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MALI: Festering issues

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Page 1: Agenda 16 1 2

ISSUE Vol. 16 No. 1 2013 US$5.00 GB£3.00 €5.00

• AFRICA REMEMBERS CHAVEZ

Page 2: Agenda 16 1 2

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page 7 photo: Tuareg on camel ride

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COVER

Tuareg revolt in Mali and imperialism in today's Africa .............. page 5

The dynamics of inter-communal violence in Mali ...................... page 8

Counter-terrorism and security: The leitmotif in US policy in Obama's second term…............................................... page 13

DEVELOPMENT

Poor countries robbed ……….......................................................... page 16

Lawyers sue states for multinationals ………................................ page 18

UN's water agenda at risk of being hijacked by big business ….................................................................................. page 20Is Zimbabwe's education sector on the road to recovery?........... page 22

POLITICS

Western Sahara occupied, Africa re-colonised ….......................... page 24

ENVIRONMENT

Climate change negotiations: uninspiring Doha pathway…....... page 27

Greater efforts needed to avert herder-farmer clashes in Burkina Faso….................................................................... page 31

WOMEN

Swazi women find strength in numbers…….................................. page 33

INTERNATIONAL

Africa remembers Chavez ……......................................................... page 35

President Hugo Chavez and race: the shift from avoidance to inclusion ….................................................................... page 37

Contents

Page 4: Agenda 16 1 2

I am one of those who condemn in principleany military intervention by western powersin southern countries as these interventionsfollow the dictates of the control over theworld by the capital of monopolies domi-nating the system.

Is France's intervention in Mali anexception to the rule? Yes and no. It is forthis reason that I am calling for support forthis intervention without however thinkingthis will provide a solution to the continu-ous deterioration of political, social andeconomic conditions not only in Mali butalso other countries in the region, as a resultof the deployment of capitalist policies ofthe Triad (United States, Europe, Japan)always at work and contributing to the

One must be very naïve to believe thatthe political Islam of some groups -describes as “moderate” would disappear indemocracy. There is certainly a sharing oftasks between the moderates and the“salafists” that will outflank them with afalse naivety through their fanatic, criminalif not terrorist excesses. But they have acommon project - an archaic theocracy bydefinition that is out of touch even with theminimal form of democracy.

De Gaulle had toyed with the idea of a« Great French Sahara » project but thetenacity of the Algerian FLN and the radi-calization of the Sudanese Union ofModibo Keita in Mali led to the failure ofthis project in 1962-63. Perhaps, if there issome nostalgia about this project in Paris, Ido not think they will be able to convincepoliticians with normal intelligence of thepossibility of reviving it.

The Islamic « Sahelistan » will pavethe way for the establishment of a greatState covering a significant part of theSahara in Mali, Mauritania, Niger andAlgeria endowed with important resourcessuch as uranium, oil and gas. Theseresources will not be open to France but tothe dominant powers of the Triad. This“kingdom” like Saudi Arabia and the GulfEmirates could easily “buy” the support ofits sparse population and emirs and trans-form into personal fabulous wealth a frac-tion of the wealth that is left for them. Forthe powers of the Triad, the Gulf remains

the best useful ally/servant in spite of theutterly archaic and enslaving nature of itssocial management. The powers in theSahelistan will refrain from perpetrating ter-rorist acts on their territory without howev-er, forbidding themselves to support theseacts elsewhere.

This war will be long, costly and diffi-cult and the outcome will be uncertain.Some conditions must be met to ensure vic-tory. There would be the need not only forFrench troops to remain in the field untilvictory is achieved but also for a Malianarmy worth the name to be quickly recon-stituted as the military intervention of otherAfrican countries cannot be the decisiveelement for victory.

Nothing much can be expected fromECOWAS countries. The Praetorian Guardin most of these countries has armies only inname. Indeed, Nigeria has many forces butunfortunately they are not disciplined to saythe least; and many of the senior officersonly seek to plunder the resources of theregions where they intervene. Senegal alsohas a competent military force and above allvery disciplined but small in line with thesize of the country. Farther in Africa,Angola and South Africa could provideeffective support but due to their geograph-ical location and other considerations, thereis the risk that they may not see the merit indoing so.

French diplomacy tagged to NATOand the European Union share the respon-sibility of its allies in the success of reac-tionary political Islam. It has provided glar-ing proof in the Libyan adventure whosesole aim was not to liberate the Libyan peo-ple from Kadhafi but destroy Libya whichhas become an operating ground for warlords, directly responsible for the consolida-tion of AQMI in Mali.

The reconstruction of Mali can only bedone by Malians. However, it is desirablethat they are assisted instead of erectingbarriers that will make the reconstructionimpossible.

France's « colonial » ambition to makeMali a client state like others in the regionsmay still held by some of those who areresponsible for Malian politics in Paris.

Francafrique still has its proponents but thisdoes not pose a real danger let alone a majorone. A rebuilt Mali can quickly assert orreassert its independence. On the otherhand, a Mali damaged by reactionary politi-cal Islam would not be able to regain arespectable position at the regional andglobal level. Like Somalia, it may stand therisk of being wiped out of the list of sover-eign states worth the name.

Since the fall of Moussa Traore, thepeople of Mali have enjoyed unprecedenteddemocratic freedoms. However, these seemto have been in vain: hundreds of ghost par-ties without programme, ineffective electedparliamentarians, and widespread corrup-tion have been the results. Analysts who stillhabour racist prejudices will hastily con-clude that this society (like Africans in gen-eral) is not mature for democracy! One pre-tends not be aware that the success of theMalian people's struggles coincided withthe “neoliberal” offensive which imposedon this extremely fragile country a lumpendevelopment model advocated by theWorld Bank and supported by Europe andFrance which has generated a social andeconomic decline and unbridled impover-ishment.

These policies are the major factorsresponsible for the failure of the discrediteddemocracy. This regression has created afertile ground for the rise of the influence ofreactionary political Islam (finance by theGulf) not only in the North captured byAQMI but also in Bamako.

The reconstruction of Mali will hence-forth depend on the rejection of liberal“solutions” which are responsible for allthese problems. Yet, on this fundamentalissue, France's concepts are those in force inWashington, London and Berlin. The con-cepts of “development assistance” of Parisfall within the dominant liberal litanies.Nothing else! France, even it wins theSahara battle - that is my wish - remains ill-suited to contribute to the reconstruction ofMali. Failure would certainly give France'sfalse allies the opportunity to take theirrevenge.

*Excerpts from the original article published inPambazuka.

EDITORIAL

4 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

Mali, a complex situationAn opinion on the situation in Mali by *Samir Amin.

Page 5: Agenda 16 1 2

AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1 5

COVER

Tuareg revolt in Mali and imperialism in today's Africa

IN April 2012, the Malian government wasoverthrown in a coup d'état. The army hadjust suffered key military defeats againstTuareg rebel fighters and the soldiersblamed the government for poorly resourc-ing them. A confrontation with the politicalleadership led to the surprisingly swift over-throw of the elected government led byPresident Amadou Toumani Touré. Upuntil then, Mali had been a poster child as astable democracy with a steady and liber-alised economy in Africa.

The early 1990s was a phase of transi-tion to democracy in Africa marked bydemonstrations and protests by movementswhich had emerged in reaction to the harshconsequences of IMF driven neoliberal

structural adjustment policies in the 1980s.In Mali these demonstrations led to theoverthrow of then long-time dictatorMoussa Traoré. Grassroot mobilisation wassignificant enough to reach rural con-stituencies. Thus, after the transition todemocracy, cotton farmers demanded sig-nificant changes to production and market-ing of cotton. Cotton is a major agricultureexport in Mali. By 1995, a peace deal waseven signed with the Tuareg rebels.

Despite these early signs of progress,the challenges facing Malian society werehardly addressed. Neoliberal economicpolicies and increasing social and economicinequality, which has bedevilled the coun-try, continued unabated, concentrating

wealth in smaller pockets. Social services,which were already limited, were allowed todecay, in order to cut public spending andto pay debts. These conditions of life wors-ened with the combined impact of globaleconomic, climate and food crises.

Like most African countries, the major-ity of Malians are small scale producers inthe agriculture sector. The Tuareg (who aremostly nomadic pastoralists) and other set-tled agriculture based communities, aretherefore highly vulnerable to changingweather patterns and access to arable lands.As a result of climate change, life in theSahel region of West Africa has beenmarked by worsening droughts and evenfamines. Conflicts between settler and

The Tuareg revolt and French military intervention has exposed how the practice of electoral

democracy and appearance of political stability in Mali had masked oppression and intensified

global capitalist exploitation, *writes Hibist W. Kassa.

Capt. Sanogho of the Malian Army French President Hollande

Page 6: Agenda 16 1 2

nomadic communities over scarce fertilelands and water are increasing in WestAfrica, stretching even down south eveninto countries like Ghana and Nigeria.

The Tuareg and settled agriculturecommunities also have to deal with forcedrelocation to make way for commercial agri-culture. In this regard, the Wold Bank andInternational Monetary Fund have beenwidely blamed for pushing neoliberal poli-cies that have removed regulations in favourof foreign investors in a manner that has hadsignificant social cost. Among these, a fewcorporate interests in Africa have also bene-fited at the expense of the majority ofMalians. A report by a US Oakland Institutestates that by the end of 2010, 22 agricul-ture investors had either leased or werenegotiating the lease of a total of 544,567hectares. Investors include LonhroAgriculture (subsidiary of Lonhro Plc basedin London), Malibya (owned by the Libyangovernment), and Huicoma, a companyowned by Malian billionaire Alou Tomota.Libya and Tomota were involved in dealsfor 100 000 hectares each where there werereports of "expropriation"" and "loss oflivelihoods." There were no resettlementplans for the affected communities. Tomotais partnered by the International FinanceCooperation and French DevelopmentAgency.

Electoral democracyThus, the practice of electoral democ-

racy and appearance of political stability inMali had effectively masked oppression andintensified global capitalist exploitation.This is the context against which the cur-rent Tuareg revolt can be understood. In2009, an uprising by Tuareg rebels was sup-pressed successfully by the Malian govern-ment with about 600 rebels handing overtheir arms as part of a peace process.Islamist forces, which were also present inthe country, were routed by the Malian mil-itary. By 2011, however, the situation rapid-ly changed with the overthrow of Libyandictator Muammar Gaddafi by rebel forceswith significant European and US militarysupport.

The Gaddafi regime had played animportant role in supporting the activitiesof rebel groups and peace processes inAfrica. This is especially so in West Africa.Tuareg rebel groups had had sanctuary inLibya and fought as mercenaries for theLibyan regime. After the fall of Gaddafi, therebels marched south entering northernMali and formed the National Movement

for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA).When the elected Malian government

was overthrown in April 2011, the Tuaregrebels, under the newly formed MNLA,took over more territories in the north anddeclared independence in northern Mali.Islamist elements affiliated to Al Qaeda,Ansar Dine (Defenders of the Faith) hadalso fought alongside the MNLA. At thetime, MNLA emphasised on their disinter-est in taking the capital. Two divisions ofthe Malian army, composed of mainlyTuaregs, defected and joined the rebels.

However, after independence wasdeclared, the Islamists broke off theiralliance with the Tuareg rebels. The Tuaregrebels are largely a secular force, and there-fore, have different orientation and agendafrom the Islamists. Ansar Dine begandemanding civilians observe a puritan ver-sion of Islam, in some areas, imposingextreme punishments. Since then reports ofkillings, maiming and rape and the destruc-tion of religious shrines and historic siteshave dominated news reports from Mali.

In comparison, prior to the Frenchintervention, atrocities by Malian forces oncivilians were not widely reported. InSeptember last year, 16 Muslim clerics werekilled by Malian forces when they were trav-elling for a conference. The MNLA's effortsto distance itself from the Islamists havealso been down played. There is also littleattention on how Al-Qaeda in the IslamicMaghreb (AQIM) has supported anotherIslamist group to fight the MNLA. Thereare even claims that the Malian governmentused the presence of the Islamists to weak-en the cause of the Tuareg rebels. Whateverbe the case, Mali has received significantmilitary aid from the United States as aresult of its “strategic position” in the “waragainst terror” which has in turn strength-ened its hand against the Tuareg rebels.

When the town of Konna was taken bymilitants, less than 40 km away from thecapital, France used this development toquickly launch a full scale military interven-tion labelling it simply as a fight against“Islamic terrorists”. Conversely, just lastmonth the French President, FrançoisHollande refused to provide similar supportto the Central African Republic (CAR) gov-ernment when rebels were advancing on thecapital. Hollande claimed that such inter-ventions by France in Africa were in thepast. That is obviously far from the truth.Moreover, French troops are even perma-nently based in CAR.

The claim that French intervention isto fight Islamic terrorists, which has also

been supported by other Western and WestAfrican states, is oversimplified and worksto draw attention away from the suppres-sion of the Tuareg revolt.

The humanitarian claims of Westerncountries are also very dubious. InDecember, 200 000 people were reportedto have been displaced. Currently, 230 000people are reported to have been displacedinternally. Another, 260 000 have fled intoother countries, according to the InternalDisplacement Monitoring Center. The situ-ation in Mali is not likely to get better soon.The UN is expecting 700 000 people to bedisplaced in the next couple of months. Ifthere is one thing to be learned from thewars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, morepeople were killed and displaced by externalmilitary interventions.

Why is this happening? There isincreased competition between corpora-tions and their representative states, overaccess and control over cheap naturalresources in Africa. Particularly in this peri-od of global economic crisis, France standsto gain by using its military strength toemphasise its standing as a leading globalmilitary power. The emergence of China asa rising global economic power house, withsignificant interests in natural resources inAfrica, raises the stakes even higher. Thisreally is another scramble for Africa.

