Africa Tomorrow: Issues in Technology,Agriculture, and U.S. Foreign Aid

December 1984

NTIS order #PB85-238624

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Recommended Citation:Africa Tomorrow: Issues in Technology, Agriculture, and U.S. Foreign Aid—A TechnicalMemorandum (Washington, DC: U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-TM-F-31, December 1984).

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 85-600503

For sale by the Superintendent of DocumentsU.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D C 20402

Preface

The United States has a stake in the agricultural development of sub-Saharan Africa.Alleviating hunger and malnutrition, expanding stable markets for U.S. products, andmaintaining the availability of critical and strategic materials provide humanitarian,economic, and political reasons for a continuing American interest in Africa. Most Africancountries are predominantly agricultural and their well-being and future developmentare tied closely to that sector. Therefore, agricultural assistance probably will continueto be a major area of U.S. involvement.

Food problems in Africa are substantial: in no other region of the world has percapita food production declined steadily for over two decades. The Congress expressedits concern for these problems in 1984 with a major supplemental appropriations billand the creation of a Select Committee on Hunger. This technical memorandum onagricultural technology and U.S. foreign assistance in sub-Saharan Africa was requestedby the Select Committee, with support from the Africa Subcommittee, House ForeignAffairs Committee. OTA was asked to investigate several topics relating to current andfuture African agriculture: technological needs, successful technology development andtransfer, and the roles of public and private foreign assistance.

This paper is the result of 6 months’ work, including: 1) a 2-day workshop with14 invited experts on African agriculture, 2) a visit by an OTA contractor to the Inter-national Institute of Tropical Agriculture in Nigeria, and 3) additional OTA staff re-search. We do not pretend that this is a definitive work on specific types of agriculturaltechnologies. Instead the paper outlines major issues constraining the development andtransfer of sustainable technologies for low-resource food producers. Our findings re-flect broad consensus on which potential congressional action can be based. The prob-lems of food production in sub-Saharan Africa are acute. Opportunities for improvingthe situation abound, however, and many are available to Congress.

This paper was prepared by Scott McCormick, Ted MacDonald, Phyllis Windle,and Chris Elf ring, OTA wishes to thank the workshop participants and additional re-viewers for their substantial contributions as well as the many others who generouslyprovided information.

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JOHN H. GIBBONSDirector

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OTA Workshop Participants, Sept. 12=13, 1984

George BurrillAssociates in Rural DevelopmentBurlington, VT

Charles FrancisRodale Research CenterEmmaus, PA

Elon GilbertCenter for Research on Economic

DevelopmentUniversity of MichiganAnn Arbor, MI

Thomas HaydenCODELNew York, NY

James HensonInternational Program Development OfficeWashington State UniversityPullman, WA

Marilyn HoskinsDepartment of SociologyVirginia Polytechnic InstituteBlacksburg, VA

Shelly KesslerUrban Resource Systems, Inc.San Francisco, CA

Carl LindbladVolunteers in Technical AssistanceArlington, VA

Sauveur MahotierePlant Science DepartmentFort Valley State CollegeFort Valley, GA

Gerald MatlockDepartment of Soils, Water, and EngineeringUniversity of ArizonaTucson, AZ

Robert McDowellDepartment of Animal ScienceCornell UniversityIthaca, NY

Uzo MokwunyeInternational Fertilizer Development CenterMuscle Shoals, AL

Anita SpringDepartment of AnthropologyUniversity of FloridaGainesville, FL

OTA Staff

Barbara LauscheEdward F. MacDonaldScott McCormickWalter ParhamPhyllis N. Windle

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OTA Staff on Africa Tomorrow: Technology and Agriculture

Roger Herdman, Assistant Director, OTAHealth and Life Sciences Division

Wa ter E. Parham, Fo

Phyl

od and Renewable Resources Program Manager

Analytical Staff

is N. Windle, Project Director

Scott McCormick, Analyst

Edward F. MacDonald, Research Analyst

Barbara Lausche, Senior Analystl

Chris Elfring, Editor 2

George Scharffenberger, Contractor

Administrative Staff

Phyllis Balanl and Patty Durana,4 Administrative Assistant

Nellie Hammond, Secretary

Carolyn Swarm, Secretary

‘Until Aug. 31, 1984‘November 1984.‘July 1984.‘From Sept. 24, 1984.

