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The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw MalinowskiCo-Evolution of an Economic and

Ceremonial Exchange System

Rolf ZieglerInstitute of SociologyUniversity of Munich

Bronislaw Malinowski1922

The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski

Theoretical interpretations have so far concentrated on the functions of the Kula

The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski

Theoretical interpretations have so far concentrated on the functions of the Kula

Unsolved problem: What kind of starting mechanism can explain the emergence of the Kula exchange?

The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski

Twofold basic aim: to theoretically derive the behavioral

assumptions of a starting mechanism for the emergence and co-evolution of a peaceful system of economic and ceremonial exchange from game-theoretic reasoning

The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski

Twofold basic aim: to theoretically derive the behavioral

assumptions of a starting mechanism for the emergence and co-evolution of a peaceful system of economic and ceremonial exchange from game-theoretic reasoning

to use simulation as a methodological device in order to demonstrate the macro-social consequences of a multi-level, multi-agent, dynamic system and compare them with the observed structure

The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski

A short description of the social

system of Kula exchange

Kitava

Kiriwina

Kayleula

Sinaketa

Vakuta

Amphletts

NW Dobu

Dobu

SE Dobu

East Cape

East EndIslands

Wari

Tubetube

Misima

Laughlan

Alcesters

Woodlark

Marshall Bennets

Kula-expedition

Sailing boat

Karumosa, a Kula canoe from the Trobriand-island

A friendly welcome

Ceremonial Dance

Amphlett Island pot

Trobriand gourd lime container

Yam storage shelter on Kiriwina, Trobriand Islands

Dancers at Kaibola, Kiriwina, Trobriand Islands

Dancers at Kaibola, Kiriwina, Trobriand Islands

A corpse covered with valuables

The Explanandum:the „Empirically Observed“ Kula Ring

The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski

Soulava – Necklaces

Kiriwina

KitavaKaileula

Sinaketa

Vakuta

Amphletts

NW Dobu

SE Dobu

Dobu

East Cape

TubetubeEast EndIslands

Wari

Misima

Laughlan

MarshallBennets

Alcesters

Woodlark

The Kula-RingDirection and entry of necklaces

Mwali – Armshells

Kiriwina

KitavaKaileula

Sinaketa

Vakuta

Amphletts

NW Dobu

SE Dobu

Dobu

East Cape

TubetubeEast EndIslands

Wari

Misima

Laughlan

MarshallBennets

Alcesters

Woodlark

The Kula-RingDirection and entry of armshells

Kiriwina

KitavaKaileula

Sinaketa

Vakuta

Amphletts

NW Dobu

SE Dobu

Dobu

East Cape

TubetubeEast EndIslands

Wari

Misima

Laughlan

MarshallBennets

Alcesters

Woodlark

The Kula-Ring

The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski

The general problem of explanation:barter, social order and ceremonial exchange

The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski

The general problem of explanation:barter, social order and ceremonial exchange

Three processes will be distinguished:

The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski

The general problem of explanation:barter, social order and ceremonial exchange

Three processes will be distinguished: the development of an economic trading

network

The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski

The general problem of explanation:barter, social order and ceremonial exchange

Three processes will be distinguished: the development of an economic trading

network the spread of peaceful relationships

The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski

The general problem of explanation:barter, social order and ceremonial exchange

Three processes will be distinguished: the development of an economic trading

network the spread of peaceful relationships the evolution of a ceremonial exchange

network of Kula valuables

Problem 1:Establishing Economic Trade

Problem 1:Establishing Economic Trade

„Double coincidence of wants“

Problem 1:Establishing Economic Trade

„Double coincidence of wants“ Empirical boundary conditions:

geographic distances as indicators of costs supply and demand of 25 goods

Process 1:Results of the Economic Trading Module

This simple model is completely unable to reproduce the structure of the exchange network

Process 1:Results of the Economic Trading Module

This simple model is completely unable to reproduce the structure of the exchange network

Trading by middlemen has to be added as another incentive to obtain a good fit

Process 1:Results of the Economic Trading Module

This simple model is completely unable to reproduce the structure of the exchange network

Trading by middlemen has to be added as another incentive to obtain a good fitDemand is determined not only by consumptive needs but also by demand of other exchange partners

Problem 2: Establishing Social Order

The interaction structure among two communities is a prisoners’ dilemma game

Problem 2: Establishing Social Order

The interaction structure among two communities is a prisoners’ dilemma game

Prerequisites of peaceful trade: recognizing property rights

Problem 2: Establishing Social Order

The interaction structure among two communities is a prisoners’ dilemma game

Prerequisites of peaceful trade: recognizing property rights

Shadow of the future

Problem 2: Establishing Social Order

The interaction structure among two communities is a prisoners’ dilemma game

Prerequisites of peaceful trade: recognizing property rights

Shadow of the future Exit option

Problem 2: Establishing Social Order

The interaction structure among two communities is a prisoners’ dilemma game

Prerequisites of peaceful trade: recognizing property rights

Shadow of the future Exit option Importance of expectations, trust,

reputation and fear of ostracism

Process 2: The Peace-spreading Module

In the beginning all actors use the defective “ALL D-exit strategy”; one pair exogenously changes to the conditionally cooperative “TFT-exit strategy”

