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DECISION-MAKING

The de Borda Institute

www.deborda.org

www.decision-maker.org

MAJORITY RULE

MAJORITARIANISM = ….........................

Микайл Сергеeвич, Вам нужен …...................

MAJORITY RULE

MAJORITARIANISM = БОЛЬШЕВИЗМ

Микайл Сергеeвич, Вам нужен большевизм

ЗАПАДНЫЕ БОЛЬШЕВИКИ

ELECTED DICTATORS

• Gamsakhurdia

ЗАПАДНЫЕ БОЛЬШЕВИКИ

ELECTED DICTATORS

• Gamsakhurdia

• Erdoğan

• Putin

• Trump

• Bashar al-Assad

MAJORITY RULE…

A CAUSE OF WAR

Always: Israel/Palestine

1940s/50s India/Pakistan

1970s/80s Northern Ireland

1990s The Caucasus, The Balkans

Rwanda

2000s Syria, Yemen…

Kenya

2010s Ukraine

THE BALKANS

“All the wars in the former Yugoslavia started with

a referendum.”

Oslobodjenje,

Sarajevo’s famous newspaper

7.2.1999

The same quotation now applies to Ukraine.

MAJORITY RULE or POWER-SHARING

50% + 1

The winner gets everything, the loser gets nothing!

2004 Yushchenko v Yanukovich

Ющенко v Янукович

2010 Yanukovich v Timoshenko

Янукович v Тимошенко

CURRENT FORMS OF GOVERNANCE

Parliament

The People

GovernmentOpposition

CRAZY COALITIONS

• UK Conservative Party + Democratic

Unionist Party

• Austria Centre-right party + Extreme-right party

• Israel Likud with very extremist Jewish Home

• Turkey Coalition with the Kurds?

• Israel Coalition with Arab List?

SWITZERLAND

AND THE ‘MAGIC FORMULA’

Federal Council

7 persons, elected by parliament on a magic

formula from the four main parties.

2:2:2:1

MY TALK

1. Majority voting (on only two options) is

inaccurate. It should be replaced by preferential

voting (on many options).

2. So majority rule should be replaced by all-party

power-sharing.

I. A critique of majority voting.

II. The right of self-determination.

III. Preferential points voting.

IV. (Briefly) all-party coalitions.

I. A CRITIQUE OF MAJORITY VOTING

Majority Voting

• Option A or option B?

• Option A, yes-or-no?

NORMAL DISTRIBUTION CURVE

Figure

1 -- Standard Normal Distribution

SMALL TALLAVERAGE

NORMAL DISTRIBUTION CURVE

Figure

1 -- Standard Normal Distribution

LEFT-WING RIGHT-WINGAVERAGE

GEORGE WASHINGTON

The two-party system of politics

“has perpetrated the most horrid

enormities [and] is itself a frightful

despotism.”

Farewell address, 1796.

A MINIMUM PLURALIST SOCIETY…

3 PERSONS WITH 3 OPINIONS

Three people

Ms i Mr j Ms k

Three options

A B C

Ale Beer Cider

3 PERSONS AND THEIR 1st PREFERENCES

Ms i Mr j Ms k

A B C

3 PERSONS AND THEIR 1st, 2nd and 3rd PREFERENCES

Ms i Mr j Ms k

1st A B C

2nd B C A

3rd C A B

ORDER OF VOTING

A

versus = A

B versus = C

C

ORDER OF VOTING

C

versus = C

A versus = B

B

ORDER OF VOTING

B

versus = B

C versus = A

A

ORDER OF VOTING

A

versus = A

B versus = C

C

B

versus = B

C versus = A

A

C

versus = C

A versus = B

B

PARADOX OF VOTING

MAJORITY RULE IN A PLURALIST SOCIETY?

A > B > C > A ….

THE SIMPLEST DEBATE

A MOTION: Paint the door red.

ONE AMENDMENT: Delete the word ‘red’

and insert ‘blue’.

A = A red door

B = A blue door

C = The status quo: a green door.

BOSNIA

1990 elections:

Moslem:Orthodox:Catholic = 40:30:20

40 + 30 > 20

40 + 20 > 30

30 + 20 > 40

40 + 20 = a majority = war

. 40 versus 20 = another war

MANIPULATION: THE ROLE OF THE CHAIR

Ms i Mr j Ms k

D D D

A A A

A = ale

D = draught

DIVIDE AND RULE

Ms i Mr j Ms k

D B C

A C D

B D A

C A B

A = ale

B = beer

C = cider

D = draught

A > B > C > D > A…

D

versus = C

C

A > B > C > D > A…

D

versus = C

C versus = B

B

A > B > C > D > A…

D

versus = C

C versus = B

B versus = A

A

‘DEMOCRATIC DICTATORS’