Contents

Chapter Page

l. Summary and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2 .

3.

4.

5.

6.

Summary . . . . ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3The Role of Foreign Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Limitations of U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4The Recipients of Foreign Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6The Responsibility of African Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Africa Tomorrow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7On the Right Track . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7New Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Food Problems in Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17Agricultural Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20U.S. Interests in Assisting Developing Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Issues in Technology Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Issues in Technology Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Issues in Technical Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

Issues for the African Governments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Appendix A: List of Additional Reviewers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87

Appendix B: The CGIAR in Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

Appendix C: “Rural Africa: Modernization, Equity, and Long-Term Development,” by Uma Lele; and“Facing Up to Africa’s Food Crisis,’’ by Carl K. Eicher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Appendix D: List of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

List of Tables

Table No Page

I. Population Growth Rates in Sub-Saharan Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182. Food and Agriculture in Selected Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203. Centers Supported by the CGIAR, 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354. The 1890 Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375. The Role of Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs): Articles of Faith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

List of Figures

Figure No. Page

1.2 .

3.4.

5 .6 .7.

8.

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Sub-Saharan Africa... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America Population Growth Rates, 1950-2000 . . . . . . . . . . 18Index of Per Capita Food Production, 1961-65 to 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America Yields for Staple Crops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22Population Projections for Sub-Saharan Africa:, 1985-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28Urban Population Projections for Sub-Saharan Africa: 1985-2025 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28AID-Financed University Contracts and Grants for Technical Assistance to Host Countries—InMillions, Fiscal Years 1970-1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36AID-Financed University Contracts and Grants for Technical Assistance to Host Countries InNumbers of Contracts and Institutions, Fiscal Years 1970-1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Integrating Farming Systems Research and Agricultural Extension for Technology Transfer . . . . . . . 54Ecological Areas of Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

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Chapter 1

Summary and Options

Chapter 1

Summary and Options

SUMMARY

Africa’s* problems in the immediate future willalmost surely worsen. In no other region of theworld has food production per capita declinedsteadily for the last two decades. Populationgrowth is the highest in the world and little ex-pectation exists that this situation will changequickly. Food production simply is not keepingpace with population growth and each year thereare more hungry. The current drought has aggra-vated the suffering and increased stresses on nat-ural resources.

Africa’s declining per capita food productionhas been blamed on many factors: environmentallimitations, inadequate incentives for farmers, alack of appropriate research on food crops, poorlydeveloped extension and management systems,general insensitivity to cultural and environmentalconditions, local governments’ failures to deliverphysical and economic inputs on time, lack of in-frastructure, and an inability to identify the prob-lems facing producers. All of these factors, in ad-dition to large population growth, play a part inthe problem.

Foreign assistance is one mechanism used bythe United States to help solve these problems.The American people traditionally are generouswith their public and private assistance. Sinceforeign aid was first initiated after World War II,the United States has supplied funds, food, andexpertise throughout the world, and since 1950it has directed special attention to developingcountries. Foreign assistance programs havegrown to reflect our understanding of the human-itarian, economic, political, and security benefitsthey produce. What is apparent now, however,is that many opportunities exist to improve assist-ance programs, especially in sub-Saharan Africa,and to encourage constructive activities within thedeveloping nations themselves,

*Africa, as used in this report, refers to Sub-Saharan Africa (seefig. 1).

The Role of Foreign Assistance

Foreign assistance has the obvious goal of help-ing to improve recipients’ lives. Agricultural assist-ance, whether direct food aid or technological as-sistance to improve food production, aims toalleviate hunger and malnutrition. But in Africaand other parts of the world, the United Statesalso has economic and political rationales for itsforeign assistance policies. Foreign aid is a mech-anism to promote U.S. interests. Developingcountries currently receive 40 percent of all U.S.exports and are the fastest growing market, byvalue, for U.S. goods and services. Twenty per-cent of U.S. farm acreage grows crops destinedfor developing countries. Foreign aid is also usedas a nonmilitary tool to further numerous foreignpolicy objectives such as promoting regional andeconomic stability, securing access to strategic fa-cilities, and encouraging cooperation with theU.S. on international issues.

