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Ballistic Missile Defense and the Atlantic AllianceAuthor(s): David S. YostReviewed work(s):Source: International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Autumn, 1982), pp. 143-174Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538436 .

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BallisticM ssile David . YostDefense and theAtlanticAlliance

The Atlantic lliancemaybe at the threshold fa new debate on the implicationsf ballisticmissiledefense BMD) forEuropean ecurity. ecretaryf DefenseCasparWeinbergernd severalU.S. SenatorsndCongressmenupport thoroughreview f U.S. BMD options, ncluding ossiblerevision fthe1972Anti-BallisticMissile ABM) Treaty nd its 1974Protocol. lthough ctive efenseof ntercontinentalallisticmissilesICBMs) eems hemost ikely pplicationfor MD, other trategicefense ptions rereportedlynder onsideration.European-basedMDagainst heater allisticmissiles uchas theSS-20, S-21, SS-22, ndSS-23 sbeing xamined s well. Such defenses reknown santi-tacticalallisticmissilesATBM) ranti-tacticalissilesATM).The term"ATM" is preferredn that t implies apability gainstcruise s well asballisticmissiles.The political nd strategicssues thatBMD programsould raise withintheAlliance houldbe explored s deliberatelys possiblebefore conomicresourcesrecommitted. aterial or reliminarynalysis esides npreviousAlliance eliberationsnBMD andinthe nformaliscussions ecently ro-voked nEuropebyobviousU.S. interestn BMD options, ncluding TM.Theissuesgo to theheart f NATO's establishedheoryf deterrencendoffern opportunityor undamentaleassessment.

This essay is based on extensive nterviews n Europe in 1980 and 1981. Despite obvious risksofover-simplification,wing to the diversity f views in each country n most issues, I havechosen toconform o standard practiceby referringo the"Europeans" as a shorthandforwhatappear to have been and to remain dominant trends n West European opinion. Special thanksare owed to Colin Gray, who first ncouraged me to investigatethis topic, and to variousobservers n government nd industry includingBenson Adams, Guy Barasch, Charles Kup-perman, and Richard Nuttall) who commented on earlierdrafts.The views expressed arenonethelessmine exclusively, nd should not be construed o represent hose of theDepartmentof theNavy or any U.S. government gency.David S. Yost s an Assistant rofessort theU.S. Naval Postgraduatechool,Monterey,alifornia. eis the uthor fEuropean Security nd the SALT Process, Washingtonaper,Number 5 (BeverlyHills and London: agePublications, 981) and editor fNATO's StrategicOptions: ArmsControland Defense (New York: ergamonress, 1981).Interniationalecuirity,all 1982 Vol. 7, No. 2) 0162-2889/82/010143-3202.50/0?D1982 by thePresident nd Fellows of HarvardCollege and of theMassachusetts Institute fTechnology.

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Internationalecurity 44

Alliance MD Deliberations,967-1968The previousAlliancedeliberationsn BMD helped to form uropean tti-tudes thathave becomefirmlyntrenched ver the past fifteenears.Theprincipal eliberationsookplace n Nuclear lanning roupNPG) meetingsfrom pril 967 hrough pril 968.The twokey ssues wereU.S. plans fortheSentinelABM system nd thepossibilityfBMD inEurope.McNamara'sSeptember 967 speech announcinghe decision o deploythe SentinelABM system ordefense f the United tates gainst rojectedChinesestrategic apabilitiescreated onsiderable esentmentmongtheallies"for everalreasons, ncluding onvictions hat the announcementhad been made without ufficientonsultationnd that heUnitedStateshad failed o honour ts obligations o the NPG."1The anti-Chineserien-tation fSentinelwas seen nEurope s based on"hystericalnddangerous"American ears f China, o that thedangers hat rethoughtoarisefromBMD deploymenteem to be incurred orno good reason."2Thesepresumed angerswerepartlyhosethoroughlyrticulatedytheAmerican pponents fBMD at approximatelyhesame time-above all,that trategictabilitynd prospects or rms ontrolnd detentewould beneedlessly ndangered y highly xpensive echnologyhat robably ouldnot be reliably ffective.ew indeed were the Europeans fthat ra whosupported U.S. BMDprograms intheWestEuropeannterest ecause tmight romote oupling y assuringhecontinuednvulnerabilityfAmer-icanretaliatoryorces.3he most requentlyffered est uropean rgumentagainstU.S. ABMdeployment as that twouldpromote neo-isolationist"Fortress merica" oncept, llowingWestern uropeto stand alone andvulnerable.heWestEuropean eaction asadmirablyummarizedyJohanHolst,recentlyheNorwegiantate ecretaryor oreignffairs:It s, on thewhole, urprisingo notetheextent o which uropean pinionhas beenso unanimouslynfavorableoany deploymentfballisticmissiledefenses.Thegenerallyriticalttitude oes not differentiateetweenvar-ious alternativeU.S. BMD deployment configurations.... The expectation1. Paul EdwardButeux, hePolitics fNuclear onsultationn NATO,1965-1974: heExperienceof the Nuclear PlanningGroup Ph.D. dissertation,London School of Economics and PoliticalScience, 1978), p. 114.2. Laurence W. Martin,BallisticMissile Defence nd theAlliance,AtlanticPaper Number 1 (Bou-logne-sur-Seine,France:Atlantic nstitute, 969),p. 31.3. An example was ElizabethYoung in Survival,Vol. 12, No. 4 (April 1970),p. 149.


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BMD and theAtlantic lliance 45

[is]that ny BMD deployments likely o generate n armsrace which, nturn,will increase tensions between the two superpowers.... If, however,we assume a similar ussianBMDdeployment,hethreat heUnited tatescould mobilize n part f her lliesmightook essimpressivehemore heSoviet BMD promised o reducethedamageofanyAmerican etaliation.Hence,a bilateral MD deployment ight n balancealso be perceived sreducing hevalidityf theguarantee.4Stillfurtheroverwhelminglyostile" rguments ereexpressedn Eu-rope regarding MD. Even CBMdefensesmightead to imited rea defen-ses and thus o virtualdecoupling"f heU.S. guarantee, ith nenhanced"possibilityfnuclearwar atEurope's xpense."Superpower MD deploy-ments ouldevenserve he American urposeof"eliminationf ndepen-dent entres fnuclear ower ntheWest," nd at the eastwould reinforceWestEuropeanfeelings fpolitical-militarynferioritynd subordination.Finally,heEuropean erceptionhat BMD seemsto be entirelyoncernedwithfighting ars rather han withdeterrence"uaranteedheconcept"chilly eception."5European istaste or heconcept fBMDbased nEuropewas evenmoreemphatic.n April1968theNPG decidedthatEurope-based MD "wouldbe toocostly, ottotally ffective,nd might ompromiserms imitationdiscussions etween heUnited tates nd theSovietUnion." DenisHealey,thenBritishecretaryf tate or efense, eportedlytresseditsprohibitivecost nd lackofeffectivenessgainst Soviet ttack."7In contrast, olst felt hat he "technical roblem fprovidingomerea-sonably ffectiveefense t a meaningfulevel n Europe s probablyur-mountable," wingto the slowerre-entrypeed ofmedium-rangeallisticmissiles MRBMs) compared o ICBMs). Holst,however,did note threepolitical bstacleso ABMdeploymentnEurope: ) Since hekillmechanismwouldprobably avetobe nuclear, e foresawa political roblemntermsof onvincing suspicious udience bout hereliabilityf hedesign gainst4. JohanJ.Holst, "Missile Defense: ImplicationsforEurope," in JohanJ.Holst and WilliamJ.Schneider,Jr., ds., Why BM? Policy ssuesin theMissileDefense ontroversyNew York: Per-gamonPress,1969),pp. 190,194. See also TheodoreSorenson,"The ABM and WesternEurope,"in AbramChayes and JeromeB. Wiesner,eds., ABM: An Evaluation ftheDecision oDeploy nAntiballisticissileSystemNew York:Harper and Row, 1969),pp. 179-83.5. Martin,BallisticMissileDefense, p. 29-36.6. Buteux,Politics fNuclearConsultation,. 123.7. Benson D. Adams, BallisticMissile DefenseNew York: AmericanElsevier PublishingCo.,1971),pp. 137-138,179.


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accidents nd abuse." 2) Disagreements bout which ocalitieswould bedefended could have disruptive ather han ntegratingffects"n theAl-liance.3) Most mportant as the risk o detente, he "danger hat BMDinWestern urope might endto perpetuate posture nd atmosphere fconfrontation."8uch politicalrguments,speciallyhe atter, ereproba-bly s importants thetechnical nd financial nes offered y Healey.Generaluropean iews n BMDIn1969, heNPG took elativelyittle otice ftheU.S. decision orevise heanti-ChineserientationfSentinel o a Safeguard ystem edicated opro-tection fU.S. retaliatoryorces nd toprovidingthin" rea defensesgainstaccidentalrsmall ttacks,oviet rChinese.This ontrastnNPG reactionsmaybe explainednpartbya recognitiony Europeans hat heater uclearweapons analyseswould be "the area ofgreatestllied nput ntoalliancenuclear olicy,"with trategicorce ecisionsmainly U.S. responsibility.9An additional actormayhave been the imminent ommencementftheStrategic rmsLimitation alks SALT)and theprospect fnegotiated on-straints n BMD.TheABMTreaty f1972 nd its 1974ProtocolwerewelcomednWesternEuropefor llthereasonswhyBMD wasrecentlypposed.The mainbenefitwas seen as stabilizationfthe rmsrace ndEast-West elations enerally,with firmoundationor ontinuingetente.an Smartuggests hreemorespecific easonsforWestEuropean pproval: ) ThecontinuedredibilityftheBritishndFrench eterrentsas enhanced. )TheUnited tates nsistedthatArticle X of theABM Treaty which prohibitshe transferfABMtechnologyo third ountries)would notprevent he transferfoffensiveweapons technology.) TheUnited tates id notmake tselfess vulnerabletoballisticmissile ttack han tsAllies.10In the intervening ears,Europeanshave generally ecome even moresensitiveo detente onsiderations,nd theABMTreaty as assumed pecialimportances a survivingkeystone" fdetente.U.S. interestnrenegotiat-ingthe ABMTreatyhereforeppearsdangerous ndpotentiallyestabiliz-ingtomany nWestern urope, nd abrogationtillmore o. Animportant8. Holst, "Missile Defense," pp. 200-201.9. Buteux,Politics fNuclearConsultation,p. 162-163.10. Ian Smart,"PerspectivesfromEurope," in Mason Willrich nd JohnB. Rhinelander,eds.,SALT: The MoscowAgreementsnd BeyondNew York:The Free Press, 1974),pp. 187, 191, 194.


