an interorganizational approach to policy implementation

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AN INTERORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH TO POLICY IMPLEMENTATIONAuthor(s): DONALD C. MENZELSource: Public Administration Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 1 (SPRING, 1987), pp. 3-16Published by: SPAEFStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40861332 .

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AN INTERORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH TO POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

DONALD C. MENZEL University of South Florida

INTRODUCTION

Policy failure is widely believed to be a function of implementation failure. The list of studies to this conclusion grows longer each year since the pioneering works of Derthick (1972) and Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) were published. As one scholar notes, "a large collection of carefully documented case studies ... points consistently to the same basic pattern: grant pretensions, faulty execution, puny results." (Elmore 1978:186) Although implementation scholars agree with one another on this point, there is little else they agree upon. Implementation research as a field of inquiry is currently robust with ideas intended to explain why policies fail or succeed. And, "... thus far, neither a dominant person nor a single theoretical framework has emerged." (Williams, 1980:11)

This brief characterization of implementation research is not meant to discourage new investigations. Rather, it is to suggest that the field is relatively wide open for inn< vative thinking and inquiry. In a manner of speaking, implementation research is at an exciting intellectual threshold and it car be safely asserted that more rather than fewer investigations rill be launched.

That more investigations, both empirical and theoretical, are needed is beyond dispute. Indeed, this article can be viewed as part of this effort. It has two major objectives: (1) to review and assess recent attempts to develop a theory of implementation and (2) to explore the utility of applying concepts drawn from



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the organizational literature, particularly the interorganizational literature, to the study of policy implementation.

NEED FOR THEORY

The call for constructing more and better policy implementation theory is loud and clear. Hargrove's (1975:13) observation of a decade ago that "it is not clear yet what the important variables are in implementation processes" remains largely valid today. More recently, Salamon (1980:1) forcefully noted 4 ' . . that implementation research is fast heading for a dead-end not because of any failings in research, but because of a weakness in theory." Moreover, Bardach (1980:17) contends 44 the field is ready to move from the stage of natural history to the stage of comparative anatomy and physiology." Berman (1978:157) argues that 4<the emerging field of implementation analysis lacks a conceptual framework for conducting general- izable research on what goes wrong with social policy and, more importantly, on how to improve policy performance." Further reflection by Berman (1980:205) leads him to conclude that 4 'analysis should now go beyond cataloguing the seemingly inexhaustible ways for programs to fail and shift their attention to designing strategies to improve implementation." To under- take this task, investigators need a conceptual framework which permits a contingency analysis of implementation. "A context- free theory of implementation," he asserts (/bid, 206), "is unlikely to produce powerful explanations or accurate predic- tions."

These pleas for implementation theory have not been ignored. Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980), for example, contend there are five conditions which are essential to effective policy implementation. These are: (1) the existence of a sound theory whereby changes in the behavior of those whose behavior the policy seeks to influence (e.g. , industrial polluters in the case of air and water pollution policies) are correctly linked to the achievement of the policy's objectives; (2) unambiguous policy statements and target populations (i.e., those who are directly impacted by the policy) ; (3) committed and skillful leadership by those responsible for implementing the policy; (4) active



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support by const tuency groups, key legislators, and executives, with the courts I ¿ing neutral or supportive; and (5) the absence of rival attention gathering problems and issues. They believe their framework is applicable to all governmental programs but is especially suited for regulatory programs governing private behaviors, {ibid., 539)

The Sabatier-Mazmanian framework is a constructive, perhaps even large step toward developing a context-oriented theory of implementation. In fact, their framework could be criticized for being too contextual and therefore may have difficulty evolving into a fully satisfactory theory of implementation. Nonetheless, their framework embraces the major foci of implementation studies which Williams (1980:1) characterizes as 4 ' . . wide scope in looking at the interplay of various political , technical, bureaucratic, organization, and socioeconomic factors that impinge on the effort to put a decision in place. An emphasis on studying the interplay among various factors is simply another way of saying that a viable theory of implementation must be able to capture the dynamics of implementation.