Agriculture is the central focus of much Amer-ican aid to sub-Saharan Africa. The Agency forInternational Development (AID) allocates about60 percent of its African assistance to agriculture,or approximately $150 million for fiscal year 1985.Foreign aid can be used to meet short- and long-term goals. Short-term aid, for example, includesemergency food supplies for crises such as the cur-rent devastating famines in Ethiopia, Chad, andMozambique. Such aid serves a critical purpose.Long-term aid is aimed at helping the developingcountries become more self-sufficient in food pro-duction. For example, such aid includes supportfor research on improved livestock and crop vari-eties. Long-term aid includes technology transfer,research, education, and other actions to promotefuture well-being.

In the face of famine or other crises, long-termagricultural goals are sometimes neglected. Butthis is extremely short-sighted. Short-term aidalone is not a viable way to improve conditionsin Africa. What is needed is a blend of both short-and long-term aid, shaped by long-term goals.

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Three major weaknesses are seen by many ob-servers to limit the effectiveness of U.S. foreignaid: it is too shortsighted and crisis-oriented, toopolitical, and suffers from unclear and inconsist-ent goals. Critics argue that American foreign as-sistance policy erroneously strives for a “quickfix’’ —development projects are generally too shortin duration (3 to 6 years), with limited attentionto follow-up. This is particularly disadvantageousto research projects, which generally requirelonger durations to show results. It will take long-term commitments to make lasting improvementsin the difficult agricultural problems faced by sub-Saharan Africa.

Similarly, American foreign assistance some-times seems preoccupied with new ideas, chang-ing focus from year to year so programs do nothave time to chart real progress. Irrigation, edu-cation, mechanization, fuelwood, and others haveeach had a moment in the limelight. The U.S.Government lacks a stable, long-term politicalcommitment to foreign assistance; developmentpolicy shifts every decade or so, with mixedresults, and public support waivers greatly.

Development assistance policies are shapedmore by political considerations than the actualneeds of developing countries. Priorities and ini-tiatives shift with administrations as foreign pol-icy goals change, and administration’s policiessometimes conflict with legislated goals. This mayfurther some American economic and political ob-jectives but can be detrimental to immediate hu-manitarian goals and long-term hopes for inter-national cooperation and development.

America’s foreign assistance goals not only areunclear they seem at times inconsistent. How, forinstance, does the country reconcile its efforts tohelp developing countries become more self-suf-ficient in food production when our agriculturalsector relies on those nations as essential markets?

Limitations of U.S. Assistance

Sub-Saharan Africa is over twice the size of theUnited States and is made up of 45 different coun-tries (fig. 1). The area contains a wide range ofclimates and environments and a diversity ofcultural, economic, and political characteristics.

About 70 percent of Africa’s 400 million peoplelive in rural areas. They are predominantly farm-ers and herders—subsistence level producers whowork with few economic and natural resources.Yet these “low resource” farmers and herders pro-vide most of Africa’s food. Much of the regionis also characterized by the major role womenplay in food production.

Sometimes foreign assistance donors lose sightof these vast cultural and environmental differ-ences. U.S. assistance, for example, can result inmajor failures if it is basedditions: a high-technology,

largely on western tra-capital-intensive, prof-

Photo credit: U.S. Agency for International Development

Low-resource producers raise the overwhelming majorityof food in Africa. These producers are those who facemajor constraints in their access to economic, natural,and technological resources. Low-resource farmers,such as these from Senegal, generally use hand tools

and family labor, till 2 to 10 acres of land, andhave little capital.

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Figure1 .—Sub-Saharan Africa* &\\ \\\ Ym . . P .’” . &\Mr :“”” %~\\\\\\\\\\~\\\\\\m\\’,=. ,

—SOURCE: General Accounting Office, “Africa’s Agricultural Policies: A More Concerted Effort Will Be Needed If Reform Is Expected, ” GAO/NSlAD-83-36,

Sept. 8, 1983 (Adapted from map by Martin Greenwald Associates, Inc.)