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example of this view is the statement f the PalmeCommission,whichincludes uch nfluential estEuropean oliticianss EgonBahr,Jean-MarieDaillet,GroHarlem-Bruntland,avid Owen, andJoopden Uyl:Ifthe ABMTreatywereabrogated nd an unbridled ffense/defensermsrace ensued, the consequences would be severe.... as continueddevelop-mentofABM systems uttressed he illusion hatnuclearwarscould befought nd survivednsomemeaningfulense, herisk ftheuse ofnuclearweaponswouldmultiply.ach side, fearinghat he othermight erceiveadvantagen a nuclear irst-strike,ight e temptedo act first. he insta-bilities nddangersnsucha situationreobvious.1"Thesewell-establishedeneral ttitudes egarding MD are reinforcedyviewsin specific ountrieshat llustrate hepolitical bstacleswithin heAlliance hatU.S. homelandBMD options ndATMmight ace.FRANCEApproximatelyifteen ears go, when theprospects orBMD deploymentfor readefense n both theUnitedStates nd the SovietUnionappearedserious, nalysts redicted hat he emergingrench trategicuclear orceprogram ouldbe deprived fall credibilityy SovietBMD; France ouldscarcely ope tobuildenough ubmarine-launchedallisticmissilesSLBMs)and ntermediate-rangeallisticmissiles IRBMs) o saturate ovietdefenses.The 1972ABMTreaty hereforerovided verywelcome pportunityor heFrench o continue he expansion f their trategic uclear orce rogram.The French overnmentouldhave reasonable onfidencehattsdeterrent'spolitical tilitywould not be rendered neffective ithout t least someadvancewarning hrough ublic abrogation f the ABM Treaty y eithersuperpower, r throughntelligence egarding landestine ovietresearchand developmentn ABM thatmight ffer he Soviets n optionofrapidABMdeployment.Whatwould theFrench o ifmoreextensive nd effectiveeploymentstakeplace?Theofficial osition ormanyyearshas been that uch a threatis genuine, utthat rance s fully repared or heeventuality.2 One ofthe11. The SALT Process:The GlobalStakes Vienna, Austria: Independent Commission on Disar-mament and Security ssues, February1981), pp. 2-3.12. Alain Bruand Lucien Poirier, Dissuasion etdefense anti-missiles,"Revuede defenseationale,December 1968,p. 1828. Hugues de l'Estoile, LucienPoirier, nd Didier e Cerf, Les implicationsstrategiquesde l'innovation technologique,"Revuede defense ationale, anuary 968, pp. 23-33,and February1968, pp. 238-239. General Poirier,then a member of the Defense Ministryplanning staff,was the key authorof the 1968 documents thatbecame the foundationsof thestill-valid 972defense whitepaper.


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highest fficialsn theFrench efenseMinistry'slanning epartment,rit-ing under pseudonym,xplains hat he ABMTreaty ould be abrogatedorcircumventedthroughir defensemissile pgrades) tanytime:Neverthelessurprincipal uarantee esides n thereciprocalurveillancethe wo uperpowersmaintain ver ach other; ach s nfactmost nterestedinassuring hat heotherwillrespectheABMTreaty.... So longas ABMdefenses emain t the currentevel, the multiple-warheadystem MRV]thatwill be in servicewith heM4 [SLBM]shouldbe able toexhaust hesedefenseswithout oo much difficultynd to assure thepenetrationf asignificantortion f our strategicmissiles.Moreover,what is called the"hardening" f warheads nd missiles anmakeour missilesmore nvul-nerable o the effects fABM warhead xplosions.Butstill ther olutionsexist . . . [e.g.,] increasingthe number of our missiles . . . [and] cruisemissiles,whichpose difficultroblems or nemy efenses.13When he was deputydirector f theplanningdepartment,olonelGuyLewin dded that henumber fwarheads nexistingmissiles ouldalsobeincreased.14he director f military pplications t the Commissariatl'EnergieAtomique asdeclared hat e-entryehicle RV) separation illbesuch that,nconjunction ithhardening, o enemy nterceptorillbe ableto destroymore hanone RV.'5 Decoysand other enetrationids maybeunder onsiderations well.At thesame time, xpressions f official oncernhave also been made.ForeignMinister ean-Frangoisoncet n February981 eportedlycautionedtheReagan administrationgainstbuildingarge-scalenti-ballistic issilesystems . . on grounds hat hiswouldcreatenstabilitynEurope."6 Thedirector ftheForeignMinistry'slanning epartmentas stated hat evis-ing theABM Treaty,ven for CBM defenses,wouldweaken hetechnicalcredibilityfourstrikingorcewithrespect otheUSSR." 7To date no relevant tatementsytheMitterrandovernmentave beenmade. Itnonethelesseemsplausible oassumethat tsofficials ouldalsooppose anyrevision f theABMTreaty.Jean-Pierreot,now ministerf13. Ivan Margine,L'avenir e la dissuasion," efenseationale, pril 978, . 10.14. GuyLewin, L'avenir es forces ucl6airesrancaises," efenseationale, ay 1980, . 18.15. Jacques hevallier,Les armes t es ripostesmises n oeuvre ar a defense rancaise,"nLa France ace uxdangerseguerre:ctes u Colloque, ol.1 (Paris: ondation our es EtudesdeDefenseNationale our 'Associationes Anciens levesde l'EcoleNationale 'Administration,1980), p..175-176.16. Internationalerald ribune,ebruary6, 1981.17. Jean-Louis ergorin,Menaceset politiques ansla decennie 980," n La France ace uxdangerseguerre,. 65.


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cooperation nd development, nce pointedout thatSoviet BMD couldundermine heFrench eterrents partof his advocacy f French artici-pationnSALT negotiations.8Morever,he hief f taff f he rmed orces,indiscussing hedecision o construct seventh SBNby 1994, dded thatit would not be reasonable, n view of France's"sufficiency"eeds fordeterrence,o havemore han evenSSBNs by theendofthecentury; orethanseven or eight SBNs would ead France wayfromhe"sufficiency"principle.19vidently his concept of sufficiency,nfluenced n part byFrance's conomic apacity, ssumesthat ovietBMD willnotbe upgradedbeyondmanageable imits.It smost mprobablehat rancewouldreopen hedecision nnouncednthe 1972WhitePaperagainst ny French MD programn thegrounds fcost and probableneffectiveness,20iventhe short ime-of-flightrom heSovietUnionto France around10 to12minutes,fwhich at mostwouldbe usefulfor nterception).21ven if Francehad theresources o pursueBMD,a French ecision o do so could egitimizeoviet nterestnBMD andtherebyeverelynderminehecredibilityftheFrench orces.nthemean-time, he Frenchnsist, s theyhave since1967when thequestion f RBMvulnerabilityas first aised, hat heir ixed RBMs areprotected ytheirSLBMs. An attack gainstFrench RBMs would be theplainestproofofaggression,nd would ustify trategicetaliation.22n Giscardd'Estaing'swords nJune 980: Anynuclear ttack n Frenchoilwouldautomaticallyprovoke trategicuclear etaliation."3The Frenchwouldthereforerobablyoppose Europe-basedU.S. BMD against oviettheatermissiles-theanti-tacticalmissileATM) concept-as likelyo egitimizeovietBMD.AnyformofU.S. homelandBMD beyond heABMTreaty egime's imitswould beseenas evenmore ertain oprovokehe xpansionfSovietBMDprograms.BRITAINBritishensitivityegardinghe ABMTreaty,nd possible mproved ovietBMDwithints onfines,an be seen n theChevaline rogramor ardened,18. Jean-Pierreot, "Plaidoyer our 'interet ational,"n La Franceace uxdangerseguerre,p. 202.19. General eannou acaze,"La politiquemilitaire,"efense ationale,ovember981, p. 13-14.Cf.Mitterrandn Le Monde, uly 6-27, 981, . 6.20. Livre lanc ur adefenseationale,olume (June 972), . 18.21. General rancoisMaurin n La Franceace uxdangerseguerre,p. 389,421.22. DefenseMinister ierreMessmernL'Express,ecember 1, 1967.23. Giscard 'EstaingnLe Monde, une 8, 1980.


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maneuveringnd early eparating e-entryehicleswith dvanceddecoysas penetrationids. The Britishovernmentasacknowledged hat, ecauseofthe GaloshABMsystem rotectingheMoscow region, hetargetingistof "key spects fSoviet tate ower"for ritishLBMs may nclude argetsoutsideMoscow-citiesand "manyhighvaluetargets,uch as majordamsand waterways,majoroil refineries, ajornavalshipyards,major ron ndsteelworks,nd majornuclear eactor stablishments."24incethese argetsarepresumably nprotectedoday,whydidtheBritisho to theexpense fthe ong-secret hevaline rogramnearly 1 billion verthe1973-1980 e-riod) to harden heSLBMRVs and equipthemwithpenetrationids? Ap-parently oth Chevaline nd theJuly 980Trident LBMdecision ssumepossible mprovementsn SovietBMD. Soviet constructionf significantBMD would require nhancedBritishenetrationapabilities.hisconcernis expressed elicatelyn publicBritishocuments:Though the Chevalineprogramme illkeep our Polaris missiles ble topenetrate nti-ballistic issiledefences nto the 1990s, continuingovieteffortnresearch nddevelopment,llowedbythe1972ABMTreaty,mightin timereduceour assurance f this.... [Trident's] MIRVcapabilityndlong range give excellentmargins f long-termnsurance gainstfurtheradvances nSovietABMand ASWcapability....25

In otherwords, Britain's osition n BMD is similar o thatof France.Precautionaryteps have been taken n case SovietBMD improves,whilepreservationftheABM Treaty's onstraintss emphaticallyreferred.omeobservers avespeculated hatBritain ould find uperpowerCBM defen-ses more cceptablehan ny rea defenses. hismightetolerablentheoryfor he maintenancef thecredibilityfBritain's eterrent,ut even suchICBMdefenses ould promotehedeploymentf SovietBMD that ouldbeorientedodefense fpopulationentersndotherargetsfpotentialritishinterest. o official ritishreferencesave beenexpressed ther han on-tinuancenforce f theexisting BMTreatyndProtocol rovisions.British nterestn BMD is even less likely hanFrench, iventhat theBritish aveno hardened etaliatoryorces o protect nd greater inancialconstraints. ritish fficials ould probably ppose the ATM concept s24. Officialevidence in the Twelfth eport rom he Expendituireommiiiiittee,ited in LawrenceFreedman,BritainndNuclearWeapons London: Macmillan,1980), p. 47. See also Freedman'susefuldiscussionof Chevaline, pp. 48-51.25. TheFutureUnitedKinigdomtrategic uclearDeterrentorce London: MinistryfDefense,July1980), pp. 7, 20. This statementwould also apply to the even longer-range nd moreeffectiveTrident I (D-5), which is to be purchased in lieu ofTrident .


