reflection on

“the needs, wants, ambitions and wisdom of” (Rosen, 1999: 19) the community to

identify issues that are in the public interest. This can gradually enable a “grassroots

reform movement” (Rosen, 1999: 1). A communitarian approach to socially

responsible journalism recognises that:

“the preservation of individual liberty depends on the active maintenance of

the institutions of civil society where citizens learn respect for others as

well as self-respect; where we acquire a lively sense of our personal and

civic responsibilities; along with an appreciation of our own rights and the

rights of others; where we develop the skills of self-government as well as

the habit of governing ourselves and learn to see others – not just self”

(Etzioni, A. 1998: xxv)

Therefore consideration of others' liberties and taking a less individualistic approach

to journalism forms the foundation of 'public journalism' which promotes the link




- 26 -

between social change and reporting. Public journalism “places citizen input at the

centre of journalistic concerns” (Eksterowicz and Roberts, 2000: 3) and promotes

personal and civic responsibilities in societies (Etzioni, 1998). This is achieved by

reflecting on issues affecting the disenfranchised. This approach is most effective in

Afghanistan where the voiceless are “marginalized because of poverty, gender, ethnic

or religious affiliation” (Coronel, 2004: 6). Afghanistan's social environment requires

coverage of issues such as women's legal rights and investigative reporting on issues

that create public debate which are fundamental to social change.

Defining Public Journalism in Afghanistan

Public journalism in Afghanistan can constitute a source of civic importance as the

nation is impacted by civil conflict, illiteracy and lack of access to diverse

information (see Blankson and Murphy, 2007). Journalists have a role in highlighting

problematic issues constructively and contributing to debates. This must be taken in

the consideration of Afghanistan's cultural 'ingredients', where cultural and religious

values are particularly sensitive. For example the Afghan BBC World Service project

has tackled taboo subjects such as unsafe sex and women's education through its

creative scripting of the program New Home, New Life for the last 15 years (S Siddiqi

2009, Interview, 17 Mar). Women's community radio such as Radio Rabia Balkhi has

delicately pursued women's issues such as forced marriages, domestic violence and

suicide by offering legal advice rather than directly criticising sharia which can

promote blasphemy charges (N Khairandish, Interviewed, 9 Mar).

This approach to journalism is effective in establishing the 'right' of expression

(Alexander, 2005: 8) for the marginalised segments of Afghan community. Skuse's




- 27 -

(2002) investigation shows that the media has challenged traditional hierarchies and

gender restrictions by allowing women to participate in social debates. This is

especially important as women, particularly in villages are perceived to have “no

business discussing radio news” (Skuse, 2002: 276) and men are “perceived as the

social arbiters of 'news talk' (Skuse, 2002: 276). Therefore women's radio exercises

freedom of expression though also practising “self-containment and self-control”

(Cohen-Almagor, 2005: 70) to protect the circumstances that allow for the

functioning of their liberties. Their goal is to mobilise social change without

'eliminating' their audiences (S Siddiqi 2009, Interview, 17 Mar) or offending

traditional structures that can become destructive to a democratic transition (see

Mendel, 2007). They ensure that their debates are not merely critical but result

oriented so that debates do not end in closure of the station (Kumar, 2006: 134).

Besides promoting civic input, the media also plays a reconciliation role in

transitional democracies where there is history of 3

civil conflict by looking at “how

journalists can be part of the solution rather than part of the problem” (Hanitzsch,

2004: 2). This means that instead of fanning the flames of ethnicity and religious

divides the media strive to promote unity, reconstruction and reconciliation within

communities (Macharia, 2008: 30-33; see Coronel, 2004). Media in sensitive

communities can promote reconciliation through careful reportage that gives voice to

many sides of an issue (Coronel, 2004: 2). This method of reporting demands more

investigative research on behalf of the journalist and requires lengthier 'conflict

3 The Rwanda massacres of 1994 indicate that objective journalism can be manipulated to

become irresponsible journalism, that impacts public opinion and consequently destroys human life

(Kürschner-Pelkmann, 2008: 1). Radio Mille Collines an independent radio, propagated news that

provoked hatred against the Tutsi ethnicity; most of the listeners of the radio were members of the

military and soldiers who went on a rampage and killed anyone who was denounced on the radio

(Kürschner-Pelkmann, 2008: 1).




- 28 -

resolution' and historical explanations rather than just focusing on the damages (see

Lynch, 2007). It resists giving unnecessary attention to violence and ethnic

background (Lynch, 2007: 7). Instead it focuses on the impacts and outcomes of the

issue from both sides of the debate and also highlights 'moral lessons' (Coronel, S.

2004: 6).

Public journalism rejects sensationalism, nationalism and production of prejudices

against certain ethnic groups or persons (Celenk, 2007: 16). This is particularly

significant in Afghanistan as Pashtun ethnic group form a majority population in

government ("Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan", 2006: 13) but

private media are primarily in the hands of non-Pashtuns. This does not necessarily

pose a problem to reportage as many community journalists have focused on

reconstruction by reflecting on the issues of the whole community. However some

government officials have demonstrated Pashtun nationalism and have targeted non-

Pashtun journalists.

Conclusion

With the careful consideration of the Afghan context, this chapter argued that

communitarian philosophy which promotes a public journalism approach, is most

effective at this stage of Afghanistan's transition. I defined this theory as 'socially

responsible' journalism which considers social change as its main focus. So although

watchdog journalism is important, the media also has a role in informing the public

about a variety of public issues, such as the their social rights in the Afghan society.

The discussion of these issues create public awareness and debate, which assist in

progressing Afghanistan's democratic transition. Since the Afghan public are




- 29 -

composed of different ethnic groups, cultures, religions and languages, they interpret

the media's messages with their particular subjectivities. Therefore the media should

also consider Afghan cultural 'ingredients' when reporting on sensitive issues. While

this chapter has defined the role of media in Afghanistan and their impact over social

change, the next chapter looks at media’s environment and what is required from its

social and political frameworks to ‘enable’ social change in Afghanistan.




- 30 -

( CHAPTER TWO )

DEFINING THE ROLE OF “HARMFUL REMNANTS”

IN MEDIA'S “ENABLING ENVIRONMENT”




- 31 -

Introduction: Defining the Media's “Enabling Environment”

This chapter defines the requirements for an environment that allows the media to

address social change issues by practicing responsible journalism. The need for this

definition was highlighted by the interview discussions conducted for this thesis,

where journalists and media professionals raised concerns over the existence of

'pressure groups' (S Siddiqi 2009, Interview, 17 Mar) within the political structures of

Afghanistan. It was noted that these constraints could potentially hinder the

implementation and structuring of particular media laws.

Taking from the interview evidence, this chapter argues that there are potentially

“harmful factors” (Price, Rozumilowicz and Verhulst, 2002: 22) stemming from

previous governmental regimes that perceive a democratic media as a threat to their

traditional interests. The research in this chapter will show that some political,

religious and ethnic leaders who have been traditionally influential in Afghan social

structures (see Rawan, 2002) have obtained positions in Parliament, Ministries,

Judiciaries and Courts (see "Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan",

2006). This chapter will provide evidence that they are structuring or implementing

legislation in ways that impede the development of media freedom in Afghanistan.

As discussed in chapter one this thesis assumes that a democratic and socially

responsible media system can be a source of social change through public and

watchdog journalism. The interviewees (2009) have highlighted that there are social

and political factors restricting the development of media freedom in Afghanistan.

This chapter defines the role of those social and political forces and the extent in




- 32 -

which they can impact the media's ability to drive social change. The combination of

social and political factors and their influence over media explain whether the media

can 'enable' social and political reforms (see Price, Rozumilowicz and Verhulst,

2002). I will use the term “enabling environment” ( Price, Rozumilowicz and

Verhulst, 2002: 17) to explain the cause and effect discourse between media and its

political environment.

In order to define the media's enabling environment in Afghanistan I have used the

“stages of transition” model introduced in Media Reform: Democratising the Media,

Democratising the State (2002), applying its criteria for social change in

Afghanistan's political environment. This model consists of four theoretical stages.

Each stage has criteria that define the enabling environment and the democratic

elements required for media to become a source of social change ( Price,

Rozumilowicz and Verhulst, 2002: 17).

I have identified Afghanistan to be in the “secondary stage” (Price, Rozumilowicz

and Verhulst, 2002: 21) of transition that is characterised by a country that is “fine-

tuning” (Price, Rozumilowicz and Verhulst, 2002: 21) its media legislative

framework. At this stage there is either “immediate consolidation” (Price,

Rozumilowicz and Verhulst, 2002: 21) which means the reforming regime accepts the

fully functional legislative framework or there is “authoritarian backlash” (Price,

Rozumilowicz and Verhulst, 2002: 21), where the reforming regime abandons the

reform process and slides back into the “primary stage” where a “ruptured transition”

(Price, Rozumilowicz and Verhulst, 2002: 19) occurs. A ruptured transition is

characterised by a government that contains individuals from the former regime who




- 33 -

are attempting to establish renewed control, and will also attempt to structure

legislative framework in a manner most advantageous to their own interests (Price,

Rozumilowicz and Verhulst, 2002: 19-23).

Although Afghanistan's political structure is showing signs of 'ruptured transition'

(Price, Rozumilowicz and Verhulst, 2002: 19) the government has not deliberately

abandoned the reform process and there are still some signs of negotiation. This is

evident for example in contradictions presented by Afghanistan's Media Law (2007).