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it-maximizing orientation. A consensus is emerg-ing that the technology most needed in sub-Saharan Africa should be:

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low-risk,resource-conserving,small-scale,affordable (not capital intensive),locally produced and repaired,adapted to local labor availability, andconsistent with traditional agriculturalmethods.

in essence, technologies* must be appropriatefor the local setting. To be appropriate, the nat-ural limitations of the African environment mustbe considered in the design of the technology. Tobe appropriate, livestock, cropping, and forestrytechnologies must be integrated with each otherand with nonagricultural sectors. In addition,local producers need increased involvement in theagricultural development process. Foreign assist-ance agencies need to solicit the input of local pro-ducers when identifying agricultural problems,planning, and implementing projects or research.Local people have an intimate knowledge of theirneeds and environment, and they are likely to bemore receptive to projects that are partly theirown. The challenge, then, is to devise systems thatinvolve local people and that integrate on-farmwork into the larger framework of established na-tional programs and international assistance.

The Recipients of Foreign Assistance

It seems an easy question: “Who needs assist-ance?” But identifying, let alone reaching, appro-priate recipients can be difficult, especially if theobjectives of the aid are unclear. If America’soverall goal is to help Africa increase food pro-duction, assistance needs to be focused on low-resource producers because they are the backboneof Africa’s food system. If America’s goal is meet-ing the basic needs of the poorest, assistanceshould take a different bent because the poorestpeople include not only farmers but also landlessand urban populations.

*Technologies include implements, management systems, andother processes for applying knowledge.

In the past, assistance strategies largely haveneglected the important role played by women inAfrican agriculture. Women in Africa contributeup to 80 percent of all farm labor, they manageone-third of the region’s farms, and they tend vir-tually all the kitchen gardens. Yet, directly andindirectly, women are excluded from communitymeetings, extension services, and access to credit.Few women have entered the ranks of agriculturalprofessionals working for donor agencies or de-veloping country ministries.

Directing special attention toward women mayseem to be one solution to this problem. Disre-garding the crucial role of African women in agri-culture is unwise, yet specifically aiming projectsat women’s needs also may be inappropriate. Amore realistic approach is to recognize that wom-en need to be integrated into development plan-ning as partners. Extension services, in particu-lar, need improvement in this area. To date, thetrack record for attempts to integrate women intoagricultural assistance programs has been poor.

Targeting any specific group—e.g., the poor-est—can be difficult. First, can the group bedefined explicitly—who are they—and how canthey be reached effectively through donor assist-ance? Is key information about the group avail-able? Does the group remain constant from yearto year? How can sustainable, replicable programsbe designed that will reach that group? Realisticapproaches account for the special constraints cer-tain groups face and ensure that these groups areincluded in development assistance.

The Responsibility ofAfrican Governments

The primary responsibility for improving foodproduction in sub-Saharan Africa lies with theAfrican governments themselves. Foreign assist-ance is just that—assistance. But in most of Africa,a variety of obstacles inhibit the design and man-agement of sound national agricultural strategies.Some government institutions face unmanageabletasks trying to coordinate large numbers of don-ors. When levels of support are erratic, the prob-lem is compounded and host countries have fewincentives to plan comprehensive programs tomeet their actual needs.

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Despite limitations, African governments havesignificant opportunities to improve food produc-tion. One way is to increase incentives for ruralproducers. Another task is to provide more ade-quate reward and support for government exten-sion workers in rural areas. They can also encour-age integration of women producers into agricul-tural planning. In all, what is needed is a moreactive and long-term commitment to food pro-duction. But it must be remembered that food pro-duction is only one part of the agricultural sec-tor and that agriculture is only one part of anoverall development strategy. While changes mustbe made by African governments, donors willhave a special responsibility to provide appropri-ate support.

Africa Tomorrow

Despite the magnitude of its problems, Africahas reasons for optimism. Ten years ago, Indiafaced a similar plight and many feared that theenormity of the problems could not be overcome.Yet today India feeds itself. Africa’s problems, ofcourse, are unique and require unique solutions.But evidence exists that Africans and donors arebeginning to address key questions and find someanswers, Since the problems are severe and com-plex, their solution will require greater commit-ment than now exists.

OPTIONS

On the Right Track

In recent years, Congress has taken a numberof actions that have confirmed America’s com-mitment to increasing Africa’s food productionin equitable and sustainable ways. Legislation hasresulted in initiatives that address many of thefindings of this report. OTA finds that each ofthe initiatives remains relevant and important.Their direction is, for the most part, consistentwith recent information on technology and foodproduction in Africa.