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likely o endanger he ABM Treaty. ecause of Britain'slose relationshipwiththe UnitedStates n strategicuclearmatters,omeobservers avespeculated hat he Britishmight e more ikely hantheFrench o acceptreadily U.S. decision o seek extensive evisionsn theABMTreaty egimeifBMD came to seem overwhelminglyecessary o preserve hecredibilityoftheU.S. guarantee;hat redibility ight e seen as a higher riorityhanmaintenance f theABMTreaty or hesakeof thepenetrabilityfBritishRVs.Although uch rguments ight e adopted s rationalizationsfBritainhadno other hoice, his peculative istinctionetweenBritishndFrenchviews would almost ertainly roveunfounded n practice. ritainwouldopposerevision ftheABMTreaty egimes firmlys France.FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANYThegovernmentftheFederalRepublic fGermanyFRG) s perhapsmorekeenly warethanother uropeangovernmentshat hecontinuingredi-bilityf heBritishnd French eterrentss in the nterestfWesternuropeingeneral. his reasonfor avoringontinuationf theABMTreaty egimeis, however, robably econdaryo theTreaty's erceivedmportanceor hefuture fdetente nd stabilityn East-West olitical elations. avoringon-tinuation f theABMTreaty egimes implicitnthe FRG'ssupport or hecontinuingALT/STARTrmscontrol rocess,which s deemed"ofper-manentmportancen all political ffortsimed at safeguardingeace andachieving tabilizationntheEast-West alanceofpower."26At a timewhen U.S. strategicrms ontrol olicy emains nderreview,theABMTreaty ppearsto be one of thefewsurvivingillars f detente-a linkto theoptimisticarlyyearsoftheOstpolitiknitiatedn 1969bythecurrentPD-FDPgovernment.nilateral .S. action o alter heABMTreatyregimewould be moreupsettinghan Soviet-Americangreement n arevision, ut no revision t all seemspreferred. erhapseven more thanelsewherenNATO Europe, henegative mpression revails hatBMD is atechnology ore rientedonuclearwar-fightinghandeterrence.Given hesegeneral ttitudes,heFRGwouldprobably otwelcomeU.S.interestntheATMconcept. et WestGermany ouldbe thekeyEuropeanally regarding TM. A major hare of the new intermediate-rangeuclearforcesincludingllthePershingls) are to be basedintheFRG.Moreover,sinceBritain ndFrance,whoinanycase havea specialnuclear tatus, re26. White aper 979:TheSecurityfthe ederal epublicfGermanyndtheDevelopmentf theFederal rmedorcesBonn: FederalMinistry fDefence, 1979), p. 69.


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unlikely o takeany nitiativen ATM, the restof the Allies and theU.S.Congress)would awaita WestGerman ecisionwith hekeenest nterest.A positiveATM decision from he currentWestGermangovernmentwould be likely nlyunder omecombinationfthefollowingonditions:)further bvious deteriorationf detente; ) a strong nd consistent .S.commitmento ATM; 3) non-nuclear ill NNK) mechanismsn the ATMsystem; ) favorable inancingndproductionrrangements;) deploymentofATM on the soil of at least twoothernon-nuclearontinentalmembersofNATO-probablyBelgiumnd Italy; ) a NATO Council ndorsementfthe ATM concept; nd 7) howeverparadoxical, he establishmentf anappropriatermscontrol egotiatingontexthatwoulddemonstrate estGermany'snterestn the ontinuationfdetentendpreferenceor n armscontrol olution. hese conditionsmaybe predictedromhe recent istoryof WestGerman articipationnNATO theater uclearmodernizationeci-sions; most, f notall,wouldprobably pplywith CDU/CSU-led overn-ment s well.27Some doubt thatthe ATM conceptwouldbe accepted venbya CDU/CSU-ledgovernment,ven with hese conditions-if hey ould all be ful-filled.Hans Ruihle ftheCDU-sponsored onradAdenauer oundation as,for xample, ublished view of"profound kepticism"egardingheATMoption: ". . . this option appears neithertechnologically racticablewithinacceptable inancialimits tpresent, or s there ny prospect fan optim-ized combinationf strategicefense ystemsn theforeseeable uture."28

The Alliance difficulties.S. BMD programsmightface become evenclearerwhenboth imited .S. homeland ptions ICBMdefensesnd"thin"area defenses) nd potentiallyxtensive .S. homeland MD are examinedfrom Europeanperspective.U.S. BMD AlternativesLIMITED U.S. HOMELAND BMD OPTIONSICBM defenses onstitutehe eastcontroversialptionfor hreereasons.27. See DavidS. Yost ndThomasC. Glad, "WestGerman arty olitics ndTheater uclearForceModernizationince1977,"Armedorces ndSociety,ol. 8, No. 4 (Summer 982), npress.28. HansRiihle, A European erspectiven theU.S.-Soviet trategic-Militaryelationship,"inWilliamchneider, r., tal., U.S. Strategic-NuclearolicyndBallistic issile efense:he 980sandBeyondCambridge, ass.: Instituteor oreign olicyAnalysis, 980), . 51.


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First, hetechnical easibilityfdefense fhardenedCBMlaunchers eemsincreasinglyredible, speciallyf everage ouldbe provided hroughmobileand/or eceptive asing. econd, CBM defenseswouldnotviolate he ong-standingffense-dominanterities f he assureddestruction"utlook. re-launch urvivabilityfretaliatoryorceswould be enhancedwithno degra-dation of their bility o penetrate o countervalueargets; he assumedstabilityf mutual ounter-societyhreats ould beunimpaired. hird, re-cisely ecause Soviet ities nd other countervalue"argets ould remainundefended nder hishypotheticalevisedABMTreatyegime, ritishndFrench uclear orces ouldretainheirbilityopenetrateotheir resumedtargets. onetheless, ny ttempto revise heABMTreaty egimeoaccom-modate CBM defenses ould becomecontroversialnEurope.Fearsofanarmsracedestabilizingast-West elationswould probably urpassmoretechnical oncerns boutpossible xpansion nd reorientationf CBM de-fenses o areadefenses,nd so forth.Limitedrea defenseswouldprobably e even more ontroversialnEu-rope. JanLodal has madeprobablyhestrongestase for imited .S. areadefenses, artly n the grounds hat heywould strengthenhecredibilityofU.S. guarantees o Allies.Lodal reasons hatan active efensewould eliminatenySoviet ncentiveocarryut "limited"nuclear ttacks gainstU.S. territory,ven ifthe UnitedStateshad usedtactical uclearweapons to stopa Soviet nvasion.The defensewould becapableof nterceptingsmall-scalettack; Soviet eader would have tolaunch large ttack several housandwarheads) openetratehesedefen-ses. A rational oviet eaderought o be deterred romaunchinguchanattack,ealizinghat nassureddestructionesponsesa muchmore rediblereaction o an attack fseveral housandwarheads han oanattack f fewwarheads.29In Lodal'sproposalfor imitedreadefenses,mutual oviet-Americanas-sureddestruction"apabilities ould remain heguarantorsfstrategicta-bility. utwhatLodal calls"a second firebreak'nthe adderof escalation"(in addition otheNATO-assumed onventional/nuclearirebreak)ouldbecreated: he UnitedStatescould use battlefield uclearweaponswith essrisk fcatastrophicoviet etaliationgainst heU.S. homeland.Lodal rightly ointsout probableEuropeanobjections o sucharea de-29. Jan M. Lodal, "Deterrence and Nuclear Strategy," Daedalus,Vol. 109, No. 4 (Fall 1980),p. 167.


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fenses.Even morethanwith CBM defenses, hemainEuropean oncernswould ncludefear fan armsraceunderminingrospects ordetente ndthe egitimizationfSoviet rea defenses ossibly educingheeffectivenessof Britishnd Frenchnuclear orces.Aboveall, limitedU.S. area defenses"would make trelatively ore ikely hat war could be foughtnEuropealone, without nvolving .S. territory-aesult hatwouldbe decried sdecoupling."Although he ongoingdebate abouttheprospective eploy-ment f ntermediate-rangeuclear orcesINF)has showngreat esonanceamongEuropeanpublics fthefalse rgumenthat heU.S. purpose n NFmodernizations to "confine nuclearwartoEurope,"Lodal's proposal sintended o maximize hatpossibility.odal udgesthat mplementationfhisproposalwouldnonethelesse "healthy or he lliance," ecause oftheincreased redibilityfU.S. guaranteesnd thusthereduced ikelihood fanyconflict,ven attheconventionalevel, nEurope: No possible trategycan fully atisfy heEuropean countries.... ourEuropean allies continue tolookfor n easy solutionwherenoneexists."30EXTENSIVE U.S. HOMELAND BMDInrejectinguchproposals or thin" rea defenses, olinGray ightlyointsout that small-scale uclear trikes re not much nkeepingwithwhat sknown bout Sovietmilitarytyle."Accordingly, ray uggests hata "thick," r truly erious,multi-levelBMD] deployment ouldusefullyreduce American elf-deterrencend so enhancethecredibilityfthe ex-tended deterrent.... in the absence of substantial omelandprotection,U.S. strategic uclearforces ack both credibilitys an extended eterrentthreatnd abilityn the eventof need. TheSovietUnioncannot e certainthat his s so (even ncrediblehreats eter o some extent) uttherequiredquality fdeterrence,tsrobustnessnperiods fvery cutepoliticaltress,could well be lackingf heU.S. homeland ontinues obe totallyt nuclearrisk.31Morecrediblextended eterrenceuaranteesould thusbe a by-productfextensive omeland efenses.A true damage-limiting"osture ould, however, lso include theoryof"escalationdominance" riented oward ontrollingheSovietUnion's30. Ibid., p. 171. Herman Kahnhas expressed a similar ttitude owardprobableWestEuropeanobjections to U.S. BMD programs:"They won't like it, ofcourse, but they are sensible peoplewhen they'reforcedto be sensible." (U.S. News and WorldReport, eptember21, 1981, p. 54).31. Colin S. Gray, "A New Debate on BallisticMissile Defence," Sturvival,ol. 23, No. 2 (March/April 1981), p. 68.