A contrasting yet similar framework is presented by Van Meter and Van Horn (1975). Their framework purports to explain why discrepancies arise between desired-end-states (policy goals) and real world impact once implementation occurs. Such discrepancies, they contend, results in performance "gaps" (i.e., differences between policy promise and performance) which, if large enough, result in policy failure. Their model identifies five major features in policy implementation that, collectively and in interaction with one another, explain why policies do not turn out the way one expects them to turn out. These features are: (1) resources (e.g., funds, staff, etc.); (2) characteristics of the implementing agencies (e.g., newness, size, etc.); (3) the policy environment (e.g., economic conditions, political support, etc.); (4) communication within and between implementing agencies (e.g. , frequency, clarity, etc.); and (5) the disposition of implementing authorities (e.g., risk-taking, motivation, etc.).

The global nature of the Van Meter- Van Horn framework is both an asset and a liability. On the one hand, an emphasis on the interconnectedne88 of all that happens in implementing a



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policy is an important point to underscore. As . noted previously, policy implementation is a complex and dynamic phenomenon. Thus, a satisfactory theory must mirror, to a degree, this complexity and dynamics. On the other hand, the complexities which Van Meter and Van Horn attempt to capture in their model result in a framework that is abstract and under- specified, thus making it difficult to test empirically. For example, it is important to note that inadequate resources can cause implementation difficulties, including policy failure, but it may be more important to understand the circumstances under which resources are more (or less) important than other variables in the implementation process.

The point of this criticism, whether directed at the Van Meter- Van Horn framework or the Sabatier-Mazmanian framework, is not that these frameworks should be discarded; rather, it is to suggest that the search for a theory of implementation might be more fruitfully pursued by the development of less ambitious theories. Ideally, such theories would take into account instrumental or normative concerns guiding implementation, the interactions among policy actors, and the social-organizational context in which implementation events transpire. What is suggested is the need to build limited theories of implementation that might serve as building blocks for more encompassing theories.

But where might we turn to launch such an effort? One place is the literature of organization.

ORGANIZATION AND POUCY IMPLEMENTATION

It would be misleading to suggest that implementation theorists ignore organizations and their role in the implementation of public policies. Van Meter and Van Horn, for example, contend that "in developing our theoretical framework we have been guided by... organization theory/' (Van Meter and Van Horn, 1975:453) Sabatier and Mazmanian (1979:485) also indicate that an important element in their conceptual framework is the idea of organizations in interaction with one another. They assert that their framework "...is based upon a (proto) theory of public agencies that are in constant interaction



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with interest (constituency) groups, other agencies, and legislative (and executive) sovereigns in their policy sub- system."

Despite these acknowledgements, it might be argued that implementation scholars should give more attention to the role of organization. As Elmore explains (1979:8) "...a good piece of intellectual capital has been invested in searching for a way of avoiding entirely the problem of organizational analysis in the implementation of public policy." Such avoidance, of course, cannot be pursued with much success for organizations are the primary vehicles through which policies are implemented. 4 'Understanding organizations," Elmore (1978:186-187) con- tinues, ' 'is essential to the analysis of implementation . . . only by understanding how organizations work can we understand how policies are shaped in the process of implementation."

It is well to proclaim that an improved understanding of implementation goes hand-in-hand with an improved understanding of organizations. But the question remains: What exactly is it we need to know about organizations? When one turns to the organization literature for an answer to this question, caution is in order. As Elmore (Ibid. , 189) notes, there is no single organizational model or theory which ' * . . . adequately captures the full complexity of the implementation process." What one finds in the organizational literature is a variety of concepts and models that are more or less applicable to studying and understanding policy implementation. Although this situation presents difficulties, perhaps even pitfalls for building implementation theory, the risks are worth taking given the present state of the art.