A parliament that is “largely controlled by fundamentalist Mujahedin” ("Country of

Origin Information Report: Afghanistan", 2006: 99) and other conservatives have

passed media laws which place the government-owned broadcaster in the public

service sector (see "Mass Media Law", 2007; Najibullah, 2007; S Siddiqi 2009, email,

20 Mar). While this demonstrates political willingness for positive change (S Siddiqi

2009, Interview, 17 Mar), Afghanistan's President Hamed Karzai has refused to order

the publication of the Media Law (Wafa and Gall, 2007). Some members of

government now argue that “the government should have its own radio, television and

newspapers” (Wafa and Gall, 2007). Since legislation that has been passed must

become effective immediately, the government has acted against the Afghan

Constitution by not publishing the Media Law (S Siddiqi 2009, email, 20 Mar). This

shows that the democratic transition has not completely regressed but there are strong

authoritarian elements that can hinder the media reform process at any time.

Defining “Harmful Remnants”

The existence of pressure groups in Afghanistan's current legal and political

structures were identified as a problem to media freedom by the interviewees (2009).




- 34 -

They perceive the media's watchdog role as a threat to the renewal of their ideologies

and they have responded to the media's interruption of political order by

“demobilising” (Hackett and Carroll, 2006: 12) public opinion in a variety of ways.

This is represented especially in the number of assaults reported by a media watch

organisation called Nai (Khalwatgar, 2008). It has reported 28 cases of assault on

journalists by government officials who claim those journalists were acting against

the country's laws (Khalwatgar, 2008).

I have identified these pressure groups as the former leaders and members of militant

factions such as the former Mujahedin who have emerged as new political parties to

represent conservative interests through their direct or indirect influence in

Parliament, Ministries, Judiciary and the Supreme Court (see "Country of Origin

Information Report: Afghanistan", 2006). Amin Tarzi (2008) a prominent scholar in

Afghan studies, calls this group the “neo-Taliban” (Tarzi 2008, 314). Although this

term explains the ideological ties of this group to their former counterparts, the term

“harmful remnants” (Price, Rozumilowicz and Verhulst, 2002: 22) is more suitable in

describing these pressure groups. This is because it describes the harmful existence of

a variety of remaining elements and individuals from former regimes who are

attempting to renew control in the new political structures of Afghanistan. I will

argue this by firstly drawing on historical examples to explain the influence of these

harmful remnants and secondly I will discuss how they have posed restrictions to the

media's role as a result.

The Role of Harmful Remnants in The Media's Environment

In order to understand the role of these harmful remnants in modern political




- 35 -

structures and why they see media's role as a threat, it is important to reflect on their

historical influence and their traditional methods of control over public opinion.

These harmful remnants initially emerged from Afghan political structures during the

decade of 1964 to 1973 which is referred to by historians as the “decade of

Constitutional law” (Nazemi, 2004: 28) where political parties were organised for the

first time (Misdaq, 2006: 81). The King had not ratified the part of the Constitution

dealing with the formation of political parties and their obligations, and thus many

different Islamist parties emerged (Misdaq, 2006: 81). Once the Soviet government

established power in Afghanistan during 1978 many of those Islamist parties moved

their operations to Pakistan and later emerged as militant factions to overthrow the

communist government (Ewans, 2002: 180). Militant faction ideologies were based

on the leader's ethnicity, tribal beliefs and school of Islam ("Afghanistan - Political

Parties", 2009). Between 1989 and 1992 Mujahedin emerged from these Islamist

factions to combat the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)

("Afghanistan - Political Parties", 2009).

After the Soviet withdrawal the factions who had once become united as Mujahedin

to fight one common enemy started to use their ethnic and Islamist ideologies to fight

for governance in Afghanistan ("Afghanistan - Political Parties", 2009). The rivalries

between the factions led to the outbreak of a civil war where the Mujahedin

committed heinous war crimes against ordinary civilians as well as the opposition

("War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity 1978-2001." 2001: 56-60). Their crimes

included the killing and torture of Afghan refugees who opposed Mujahedin leaders

or those who worked for humanitarian organisations with the abuse continuing until

2001 ("War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity 1978-2001." 2001: 56-60).




- 36 -

Continuing violence led to the emergence of the more conservative Pashtun faction,

the Taliban ("The Emergence of Taliban", 2002). The Taliban wanted to combat the

Mujahedin who were raping women and carrying out brutal attacks on civilians

(Misdaq, 2006: 193; "War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity 1978-2001", 2001:

19-20). Today these former militant faction leaders and their members have evolved

beyond Mujahedin and Taliban “to encompass new groups with new agendas” (Tarzi,

2008: 276) manifesting themselves in post-Taliban structures and under new party

names since 2004 ("Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan", 2006: 21-

23).

Since party registration laws prohibit parties from maintaining their own militias

("Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan", 2006: 21), militant factions

such as Ittihad-e Islami re-emerged as Daw'at-e Islami to show a separation of their

ideologies from former militant factions who were associated with violence, brutality

and undemocratic values ("Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan",

2006: 22). Changing party names has allowed the members and leaders from these

former factions to legally operate and maintain influence in the post-Taliban political

framework of Afghanistan (Nojumi, Mazurana and Stites, 2004: 16-17).

These harmful remnants have influence over decision-making processes and because

of their influence they can inappropriately structure the law to benefit their own

political interests (Price, Rozumilowicz and Verhulst, 2002: 22). For example former

4Ittihad-e Islami faction leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf chaired a Parliamentarian working

4 This faction is now Dawat-e Islami Party (see "Wardak Provincial Summary." 2008)




- 37 -

group in 2003 for drafting the Constitution of Afghanistan ("Abdul Rasul Sayyaf",

2009). He suggested that working groups should be divided based on ethnicity,

gender and expertise rather than a random selection so that the “results of the

discussion and debate” will be “positive”, and “closer to each other” ("Abdul Rasul

Sayyaf", 2009). The decision to structure the working group in this way does not

distribute power equally because it allows a particular ethnic, religion or gender

group to dominate outcomes that are beneficial to a margin of society and undermines

the democratic process. Sayyaf who was elected into parliament ("Country of Origin

Information Report: Afghanistan", 2006: 219) has further secured his position and

interests by “placing his 'clients' in top court positions” (Tarzi, 2008: 328) such as

Mawlawi Fazl Hadi Shinwari a religious cleric as the Supreme Court Judge and

Wahid Muzhda in lower court positions (Tarzi, 2008: 328). Shinwari, during his

period as the Supreme Judge appointed 128 judges to the Supreme Court, which has

further strengthened intolerance within the justice system (Price, 2009). Thus harmful

remnants have maintained influence in the political system and judiciary either

directly or through their political proxies who can pose restrictions on media freedom

and politicise the media's enabling environment.

As a result of the existence of harmful remnants in the Judiciary and other political

institutions the media's role is undermined as a government watchdog because the

decisions of the Judiciary are highly politicised:

“The decisions of judges are open to the influence of the political and

military leadership independently or via the Supreme Court. Such activities

dangerously blur the line between the executive and the judiciary branches

of the Afghan government in Kabul and throughout the country.” (Nojumi,

Mazurana and Stites, 2004: 17)




- 38 -

The line between the Executive and the Judiciary branches is blurred because the

conservative sharia graduates represent both of these sectors and have ties to party

leaders such as Sayyaf (Tarzi, 2008: 328). The more progressive law school graduates

from Kabul University have less power on cabinet and at ministerial levels (Nojumi,

Mazurana and Stites, 2004: 12).

These influences are problematic in a case of corruption, for example, because the

“motions against high ranking officials are likely to be dismissed or overturned by

more powerful officials” (Nojumi, Mazurana and Stites, 2004: 15). If the media

reports on corruption or accountability of government officials, it is also highly likely

that the critical journalists are targeted or are accused of spreading rumors and are

reprimanded (Khalwatgar, 2008). For instance in 2003 two Aftab Daily journalists

were charged with “defaming Islam” (Behzad, 2003) for publishing articles critical of

the government's performance and reporting on their links to former Mujahedin who

carried out war crimes (Behzad, 2003). The journalists were not criticising Islam or

sharia but because they were discussing the performance of former Mujahedin who

hold positions in government (Behzad, 2003) the laws were misused by their allies in

the justice system for stopping these journalists from uncovering corruption. The

interpretation of the journalists' conduct was politicised for two reasons; firstly

Shinwari who is the Supreme Court Judge has close ties to Sayyaf (Tarzi, 2008: 328)

whose faction carried out the massacre of 700 Hazarahs in the Afshar District of West

Kabul in 1993 ("Wardak Provincial Summahry", 2008: 5), also the Supreme judge

can override any rulings (Nojumi, Mazurana and Stites, 2004: 15) and since he shared

a political interest in the matter he could not be relied on to have an impartial

decision. Secondly, because the Mujahedin were fighting the “infidel” (Knapp, 2003:




- 39 -

90) communists, their role is compared to Jihad in Islam which was carried out

against “apostates” (Knapp, 2003: 84). Thus they are perceived as “heroes” (Tarzi,

2007) and it is considered unpatriotic to denounce them as corrupt. As a result of such

mis-interpretation of the laws and the mis-representation of justice in the legal system

by harmful remnants, the judge was able to order the arrest of the Aftab Daily

journalists.

