part 6: local conflicts€¦ · out the militants under operation zarb-e-azb, and partly through...

THE NAP TRACKER

99© Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

PArT 6: locAl conFlIcTs6.1 Introduction

TheNAPalsoattempts toaddresslocal conflicts in the FederallyAd-ministered Tribal Areas (FATA)(#12), Karachi (#16), and Baloch-istan (#17). The FATA conflict isbeing addressed partly by drivingout themilitants underOperationZarb-e-Azb, and partly throughmuch-neededpotential reforms intheregion.

TheMinistryofInteriorandNarcoticsControlpresentedareportintheNationalAssemblyinJanuary,2016.Accordingtothisreport,acommitteeonFATAreformshasbeenconstituted,surrenderofandreconciliationwithBaloch insurgents isunderway,anurbanpacificationoperation inKarachihascreateda significantdeclineinmurderandviolence(particularlytargetkillings),andthousandsofter-roristshavebeenarrestedorkilled.1

6.2 FATA Reforms

6.2.1HistoricalBackgroundofFATA

FATAisgeographicallylocatedalongtheDurandline,withKPonitseasternbor-der. The semi-autonomous region is comprised of seven agencies — Bajaur,Mohmand,Khyber,Orakzai,Kurram,NorthWaziristanandSouthWaziristan.

The Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), an archaic, draconian piece of legisla-tion, servesas themanifestationofgovernmentwrit in theFederallyAdminis-teredTribalAreas(FATA)ofPakistan,datingbacktotheBritishcolonialperiodinpre-partitionIndia.The“excludedareas”astheywerecalledbysection91ofthecolonialconstitutionallawofGovernmentofIndiaActarestilltheexcludedareasfromtherealmofdevelopment,investment,andmoderncivilization.FATAhasno

1 QuestionsandOralAnswers,28thsessionoftheNationalAssembly.(2016,January15).RetrievedMarch15,2016,fromhttp://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/ques-tions/1452850149_459.pdf.

locAl conFlIcTsNAP POINT 12:Administrativeanddevel-opmentreformsinFATAwithimmediatefocusonrepatriationofIDPs.

NAP POINT 16:OngoingoperationinKa-rachiwillbetakentoitslogicalend.

NAP POINT 17:Balochistangovernmenttobe fully empowered for political rec-onciliationwith complete ownership byallstakeholders.

THE NAP TRACKER

100 © Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

networkofthestateinstitutionsinthemodernsense.Almostsevendecadesafterindependence,tribalPashtunsremainsubjecttotheapplicationofthisludicrous,inhumanesetofregulations.

Article247oftheconstitutionstates:“SubjecttotheConstitution,theexecutiveauthorityoftheFederationshallextendtotheFederallyAdministeredTribalAr-easandprovinceshallextendtotheProvinciallyAdministeredTribalAreas”.NW-FP’sprovincialgovernorexercisesexecutiveauthorityinFATAasthepresident’srepresentative.TheoveralladministrativeandpoliticalcontrolofFATAfallsundertheFederalMinistryofStatesandFrontierRegions(SAFRON).

6.2.2FCRversus1973Constitution

Pakistan’sconstitutionaffordsfundamentalhumanrights,includingequalcitizen-ry,toallPakistanisunderarticles8-28.However,underarticle247theseprovi-sionsarenullandvoidforFATA.Noactoftheparliamentextendstotheseareasunlessthepresidentdirectsso.Infact,evenlawmakerselectedfromtheregioncanlegislateforanypartofthecountry,exceptforFATA.TheFCRdiscriminatesboth incivilandcriminalmatters,classifiescitizens,doesnotrequireproof forconvictionora civil decree,andgivesno rightofdefensebya counselor,orarightofappeal. Inshort,theConstitutionoftheIslamicRepublicofPakistanasawhole,forallpracticalpurposes,isaredundantandtautologicaldocumentasfarasitsapplicationinFATAisconcerned.Consequently,thepeopleofFATAhaveneitherany‘humanrights’norcantheyclaimanyotherstatus,privilege,positionconferreduponothercitizensofPakistanbytheconstitution.

PleaseseeSection6.6foradetailedargumentonFATAreforms.

6.2.3CurrentStatus:FATAReforms

FATAReformsCommittee,thelatestinalineofmany,wasformedinMay2014,priortotheenactmentofNAP,toframestrategicobjectivesforthevolatiletribalareas.Thiscommitteereleaseditsreportafterthoroughdeliberation.2Butunfor-tunatelythereportdidn’tcomeupwithanysuggestionsonFATAreforms.

AnothercommitteewasformedbythePrimeMinister,almostayearaftertheAPSattack,inNovember,2015.3Themovewasseenbymanyasameanstoappease

2Ali,Z.(2014,March20).AnothercommissionformedonFatareforms.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1107498.3Manan,A.(2015,November09).Govtformshigh-poweredpanelonFATAreforms-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/987775/notification-is-

THE NAP TRACKER

101© Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

FATA lawmakers forwithdrawalof their candidateagainstSardarAyazSadiq,amerefivedaysbeforetheelectionoftheNationalAssemblyspeaker.ThereportpresentedtotheNationalAssemblydetailsnoprogressonFATAreforms,exceptthatthecommitteehasbeenformed,SpecialAdvisortothePrimeMinisterSartajAzizhasbeenappointedasthehead,andconsultationsareunderway.1Thecom-mitteewasmeanttodeliberateoverthreecoreissues:

1. extendingthejurisdictionofthesuperiorcourtstoFATA;

2. shiftingthelegislativepowersforthetribalareasfromthehandsofthepresidentandgovernorKPtotheparliament,andtotheBalochistan/KPAssemblies;and

3. decidingifFATAshouldbemadepartofmainstreamKPoroftheProvin-ciallyAdministeredTribalAreas(PATA)inKPorifitshouldbegiventhestatusofaprovinceofPakistan.

Thusfar,thecommitteehasofferednothingsubstantial.

AFATATribunalwasre-formedbythegovernmentinMay2015,totakeupcasesdispensedbyadministrators.TheprevioustribunalhadexpiredinJanuary,2015.4 Thisisanad-hocmeasurethatdoeslittletohelpthepeopleofFATA,andhasverylimitedpowerstoaffectchange.

6.3 FATA: Operation Zarb-e-Azb

OperationZarb-e-Azb is a jointmilitary offensive beingconductedbythe Paki-stanArmedForces againstvarious militantgroups,includingthe Tehreek-i-TalibanPakistan (TTP), the IslamicMovementofUzbekistan (IMU), the EastTurkestanIslamicMovement(ETIM), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi(LeJ), al-Qaeda(AQ), Jundallah and the HaqqaniNetwork.Theoperationwas launchedon June14,2014 in NorthWaziristan,buthas sinceexpanded to includeurbanpacificationoperations intheportcityofKarachiinSindhprovince.Theoperationhas30,000soldiersonthefrontlines,andwaslaunchedfollowingthebreakdownofnegotiationswithextremistelementsandabrazenattackonKarachiairport.5

sued-govt-forms-high-powered-panel-on-fata-reforms/.4BureauReport.(2015,March28).‘Muchawaited’FataTribunalformed.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1184671.5Salahuddin,Z.(2014,April24).CounteringInsurgency.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2014/08/29/pakistan-countering-insurgency.