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BMD and theAtlanticAlliance 155

powerprojection dvantagesnEurasia s wellas denying heSovietsop-portunitieso playupon theprobabilityfself-deterrencen an undefendedAmerica.n otherwords,while he assureddestruction"erity fnear-totalpopulation ulnerabilityouldbediscarded, .S. operationalapabilities orstrategicuclearwar, bothoffensivend defensive, ould be improvednorder omake mplausible nySoviet heory fvictory.tability ould bederivedfrom U.S. ability o dominate nyescalation rocessby limitingdamageto its population enters s wellas itsmilitaryssets. The UnitedStates ouldthus xtend nd honor uarantees-including,fnecessary,irstuseofnuclearweapons-with essrisk f elf-deterrenceecause herewouldbe less riskof homelanddamage.Becausedeterrence ould be improved,war wouldbe lessprobable,nd lesscatastrophic,f toccurred.All thepremises fthiscompellingnd logically onsistenttrategic re-scription re rejected y partisans f the "assureddestruction"modelofdeterrencendstability,ho are evenmorepredominantnWesternuropethan ntheUnited tates. t s assumed hat eliable opulation efenses reinfeasiblenan offense-dominantorld, nd that nySoviet-Americanom-petitionn defensivemeasureswoulddangerouslyestabilize hestrategicnuclearbalance, n addition obeing self-defeatingnd extremelyostly.32Evenmorethanwith imited efenses, uropeanswould almost ertainlydeploreU.S. interestn extensive rea defenses s undermining,fnot de-stroying,he peace-preservingtructurefdeterrence;s possibly lidingfrom roper ontrol fself-deterrenceo a "first-strike"osture; s attempt-ingto confine nyfuture uclearwar to Europe;and as encouragingheSovietUniontoconstructimilar efenses.Even ifEuropeans ouldgenerally cceptGray's udgment hat, n "thecontext fU.S. BMD deployment,ovietBMD would notbe a destabilizingdevelopment,"33xtensive ovietdefenses ouldmake theneed for ostlyimprovementsnconventionalndbattlefielduclear orcesnEuropemoreobvious.NATO's strategicnd intermediate-rangeuclear orces ould notbe as readily ppliedtodeterringoviet ttackswith onventionalrbattle-

32. Calling hismodel fdeterrencend stabilityassureddestruction"sadmittedlyomewhatunfairn that,despitepopularperceptionso the contrary, .S. targetingnd operationaldoctrine as formanyyears ncludednumerous ounterforcend counter-militaryptions."Assured estruction"onethelessecame he horthandharacterOzationf U.S. declaratorypolicynthe ate 1960s, nd retains certain escriptive erit wing o graveU.S. andWestEuropeandeficienciesn active nd passivedefenses.Thosewho believesuch deficienciestechnologicallynavoidablend strategicallytabilizingarry orwardhe assured estruction"logic fthe ate1960s.33. Gray, NewDebateon Ballistic issileDefense," . 65.


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fieldnuclearforces ecause Sovietdefenseswould directly ounter hem.The recent olitical rials fsustainingn approximatehree ercentnnualreal ncrease n defense pendingnNATO Europe suggesthowwelcomenew programs or xtensiveonventionalorce mprovement ould be.Moreover,xtensiveoviet readefenses,more han CBMor imited readefenses,would tend toreducethe deterrentalue of the British,rench,and (incidentally)hinesenuclear orces. uttingside thequestion fhowgreat hatdeterrentalue s inU.S. (or,more mportantly,oviet) yes,thecontinued echnical redibilityf thesenuclear orces smeaningfulo moreEuropeans han those n the British nd French overnments. he UnitedStateswas especially ostile o theFrenchnuclear fforturing he1960s,when RobertMcNamarawas secretaryf defense. or over decade,how-ever,U.S. policyhas accepted, venvaguely pproved,maintenancef theFrench orcesin,for xample, he1974NATO Ottawa ommunique),houghstillnotwith hedegree f active ooperationccorded o theBritish.Whiledamage-limitersould arguethat hegreater oodof theAlliancewould beservedbythe mproved eterrenceerived rom xtensive .S. area defen-ses,and that mallerndependenteterrents ould be lessnecessary,manyEuropeanswould probably e skeptical,osaythe east.Still notherWestEuropean rgumentgainstU.S. homeland MDis thattheresultant oviethomelandBMD would underminehe U.S. ability oexecute imited trategic ptions.WhileU.S. penetrationechnologyouldperhapsovercome ovietdefenses, he Sovietscould nonetheless efendagainst imited trategic uclear trikesmorereadily hanagainstgreaterones and could thusobligethe UnitedStates to considermoreextensiveoptions-increasinglyessdistinguishablerom eneral uclear esponse-inorder o honor heguarantee. his s theobverse ftheLodal argumentor"thin" rea defenses,nditapplieswith vengreaterorcefmore xtensiveBMDprogramsntheUnited tates nd theSovietUnion reenvisaged. heUnited tatesmaywellbe self-deterredromxecutingny imitedtrategicoptions.Moreover, ven iftheUnited Stateswerenotself-deterredromemployinguchoptions,whatvalue couldthey avewhentheUnited tatesis defenseless gainstthe virtuallynevitable ovietstrategic uclearre-sponses?Finally,WestEuropeansremain keptical boutthe armscontrol rgu-ments orU.S. homeland MD setforthy omeAmericans. uch rgumentspresume hatSovietand U.S. BMD programswould permit othsides tolimit r even sharply educe ffensivetrategicuclear orces ecause CBMs


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BMD andtheAtlantic lliance157

and other argetswould be defended.Abrogation r revision f the ABMTreatywouldbe necessary, utextensiveuperpoweromeland MD couldtheoreticallylso promote trategictability y minimizinghe effectsfcheating n negotiated ffensiveorce evels and, more mportantly,yenhancing ncertaintys to thecost nd feasibilityfoffensivetrike lans.Crisis tabilityould be improvedyreductionsnretaliatoryorce ulnera-bility, nd by "allowingfornonnuclearnterceptoraunch under real orapparent ttack."34uropeandoubtsderive rom heirudgment hat uper-powerBMD would in practicenot result n limitationsr reductionsnoffensiveorces, nd would probablyromotenstabilityhroughntensifiedcompetitionnstead.U.S. InterestnATMDefenseSecretary arold Brown pparently id notevenconsider he fea-sibility fATM defensesforthe plannednew intermediate-rangeuclearforcesINF)-the ground-launchedruisemissilesGLCMs)andPershingls(P-11s) cheduled o begindeploymentn1983-whenhe made thefollowingassessment:IfTNFare to provide credible eterrent,heymustbe highly urvivablentheaggregate,t least against onventionalr limited uclear ttack.To alarge extent, orce urvivabilitygainst hese threats epends on mobilityand concealmentromWarsaw Pacttarget cquisitionystems.Giventherelativelyimited eploymentrea forNATO land-based ystemsnd shorttime fflightor oviet allisticmissiles,bsolute urvivabilitygainst arge-scale, bolt-out-of-the-blueuclear ttacks s probablynfeasiblendcertainlyexcessivelyostly.35 [Emphasis added]Thisview s similar othegeneral uropean iewexpressed yRAFMarshallSirNeil Cameron: We can,ofcourse,do nothing gainst ballisticmissileattack utdigdeep. ..."3634. G.E. Barasch et al., BallisticMissileDefense:A Potential rms-Controlnitiative,A-8632 (LosAlamos,NewMexico: os AlamosNational aboratory,anuary981), . 23. While his tudypresents erhaps hemostcomplete ersion fsuch arguments,imilardeas aboutBMD'spotentiallyeneficialffectsor trategictabilityavebeen expressedyHermanKahn,JamesR. Schlesinger,ndothers.35. Harold Brown,DepartmentfDefense nnualReport iscalYear 1981 Washington,D.C.: U.S.Governmentrintingffice,980), . 146.36. NeilCameron, Defense nd theChanging cene,"RUSIJournal,ol. 25,No. 1 (March1980), . 26. For similar mericaniew nthe ndefensibilityfEurope, eeLodal, Deterrenceand Nuclear trategy,". 171.


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In contrast, Principal Deputy Undersecretary f Defense Research andEngineeringJamesWade has made the following valuation:The question of active defensefortheaternuclear forces s being looked atquite carefully.... it is reasonably clear that such a course could havemerit.... both the GLCM and P-II are designed to achieve survivabilityagainst a number of threats hrough overtfielddeployment,frequent elo-cation in the field, and the reductionof signaturesassociated with fielddeployment.This mode of operationassumes enough warningto disperseto covertfield itesprior o an attack.37 n ATM could reducethe mportanceofwarningtime....38

Since Wade's statements, t has been reported n more specific ermsthatarmingthe Patriotmissile with a nuclear warhead fordefenseagainstSoviettheater missiles is under consideration."A separate study contract s ex-pected from heArmyfordevelopmentof a non-nuclearwarhead for heaterBMD toavoid theproblemofobtaining eleaseauthorityfPatriot s equippedwith a nuclear warhead."39 This report s consistentwith other unofficialAmericandiscussions of theaterATM capable ofneutralizinghethreat osedby the SS-20 and other Soviet theatermissiles,which could have conven-tional, nuclear,or chemical warheads.It is notyetclearwhetherreportedresearchactivitieswill result n actualATM programs. No plans currently xistto replace or supplement the nu-clear-armed Nike-Hercules air defense systemwith new nuclear-warheadactive defenses,40 r withconventional-warhead ystems capable of theaterATM defenses. If ATM programswere pursued, they could face seriousopposition in WesternEurope, given established views on BMD in generaland special factors n Britain,France, and the FRG. Six problematic ssuescould inhibit r even frustrate U.S. initiativen favor fATM: technologicalcredibility, oviet countermeasures,Alliance cohesion, military ationales,implementation f INF modernization,and arms control ssues (includingINF negotiations s well as SALT-re-named STARTbytheUnitedStatesinNovember 1981-and the ABM Treaty).