This section reviews some of this report’s ma-jor conclusions and the existing legislation thatOTA feels is both relevant and appropriate to re-

The United States can continue to play an im-portant role in improving food production andalleviating hunger and malnutrition in ,sub-Saharan Africa. The best hope of increasing foodproduction lies with improving opportunities forthe low-resource producers—they provide anoverwhelming proportion of the region’s foodsupplies and yet they have been largely ignored.The United States can contribute appropriate as-sistance with agricultural education, research, andtechnologies.

Today, Africa is a continent in trouble. TheUnited States could make certain choices that in-crease the likelihood that Africa’s future will bea hungry one—facing the possibility of social andenvironmental problems of global dimensions. Orthe United States could strengthen its leadershipin foreign assistance, examining the part that thiscountry can play in alleviating Africa’s dilemmaand coordinating with other nations to help Africareach a future chosen by its people.

For some substantial number of the world’spoor, the United States still holds out the futureto which they aspire. What they require from usis not advice . . . but action alongside them in thetask of hastening their economic development. Be-longing to the same world population, we haveas large a stake in the outcome as they do.

–Gerard Pie], 1984 President-elect, AAASChairman of the Board, Scientific American

solving some of the problems presented. Unlessotherwise noted, the provisions cited refer to theForeign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (U.S.Congress, Feb. 1984).

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Emphasis should be placed on low-resourceproducers: The Congress finds that the great-est potential for significantly expanding foodproduction lies in increasing the productivityof small farmers who constitute a majorityof agricultural producers in developing coun-tries [sec. 103(c)].Greater emphasis is needed on research forlow-resource producers: Agricultural researchshall: 1) consider the special needs of small

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farmers; 2) include research on the interrela-tionships among technology, institutions,and economic, social, environmental, andcultural factors affecting small-farm agricul-ture; and 3) make extensive use of field test-ing to adapt basic research to local conditions[sec. 103A].Technologies should account for the particu-lar needs and constraints of the low-resourceproducer: Emphasis shall be placed on useof relatively smaller, cost-saving, labor-usingtechnologies most appropriate for smallfarms, small businesses, and small incomesof the poor [sec. 107].Greater emphasis is needed on the role ofwomen in development: U.S. assistanceshould promote the participation of womenin national economies of developing coun-tries and the improvement of women’s statusas an important means of promoting the totaldevelopment effort [sec. 102(b)(6) and sec.113(a) cf.].The Congress declares that the principal pur-pose of U.S. bilateral development assistanceis to help the poor majority of people in de-veloping countries to participate in a proc-ess of equitable growth through productivework and to influence decisions that shapetheir lives, with the goal of increasing theirincomes and their access to public serviceswhich will enable them to satisfy their basicneeds and lead lives of decency, dignity, andhope [sec. 102].Assistance efforts are more efficient and ef-fective if donors coordinate: U.S. assistanceefforts shall be planned in coordination andcooperation with assistance efforts of othercountries, including the planning and imple-mentation of programs and projects on amultilateral and multidonor basis [sec. 102(b)(11)].More effective evaluation is needed for pro-jects and programs undertaken by AID: TheInternational Development CooperationAgency (IDCA) is directed to improve the as-sessment and evaluation of the programs andprojects carried out [sec. 125].Private and voluntary organizations have amajor role to play in assisting the poor inmeeting their basic needs and in increasing

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public awareness of hunger and poverty indeveloping countries: Congress finds that de-velopment can be assisted and acceleratedthrough an increase in activities planned andcarried out by private and voluntary orga-nizations and cooperatives. Their financialresources should be supplemented by contri-butions of public funds without compromis-ing their private and independent nature [sec.123],

To increase public awareness of the polit-ical, economic, technical, and social factorsrelating to hunger and poverty and to ensurethe effectiveness of private and voluntary or-ganizations in dealing with world hungerabroad, AID is urged to assist private andvoluntary organizations [International Secu-rity and Development Cooperation Act of1980, Title III, sec. 316].To help increase food production in Africa,the Federal Government should support andencourage appropriate research by U.S. uni-versities, national and regional research fa-cilities in Africa, and international agricul-tural research centers: This support shouldbe provided on a long-term and continuingbasis. The United States should improve U.S.land grant and other eligible universities’ par-ticipation in international efforts to applymore effective agricultural sciences to thegoal of increasing world food production,and should provide increased and longerterm support to the application of science tosolving food and nutrition problems of thedeveloping countries [sec. 296(a)].