THE NAP TRACKER

102 © Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

6.3.1Progress

OnJune13,2015,thePakistanimilitaryreportedprogressovertheoperationinthecourseofayear.DirectorGeneraloftheInterServicesPublicRelations(ISPR)AsimSaleemBajwareportedthat2,763militantshadbeenkilledsofar,includ-ing218terroristcommandersin9,000intelligencebasedoperations(IBOs).6Theupdatealsolisted837hideoutsdestroyed,253tonsofexplosivesrecovered,and18,087weaponsseized.347officersandsoldiershadalsosacrificedtheirlivedintheoperation.Thisaccountsforthefirstyearoftheoperation.Thereportpre-sented intheNationalAssembly inJanuary,2016claims2,159terroristskilled,andanother1,724arrestedoverthecourseofthefirstyearoftheNAP.1

Graph 6.1 Progress against Militancy and Armed Combatants

ThisgoesontoshowthatthelawenforcementagenciesinPakistanareparticu-larlyadeptatkillingtheextremistthreat.However,thisasymmetricalwarfareisnotsustainableasitdoesnothingtoeliminatetheradicalideologythatformstherootofthisconflict.Pakistanneedssignificantpolicychangesandlawreformsto

6ISPR.(2015,June13).ISPRPressRelease-NoPR170/2015-ISPR.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttps://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2015/6/13.

THE NAP TRACKER

103© Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

ensuretherelativepeaceacquiredismaintainedinthelongrun.

PleaseseeSection6.7foradetaileddiscussiononthefutureofNAPinFATAandKP.

6.3.2InternallyDisplacedPersons

PleaseseeSection8.3.3:IDPs–RehabilitationPlans.

6.4: Karachi Operation

6.4.1ViolenceinKarachi

DatacollectedbytheCenterforResearchandSecurityStudies(CRSS)showsthatdespitetheviolenceinFATA,Karachiremainedthemostviolentandvolatiledis-trictinPakistanthelastseveralyearsrunning.Karachilost5,063personstovio-lenceinthelastthreeyears.However,thelevelofviolencehasreducedbynearly78%inSindh,whileKarachiwitnesseda48%dropinthefatalitiesfromdifferentformsofviolenceintheyear2015.7

7Nafees,M.,Gul,I.,&Salahuddin,Z.(2016,February26).CRSSAnnualSecurityReport-2015.RetrievedFebruary26,2016,fromhttp://crss.pk/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/CRSS-Annual-Se-curity-Report-2015.pdf.

THE NAP TRACKER

104 © Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

Graph 6.2 Violence in Karachi – 2013 – 2015

6.4.2Ranger’sDeploymentinKarachi

RangersareaparamilitaryforceundercontroloftheMinistryofInterior,andtheirprimarytaskistoguard,defendandsecurebordersinpeacetimeaswellaswartime,provideandmaintainsecurityinwarzonesandareasofconflict,andmain-tainlawandorderwhichincludesprovidingassistancetothe police.

TheRangersKarachioperationwasinauguratedbyPrimeMinisterNawazSharifonSeptember5,2013,toridthecityofcrime,politicalmilitancyandviolence.8 Twoyearslater,theRangersannouncedthecompletionofphaseone,withthesecondphasetocommencefromAugust14,2015.9

TheRangersoperationinKarachicontinuesatthetimeofwritingthisreport.

6.4.3ShiftinFocussinceNAP

Anewsenseofurgencywasobserved in January,2015,whenthePMcalleda

8Tunio,H.(2013,September04).Karachilawandorder:Rangerstolaunchoperationintwodays-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/600064/kara-chi-law-and-order-rangers-to-launch-operation-in-two-days/.9Khan,F.(2015,August10).FirststageofKarachisecurityoperationcomplete:Rangers-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/935314/fist-stage-of-karachi-security-operation-complete-rangers/.

THE NAP TRACKER

105© Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

highlevelmeetingonthelawandordersituationinKarachi.10Therewasaclearshift inmandate,as justoveramonth later,politicalmilitancy,a long-standingsourceofextremeviolence in thecitywas targeted inKarachi.Rangers raidedtheheadquartersofMuttahidaQaumiMovement(MQM),arrestingabscondersandrecoveringbanned,unlicensedweaponry.11ThusbothsourcesofviolenceinKarachi,religiousmilitancyandpoliticalmilitancy,weretargeted.

6.4.4OutcomesofKarachiOperation

IntheJanuary,2016reporttotheNationalAssembly,itwassharedthatasignif-icantdeclineinviolence,militancyandcrimewasobservedinKarachi.1 Accord-ingtothereport,targetkillingwasdownby53%,robberiesdownby30%,andextortiondownby56%.69,179criminalshadbeenarrested,whichinclude890terrorists,676proclaimedoffenders,10,426absconders,124kidnappers,545ex-tortionists,and1,834murderers.Thereportalsoclaimedthat16,304weaponshadbeenrecovered.

10Khan,F.(2015,August10).PMsummonshigh-levelmeetingonlawandordersituationinKarachitomorrow-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/829573/pm-summons-high-level-meeting-on-law-and-order-situation-in-karachi-tomorrow/11Salahuddin,Z.(2015,April15).ANewTurnforPakistan’sFightAgainstMilitancy.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/15/a-new-turn-for-pakistans-fight-against-militancy/.

THE NAP TRACKER

106 © Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

Graph 6.4 Karachi Operation Outcomes - Milestones

THE NAP TRACKER

107© Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

Graph 6.3 Karachi Operation Outcomes - Arrested

Thisdata isbackedbyfindings from theCenter forResearchandSecurityStudies,althoughthefiguresdiffersomewhat.7

PleaseseeSection6.8foradetaileddiscussiononKarachi.

6.5: Baluchistan Insurgency

6.5.1BaluchistanNationalistMovement

Balochnationalisminitscontemporaryformbegannearlyacenturyagointhe1920s in theformof theAnjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Balochan(AIB -OrganizationforUnityoftheBaloch).ThemovementclaimsthattheBalochpeopleareanation,andemphasizesethnicloyaltyoverreligiousloyalty;anideathatiscontrarytotheideologybehindPakistan’s creation.Theirdemandshave ranged fromcultural,

THE NAP TRACKER

108 © Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

economicandpoliticalreforms,topoliticalautonomy,tooutrightsecessionfromPa-kistan.ThemovementissecularandheavilyinfluencedbyleftistMarxistideology.12

6.5.2BalochInsurgentGroups

Theongoing insurgency isnot thefirstof its kind. In fact, thecurrent conflict,startedin2003,isthefifthofitskind.13TheinsurgentsinPakistanarefragmentedintoseveralgroups,mainlytheBalochLiberationArmy(BLA),theBalochRepubli-canArmy(BRA),theBalochLiberationFront(BLF)andtheLashkar-e-Balochistan(LeB-Baluchistan’sarmy).Whilethisfragmentationisreflectiveofthetribalna-tureofBalochnationalists,theirdemandsaredeeplyrootedinBalochnationalistideology.