COVER

6 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

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7AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

COVER

West Africa is particularly significant inthis regard, with oil in Nigeria, Ghana andCote d'Ivoire making the sub-region astrategic area to control. France also reliesheavily on uranium mines in Niger to fuelits nuclear installations. Uranium, gold, oiland gas are located in areas occupied by theTuareg. Mining is particularly destructive ofthe environment and livelihoods of localcommunities in Africa. It is no different forthe Tuareg, most of who live as nomadicpastoralists and are heavily dependent ontheir access to land for grazing and water.

Apart from this, Hollande also benefitsfrom the intervention by shoring up hisdomestic support on a rising tide ofIslamophobia and racism in the midst ofpersistent economic crisis in France. Thegrowth of far right party, the National Frontin recent years shows how real this threat is.Strikes in Europe, especially in Greece,Spain and France, have shown how theresistance to austerity in Europe has alsogrown. Racism plays an important role individing people and diverting attentionfrom the economic crisis. Thus, much likehis predecessor, Sarkozy, Hollande has con-tinued to deport Roma people. So far, the“war against terror” in Mali has worked toimprove his popularity in France as a'strong' leader. Nevertheless, it is not onlythe West which has interest in the militaryintervention in Mali.

Some West African governments, par-ticularly Niger and Chad, face the threat ofsimilar rebellions or unrest by Tuareggroups. Tuaregs are present in countriessuch as Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, Algeriaand Libya. Thus, in January 2011, Nigerattempted to quell discontent by appoint-ing a few Tuaregs into government. Apartfrom this, Nigeria already has its hands fullwith the extremist Islamist group BokoHaram and Biafra separatists. In total, WestAfrican countries have promised to sendabout 3 000 troops with Nigeria and Chadpromising 1 200 and 2000 troops respec-tively.

It is not farfetched to expect that theexternal intervention by Western and WestAfrican governments is going to escalateconflicts beyond Mali. Even Ghana, whichis not directly linked to the conflict and hassent only 120 troops and is on high alertaccording to its national security coordina-tor.

Similar military interventions inSomalia by Ethiopia and Kenya, at therequest of the United States, led to an esca-lation of conflicts and oppression withinthose countries. In Kenya, there were bombattacks by extremist groups based inSomalia. There were also hate crimesagainst people of Somali origin in Nairobi.The Ethiopian government, on the otherhand, has taken steps to regulate Muslims

by imposing a state sanctioned version ofIslam as part of its “war against terror”. Thegovernment has also repeatedly jailed crit-ics such as journalists and political activistson terrorism charges.

The Tuareg revolt in Mali has re-emphasised the point that the underlyingproblems of increased social and economicinequality and insecurity in Africa must beaddressed. The practice of liberal democra-cy in Africa, which has focused on electoralpolitics with different factions of the rulingclass competing for power, has not reversedthe concentration of wealth and power. Infact, in many cases this has intensified sincethe 1990s especially with the onset of glob-al economic crisis. This is a reality facingmany countries in Africa.

ResolutionIn the case of Mali, a resolution of these

challenges will not emerge from militaryintervention by France and West Africancountries. The current military interventionserves the interests of corporations andpoliticians in Western countries by securingthe sub-region within their orbit of control.West African governments also stand togain from the suppression of the TuaregRevolt and the restoration of the status quoin Mali.

The intensification of economic andclimate crisis in recent years has increasedinsecurity and hardship across the world,including Africa. This is likely to intensifyImperialist oppression and resistance inAfrica.

The current military interventionworks against the interests of the workingpeople and the poor in Mali since itstrengthens the hands of the very powersthat have benefited from economic liberali-sation, debt repayment and cut backs insocial spending. In this respect, corporateinterests based in the West and within theSouth are no different. Within Mali itself,the ruling class has benefited greatly fromthe status quo. This needs to be recognisedand challenged by social movements andactivists as part of the wider struggle againstneoliberalism and imperialism in Africatoday.

* Hibist Kassa is an alumna from theDevelopment Alternatives with Women in aNew Era (DAWN) Africa Regional Traininginstitute in 2010 and a former intern atNETRIGHT. She also writes for theInternational Political Forum.

Tuaregs on camel ride

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8 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

COVER

SHOPS and houses owned by Tuaregs,Arabs or Mauritanians in Timbuktu havebeen looted since 28 January, according tolocal reports.

Moulaye Cherif Haïdara, a Malianjournalist with national media bureauORTM, told IRIN from Timbuktu:"Almost all of the Arabs have fledTimbuktu, fearing reprisal attacks. Manyhere believe Arabs were complicit with theIslamist groups who terrorized populationsover recent months."

Two Malians of Arab origin were badly

beaten up on the outskirts of Timbuktuwhen attempting to flee, he said. Malianmilitary leaders are trying to control the sit-uation. Col Keba Sangaré, who is headingMalian operations in Timbuktu, gatheredresidents in the market-place: "Not allArabs are rebels. Be careful. Do not take allArabs and Tuaregs to be associated withjihadist groups. Be tolerant and patient andlet the army and the authorities deal withthis problem."

In Gao most of the shops run by Arabshave been shut. Three men found hiding

under a tarpaulin in the market-place werereportedly beaten up and left for dead. Themayor, upon returning to town, appealedfor peace, telling a reporter from Le Monde:"I am a Peulh, but I cannot live without theArabs or Tuaregs." Local radio stationRadio Koima is also trying to appeal for rea-son, reportedly warning people to reportany suspected Islamists to the authorities,and not to take the law into their ownhands.

Even in the capital, Bamako, Tuaregsand Arabs are starting to feel insecure, indi-

Dynamics of inter-communal violence in MaliSince the French-backed onslaught on Malian rebels ethnic Tuaregs and Arabs in towns across

central and northern Mali, including Gao and Timbuktu, have been fleeing into the desert or to

neighbouring countries as their houses and shops are looted or they are hunted down on

suspicion of being Islamist militants. Fears of inter-communal violence are spreading.

Malian women

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9AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

COVER

viduals told IRIN. Assaedek Mohamed, aTuareg, says he is scared to leave the house."Believe me, it is not nice to leave yourhome in Bamako and have everyone look atyou strangely... to have people mutter"rebel" as you walk down the street, and tohave your fellow citizens tell you the bestway to finish off this cycle of rebellion is toget rid of Tuaregs altogether."

Reprisal killingsThe latest ethnic violence comes on

the back of reports from the InternationalFederation for Human Rights (FIDH) thatMalian armed forces carried out reprisalkillings against Tuaregs and ethnic Arabs,allegedly feared to be rebel "infiltrators", inSévaré, Mopti and Niono in central Mali.Some reports suggest bodies were dumpedin shallow graves or in wells. Human rightsgroups, including Human Rights Watchand Amnesty International, are furtherinvestigating reports of abuses across thecountry and will report their findings immi-nently; FIDH has called for an independentinquiry and has supported the InternationalCriminal Court's 28th statement implying itwill look at abuses carried out by all sides inMali since the beginning of 2012.

In Sévaré, citizens spoke to IRIN ofhastily buried bodies. Many associatedbeing an Arab or Tuareg with being a rebel.In Douentza to the north, truck-driverMohamed Diarra told IRIN he saw men inarmy uniform quickly digging shallowgraves with at least three bodies lined up.

The Malian army has been linked withviolent crackdowns against Tuareg rebeluprisings in the past, which has led to ten-sion between Tuaregs and the army, despiteefforts to incorporate Tuaregs into thearmed forces.

Chief of Staff of the Malian Army GenIbrahim Dahirou Dembélé told IRIN hisforces would be held to account: "AnyMalian soldier that commits atrocitiesagainst civilians will be immediatelybrought from the field and judged by a mil-itary tribunal. The army must be withoutreproach and there can be no question forus that we are sanctioning acts that weblame terrorists for," he said.

He added it was important not toassume that all of the yet-to-be-confirmedatrocities were connected to the Malianarmy. "There are men who wear Malian mil-itary uniforms to commit abuses while pre-tending to be members of the army," hesaid, explaining that the army has arrested

50 or so criminals masquerading as soldiersin Sévaré, Diabaly, Douentza and Bamako.French Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayraultcalled on 27 January for the quick deploy-ment of international monitors to Mali, totry to minimize further violence.

Will militias groups get involved?An important factor dictating whether

or not inter-communal violence will get outof control, is whether or not the many mili-tia groups, which have been trained and"intensively indoctrinated" over recentmonths, get involved, said Yvan Guichaoua,Sahel expert and lecturer in internationaldevelopment at the University of EastAnglia.

The Ganda Koy militia, with severalhundred members, is the largest of manyhomegrown armed civilian groups, many ofthem set up in response to Tuareg rebel-lions of past decades. Djibril Diallo, head ofGanda Koy, told a reporter: "We considerall Tuaregs MNLA [National Movementfor the Liberation of Azawad]."

Arabs and Tuaregs are considered tobe complicit with Islamist rebel groups AlQaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM),Movement for Oneness and Jihad(MUJAO), and Ansar Dine, despite the factthat these groups promptly ousted the secu-lar MNLA from northern Mali in April2012.

During that time, citizens of the northaccused the MNLA, and the Islamist groupswho followed, of carrying out widespreadlooting, sexual violence and other abuses, asevidenced by human rights groups.

ContextThe highly complex and ever-shifting

network of alliances and rivalries amongTuareg nationalist groups; Islamist groupsrun by Malians, Algerians, Mauritaniansand others; and numerous militia groups inthe north and south, has created years ofethnic tension and inter-communal vio-lence in Mali, which sits alongside a culturalcontext of inter-ethnic tolerance.

The Islamist groups running northernMali were by no means only Malian: AQIMoriginated in Algeria (originally the SalafistGroup for Preaching and Combat) and hadmany non-Malian members; MUJAO washeaded by a Mauritanian and an Algerian,and recruited many non-Tuareg youths intoits ranks.

Ansar-Dine, which until it split intotwo recently, was led by Iyad Ag Ghali, aprominent figure in the 1994 Tuareg rebel-lion and allegedly a key negotiator in myri-ad hostage deals between AQIM andWestern governments, many of whichallegedly benefited leaders in the Malianadministration, including ex-PresidentAmadou Toumani Touré (ATT).

The dynamics between these groupsfurther complicated long-standing alliancesthat had been formed, opening up space formore instability. For instance, when theMNLA vied for control of Timbuktu inApril 2012, it was soon crowded out by localArab militias previously allied with theMalian state in Bamako, but which "dramat-ically shifted their loyalties" to ally withAnsar Dine and AQIM, said Guichaoua, theSahel expert at the University of EastAnglia.

MUJAO, an AQIM splinter group,took control of parts of Gao by allegedlymaking a deal with youth militias, Arabtraders and drug traffickers to oust theMNLA.

“Arabs and Tuaregs are consid-

ered to be complicit with

Islamist rebel groups Al Qaeda

in the Maghreb (AQIM),

Movement for Oneness and

Jihad (MUJAO), and Ansar Dine,

despite the fact that these

groups promptly ousted the

secular MNLA from northern

Mali in April 2012.”

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10 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

Before these events, inter-ethnic rela-tions in northern Mali were already at a verylow point, said Guichaoua, characterized byan intensification of micro-conflicts:between farmers and pastoralists; over drugtrafficking; over deals on electoral man-dates, AQIM's entrenchment, and personalpolitics.

Tensions between prominent Tuareggroups and members of AQIM were highfollowing a decade during which AQIM hadfully entrenched itself in northern Mali,with members circulating widely across theterritory. Complaints by Tuareg groups ofwhat they saw as intrusion were not pickedup by the authorities in Bamako. Localyouths, meanwhile, benefited from paidjobs as AQIM members.

If Arabs and Tuaregs return to theirnorthern homes, more mundane rivalriescould also exacerbate tensions betweenthose who stayed in the north and thosewho fled, said Guichaoua, such as conflictover land, property or livestock abandonedby some who fled, and seized by others.

"These ongoing low-level conflictscould be exacerbated now. It happens in allwars where some had to flee and others hadno choice or for various reasons decided tostay," he said, citing a similar dynamic inCôte d'Ivoire's crises over the past decade.

Now that the political situation ischanging - and quickly - "all of the peoplewho feel they have been betrayed, want toright wrongs," he added.

In the medium term, the French arelikely to rely on Malian, and Chadian andNigerien forces to secure the north. Troopsfrom Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Senegal andBenin are also arriving, and the overall sizeof the West African intervention force inMali is expected to reach 6,000.

In the longer term, only initiating aninclusive south-north peace process thatrealistically addresses the repeateddemands made by northern groups - devel-opment dividends, and some degree of self-rule - can sustainable peace be built, say ana-lysts.

On 30 January, French ForeignMinistry spokesperson Philippe Lalliotcalled for a peace process with legitimaterepresentatives from the north, includingnon-terrorist armed groups. CharlesGrémont of the Centre for African Studies,a research institute in France, toldIRIN:"The most important thing is for therepresentatives of the local population totalk to each and not just leave the affairs to

armed groups. Local leaders ... must playtheir role and talk sincerely amongst them-selves, while [the administration in]Bamako and the international communityshould listen to them."

Rebuilding the ailing Malian army andfinding solutions to the political disarray inBamako are also vital. Mali's parliamentannounced a political roadmap on 29January to pave the way for 31 July elec-tions.

Tuaregs who spoke to IRIN said theyare tired of only being seen as part of the

problem, not part of the solution. "We[Tuaregs] can help fight Islamists. We arepart of the solution," said Mohammed AgOssade, director of the Tuareg cultural cen-tre in Bamako.