PLACE Date AUTHOR ISSUE FOR TURN

OUT

FRANCE 1800 NAPOLEON BE CONSUL 99% 43%

CHILE 1818 O’HIGGINS BE SUPREMO 100% -

RUSSIA 1903 LENIN BOLSHEVISM 49% -

GERMANY 1936

HITLER

FUHRER 98% 98%

AUSTRIA 1938 ANSCHLUSS 99% 99%

IRAN

1953 MOSSADEGH SOCIALISM 99% -

1963 SHAH REVOLUTION 99% 91%

1979 KHOMEINI ISLAMIC 99% 65%

THE QUESTION IS THE ANSWER

PLACE Date AUTHOR ISSUE FOR TURN

OUT

NORTHERN

IRELAND

1973 TED HEATH

(BRITISH PM)

THE BORDER 99% 59%

NAGORNO-

KARABAKH

199I - INDEPENDENT 99% 82%

KOSOVA 1991 RUGOVA INDEPENDENT 99% 87%

Republica

Srpska

1991 KARADŽIĆ STAY IN

YUGOSLAVIA

98% 85%

ABKHAZIA 1999 ARDZINBA INDEPENDENT 97% 88%

IRAQ

1995

SADDAM

HUSSEIN

HIMSELF 99.9 99.5

2002 HIMSELF 100% 100%

II. SELF-DETERMINATION

“All peoples have the right of self-determination.”

USA President Woodrow Wilson

A MAJORITY

OF THE WHOLE

BIG

A MAJORITY OF THE MINORITY

SMALL

A MAJORITY OF THE MINORITY

OF THE MINORITY

TINY

MATRIOSHKA NATIONALISM

BIG SMALL TINY

UK IRELAND NORTHERN IRELAND

SCOTLAND ORKNEY ISLANDS

SOVIET

UNION

or

RUSSIA

GEORGIA ABHAZIA

SOUTH OSSETIA

ADJARA

AZERBAIJAN NAGORNO-KARABAKH

MOLDOVA TRANS-DNESTR

CRIMEA

UKRAINE DONETSK

KRASNOARMIISK RAION ?

CHECHNYA

TARTARSKAYA?

YUGOSLAVIA

CROATIA KRAJINA

BOSNIA REPUBLIKA-SRPSKA

HERZEG-BOSNA

SERBIA KOSOVA

PREŠEVO VALLEY ?

. KIRKUK

IRAQ

. KIRKUK

IRAQ

. KIRKUK

IRAQ

. KIRKUK

IRAQ

III. A MORE INCLUSIVE VOTING PROCEDURE

Multi-option voting

Preferential voting

SWEDEN – 1955

Which side of the road shall we drive on?

• Left

• Right

• Blank

SWEDEN – 1955

Which side of the road shall we drive on?

• Left 82.9%

• Right 15.5%

• Blank 1.6%

CLOSED

QUESTIONS

SEMI-OPEN

QUESTIONS

OPEN

QUESTIONS

↑All

Prefs

DECISION-MAKING Preferential

points voting

C AV = alternative vote

PPV = preferential points voting

TRS = two-round system

Condorcet

OSome

U prefs AV

N 1st

prefs

only

Weighted majority

EU

Power-sharing

NI, Bosnia

2-round system

TRS Norway*

T Simple majority

Everywhere

Double Majority

Switzerland

Plurality

Denmark

* a first-

round

plurality

and then a

majority

vote

1 of 2

options

1 of some

options

1 or some of

some options

1or some or all

of all options

1st preference only Preferential

BINARY MULTI-OPTIONAL

VOTERS’ CHOICE → →

AVERAGE HEIGHT

Option A < 1 m 60

Option B ≥ 1 m 60

Option C ≥ 1 m 70

Option D ≥ 1 m 80

Option E ≥ 1 m 90

A VOTERS’ PROFILE ON FOUR OPTIONS

A, B, C and D

14 voters

5 4 3 2

1st Preference A C D B

2nd Preference B B B D

3rd Preference C D C C

4th Preference D A A A

PLURALITY VOTE

A 5, C 4, D 3, B 2

14 voters

5 4 3 2

1st Preference A C D B

2nd Preference B B B D

3rd Preference C D C C

4th Preference D A A A

TWO-ROUND SYSTEM (TRS)

1st round: A 5, C 4, D 3, B 2

2nd round: A 5, C 9

14 voters

5 4 3 2

1st Preference A C D B

2nd Preference B B B D

3rd Preference C D C C

4th Preference D A A A

ALTERNATIVE VOTE (AV, IRV, PV or STV)

1st round: A 5, C 4, D 3, B 2

2nd round: A 5, C 4, D 5

3rd round: A 5, D 9

14 voters

5 4 3 2

1st Preference A C D B

2nd Preference B B B D

3rd Preference C D C C

4th Preference D A A A

BORDA COUNT (BC)

PREFERENTIAL POINTS VOTING

A 29, B 44, C 36, D 31

14 voters

5 4 3 2

1st Pref (4 points) A C D B

2nd Pref (3 points) B B B D

3rd Pref (2 points) C D C C

4th Pref (1 point) D A A A

PREFERENTIAL POINTS VOTING

A 29, B 44, C 36, D 31

14 voters

5 4 3 2

1st Pref (4 points) A 20 C 16 D 12 B 8

2nd Pref (3 points) B 15 B 12 B 9 D 6

3rd Pref (2 points) C 10 D 8 C 6 C 4

4th Pref (1 point) D 5 A 4 A 3 A 2

THE WINNERS!