6.5.3MissingPersons

Missingpersons isagenerictermusedinPakistantorefertotheostensiblyhun-dredsofpersonsin Pakistan whohavedisappeared inconflictzones.

Thenumberofmissingpersons isacontested issue,withahugegulfbetweentheclaimsbyBalochactivists,humanrightsbodiesandthestatisticsofthegov-ernment.MamaQadeer’sVoiceforBalochMissingPersons(VBMP)hasalwaysclaimed the highest toll at 21,000+14. This is abnormally different fromofficialnumbers, as theCommissionof InquiryonEnforcedDisappearances (CIED) in-formedtheSupremeCourtthat982missingpersonshadbeentracedinthelastfouryears.15AccordingtoCIED’sreport,1,273casesofenforceddisappearancesarestillunresolved,withonly122ofthembelongingtoBalochistan.Meanwhile,DefenceofHumanRights,anNGOthattracesmissingpeople,putsthenumberat5,149fromalloverPakistan.16

Missingpersonsremainathornyissueforauthoritiestonavigate.Withoutaprop-erresolutionoftheproblem,reconciliationeffortswillbehamperedinBalochistan.

12Breseeg,T.M.(2004).Balochnationalism:Itsoriginanddevelopment.Karachi:RoyalBookCompany.13BBC.(2014,February22).Balochistan:TheuntoldstoryofPakistan’sotherwar-BBCNews.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26272897.14Correspondent.(2015,April17).Raisinghisvoice:21,000missinginBalochistan,saysMamaQa-deer-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/871142/raising-his-voice-21000-missing-in-balochistan-says-mama-qadeer/.15Malik,H.(2015,February22).Enforceddisappearances:Upto982missingpersonstracedinthepastfouryears-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/842656/enforced-disappearances-up-to-982-missing-persons-traced-in-the-past-four-years/.16Iqbal,N.(2015,January14).SCseeksreportonnumberofmissingpersons.RetrievedMarch2,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1156658.

THE NAP TRACKER

109© Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

PleasealsoseeSection4.3:CPECSecurity.

6.5.4ReconciliationEfforts

ThegovernmentcurrentlybelievesthatreconciliationandaddressinggrievancesisthebestwaytoappeasetheBalochnationalistsandtoendtheconflictintheprovince.ThereportpresentedtothelawmakersintheNationalAssemblybytheInteriorMinisterChaudharyNisarisfairlyvague.Verbatim,itstatesthat“surren-derandreconciliation/rehabilitationofabsconders/outlawsinprogress”.1 Theex-actfigureforinsurgentswhohavesurrenderedvariesfromsourcetosource,butitwasreportedthat625insurgentslaiddowntheirarmsinthelastsixmonths.17

According to another report, some 1,025 militants, belonging to various pro-scribedoutfits,have surrenderedbefore theprovincial governmentduring thepastyear.18

InApril2015,BalochistanChiefMinisterDr.AbdulMalikalsosaidthatarecon-ciliationstrategyhadbeendevisedtohelpmainstreamBalochnationalists.19ThePrimeMinisteralsovisitedBalochistaninAugustandlauncheda“PeacefulBaloch-istanPlan”tobringangryBalochsbackintothefold.20AfterameetinginOctoberbetweentheCMandthePM,theCMannouncedthathewouldholdatribalcoun-cil tomeetexiled leadersandpersuadethemto jointhepoliticalmainstream.21 BalochistanMinisterNawabSanaullahZehrihadalsomettheKhanofKalat22 inLondonearlierinAugust,2015aspartofthereconciliationpolicy.23

PleaseseeSection6.9foradetaileddiscussiononBalochistan.

17Correspondent.(2016,February08).Balochistanreconciliation:625insurgentssurrenderedinsixmonths-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/sto-ry/1042338/balochistan-reconciliation-625-insurgents-surrendered-in-six-months/.18(2016,April26).1,025militantssurrenderedinBalochistanduringpastyear.RetrievedMarch06,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1254551.19Khan,A.(2015,April26).ReconciliationplandrawnupforestrangedBalochleaders:CM-TheExpressTribune.RetrievedMarch06,2016,fromhttp://tribune.com.pk/story/876111/reconcilia-tion-plan-drawn-up-for-estranged-baloch-leaders-cm/.20Shahid,S.(2015,August07).Planfor‘peacefulBalochistan’approved.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1198912.21Ali,S.(2015,October08).SharifintensifieseffortstoreconcilewithexiledBalochleaders.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://nation.com.pk/national/08-Oct-2015/sharif-intensifies-ef-forts-to-reconcile-with-exiled-baloch-leaders.22CurrentKhan-e-Kalat,MirAghaSulimanDaud,wentintoself-exileintheUnitedKingdomaftertheassassinationofNawabAkbarBugtiin2006anddecidedtofromagovernmentinexileofBalochistan.23Shah,S.A.(2015,August15).ZehrimeetsKhanofKalatinLondon.RetrievedMarch04,2016,fromhttp://www.dawn.com/news/1200640.

THE NAP TRACKER

110 © Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

6.6 ARTICLE: FATA Reforms: the Political Economy by Imtiaz Gul24

DowntheRabbitHole

InDecember 2006, at the height ofGeneral (retd) PervezMusharraf’s contro-versialcareeras thePresidentofPakistan,a largemeetingwasconvened.Theattendees includedofficials from FATA, FATA Secretariat (including the PoliticalAgents),SAFRON,andthethenNWFPGoverner,aswellasanumberofFATAelitessuchasministersandclerics,andacontingentofthemilitaryestablishment.ThePresident’s intentwastoputalltheFATAstakeholdersinoneroom,anddeter-minethefutureofFATA.Fornearlythreedays,fieryspeeches,ambitiousplansandreformproposalsbouncedbackandforthbetweenthepoliticalandmilitaryelite,theonlycommonthreadbeinguniversalpraiseforMusharraffortakingtheinitiative.

However,theenthusiasmgavewaytocautiononthethirdday,whenparticipantsuniversallyadmonishedMusharraftonottinkerwiththeexistingsystem,lesthewas prepared to face catastrophic consequences. Despite days of deliberationanddiscussion,thegrouprose,undecided,perhapstomeetanotherday.OneofthePoliticalAgents(PAs)recountedtheseproceedingstomeattheParliamentar-ian’sLodgesinIslamabad.HewasnotparticularlythrilledaboutfuturemovementonthestatusofFATAeither,andperhapsunderstandablyso.Militaryofficials,hesaid,disfavoredanychangesintheviewoftheongoing“religiousinsurgency”.

Themilitary’sstakeinFATAalsocametolightin2009,whena27-memberCom-mittee on Constitutional Reforms deliberated extensively and climaxed withamendments to 105 articles of the federal constitution. However, not one oftheseappliedtoPartXII:Miscellaneous–ChapterIII:TribalAreas.Specifically,Ar-ticle246-whichgeographicallydefines“TribalAreas”,“ProvinciallyAdministeredTribalAreas”and“FederallyAdministeredTribalAreas”-andarticle247-whichgives the President sweeping powers, and excludes these areas fromany par-liamentarylegislation,orlegaljurisdictionfromtheSupremeCourtoranyHighCourt-weresimplymissingfromthesuggestedlist.