To prevent famine and establish freedomfrom hunger, various components must bebrought together in order to increase foodproduction including:1.

2.

3. international agricultural research centers

strengthening the capabilities of universi-ties to assist in increasing agricultural pro-duction in developing countries,institution-building programs for develop-ment of national and regional agriculturalresearch and extension capacities in devel-oping countries that need assistance,

[sec. 296(b)].● Development is primarily the responsibility

of African governments: Development plan-

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ning must be the responsibility of each sov-ereign country. U.S. assistance should be ad-ministered in a collaborative style to supportthe development goals chosen by each coun-try receiving assistance [sec. 102(b)(2)].

● Further efforts to prevent degradation of nat-ural resources are vital to sustained agricul-tural development: The President is author-ized to furnish assistance for developing andstrengthening the capacity of developingcountries to protect and manage their envi-ronment and natural resources, Special ef-forts shall be made to maintain and restorethe land, vegetation, water, wildlife, andother resources upon which depend economicgrowth and human well being, especially ofthe poor [sec. 118(b)].

While this legislation is consistent with the find-ings of this report and suggests that the UnitedStates has taken steps in the right direction, Con-gress has a continuing role to play in monitoringthe progress of these efforts and correcting anyunexpected adverse effects of its original legisla-tion or amendments, OTA’s preliminary analy-sis suggests that Congress could continue to en-courage the executive branch to demonstrate thatspecific legislative instructions are being carriedout. Requests for reports from the executivebranch and holding congressional hearings aretwo methods for doing this.

New Initiatives

Another way the Congress could enhance theeffectiveness of U.S. assistance to Africa is byundertaking certain new initiatives. OTA findsthat important changes in the U.S. approach couldsubstantially improve food production.

A Commitment Measured in Decades

Finding: U.S. assistance needs to be long-term and consistent over time if theUnited States is committed to increasingfood production in Africa. Currently, theUnited States supports hundreds of short-term projects designed to encouragelong-term development. The goals andobjectives of these activities are oftenunclear and inconsistent and their effec-tiveness is hampered by political con-siderations.

Many experts are coming to agree that long-term improvements in food production requirecommitments—for projects and agricultural re-search—of at least 10 to 20 years. AID-sponsoredprojects seldom last this long, although AID con-tends that the trend in project length is upward.Most programs face annual scrutiny, and politi-cal and fiscal considerations determine their con-tinuation. While monitoring project effectivenessis appropriate, certain types of projects, particu-larly research efforts, are not likely to show im-mediate results and will require long-term con-tinued support.

The inclusion of political factors in designatingrecipients of U.S. assistance is always controver-sial. Evidence exists that frequent shifts in bothdevelopment approaches and countries designatedas acceptable recipients reduce the effectivenessof U.S. assistance. Much U.S. assistance is chan-neled through private and voluntary organiza-tions. Some of these groups, especially those withlong-term programs in Africa, are particularly af-fected by U.S. policy changes.

In addition, the United States sponsors someprograms that have seemingly conflicting goals—e.g., attempts to increase local food productionwhile simultaneously providing aid to dispose ofU.S. agricultural surpluses or expand markets forU.S. food products. The Food for Peace Program(Public Law 480) is often cited as an example ofAmerica’s unclear and conflicting foreign assist-ance goals.

These factors—the short-term, political, andunclear nature of U.S. foreign aid—are majorlimits to its effectiveness. Congress could beginto resolve these issues by severaI means.

Option: Congress could examine the soundnessof AID’s major operational method—the designand support of individual local projects—as ameans of providing long-term, well coordinatedassistance. Alternatives that might provide lessfragmentary aid with fewer administrative bur-dens could be examined—e.g., supplying fundsin lump sums for large program areas such as in-stitutional development, training, and university

post-graduate program development. The needfor such “program” assistance in research fundingcould be evaluated in detail. Other alternativesmight include adopting the most effective provi-

38-856 0 - 85 - 2 : QL 3

10

sions used by other bilateral donors or integratingall types of aid into individual country programs.