Most of Mali's 15 million people arefrom the Mande, Peulh and Songhai ethnic-ities and make up 90 percent of the popula-tion, outnumbering the 10 percent that arelighter-skinned Tuaregs and Moors, mostlyinhabiting the desert north.

* IRIN report

COVER

May bear brunt of the conflict : young Tuareg boys having fun

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11AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

COVER

A chronology of key events:

MALI PROFILE

11th century - Empire of Mali becomes dominant force in the upper Niger basin, its period of greatness beginning

under King Sundiata in 1235 and peaking under Mansa Musa who ruled between 1312 and 1337 and extended empire

to the Atlantic.

14th-15th centuries - Decline of the Empire of Mali, which loses dominance of the gold trade to the Songhai Empire,

with its base in Timbuktu - historically important as a focal point of Islamic culture and a trading post on the trans-

Saharan caravan route.

Late 16th century - Moroccans defeat the Songhai, make Timbuktu their capital and rule until their decline in the 18th

century.

19th century - French colonial advance, and Islamic religious wars which lead to creation of theocratic states.

1898 - France completes conquest of Mali, then called French Sudan.

1959 - Mali and Senegal form the Mali Federation, which splits a year later.

INDEPENDENCE1960 - Mali becomes independent with Modibo Keita as president. It becomes a one-party, socialist state and with-

draws from the Franc zone.

1968 - Keita ousted in coup led by Lieutenant Moussa Traore.

1977 - Protests erupt following Keita's death in prison.

1979 - New constitution provides for elections; Traore re-elected president.

1985 - Mali and Burkina Faso engage in border fighting.

1991 - Traore deposed in coup and replaced by transitional committee.

DEMOCRACY1992 - Alpha Konare wins multiparty elections to become Mali's first democratically-elected president.

1995 - Peace agreement with Tuareg tribes leads to return of thousands of refugees.

1999 - Former President Moussa Traore sentenced to death on corruption charges, but has his sentence commuted to

life imprisonment by President Konare.

1999 October - Several people killed in fighting in the north between members of the Kunta tribe and an Arab com-

munity over local disputes.

2000 February - Konare appoints former International Monetary Fund official Mande Sidibe prime minister.

2001 December - Manantali dam in southwest produces its first megawatt of hydro-electricity, 13 years after it was

completed.

AMADOU TOURE2002 April - Amadou Toumani Toure elected president by landslide. Poll is marred by allegations of fraud.

2002 September - France says it will cancel 40% of debts owed to it by Mali, amounting to some 80m euros ($79m,

£51m).

2002 October - Government resigns, without public explanation. New "government of national unity" is unveiled.

2003 August - Clashes between rival Muslim groups in west kill at least 10 people.

2004 April - Prime Minister Mohamed Ag Amani resigns and is replaced by Ousmane Issoufi Maiga.

2004 September - Agriculture minister says severe locust plague has cut cereal harvest by up to 45%.

2005 June - World Food Programme warns of severe food shortages, the result of drought and locust infestations in

2004.

2006 June - The government signs an Algerian-brokered peace deal with Tuareg rebels seeking greater autonomy for

their northern desert region. The rebels looted weapons in the town of Kidal in May, raising fears of a new rebellion.

2007 April - President Toure wins a second five-year term in elections.

2007 July - The ruling coalition, Alliance for Democracy and Progress (ADP), strengthens its hold on parliament in elec-

tions.

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12 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

COVER

REBEL ACTIVITY2007 August - Suspected Tuareg rebels abduct government soldiers in separate incidents near the Niger and Algerian

borders.

2008 May - Tuareg rebels kill 17 soldiers in attack on an army post in the northeast, despite a ceasefire agreed a month

earlier.

2008 December - At least 20 people are killed and several taken hostage in an attack by Tuareg rebels on a military

base in northern Mali.

2009 February - Government says the army has taken control of all the bases of the most active Tuareg rebel group.

A week later, 700 rebels surrender their weapons in ceremony marking their return to the peace process.

2009 May - Algeria begins sending military equipment to Mali in preparation for a joint operation against Islamic mil-

itants linked to al-Qaeda.

2009 August - New law boosts women's rights, prompts some protests.

2010 January - Annual music event - Festival in the Desert - is moved from a desert oasis to Timbuktu because of

security fears.

TERROR CHALLENGE2010 April - Mali, Algeria, Mauritania and Niger set up joint command to tackle threat of terrorism.

2012 January - Fears of new Tuareg rebellion following attacks on northern towns which prompt civilians to flee into

Mauritania.

2012 March - Military officers depose President Toure ahead of the April presidential elections, accusing him of fail-

ing to deal effectively with the Tuareg rebellion. African Union suspends Mali.

2012 April - Tuareg rebels seize control of northern Mali, declare independence.

Military hands over to a civilian interim government, led by President Dioncounda Traore.

2012 May - Junta reasserts control after an alleged coup attempt by supporters of ousted President Toure in Bamako.

Pro-junta protesters storm presidential compound and beat Mr Traore unconscious.

The Tuareg MNLA and Islamist Ansar Dine rebel groups merge and declare northern Mali to be an Islamic state. Ansar

Dine begins to impose Islamic law in Timbuktu. Al-Qaeda in North Africa endorses the deal.

2012 June-July - Ansar Dine and its Al-Qaeda ally turn on the MNLA and capture the main northern cities of

Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao. They begin to destroy many Muslim shrines that offend their puritan views.

2012 August - Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra forms a new government of national unity in order to satisfy

regional demands for a transition from military-dominated rule. The cabinet of 31 ministers includes five seen as close

to coup leader Capt Amadou Sanogo.

2012 Autumn-Winter - Northern Islamist rebels consolidate their hold on the north. They seize strategically impor-

tant town of Douentza in September, crossing into the central part of Mali and closer to the government-held south-

west.

2012 November - The West African regional grouping Ecowas agrees a coordinated military expedition to recapture

the north, with UN and African Union backing. Preparations are expected to take several months.

2012 December - Prime Minister Cheick Modibo Diarra resigns, allegedly under pressure from army leaders who

oppose plans for Ecowas military intervention. President Traore appoints a presidential official, Django Sissoko, to suc-

ceed him. The UN and US threaten sanctions.

FRENCH INTERVENTION2013 January - Islamist fighters capture the central town of Konna and plan to march on the capital. President Traore

asks France for help. French troops rapidly capture Gao and Timbuktu and at the end of the month enter Kidal, the last

major rebel-held town. European countries pledge to help retrain the Malian army.

Credit: BBC News

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13AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

COVER

IN his State of the Union address veryrecently, US President, Barack Obamathrew in a few words about US-Africa rela-tions. Obama talked about the Americanplan to “help allies who take the fight to ter-rorists” in places like Libya, Somalia andMali, where the Americans believe Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have set up shop.

American support in the ongoing inter-vention in Mali, including the deploymentof 100 troops in Niger to help with

unmanned reconnaissance flights and intel-ligence gathering with the French forces intheir operations, is an example of this policyapproach. A few weeks before the State ofthe Union address, Obama had recited aworn-out line about supporting democracyin Africa and elsewhere in his second inau-guration speech at the US capitol inWashington D.C. That was the only men-tion of Africa in the inauguration speech.

Not the moments to pronounce a com-

prehensive US-Africa policy, these speech-es, but the little said, however, is reflectiveof a narrowing of the American vision withrespect to Africa. The aspects of US-Africarelations that entered these speeches showthe areas of priority. There is a shift inemphasis from the broad political, socialand economic drivers of US-Africa relationsthat the Obama administration enunciatedearly in its first term to one whose prioritycentre's on counter-terrorism.

Obama's historic election in 2008 was met with jubilation right across Africa but under his

administration, the United States has narrowed its vision with respect to Africa: shifting away

from the broad political and socio-economic drivers of US-Africa relations to prioritise

counter-terrorism, writes *Emmanuel Asiedu-Acquah.

The leitmotif in US-Africa policy in Obama's second term

Counter-terrorism and security:

Flashback : President Obama in Ghana in July 2009

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14 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

In its first term, the Obama administra-tion stressed five broad thematic concernsas the pillars of its Africa policy: there wasthe usual commitment to the spread andconsolidation of democracy; support foreconomic growth in Africa, with increasedagricultural production and food security asthe corner stone, as well as the strengthen-ing of trade relations around the alreadyflagging African Growth and OpportunityAct (AGOA); continued assistance inhealth, especially public health, where theUS President's Emergency Plan For AIDSRelief (PEPFAR) was to be the flagshipprogram; support for conflict preventionand resolution; and, the development of apartnership for dealing with transnationalchallenges like drugs and arms trafficking,climate change, clean energy, and the “ille-gal exploitation of Africa's minerals andmaritime resources”, as Johnnie Carson,assistant secretary of state, put it. (Thequoted phrasing could be a glossing forcompetition with China over Africa'sresources). These pillars of Obama's Africapolicy shared much continuity with thepolicies of previous US administrations anddid not show the envisioning of any newrelationship with Africa besides the old.

IllusionsThe high expectations in Africa for

America's first African-descended presidentmay have been unrealistic but he has alsobeen spectacular in doing little to meetthose expectations. The balance sheet at theend of the first term scuttled any illusionsabout the man's Africa agenda and vision.Apart from the much-reported travels toEgypt and Ghana in 2009, the US presidenthas not been to any other African countries.

The policy document on US strategytowards sub-Saharan Africa was releasedonly in June last year. Against the record ofhis predecessors, George W. Bush and BillClinton, Barack Obama has been, as someobservers put it, nonchalant or detachedtowards Africa. His predecessors startedPEPFAR, AGOA and other such pro-grammes, which he incorporated into hisAfrica agenda. Under him, there has beenUS involvement in the resolution of theSouth Sudan question and the improve-ment of security in Somalia, which led tothe establishment of a new parliament andthe coming to office of a president andprime minister. In truth, American assis-tance in Somalia largely hinged on its inter-est in dismantling the Al-Shabaab Islamist

group, which the US regardsas a terrorist group.

It is against this back-ground that the militariza-tion of US-African relationsshould be seen. The center-piece in the Obama admin-istration's focus on Africa isincreasingly becomingcounter-terrorism and othermilitary engagements.Indeed, some observershave recently argued thatObama lacks a comprehen-sive strategy for Africa butthat is precisely because thevision from WashingtonD.C., if indeed it can becalled a vision, only sees ter-rorists planning maleficencein isolated outposts in far-off locales and deserts inAfrica. The aridity of thatvision portends troublingtimes ahead.

One could trace themilitarist turn to certaindevelopments in the firstterm. For instance, in late 2011, Obamasent about 100 US Special Forces and advi-sors to Uganda to help its government trackdown and eliminate the Lord's ResistanceArmy of Joseph Kony. That programmeremains unchanged. Also unchanged is thepolicy of offering training, providing equip-ment and sponsoring joint military exercis-es with favored African militaries like that ofGhana, which also began in the first term.

The signal event in the prioritization ofcounter-terrorism in the new term of theObama administration would be the reach-ing of an agreement with the government ofNiger to host an American drone base a fewweeks ago. The Americans and theNigeriens insist that the drones will be usedto monitor Al-Qaeda and other terroristgroups and activities in the region. Nigerthus becomes the sixth African country toaccept to host US drones besides BurkinaFaso, Senegal, Morocco, Uganda andDjibouti. The insistence on using thesedrones for just surveillance purposes is a slyresponse to the criticism emanating fromthe high death toll of innocent people inplaces like Afghanistan and Yemen wherethe US has been using drones to target ter-rorists.

There appears to be no desire on thepart of the administration to reconsider its

use of drones and there is reason to believethat if they see fit they will use the dronesfor more than surveillance purposes inAfrica. As Obama said in his recent State ofthe Union speech, his administrationwould, “through a range of capabilities…take direct action against those who posethe gravest threat to Americans.” Vaguephrasing like “a range of capabilities” hasbeen the deliberate cover for and anattempt to parry any serious discussion ofthe deadly drone policy.

COVER

“The policy document on US

strategy towards sub-Saharan

Africa was released only in

June last year. Against the

record of his predecessors,

George W. Bush and Bill

Clinton, Barack Obama has

been, as some observers put it,

nonchalant or detached

towards Africa.”

Obama and his new Secretary of State John Kerry

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15AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

The ongoing French-led intervention

in Mali with American support should com-

pel a reflection on the shift to counter-ter-

rorism and military interventions over a

more comprehensive US-Africa policy.

Because the interventionists are thinking

only in terms of stopping Islamists or ter-

rorists (sometimes both official and media

discourse is confusing over this), little

thought appears to have been given to the

larger political and social causes and ramifi-

cations of the Malian rebellion, which invit-

ed the intervention. Already, there are news

reports that members of the Tuareg rebel

and Islamist groups have fled the interven-

tion in northern Mali to Niger and are

regrouping. Long marginalized Tuareg

clans in Niger have welcomed their

brethren or at least have averted their eyes,

as it were, as the rebels move in.

The political and economic conditions

that sparked the rebellion in Mali are shared

in Niger and other countries in the region.

The outcome of the intervention would

therefore not be, as one expert, Sebastian

Elischer, puts it in Foreign Affairs, the end to

the conflict in Mali but the eastward “migra-

tion of the problem. Drone policing [and

any other military effort, for that matter] -

the Obama administration's preferred tactic

- provide little more than

a short term fix.”