RepresentativesfromtheAwamiNationalParty(ANP)andPakistanPeople’sPar-ty(PPP)toldmeinbackgroundinterviewsthatthemilitaryopposedanydiscus-siononFATA.Jameat-e-Ulema-e-IslamFazl-ur-Rehman(JUI-F)membersremainedvaguewhenaskedaboutFATA.Nearlyeveryoneagreedontheneedforreforms,butnonehadanysolutions,andmostblamedtheGHQ.Militaryofficials,includ-ingGeneralTariqKhan,thethenInspectorGeneraloftheFrontierCorps,toldmetheparliamentarians“askedusforouropinionandwetoldthemthatthetiming

24Articlere-printedwithauthor’spermission.

THE NAP TRACKER

111© Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

wasnotright”.But,heunderscored,themilitaryleftittothewilloftheparlia-mentarianstodowhatevertheywantedwithFATA.

Thenetresultwasthattherewasnotevenan“expressionofintentwithregardstochangesinFATA”inthe18thAmendment,passedonApril10,2010.However,tosolelyblamethemilitary’smanipulationoftheFATAreformagendawouldbefeigningobliviousnesstothepoliticaleconomyoftheregion.Thisrabbitholegoesthedeeperthemoreyoutraverseit.

AMatterofRegulations

Inordertounderstandthepoliticaleconomyoftheregion,itisimportanttofirsttakealookatthehistoryandnatureofFATA’scurrentstatus,aswellastheFron-tierCrimesRegulation(FCR).

Historically,FATAhasalwayspresentedacomplexsetofjudicialandadministra-tiveproblems.TheFCR,formedin1901,wasanevolutionoftheMurderousOut-ragesRegulationof1867,whichgaveBritishrulers,historicallyunabletoestab-lish theirwrit in the tribal region,powers toprosecute individuals forheinouscrimes,suchasmurder.In1947,PakistannotonlyadoptedtheFCR,butaddedtheclausethatwouldallowforanindividual’sarrestwithoutevenspecifyingthecrime.Sincethen,theFCRisalmostuniversallyseenasasystemofoppression,outdated,ill-advised,anddraconic.Overtime,theregulationhasbeenamendedseveraltimes,butnevertothebenefitofthepeopleofFATA.

TheFCRcontains64sections,mostofthemill-intended,butthemostdetrimentalonesaresections21-30,32,34and40.Sections21-30,alsoknownastheCol-lectiveResponsibilityclause,allowatribetobepunishedfortheactionsofonemember.Section34allowsforhomesandpropertyofthetribesmentobede-molished,if,forinstance,thestatewishestoacquirethatland.Section32allowsforentiresettlementstobeburnedtotheground.Section40,perhapsthemostabusedofall,allowstheadministrationtodetainaperson,potentiallyforyears,onmeresuspicion,andwithoutproof.ThisalsoimpliesthatthereisnoprovisionfortheaccusedtoappealandprovehisinnocenceundertheFCR.

TheFCRisalsocreditedwiththeriseofmilitancyinPakistan.ProfessorIjazKhanofPeshawarUniversitybelievesthatasatooltoimposeruleoflawandimproveservicedeliveryinthejusticesector,theFCRonlybecameweakerthanitalreadywasafter9/11.WhentheTalibanfledAfghanistan,theycametoFATAbecausetherewasalreadyasecurityvacuumduetopoorgovernance, lackofdevelop-ment,withno judicialoradministrative systemworking for thewelfareof thepeople,illiteracy,andanti-stateangst,allofwhichhelpedthemilitantsmakethisregiontheirsafehaven.

THE NAP TRACKER

112 © Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

TheFCRisalsocompletelysilentonwomen,andaffordsthemnorights.

Understandably,thecontinuationoftheFCRandthelackofprogressonthesta-tusofFATAonlywidenedthegulfbetweenthecitizensofFATAandthefederation.

FATA is theonly region inPakistanwhere theparliament cannot legislate, andtheapexcourtscannotadjudicate.TheareaisadministeredbytheGovernor(asarepresentativeof thepresident)of theKhyberPukhtunkhwaprovince,underthesupervisionofSAFRONinIslamabad.Oddly,the12membersintheNationalAssemblyand8intheSenatefromFATAcanvoteandlegislateonbillsinanypartof thecountry,but theconstituents they represent.Theyhaveno technicalorpoliticalpowerunderarticle247oftheconstitution.TherealpowerbelongswiththePoliticalAgents.

PoliticallyEconomical

JohnDalberg-Acton,theEnglishCatholichistorian,writerandpoliticianoncesaid,“Powertendstocorrupt,andabsolutepowercorruptsabsolutely.” InPakistan,nowhereisthismoreevidentthantheroleofthePAs.PoliticalAgentsarea)thesymbolofthestate’sauthority,b)thetribalpeople’sadvocate,andc)theliaisonbetweenthepeopleandthegovernment.ThePAservesinthreeofficialcapaci-ties,a)thetitularoffice,b)districtmagistrate,andc)sessionsjudge.Hecanevenimposecurfew,rejectbail,andholdsomeoneinconfinementindefinitely.

Nearuniversally, thePA role is viewedascorruptofficialsenjoyingunchecked,boundlesspower.Facilitatedandpoweredbytheroughly35,000orsoMaliks(ti-tle-holders/representativesoftribes),theFCRisoftenusedasafulcrumtoexactpoliticalvengeance.TheeliteandrichcaneasilyleveragetheFCRasamechanismtoescapepunishment(avoteofconfidencefromfourMalikscanpreventdeten-tion),andasatooltoeliminatecompetition,punishenemies,orcleartheplayingfield.Itiseasytoseehowthisoppressiveandunjustsystemcanbeexploitedbythosewithresourcesandpower,andabhorredbyyouthandthelowestrungsofthesocio-economicstrata.

TheanecdoteatthetopsuggeststhatthemilitaryestablishmentisadamantlyandhistoricallyopposedtochangesinthestatusofFATA.TheypresentaformidableblockadeagainstprogressonFCRreforms.The35,000orsoMaliksinFATA,andtheelite,includingtheministers,thebusinessmenandotheraffluentinfluentialsthatenjoyalifeofluxuryandprivilegewithoutconsequence,alsoopposereformsin theregion.Finally, theFATASecretariatandSAFRONareakeystakeholders.TheSecretariatunderthegovernor,includingthesevenPoliticalAgents,andtheirrespectivestaffs(essentiallyasmatteringofsuper-empoweredbureaucratsinIs-lamabadandPeshawar),haveahugemonetarystakeinthestatusquo.ThemostpowerfulandvocalofthesehailfromKhyberandBajaurAgencies,Bannu(North

THE NAP TRACKER

113© Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

Waziristan)andD.I.Khan(SouthWaziristan).