These harmful remnants are also in positions of power where they can create or

restructure legislation for their own protection. For instance an amnesty bill was

passed by the majority of the Parliament in 2007 which sought immunity for the

Mujahedin from prosecution (see Tarzi, 2007). The bill states that Mujahedin war

criminals “should not be subjected to any criticism” (Tarzi, 2007) as well as any legal

or judicial proceedings (Tarzi, 2007). Although the law has not been signed yet by the

President (Synovitz, 2007) this example evidently shows the influence of harmful

remnants in undermining the democratic processes by protecting their interests. This

contributes to the backsliding of the country's democratic transition as the media is

unable to create accountability.

Conclusion

A number of different pressure groups were identified as harmful remnants who have

maintained or renewed control in post-Taliban structures. Some of the most harmful

militant factions have re-established their influence through tactics such as changing

party names. Due to their influences and connections to key political positions they

are not only creating threats to media's activities, but they can also develop new laws

that legitimise their power monopoly further. As they used ethnic and religious




- 40 -

differences in the past to oppress particular ethnic groups ("Wardak Provincial

Summahry", 2008: 5), they can renew old tactics to drive new political agendas by

politicising religion and ethinicity. The next chapter looks at how these harmful

remnants impact media freedom by their indirect politicisation of the media's

environment.




- 41 -

( CHAPTER THREE )

THE IMPACT OF HARMFUL REMNANTS

BY POLITICISING THE MEDIA'S ENVIRONMENT




- 42 -

Introduction: Ethnicity as a Political Instrument

This chapter discusses the “utilisation of ethnicity” (Schetter, 2007: 5) and religion as

a social change demobiliser (Hackett and Carroll, 2006: 12) in Afghanistan. I will

argue that the harmful remnants are using these two sensitive elements of Afghan

culture to politicise media's environment. Furthermore, this type of politicisation also

has an indirect impact on media's role which can potentially politicise the media's role

in Afghanistan. I will discuss the issue of politicisation in relation to the Media's

social and legal environments. In this chapter, the 'ethnic politicisation' section is

mainly concerned with the social environment, while the 'politicisation of religion'

section is focused on the legal and legislative frameworks for media. These two

sections assess two sides of the media's environment and whether they are enabling

media to be a source of social change in Afghanistan.

In chapter three I identified the harmful remnants as the religious scholars and former

faction leaders in the political system (see Tarzi and Crews, 2008). They view media's

role as a threat to their power monopoly in Afghan society (see Tarzi and Crews,

2008). This chapter will use historical evidence to show that politicisation has been

used by leaders in the past for political purposes. Due to the emergence of these

former leaders in modern political structures of Afghanistan, once again politicisation

is becoming an issue. I will argue this by making a link between historical evidence

and modern examples related to the inappropriate restructuring of particular laws by

the harmful remnants. I will discuss these links and their relationship to media, by

discussing two key case studies of language politicisation and Perwiz Kambakhsh's

blasphemy case that occurred in 2007 to 2008. As evident by the dates, they are

current cases and the purpose of this chapter is to address the issue of the indirect




- 43 -

politicisation of media at its early stages.

As it was discussed in chapter two, the media requires an enabling environment with

appropriate social and legal frameworks that support social change. This chapter

discusses the impact of harmful remnants over media freedom by politicising Media's

enabling environment. More specifically, this chapter looks at the issue of

politicisation and its role in demobilising media's ability to critically cover social

issues. For example, media's ability to discuss issues of women's equal rights in

Afghan society which also has religious connotations. There are other ways in which

media can become a political instrument; such as the direct politicisation of media

through financial aid by various governments and parties. The term “political media”

(Hakimi and Aziz, 2009: 18) is used by Afghan journalists to refer to the type of

media funded by political parties; furthermore it would also be interesting to look at

the role of foreign donors in Afghanistan. However this thesis is focusing on the

‘indirect’ politicisation of media through its environment and therefore renders the

role of political media out of the scope of this thesis.

In this chapter I will tackle two aspects of indirect politicisation; firstly, I will discuss

the issue of “ethnic nationalism” (Misdaq, 2006: 5) and its role in media's social

environment. For example the use of ethnicity by Pashtun politicians for the

marginalisation of non-Pashtuns in the media (Najafizadeh, 2008); and the use of

ethnicity by the harmful remnants for developing restrictive laws that contradict

media's social change efforts in Afghanistan (Tarzi, 2003). Secondly the politicisation

of the legal framework by religious clerics for further restricting media from

discussing social issues that are tied to religious or tribal values.




- 44 -

Pashtun leaders have traditionally held a large amount of authority to endorse

“Pashtun life-style and values, the political and ideological integration of fragmented

Pashtun groups as well as the active promotion of Pashto as lingua franca” (Oberson,

2002: 14). Jose Oberson (2002) refers to this endorsement of culture as

“Pashtunising” or “Pashtunisation” (Oberson, 2002: 12). Najia Haneefi (2009) also

raised this issue as “Pashtunsazi” (N Haneefi, Interviewed, 8 Mar). This term carries

political connotations, because it is used for describing Pashtun leaders' dissemination

of Pashtun culture and values over other ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Furthermore it

describes the “instrumentalisation of ethnicity” (Schetter, 2007: 3) by Pashtun leaders

to build sovereignty among themselves and 'depending on the circumstances', against

other minorities in Afghanistan (see Oberson, 2002).

Defining Politicisation of Ethnicity

Ethnic politicisation can become a mobilisation instrument for politicians (Schetter,

2007: 5). In contemporary Afghanistan, politicians are able to utilise ethnicity to

justify inappropriate restructuring of legislative frameworks for political gain, such as

elections (see Hakimi and Aziz, 2009). This was seen in 2009 when legislation was

structured inappropriately to appeal to potential Hazarah voters in the August

elections (Boone, 2009). In this case ethnicity became an “electoral issue” (Kelstrup,

2000: 162) where a marital law was passed that acted in the interest of Hazarah men

in Afghan society, potentially promoting 'marital rape' (Price, 2009). The Hazarah

ethnic group who have historically been discriminated against for their Mongolian

features, language and religion (Schetter, 2007: 3; "Country of Origin Information

Report: Afghanistan", 2006: 120), are given their own sense of identity through the




- 45 -

'Shia' marital law that undermines women's rights (Boone, 2009).

Moreover the law was signed by the government (Boone, 2009) to potentially appeal

to one of the most influential Hazarah political parties in Afghanistan ("Wardak

Provincial Summahry", 2008: 3). This is the Shia Hazara party, called Hezb-e Wahdat

and led by Haji Muhammad Muhaqiq. Muhaqiq, “as a member of the Wolesi Jirga

[lower house] and party leader, Mohaqiq has increased his popularity among the

Hazarah by focusing on issues relevant to the Hazarajat and the Hazarah population”

("Wardak Provincial Summahry", 2008: 3). It is believed that the party is supporting

Karzai ("Information on Hezb-e Wahdat", 2003) and have negotiated “power sharing

under a future government” (Salahuddin, 2009). Therefore ethnicity has been

potentially instrumentalised for maintaining voting preferences. The formation of

such legislation is not unrelated to media, because it shows that the harmful remnants

are capable of restructuring and implementing inappropriate legislations which can

create potential restrictions for media. This legislation further demonstrates how

ethnicity can be politicised by authorities to legalise other forms of discrimination in

Afghan society.

Ethnicity on its own is not the problem in Afghan society (see Glatzer, 2002) and

language differences do not appear to pose communication problems:

“You will sit in a place where two people will have a conversation, one

person will speak one language and the other will speak the other language.

Because they have been living together [in mixed communities] they

understand each other perfectly well and they do not see the need to switch

it [the language].” (S Siddiqi 2009, Interview, 17 Mar)

The local media also usually reflect on a variety of languages to reach diverse groups.




- 46 -

For instance the program New Home, New Life runs in Pashto and Persian. However

as Sidiqqi (2009) explains, some audiences listen to both services because they like

the program and they want to compare the acting in different languages. Moreover, as

Schetter (2007) suggests Afghans are not restricted to the characteristics of their

ethnic groups. For example, many Pashtuns are bilingual (Girard and Spek, 2002: 14)

and the the former King Zahir was a Pashtun who did not speak a word of Pashto

(Schetter, 2007: 3).

Glatzer (2002) views tribes as social and political “units” (2002: 6) that have been

used as instruments (2002: 6). Glatzer (2002) and Schetter (2007) agree that

Afghanistan's political problems are not driven by ethnic differences. As Glatzer

(2002) suggests, “ethnic and tribal boundaries are not fixed” but are a matter of

“negotiation” (2002: 12). This means that utilisation of ethnicity by leaders is

dependent on opportunities and “tactics and may change quickly” (Glatzer, 2002: 12).

For example the Pashtun militant faction leader Gulbudin Hekmatyar initially focused

his public speeches on pan-Islamism and the Islamic ummah which calls on a plural

Muslim society (Glatzer, 2002: 12). However when he recruited in Pashtun areas

(Suhrke and Borchgrevink, 2009: 224) he appealed to the ethnic and tribal solidarity

of the Pashtuns who “should defend their identity and honour against the rest of the

world” (Glatzer, 2002: 12). Therefore ethnic differences are intentionally highlighted

for driving particular political agendas. Moreover it appears that ordinary Afghans

from different ethnic backgrounds have been able to coexist (see Gregorian, 1969)

and adapt each other's culture and language without any problems (see Schetter,

2007; S Siddiqi 2009, Interview, 17 Mar). The only time ethnicity has become a

problem is when it is utilised by leaders who have “master[ed] the cultural [ethnic]




- 47 -

patterns” (Schetter, 2007: 3) for mobilising particular groups and driving particular

political motives (see Schetter, Glassner and Karokhail, 2007).