America's own Cold

War history is instructive

here. The covert opera-

tions, subterfuge, target-

ed killings and hot wars

engineered by successive

US administrations in

the name of containing

the ideological influence

of the Soviet Union in

Africa wreaked disaster

all over. That mindset,

not completely aban-

doned in Washington

DC, conflated and

reduced everything to

the spread of Soviet

influence. There were

communists here, com-

munists there, commu-

nists everywhere. Today,

the obsession is about

the spread of Al-Qaeda

influence: there are ter-

rorists here, there and everywhere.

The redrawing of the geopolitical map

of terror to include Africa is highly prob-

lematic. (Remember Mitt Romney's men-

tion of Mali twice in response to a question

on the Middle East during the last of the US

presidential candidates' debates in

November of last year). The re-mapping of

the Middle East to include Mali could only

make sense if one reduced the complexity

of life in these two places to terror and of

course, the Islamic connection. In that per-

spective, local material conditions and con-

cerns like the complex situation in Mali take

a backseat.

There is some talk in the American

media about debates (and dissension) with-

in the Obama administration over diplo-

matic/political versus military efforts in

American foreign policy strategy generally.

If indeed there is such a debate, the diplo-

matic party is losing out. Not that diploma-

cy is going to be abandoned but it may have

to play second fiddle to more macho

approaches in foreign policy. The US

domestic political situation also appears not

to favor the stances of the diplomatic party.

The Republicans have been baying for

blood since the killing of the US ambassa-

dor and three others in Benghazi, Libya, last

September. All congressional inquiries have

been used by the Republicans to push for a

greater US security presence abroad.

Obama may disagree with them over some

issues but he has not shown himself to be

any less belligerent. The focus on counter-

terrorism and security suit temperaments

on either side of the political divide well.

Given the frail state of the American

economy, there will be some attention

given to trade and investment. This is par-

ticularly so when the American economic

presence in Africa vis-à-vis the Chinese is

getting weaker. AGOA, for instance, is up

for renewal in this second term. However,

in the current militaristic state of mind eco-

nomics remains a sub to security concerns.

A different dynamic could be anticipat-

ed if African leaders took the initiative in

their relations with the US but recent years

provide no such examples. In any case, the

counter-terrorism and security theme fits in

well with those leaders who are struggling

for legitimacy at home. So the right noises

about democracy and freedom will be

made, offers of support to deal with unsta-

ble situations will be given, while partner-

ships to tackle terror will be forged with

Africa so Uncle Sam can feel that his inter-

ests are secured.

* Emmanuel Asiedu-Acquah is a PhD candi-date at Harvard University.

COVER

“The re-mapping of the Middle

East to include Mali could only

make sense if one reduced the

complexity of life in these two

places to terror and of course,

the Islamic connection. In that

perspective, local material con-

ditions and concerns like the

complex situation in Mali take

a backseat. “

Page 16: Agenda 16 1 2

Poor countries robbedDeveloping countries experienced an outflow of nearly US$6 trillion in funds between 2001 and

2010 - a historical high writes *Jaya Ramachandran.

DEVELOPMENT

16 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

Crime, corruption, and tax evasion record-ed near-historic highs in 2010, with illicitfinancial outflows costing the developingworld US$859 billion in 2010, just belowthe all-time high of $871.3 billion in 2008,the year preceding the global financial crisis.Besides, nearly $6 trillion were stolen frompoor countries in the decade between 2001and 2010, says a new report and urges world

leaders to increase transparency in theinternational financial system.

"Astronomical sums of dirty moneycontinue to flow out of the developingworld and into offshore tax havens anddeveloped country banks," said RaymondBaker, Director of the Washington-basedadvocacy organization, Global FinancialIntegrity (GFI).

"Regardless of the methodology, it'sclear: developing economies are hemor-rhaging more and more money at a timewhen rich and poor nations alike are strug-gling to spur economic growth. This reportshould be a wake-up call to world leadersthat more must be done to address theseharmful outflow," he adds.

Co-authored by GFI's lead economist

Leaders of the world’s leading 20 economies

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17AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

Dr Dev Kar and economistSarah Freitas, the study,Illicit Financial Flows fromDeveloping Countries:2001-2010 points out that asdeveloping countries beginto relax capital controls, thepossibility exists that themethodology utilized in pre-vious GFI reports - known asthe World Bank ResidualPlus Trade Mispricingmethod - could increasinglypick-up some licit capitalflows.

The methodology intro-duced in this report - theHot Money Narrow PlusTrade Mispricing method -ensures that all flow esti-mates are strictly illicit mov-ing forward, but may omitsome illicit financial flowsdetected in the previousmethodology, the study'sauthors say.

"The estimates provided. . . are still likely to beextremely conservative asthey do not include trademispricing in services, same-invoice trade mispricing,hawala transactions, anddealings conducted in bulkcash," explained Dr Kar, whopreviously served as a senioreconomist at theInternational MonetaryFund.

“This means that muchof the proceeds of drug traf-

ficking, human smuggling, and other crimi-nal activities, which are often settled in cash,are not included in these estimates,” headded.

The study, released on 17 December2012, finds that the $858.8 billion of illicitoutflows lost in 2010 is "a significant uptick"from 2009, which saw developing countrieslose $776.0 billion under the new method-ology. It estimates the developing worldlost a total of $5.86 trillion over the decadespanning 2001 through 2010.

"This has very big consequences fordeveloping economies," explained thereport's co-author Freitas. "Poor countrieslost nearly a trillion dollars that could havebeen used to invest in healthcare, educa-tion, and infrastructure. It's nearly a trillion

dollars that could have been used to pullpeople out of poverty and save lives."

The authors' research tracks theamount of illegal capital flowing out of 150different developing countries from 2001through 2010, and it ranks the countries bymagnitude of illicit outflows. According tothe report, among the 20 biggest exportersof illicit financial flows over the decade are:China recording unlawful outflows of $274billion average ($2.74 trillion cumulative);Mexico ($47.6 billion average and $476 bil-lion cumulative); Malaysia ($28.5 billionaverage and $285 billion cumulative);Saudi Arabia ($21.0 billion avg. and $210billion cum.); Russia ($15.2 billion avg. and$152 billion cum.); Philippines ($13.8 bil-lion avg. and $138 billion cum.); Nigeria($12.9 billion avg. and $129 billion cum.);India ($12.3 billion avg. and $123 billioncum.); Indonesia ($10.9 billion avg. and$109 billion cum.); and United ArabEmirates ($10.7 billion avg. and $107 bil-lion cum.) Others include: Iraq ($10.6 bil-lion avg. and $63.6 billion cum.); SouthAfrica ($8.39 billion avg. and $83.9 billioncum.); Thailand ($6.43 billion avg. and$64.3 billion cum.); Costa Rica ($6.37 bil-lion avg. $63.7 billion cum.); Qatar ($5.61billion avg. and $56.1 billion cum.); Serbia($5.14 billion avg. and $51.4 billion cum.);Poland ($4.08 billion avg. and $40.8 billioncum.); Panama ($3.99 billion avg. and$39.9 billion cum.); Venezuela ($3.79 bil-lion avg. and $37.9 billion cum.); andBrunei ($3.70 billion avg. $37.0 billioncum.).

The report, funded by the FordFoundation, also reveals the top exportersof illegal capital in 2010: China ($420.36billion); Malaysia ($64.38 billion); Mexico.($51.17 billion); Russia ($43.64 billion);Saudi Arabia ($38.30 billion); Iraq ($22.21billion); Nigeria ($19.66 billion); CostaRica ($17.51 billion); Philippines ($16.62billion); Thailand ($12.37 billion); Qatar($12.36 billion); Poland ($10.46 billion);Sudan ($8.58 billion); United ArabEmirates ($7.60 billion); Ethiopia ($5.64billion); Panama ($5.34 billion); Indonesia($5.21 billion); Dominican Republic($5.03 billion); Trinidad and Tobago($4.33 billion); and Brazil ($4.29 billion).

Previous reportsChina, the largest cumulative exporter

of illegal capital flight, as well as the largestvictim in 2010, was the topic of an October2012 country-specific report by Dr Kar and

Freitas. Using the older methodology,'Illicit Financial Flows from China and theRole of Trade Misinvoicing,' found that theChinese economy suffered $3.79 trillion inillicit financial outflows between 2000 and2011.

"Our reports continue to demonstratethat the Chinese economy is a ticking timebomb," said Dr Kar. "The social, political,and economic order in that country is notsustainable in the long-run given such mas-sive illicit outflows."

Mexico, the second-largest cumulativeexporter of illicit capital over the decade,was also the topic of a January 2011 GFIreport by Dr. Kar. The study, 'Mexico:Illicit Financial Flows, MacroeconomicImbalances, and the UndergroundEconomy', found that the country lost atotal of $872 billion in illicit financial flowsover the 41-year period from 1970 to 2010.

Furthermore, illicit outflows werefound to drive Mexico's domestic under-ground economy, which includes - amongother things - drug smuggling, arms traffick-ing and human trafficking.

Possible solutionsGlobal Financial Integrity report urges

world leaders to increase the transparencyin the international financial system as ameans to curtail the illicit flow of moneyhighlighted by the organization's research.

In particular it stresses the need foraddressing the problems posed by anony-mous shell companies, foundations, andtrusts by requiring confirmation of benefi-cial ownership in all banking and securitiesaccounts, and demanding that informationon the true, human owner of all corpora-tions, trusts, and foundations be disclosedupon formation and be available to lawenforcement.

The report also calls for reforming cus-toms and trade protocols to detect and cur-tail trade mispricing; requiring the country-by-country reporting of sales, profits andtaxes paid by multinational corporations;requiring the automatic cross-borderexchange of tax information on personaland business accounts; harmonizing predi-cate offenses under anti-money launderinglaws across all Financial Action Task Forcecooperating countries; and ensuring thatthe anti-money laundering regulationsalready on the books are strongly enforced.

*The above article is reproduced from ThirdWorld Network Features, February 2013.

DEVELOPMENT

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18 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

DOZENS of highly paid internationallawyers are pocketing millions of dollars infees from multinational corporations to suegovernments in secretive “arbitration tri-bunals” for profits they claim to be owedunder international investment treaties,according to “Profiting from Injustice” - anew report from Brussels-based CorporateEurope Observatory and Amsterdam-basedTransnational Institute.

If governments lose at these tribunals,they face penalties that can run into billionsof dollars which are often passed onto tax-

payers. This is despite the fact that thejudgements sometimes run counter to pub-lic interest laws such as those on environ-mental and human rights. Even if the gov-ernments win, they may still be liable formulti-million dollar legal bills for defendingthemselves against frivolous lawsuits.

Either way, the lawyers earn a lot ofmoney, notes Cecilia Olivet, a co-author ofthe report. “A handful of (law) firms areactively encouraging corporate clients tosue governments,” says Olivet. “Meanwhiletop arbitrators are using their influence to

secure investor-friendly rules and sustainthe flow of multi-million dollar lawsuits.”

Members of the public cannot attendmost of the trials conducted by these arbi-tration tribunals. Decisions are made by tri-bunal judges who are partly selected by thecompany bringing the dispute and finaljudgements cannot be appealed to aSupreme Court in any country or even innational parliaments.

Legal experts have denounced thistrend. “Investment treaty arbitration …imposes exceptionally powerful legal and

DEVELOPMENT

Lawyers sue states for multinationals

Lawyers are making huge profits from suing governments on behalf of multinationals

purportedly for violating international investment treaties writes *Pratap Chatterjee.

Permanent Court of Arbitration

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19AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

DEVELOPMENT

economic constraints on governmentsand, by extension, on democraticchoice, in order to protect from regula-tion the assets of multinational firms,”writes Professor Gus van Harten of theOsgoode Hall Law School in Toronto.

Investment TreatiesThe system of arbitration was orig-

inally created by Western governmentsto ensure the assets of their nationalcorporations could not be seized byanother country. The idea was toencourage investment across bordersand create a system of fair internationaldispute settlement mechanisms thatcould be viewed as above the nationalinterests of any single country.

There are five major arbitrationtribunals that take on these cases - theWorld Bank's International Center forSettlement of Investment Disputes(ICSID) in Washington DC, thePermanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) inthe Hague, the Court of InternationalArbitration (LCIA) in London, theInternational Chamber of Commerce(ICC) in Paris and the Chamber ofCommerce in Stockholm (SCC).

Over the last two decades, these tri-bunals have evolved into a de facto interna-tional legal system that has accompaniedthe rapidly expanding global free trade sys-tem. While many of the arbitrations takeplace between two companies, many coun-tries have signed up to the system via some3,000 bilateral and international agree-ments (like the North American Free TradeAgreement between Canada, Mexico andthe United States) which typically requirethe settlement of any kind of disputebetween investors and foreign countries tobe referred to these tribunals.

The number of such lawsuits registeredat the ICSID has skyrocketed. In 1996, just38 cases were under arbitration but by2011, this had risen almost 12 fold to 450.*

While the original idea of the systemwas to be fair and neutral, in reality it hasfavored the companies over the govern-ments, and private interests over public, saythe report authors. For example, the feesrequired to defend against such lawsuits arebeyond the reach of most small countries:lawyers charge as much as $1,000 an hourto work on these cases and the average costof fighting a case is over $8 million. Thejudges can be paid as much as $1 million towork on these cases.

These sums are small change for theFortune 500 multinationals. So PhilipMorris, the US tobacco multinational, issuing Australia and Uruguay for compulso-ry health warnings on cigarette packetswhile Vattenfall of Sweden is suingGermany for €3.7 billion ($4.8 billion) fordeciding to phase out nuclear energy fol-lowing the Fukushima disaster in Japan. Inthe past US billionaire Ronald Lauder suc-cessfully sued the Czech republic in theNetherlands for $270 million.