CurrentProgress

TheattemptatFATAreforms isnotnew.ThemeetingwithMusharraf in2006,andtheconstitutional reforms in2009,are just twoexamples. In2010,elevenreformsintheFCRwereproposedbythePoliticalPartiesJointCommitteeonFATAReforms.Thesewerechidedforbeinginvariablychainedtogovernmentinterests.InAugust2011,thethenPresidentAsifAliZardaripassedaPresidentialOrdertoamendtheFCR.Althoughminimalinitsscope,it isstillrecognizedasthemostpracticalandsignificantchangeintheregulationsinceitsinception.

Years later, inMay2014,weatCRSShadanotheropportunity todiscussFATA,thistimethrougha20-episodeseriesofTVshowsand60radioshows-involv-ing about 50notables such as FATAMPs, businessmen, civil societymembers,andrepresentativesfrommainstreampoliticalparties.Ironically,allthesediscus-sions yieldeda fragmentedpicture;mostof theyouth - students, civil society,andyoungerparliamentariansvociferouslyadvocatedfortheabolitionofFATA’scurrentstatus.Mostoftheparliamentariansandbusinessmen,however,pleadedforaphased,incrementalchangetothestatusofFATAthroughextensionofthewritofthePeshawarHighCourtandthelocalgovernmentelections.EvensomeoftheofficialswespoketoalsoarguedthattouchingFATAinexistingcircumstanc-eswasadangerousproposition.Thismirrorsthepoliticaleconomydichotomyintheprevioussections.

Mostrecently,inSeptember2015,nearlythreemonthsaftertheFATAReformsCommission’sreport,sourcesindicatethata“step-by-stepprocedureformerg-ingtribalareasintosettleddistricts”isunderway.Toprecipitatethis,BajaurandMohmandAgenciesfromFATAwillbemergedintoPATA.Theestimatedtimeforthistransitionis8-10months,anditwillserveasasteppingstoneforotherareastobebroughtintothenationalfold.Onthe9th,the22ndConstitutionalAmend-mentBillwaspresentedintheNationalAssemblybyFATAlawmakers,proposingamendmentstoArticles246/247tograntfullcitizenshiprightstothetribesmen,extendthereachofapexcourtstotheregion,andthemergerofFATAintoKP.

TheWayForward

Moong Qabail,theseriesofmediaprogramsCRSSconductedonFATAreforms,broughtfortharangeofsuggestedsolutionsandideasonhowtomanagethiscentury-oldproblem.Theseriespublicallyandempiricallyconfirmedthesenti-mentthatthepeopleofFATAholdFCRresponsiblefortheillsbeingsuffered,andthat itwastime itwasrepealed, reformed,orabolishedaltogether.Thestatusquosimplycannotcontinue.ThepeopleinFATAmayholdthegreenpassport,buttheConstitution’sArticle247andtheFCRdeprivesthemoffundamentalhuman

THE NAP TRACKER

114 © Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

rightsandcivilliberties,eventhoughtheyareaffordedtocitizensinallotherpartsofthecountry.TheseFederally“Alienated”TribalAreasaredeniedtheirrighttolife,security,justiceandexpression.

TheabolishmentoftheFCRpresentsthreeoptionsforthestatusofFATA.FATAcouldbemergedintoKP,becomeitsownprovince,orFATAcouldrunwithitsownGovernorwithCentralCouncil,aswellasagencyandtehsilcouncils.The22ndCon-stitutionalAmendmentproposesthefirstofthese.Failingthis,aplethoraofis-suesneedtobemanaged.Theseincludetheinfluenceofthepoliticalagents,theseparationofadministrationand judiciary, theFATAcouncil,holding localbodyelections,representationofwomen,development,educationandhealthfacilitiesandtheinfluenceofthegovernmentwithintheambitofthejudiciary.

As it stands, two things seemtobehappening simultaneously: thegingerfirststepofmergingtwoagenciesintoPATA,anddoingawaywithFCRaltogether,andmergingFATAintotheKP.Botharegoodnewsforapeoplesubjugatedbyoveracenturyofbadgovernance,archaicpolicies,anddatedregulations,butitmustbesaidthatneitherisofficialorexpectedsoon.MostoftheolderFATAMPsbelievein a gradual shift from the current status tomainstreamingof FATA.However,thepulloftheforcesofstatusquoissimplymuchstrongerthanthosewhofavorcomprehensive reform,wherebythe lawof the landcouldbeextendedto theFATAanditcouldbethusmainstreamed.Toturnthetide,aseriesofmechanismswillneedtobedeployedtohelpmitigatethepowerfulpoliticaleconomythatsovehementlyresistsanyattemptatchange.

Imtiaz Gul is a noted media analyst and author of several books. He is also the Executive Director at CRSS. He can be reached at imtiaz@crss.pk.

THE NAP TRACKER

115© Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

6.7 OPINION: NAP has to go a long way in KP/FATA by Shiraz Paracha

ThePakistanTehreek-e-Insaf(PTI)ledbyImranKhanhasbeenleadingacoalitiongovernment in theKhyberPakhtunkhwaProvinceof Pakistan for thepast twoyearsandahalf.

Thecricketer-turned-politicianclaimshisparty’sgovernmenthastransformedtheprovincialpoliceintothebestpoliceforceofthecountrybutitidhardtoprovethatclaimifonelooksatthelaw&ordersituationandthecrimerateintheprov-ince.

Justtwodaysbeforetheturnoftheyear,thecarnageinMardan,thesecondlarg-estcityofKhyberPakhtunkhwa,wasastarkreminderthatalotmoreneedstobedonebytheprovincialgovernmentbeforeitclaimsthatsituationisbacktonor-malintheprovince.Atleast26peoplewerekilledwhenasuicidebomberblewhimselfupattheofficeofNationalDatabaseandRegistrationAuthority(NADRA)inthecity.Another52werewounded.

Itwas thefirstmajorattack in theprovincesince thedastardlygunandbombattackattheAmyPublicSchoolinPeshawarinwhichnearly150people,mostoftheminnocentstudents,weremoweddownbyagroupofterroristsassociatedwiththeTehreik-e-TalibanPakistan.ItwastheattackwhichsentshockwavesnotonlythroughoutPakistanbutacrosstheworld.

ObserverssayhadsecurityguardbeennotpostedattheNADRAofficegateandhewouldnothavestoppedtheattackerfromgettingintotheoffice,thefatalitiescouldhavecrossedthe200marksastheNADRAofficewaspackedwithscoresofpeoplelookingfortheirnationalidentitycards.

QuestionsarebeingaskedthathowcouldthebombermanagetocometotheofficeoftheNADRAridingonmotorbikewithoutbeingnoticed.

Theattackisallthemoreshockingforithastakenplaceinanareawhichisthebirthplaceof2500-year-oldancientGhandharaCivilization.

MonkstrainedatBuddhistschoolsofMardanregionwouldtraveltopresentdayJapan,KoreaandChinatospreadBuddha’smessageofpeaceandtranquility.

Nearly90yearsago, fromhere,KhanAbdulGhafarKhanalsoknownasBachaKhan,hadlaunchedanon-violentmovementfortheindependenceofIndiafromthecolonialrulefromthesameregion.