Option: Congress could reemphasize its com-mitment to coordination among public and pri-vate donors by exploring new ways to encouragethis coordination, such as: a) hear testimony fromdonors on their needs, b) investigate the need tobring additional donors into existing donor coor-dination groups, and c) explore other means tostrengthen coalitions of public and private donors.

Option: Congress could evaluate whether AID’scooperation with private and voluntary organi-zations is meeting the congressional intent in Sec-tion 123 of the Foreign Assistance Act. This eval-uation could include: thoroughly examining theeffectiveness of these organizations’ work versusgovernment funding; clarifying whether Congressintended that their programs be confined to cer-tain countries designated by AID as acceptablerecipients of U.S. assistance; and assessing wheth-er AID should model the scale of its programsafter some private and voluntary organizations’small-scale efforts, which many experts regard asa particularly effective approach.

Option: Congress could require that AID in-crease the average duration of individual assist-ance projects/programs designed to increase long-term development of African food production.For example, Congress could stipulate that theaverage length of such projects should increaseto 10 to 15 years by a given target date.

Option: Congress could request that the Gen-eral Accounting Office (GAO) conduct a majorevaluation of Public Law 480’s effects on Africanfood production and synthesize its considerablebody of past Public Law 480 work. Such a studywould capitalize on GAO’s a) ability to conductlocal investigations in Africa, b) expertise inaccounting, and c) extensive record of Public Law480 analysis. Important issues include the allegeddisplacement of local farmers and technologies,shifts in diet, and disincentives for local food pro-duction.

Reaching Those Most in Need

Finding: The possibility of successfully di-recting agricultural assistance to meetthe needs of specific target groups re-mains debatable.

The Foreign Assistance Act, section 128, re-quires that 40 percent of AID’s funding be directedtoward the poorest residents. And the spirit of thislegislation is important in ensuring that AID meetsits responsibilities to assist the poorest people ofAfrica.

However, many questions have arisen regard-ing the best method to accomplish this goal, AID’srelative success in meeting it, and whether agri-cultural assistance is the most effective way tomeet the poorest people’s needs. Some of the poor-est people may be those with little or no accessto land or livestock, female heads of households,the chronically underemployed in urban areas, orrefugees. Projects designed to stimulate employ-ment and other income-generating activities or tomeet basic needs may be more appropriate usesof funds for assisting these poor. At the same time,aid to increase food production could be directedtoward alleviating the constraints of low-resourceproducers, who are usually poor themselves butmaybe not the “poorest. ”

Reliable data on the heterogeneous group called“the poor” are scarce. Therefore, much remainsto be done to understand the poor who face severeeconomic, social, technical, or environmental con-straints on their attempts to increase food pro-duction. More information is needed on the types,proportions, and magnitude of their problems aswell as the constraints faced by other poor peo-ple such as the landless and unemployed.

Congress could assist in this effort by determin-ing the beneficiaries of agricultural versus income-generating projects and examining the need forspecial attention to low-resource producers.

Option: Congress could reiterate its commit-ment to Section 128 of the Foreign Assistance Act

by holding hearings to determine strategies andfunding levels necessary to meet the needs of thepoorest rural residents. Witnesses could includerepresentatives from: a) African governments atthe national and regional levels—e.g., nationalministers of health, water resources, agriculture,and women’s affairs, and representatives of theOrganization of African Unity; b) internationalfood agencies such as the United Nations’ Foodand Agriculture Organization (FAO); c) privateand voluntary organizations with expertise in ru-ral land reform and community development; andd) the U.S. Agency for International Devel-opment.

Option: Congress could consider new legisla-tion and funding that would be specifically aimedat reducing constraints which inhibit the majorityof low-resource producers from increasing foodproduction.