Now law firms are aggressively tryingto expand their business - some activelyencouraged companies to take advantage ofthe collapse of the Libyan government andthe Eurozone crisis in Greece to pursue law-suits.

“Investment lawyers have become thenew international 'ambulance chasers', in asimilar way to lawyers who chase hospitalwagons to the emergency room in searchfor legal clients,” write the authors of“Profiting from Injustice.”

Some of the top law firms profiting outof this include Freshfields of the UK, whichwas involved in 71 cases in 2011 alone, fol-lowed by White & Case of the US with 32,and King & Spalding of the US with 27.And over half of the judges hired to work onall known investment treaty disputes arelimited to a tiny pool of 15 powerful indi-viduals.

These lawsuits - some of which arespeculative - make life difficult for develop-ing country governments. For example, thePhilippine government spent $58 milliondefending two cases against German airportoperator Fraport, which the authors esti-mate could instead have paid the salaries of

12,500 teachers for one year or vaccinat-ed 3.8 million children against diseasessuch as TB, diphtheria, tetanus and polio.

Ultimately Fraport lost the lawsuitwhen it was revealed that the companyhad offered bribes to secure the contract.But damage was done. “The costs ofthese legal actions weigh on govern-ments in the form of large legal bills,weakening of social and environmentalregulation and increased tax burdens forpeople, often in countries with criticalsocial and economic needs,” note theauthors.

Opting Out“International investment treaties are a

powerful corporate weapon to rein ingovernment and make taxpayers pay forbusiness losses,” writes Pia Eberhardt,

the other co-author of “Profiting fromInjustice.”

“Policy-makers who sign such treatiesare handcuffing themselves and their suc-cessors for decades to come.”

Today a few countries have started torealize that the system is stacked againstthem and have decided to opt out of the sys-tem of bilateral treaties altogether. (This isnot as easy as one might imagine becausemany of the treaties are protected againstregime change and revolution via “survivalclauses” that make them binding on a coun-try for 10-15 years, even after a countrywithdraws from such agreements)

To date Argentina has refused to paythe $1.15 billion in judgements against it.Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela have termi-nated several agreements. Australia hasannounced it will not sign any new oneswhile South Africa has said it will cancel itsagreement with Belgium and Luxembourg.

Foreign investors are not happy aboutthis trend but some governments are stand-ing firm for now. “If there are investors whostay away because they feel that we don'thave old-style, dated, antiquated bilateralinvestment treaties in place, I can assureyou there are plenty of other investors fromother parts of the world who are happy tocome and don't insist on this,” says RobDavies, Trade and Industry Minister ofSouth Africa.

*Pratap Chatterjee is the Executive Director ofCorpWatch.

The above article is reproduced from ThirdWorld Network Features.

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DEVELOPMENT

BUT Maude Barlow, chairperson, Councilof Canadians and a former senior advisoron water to the president of the U.N.General Assembly in 2008-2009, warns theU.N.'s water agenda is in danger of beinghijacked by big business and water con-glomerates.

“We don't need the United Nations topromote private sector participation under

the guise of greater 'cooperation' whenthese same companies force their way intocommunities and make huge profits fromthe basic right to water and sanitation,”Barlow told IPS.

At this time of scarcity and financialcrisis, she said, “We need the UnitedNations to ensure that governments are ful-filling their obligations to provide basic

services rather than relinquishing totransnational corporations.”

The Paris-based U.N. Educational,Scientific and Cultural Organisation(UNESCO), which has been designatedthe lead U.N. agency, formally launchedIYWC at a ceremony in the French capitalMonday.

In New York, Secretary-General Ban

U.N.'s water agenda at risk ofbeing hijacked by Big Business

Amidst growing new threats of potential conflicts over fast-dwindling water resources in the world's ar

will commemorate 2013 as the International Year of Water Cooperation (IYWC) *writ

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DEVELOPMENT

Ki-moon warned of the new pressures onwater, including growing populations andclimate change. One-third of the world's 7.1billion people already live in countries withmoderate to high water stress, he said.

“Competition is growing betweenfarmers and herders; industry and agricul-ture; town and country,” Ban said.Upstream and downstream, and across bor-

ders, “We need to cooperate for the benefitof all now and in the future… Let us har-ness the best technologies and share thebest practices to get more crop per drop.”

Back in December 2010, the 193-

member General Assembly adopted a reso-

lution declaring 2013 as the IYWC, follow-

ing a proposal by Tajikistan.

The 2013 World Water Day, which will

take place on Mar. 22, will be dedicated to

water cooperation.

Barlow told IPS big water corporations

have gained influence in almost every

agency working at the United Nations.

The CEO Water Mandate, a public-

private sector initiative launched by the

United Nations in July 2007 and designed

to assist companies in the development,

implementation and disclosure of water

sustainability policies and practices, puts

corporations such as Nestle, Coca Cola,

Suez and Veolia directly into a position of

influence over global water policy and pres-

ents a clear conflict of interest, she said.

Corporate capture

“For-profit private companies cannot

uphold the public interest if it conflicts with

their bottom line,” said Barlow, who is also

founder of the Blue Planet Project.

Even the World Water Development

Report is now advised by an industry group

on “business, trade, finance and involve-

ment of the private sector,” she added.

Tom Slaymaker, senior policy analyst

on governance at the London-based

WaterAid, told IPS the United Nations

recognised the “human right to water and

sanitation” back in 2010.

“But today over 780 million lack

improved water supplies and 2.5 billion lack

basic sanitation facilities,” he added.

The 2013 International Year of Water

Cooperation will be a critical year for the

United Nations to reflect on why universal

access has not yet been achieved, he said.

Slaymaker said it's also time to reflect

on the kind of political leadership and new

forms of partnership that are required to

accelerate progress towards universal

access as part of the emerging post-2015

development framework of the United

Nations.

According to the United Nations, the

primary objective of IYWC is to raise

awareness, both on the potential for

increased cooperation, and on the chal-

lenges facing water management in light of

the increase in demand for water access,

allocation and services.

Since the General Assembly recog-

nised the human right to water and sanita-

tion, a number of countries, including

Mexico, Kenya, Bolivia, The Dominican

Republic, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Ecuador, El

Salvador, The Netherlands, Belgium, the

UK and France, have either adopted laws

recognising the right to water or amended

their constitutions to do so.

The Vatican recently recognised the

human right to water and added that “water

is not a commercial product but rather a

common good that belongs to everyone.”

And last June, all 193 member states

signed the Rio+20 Declaration which

includes the recognition of the human right

to water and sanitation as a universal right.

Specifically zeroing on the role of the

private sector, Barlow told IPS that corpo-

rations are among those pledging their sup-

port for IYWC.

Aguas de Barcelona, the water compa-

ny at the heart of a fierce debate in Spain

over control of drinking water, is participat-

ing, she pointed out.

So are “corporations who fought us on

the right to water are now scrambling to

claim it in their own image”.

She quoted Nestle as saying that 1.5

percent of the world's water should be put

aside for the poor and rest should be put on

the open market.

If Nestle gets its way, she argued, there

will one day be a water cartel similar to big

oil, making life and death decisions about

who gets water and under what circum-

stances every day.

“But at least we have this recognised

and acknowledged right that no one should

be allowed to appropriate water for person-

al gain while others die from an inability to

pay for water,” she said.

With time, “we will build consensus

around the right to water and the under-

standing that water is a common heritage

and a public trust.”

* Thalif Deen writes for the IPS from NewYork.

t risk of Business

d's arid regions, the United Nations

rites Thalif Deen.

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22 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

DEVELOPMENT

ZIMBABWE'S education system, onceregarded as the finest on the continent, wasa casualty of the country's economic melt-down in the 2000s, when it nearly collapsed- but lately there have been signs of recov-ery.

The education malaise was widelyblamed on hyperinflation, which madeteachers' salaries worthless and funding forschool materials and maintenance impossi-ble.

But with economic reforms of 2009and the establishment of a donor fundingmechanism, the school system is seeingmodest, gradual improvement. Still, vastchallenges - from poor infrastructure toteacher shortages - remain.

A turnaround David Coltart, the education minister,

told IRIN that the country's education crisisactually predates hyperinflation. “Contrary to what many people think, the

downward spiral began long before hyper-inflation occurred. It started with the sectornot getting as much as it got during the first10 years of independence,” he said.Zimbabwe gained independence fromBritain in 1980.

The education system's deteriorationaccelerated under the effects of hyperinfla-tion. Then, in early 2009 the countryditched its local currency and adopted amulti-currency financial system using theUS dollar, the Botswana pula and the SouthAfrican rand, ending hyperinflationovernight.

By the time Coltart assumed his post inFebruary 2009 - after the opposition party,the Movement for Democratic Change,entered a government of national unity withPresident Robert Mugabe's ruling ZANU-PF party - the economy was beginning toturn around.

Coltart found the education system“chaotic”, with schools closed, teachers on

Is Zimbabwe's education sectoron the road to recovery?

There are indications the education sector in Zimbabwe has turned the corner and is

beginning to improve.

Zimbabwe’s schoolgoing children have paid a heavy price for the country’s political

and socio-economic crises

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23AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

strike and infrastructure in a state of disre-

pair. One of the first steps towards over-

hauling it was the establishment of the

Education Transition Fund (ETF), a mech-

anism to allow donors control over their

funds.

“The way the fund works is the donor

community provides funding, I chair the

education transition fund meetings, and

UNICEF [the UN Children's Fund] is the

ultimate manager of the fund. So we reach

consensus regarding how the money is to be

spent, and the ministry decides what its pri-

orities are,” Coltart explained.

Funding for the ETF varies from year

to year. A variety of donors - including the

European Commission and the govern-

ments of Australia, Denmark, Finland,

Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, New

Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the

US - contribute to the fund, which UNICEF

then administers.

In 2012, the ETF was funded to the

tune of about US$12 million, and in 2013,

$25 million is earmarked for it, UNICEF

said in a statement.

Green shoots of recovery

Hyperinflation had prevented the pub-

lication of school textbooks. “In some

schools, as many as 15 pupils shared a text-

book, while in some rural schools only the

teacher had a bedraggled textbook,” Coltart

said.

Julia Mapondera, principal of Gwinyai

Public Primary School in Mbare, a poor

neighbourhood in the capital, Harare, told

IRIN that erratic attendance by students

and teachers, combined with the unavail-

ability of text books, proved a toxic mix.

Prior to the crisis, students learned to

read and write in their first year of school;

student Kelvin Bimha, now 11, didn't gain

those skills until his fourth year, and then

only with the assistance of remedial classes

during the holidays.

Donor funding has since helped

address the textbook shortage; the pupil-to-

book ratio is now one-to-one, Coltart said.

Next are plans for the distribution of non-

academic books to encourage a culture of

reading; $9 million is budgeted for this in

2013, with donor support through the ETF.

At the height of the crisis, in 2008 - dur-

ing which food insecurity and waterborne

disease were widespread, and schooling was

disrupted by political violence and teacher

strikes - the pass rate for the final year of pri-

mary school dropped to 52 percent. The

previous year, it had been 70 percent.

In 2009, only 39 percent of those who

sat for the final-year exams passed. It has

since improved, with 2010 seeing a pass rate

of 42 percent and 2011 a rate of 45 percent.

Still, Coltart expects the pass rate to

remain low for several years and then grad-

ually improve.

Principal Mapondera says lack of infra-

structure continues to undermine the edu-

cation system. In 2012, the number of stu-

dents at Gwinyai was close to 2,000 - nearly

double its intended capacity. The over-

crowding has led to a practice known as

“hot seating”, in which some children

attend morning classes and others attend

afternoon classes.

Coltart says the situation is not unique

to Gwinyai. “We've got 8,000 schools. If you

go to most of these schools, you'll see the

infrastructure is crumbling - schools not

being maintained, toilets in a terrible state

of disrepair. Many schools don't have desks,

don't have blackboards.”

Low salaries

He said the $500,000 from the 2012

national budget for school maintenance was

“less than drop in the ocean”, and his min-

istry would be seeking donor assistance.

“We could spend a billion dollars on the

education sector, and we wouldn't address

all these structural problems.”

The education budget for 2012-2013 is

$750 million. More than half of this, Coltart

says, goes to primary and high school teach-

ers' salaries, which average about $300 a

month.

During the hyperinflation years, many

teachers just walked off the job, as their

salaries fell to the equivalent of $1 or less a

month. The ministry has declared an

amnesty for these teachers, and many have

returned. But many others moved to other

countries in search of employment and bet-

ter salaries, and it has proved difficult to lure

them back. It is estimated that 20,000

teachers left the country between 2007 and

2009.

There are currently about 106,000

teachers; about 30,000 more are required.

However, even if the teacher target is

achieved, Coltart says, there will not be

enough classrooms available for them to

teach in.

He says the government's relationship

with the teachers' unions - such as the

Zimbabwe Teachers Association and the

Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe -

is improving. But threats of strikes are never

far from the surface.

The education sector had been stabi-

lized, but remains fragile. “Until we see lit-

eracy rates starting to improve, until we see

grade 7 [the final year of primary school]

examination results getting back to the lev-

els they were perhaps 10 years ago, I will

remain concerned about the education sec-

tor,” he said.

* An IRIN report from Harare, Zimbabwe

“Prior to the crisis, students

learned to read and write in

their first year of school;

student Kelvin Bimha, now 11,

didn't gain those skills until his

fourth year, and then only with

the assistance of remedial

classes during the holidays.”