37. Wade in U.S., Senate, Armed Services Committee,DepartmentfDefenseAuthorizationorAppropriationsorFiscal Year1981,Hearings,Part 5, Researchand Development,March 13, 1980(Washington,D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrintingOffice,1980), pp. 3013-3014.38. Wade cited in "ProtectionforEurope-Based Nuclear Missiles," Flightnternlational,ctober18, 1980, p. 1496.39. AviationWeek nd SpaceTechnology,une22, 1981, p. 89.40. TheFY 1983DepartmentfDefense rogramorResearch,evelopmenit,ndAcquiisitioni,tatementby theHonorable Richard D. DeLauer, Under Secretary fDefense Researchand Engineeringto the 97thCongress,March2, 1982,pp. VII-14.


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BMDandtheAtlanticlliance159

TechnologicalredibilityfATMEuropean xperts, o say nothing f politiciansnd the general ublic,willnot be easily convinced f the technical easibilityf ATM defenses.Thetendency s to assume that he nfeasibilityf reliableBMD was long agoestablished t the ntercontinentalevel,and that horter istances, horterwarning imes, nd ower rajectoriesake heater MD evenmoredifficult.BMD technology as in fact dvanced,particularlynsuch areas as discrim-ination, omputerization,ata processing, adar, nd other-i.e., optical-detection ystems.Moreover, ecause the distance nd duration f theirboost flight hases are relativelyhort, heater allisticmissiles especiallythe SS-21 nd SS-23)have significantlylower e-entrypeedsthanSLBMs,ICBMs, and longer-rangeheater allisticmissiles ikethe SS-22 nd the SS-20. Shorter light-timesend to aggravate or, as BMD specialists ay,"stress") he nterceptroblem, hile lower e-entrypeedstend osimplifyit.Skepticismas focusednitiallyn thereporteddea ofusingPatriotnanATM role.When hePatriot tudy rogramthen alledSAM-D) was startedin the mid-1960s, n ATM role was envisaged, n addition o a capacityagainsthigh-performanceircraftt high nd low altitudes. .S. policy asreflectedn theNPG deliberations)hen avored onsiderationfATM. How-ever, theATM requirement as laterdroppedbecause of costs and thechallenges f defending gainstheavynuclear ttacks,n addition o theAlliance ecommendationgainst heater MD. Patriots now intended oserve s a replacementor heHawkandNike-Herculesirdefense ystems.Patriot adars represumably esigned nly ornti-aircraftperations.venif quippedwith adars nd data processing orATM-capable iscriminationand responsiveness,atriotmight otbe promptnd accurate noughforan ATM role unless a nuclearwarheadwere used as the killmechanism.Eventhen ome observers ouldhavegravedoubts, specially oncerningthehigher e-entrypeeds of onger-rangeovietmissiles e.g., theSS-20and theSS-22). Developing low-performanceangeATM (on the basis ofthePatriot, r, n theSoviet ase, theSA-10)capableof nterceptingruisemissiles rslower, horter-rangeallisticmissilese.g., theSS-21 ndSS-23)wouldbe lesschallenginghandeveloping newhigh-performanceissile.Probably nly n entirely ew high-performanceTMmissile, fequippedwith ffectiveensing ndhoming evices, ould avoid therequirementornuclearwarheads.The potential ecessity or uclearwarheads,whichwouldpose thepolit-


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ical problem f ntroducingew nuclearweapons systemsnWestern u-rope, underlines he many advantages fnon-nuclear ill NNK) mecha-nisms.These advantageswould includereducedmanpower equirements;simplifiedogistics, ecurity,nd command, ontrol,nd communications;minimized isk o allies;no self-inflicteduclearffects-i.e., lectromagneticpulse EMP) orblackout-hinderingadars nd communicationsystems; orequirementornuclearweapon materials;implifiedelease uthority;ndconfidencen system eliability,ecausetotal ystem estings feasible,n-cludingdestructionf ncoming argetwarheads.EventhoughNNK war-heads, designedfor ither irectmpact rhighexplosive etonation eartheRV, are cheaperthan nuclearwarheads, kepticismboutNNK cost-effectivenessnd reliabilityillpersist ntil esearchincluding perationsresearch)eads to moredefinitiveonclusions ndthepublicationf uthor-itative ssessments.Althoughomeobservers, erhaps orrectly,eemATM "theonly ffec-tiveoption" for a reasonabledegreeof survivability"orNATO theaternuclear orces, ncludingNF,41 ne recent fficialiscussion f ATM tech-nologynotedthe need toconsider ts costs nd effectivenessnthecontextofalternativesoATM:Thetechnology equired o defend gainst n IRBMattack ncludes:Acqui-sition nd trackingadarcapableofpicking p and trackingn incomingwarhead; apid, ophisticatedignal rocessing quipmento allowfiringninterceptor ithin few seconds;a high-speed, igh accelerationmissilewhich anreach he ncoming arhead ntime okill tat a sufficientangetopreclude amage tothe defended arget; dequateterminaloming; ndan interceptorarhead apableofdestroyinghe ncoming eentryody. naddition, f a system s to be used to defend mobiletarget uch as aPershing auncher, ll of the nterceptorsnd supporting quipmentmusthavemobility onsistent ith hatof thetarget o be defended.This tech-nology s attainable;muchof it existsfrom urABM development ork,althoughthere are differencesetweendefending ixedtargets gainstICBMs, and defendingmobile nes againstRBMs.Whatwillbe at issueisthedegree o whichATM hardware ontributesosurvivabilitynthe ggre-gate,what ther ctive ndpassivemeasures an enhance urvivability,rmscontrol onsideration,ost ofATMalternatives,nd thebest technicalp-proach should we electto fieldsuch a system....41. Wayne R. Winton, "Applicationsof BMD Other Than ICBM Defense," in U.S. ArmsControlObjectivesnd the mplicationsorBallisticMissileDefense, roceedings ofa Symposium held at theCenter forScience and InternationalAffairs,Harvard University,November 1-2, 1979 (Cam-bridge,Mass.: PuritanPress, 1980), p. 96. Cf. Carnes Lord, "The ABM Question," Commentary,Vol. 69, No. 5 (May 1980),p. 38.


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We are not far nough long nour examinationf this omplexssue tohave the answers to all these questions.... While we are not yet preparedto estimate hat uch a systemmight ost, am certainhat hecostwouldbe substantial....42Alternativeso ATM wouldpresumablyncludemprovedispersal lanningandmobility,eception, edundancy,nd signature eductions.

The ABM development ork hatmaybe ofgreatest elevanceo ATM isthat n the Low Altitude efense ystem LoADs), which onsists fsmallradars nd interceptorsesignedforpossiblemobiledeployment iththeMX ICBM. In conjunction ithemerging echnologyor ndoatmosphericNNK,LoADs developmentmight e directlypplicable o ATM.43 onethe-lessdisagreement ithinhe echnicalommunityersistss to thefeasibilityofreasonablyffectiveMD, owing otechnicalnd operational roblems,includinghechallenge freliableNNK.4Uncertaintiesould persist, venwithreliableNNK. EndoatmosphericinterceptionithNNK of he hemical arheads heSoviets ave reportedlydeployedon theater allisticmissiles ouldbe less thansatisfactory,incesuch an interceptionver Alliedterritoryould spreadthechemicals, e-pendingon the altitude f the interceptionnd otherfactors. rompterinterceptions ight hereforerovide etter olutionsgainst oviet hemicalwarheads ver he ongterm.High-level NK interceptionsverAlliedterritoryould also representproblemf heSovietsdesigned heirwarheadswith hemechanism f "sal-vage-fusing," hereby ncoming Vsmight e detonated ythe mpact fthe nterceptor'sillmechanism.While heobvious dvantage f nterceptingthe Sovietwarhead everalmiles wayfromts ntended argetwould re-main, "salvage-fusing"uclear xplosion ould nterfere ith ubsequentAllieddefenses ecauseof tseffectsn radar nd communicationsystems.However mprobablehe"salvage-fusing" ossibilityeems-owing to itsgreat ost nd difficulty,ndrisk fcatastrophicailure-it ouldserve s a42. Wade, in DoD Authorization.. FY 1981, p. 3014.43. Winton, "Applications of BMD"; JonathanE. Medalia, Antiballistic issiles, Issue Brief,Number B81003 Washington,D.C.: CongressionalResearch Service, September1, 1981), p. 15.44. For somewhat contrastingssessments ofBMD technology, ee the Los Alamos study citedin note 34; Guy Barasch, NikkiCooper, and Ray Pollock, BallisticMissile Defense:A Quick-LookAssessment, A-UR-80-1578 (Los Alamos Scientific aboratory,June1980); Chapter 3 (on BMD)of U.S., Congress, Office f TechnologyAssessment,MX MissileBasing Washington,D.C.: U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,1981); and the articlesby WilliamA. Davis, Jr.,Deputy BallisticMissile Defense Project Manager, in NationalDefense, eptember/October979 and December1981.


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basis forEuropean echnicalkepticism.uch uncertaintiess thetechnicaleffectivenessfNNKATMwouldnotnecessarily epriveATM of all deter-rentvalue. Resultant oviet uncertaintiess to the effectivenessf theiroffensivetrikes ould still e helpfulo deterrence.SovietATM CountermeasuresSoviet responses o a U.S. ATM program orNATO could be offensive,defensive,nd political.Offensiveesponseswould be systems esigned o destroy,verwhelm,or circumventWesternATM systems.Given the deficiencies fNATO'scurrentir defenses, he Soviets could attack heATM radarsand othercomponents ithair-breathingystems. mproved ir defenses nd ATMdefenses ouldthereforeoth e requiredna serious amage-limitingffortby NATO.ATMsystems ouldalso be saturated ytheSoviets t specific ointsofinterest,t costs partly ependent pon the sophisticationnd number fSovietpenetrationids as opposedto the ATM's discriminationapabilityand cost-effectiveness.venwithout enetrationids,the numbers fRVsonSoviet heater allisticmissiles re veryhigh:Thenumber fNATO militarynstallations hich heSovietsmight argetwithnuclearweapons s,atmost, pproximatelyhree undred. he Sovietspresently avetendeliveryystems or achtarget,nd whentheSS-20hasbeenfully ielded heywillhave tenweaponsfor achtargetnthis ystemalone.... The Soviet motivationfor this tremendouscapability, enablingthem odestroy verymilitarynstallationnNATO ten imes ver, ontinuestobe a mysteryntheWest.45

The Sovietcapability eemsexcessive, venallowing orredundancy ocompensate or eliabilityncertaintiesndthehypotheticalontingenciesfWestern re-emptionr ntra-warttrition,nd to cover n even more m-bitious arget etinWestern urope.Some Westernnalysts ave offereddeceptivelyeassuringxplanationsnspeculatinghat xtra-rationalactors(e.g., bureaucraticolitics r cultural radition)mayaccountfor hehighnumbersfSoviet eployments.he Sovietsmay lso bedeployingmilitarily45. Francis X. Kane, "Safeguards fromSALT: U.S. TechnologicalStrategyn an Era ofArmsControl," n Paul H. Nitze et al., The Fateful nds and Shades fSALT (New York: Crane, Russakand Co., 1979),p. 116.