Unfortunately,thisentireregionwasturnedintoabastionofTalibanandextrem-

THE NAP TRACKER

116 © Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

istsoverpastfewdecades.

ManypeoplesuspectthatextremismspreadinthePakhtunregionontheprod-dingofthepowerfulestablishmentwhichpamperedextremistsgroupstoachieveforeignpolicyobjectivesinAfghanistanandIndia.

Dubbedas“military-mullah”alliance,thethistwo-waycooperationandcoordina-tioncontinueduntiltheAPSdeadlyattackon16December2014.

Followingthattragedy,Pakistanipoliticalandmilitaryleadershipagreedonacom-prehensivestrategyintheshapeofNationalActionPlan(NAP)tofightterrorism.

ThegovernmentclaimstheNAPisbeingsuccessfullyimplementedbutthatclaimisbeingwidelydisputed.

Itistruethatoverthepastoneyearcoordinationamongintelligenceagencieshasimproved,aspecialcounterterrorismforcehasbeenestablishedinKhyberPakh-tunkhwa,but,targetkillings,kidnappingsandradicalizationofpeoplecontinuesintheprovince.

Governmentsourcessaythenumberofterroristattackshasbeenfallenduetothesuccessfulcrackdownof the lawenforcement forces’successfulandbettercoordinationamongvarioussecurityagencies.

Officialsoffederalandprovincialagenciesregularlymeet;exchangeinformationandplancounterterrorismaction.

Nonetheless,manyofficersadmitthatmutualtrustamongvariousagenciesoverinformationsharingisstillachallenge.

TheKPKpolicearebelievedtobeusedasPRtoolbythePTIgovernmentthoughinrealitythereiswidespreaddissatisfactionamongrankandfileofthepoliceforce.

Officersandconstablesfeelthattheirsacrificesarenotdulyacknowledged.

The Police have been pushed into awar forwhich they are neither properlytrainednorbeingequipped.ThePolicearenottrainedtofightterrorism.

Theprovincialgovernmentissaidtobenotsupportingthepoliceforcetheyde-servedtobebackedup.

Themoraleoftheforcecannotberaisedjustbyonlyannouncingfinancialcom-pensationforthosewholaydowntheirlivesorgetinjuredinthelineofduty.

Policeofficersexpectthatprovincialministerswouldstandshouldertoshoulder

THE NAP TRACKER

117© Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

withthePoliceinthefightonterror.

NasirDurrani,theprovincialpolicechief,isacompetentofficer.

Mr.Durranihasbeentryinghislevelbesttomaketheforceworthofitsnamebutbuthehastogoalongwaytogotoachievethisobjectives.

Thereisadiscontentintherankandfileoftheofficersthroughouttheprovince,

Manycivilianofficersdeputedinthepoliceforcearenothappyeither.

There isaclear-cutdivisionamongcivilbureaucracyoverpromotions,postingsandtransfersintheprovince.

Itisunrealistictoexpectgoodperformancefromademoralizedforce.

Duetolackofappreciationandencouragement,civilservantsandpoliceofficersarejustdoingtheirroutinework.Thislackofinterestisnegativelyaffectingprog-ressintheimplementationoftheNAP.

InNovember2015,Isawhundredsandthousandsofhighlychargedpro-TalibanpeopleinthefuneralofareligiousfigureinAkoraKhattak,asmalltownjustsixkilometerseastofNowsheraCantonment.

Theseradicalizedpeopleweredrawnfromalloverprovince,FATAaswellasAf-ghanistantopayhomagetotheirteacherandspiritualleader,MaulanaSherAliShah.

ThedeceasedwasacolleagueofMaulanaSami-ul-Haq,who isknowntohavecontactsbothwiththemilitaryandmilitants.

NewconstructionisunderwayntheHaq’ssprawlingatDarulUloomHaqaniaorseminaryinAkoraKhattakwhichhasservedasaalmamaterforsevera;lTalibanleaders.

Moreandmoreyoungpeoplearegettingthemselvesenrolledwiththeseminary.Topgovernmentleadersarealsoamongthevisitors.

Justmilitary and police operations cannotwipe out terrorism. The places likeDarulUloomHaqanianeedtobeturnedintobastionoflove,peaceandhumanity.Untilthathappens,noNationalActionPlanwillwork.

Shiraz Paracha is an analyst, commentator, journalism professor, and his areas of interest include Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, Russia and China. He can be reached at shiraz_paracha@hotmail.com.

THE NAP TRACKER

118 © Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

6.8 OPINION: Karachi’s Woes by Amir Zia

TheongoingoperationinKarachiremainsakeycomponentofthe20-pointNa-tionalActionPlan(NAP)withoutwhichPakistancannothopetoachieveadecisivevictoryinitswaragainstextremismandterrorism.

TheNAPdeclarationsaysthattheKarachiOperationwillbetakento“itslogicalconclusion.”Butmorethan twoyearsafter theparamilitaryRangerswereem-poweredtogoaftercriminalsandterrorists responsible forpoliticallyandreli-giously-motivatedkillings,extortion,kidnappingsforransomandterrorism,thismuchtrumpetedcampaign--launchedinSeptember2013--isnowhereclosetoits“logicalconclusion.”

Yes, theoperationbrought“targeted-killings” sharplydown in this restiveportcity.SindhPolicefiguressaythat986peoplewerekilledin2015comparedtothehighsofaround1,925in2014.In2013–thedeadliestinrecentyears–morethan2,500peoplehadbeenkilled,mostlyintit-for-tatkillingsamongcriminal-cum-po-liticalmafiasandvarioussectarianandreligiousgroups,whilein2012suchkill-ingswerealittleover2,000.

Thecrackdownalsohelpedendthereignofterrorofvariouspolitical,ethnicandcriminalmafiasinmanyvolatilepartsofthecity.Extortion,whichwaswidespreadandforcedshopkeepersandtraderstostageaseriesofunprecedentedlock-outsoftheirbusinessesin2009&2010onwards,witnessedasharpdecline.

Kidnappingforransomcases,whichpeakedto283in2013,fellto115in2014asaresultofthearrestsandkillingsofanumberofkidnappersin“encounters.”Andin2015,only25kidnappingforransomincidentswerereported,accordingtothefigurescompiledbytheCitizen-PoliceLiaisonCommittee,whichspecializesinre-solvingsuchcaseswiththehelpofthelawenforcementagencies.

TheHumanRightsCommissionofPakistan(HRCP)inits2015reportonKarachialsohighlightedthedecliningtrendintheincidentsoforganizedviolenceandter-rorism.TheHRCPfiguresshowalmosta50percentdropinthenumberofbombexplosionsinKarachiin2015.

Butdespitesuccesses,therearelegitimateconcernsaboutthesustainabilityofthesegains.

The ongoing tussle between the Sindh and the federal governments over theoperationalautonomyforparamilitaryRangers isnottheonly factortriggeringuncertainty.Thereareanumberofotherfundamentalissues,whichifremainun-resolvedwillnotjustobstructtheKarachiOperationfromachievingitsobjectives,

THE NAP TRACKER

119© Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

buthurtthecountry’soveralleffortinthewaragainstterrorismandextremism.Therefore,thesuccessofKarachiOperationremainspivotalifthegovernmentisseriousinestablishingtheruleoflawandbringingpeaceinthecountry.