Politicisation of language

Another element of ethnic difference is language in Afghanistan. Language is also

potentially becoming an instrument of politicisation because non-Pashtuns who are

generally Persian speakers share this language with Iran. Pashtun nationalists, in

particular the Pashtun militant group the Taliban, had political frictions with Iran.

External political issues with Iran have reflected negatively in the treatment of

Persian speakers by harmful remnants of Pashtun ethnicity in post-Taliban

Afghanistan. I will illustrate this form of politicisation by firstly arguing that Persian

language is local to Afghanistan, secondly presenting evidence of political friction

between Iran and ethnic nationalist Pashtuns and thirdly demonstrating through a case

study how language can be politicised through the media in Afghanistan.

Anthropologists generally group non-Pashtun minorities by their language of Persian

while Pashtuns are generally united by the elements of a common tribal heritage (see

Lyon, 2006), Pashtunwali tribal code and the Pashto language in Afghanistan

(Wardak, 2003: 1; Lyon, 2006: 184). There is no official census available since 1979,

but Persian appears to be more prominently spoken through out the country ("The

CIA world factbook 2008", 2007). Misdaq (2006) suggests this is due to

Afghanistan's historical ties to Persia's courts, which was particularly influential

during the 18th century where many Pashtuns adopted Persian as their language as

well (Misdaq, 2006: 8). As a result of the language commonalities with Iran, Persian

speaking Afghans have been influenced by Iranian literature, history and culture




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(Misdaq, 2006: 21). There is even dispute over the nationality of certain philosophers

and intellectuals, for example Ibn Sina and Seyd Jamaludin Afghani (or Seyd

Jamaludin Asadabadi in Iran) are claimed by both nations of Persian speakers. This

shows the fluidity of Persian culture between Persian speaking Afghans and the

Iranians. Latif Nazemi (2003) is an Afghan journalist and poet working for Deutsche

Welle and in the article A Look at Persian Literature in Afghanistan, he provides

further evidence of this fluidity (see Nazemi, 2003). On the other hand, Pashtuns have

historically wanted to separate themselves and build their own nation called

“Pashtunistan” (Misdaq, 2006: 77). Pashtuns' ambitious plans for establishing a

unique sense of identity in the region have also led to genocides and civil conflict,

particularly in the last three decades (see Misdaq, 2006).

Pashtuns see Iran as a potential threat to their political ambitions (see Arabzadah,

2008). As suggested by Olivier Roy (1986), it appears that Iran with a Shia majority

government is attempting to:

“strengthen its control over the Shia minorities and to use them as pawns in

a policy of regional expansion, for, in spite of its fine phrases, Iranian

policy is more a manifestation of Persian nationalism than a universal

revolution.” (Roy, 1986: 213)

Hostilities have been seen more visibly between militant Pashtun factions and Iran in

recent history. In 1997, the Taliban killed a number of Iranian diplomats in the

consulate offices of Mazar Sharif and closed the Iranian Embassy in Kabul (Lyon,

2006: 187-189). In early 2002, the Iranian government “expelled” ("Iran expels

Afghan warlord", 2002) one of the most influential Taliban leaders, Gulbuddin

Hekmatyar, leading to the closure of his Hizb-i Islami party office in Tehran ("Hizb-i-

Islami, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar", 2009). The product of these hostilities in foreign




- 49 -

politics coupled with Pashtun nationalism, have attached political connotations to

Persian language in Afghanistan. Such issues have politicised the nature of Persian

language in Afghanistan and Pashtun leaders have openly shown their opposition to

its use. This is reflected by Haneefi, who believes they are discriminated and called

political “agents” (N Haneefi, Interviewed, 8 Mar) for speaking their own language:

“It is very difficult for us Persian speakers because we are discriminated by

Pashtun politicians who call us agents of Iran, when we are only using our

mother tongue.” (N Haneefi, Interviewed, 8 Mar)

The issue of language politicisation became a public matter in 2008, when the

Minster of Information and Culture, Karim Khorram reprimanded a Balkh RTA

reporter for using5Persian words in a broadcast (Najafizadeh, 2008). Khorram is a

Pashtun and a former member of the militant party, Hizb-i-Islami (Synovitz, 2008)

known to follow similar ideologies to the Taliban, led by one of the most wanted

former Mujahedin leaders, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar ("Logar Province", 2008; Synovitz,

2008). The minister criticised the reporter for introducing “alien” (Najafizadeh, 2008)

Iranian words to the 'Afghan language' (Najafizadeh, 2008). Criticisms were baseless

because, firstly the Afghan Constitution (2004) promotes the use of various dialects

and languages (2004: 7) and secondly the news broadcast was in Persian and in the

province of Balkh (Najafizadeh, 2008) which is predominantly composed of Tajiks

("Provincial Profile - Balkh" 2006) who are Persian speakers. Thirdly, he replaced the

Ministry's Persian entrance sign to a Pashto language sign upon becoming the

minister (Najafizadeh, 2008). These events characterise an active disregard for non-

Pashtuns which further promote ethnic patriotism and language politicisation in

Afghanistan. The politicisation led to ethnic discrimination and the dissemination of

5 Such as 'daneshgah and daneshjoo' to refer to 'university and student' rather than using the

Pashto word, 'Pohantun' (Najafizadeh, 2008)




- 50 -

ethnic hatred, leading to fighting among students at Balkh and Kabul Universities and

200 students were injured (Arabzadah, 2008).

These events have a negative effect over media because the minister's actions have set

ethnic frameworks to media's reportage. Moreover harmful remnants benefit from

ethnic conflict as it keeps the country “segmentary” (Misdaq, 2006: 64) and maintains

their monopoly over public opinion (see Rawan). The media demonopolises the

power of these harmful remnants by democratising the public opinion; if its role is

politicised, instead, the media will initiate these harmful remnants' political

aspirations (see Hackett and Carroll, 2006).

Defining Politicisation of Religion

While ethnicity is a sensitive aspect of Afghan culture that has been evidently

instrumentalised to politicise the media's environment, religion is another sensitive

aspect of Afghan culture that can be used by harmful remnants. The harmful remnants

in this case are religious clerics who have powerful positions within the government

and control the Judiciary (see "Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan",

2006). Religion is politicised by these harmful remnants to restrict the critical

coverage of social issues that are tied to religious values. Because religious leaders

are judges or have influence over legal decisions, the judges' interpretation of the

Media Law are based on the sharia (see Nojumi, Mazurana and Stites, 2004). This is

problematic for media's ability to critically cover a variety of social issues, in

particular issues related to women's equal rights in society.

As illustrated by Suhrke and Borchgrevink, in the Afghan legal framework there is




- 51 -

hardly a distinction made between the 'rule of law' and the law “as pronounced by the

ulama” (Suhrke and Borchgrevink, 2009: 216). In rural areas this issue may be

complicated by the influence of “tribal elders” (Suhrke and Borchgrevink, 2009: 216)

and tribal Islam's influence over legal decisions. While the influence of ulama in the

legal framework has already been established by researchers (see Suhrke and

Borchgrevink, 2009; Nojumi, Mazurana and Stites, 2004; Mendoza, 2004) as a

problem within the legal framework of Afghanistan, the issue for journalists is further

complicated by the lack of an independent blasphemy legislation for the media. This

provides prosecutors with a political vacuum where they can make sharia applicable

to media conduct.

While the Media Law stipulates that the Afghan government “promote and guarantee

the right to freedom of thought and speech” ("Mass Media Law", 2007: 1). Article 1

states that the Media Law is developed with the consideration of Islam “pursuant to

‘Article 34’ of the Constitution and Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights” ("Mass Media Law", 2007: 1). At this point one would make the assumption

that Article 34 of the Afghan Constitution (2004) discusses Islamic principles that

Afghan citizens must adhere to. However article 34 shows one of the ways in which

the Media Law struggles to define its position on religion, because the article also

defends freedom of expression rather than providing any form of definition (see "The

Constitution of Afghanistan", 2004):

“Every Afghan shall have the right to express thoughts through speech,

writing, illustrations as well as other means in accordance with provisions

of this Constitution” ("The Constitution of Afghanistan", 2004: 10).

Furthermore, other articles of the Afghan Constitution (2004) and the Penal Code




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(1976) are also silent on definitions of blasphemy. The three laws mention some

general prohibitions but they are ambiguous. For example article 3 of the Constitution

(2004) states that “no law shall contravene the tenets and provisions” of Islam (2004:

4), and article 45(1) of the Media Law (2007) specifies that content must not be

“contrary to the principles and provisions” of Islam (Tarzi, 2007b); but there is no

explanation provided as to what these 'provisions' are. The Afghan Media Law

(2007), the Constitution (2004) and the Penal Code (1976) in fact demonstrate a

liberal approach to interpreting freedom for the Media; but because the statements are

ambiguous, they provide the prosecutors with a vacuum for individual applications of

the sharia.