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redundant NF for negotiatingurposes, .e., no loss of required argetcoverage, ven ifnegotiations esultn reductions.Whatever he explana-tions, he seemingly edundantwarheads n effectonstituteouble nsur-ance againstpotential utureATM capabilities-an mpressive apacity ooverwhelm TM, which nturnworks odiscourageNATO from ursuingsuchsystems.fan ATM were to cast doubton theeffectivenessfsystemssuch as the SS-22 or SS-20,the Sovietswould probably se it as a newrationale o deploy ven morenumerous nd effectiveNF; thiswould maketechnical nd cost-effectivenessrgumentsorATM even moredifficultorWestern roponents.Although ovietredundancyntheater allisticmissilenumbersmakes timprobable,nother oviet ffensiveountermeasureouldbe attackingar-gets defendedby European-based TM with SLBMs and ICBMs. Knowl-edgeableobservers ssume that pproximately20of theSS-11 CBMs,aswellas someSS-19 CBMs, mayhavetargetsnEurope.46hismeansthatfullyredible TM wouldrequiren abilityo ntercepthevery apid CBMandSLBMRVs, whilethe attermightome fromnydirection.ICBM RVscouldalso come fromnydirectionf heSoviets sed theFractional rbitalBombardmentystem FOBS], ororbitedmissiles; utthese delivery ech-niques seem mprobables concerns argetsnEurope.)An imperfectbilitytodefend gainst ertain ypes fSoviet ntermediate-rangeissileswouldnonetheless onstituten improvementverthecurrentituation,nwhichno defense xists gainst oviet CBMs, SLBMs, or ntermediate-rangeis-siles.Defensive ovietcountermeasures ould consist fexpandedBMD sys-tems. SincetheABMTreatywas signed,SovietBMD research nd devel-opmenthas been more ntensivehanthat f the United tates.Moreover,in contrasto the UnitedStates, he Sovietsretain ctiveBMD capabilitiesaroundMoscow,permittedytheABMTreatynd tsProtocol,ndcontinueto perfect adars and air defense nterceptor issilesforpossiblefutureupgradingoBMDroles.WhetherheUnited tates etains n advantagenthekey reas ofBMDtechnologysno longer lear; t the east, omparativeU.S. advantages n certain reas have probably een reduced since1972,giventhe contrastingevels of investment ffort nder the ABM Treatyregime.Although he United tatesperhaps etainsn edge insomeareas,46. Lawrence Freedman, "The Dilemma of Theatre Nuclear Arms Control," Survival,Vol. 23,No. 1 (January/February981), p. 5.


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for xample, attlemanagementnd discriminationechnologiesnd exoat-mospheric onnuclear illmechanisms,tis reasonable o suspect hat hedimensions f the U.S. lead in ABM technology ave been significantlyreduced.The Sovietsmaybe better laced than heU.S. todeploy ffectiveBMD in a timely ashion.47Even fnew BMD programsould be restrictedhroughoviet-Americannegotiationsocapabilitiesgainst heater allisticmissiles, ovietATM, ikeU.S. ATM, could be virtuallyndistinguishablen practice rom ystemscapable of nterceptingCBM and SLBM RVs. Forfull echnicalredibility,ATMsystemswouldalmosthave to be capableof such nterceptions.eo-graphicalsymmetry ould favor heUSSR, nthat SovietATM,whethercapableof CBMandSLBMRV nterceptionsrnot, ould defend hehome-land as well as Allies.U.S. ATM inWestern urope would defendAlliesalone, notthe U.S. homeland. ome analysts peculate hat herecent on-

solidation fthe SovietTroopsofNationalAir Defense PVO Strany)withthetroops fAirDefenseof theGround orces PVO SV) maybe related onewproblems osed byoverlappingtrategicnd theater MD challenges,though hecentralizationfairdefenses ould also be explainedby othermanagerialims.48 oreover,here emains hepossibilityhat oviet estingofairdefense ystemsn an ABMmode, possiblynviolation fthe ABMTreaty,ncludesdevelopmentf an ATM.49On the otherhand, one wondershow to interpretherepeatedSovietcomplaintshat ershingIwould allowthem nly to8minutesfwarningtime. The Sovietsnaturally ever ndicatehow muchwarning imeEuro-peans couldexpect rior o the mpact f heirNFRVs,or ndeedhow muchwarningimeU.S. coastal, r WestEuropean, argetsouldhaveprior o the47. Indeed, the Sovietsmay surprisemany Western bservers y choosing hemselves opropose evisionsn theABM Treaty egime r to end t.This ssay sconcerned rimarilyithcurrent lliance ssues posed by prospective .S. BMD decisions, nd thereforeeflectshewidespreadWestern ssumptionhat heSovietswillbe reactingoU.S. and NATO decisions,not vice versa. Soviet decisions orBMD could substantiallyhangethe current limate fopinionregarding MD in the UnitedStates nd Western urope. Soviet ncentivese.g.,protectingey ssetsfrom U.S. second trike) nd disincentivese.g., prospectivelleviationof U.S. ICBM vulnerability)orBMD deploymentsonstitute large ubject istinctrom hepurposes f this ssay. See theDoD assessment fSovietBMD inU.S., Senate,CommitteenAppropriations,Departmentf DefenseAppropriationsorFiscal Year 1982, Hearings, Part 5, June1981 Washington,.C.: U.S. Governmentrinting ffice, 981), . 466.48. William . and Harriet astScott ited y Henry radshernWashingtontar, uly 6, 1981,p. 10.49. Winton, ApplicationsfBMD," pp. 96-97;cf.SenatorJakeGarn, SovietViolations fSALT ," Policy eview, umber (Summer 979), p. 24-28.


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BMD and theAtlanticlliance165

impact fSovietSLBM RVs.) Ifsincere, hecomplaintsould mplyack ofconfidencen theirATMupgrade apability.he SovietATMresearch nddevelopment rogramgainstPershingI has been described s "aggres-sive";50 uttheUnited tatesofficiallyttributesershingI "a high ssur-ance ofpenetratinguture ovietdefenses,"'51artly ecause theGLCM-PershingI combinationtresses ovietdefenses ndbothhavepotential orpenetrabilityeasuresupgrade.52 he Sovietcomplaintsbout PershingIcould,moreover, lso be partof theSovietpolitical trategy fportrayingNATO INFmodernizations "aggressive."The Sovietpolitical esponse oATMwould be an extension fthe bar-gaining osture heSovietshavealready ssumed.U.S. interestn an actualATMprogram ouldbe seized andexploited or variety fmediathemes:theunmaskingfthetrulyggressivewar-fighting"ntentionsf heWest,thethreato strategictabilityndworldpeaceinviolatingheABMTreatywithATM, theinitiation f a new "arms race" by thecapitalistmilitary-industrialomplex, nd so forth.More mportantly,U.S. ATM initiativecouldbe perceived ytheSoviets s an opportunityopromotentagonismbetween heUnited tates nd Western urope.Alliance ohesionndATMThe Sovietopportunityopromotentagonism ouldreside n thepoten-tially ivergent .S. andWestEuropean ppreciationsf theutilityfanyBMDprograms,ncluding TM. WhileBritainnd Francewouldhavetheirown national easonsfor pposing nythinghatmightlter heABMTreatyregime, hesereasonswouldbe endorsed yothersnWestern urope ndreinforcedythegeneral endencyosee BMDas destabilizingndlikely opromoten expensive nd futile armsrace" that ouldend inwar. IftheUnitedStates determined hatATM couldbe cost-effectivend militarilyuseful, nd should be pursued s an activeprogram, TM couldprovideanotherxample f hebroaddichotomynU.S.-NATOEuropean iews hatwas notedbyRobertW. Komer,whenPresident arter's ndersecretaryfdefense orpolicy: Indeed,we Americansre ncreasinglyskingwhether50. Senator ohnWarnernDoD Authorization.. FY 1981, p. 3013.51. Caspar W. Weinberger,Departmentf DefenseAnnual Report iscal Year 1983 (Washington,D.C.: U.S. Governmentrinting ffice, 982), p. III-72.52. William . Perry, henUnder ecretaryf DefenseforResearch nd Engineering,nDoDAuthorization. . FY 1981, p. 3018.


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Europe s as interestedn tsown defense s is theUnited tates, rperceivesthe ame hreat."53ncontrast,uropeansmight iew heAmerican oncernsas immoderate.Secondary lliance ohesion roblemsould arise fATMprograms ereaccepted ytheAlliance.ntra-Allianceisputes ouldconcern hat ystemsand localitieswouldbe entitledo ATMprotection,hileATMprotectioncouldbe opposedfor pecificocalities r for pecific urposes.Military ationalesorATMThe precisemilitaryurposesATM mightervehave yet o be fully larified.The statementyJamesWadecited bove oneofthefewofficialommentsonATM'spotential tility)tresses heprospectiveain n survivabilityorNATO's new INF ifone did nothaveto count n theSoviets ooperativelyproviding arningime o NATObeforengagingnstrikesgainst he NF.If NF survivabilityere more horoughlyssured, he NF deterrenthreatto theSovietUnionwouldbemore ormidable-forre-war eterrencend,depending n thethicknessfthedefenses nd their ndurance otential,forntra-wareterrences well. While NF survivability aybe adequatelyassured hrough arning ime,mobility,nd dispersal, ixed argets ouldremain ulnerable.ffixed argets uchas airfields,uclearweapons toragesites, nd certain ommand,ontrol,nd communicationsC3) centerswerealso equippedwithATM defenses, hedamage-limitingapabilitiesmightsignificantlyncreaseSoviet uncertaintys to theprospects f successfulattack gainstNATO. ATM might,n particular,bstructrobable ovietplansfor re-emptiveuclear trikesgainst heater uclearweaponstargetsinWestern urope.Thisconcept,whichone might all "theater amage-limitingordefenseanddeterrence," ouldbe mostpracticalndconvincingfused indefenseofhardened ites, speciallyNF andfixed 3centers. efense fC3centerscould nparticularavea "forcemultiplier"ffect,hile llowing urrent3vulnerabilitieso persist imply ffersheSoviets lucrative pportunityodegradethe effectivenessfall typesof forces.54he Sovietscould over-whelm lmost nydefenses,fdeterminedo do so, yetobligingheSovietsto ncrease he cale oftheir ttack ouldbe seenas raisingheprobabilityf53. RobertKomer citedinAviationWeek nd Space Technology, arch3, 1980,p. 57.54. William R. Graham, "Reducing the Vulnerability f RetaliatoryForces and Command,Controland Communications:A Question of Balance," in David S. Yost, ed., NATO's StrategicOptions:ArmsControlndDefenseNew York:PergamonPress, 1981),pp. 170-178.