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24 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

THE conflict in Western Sahara seems togain more and more visibility and impor-tance in the regional and internationalgeopolitics this last decade, despite thegreat lack of media coverage and academic

analysis of its different facts, aspects, possi-ble consequences and perspectives. It isthanks to some brilliant academics, jurists,human rights defenders, activists and jour-nalists, both foreign and Saharawi that the

question of Western Sahara has remainedimpossible to ignore whenever the debatetackles the future of North Africa, theMaghreb Union, the North-South andSouth-South interrelations and influence.

Western Sahara occupied,Africa re-colonised

*Malainin Lakhal argues that it is 'a subject that should concern all Africans, and all actors

who know that Africa can never rise up as a Union or as a future power unless it jointly struggles

for its freedom from poverty, ignorance, re-colonisation, foreign exploitation, internal rivalry, and

lack of communication between all its peoples and elite.'

DEVELOPMENT

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25AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

DEVELOPMENT

This clear-cut and easily iden-tified conflict is about decolonisa-tion in terms of international law.It is brought to the spotlight bythe contributors in thisPambazuka special issue onWestern Sahara. They haveproven each in his or her own wayhow the Western Sahara conflict ismade complicated by the oppositepositions held by the two partiesto the conflict, Polisario andMorocco. The former wantsdecolonisation and self-determi-nation, the latter wants territorialexpansion by military means. Butalso by the conflicting geo-politi-cal agendas of the regional actorsand the super power nations whohave their own agendas and strate-gic goals, not only regarding theirposition on Western Sahara, butalso their vision of the future of allNorth Africa, African Union andthe Middle East.

Last colony of AfricaThe objective of this second

special issue on the conflict ofWestern Sahara is not the result ofa simple opportunity to cover oneof the hottest conflicts on themodern political arena. It is rathera well thought-out and carefullydiscussed step towards communi-cating to readers some of theinternational legal facts, political

theory debates, and on-the-ground realitiesrelating to the last colony in Africa. It is thusa subject that should concern all Africans,and all actors who know that Africa cannever rise up as a Union or as a future powerunless it jointly struggles for its freedomfrom poverty, ignorance, re-colonisation,foreign exploitation, internal rivalry, andlack of communication between all its peo-ples and elite. Africa needs to build itsmodel for the future on the basis of a con-scious awareness about the huge potential ithas, and above all its human resources.

This second special issue presentssome new aspects and discussions of theconflict in Western Sahara. It cannot ofcourse cover everything, but it offers a lot ofinteresting questions, ideas and facts tothose who would like to know better what isat stake in the region. What is at stake is thatthe international legal order seems to be soeasily violated and purposely manipulated

by certain international actors, especiallyMorocco. Morocco could not continue itsillegal occupation of Western Sahara anddefy more than 100 United Nations resolu-tions unless it had a mysterious green lightfrom Uncle Paris, and an even more myste-rious complicity from other countries suchas the US. But above all a criminal andimmoral support from multinationals andinternational trade that does not care aboutthe violation of the Saharawi people's rightover their own natural resources. Readerscan read this history of the Western Saharaconflict in the article submitted by AluatHamudi, a Saharawi Master's student.

Complex issuesSo what is at stake is momentous. Are

Africans aware of it? This is another ques-tion. But what is certain is that the persist-ence of the occupation of Western Sahara,the violations of Saharawi people's political,economic, social and cultural Rights, theexploitative plundering of their naturalresources and the persistent pressures exer-cised directly or indirectly over them duringthe last 40 years is only maintaining a verydangerous situation that can explode at anytime, especially in a region that is far fromstable. Dr Jacob Mundy contributes againby writing about the security issues acrossthe Sahara-Sahel region, as part of a widerdebate about Morocco's annexation ofWestern Sahara also a factor of regionalinstability. Dr Sidi Omar, a Saharawi col-league writes of the involvement of theAfrican Union in the Western Sahara story,and of the factors that should rather con-vince the parties to reach a peaceful and fairsolution so as to make this region one of themain assets of the Maghreb and AfricanUnion.

The articles collected in this editioncover many issues but our main themefocuses on the legal issues of the conflictand the status of Morocco in WesternSahara. The article by Pedro Pinto Leiteand Jeffrey J. Smith offers a new insight intheir detailed examination that questionstechnical legal theory on self-determinationprocesses and the United Nations. KatlynThomas has provided us with her October2012 Testimony to the Special Political andDecolonisation Committee of the UnitedNations General Assembly, alongsidewhich we also provide the web link to theUnited Nations Committee of theAssociation of the Bar of the City of NewYork June 2012 full report on the legal

issues involved and the principle of self-determination.

Western Sahara Resource Watch pro-vides an update on an imminent vote in theEuropean Union regarding the importanceof protecting Western Sahara's naturalresources, another key issue in the persist-ence of illegal occupation. It was thusimpossible to prepare this second issuewithout a special focus on this key topic ofthe Moroccan and European illegalexploitation of the natural resources of thisterritory, but also a chance to listen to thestories that Saharawi activists and fisher-men on the ground, such as Khalil Asmarand Mohammed El Baykam, sent us.

The Saharawi women and the uniqueexperience of the Saharawi refugees in theprocess of the efforts of nation-state build-ing is another aspect that is seldom dis-cussed. The few studies on this subject werealmost all done by wonderful women frommany countries who were able to visit thesecamps and see first-hand how they function,such as Dr Alice Wilson's introduction tothe Saharawi direct democracy experimentbased on her PhD research, and SoniaRossetti's PhD research on Saharawiwomen's involvement in state building.

“The Western Sahara conflict is

made complicated by the

opposite positions held by the

two parties to the conflict,

Polisario and Morocco. The for-

mer wants decolonisation and

self-determination, the latter

wants territorial expansion by

military means. But also by the

conflicting geo-political agen-

das of the regional actors and

the super power nations who

have their own agendas and

strategic goals, not only

regarding their position on

Western Sahara, but also their

vision of the future of all North

Africa, African Union and the

Middle East.”

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DEVELOPMENT

26 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

Joining them are four Saharawi women,Fatimetu, Senia, Asria and Agaila, all stu-dents and who illuminate the thoughts andexperiences of being refugee youth caughtup in exile from their homeland. We hopethis serves to show how the Saharawiwoman is a pillar in the building of the mod-ern experience of Saharawi society.

Rights violationThe phenomenon of the massive and

systematic violations of human rights inWestern Sahara is another major aspecttreated in this issue. It is a phenomenonbecause it is strikingly obvious that theMoroccan authorities of occupation are bla-tantly violating all internationally recog-nized rights, freedoms and liberties in thiscolony, while the international communityseems to be wilfully turning a blind eye onthis fact. All international human rightsorganizations, without a single exception,including the UN High Office of Humanrights in addition to governments, parlia-ments, political parties, trade unions andcivil society actors, have been denouncingthe many human rights violations commit-ted against Saharawi civilians in the occu-pied zones of Western Sahara. KonstantinaIsidoros has provided a summary about the17 February 2013 news of the Moroccanmilitary tribunal of 25 Saharawi human

rights activists and provides readers withlinks to the world-wide campaign groupswho have spoken against the military sen-tencing of civilians.

Yet in the 40 years since Morocco's ille-

gal invasion of Western Sahara, the UN

Security Council seems to be unable to

adopt a simple resolution to mandate the

UN peacekeeping mission (MINURSO) in

the territory to monitor and protect

Saharawi civilians from the Moroccan

oppression and humiliation. MINURSO is

in fact the only UN peacekeeping mission in

the world without a Human Rights compo-

nent and this is 'thanks' to the French

refusal in the UN Security Council to allow

such a decision to be taken. Both the UK

based Western Sahara Campaign and

Vivian Solana (also a PhD researcher) share

their updates with us on this imminent

renewal of the MINURSO mandate, and

Salah Mohammed provides an insight of

what happened when Christopher Ross, the

UN special envoy, came for the first time to

El Aaiun in Western Sahara in early

November 2012.Another astonishing factor that can

help readers, as Africans, to link with theSaharawi people and self-determinationstruggle is the history of Saharawi culture,

which is ethnically amixture of Arabs,Berbers and Africans.So too is Saharawimusic deeply rooted inboth African and Arab-Berber traditions. Weare grateful to DanielleSmith and VioletaRuano from the UKbased arts and humanrights charity,Sandblast, for provid-ing us with the visualcolour, culture andmusic of the Saharawi,which we weavethrough this very inter-national law-themedsecond issue.Danielle's article illu-minates how Sandblasthas set up a music proj-ect in the refugeecamps and Violetashares her PhDresearch on Saharawimusic's role in our

independence struggle. In contrast,Saharawi journalist and activist, SaidZeroual and RuGaibi AbdullahMohammed Sheikh, have written howSaharawi under Moroccan military occupa-tion feel about the theft of their culture andhistory, which is another important issueabout our cultural heritage.

Finally, this Pambazuka second issueon Western Sahara offers valuable informa-tion about new books and films on our asyet un-decolonised African nation.Anthony Pazzanita, a long-time WesternSahara observer and current editor of the'Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara',joins us again by sharing his forthcomingbook review of 'Western Sahara: TheRefugee Nation' by Pablo San Martín,another academic researcher who lived inthe refugee camps. Throughout the specialissue, we have posted links to the a range offilms and documentaries from which read-ers can further discover how the Saharawiare trying to use the tools of non-violentprotests and freedom of speech to continueto resist the occupier, despite facing enor-mous pressures, oppression and violence.

* Malainin Lakhal, in the Saharawi refugeecamps, is Secretary General of the SaharawiJournalists and Writers Union

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ENVIRONMENT

THE Doha UN climate change conference(COP 18) which took place in the Qataricapital from November 26 - December 7,2012 was particularly important as it wasthe first COP after the regime change thatthe Durban Mandate represents.

Delegates had three key tasks to grap-ple with in Doha: to successfully concludework under the Ad Hoc Working Group onLong Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) track of negotiation including a clearpathway on pre-2020 finance and Long-term finance to enable developing countriesto respond to climate change; renew emis-sion reduction commitments of developedcountries under the Kyoto Protocol (the

first commitment period of which expiredon December 31, 2012) and agree on awork plan for the negotiation of a compre-hensive climate change agreement (drawnfrom the Durban Mandate) by 2015 for itsimplementation to start post-2020.

But after the two weeks of intensiveand mostly fractious negotiations, Dohaneither set a more ambitious goal for reduc-ing greenhouse gas emissions nor addressedthe question of long term finance.

Five years after its launch in Bali,Indonesia, in 2007, the Ad-Hoc WorkingGroup on Long term Cooperative Action(AWG-LCA) track of negotiations was ter-minated in Doha amidst protest from devel-

oping countries that the track had not com-pleted its mandate. Most uncompletedissues from the AWG-LCA were transferredto subsidiary bodies of the UNFCCC.Key Doha decisions include further exten-sion, until 2020, of the Kyoto Protocol(KP) on reducing GHG emissions and apost-2012 work plan for negotiating a newglobal climate change deal by 2015 forimplementation to begin from 2020 underthe Ad-Hoc Working Group on the DurbanPlatform (AWG-ADP).

The European Union got away with aneight-year second commitment period(2013-2020), as it offers these countriesand other developed country parties that

Uninspiring Doha pathwayThe latest UN conference on climate change held in the Qatari capital offered very little hope

that the world is ready to resolve the climate crisis. After weeks of intensive and mostly fractious

negotiations, Doha neither set more ambitious goals for reducing global emissions nor

addressed the question of long term finance, writes *Kwesi W. Obeng.

Climate change negotiations:

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28 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

ENVIRONMENT

Key Doha decisions include furtherextension, until 2020, of the Kyoto Protocol(KP) on reducing GHG emissions and apost-2012 work plan for negotiating a newglobal climate change deal by 2015 forimplementation to begin from 2020 underthe Ad-Hoc Working Group on the DurbanPlatform (AWG-ADP).

The European Union got away with aneight-year second commitment period(2013-2020), as it offers these countriesand other developed country parties thatsubscribed to KP-II another eight-year win-dow to further pollute the atmosphere withclimate altering gases. Ironically, the EU isprojected to meet its emission reductiontargets under the KP-II by the close of 2013.

The United States, a non-signatory tothe protocol, couldn't be so botheredexcept, like some other Annex I parties, theypushed for the market mechanisms underthe protocol to be accessible even to non-KP parties. Russia, Japan, Canada, NewZealand and a few other developed coun-tries which have pulled out of the KP (sec-ond commitment period) fought hard toretain access to these mechanisms too.

Negotiators will however review thetargets by 2014 to raise these emission tar-gets of participating countries. Access toflexible market mechanisms under the

Protocol including CDM (i.e. ability totransfer and acquire Certified EmissionReductions- CERs) were conditioned onparticipation in the second commitmentperiod, a demand forcefully made by devel-oping country groups at the negotiations.

Also under Joint Implementation onlyparticipating countries in the 2nd commit-ment period can transfer and acquire CERs,Assigned Amount Units (AAUs), emissionreduction units (ERUs) and removal units(RMUs) valid for emissions trading in thesecond commitment period.

The Group of 77 and China and otherdeveloping country groupings sought for afive-year commitment period to avoid lock-ing in low emission targets and pledges butthese were in effect dismissed. Developingcountries also pushed, albeit without anysuccess, for rich countries to move to thetop of their pledged ranges and withoutconditionalities.

The renewal of KP-II may be no morethan symbolism as actual GHG cuts willamount to just about 18 per cent of globalemission reductions. This is not enough tosave the plant from warming above twodegrees Celsius.