A or B or C or D

Plurality Two-

round

AV or

STV

PPV

A 5 5 5 29

B 2 - - 44

C 4 9 - 36

D 3 - 9 31

….

PREFERENTIAL POINTS VOTING

He who votes for 1 option gives his favourite 1 point.

. PARTIAL VOTING IN PREFERENTIAL POINTS VOTING

He who votes for 1 option gives his favourite 1 point.

She who votes for 2 options gives her favourite 2 points (and her

2nd choice 1 point).

. PARTIAL VOTING IN PREFERENTIAL POINTS VOTING

He who votes for 1 option gives his favourite 1 point.

She who votes for 2 options gives her favourite 2 points (and her 2nd choice 1 point).

He who votes for 3 options gives his favourite 3 points, (his 2nd

choice 2 points and his 3rd choice 1 point).

PARTIAL VOTING IN PREFERENTIAL POINTS VOTING

If you vote for:

Number of options

1 2 3 4 5

your 1ST preference

gets:1

point

2

points

3

points

4

points

5

points

your 2ND preference

gets:_ 1

point

2

points

3

points

4

points

your 3RD preference

gets:_ _ 1

point

2

points

3

points

your 4TH preference

gets:_ _ _ 1

point

2

points

your 5TH preference

gets:_ _ _ _ 1

points

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

A-40% B-45% C-50% D-55% E-60%

MrJ

LOGICAL PREFERENCES

Mr J - E, D, C, B, A

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

A-40% B-45% C-50% D-55% E-60%

MrJ

MsK

LOGICAL PREFERENCES

Mr J - E, D, C, B, A

Ms K - B, A, C, D, E

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

A-40% B-45% C-50% D-55% E-60%

MrJ

MsK

MsL

LOGICAL PREFERENCES

Mr J - E, D, C, B, A

Ms K - B, A, C, D, E

Ms L - B, C, D, A, E

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

A-40% B-45% C-50% D-55% E-60%

MrJ

MsK

MsL

MrM

ILLOGICAL PREFERENCES

Mr M - D, B, E, A, C

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

A-40% B-45% C-50% D-55% E-60%

MrJ

MsK

MsL

LOGICAL PREFERENCES

Mr J - E, D, C, B, A

Ms K - B, A, C, D, E

Ms L - B, C, D, A, E

COLLECTIVE

SET OF PREFERENCES

Mr J (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)

+ Ms K (4, 5, 3, 2, 1)

+ Ms L (2, 5, 4, 3, 1)

= All (7, 12, 10, 9, 7)

THE COLLECTIVE WILL

3 LOGICAL PREFERENCESMr J = 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5

Ms K = 4 - 5 - 3 - 2 - 1

Ms L = 2 - 5 - 4 - 3 - 1

All = 07-12-10-09-07

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

A - 40% B - 45% C - 50% D - 55% E - 60%

J

K

L

All

CLOSED

QUESTIONS

SEMI-OPEN

QUESTIONS

OPEN

QUESTIONS

↑All

Prefs

DECISION-MAKING Preferential

points voting

C AV = alternative vote

BC = Borda Count

MBC = Modified Borda Count = PPV

PPV = preferential points voting = MBC

TRS = two-round system

Condorcet

OSome

Approval

voting

U prefs AV

N 1st

prefs

only

Weighted majority

EU, Finland

Power-sharing

NI, Belgium

2-round system

TRS Norway*

T Simple majority

Ireland, UK, all

Twin Majority

Switzerland

Plurality

Denmark

* a first-

round

plurality

and then, if

need be, a

majority

vote

1 of 2

options

1 of some

options

1 or some of

some options

1or some or all

of all options

1st preference only Preferential

BINARY MULTI-OPTIONAL

VOTERS’ CHOICE → →

CURRENT FORMS OF GOVERNANCE

Parliament

The People

GovernmentOpposition

16

32

64

128

256

512

2000 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 ’05 ’06 ’07 ’08 ’09 2010 ’11 ’12 ’13 ’14 ’15 16 17

Austria

Belgium

Finland

Germany

Ireland

Netherlands

Spain

SMALL CIRCLE Minority, one partyDIAMOND Minority coalitionBIG CIRCLE Majority, one partyTRIANGLE Majority coalitionSQUARE Grand coalition

LINE Undecided

REPRESENTATION

Government

Parliament

The People

IV. ALL-PARTY COALITIONS

The people elect the parliament,

the electoral system is proportional and preferential.

The parliament elects:

(i) the government; and

(ii) its referees;

again, the electoral system is proportional and preferential.

For non-urgent decisions:

all parties can make proposals

the referees choose the options for the ballot

and decisions are taken by a preferential points system.