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bringingboutretaliationy U.S. strategicuclear orces gainst he SovietUnion.ATM could thusbe considered non-provocativenddefensivemeansofdenying heSoviets ny opportunityheymightwrongly erceive f rela-tively ow-cost ictory hroughelectiveheater uclear trikes. eterrenceand stability ouldbe enhanced,becauseobliging heSovietsto use farmorenuclearwarheadswouldraisethe risks o theSovietUnion. ftruly"thick" nd cost-effectiveTM defenses ould be constructed,heSovietpotential ornuclear lackmailgainstWestern uropemight e so severelyeroded thatdoubts bout thecredibilityftheU.S. strategicuclearguar-anteewould become n almost econdaryoncern.Another ossiblemilitaryationale orATM might e escalation ontrol.Atpresent, t s assumedthatNATO wouldreceivewarning ime ufficientfordispersal f the newINF, and that hewarning imewouldhavetobeused to assurethe survival fthe NF. In a crisis ituation,tseems ikelythat ome Western oliticians ould arguethat ctualdispersal f the NFwouldbe provocative,.e., likely oaggravatehe crisis nd makewarmoreunavoidable; nd yet failure o disperse ould equal the destructionf theINF. If ATM defenseswere available,warning ime nd prompt ispersalwouldbe lessnecessary. olitical ontrol ver scalation rocessesmight eenhanced f herewere essmilitaryperationalncentiveoengage nseem-ingly rovocative ehavior.None of the above militaryationaless likely o have muchappeal inWestern urope.Suchrationales-especiallyhe"protracted ar" conceptof enduring" urvivability-wouldppearmore rientedoward ctualwar-fightinghan oward eterrence.WestEuropeans enerallyreunwillingoacceptthe Sovietview (increasinglyespected n theUnitedStates)thatdeterrentapabilitiesre a product f operationallyffective ar-fightingcapabilities.nstead,WestEuropeans evenmorethanAmericans)endtofavor "deterrence-only"erspectiveasedonthreateningtrategicuclearretaliationgainstSoviet society.The U.S. threat o retaliate gainsttheSoviethomelandsenough, hey enerally eel, o deter nySoviet nvasion.In Ian Smart'swords, WestEuropean oliticaleaders nd their lectorateshaverarely,fever,beenwilling o devote erious ttentionowhatwouldhappenif the deterrence finitial ttackby threat f intolerable enaltyshouldfail."55The favorable eceptionn WestEuropeancircles fMcGeorgeBundy's55. Smart, "PerspectivesFrom Europe," p. 186.


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keynote ddress to the 1979Conference f the Internationalnstitute orStrategictudies s a bitof necdotal vidence or he amepoint.Above all,WestEuropeansdrewcomfort rom undy's nsistencehatdeterrence fany Soviet ttacks well assured:... no oneknowshat major ngagementnEuropewould escalate o thestrategicuclear evel.But the essential oint s theopposite;no one canpossibly nowthat twould not.56Bundy's ffirmations to thegenuine ossibilityf scalation asreassuringtoEuropeans ecausethey refer concept f deterrence ithoutntra-warescalation oundaries.WestEuropeanfaithn strategiceterrences oftenassociatedwiththeassumption hatmorecredible heaterwar-fightinga-pabilities ouldunderminetrategicuclear eterrence.he threatopunishSoviet ocietys thebedrock fdeterrencen their iew,notan ability odefeat SovietoffensivegainstWesternurope.

The possiblemilitaryationalesorATMoutlined bovewould,however,notonly ound ntolerablyellicose omanyWestEuropeans;uchrationalescould also seem subtlydesignedto decouplethe U.S. guarantee nd toconfine arto Europe. Protectinghenew INF couldbe seen as creatingdistinctEurostrategic"evel of potential onflict,omethingheDecember1979NATO decision on INF was intended o avoid. Giventhe abidingconcerns f West Europeans,manywould suspectthe UnitedStates ofimprovingonditions or uccessful ar-fightingnEuropeoutof desire oconfine war to thatregion.Whatone might all the "incalculabilityfescalation" ould be underminednEuropeanperceptionsfATMpromisedto ncrease rospects orholding onflictothetheaterevel.UsingATM to avoid premature ispersalof INF in orderto enhancepolitical ontrol ver the escalationprocesswould notnecessarily e anappealing rgumentnWestern uropebecause t would underline hepo-tentialulnerabilityfthe NF toSoviet ttack. ecauseATM defenses ouldbeseen as guaranteeingntensive oviet trikesntendedooverwhelmhemanddestroyhe NF,WestEuropean fficialsre ikelyoprefero stress heprobabilityhat eterrenceillnotfail ndthe dequacy fdispersal hroughmobilityndwarningime s meansofsurvivabilityor he NF.Therisk fappearingprovocative" ydispersinghe NFwouldhavetobe setagainst1) the risk of appearing oo frightenednd vulnerable o do so; 2) thecontrasting essage ffirmnessnd readiness o act-constructiveor crisis56. McGeorgeBundy, "The Futureof Strategic eterrence,"Survival,Vol. 21,No. 6 (November/December, 1979), p. 271.


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management"-that ispersalmight sefully ransmit;nd3) therisk ftheINFbeingdestroyedn their eacetime asing reas.Strategic ationale rgumentsgainstATMcould alsobe derived rom he"flexibleesponse"doctrine f NATO. First,tcouldbe argued, tpresentNATO assumes thatwhatever ascentATMcapabilityheSovietshave isinadequate or efense gainst hePershingI. However,f heSoviets uiltup their wn ATM capabilities,heoptionwithinflexibleesponse" fwhatmight e called "deliberate imited scalation"would be underminedySovietdefenses.NATO's strikes ouldhave to be more xtensiveo achievesimilarffects,factwhichmight e seenas harmfulo escalation ontrol.A second trategicationale rgumentgainstATMwouldapply f hekillmechanismwere nuclear.An ATMsystemwouldbe used as necessaryodestroy ncoming Vsthreateningefended argets.fthe killmechanismwerenuclear, hiswouldamount o NATO's usingnuclearweaponsreac-tively gainst n "accidental"arget.his ituation ouldcontradictheWestEuropean reference,or eliberatelyontrolledolitical seofnuclearweap-ons ifnuclearweaponsever have to be used. It is still ssumed despitemountingvidence fthe nuclear rientationf Soviet heater orces) hat,unlesstheSoviets nitiate heirggression ith pre-emptiveuclear trike,NATO would precedethe Soviets n makingdecisionson initialuse ofnuclearweapons,and that he nitial se shouldbe plannedprimarilyorpoliticalffect ith heresultantmilitaryffectsfsecondarymportance.A third trategic ationale as well as an Alliancecohesion) argumentdirectly ollows.A nuclearwarheadATM could notbe effectivenlessitcouldrespond o ncoming Vsautomatically.hiswouldrequiren agree-mentnadvance mong heAllies ouse theweapons,with pre-delegationof release uthority,nlesstheUnited tateswereto nsist n a strictnter-pretation f the 1962 Athensguidelines n consultationnly"time andcircumstancesermitting."t would be politically eryawkwardfor theUnited tates o so insist. t would be no lessdifficultor heUnited tatesto obtain dvanceapprovalofnuclear eleasefrom heAllies.57venif t57. Someobserversonsiderhenuclear-armedike-Herculesirdefenseystemobevirtuallyunusable or hese easons. here s a linkage etweenNike-HerculesndthePatriotn that heNNK Patriot or irdefensesscheduled o replace heNike-Hercules,nd nthat n ATM witha nuclear illmechanismmight e more eadily cceptednWesternurope fpresenteds asuccessor o theNike-Herculesystem.t has beenreported oryears hatWestEuropeanswould iketoretain henuclear igh-altitudenti-airapabilityhatNike-Herculesepresents,and for his eason t east nuclear uccessorystem ithATMpotential ight e acceptable.(Cf. Walter incus n The Washingtonost,November , 1981;and AviationWeek nd SpaceTechnology,ugust 9, 1977, p. 47-48.)