While “in the Anglo-American world the conditions of modernity have made legal

prosecutions against blasphemy not only rare but also obsolete” (Hassan, 2008: 158).

In Islam an insult to God, to the Prophet or any of the divine revelations is considered

blasphemous conduct. Moreover “suspicions of apostasy” (Hassan, 2008: 158) is also

a crime that can be punishable by6death. This is evident in Kambakhsh's case, where

the ulama have interpreted his conduct as the weakness of faith in Islam ("Journalism

student given 20-year jail term in Afghanistan", 2008). Demonstration of apostasy has

stemmed from the article's critic of polygamy ("Afghan Journalist's Death Sentence

Commuted", 2008) which is allowed in Islam. Under these interpretations any form of

expression that suggests 'infidelity' towards Islam is also considered blasphemous

(Hassan, 2008: 158). For example the former communist regime were called 'infidels'

by the former Mujahedin and Taliban (Knapp, 2003: 90).

6 Such as the case of Salman Rushdie a former Shia Muslim, who wrote the book The Satanic

Verses that lead to Khomeini's controversial Fatwa in 1988 (Brooks, 2008; Hassan, 2008: 158).




- 53 -

Blasphemy is instrumentalised to silence opinions contrary to the regime, hence

restricting the media's ability to cover religious issues critically. This further limits

the media's ability to engage a public debate about issues like women's rights in

Afghan society. This is important for ordinary Afghans who have not acquired up to

date knowledge about the religion during the last three decades of conservative rule

and their understanding about their rights and social issues are limited (N

Khairandish, Interviewed, 9 Mar; S Siddiqi 2009, Interview, 17 Mar). The media's

restrictions are created by politicising the religious law, making religion an

instrument of power legitimisation for remnants of an authoritarian regime (Esposito,

2000: 50; Suhrke and Borchgrevink, 2009: 215-216). Political scientists are referring

to this as 'political Islam' where religion is no longer just “mediat[ing] between man

and god” (Fuller, 2003: 13) but is used by governments to fill a political vacuum (see

Fuller, 2003). This is problematic for media, because sharia requires the interpretation

of the ulama who make those meanings relevant to everyday life (Mendoza, 2004: 3).

Religious scholars base their interpretations on Islamic sources which are the Quran,

Prophet's teachings the Sunna and divine revelations the Hadith (Radan, Meyerson

and Croucher, 2005: 273). Religious scholars “read and interpret the Sharia by using

a particular set of rules” (Mendoza, 2004: 3) from those Islamic sources (Mendoza,

2004: 3). In Afghanistan these ulama who are the harmful remnants, not only step in

to protect religion but also to protect themselves from journalists who challenge their

power monopoly in the government.

Many judges act with dual positions (see Suhrke and Borchgrevink, 2009), for

example Shinwari was a senior member of Afghanistan's Council of Islamic Scholars

(Tarzi and Crews, 2008: 328) while also serving as the Supreme Court Judge between




- 54 -

2002 to 2006 (Price, 2009; Tarzi and Crews, 2008: 328). Evidently, these judges

could have a conflict of interest in blasphemy cases, because they could use their

positions to “act as a moral guardian, censor and defender of broad jurisdiction for the

sharia” (Tarzi and Crews, 2008: 328). In a consultation event hosted by the UNAMA

("Multi-stakeholder Consultation on Freedom of Expression in Afghanistan", 2009),

journalists also believed that many of the judges wanted to act as a ‘guardian’ of

religion (Hakimi and Aziz, 2009: 18). For example journalists have suggested that

Perwiz Kambakhsh's blasphemy case was intentionally politicised “to 'teach a lesson'

to others not to question conservative religious interpretations, their authority and that

of their political allies” (Hakimi and Aziz, 2009: 16). Perwis Kambakhsh, a journalist

and a student, received the death penalty for downloading an article that was critical

of polygamy and gender inequalities in Islam ("Afghan Journalist's Death Sentence

Commuted", 2008). Even under the assumption that Kambakhsh did 'attack' Islam, the

Penal code (1976) in reference to Crimes Against Religions in article 348, specifies

only a “short imprisonment” and “cash fine” for an “attack” on Islam ("Penal Code",

1976: 101).

Lack of a blasphemy legislation in Afghanistan also means that there is no clear

indication between what is religion and tribal custom (see Nojumi, Mazurana and

Stites, 2004). Due to the numerous tribes and ethnic groups in Afghanistan,

interpretations of what constitutes blasphemous can also vary. The issue of tribal

Islam is especially problematic in rural regions, where journalists can also be directly

targeted by local commanders or tribesmen (N Khairandish, Interviewed, 9 Mar). In

Pashtun tribal regions and villages, social 'norms' are more strictly interpreted based

on Pashtun customs (see Kakar, 2003). Pashtun customary law is comprised of




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traditions specified in Pashtunwali code (see Kakar, 2003). This code has been

historically enforced through the tribal council of jirga which has traditionally acted

as the village court (Nojumi, Mazurana and Stites, 2004: 37). So as Soheil (2009) has

suggested there is an influence of “tribal mentality” (S Soheil 2009, Interviewed, 13

Mar) in the court system which is problematic, because in many instances tribal

customs even override sharia (Moghadam, 1993: 210). For instance according to

Pashtun tribal code a woman accused of adultery can be executed based on rumours,

while this contradicts sharia which requires four witnesses (Moghadam, 1993: 210).

This indicates “that Islam is not the only institution that regulates everyday affairs”

(Misdaq, 2006: 275) in Afghanistan, and Afghan Islam is a hybrid of sharia and

customary laws. As Schetter argues, Afghan Islam contrasts with the concept of an

'Islamic ummah' or a plural Muslim society because of the “fragmentation of society

along ethnic lines” (Schetter, 2007: 4). Therefore this contradicts Gregorian's (1969)

belief that Islam is a unifying factor among Afghans. As a result of the existence of a

tribal Islam, the harmful remnants in Judiciary and courts also interpret blasphemy

conducts based on their ethnic understandings of the sharia (see Mendoza, 2004).

Conclusion

The restrictions raised in Afghanistan's media environment at this stage of transition

are caused by a lack of separation between the rule of law, religion and customs. In

the Afghan context these issues are intertwined and related, once one element, such as

religion is politicised, the three elements become instruments for regressing or

stalling social change in Afghanistan. These sensitive aspects of Afghan culture are

utilised by the harmful remnants who justify the inappropriate implementation of the




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rule of law under Islam. The Media Law interpretations are therefore politicised for

the institutionalisation of the enforcement of further restrictions over media in

Afghanistan.

This is problematic for media freedom because journalists are limited in the way in

which they can critically discuss social issues crucial to ordinary Afghans. In this

context sharia is applicable to journalistic conduct, this demonstrates a lack of

willingness for social change from the legal framework. The journalists at the

UNAMA's consultation (2009) have suggested that the Afghan media environment “is

not conducive” (Hakimi and Aziz, 2009: 17) for discussing religious issues critically.

In this context of blasphemy, journalists are not perceived as the fourth estate but

rather as 'faithful' Muslims who have no business acting as the state watchdog or

discussing particular issues of public interest.




CHAPTER FOUR

STRATEGIES OF RESPONSE BY JOURNALISTS

IN AFGHANISTAN




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Introduction: Media Interviews

Previous chapters identified the issue of harmful remnants and their politicisation of

ethnicity and religion for restricting media freedom. These issues were discussed

within their social, cultural and political contexts. This chapter presents evidence of

these restrictions from the Afghan journalists’ perspective. The aim of this chapter is

also to provide recommendations about how Afghan journalists can negotiate

restrictions for driving social change in Afghanistan.

As discussed in chapter one, the most suitable approach for media in Afghanistan is

public journalism, where civic education and public interest issues are prioritised (see

Etzioni, 1998). This chapter, in particular the section on 'responsible journalism'

demonstrates how journalists tackle social change issues through communitarian

philosophy. The interviews were conducted with Faheem Dashty (Chief Editor and

Political Analyst of Kabul Weekly), Mobina Khairandish (Producer of Radio Rabia

Balkhi), Najia Haneefi (women's rights activist and the owner of Radio Rabia Balkhi),

Sanjar Soheil (Chief Editor and Political Analyst of Hasht-e Sobh) and Shirazuddin

Siddiqi (Director of BBC World Service Trust Afghanistan and Afghan Education

Projects), Associate Professor Martin Hadlow (former Director of UNESCO office in

Kabul). While the radio journalists often represent public journalism that promote

civic education, the newspapers in Afghanistan often represent political journalism.

The interviewees are selected from diverse professional backgrounds, which assists

the thesis in presenting a range of perceptions about the current restrictions and steps

forward for addressing social change issues in Afghanistan.




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Interview Categories

The issues and strategies raised by interviewees are categorised into four groups of

(1) traditional restrictions, (2) law enforcement, (3) professional experience and (4)

responsible journalism in Afghanistan. Category (1) presents the interviewees'

perceptions of 'freedom' in the context of traditional and cultural environments. These

environments have been defined in chapter two, and in this section those definitions

'frame' the analysis provided by the interviews. Category (2) presents the journalists'

understanding of the Media Law restrictions and their suggestions on how the law and

the issues of its enforcement could be addressed. Category (3) presents media

professionalism issues in Afghanistan, and highlights an area for further study for

future research. Category (4) presents how Afghan journalists are battling the

restrictions I have highlighted in chapters two and three of this thesis. This section

also supports my argument for a communitarian philosophy which prevails a public

oriented media approach in Afghanistan.