Toachievethisgoal,ourpoliticians–bothatthefederalandprovinciallevel–mustshowpoliticalwill,maturityandconsistency.Theyalsoneedtoriseabovetheirnarrowselfandpoliticalinterestsandsincerelyworktobreakthetiesbetweencrimeandpoliticswhichhasbeenthrivinghereforthepastseveraldecades.

However,theforemostandimmediatechallengethatthreatenstowipe-outthegainsofKarachiOperation stems from the lackof consensus amongkey stakeholdersregardingitstargets,directionandmethods.

ThePakistanPeoples’Party-led(PPP)SindhGovernmentistryingtocliptheop-erationalautonomyofRangersandnarrowdowntheambitoftheirassignmentafterraidsonprovincialgovernmentofficesandarrestof“itsownmen.”

The arrest of former federalministerDrAsimHussain – a close friend of PPPCo-ChairpersonAsifAliZardari–ontheallegedchargesofcorruptionandassist-ingterroriststriggeredfearsamongmanySindhGovernmentstalwartsandpar-ty’scentralleadersthattheycouldalsobeamongthepossibletargets.Therefore,thePPPaimstoblunttheoperationandrestrictitsfocusmainlytothebannedsectarianandreligiousgroupsortheotherpoliticalforces,includingtheMuttahi-daQaumiMovement(MQM).

However,theargumentofthelawenforcementagenciesmakessensethatwith-outchokingfinancesandapprehendingsupporters,abettorsandpatronsofcrim-inalsandterrorists,theirjobwillonlybehalfdone.

AlthoughthefederalgovernmenthassupportedtheRangers inthistussle,thefrictionbetweenSindhgovernmentandthesecurityestablishmentisabadnewsinPakistan’sfightagainstterrorism.

ThePPP,otheroppositionpartiesand the rightsgroupsmightbe raisingsomelegitimateconcernsabout theallegedhigh-handedactionsof theRangers,buttheyshouldbeaddressedwithoutcompromisingtheoperationalautonomyandindependenceoftheRangers.

TheauthoritiesshouldconsidersettingupanindependentmonitoringcommitteetoaddresscomplaintsorgrievancesabouttheconductoftheOperation.Thepro-posedCommitteecancompriseofretiredjudgesandcivilsocietymembersandworkintandemwithanin-housewatch-dogofthesecurityestablishment.

ThePPPandtheotherpoliticalforcesshouldrealizethatthereisanoverwhelm-

THE NAP TRACKER

120 © Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

ingsupportfortheoperationamongthemasses.Anyattemptstoderailitwouldonlycreatecomplicationsandunintendedconsequences.Therefore,thepoliticalforcesshouldsupporttheoperationinitspresentformandrefrainfromchangingrulesofthegametosaveaselectfew.

Besides,thecivilianleadershipmustfocusonthefollowinginitiativesiftheywanttoseeKarachiOperationasuccessandachievethegoalssetintheNAP.

Firstly,thegovernmentneedstomoveonawar-footingtoimplementthelongoverduepolicereforms.Thesereformsmustincludegrantingthepoliceforceacompleteoperationalautonomyandindependence.TheyshouldalsoputanendtopoliticalinterferenceinthePoliceDepartment,establishamerit-basedrecruit-mentprocess,ensuremoderntrainingandguaranteetransparencyinalltransfersandpostings.

Secondly,sweepingjudicialreformshavealsobeenpendingforalongtime.TheNAP declaration calls for upgrading the judiciary. This includes increasing thenumber of judge and courts, establishing a protection program forwitnesses,prosecutorsandjudgesandcapacity-buildingandtrainingofprosecutorsandin-vestigators.

Thirdly,thegovernmentshouldalsofocusonabolishingthebreedinggroundsofcrimeandterrorism.Thiscanbedoneonlythroughinvestmentoneducationandsocial,economicandinfra-structureupliftanddevelopment.

Sadly,civilianauthoritiesfarepoorlyonthesethreefronts.Themedia,thecivilsocietyandvariousstakeholdersshouldcreateawarenessandbuildpressureonthefederalandprovincialgovernmentstoinitiatemeasuresonthesethreekeyfrontsasarrestsandkillingsofcriminalsandterroristscanonlyworktoanextent.Therealchallenge in themid- to long-term is toeliminatethose factorswhichbreedcriminalsandterrorists.KarachiOperationcanonlybesuccessfuliftheau-thoritiestakeaholisticapproachandalongwiththeuseofforce,focusonreformsanddevelopmentaswell.

Amir Zia is a senior journalist, who has worked for some leading national and international media organizations in a career spanning over two decades. He can be reached at amir.zia@gmail.com.

THE NAP TRACKER

121© Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

6.9 OPINION: The Balochistan Saga by Shahzada Zulfiqar

Thegovernmenthassucceededincontrollingterrorismtoaconsiderableextentin Baluchistan, particularly in areas affectedby theBaluch separatist violence,withtheimplementationoftheNationalActionPlan(NAP).

HoweverithasnotyettakenanytangiblestepstoinitiatedialoguewiththeBa-lochseparatistslivinginexile.

InthefirstapexcommitteemeetingheldinQuettainFebruarylast,aroadmapwasdrawnfortheimplementationofNAP.

Themeeting,chairedbythePrimeMinisterNawazSharifandattendedbyArmyChiefGeneralRaheelSharifalongwithheadsofsecurityagencies,formulatedapolicytoimplementtheNAPbyusingcarrotandstickpolicy.

Under thispolicy, themilitarywasallowedto launch intelligencebasedopera-tionsandatthesametimetheprovincialgovernmentisdirectedtostartreconcil-iationeffortswithBalochseparatistleaders.

Theapexcommitteealsoapprovedageneralamnestyschemeunderwhichmon-etarybenefits,employmentopportunitiesandsecurityforthosewhoarewillingtosurrenderhavebeenannounced.

Underthispolicy,halfamilliontotwomillionrupeesweretobeawardedtothefighters ranging fromanordinaryfighter to a local commanderwho laydowntheirarms.

Thepolicywasaimedatluringthemilitantstoabandonfightinginreturnformon-etarybenefitsandsecurityassurances.

Ithasalsobeendecidedthateffortswouldbemadetoseekdeportationoftheseparatistsleaderslivinginexileinthewesterncountriesaswellasconfiscationoftheirallmoveableandimmovablepropertiesinordertochokethefinancingtotheirbannedorganizations.

BesidesfederalagencieslikeFIA,CustomsandNAB,Policehavealsobeendirect-edtoprobefinancialsourcesoftheseparatistandinsurgentgroups.

ThepeopleprovidingmoneytotheseinsurgentsthroughHawalaunderthegarbofmoneyexchangebusinessarebeing interrogatedwhile revenue recordsarebeingcheckedatthetehsil leveltoobtainthepropertydetailsoftheinsurgentleaders.However,nobreakthroughhasbeenachievedonthiscount,sofar.