To return to the question of ' 'what is it we need to know about organizations," we must know as much as possible about an organization's internal characteristics (e.g., decision-making style, etc.) and its external relationships. In general, from the available implementation literature we presently know far more about an organization's internal properties than about its relationships with the environment in which it functions. In fact, it is not uncommon for implementation problems to be viewed solely as internal problems which can be resolved through more effective management. Thinking along these lines, however,



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tends to ignore the following external concerns:

1. Organizado s are frequenlty dependent on other organizations for such th ags as resources, status, and authority.

2. Organizado; s are often not self-directed but primarily other-directed. Decisions and courses of action are mainly determined by ti e organizational environment.

3. Organization 9 are involved in a constant struggle for autonomy and discretion, frequently engaging in a substantial effort to create o avoid dependency on other organizations.

These external concerns are highlighted by several scholars. The author of one study concludes that "our own research suggests that while organizational characteristics of an administrative agency are critical, we often need to understand its relationship with the legislature and the governor's office as well as with the larger political culture in which the agency operates." (McDonnell, 1979:18) Berman (1978) suggests that implementation can be conceptualized as both an intra- and inter-organizational process. He labels the infra-organizational focus micro-implementation because it emphasizes the efficient translation of resources into organizational outputs, Micro- implementation issues center on "how to bring together communication, commitment, and capacity so as to carry an implementation decision into action9' (Williams, 1980:3). The view of implementation as an inter-organizational concern may be defined as macro-implementation. More broadly viewed, macro-implementation emphasizes influence and power wield- ing by implementation actors in the policy environment. By way of example, Berman (1978:184) notes:

The federal government must execute its policy so as to influence local delivery organizations to behave in desired ways; we call this the macro- implementation problem.

The discussion above suggests that (1) no single organizational theory or model is likely to be applied in a fully satisfactory way to the study of policy implementation; (2) partial theories of implementation are needed; and (3) one such theory might be



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fashioned out of interorganizational theory. The following section discusses, in an exploratory manner, the potential for developing and applying an interorganizational framework to policy implementation.

WHAT IS THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLE?

Thus far, no explicit effort has been made to define implementation or indicate what it is that implementation scholars seek to explain. To be sure references have been made to "effective" implementation or "successful" implementation. These references have implied a concern with (a) how fast an idea or policy is assimilated by a target population; (b) the extent to which policy-induced change occurs in a target population; (c) the degree to which changes in a target population coincide with desired end-states as set forth in policy goal statements; and (d) the efficiency in converting resources into implementation outputs and consequences.

These definitions have a common concern with managing goal directed behavior which, more often than not, is viewed as an hierarchical activity. As described by Elmore (1978:201), these views approximate a bureaucratic perspective on implementation, one in which "the central analytical problem is to discover where discretion resides and how existing routines can be shaped to the purposes of the policy." Reinforcing this perspective, Edwards (1980:17) declares:

If policies are to be implemented properly, implementation directives must ... be clear. If they are not, implemento» will be confused about what they should do, and they will have discretion to impose their own views on the implementation of policies, views that may be different from those of their supervisors.

Such a "top-down" view posits that anything {e.g., poor communication, inadequate coordination, too much discretion» etc.) that "impedes" implementation is undesirable. Moreover, such impediments are viewed as the sources of unwanted conflict. From an organizational perspective, then, it is assumed with equal force that conflict occurring within or among organizations is disruptive and undesirable.



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A "bottoms-up" view of implementation presents a different perspective- one in which implementation outcomes may occur in a conflict-laden environment and are determined more by action than intent. This is a rather unsettling prospect, "neither administrators or policy analysts are very comfortable with the possibility that most of what happens in the implementation process cannot be explained by the intentions and directions of policymakers." (Elmore, 1970:4) Is implementation, then, merely a set of unrelated and unpredictable events which are not susceptible to systematic investigation? The answer is a resounding "no" and several organizational theorists have provided a useful way of thinking about this matter.

Cohen, March, and Olsen' s (1977) research on organizational choice led them to conclude that organizational actors attempt to make rational choices (i.e., are guided by intention) but find that the complexities of the situation often preclude this from happening. Choices evolve out of continuing streams of problem seeking solutions, solutions looking for problems, participants moving in and out of decision situations, and choice opportunities occurring at regular and irregular intervals. This "garbage can" decision process: (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1979:37)

does not do a particularly good job of resolving problems. But it does enable choices to be made and problems sometimes to be resolved even when the organization is plagued with goal ambiguity and conflict, with poorly understood problems that wander in and out of the system, with a variable environment, and with decision makers who have many other things on their minds.