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were case ofdefendinggainst ncoming S-20RVs,manyWestEuropeanofficials ight rgue hatwarning ystemmalfunctionsould ead to a rapidand unnecessaryscalation f a crisis fany nuclear xplosion ook place.The advantages eliableNNK would offerre again apparent.INFModernizationndATMThe impact n actualU.S. ATMprogrammight ave on theongoingNFmodernizationrograms indeterminate,ut some Europeanofficialsreconcerned hat he mpact ouldbeharmfulna numberfways. f heATMrequired nuclearwarhead, t would constitute new nuclear ystem orpossible ntroductionntoWestern urope, nd hencea newfocusof con-troversy. oreover,whether uclear r NNK,ATMwould represent suf-ficientlyramatic evelopment o "overload"the WestEuropeandecision-making rocess.Europeangovernmentsre reluctanto see anynew dra-maticssuesraised such s enhanced adiation attlefieldeapons, hemicalweapons,newmid-range uclearmissiles, tc.)thatmightmake mplemen-tation f heDecember 979decisions n NFarms ontrolndmodernizationeven moredifficult.SomeWestEuropeansmighteeATMas a justificationor otproceedingwith he NFmodernizationecision, ven fATM werepresenteds a long-termnecessity ordefenseof thenew INF. Variousargumentsmight emade to this ffect:-Given the ATMpossibility,houldthe NF decision nd its rationale otbe re-examinednorder ofind more ptimalmix fsystemsndbasingforATMdefenses?-Why introduce ewoffensiveystemst all iftheproblem osed bytheSS-20 and other oviettheater allisticmissiles an be solvedeffectivelyand directlyhrough efensiveystemshatwould notpose a threatheSovietsmight erceive s "aggressive"?-Given the ikelihoodhat heSovietswouldtry ooverwhelmny ATM,

should ny and-based ystems e deployed t all?A number finfluential est Europeans re already oncerned hat and-based INF would constitutettractiveargetsn Sovieteyes,and an ATMprogrammight endto underline hatprobability.n thewords of CarlFriedrichonWeiszacker,Incase of crisis, heseweaponswouldnaturally


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be thetargets f a Russianfirsttrike. he necessity favoiding uch criseswouldmakeEuropemorevulnerable o blackmail."58ATM andArms ontrolWouldATMviolate heABMTreaty?he ATMconcepts distinctromhepurposeof the ABM Treaty,whichdefines n ABMsystems "a system ocounter trategicallisticmissiles rtheir lementsnflightrajectory"Ar-ticle I). Some observershereforerguethatATMcouldbe developed nddeployedwhile omplying ith heABMTreaty. fterll,thepurpose f nATM would be to protectheatermilitaryssets.59On theotherhand,ArticleX of theABMTreaty tates hat eachPartyundertakes ot to transfero other tates, nd not to deployoutside tsnational erritory,BMsystems r their omponentsimited ythisTreaty."Thisprovision ftheTreaty ould be used bythe Soviets nd byWesternEuropean and American) pponents fATM toargue hatATMrepresentsan attempto circumventheABMTreaty.tcouldrapidly ecome pparentthat, ven f heTreatyanguagedoes notexplicitlyxcludeATM, politicallyand in terms f publicperceptions, TM is covered ytheTreaty'simita-tions.Even if the UnitedStateswere topointout that he ATMwould not becapable of protectingontinental .S.-based assets, the Sovietswould re-spondthat hisproves hatU.S. "forward-basedystems"FBS) nEurope-mostly ircraft-muste limited y arms controlmeasures.FBS are morethreateningo the Soviets, fmore urvivable;he Sovietswouldthereforeinsist ven more mphaticallyhat BSbe includednthe NFnegotiations.The ABMTreatyssue couldraise arms ace" and"destabilization"pectersthatmight e almost mpossibleoexorcisenthe ocialdemocraticircles fWestern urope,evenwith n NNK ATM. The more ffectiven ATMis,themore twill ook ike nABM,even f ncapable fdefense gainst LBMand ICBM RVs. Ironically,herefore,he ess effectiveheATM,the easieritmight e todeploynterms fpublic elations.While he dealATMwouldalsobe capableof nterceptingLBMand ICBMRVs,even anATMcapable58. Carl-Friedrichon Weiszacker, "Can a Third World War Be Prevented?" Internationialecu-rity, ol. 5, No. 1 (Summer 1980), p. 204.59. See, for xample, Winton, "Applications of BMD," p. 97. Cf. Medalia, Antiballistic issiles,p. 17.


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only f nterceptingovietNF couldbe part f set ofmeasures nhancingdeterrencend securitynEurope.General rms ontrolnd detente ssuesfollow irectlyrom his ituation.TheSovietsmight erywellpropose nclusion fATM nthe NFnegotiationsor nsomeother rms ontrol orum,nd the uggestion ouldprobablyeheartilypprovedby many ectors f WestEuropeanopinion. twould behard forthe United States to extricatetself rom uch an armscontrolnegotiationffer ithout eingportrayeds a "warmonger." TM's inclu-sion nthe NFnegotiations ould tendtoprotractn already omplex nddifficultet ofnegotiations,nd could make useful esults ven ess likely.Thesenegotiationslready romise o disappointmany nWestern uropewithunrealisticxpectationsbout armscontrol,nd to strain urtherhefabricftheAlliance.60ConclusionThe sensitivityf West European governmentsnd publics regardinglltypes fBMD is a factorheUnited tateswillhave to considers itexaminesoptions hatmight equire evision fthe ABMTreaty rthatmight e soperceivedi.e., ATM).Neither omeland MDoptions or he ong-dormantATMquestionhave been raised explicitlyytheUnitedStateswithWestEuropeangovernments.t is possible hat,whenand ifa BMD question sraisedofficially,oliticalnd technical ircumstancesillhavechanged ig-nificantlyrom he current ituation.Highly onvincing MD technology(especially orNNK), perceptionsfan increased oviet hreat, eightenedfeelingsfdependence nU.S. militaryower,favorablei.e., U.S.) financ-ing arrangements,nd/or therfactors ould combine o persuadeWestEuropeans o accept,however egrudgingly,newU.S. andNATO strategyofdamage-limitingordefense nd deterrence-i.e., n abilityo denytheSovietsvictory y defendingelectedmilitaryargets.No reassessmentf NATO's general trategicutlook ould be morefun-damental. tpresent, ATO's deterrenttrategysbasedonthe ssumption60. Someobservers avesuggestedhat nATM could lso beemployed s a surface-to-surfacemissile, n whichcase an armscontrol roblemmight e posed in terms f"changing henumbers" f ystems hatmightargethe ovietUnion.The Patriotsed n a surface-to-surfacerolewould not,however,have the rangeto threatenhe SovietUnion.Nor does it seemprobable hat nyATM system ow ikely o be developedwould havea range ncompassingSoviet erritory.


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that ny East-West onflictould rapidly ead to an escalation rocessulti-mately ncludingU.S. strategic uclear trikesgainstSoviet society.TheU.S., Western urope, and NATO military orces re almost completelyvulnerableoSovietnuclear hreats,xcept or imited ir and civildefensesand,aboveall,thethreatoseverely unish oviet ocietynretaliation.Both spects f heposture-the ltimateeliancena threatokillmillionsof Soviet itizens,nd thevirtuallyompletebsenceofeffectiveefenses-could provemostunsatisfactoryuaranteesfsecuritynwar. ftechnicallyfeasible nd cost-effective,amage-limitingapabilitiesoulddenytheSo-vietspart ftheirbility othreatenheUnited tates nd Western urope,and make t essnecessaryor heAlliance othreatenarm o Soviet ociety.An ability o physically eny the Soviets heir lausiblemilitarybjectivescouldbecome yardstickorAlliance trategyuperiorotheambiguitiesf"flexible esponse." Sincethemostplausible ovietmilitarybjectives re

not citiesbut militaryargets hatcouldbe relativelythough mperfectly)welldefended, oviet trategiesornuclearwar-fightingnd victoryouldbe thwarted,nd deterrencetrengthened,y damage-limitingapabilitiesthat ncrease ovietuncertaintiesboutprospects or uccessful re-emptiveattack.The ackofdamage-limitingapabilitiesn theWest ends o driveAlliancestrategyntoembracing oliticallyonvenientmbiguities.he ambiguitiesaboutwhat flexibleesponse"mightmeanoperationallyrepartlyntendedtoconceal he carcityfmilitarilyensible etaliatoryptions given he ackofdamage-limitingeans)fromheSoviets nd Western ublics. Flexibleresponse"thusultimatelyestsheavily n the threat o unleash a conflictthat ould ead to the destructionfmuchof NorthAmerica nd Eurasia.Damage-limitingould assist NATO in becomingess dependent n thisthreat.All thatAlliance trategistsan hope for t presents thatmutualrestraintn a "crisismanagement" rocesswill be able to control uclearconflict,or heWest has virtuallyo abilityo enforce amage imitationsthroughctivenon-counterforce)efenses.61Reassessmentf hemerits fdamage-limitingslongoverdue,ndchange61. Anti-submarinearfareASW) capabilitiesre here ssumed o constitute form f coun-terforce,s opposedto active efenses hat ould nterceptallisticmissile Vs or air-breathingsystemsnflight. ven fone hypothesizeshatWestern SW couldneutralizeoviet SBNspre-emptivelya highlymprobableeat or everal easons, ncluding hefact hat and-basedASW communicationsnd detectionmeans would be at risk n war),the threat o Westernsociety rom oviet ir-breathingystems nd land-based allisticmissileswouldremain ire.


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may be imminent.MD, perhaps n conjunction ith a deceptive-basingsystem,s one of hree oncepts or ong-termXbasing nder onsiderationby theReagan dministration.ongress,ntheFiscalYear1982Appropria-tionsAct,has mandated eporting final election f n MX-basingmodebyJuly 983, nd decisionsmaybe madeby April 983.62While hescheduledOctober 982 econdfive-yeareview ftheABMTreatymay hereforeasswithoutitherU.S. or Sovietproposals or evision,heUnited tatesmayelectto proposeamendmentsater,perhaps s a result f theMX-basingdecision.Amendmentso theABMTreatymaybeproposed tanytime; ndeither artymay withdraw, ith ix months'notice,f t udgesthat ex-traordinaryvents" elated otheTreaty's ubjectmatter ave"jeopardizedits supreme nterests."On theother and,doubts boutthematurityfBMD technology ersistin some political nd technical ircles. he possibilityhat he Sovietshavea superior BMTreatybreak-out"otential wingto their reaternvest-mentsnBMD (andairdefense) esearchmaybe anotherrgument orU.S.cautionnproposingmajor hanges ntheABMTreaty. xtensiveesearch(particularlyn NNK) seems ikely eforeATM willbecome n immediateoption.The BMD technologynd costswill be keyfactorsn determiningwhether shiftwayfromheWest'sprevailingheoryfdeterrencesocietalpunishment) o one partaking f greater lements f damage-limitingsfeasible.One might henconsiderwhether, ivenpossibleSovietcounter-measures, damage-limitingtrategy-ort east mproved amage-limitingcapabilities,specially ordefense f selected trategicnd theatermilitarytargets-would e sensible.Technological pportunity ay not,however, etermineherejection rchoiceofdamage-limitingeasures s much s establishedonvictionse-garding MD and itspolitical, iplomatic,nd financial osts.Less costlyBMD technologymight educethe financial urden,but the questionofpoliticalwilltopursuedamage-limitingrogramsverthe ongtermwouldremain.Without omestic rAlliance onsensus n thestrategic erits fdamage-limiting,heUnitedStateswouldfind t hard to sustainBMD de-ployment ecisions.Moreover, .S. political illto pursue nalysis fBMDoptions eriouslynd to reassessAlliance trategyn the ight fpotentialdamage-limitingpportunitiessnot ikely o be stiffenedy encouragementfrom heAllies nWestern urope.

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