In fact, the United NationsEnvironment Programme's (UNEP) latest(2012) assessment of the emissions gap

presented at the negotiations paint a grimpicture for the planet. Current global emis-sions, the report shows, are way above emis-sion levels consistent with the two degreeCelsius target in 2020. The report starklyindicates that the world is on a trajectory offour to six degrees Celsius of overheating

Global emissions which declinedbriefly during the peak of the global finan-cial and economic crisis between 2008 -2009 have picked up again. Emissions arenow already 10 per cent above what theyneed to be in 2020. The world is thus ontrack to exceed by up to a third the level ofcarbon emissions necessary to ensure emis-sion cuts can take place at a cost manage-able in 2020. They must peak by 2015 to

“The renewal of KP-II may be

no more than symbolism as

actual GHG cuts will amount to

just about 18 per cent of global

emission reductions. This is not

enough to save the plant from

warming above two degrees

Celsius.”

Doha : Climate change negotiators

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29AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

ENVIRONMENT

have any chance of reversing any damage tothe planet.

Significantly, Doha mainstreamed“Loss and Damage” caused by climatechange into the climate negotiations. Thedecision called for an international mecha-nism on “Loss and Damage” to be estab-lished under the UNFCCC. Developedcountries resisted an agreement on “Lossand Damage” mechanism as it could formthe basis for developing countries' claim forcompensation for the negative effects of cli-mate change, which is one of the key rea-sons for which developing country group-ings, especially AOSIS campaigned for thedecision.

For developing countries the decisionon the mechanism is a further recognitionof the suffering and the negative effects ofclimate change on the poorer parts of theworld.

But by far the two most contentiousissues at the Doha negotiations were emis-sion reduction and finance, especially firmpledges on adequate finance from devel-oped countries for the pre-2020 period andlong term finance.

Although the Green Climate Fund(GCF) was set up in Durban in December2011 to enable developing countries tomeet the challenges imposed by an over-

heating planet, it has remained an emptyfund as no country is willing to make anypledges. To avoid a discussion of finance,some developed countries led by theUnited States and European Union stayedaway from a couple of scheduled sessions,in preference of small group consultationsbetween influential developing and devel-oped countries. The United States categor-ically declined to pledge any funds eventhough the Fast Start Finance ended onDecember 31, 2012.

BlocsThe hard line stance of rich countries

on finance seemed to have pulled poorcountry blocs together. Developing countryblocs led by the G77 and China proposed aUS$60 billion finance gap that rich coun-tries ought to provide to enable developingcountries to deal with climate changebetween 2013 and 2015. The DurbanDecision requires a new climate regime tobe negotiated with legal outcomes not laterthan 2015 for its implementation to kick-inin 2020.

The three-year Fast Start Finance(FSF) to which developed countries agreedin Copenhagen in 2009 to commit US$30billion dollars to enable developing coun-tries to address climate change expired on

December 31, 2012. There would be nonew Fast Start Finance, rich countries tolddeveloping countries in Doha.

Doha agreed to extend the work pro-

gramme on long-term finance for another

year -to the end of 2013 to enable parties to

more concretely resolve the issue.

However, Britain, Denmark, France,

Germany, Sweden and the EU Commission

pledged US$6 billion dollars to enable

developing countries to respond to climate

change but not as part of the GCF. The

absence of a concrete decision on long-term

finance could undermine non-Annex I par-

ties' ability to undertake their Nationally

Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs).

Developed countries certainly walked

away from Qatar the happiest, as the Doha

deal further sets the scene for negotiation of

a new climate regime that excludes some of

the fundamental principles of the Climate

Convention and key demands of develop-

ing countries. The Doha package further

dismantles some previous successfully

negotiated agreements and systems to

address climate change.

* Kwesi W. Obeng is assistant editor, AfricanAgenda.

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ENVIRONMENT

30 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

I) Amendment of the Kyoto Protocol

The Kyoto Protocol, as the only existing and bindingagreement under which developed countries commit tocutting greenhouse gases, was amended so that it willcontinue as of 1 January 2013.

• Length of the second commitment period will be 8 years.

• Agreed on the legal requirements that will allow a smooth continuation of the Protocol.

• The valuable accounting rules of the protocol were preserved.

• Countries that are taking on further commitments under the Kyoto Protocol have agreed to review their emission reduction commitments at the latest by 2014, with a view to increasing their respective levels of ambition.

• The Kyoto Protocol's Market Mechanisms - the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint Implementation (JI) and International Emissions Trading (IET) - can continue as of 2013.

• Access to the mechanisms will be uninterrupted for all developed countries that have accepted targets for the second commitment period.

• Joint Implementation (JI) will continue to operate, with the agreed technical rules allowing the issuance of credits, once a host country's emissions target has been formally established.

• As part of accounting rules, provisions relating to carry-over of assigned amount units from the first to the second commitment period were further developed, aiming to strengthen the environmental integrity of the Kyoto Protocol regime. In addition, Australia, the EU, Japan,

• Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway and Switzerland

clarified, through declarations attached to the

Doha decision on the second commitment

period, that they will not purchase such surplus

units from other Parties.

II: Time table for the 2015 global climate

change agreement and increasing ambition

before 2020

Governments to work toward a universal climate change

agreement covering all countries from 2020, to be

adopted by 2015, and to find ways to scale up efforts

before 2020 beyond the existing pledges to curb emis-

sions so that the world can stay below the agreed maxi-

mum 2 degrees Celsius temperature rise.

• A significant number of meetings and

workshops are to be held in 2013 to prepare the

new agreement and to explore further ways to

raise ambition.

• Governments agreed to submit to the UN

Climate Change Secretariat, by 1 March 2013,

information, views and proposals on actions,

initiatives and options to enhance ambition.

• Elements of a negotiating text are to be available

no later than the end of 2014, so that a draft

negotiating text is available before May 2015.

III: Completion of new infrastructure

• In Doha, governments moved to completion of

new infrastructure to channel technology and

finance to developing nations and move toward

the full implementation of this infrastructure and

support. They:

• Doha endorsed the selection of the Republic of

Korea as the location of the Green Climate Fund

and the work plan of the Standing Committee on

Finance. The Green Climate Fund is expected to

start its work in Sondgo in the second half of

2013, which means that it can launch activities in

2014.

• Doha confirmed a UNEP-led consortium as host

of the Climate Technology Center (CTC), for an

initial five-year term. The CTC, along with its

associated Network, is the implementing arm of

the UNFCCCs Technology Mechanism.

Governments have also agreed the constitution

of the CTC advisory board.

IV: Long-term climate finance

• The Doha agreement merely encourages developed countries to increase funding between 2013 --2015 at least to the average annual level with which they provided funds during the 2010-2012 Fast-Start Finance period. This is to ensure there is no gap in continued finance support while efforts are otherwise scaled up.

• Germany, the UK, France, Denmark, Sweden and

the EU Commission announced concrete finance

pledges in Doha for the period up to 2015,

totaling approximately US$6 billion.

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31AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

RECENT fighting between herders andfarmers in Burkina Faso's central-easternSangou area which left seven people dead isa warning that recurrent violence betweenthe two groups could get out of hand unlessurgent action is taken.

“We are used to having frequent clash-es between herders and farmers in this partof the country, but they have never beenthis bad,” said Allahidi Diallo, governor ofthe Central-East region, one of the coun-

try's most fertile. On 31 December clashes broke out

again between Fulani herdsmen and Bissafarmers after a herder's cattle grazed on afarm. “A lot of property, including houses,granaries and cattle was destroyed,” saidDiallo adding that a temporary curfew wasimposed in Sangou village and the sur-rounding areas. He said fighting had spreadto areas as far as 100km away.

“We think that some people are delib-

erately attacking others because of theirethnicity. We must put an end to thesepractices where communities are attackedwhen one of their members has committedan offence. There is no collective responsi-bility under Burkina Faso law,” InteriorMinister Jerome Bougouma told reporters.

He said the violence was mainly due tolack of faith in the judiciary, and the relianceon traditional laws and collective punish-ment. He pledged that a security forces' unit

Greater efforts needed toavert herder-farmer clashes

in Burkina FasoDespite peace bids, Burkina Faso farmers and herders recently clashed, forcing hundreds of

people to flee from their homes.

POLITICS

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POLITICS

32 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

would be established in the troubled region.“There is a lack of confidence in the

judiciary and the administration. We willwork to rebuild confidence and the rule oflaw so that people can understand that theyneed to abide by the state laws and not tra-ditional laws which encourage collectivepunishment.”

Peace effortsDeadly clashes between farmers and

herders are frequent in Burkina Faso. In2012, the government held workshops inthe country's 13 regions to seek ways to easetensions among different communities.According to government statistics, 55 peo-ple have been killed in clashes in the pastfour years and on average there are 600 suchconflicts every year.

The peace initiative focused on landregulation, the importance of protectingnomadic paths and seeking ways in whichfarmers and herders can sustainably use nat-ural resources. In Burkina Faso, livestockare an economic mainstay for many fami-lies, with 80 percent of rural families keep-ing at least one or two animals to fall back

on when times are hard.“During sensitization campaigns, we

failed to reach a huge part of the population.How many of those who clashed in theCentre-East region have taken part in ourmeetings?” asked Hassan Barry, head ofTapital Puulaku, a Fulani cultural organiza-tion promoting understanding betweenpastoralists and farmers. “This is not some-thing that will end immediately.”

Barry urged that local administrationofficials be trained to increase understand-ing between farmers and herders and “sen-sitize them before the beginning of rainyseasons in order to have zero deaths”.

“In December, farmers lost their don-keys after an attack… but later the perpe-trators were released by the security forces,”said Halidou Barry, a Fulani herder. “Justicemust prevail when there are attacks fromeither side.”

DisplacedAround 600 people, mainly women

and children, have been displaced by thelatest fighting, Diallo told IRIN. Some havesought refuge in villages outside Sangou

while others crossed the border into neigh-bouring Ghana. A local resident told IRINthe men were hiding in the bush with theircattle.

“We lost two children, one aged threemonths and another aged four years…because they were sick and we could nottake them to hospital. It is cold, we lackfood and water,” said Zaman Diao, one ofthose who fled after the attack.

Burkina Faso's Ministry of SocialWelfare has sent food and tents to the dis-placed, but Diallo said more was needed.“The emergency aid sent was done on thebasis of first estimates which are now out-dated…

“On security, the situation is undercontrol. But there is an emergency. Theimperative now is the management ofhumanitarian issues because there are hugeconcentrations of displaced persons in cer-tain areas,” Diallo added. “There is noattack and no clashes. Security forces arepatrolling.”

* An IRIN report.

Shepherd and his flock

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33AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

WOMEN

Swazi women findstrength in numbers

SWAZI women are organizing to promotetheir rights and welfare, convinced that dis-criminatory laws are at odds with the essen-tial roles they play in their families and intheir country's economy.

“We are taking a page from the past toachieve the recognition Swazi womendeserve as the ones who keep this societygoing. It is a scandal how the authoritiesrefuse to take women seriously when we areholding the country together,” said Cynthia

Simelane, an activist who works with femalegarment workers at the Matsapha IndustrialSite, outside the city of Manzini.

The Swaziland Coalition of ConcernedCivil Organisations has noted that theSwazi government has signed various inter-national accords pledging to end genderdiscrimination, but it has never enacted leg-islation to put those pledges into action.

In 2005, King Mswati III, a strict tradi-tionalist with 13 wives, signed a new consti-

tution granting men and women equalrights. However, discriminatory laws - suchas one that prevents women from taking outbank loans - remain in place. Another suchlaw, forbidding women from owning prop-erty, remains on the books despite havingbeen ruled unconstitutional.

In the past year, the Swaziland SingleMothers Association (SWAMASO), whichaims to improve the lives of single mothersand reduce high teen pregnancy rates,

A majority of children in Swaziland are raised by single mothers or grandmothers,

according to women's groups.

Swazi women remain forbidden from owning property

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WOMEN

34 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

doubled its membership. “In Swaziland today, a majority of chil-

dren live with one or no parent, mostlybecause of AIDS but also because Swazimen have many girlfriends," said ThabsileNdwandwe, a SWAMASO member. "Amajority of Swazi children are raised by sin-gle mothers or by their grandmothers if themother is no longer alive. Where are theprogrammes to assist these mothers?Where is even the government acknowl-edgement of this reality?”

"It is a scandal how the authoritiesrefuse to take women seriously when we areholding the country together"

Instead, the government announcedlast week that elderly Swazis, includinggrandmothers, will not receive their pen-sion stipend this quarter due to “limitedresources”. Swaziland's financial crisis hasnot eased since the last time the govern-ment suspended pension payments in 2011.The amount of the stipend is only US$73per three-month period, but the majority ofelderly live in chronic poverty and the sus-pension of the pensions will hinder theirability to purchase food and medicines andcare for their grandchildren.

SWAMASO's attempts to lobby thegovernment to give more assistance to sin-gle mothers have not yet paid off, but theorganization is making a difference in otherways. Its network of community groupsplays an important role in educating girlsabout avoiding pregnancy and sexuallytransmitted diseases, including HIV. Aquarter of Swaziland's population is HIV-positive, the highest rate in the world.

Tradition of organizing Activist Simelane pointed out that

Swazi women have a long tradition oforganizing according to their age groups,from the young maidens who assemble tocollect building material for the QueenMother ahead of the annual reed dance tothe grandmothers who supervise communi-ty improvement projects.

Other women's groups include theSwazi Women for Positive Living, estab-lished in 2003 by HIV-positive women toassist other women living with the virus,and the Swaziland Action Group AgainstAbuse, formed by women to influence poli-cy on the country's high rates of domesticand gender-based violence.