This description of organizational choice can be easily and usefully juxtaposed to implementation decision-making. First, the "messiness" which often characterizes the implementation process is, when viewed from an organizational choice perspective, "normal" and perhaps therefore not as discon- certing as is typically assumed. Second, such "noise" in the implementation process when reduced to a tolerable level makes the context of implementation more sensible and less overwhelming. Third, and perhaps most importantly, a "garbage can" view treats conflict within and between organizations as both natural and unavoidable. Other organiza-



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tional theorists also endorse this view (Nagandhi, 1969; Pfeffer and Salandk, 1978).

To take these observations one step further, the major thrust of an implementation framework constructed with interorganizational concepts would be to explain conflict and its attendant consequence, (de Haven-Smith and Van Horn, 1984) However, such a framework is likely to assume an operational definition of effective imple nentation that is unconventional; that is, implementation success or failure would be viewed in relative rather than absolute terms.

Another waj to look at the explanatory focus of an interorganizational framework is to suggest that it would approach a central concern of imp'ementation analysis- policy coordination- in a different way. '. he complexity of joint action so well documented by Pressman ind Wildavsky (1973) is a critical concern in pluralistic, hij hly organized societies. Hanf and Scharpf (1978:6), for example, assert that "...policy implementation is influenced by t very complex web of relationships between the various actors c f the different levels of government and not by a clear cut patten of hierarchical authority." Dillion and Quinn (1980:63) note:

Whether problem at issue is an antipolution efforts, a regional development plan, or the delivery of comprehensive social services for the poor, the actors are many, and the need for coordination is clear.

That the "coordination" problem is receiving increased attention cannot be denied. Indeed, some authors suggest that there now exists a "cult of coordination." That is, there is such a commitment to finding ways to improve coordination among organizations that some conceptual blindness has developed. (Kaplan, 1982:419) It might be suggested that the coordination problem can be more usefully viewed as a conflict problem. Therefore, it might be promising to focus on interorganizational conflict rather than a lack of coordination. Instead of asking, "Why is there weak coordination between implementing agencies and what can be done about it?" it might be more fruitful to accept coordination problems as "given" and ask, "What contributes to interagency conflict problems and how



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does conflict impact on the implementation of public policies?" It follows, therefore, that an interorganizational framework

necessarily focuses on the "...comparative and relational properties of an interaction network/' (Negandhi, 1969:22) Á network consists of organizational units that are interdependent in the sense that the ability of individual units "...to achieve their own objectives will depend not only on their own choices and actions but also on those of others/9 (Hanf and Scharpf, 1978:2) At one level, the unit of analysis can be defined as the "...totality of the network/' (Stern, 1979:322) At another less encompassing level, perhaps a level which might make sense for a limited theory of implementation, the unit of analysis could be defined as the relationships between pairs of organizations.

INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

One important relational property is resource dependency. Reduced to its simplest form, the more one organization depends on another organization for resources, the more likely it is that the dependent organization will be vulnerable to the influence wielded by the resource-supplying organization. (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978:46-47) In terms of interorganizational conflict, that conflict is most likely to be present when pairs of organizations are heavily dependent on yet another resource-supplying organization.

Another important relational property is structural dependency. The central idea here is that every organization is part of an interorganizational field which contains influences (legal, constitutional, etc.) that bind them together. Milward (1982:471-472) contends that an organization's power and autonomy is determined largely by where it is positioned in the interorganizational field. Consider, for example, a hypothetical case in which a city wishes to expand its boundaries but another organization (the county) is not in agreement. State law is likely to specify which government is in a more or less advantaged position, independent of the actions taken by the respective organizations. Thus, if the law states that a city can annex property without the explicit approval of the county, the city's power and autonomy is greater than that of the county. In this




hypothetical case, conflict may still occur since the influence conferred through structural conditions is seldom absolute.