Process 2: The Peace-spreading Module

In the beginning all actors use the defective “ALL D-exit strategy”; one pair exogenously changes to the conditionally cooperative “TFT-exit strategy”

An actor i contacts actor j iff j ’s reputation (= the opinion of i’s other partners about j) is predominantly positive; if it is undecided or unknown it depends on i ‘s trust

Process 2: The Peace-spreading Module

In the beginning all actors use the defective “ALL D-exit strategy”; one pair exogenously changes to the conditionally cooperative “TFT-exit strategy”

An actor i contacts actor j iff j ’s reputation (= the opinion of i’s other partners about j) is predominantly positive; if it is undecided or unknown it depends on i ‘s trust

If a contact is made the chances of peaceful trading depend on the strategies used by both actors and the trust and perception of a conditionally cooperative host j about his “guest’s” reputation

Process 2: The Peace-spreading Module

In the beginning all actors use the defective “ALL D-exit strategy”; one pair exogenously changes to the conditionally cooperative “TFT-exit strategy”

An actor i contacts actor j iff j ’s reputation (= the opinion of i’s other partners about j) is predominantly positive; if it is undecided or unknown it depends on i ‘s trust

If a contact is made the chances of peaceful trading depend on the strategies used by both actors and the trust and perception of a conditionally cooperative host j about his “guest’s” reputation

After an interaction has taken place both actors recognize and remember each other’s present true strategies

Process 2: The Peace-spreading Module

In the beginning all actors use the defective “ALL D-exit strategy”; one pair exogenously changes to the conditionally cooperative “TFT-exit strategy”

An actor i contacts actor j iff j ’s reputation (= the opinion of i’s other partners about j) is predominantly positive; if it is undecided or unknown it depends on i ‘s trust

If a contact is made the chances of peaceful trading depend on the strategies used by both actors and the trust and perception of a conditionally cooperative host j about his “guest’s” reputation

After an interaction has taken place both actors recognize and remember each other’s present true strategies

Afterwards defective players adopt the conditionally cooperative TFT-exit strategy if they have made a certain number of contacts because of fear of exclusion due to a bad reputation

Process 2: Results of the Peace-spreading Module

Without trust, reputation and fear of ostracism a coherent network almost never develops

Process 2: Results of the Peace-spreading Module

Without trust, reputation and fear of ostracism a coherent network almost never develops

With trust, reputation mechanism working and fear of ostracism peace always prevails and all actors can satisfy their consumptive needs

Problem 3: Signaling Peaceful Intentions

Problem 3: Signaling Peaceful Intentions

If both actors have a lasting interest, then they are both interested in reducing their uncertainty concerning their partner’s strategy through a reliable signaling system

Problem 3: Signaling Peaceful Intentions

If both actors have a lasting interest, then they are both interested in reducing their uncertainty concerning their partner’s strategy through a reliable signaling system

Main thesis: Reciprocal gift-giving issuch a signaling system of peaceful intentions

Problem 3: Signaling Peaceful Intentions

If both actors have a lasting interest, then they are both interested in reducing their uncertainty concerning their partner’s strategy through a reliable signaling system

Main thesis: Reciprocal gift-giving is such a signaling system of peaceful intentions

There is a common interest in creating the following convention: „Don‘t forget to present a gift, if you have a lasting interest!“

Problem 3: Signaling Peaceful Intentions

If both actors have a lasting interest, then they are both interested in reducing their uncertainty concerning their partner’s strategy through a reliable signaling system

Main thesis: Reciprocal gift-giving is such a signaling system of peaceful intentions

There is a common interest in creating the following convention: „Don‘t forget to present a gift, if you have a lasting interest!“

The problem of cheating and trust

Problem 3: Signaling Peaceful Intentions

If both actors have a lasting interest, then they are both interested in reducing their uncertainty concerning their partner’s strategy through a reliable signaling system

Main thesis: Reciprocal gift-giving is such a signaling system of peaceful intentions

There is a common interest in creating the following convention: „Don‘t forget to present a gift, if you have a lasting interest!“