Last month saw the establishment of anew group - the Swaziland Young Women'sNetwork - which announced its launch with

a march through the streets of the capital,Mbabane, to protest the prevalence of sexu-al harassment. The police blocked themarch on the grounds that some of thewomen were wearing miniskirts.

A week later, the Royal SwazilandPolice Force spokeswoman Wendy Hletainvoked a 19th century public indecencylaw as a basis for arresting women wearingminiskirts or tank tops. Hleta added thatwomen who wore revealing clothing wereresponsible for provoking rape.

Her comments drew a flood ofunfavourable reports in the internationalmedia, prompting a government spokesper-son to deny that a mini-skirt ban was inplace. Gender rights activists consideredthis a partial victory.

“The government's first response towomen seeking our rights was to block usand threaten us with arrest, and to controlus by telling us what to wear. That is theirinstinct, and it is going to be hard to over-come, but we are determined not only forour own sake but for the sake of the coun-try,” said Simelane.

Ntombi Dube, a health worker inManzini, argued that the only way forSwaziland to reverse economic and socialdecay was for women to assume a greaterrole in policymaking.

“This is what Swazi women have been

doing in our 'regiments' for generations…Men have got to stop seeing our call for theend of discrimination against women as anattempt to usurp their authority,” she said.

The new constitution stipulates that athird of members of parliament should bewomen, but the actual proportion is about aquarter - and parliament's role is limited toraising and debating issues, as legislationcan only be drafted by cabinet.

The women's advocacy groups insistthey are not asking Swazi women to choosebetween traditional Swazi life and Westernconcepts of femininity, arguing that this is afalse choice.

“There is no traditional life to live anymore. It is sad that the old multi-genera-tional homestead where women heldrespected roles is a thing of the past,” saidDube. “We can't go back to that, and wehave to adapt as African women who areproud of a culture that respects women.That respect got lost somewhere.”

Simelane agreed: “All these laws thatmake Swazi women second-class humanbeings, they were not part of traditionalSwazi life because we did not live underWestern laws. Swazi women want to returnto the way it was when we were equal.”

* IRIN

A Swazi student

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35AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

Venezuela has been inundated with mes-sages of condolence from around the worldincluding Africa as the country mourns thedeath of its hugely popular and charismaticPresident Hugo Chavez.

Chavez who had been president ofVenezuela since 1999, died on March 5after a two-year battle with cancer in theVenezuelan capital, Caracas, at the age of58.

Vice-president Nicolas Maduro madethe announcement on public televisionshortly after, speaking from the Military

Hospital in Caracas, where Chavez wasbeing treated. Several Latin American coun-tries declared days of mourning for the lateVenezuelan leader.

Venezuela will hold a presidential elec-tion within 30 days. Vice President Maduromeanwhile has taken over the presidentialduties.

Chavez reduced poverty in half in hiscountry and nationalized Venezuela's oilresources for the benefit of the people. Theformer president emerged from the Africanand Indigenous working class communities

of Venezuela. He often spoke proudly of hisAfrican ancestry, saying, “We love Africa.And every day, we are more aware of theroots we had in Africa.”

Chavez visited Banjul as guest of hon-

our of the 7th African Union summit The

Gambian capital hosted in 2006. At that

summit, Chavez proposed a joint commis-

sion for four areas of cooperation among

the peoples of Africa, Latin America and the

Caribbean in the spirit of South-South

cooperation.

Africa remembersHugo Chavez

Transition:

INTERNATIONAL

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INTERNATIONAL

36 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

The areas were “Petrosouth,Telesouth, Bank of the South andUniversity for the South”. Petrosouth forleaders to harness the power of oil for socialdevelopment of their peoples; Telesouth toestablish a TV station for the peoples; theBank of the South will be a developmentbank to assist the poor from the threeregions while the University of the Southwould assist in training the youths of Africa,Latin America and the Caribbean in keyareas.

But Chavez was essentially demonizedby the United States and many otherWestern countries.

South AfricaPresident Chavez's second official visit toAfrica took him to South Africa inSeptember 2008 but he had millions ofadmirers across the continent.

In his tribute, South African president,Jacob Zuma described Chavez as a visionaryleader who was committed to the socialstruggles of the less fortunate. He saidPresident Chavez's 2008 visit “furtherstrengthened the existing solid bilateral rela-tions between the two countries”. Zumasaid, “our hearts are with the family ofPresident Chavez, as well as the govern-ment and the people of Venezuela duringthis difficult time of mourning the departureof this respected revolutionary leader ofVenezuela…under the leadership ofPresident Chavez, Venezuela instituted adramatic change under the government's'Bolivarian' approach in Latin America andbeyond in promoting regional integrationbased on the principles of social justice”.

GhanaGhana's President John Mahama in a mes-sage of condolence to the government andpeople of Venezuela said, President Chavezwould be remembered for dedicating him-self to building a new society in his countrythrough progressive social and economicchange that took millions of Venezuelansout of poverty.

NigeriaPresident Goodluck Jonathan expressed his“sincere commiserations to the governmentand people of Venezuela”. “PresidentJonathan and Nigerians join the brotherlypeople of Venezuela in mourning PresidentChavez who greatly endeared himself to theordinary people of his country with his

admirable efforts to improve the living con-ditions of underprivileged Venezuelans,"said a statement from Aso Rock, the presi-dency.

KenyaOutgoing President Mwai Kibaki said “thepeople of Venezuela have lost a dependableleader who had the interests of his countryand people close at heart". He noted thatstronger ties forged between Venezuela andseveral African countries constituted “amemorable legacy of President Chavez thatwe shall cherish”.

SudanSudanese President Omar al-Bashir in hismessage of condolence expressed his appre-ciation for “the late President Chavez'sstances in support of Sudan". He describedChavez “a world leader who called for liber-ating peoples from hegemony”.

GambiaIn Gambia, the government dedicated twodays of prayer for the late Venezuelan presi-dent, his family and the country. The YahyaJammeh government said, “The Gambiahas not only lost a dear friend but a truefighter for the poor and helpless”.

The government hailed the late presi-dent for not using his country's wealth to

bully people and other countries but insteadtransform the lives of the ordinary people athome and abroad. “This is a proper exampleof what a real leadership is,” said the presi-dential statement.

United Nations Gen-SecUN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moonexpressed sadness at the death of Chavezand offered his condolences to the family ofthe president, the government and the peo-ple of Venezuela. “President Chavez spoketo the challenges and aspirations of the mostvulnerable Venezuelans.”

The late president “provided decisive

impetus for new regional integration move-

ments, based on an eminently Latin

American vision, while showing solidarity

toward other nations in the hemisphere,”

Ban said.

In a tribute TransAfrica noted that

although Chavez was often reduced to one-

dimension by the mainstream media, he was

a dynamic leader who will be remembered

for his tremendous contributions to

strengthen the well being of the most disad-

vantaged. “Chavez's policies had an impact

not only on the poor in Venezuela, but with

his leadership Venezuela also reached out to

help support those most in need beyond its

borders.”

Flashback : 2008 Chavez with South Africa’s ex-President Mbeki

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37AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

INTERNATIONAL

“RACISM is very characteristic of imperialismand capitalism. Hate against me has a lot todo with racism. Because of my big mouth andcurly hair. And I'm so proud to have thismouth and this hair, because it is African.”-Hugo Chavez, September 21, 2005

The death of democratically electedPresident Hugo Chavez Frias (1954-2013)has evoked serious thoughts and reflectionson the meaning of his life and the process heled from peoples and communitiesthroughout the Americas and the world.Despite much criticism by many right wing

governments and people in the West, HugoChavez led a process in Venezuela that sym-bolised the new assertiveness and self-con-sciousness of nations in Latin America thatsaw a future for themselves, liberated fromthe heavy-handed, oppressive and econom-ically draining policies of their powerfulneighbour from the North.

But along with the symbolism connect-ed to the new politics of authentic decoloni-sation that many of the centre-left statesembraced, Chavez was committed to aprocess of providing real, substantive sup-port to states in the region who were willing

to pursue a course that could result in a realshift in power in the region. What that sig-nified for many of us in the Afro-descendantcommunities in the Americas, was that therise of Chavez and the Bolivarian processthat the people of Venezuela had embarkedon would raise the spectrums of a new kindof politic in the region. We hoped that withthe new commitment to social inclusionand the ending of all forms of oppressionthat the issue of race and racial discrimina-tion would become an acceptable andindeed an essential element of the transfor-mation process in the Americas.

Hugo Chavez and race: The shift from avoidance

to inclusionIn the wake of the death of the President Chavez, *Janvieve Williams Comrie offers an

Afro-descendant view on the meaning of Hugo Chavez,

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38 AFRICAN AGENDA VOL.16 NO.1

Venezuela and its relations to

African descendants in the

diasporaUnder his 14-year leadership, Chavez

was able to guide unprecedented govern-ment initiatives that led to programmes andpolicies that resulted in significant progresstoward combating the historical legacy ofracism and discrimination that historicallyplagued the country. Chavez also providedsimilar parallel support to other nationswith predominantly Afro descendant popu-lations, where their governments were notwilling to make it a priority. PresidentChavez was able to institute many reformsto ensure African descendants in Venezuelacould have full and equal access to social,economic and cultural rights.

The preamble of the new 1999Constitution, states that Venezuela "is amultiethnic and multicultural society" that"guarantees the right to life, to work, to cul-ture, to education, to social justice andequality without discrimination or subordi-nation". Among the several reforms to sup-port this new recognition of race and cul-ture was the creation in 2005 of thePresidential Commission for thePrevention and Elimination of all Forms ofRacial Discrimination in the VenezuelanEducational System. This commission wastasked with examining, advising and pro-posing reforms on racially and culturallyappropriate education, including but notlimited to literacy programmes, access tohigher education by all, and a series of pro-grammes intended for Afro descendants

and indigenous peoples to leverage theireducation in the context of their culturalidiosyncrasies (including learning in theirtraditional languages). Chavez also took thebold step of requiring that all schoolsinclude the contributions of Afro-Venezuelans in their curriculum.

Also included in his work againstracial discrimination is the creation of the"law against racial discrimination", theincorporation of the category of AfroDescendant in the census, and the creationof Afro Venezuelan Day, as well as theexpansion of embassies and consulates inAfrica to name a few.

While the United States has a historicalpretense of humanitarian support of devas-tated countries, its record in actually pro-viding expedited support to countries thatdo not fit into their strategic economic rela-tionships, Venezuela under PresidentChavez rose to the support and plight ofseveral issues related to African descen-dants in other countries, including theUnited States.

After the ravishing of HurricaneKatrina through the Gulf coast in 2005,despite a strained political relationship withthe United States government, Venezuelaoffered aid to the region through itsVenezuelan Embassy in the form of mobilehospitals, medical workers, power plants,and food, among others. Venezuela's offerswere overtly denied by the US government(under then President George W Bush).

Haiti is another example of howChavez has prioritised and ensured that the

historical plight of African descendants foreconomic, social and cultural rights berespected. In light of the multiple naturaldisasters that have plagued the first freeAfrican country in the region since 2010,Venezuela wrote off Haiti's over US$395million in foreign debt, and pledged morefinancial support to relief the devastationthan either the United States or theEuropean Union.

And if that was not enough, since 2005,Venezuela has been leading initiatives inAfro descendant communities such as NewOrleans and the South Bronx, providingthem with discounted heating oil, and freeenergy saving light bulbs to poor and lowincome families during the winter months,and providing grants to community-basedorganisations to build self-sustaining insti-tutions such as worker-owned cooperatives,and holistic healthcare for women.

Following a legacyMany African descendants in the

region are certainly mourning the passing ofPresident Chavez. He represented a refresh-ing lesson on upholding human rights,rather than talking about them, through hisprioritisation of African descendent issuesand politics, not only within Venezuela, butalso outside of Venezuela.

Many of us will remain attentive towhat the near future of Venezuela holds forit in the next few days and months, to viewand see how either a continuum of the cur-rent government and leadership or a newgovernment will continue to uphold thestrides that were accomplished by PresidentChavez.

And although he has left this life to jointhe ancestors, we know that he will alwaysbe with us. We are proud of this "African-American" president and with his examplewe will continue to uphold the principlesthat he stood for as we struggle for a newworld free from domination and oppres-sion.

* Janvieve Williams Comrie, is the currentExecutive Director of the Latin American andCaribbean Community Center. Her previousprofessional experience include the Office ofthe High Commissioner of Human RightsCentral America Regional Office and the USHuman Rights Network in the United States,where she worked directly on race and racialdiscrimination and human rights. Comrie'sarticle was first published by Al Jazeera.

INTERNATIONAL

Flashback : Hugo Chavez meets former AU Commission chairman Jean Ping

Page 39: Agenda 16 1 2

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AUSTRALIA, BRUNEI, PHILIPPINES, SINGAPORE, THAILAND, UK, USA:You can pay by credit card or cheque/bank draft/international money order in own currency, US$ orEuro. If paying in own currency or Euro, please calculate equivalent of US$ rate. If paying in US$,please ensure that the agent bank is located in USA.

ALL OTHER COUNTRIES:Credit card or cheque/bank draft/ international money order in US$ or Euro.If paying in Euro, please calculate equivalent of US$ rate.If paying in US$, please ensure that the agent bank is located in USA.

CREDIT CARDS ACCEPTED:VISA/MASTER CARD/AMERICAN EXPRESS.

Please send payment/enquires to:

THE WORLD NETWORK131-JALAN MACALISTER

10400 PENANG MALAYSIA

Email: [email protected] .myWebsite:http://www.twnside.org.sg

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