The larger point is that conflict can be treated as a function of organizational interdependence. (McLear and Rogers, 1979) Studies along these lines are rare which, as Pfeffer and Salancik (1979:99) note, "...is especially remarkable since many organizations have as their primary function and purpose the control and alteration of the activities of other organizations." Of course, part of the explanation for this situation is that measures of organizational interdependency are difficult to devise. Interdependence, for example, can encompass more than resources and structure. Subjective, perceptual dependencies between members of different organizations may be as important as expressions of resource dependencies defined in terms of legal authority.

Interdependence among organizations, as argued above, fosters conflict which in turn confounds policy implementation and the attendant outcomes. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978:40) maintain that "...interdependence is the reason why nothing comes out quite the way one wants it to." Indeed, the fact that things may not come out the way one epxects them to may not be all that important when viewed from an interorganizational perspective. An interorganizational perspective assumes that implementation outcomes are often unpredictable and largely the result of the "give-and-take" among organizations pursuing independent goals. This view of implementation means that preordained outcomes are neither automatic nor assured and implementation looks "...more like a disorderly learning process than a predictable peocedure" (Berman, 1980:211). Moreover, this perspective parallels March and Olsen' s (1979) notice that organizational choice is not orderly or predictable. Decisions are made and outcomes occur is a context of organized anarchy. (Ibid.)

Elmore (1978) describes this organizational model of implementation as a conflict and bargaining model. The underlying premise is that there is no "commonality of purpose." (Ibid., 222) Other organizational models of implementation (e.g., systems management, bureaucratic process, and organizational development) assume that successful implementation is



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dependent on a common conception of policy which is shared by all participants in the implementation process. A conflict and bargaining model implies that one understands implementation by "...focusing on conflict among actors, the resources they bring to the bargaining process, and the mechanisms by which they adjust to each others' moves." (Ibid.) Stated differently, implementation becomes essentially a series of moves by individual organizations, each seeking to influence the behavior of others and with none having complete control over the outcome. The overall picture of implementation depicted here is a process in which problems, choices, and opportunities are, in part, disconnected.

CONCLUSION This article has attempted to demonstrate the potential that

an interorganizational approach has for improving our understanding of implementation. Elmore (1979:16) asserts that:

there is strong support in the literature for an analytical framework that takes account of (1) reciprocity in the relationship between superiors and subordinates in organizations; (2) the connection between hierarchical control and increased complexity; (3) discretion as an adaptive device; and (4) bargaining as a precondition for local efforts.

Berman (1978: 179) delares that:

it is time to design research so that knowledge from individual studies in different policy sectors can be cumulated and compared. To do so, we need a loose framework that defines key concepts and identifies major factors affecting implementation.

It would be immodest to suggest that interorganizational theory has me these challenges. It does not, however, seem immodest to ? aggest that the potential exists for doing so. Insofar as inUrorganizational theory holds some promise for building a the >ry of implementation, it would be as a theory which focuses on policy failure and success defined in relative terms and as a function of organizational interdependence. As suggested earlier, empirical studies along these lines would map organizational networks, i.e., identify participants and




their linkages, and/or focus on the relationships and interactions of "focal" organizations with other organizations. (Keller, 1984) Both lines of inquiry are needed and would contribute to theory building.

There is urgency in launching this line of research. One of the ironies of the 20th century is that the growth of bureaucracy and the rationalization of public choice, particularly in western democratic societies, have occurred in tandem with growing social and political pluralism. Indeed, as one futurist writes, "... power ... is increasingly randomized, so that no one knows from moment to moment who is responsible for what." (Toffler, 1980:411) The "puny" results of well-intentioned policies might well be the result of the inability of policy-makers and authoritative agencies to understand and cope with a trend toward the dispersal of influence, power, and authority. The implementation research advocated in this article could make a significant contribution toward helping policy-makers function in an increasingly interdependent yet pluralistic organizational environment.

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an interorganizational approach to policy implementation

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