The problem of cheating and trust The mechanism of reputation and the fear of

being ostracized foster both cooperative and honest behavior

The Simulation Model:Coupling of the Three Processes

EconomicBarter

Peaceful Cooperation

CeremonialExchange

The Simulation Model:Coupling of the Three Processes

EconomicBarter

Peaceful Cooperation

CeremonialExchange

Barter only possible if both actors cooperate

The Simulation Model:Coupling of the Three Processes

EconomicBarter

Peaceful Cooperation

CeremonialExchange

Barter only possible if both actors cooperate

Change of strategy due to fear of loss of reputation

The Simulation Model:Coupling of the Three Processes

Signaling function of gift exchange if reputation and trust is workingEconomic

Barter

Peaceful Cooperation

CeremonialExchange

Barter only possible if both actors cooperate

Change of strategy due to fear of loss of reputation

The Simulation Model:Coupling of the Three Processes

EconomicBarter

Signaling function of gift exchange if reputation and trust is working

Peaceful Cooperation

CeremonialExchange

Barter only possible if both actors cooperate

Exchange of Kula valuables only if trading is possible

Change of strategy due to fear of loss of reputation

The Simulation Model:Coupling of the Three Processes

Signaling function of gift exchange if reputation and trust is workingEconomic

Barter

Peaceful Cooperation

CeremonialExchange

Barter only possible if both actors cooperate

Exchange of Kula valuables only if trading is possible

Change of strategy due to fear of loss of reputation

Contact of Kula partners independent of distance

The Simulation Model:Coupling of the Three Processes

Signaling function of gift exchange if reputation and trust is workingEconomic

Barter

Peaceful Cooperation

CeremonialExchange

Barter only possible if both actors cooperate

Exchange of Kula valuables only if trading is possible

Change of strategy due to fear of loss of reputation

Contact of Kula partners independent of distance

The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski

Is the process converging towards „fixed points“?

The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski

Is the process converging towards „fixed points“?

Goodness-of-fitness measures: Similarity of trading network Degree of clockwise circulation Reachability of gift exchange

The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski

Is the process converging towards „fixed points“?

Goodness-of-fitness measures: Similarity of trading network Degree of clockwise circulation Reachability of gift exchange

Mean values of fixed points

The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski

Is the process converging towards „fixed points“?

Goodness-of-fitness measures: Similarity of trading network Degree of clockwise circulation Reachability of gift exchange

Mean values of fixed points Aggregate simulated Kula Ring

The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski

The empirical fit of this baseline model is unsatisfactory

Mean(945 fixed points)

Aggregate

Similarity .539 .628

Circulation .064 .647

Reachability .483 .039

The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski

A substantial improvement is gained by differentiating between different historical phases in the emergence of the Kula-ring

Differentiation of Historical Phases

Myths as evidence for an early „Urkula“

Differentiation of Historical Phases

Myths as evidence for an early „Urkula“ Phase 1: the process develops among the 9

members of the Urkula in the Western part

Phase 1 ofthe Ur-Kula

Kiriwina

KitavaKaileula

Sinaketa

Vakuta

Amphletts

NW Dobu

SE Dobu

Dobu

East Cape

TubetubeEast EndIslands

Wari

Misima

Laughlan

MarshallBennets

Alcesters

Woodlark

Differentiation of Historical Phases

Myths as evidence for an early „Urkula“ Phase 1: the process develops among the 9

members of the Urkula in the Western part Phase 2: the potential link between Tubetube

and Woodlark is “opened”

Phase 2 ofthe Ur-Kula

Kiriwina

KitavaKaileula

Sinaketa

Vakuta

Amphletts

NW Dobu

SE Dobu

Dobu

East Cape

TubetubeEast EndIslands

Wari

Misima

Laughlan

MarshallBennets

Alcesters

Woodlark

Differentiation of Historical Phases

Myths as evidence for an early „Urkula“ Phase 1: the process develops among the 9

members of the Urkula in the Western part Phase 2: the potential link between Tubetube

and Woodlark is “opened” Phase 3: the simulated Urkula is embedded in

the total Kula; members of the Urkula stick to their “traditional way of ceremonial exchange” among themselves

Simulation Results with Historical Phases

Bifurcation of development depending on the outcome in the Ur-Kula

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circulation measure

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Baseline Model

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Model with Historical Phases after positive Ur-Kula

Baseline Model

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Model with Historical Phases after positive Ur-KulaModel with Historical Phases after negative Ur-KulaBaseline Model

Simulation Results with Historical Phases

Bifurcation of development depending on the outcome in the Ur-Kula

Better goodness-of-fit

Simulation Results with Historical Phases(mean values of fixed points)

Baseline Model

(945 fixed points)

Model with Historical Phases

After positive Urkula (597 fixed points)

After negative Urkula (385 fixed points)

Similarity .539 .556 .556

Circulation .064 .395 –.340

Reachability .483 .657 .758

Simulation Results with Historical Phases(values of aggregate Kula)

Baseline Model

Model with Historical Phases

After positive Urkula

After negative Urkula

Similarity .628 .659 .659

Circulation .647 .622 –.676

Reachability .039 1.000 .595

The Kula-Ring of Bronislaw Malinowski

Limits and future directions