(1) Traditional Restrictions

The journalists interviewed believe that “tribal mindsets” (S Soheil 2009,

Interviewed, 13 Mar) exist among Afghans and more evidently amongst rural

Afghans (N Khairandish, Interviewed, 9 Mar; N Haneefi, Interviewed, 8 Mar; S

Soheil 2009, Interviewed, 13 Mar; S Siddiqi 2009, Interview, 17 Mar). In villages,

provinces and regional areas in particular local commanders, tribal and religious

leaders can cause physical threats to journalists ("Main threat to Afghan journalists is

from government", 2009). Soheil (2009) suggests that these individuals perceive

freedom of expression as a disruption to their tribal ‘autonomy’. Autonomy in this




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sense, refers to the way Afghan traditional living is structured (S Soheil 2009,

Interviewed, 13 Mar). For example, there are inequalities within tribes, especially

between genders and there is a “hierarchical social structure” (Giustozzi and Ullah

2006: 3) which affects Afghan's understanding of freedom of expression:

“In Afghan households children are told 'you do not understand and

therefore you do not participate in adult discussions'. When we are adults

we are always nervous about expressing our opinions because we are

worried about being wrong. This type of mindset exists among the educated

and the uneducated in Afghanistan. In Afghan society there has never been

a chance for us to ask questions. We are not allowed to ask questions from

our elders in our families and the leaders in our society. In elders'

gatherings [jirga] I am told that I do not have the right to speak. Why don't I

have the right?” (S Soheil 2009, Interviewed, 13 Mar)

The apparent communication hierarchy within the family defines an individual’s right

to freedom of expression and their ability to participate in discussions. Besides the

enforcement of a communication hierarchy in the family, communication is further

'institutionalised' (Rawan, 2002: 156) through the tribal gatherings of ‘jirga’ (Rawan,

2002: 166). As a traditional communication channel (Rawan, 2002: 166) the jirga

eliminates the voice of the disenfranchised such as women (Nojumi, Mazurana and

Stites, 2004: 3) but only a selection of individuals from local tribes can participate in

decision making processes (see Wardak, 2003):

“Although jirgas may be positive for collaboration in essence their structure

is very undemocratic. Ordinary Afghans do not get a say in what is decided

for the village. The members of the jirga are usually the male elders of the

tribes who promote the patriarchal structure of our society and it is

important for these leaders to maintain their tribal structure.” (S Soheil

2009, Interviewed, 13 Mar).

Jirga is a tribal council, mainly common among the Pashtun populated areas, which is




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represented by the community's “opinion leaders” (Rawan, 2002: 166). These opinion

leaders are defined by Rawan (2002) as the leaders of tribes, mullahs, commanders

and land owners (2002: 166). The gathering of these powerful individuals allows

them to make decisions on public issues (see Rawan, 2002). This representation of

public opinion allows the jirga members to have a monopoly over public opinion in

the village (Gregorian, 1969: 42; see Mendoza, 2004) and they have traditionally

disseminated news through their “communication channels” (Giustozzi and Ullah,

2006: 16), such as the through the Bazaar and the mosque sermons (Rawan, 2002:

156). Therefore the jirga's role is comparable to modern media as the fourth estate,

which traditionally represented a form of public “consensus” in Afghan society

(Schetter, Glassner and Karokhail, 2007: 146).

However the jirga functions in contradictions to the local media which is attempting

to democratise the public opinion. Historically politicisation of ethnic groups in

Afghanistan were carried out by the jirga (see Schetter, Glassner and Karokhail,

2007; Wardak, 2003). The jirga's hegemonic control over public opinion has enabled

them to motivate “a wide range of 7rivalries and vendettas alive among the Afghan

tribes” (Gregorian, 1969: 42). In contemporary Afghanistan, the ‘opinion leaders’

have emerged as ‘harmful remnants’ in modern political structures who can politicise

the public opinion through the instrumentalisation of ethnicity and religion. They can

impact the public opinion against their non-Pashtun rivals as it has been demonstrated

in the past.

7 This is evident through the factionalisation of the Mujahedin (see "Country of Origin

Information Report: Afghanistan", 2006), the Hazarah ethnic genocides ("Wardak Provincial

Summary", 2008: 5) and the revolting of the Khost Pashtun tribes against Amanullah's 1919 social and

political reforms (Misdaq, 2006: 64).




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“Two years ago we had a critical program about Mazar Sharif's local

government. We were told that we have gone 'beyond our journalistic

boundaries' and this is going to become problematic for us.” (N

Khairandish, Interviewed, 9 Mar)

On the contrary, the chief editor of Kabul Weekly, Dashty (2009) believes that

because the Afghan media law (2007) promotes and guarantees freedom of

expression, journalists should not refrain from reporting on political subjects. He

suggests that through careful consideration of Afghan laws and undertaking

responsible journalism the media can be free and act as a watchdog:

“We have not had any deaths or arrests at Kabul Weekly but we have

received threats. I ensure that we do not go beyond the ‘frame of law’. That

is why I think we have less problems.” (F Dashty, Interviewed, 2 Mar)

Dashty (2009) suggests that the Afghan Media Law supports freedom of expression

and if it is implemented correctly, it offers journalists legal protection. However,

Haneefi (2009) believes the law fails to support freedom of expression because

Afghan customary laws do not entitle women to equal rights in society (see Nojumi,

Mazurana and Stites, 2004):

“When we cannot talk about women's rights because it is considered an

exported Western ideology - how can one call this freedom?” (N Haneefi,

Interviewed, 8 Mar)

Furthermore, Khairandish (2009) does not believe the law offers any legal protection

because of the lack of its appropriate enforcement:

“If the Afghan government implement the current Media Law in its true

meaning then essentially all of our problems will be solved. If the officials

understand the law and what it upholds then we will not have problems” (N

Khairandish, Interviewed, 9 Mar).




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The issues of protection provided by the Media Law for journalists has been much

debated; as discussed in chapter three, the Afghan laws do not pose direct restrictions

on freedom of expression, however all the interviewed journalists and media

professionals have raised concern over the law's ‘inappropriate’ implementation by

the authorities.

(2) Law Enforcement

While many of the interviewees agree that Afghan Media Law (2007) is democratic in

nature and provides freedom of expression 'on paper', all the interviewees agree that it

is not enforced appropriately (F Dashty, Interviewed, 2 Mar; M Hadlow, Interviewed,

3 Mar; N Khairandish, Interviewed, 9 Mar; Haneefi, Interviewed, 8 Mar; S Siddiqi

2009, Interview, 17 Mar; S Soheil 2009, Interviewed, 13 Mar). Events of

inappropriate law enforcement are two fold; firstly the Media Law's “ambiguities on

issues such as insult to national personalities, Islam and slander” ("Afghan journalist

union says Media Law vulnerable to misuse", 2008) and secondly the existence of

individuals in positions of power who take advantage of those ambiguities and mis-

interpret the law for shutting down media and arresting of journalists. Dashty (2009)

suggests, ambiguities in the Afghan Media Law are problematic for journalists:

“There are at least eight articles in the Media Law which are the prohibited

issues. For example, not accusing, lying and talking against the national

interest of Afghanistan or Islam. These are the red lines, but we were

expecting these. What we want is some definition on these articles so the

law can not be misused.” (F Dashty, Interviewed, 2 Mar)

The majority of the Media Law's prohibitions are related to blasphemy and

defamation; the law itself is merely a list of prohibitions which are not defined

("Mass Media Law." 2007). Siddiqi (2009) suggests the existence of vacuum in the




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Media Law allows religious and 'political interest groups' or as defined in this thesis

as harmful remnants, fill in the gap with their own interpretations and Haneefi (2009)

agrees:

“There are many generalisations made in the Media Law, tohin, 'insult' is

not defined, which allows religious scholars to label journalists' conducts as

an insult to religious values and make journalists vulnerable to

prosecution.” (N Haneefi, Interviewed, 8 Mar)

Similarly lack of definition on blasphemy articles means that journalists cannot

always predict the consequences of their work and sometimes have to refrain from

discussing certain topics because of potential outcomes. For example Haneefi (2009)

suggests that 'religious violence' against women cannot be discussed as it can be

potentially considered blasphemous. Siddiqi (2009) believes this is a problem as the

nation is largely uneducated, as ordinary Afghans have not been exposed to critical

thinking for almost three decades, and as an Islamic country the “media cannot ignore

religion as an interesting topic” (S Siddiqi 2009, Interview, 17 Mar). He suggests that

the line between blasphemy and critical coverage of religion must be defined to allow

those discussions (S Siddiqi 2009, Interview, 17 Mar).

Soheil (2009) believes that the issue of inappropriate law enforcement is caused by

the presence of religious leaders in government, legislative and judiciary who have

control over development and implementation of the laws. Haneefi (2009) in

particular raised concern over the involvement of former members of political

factions and Mujahidin leaders in the post-Taliban government. She estimates eighty

percent majority of the current Afghan parliament to be composed of harmful

remnants or otherwise from former factions who she suggests have posed problems to

media freedom:




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“In my opinion the situation of media freedom compared to previous

regimes is improved but there is limited freedom. Nothing can be said

against religious and political values” (N Haneefi, Interviewed, 8 Mar).