THE NAP TRACKER

122 © Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

Thepro-governmenttribalChieftainslikeNawabSanaullahZahri,NawabChagaizMarri–sonandsuccessoroftheseparatistleaderNawabKhairBuxMurri--andSardarSarfarazDombki--thegrandsonofNawabAkbarBugti--playedactiveroleintryingtopersuadetheoutlawedcomradestolaydownarms.

Aroundsixhundredfightersbesidessixcommandersofthebannedorganizationshaveso far surrendered fromAwaran, Lahri,DeraBugtiandKohlu ina specialceremonies.

There are some suspicions among general public about genuineness of thesesurrenderingpeopleamidstreportsthatthetribesloyaltopro-governmenttrib-alnotableswereincludedinthelistof‘surrendering’insurgentsforthesakeofmonetarybenefits.

Ontheotherhand.majorseparatistelementsrejectedthegeneralamnestyofferandvowedtocontinuefightingtillindependence.

The Baloch nationalist groups, however, believe that such amnesty schemesaimedatwinningloyaltiesthroughmoneyinsteadofaddressinggenuineissueswouldnotyieldanypositiveresultinthelongrun.

Intheanti-insurgentsoperation,threenephews,abrotherandabrother-in-lawoftopfugitiveDrAllahNazarbesidesanumberofcolleagueswerekilledinAwaran.

Initially,therewerereportsthatDr.Nazar,whoheadsseparatistBalochLiberationFront,wasalsokilled,but lateravideowasreleasedpurportedlyshowinghimalive.

Some 204 suspected terrorists of banned organizations including TTP and LEJwerealsokilledand29injuredin1935operationsduringlastoneyearwhile9176werearrestedbesidesrecoveringof3290weapons.Nofigureisavailableaboutthecausalityofforcesintheseoperations.

EightlawswereproposedtoreformtheCriminalJusticeSystemandtwoofthemhavebeenapprovedbytheprovincialassemblywhilerestarepending.

Inordertocurbhatespeech,13peoplewerearrestedwhile1200booksand284hatematerialwereconfiscated.

HowevernoactionhasbeentakenagainstMadarisfuellingsectarianhatred.

116casesofsectarianmilitantsarependingincourtswhile54caseshavebeenreferredtoSpecialTrial(military)courts.

ThesecurityforcesarecreditedwithkillingoftopmilitantsofLashkar-e-Jhangvi

THE NAP TRACKER

123© Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

likeUsmanSaifullahandMahmoodKurdaliasWadeed,themastermindsofdead-lysuicideattacks,killingsofhundredsofShiaMuslimsinBalochistanandSindh.

AfterthekillingofLeJleaderMalikIshaqalongwithhiswholetophierarchyinpo-liceencounterinPunjab,therewasgeneralexpectationsthattheircounterpartsinBaluchistanwouldalsobebroughttojustice.

AnimportantcommanderofAl-Qaeda’sUmarLateefwaskilledinAugust2015inChaghiareaborderingAfghanistanwhilehiswifeTayyabawhoissaidtobeheadofthewomenwingofthebannedorganizationwasarrested.

Hisbrother,identifiedasBilal,however,managedtoescapeintoAfghanistan.

Aprovincial governmentdelegationcomprisingministersandparliamentarianscumtribaleldersoftheNationalPartyinRamadanpaidavisittoKhanofKalatMirSulemanDaudlivinginexileinLondon.

NawabSanaullahZahri,thenewlyappointedChiefMinisterandprovincialheadofPML(N),hasalsovisitedLondontomeetKhanSuleman.

Although government and its ministers have been claiming success, but bothmeetingsremainedinconclusive.

Khan went abroad to fight a legal battle in the International Court of JusticeagainstPakistanfor its failuretoabidebythe instrumentofaccessionreachedbetweenQuaid-e-AzamandMirAhmadyarKhan, the lastKhanof theprincelystateofKalat.

AfterkillingofNawabAkbarBugtiinamilitaryoperation,KhanofKalathadcon-venedatribalJirgainKalatinSeptember2006thathadgivenhimthemandatetoseekjusticefromICJ.

The outgoing ChiefMinister Dr. AbdulMalik Balochmet Brahamdagh Bugti inSwitzerlandandisbelievedtohaveconveyedsomeofhisdemandstothemilitaryestablishment.

NoBalochpartyexceptNationalPartyofDr.MalikBalochisinthefavourofmak-ingGwaderportoperationalandconstructionofCPECunlessreservationsofBa-lochpopulationthatitisbeingturnedintominorityduetothesemegaprojectsareremoved.

Anothermajor issueBalochpopulationisconfrontedwith istheregistrationofAfghanrefugeesinmillionsasPakistaninationalsinNADRArecordbesidesvoters’lists.

THE NAP TRACKER

124 © Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

DrMalikandotherBalochpartiesopposedholdingofcensusin2016inthepres-enceofAfghanrefugeeswhoareestimatedtobetwoandanhalfmillioninBa-lochistan.

Themilitaryhighupsinapexcommitteemeetingshaveassuredprovincialgovern-menttoapprisetheirtopbrassaswellasfederalgovernmentaboutitsreserva-tionsandapprehensionsthroughtheirchannel.

PashtoonbasedpoliticalpartiesparticularlyPKMAP,however,rejectthesereser-vationsandopposetheproposalofprovincialgovernmentinthisregard.

AlthoughHomedepartmentclaimstohavetakensternactionagainsttheprivatemilitias,butmanypeopledoubtit.

Thesearmedgroupsarebelievedtohavebeengiveninthecontrolofpro-govern-menttribalnotables.

TheofficialsclaimthatgovernmenthasenoughevidencethatShafiqMengal,whoheadsagovernment-backedprivatemilitia,harborsthehardcoreelementsfrombannedsectarianorganizationsandTTPwhoalsoinvolvedinkillingofeightLevymen.

ThereligiousminoritiesparticularlyHindushavebeenpersecutedbythesemili-tiasduringthepast15yearslonginsurgency.

Hindu traders in restivedistricts particularly Khuzdar, Kalat andMastungwerebeingforcedtopayBhathatotheseprivatemilitias.ConsequentlyhundredsofHindufamilieshavemigratedtoIndiaortoneighboringSindhprovince.

Theactivistsofthesemilitiashavebeeninvolvedincrimeslikehighwayrobbery,rape,carsnatching/liftingandabductionforransom.

AccordingtoareportoftheHomeDepartment,2441seminarieshavebeenreg-isteredwhile518haveyettoberegistered.

Some143,446students including5,862foreignershavebeenenrolled in theseMadaris.

Still,itisbelieved,aroundathousandMadarissituatedinthefarflungareasoftheprovincehaveyettoberegistered.

Dozensof facebookaccounts, tweetersandwebsiteshavebeenblockedwhichwerebeingusedforpropagandainfavourofseparatistsoragainstthestateandsecurityagencies.

THE NAP TRACKER

125© Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016

Shazada Zulfiqar is a veteran journalist from Balochistan who reports for AFP. He can be reached at ahmadzee63@gmail.com.

THE NAP TRACKER

126 © Center for Research and Security Studies - 2016