Soheil (2009) also raises the issue of corruption in the justice system which allow

judicial decisions to be impacted by bribery. Furthermore, his newspaper has been

highly critical of government's actions towards the misrepresentation of the law.

Below is an excerpt from an article in Hasht-e Sobh that has criticised the government

for freeing drug traffickers because of the request of influential tribesmen:

“The release of five drug traffickers who had been sentenced to long termsof imprisonment by the Court, has once again showed the total negligence

of those officials who must protect and implement the law [...] It has been a

long time now that an innocent young man, Parwiz Kambakhsh, is

languishing in his cell on the basis of groundless accusations, but the

president does not show mercy towards him. Nonetheless, Mr Hamidzada

has added that 'mediation and guarantees by some elders and influential

figures can help release the repentant prisoners, because their release is for

the good of society and everyone'.” ("Afghan paper hits out at president's

order to free drug traffickers." 2009)

Afghan journalists flag9Kambakhsh's blasphemy case who was initially given the

death penalty, as an example of misusing the Media Law ("Afghan journalist union

says Media Law vulnerable to misuse", 2008; "Afghanistan: Journalist Given Death

Sentence For 'Blasphemy' ", 2008). He was convicted for downloading and

distributing an article discussing women's rights in Islam, later the death sentence was

reduced to twenty years in jail after international pressures ("Afghan Court Upholds

Journalism Student's 20 Year Blasphemy Sentence ", 2009).

9 For discussion of this case study refer to the section on 'politicisation of religion' in chapter

three.




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Besides the misinterpretation of religion to restrict media freedom, there is further

constraint on media through its “ethnicisation” ("Afghan paper highlights need for

decentralization of power", 2009); this is potentially caused by the “centralisation”

and “dominance” ("Afghan paper highlights need for decentralization of power",

2009) of one ethnic group over the other in Afghanistan's political system ("Afghan

paper highlights need for decentralization of power", 2009). In the past political

factions have mobilised their members based on common tribal heritage (Glatzer,

2002: 12), and journalists fear that those groups may be renewing their power to

'demobilise' (Hackett and Carroll, 2006: 12) the public opinion once again:

“The religious leaders can influence public opinion and encourage people

against the local media.” (N Haneefi, Interviewed, 8 Mar)

Haneefi (2009) used the term 'Pashtunsazi' to describe the 'ethnic politicisation'

tactics utilised by Pashtun politicians in key political positions:

“In the parliament there are two or three representatives from the Taliban.The Information and Culture Ministry is controlled by a former Pashtun

political faction leader and he has similar views to the Taleban. He is trying

to reduce the use of Persian language in the media and he promotes

backward Islamic ideologies. They [Pashtun politicians] disseminate their

[tribal] ideologies through the [state owned] media that they have control

over.” (N Haneefi, Interviewed, 8 Mar)

While particular remnants attempt at politicising media's reportage, many private

media promote pluralism and national unity through their style of coverage. Dashty

(2009) acknowledges that media can inflame ethnic division in Afghanistan and

therefore Kabul Weekly takes the ethnic factor into consideration when reporting:

“Ethnic division is one of the biggest problems in Afghanistan and I said to

all my colleagues that no one has the right to touch the issue negatively. If

we promote national unity, people will also accept and appreciate it.” (F




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Dashty, Interviewed, 2 Mar)

Moreover, Afghan media needs to address ethnic diversity by producing content in

more than one language. For example the Kabul Weekly publishes in languages of

Persian-Dari, English and Pashto (F Dashty, Interviewed, 2 Mar). While Rabia Balkhi

has eighteen hours of daily broadcast in Persian-Dari, Pashto, Uzbeki and Torbeki

and news in English (N Khairandish, Interviewed, 9 Mar). This promotion of various

languages by local media, is one way public journalism can promote tolerance for

social change in Afghanistan's transitional environment.

(3) Professional Experience

Despite the work that public journalism does in mobilising social change, many of the

interviewees raised concern over the lack of professionalism in Afghan media:

“I think some journalists cannot differentiate between critical coverage and

insulting. Sometimes they are making accusations without evidence at

hand” (F Dashty, Interviewed, 2 Mar).

Mr Seddiqi's concern (2009) is that some reports do not contribute to public debates,

even though they may not constitute blasphemy:

“The media has to use it [critical coverage of religion] to educate the nation

and contribute to development of religious education in an objective way.

But to do that media practitioners also need to be extremely professional.

Some of the articles published in the media have not actually proved that

the media practitioners and journalists have got there yet.” (S Siddiqi 2009,

Interview, 17 Mar).

The interviewees (2009) believe that the lack of responsible journalism by some

media is caused by insufficient training or experience. Hadlow (2009) who worked on

media development projects in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2004 explains that the




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issue stems from impacts of Soviet-style journalism in Afghanistan.

“At Kabul University all the lecturers had received degrees from Soviet

Universities such as Moscow or Ukraine State Universities and theycertainly brought that back.” (M Hadlow, Interviewed, 3 Mar)

This kind of journalism has promoted self-censorship in some Afghan media; because

the media under the Soviet regime acted as the 'voice of the government'. Skuse

(2002) suggests “the advent of the Soviet presence accelerated the pace at which

alternatives were sought and it is during this period that many current perceptions and

opinions concerning the 'quality, impartiality and accuracy' of national radio

broadcasting services were formed” (2002: 269). As Skuse's (2002) investigation in

the Afghan media under the Soviet regime shows, not only the ordinary Afghans lost

'trust' in the quality of the local media, but this perception is also reflected in the

perceptions of current journalists who cannot see a link between democracy and the

media:

“Some of the journalists I met were members of the old Soviet Association

of Journalists and of course they still saw things as they have always seen.

In the seminars and training courses we had on the issue of what is the role

of free press is, in a democracy there were many spirited arguments;

because some journalists could not see that it [free press] was particularly

useful” (M Hadlow, Interviewed, 3 Mar).

Soheil suggests that this kind of journalism training will fail to produce journalists

who can meet the needs of their communities and contribute to reconstruction and

change in Afghanistan.

Siddiqi (2009) suggests that Afghan media suffers from insufficient investigation and

overtly opinionated pieces. He also believes Afghan journalists should be more




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selective about what they broadcast (S Siddiqi 2009, Interview, 17 Mar). For example

reporters should take the cultural 'ingredients' into consideration and avoid obvious

inflammatory broadcasts that do not contribute to a constructive debate (see Mendel,

2007). For example an Afghan TV station broadcasted some of the asleep officials at

the Afghan national assembly which created a backlash from those officials who were

humiliated (see Mendel, 2007). With the careful consideration of the Afghan cultural

context that is intertwined with religious and tribal traditions, critical ways of looking

at issues should be introduced so the program “does not go against audience's taste”

(S Siddiqi 2009, Interview, 17 Mar) and journalists should “be liberal in the eyes of

the conservative” (S Siddiqi 2009, Interview, 17 Mar), proposes a need for

journalistic strategy that actively considers how coverage will be interpreted by a

variety of audiences (Cohen-Almagor, R. 2005: 80). For example New Home, New

Life is tackling issues of sexually transmitted diseases in rural Afghanistan (S Siddiqi

2009, Interview, 17 Mar). Their investigation unraveled some of the10

causes of the

recent rise in HIV transmissions in Afghanistan (S Siddiqi 2009, Interview, 17 Mar).

The program created public awareness about the issue by showing that “the character

had blood transfusion and the blood was not screened; before he was aware he had

already transmitted it to his wife” (S Siddiqi 2009, Interview, 17 Mar). This coverage

related a potentially sensitive topic without drawing on tribal or religious issues,

therefore considering the audience's sensitivities.

Although BBC through its training programs have provided a benchmark for

professional journalism in Afghanistan (see "Afghan Media Reconstruction in Focus:

10 Their investigation showed that HIV was transmitted through unscreened blood as only thirty

percent of the blood at the blood banks were tested. The infected who were among the drug addicts had

introduced injection to Afghanistan and in this way they had increased the chances of HIV transmission.




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An activity report", 2002), Afghan media still suffer from the lack of a “standard

setter” (S Siddiqi 2009, Interview, 17 Mar). Hadlow suggests that the county needs to

set up Radio and Television Afghanistan (RTA) as a public service broadcaster (M

Hadlow, Interviewed, 3 Mar). RTA, as a state owned broadcaster, is posing problems

to public journalism, because in regional areas politicians have more influence over

the broadcast content (S Siddiqi 2009, Interview, 17 Mar). For example, a journalist

in Balkh province working for the RTA, was reprimanded by the Minster of

Information and Culture for using non-Pashto words (Najafizadeh, 2008). Many

Afghan journalists and members of the international community have lobbied for the

political independence of RTA ("Change at Radio Television Afghanistan", 2007),

which was made a public service broadcaster in the most recent Media Law (2007)

but since the law remains unpublished it is not enforceable (S Siddiqi 2009, email, 20

Mar). Journalists and media professionals suggested that the government has not

published the law because:

“It grants an independent status to Radio and Television Afghanistan (RTA)

as a public service broadcaster placing it formally outside the control of the

Ministry of Information and Culture and the rest of government.”

("Situation of Freedom of Expression in Afghanistan: Summahry of

Consultations", 2009).

Most interviewees believed that lack of professionalism from some Afghan media is

jeopardising the limited liberties available currently in the media's environment,

potentially prompting the government to propose further restrictions. The

interviewees suggest the requirement for up to date training to address issues of

professional journalism in universities. Furthermore, the government needs to show

its commitment to the country's laws and publish the approved Media Law, so RTA

can also be utilised for public education rather than a tool for dissemination of state




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generated content.

(4) Responsible Journalism

While all the journalists (2009) interviewed have raised issues about restricted

political reporting and coverage of religion, they believe they are undertaking

responsible journalism by carefully challenging these boundaries. For example Soheil

(2009) believes that Hasht-e Sobh newspaper is playing a role in addressing

corruption and human rights issues. His primary target audience are the marginal

segments of the Afghan public who can read and are familiar with literary forms of

the language. This group also share an interest in political debates and can afford to

buy newspapers (S Soheil 2009, Interviewed, 13 Mar). His journalism is attempting to

change the political 'willingness' of the elite members of the Afghan public who have

direct or indirect impact over the democratic transition of Afghanistan:

“We want to change the way our leaders think. Because if our leaders create

positive reforms and make structural changes to the way the country is

managed then our social and local problems will also be solved easier.” (S

Soheil 2009, Interviewed, 13 Mar).

He believes fundamental changes need to be made for the political and legal

frameworks of the country to complement social change (S Soheil 2009, Interviewed,

13 Mar). The newspaper is trying to create awareness about the problems through

efforts such as the dedicated column in the newspaper and on its website for 'letters to

future president' which engages public opinion for the upcoming elections

(2009," ا ف نز را "). While this is good for creating a public

response, the majority of Afghans also need their immediate problems regarding

health, poverty and education addressed (see "Afghan Media Reconstruction in

Focus", 2002). An investigation conducted by the BBC World Service Trust (2002)




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team has highlighted the importance of media “to reach the poorest in Afghanistan”

("Afghan Media Reconstruction in Focus", 2002: 6). Siddiqi (2009) is a contributor in

this report ("Afghan Media Reconstruction in Focus", 2002: 40) and he has reinforced

the importance of media's educational role in Afghanistan (S Siddiqi 2009, Interview,

17 Mar). In his view newspapers are ineffective in mobilising social change because

they target the elite and the “elite have been insignificant to recent history of

Afghanistan” (S Siddiqi 2009, Interview, 17 Mar):

“They [elite] did not have any role in changing or defining the direction of

history. It is been the masses and it is actually gone to the countryside. Even

at the moment the problem is not necessarily in the cities - it is in the

country side” (S Siddiqi 2009, Interview, 17 Mar)

This is supported by historical examples of the 1919 reforms, where Amanullah

placed intellectuals in positions of power to direct his social and political changes

(Misdaq, 2006: 64). His reign is marked as a time of cultural developments, where

significant changes were made to the Constitution (Nazemi, 2003: 27). Moreover new

legislations were introduced and women were given equal rights (Nazemi, 2003: 27).

However rural Afghans were not ready for such reforms and a tribal and religious

backlash resulted in a reversal of those changes (Tarzi, 2003). This slided back the

country's transition for over three decades and the culture stayed stagnant well into

the 1960s (Nazemi, 2003: 27). Hence Siddiqi suggests that for modern media to be

effective it should mobilise a 'grassroots reform movement' (Rosen, 1999: 1) among

the ordinary Afghans.

Haneefi (2009) believes former militants in Afghan government pose restrictions on

the media's ability to drive a reform movement as they do not allow the open

discussion of human rights issues in Afghanistan (N Haneefi, Interviewed, 8 Mar). In




- 75 -

contrast Dashty (2009) does not think there are such restrictions because in his

opinion the President and his performance can be scrutinised without any problems (F

Dashty, Interviewed, 2 Mar). However Haneefi (2009) does not believe this type of

freedom is useful because it does not address women's issues in Afghan society. She

acknowledges that women's radios are a “phenomenon” (N Haneefi, Interviewed, 8

Mar) in Afghanistan, because “women listen to women's voices” (N Haneefi,

Interviewed, 8 Mar) and since the majority of Afghan women do not undertake work

outside of home, they listen to the programs daily (N Haneefi, Interviewed, 8 Mar).

This is effective because it encourages a 'responsive public opinion' (Gunther and

Mughan, 2000: 4-5) as the women call in and discuss their issues with other female

journalists who can give “voice” (N Khairandish, Interviewed, 9 Mar) to their

problems:

“Even women who work have very little chances of being heard in society

and it is more likely that women will feel more comfortable to speak to

female journalists about their problems. In these radios women have a much

higher chance to be involved. Because we are passionate about common

issues. This gives women a voice, to me this is social change” (N Haneefi,

Interviewed, 8 Mar).

These radio programs are a source of social change for women in Afghanistan as

women previously had no rights under the Taliban. Although this change is positive,

on the other hand, rural women are still largely denied a voice and denied fair justice

within customary and even institutional legal systems in post-Taliban Afghanistan

(see Nojumi, Mazurana and Stites, 2004). Furthermore there are also social and

political restrictions on what and how female journalists can discuss women's issues

(N Haneefi, Interviewed, 8 Mar). Women's positions in voting and in education may

be legally changed, but socially and culturally their conditions are still very restricted




- 76 -

(Halliday, 1978: 36). As a result women have to report sensitive issues with greater

care:

“I am sure that if we try to practice our right to freedom of expression it

creates the most impact on the women who work with us. As some of them

live in conservative families. So we have 'to keep the society on our side'

and work within the social boundaries so we can always be active. Surely

the changes we create will inform our youth in building a better future

tomorrow” (N Khairandish, Interviewed, 9 Mar).

According to Khairandish (2009), Altai marketing has reported an estimated 300,000

listeners in Balkh and villages around the province. This is potentially a large

audience that the radio has been able to maintain through careful coverage. Sixty

percent of the programs are dedicated to women's legal, social and religious rights as

well as issues of care, pregnancy, intimacy, violence and where women can seek help

(N Khairandish, Interviewed, 9 Mar). This community focus has created positive

outcomes where Afghan women are speaking about their problems:

“Women are starting to voice their problems, something that they would

have not done in the past due to low self confidence and lack of

understanding of their roles in the Afghan society.” (N Khairandish,

Interviewed, 9 Mar)

Evidently the women's dedicated radio has created a positive movement for social

change in Afghanistan. In a society where women's rights are traditionally dictated by

'cultural codes', these radios provide an arena where women can familiarise

themselves with their rights. These radios are discreetly contributing to the women's

movement in Afghanistan.




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Thesis Conclusion

In this thesis I argued the emergence of a variety of pressure groups in Afghanistan's

post-Taliban social and political frameworks and I defined them through the term

'harmful remnants' (Price, Rozumilowicz and Verhulst, 2002: 22). In the current stage

of Afghanistan’s democratic transition, the importance of an 'enabling environment'

with an appropriate media blasphemy legislation was identified. My investigation

found that the harmful remnants are working in contradictions with the media and

they are renewing a variety of tactics for demobilising media's social change efforts

in Afghanistan.

Demobilisation of public opinion has generally been known through the direct

politicisation of the Afghan media; such as bribery and rise of political media which

are owned by parties and governments (see Hakimi, 2009; Hakimi and Aziz, 2009).

My research has identified a new form of politicisation which explains how those

harmful remnants are demobilising social change through instrumentalisation of

ethnic and religious factors in post-Taliban structures. Through various historical and

interview evidence I have demonstrated that this type of politicisation has stalled

social change in the past and if appropriate media strategies are not proposed and

practiced, those remnants can effectively backslide Afghanistan's democratic

transition.

The interview analysis in this thesis has provided the strategies undertaken by

journalists for social change in Afghanistan. Various journalists have made

suggestions on how public interest issues can be addressed without creating a




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political confrontation. While many recent reports (see Hakimi and Aziz 2009; Wafa,

and Gall, 2007) have expressed disappointment with the level of tolerance and

willingness from the political frameworks, on the other hand many Afghan journalists

perceive reconstruction of Afghan society as their job. They are not demanding

freedom of expression ‘rights’ and tolerance from their environments, but their efforts

are to create the factors that ‘enable’ and advance social change in Afghanistan.

The interviewees (2009) believe that Afghans are ready to accept a range of views

and ideas while also keeping their cultural values:

“When we are given opportunities and others support us in our cause, our women

achieve big things in society. They along with the men can play a role in the

reconstruction of their country. Their involvement is evident today, and even in the

past, where they had very little resources and opportunities to be involved” (N

Khairandish, Interviewed, 9 Mar). Evidently this powerful spirit is not easily shaken

but steps must be taken to address the issues of Afghanistan’s deteriorating media

environment, for these journalists to be safe and to continue their work in

Afghanistan.




- 79 -

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Interviews

Dashty, Faheem. Personal interview. 02 March 2009

Hadlow, Martin. Personal interview. 03 March 2009

Haneefi, Najia. Personal interview. 08 March 2009

Khairandish, Mobina. Personal interview. 09 March 2009

Siddiqi, Shirazuddin. Personal interview. 17 March 2009.

Soheil, Sanjar. Personal interview. 13 March 2009

an investigation into the issues impacting the media freedom in post-taliban afghanistan. bita...

Documents