Option: Congress could require AID to provideinformation on: a) how the Agency could increaseits effectiveness in evaluating its own programsand incorporate this information into future proj-ect design and implementation, and b) the levelof funding necessary to fulfill this task. Congresscould also help make evaluation a project designtool by encouraging AID to: establish an evalua-tion staff officer for each mission and regionalAID office; collect improved baseline demograph-ic data in host countries—e.g., data disaggregatedby sex and economic class; and include the pro-posed beneficiaries (especially women and low-resource producers) in the design and evaluationphases of project development.

Option: Congress could investigate the relativemerits of the “grass roots” development strategyrepresented by the African Development Foun-dation (ADF). Congress could support the ADFby: carrying over the Foundation’s unallocatedfiscal year 1984 funds into 1985, funding ADF pastfiscal year 1986, supporting ADF’s forums on“grass roots” development, and strengthening theorganization’s management and technical ca-pacity.

Women: The Invisible Producers

Finding: Women contribute significantly tothe production of food crops but havelimited access to extension services,credit, and training.

Women contribute up to four-fifths of the la-bor and management for the production of foodcrops in Africa. They receive few services to helpthem increase food production despite the fact thattheir important role has been recognized interna-tionally for over 10 years. Women represent someof the most overworked and undersupported and,in most cases, some of the poorest of the ruralpopulation. Therefore, providing assistance towomen farmers and herders is crucial to increas-ing African food production.

Many ways exist that African women produ-cers can be assisted by donors such as the UnitedStates and by African governments. Primarily,women need greater access to extension services,affordable credit, reliable land rights, and train-ing in food production technologies that are gen-erally more available to men. Women develop-ment experts and agricultural professionals willbe better able to provide these services in manycountries due to cultural constraints. Congresscould assist African food producers by helping tomake more women agricultural experts available.

Option: Congress could direct AID to give pri-ority to hiring women agricultural professionalsas project officers. Over the last several years,AID appears to be recruiting more female Inter-national Development Interns. Increased emphasiscould be placed on increasing women staff in AIDAfrica missions, given the importance of womenin agricultural development in Africa. It is alsoimportant that the women recruited have train-ing in agriculture and environmental science aswell as health, nutrition, and social science.

Option: Congress could direct AID to expandthe selection of African women for overseas train-ing courses. Over the past 7 years, only 16 to 18percent of all the African participants were wom-en. Congress could consider imposing standardson AID for the selection of more women so thatequal numbers of men and women are trained.

Option: Congress could direct AID to upgradethe Women in Development (WID) position in itsAfrican missions to ensure that the WID officeris involved in all phases of project identification,development, implementation, and evaluationand that WID officers are people with technicalexpertise and developing-country field experience.Congress could request periodic reports on AID

12

progress on these activities as well as AID’s prog-ress in implementing its Women in DevelopmentPolicy Paper.

Option: Congress could direct AID to encour-age host countries to recruit additional femaleagricultural extension staff. Also, Congress couldrequest that AID develop training courses forAfrican male and female extension agents thatwould provide methods for them to reach womenfood producers.

Technology Types: The Right Stuff

Finding: Farmers and herders with little ac-cess to economic and natural resourceshold the key to increasing food produc-tion in Africa. Technologies to help theselow-resource producers are largely lack-ing, especially in developed countriessuch as the United States.

A consensus exists that low-resource producersare the group most likely to increase food pro-duction enough to feed a significantly greaternumber of Africa’s population. A consensus alsoexists regarding the types of technologies theseproducers need: low risk, resource-conserving,small-scale, adapted to local labor conditions,consistent with traditional agricultural methods,affordable, and locally produced and repaired.Some of these technologies can be adapted fromcurrent traditional practices. A need also existsfor new types of technologies, especially given thelarge projected increases in total and urban Afri-can populations.

U.S. agricultural technologies—both equipmentand management systems—generally do not ex-hibit the characteristics most needed by low-resource producers. Therefore, many attempts touse U.S. agricultural technology directly in Afri-can food production have been unsuccessful.Many feel that America’s considerable agriculturalexpertise has much to offer Africans, but care willneed to be taken if it is to be brought to bear ef-fectively.

The Congress directed that special attention begiven to “appropriate technology” in section 107of the Foreign Assistance Act. OTA finds thatsuch attention is justified and that methods couldbe devised to make relevant information devel-

oped in the United States more available to Afri-can researchers and producers.

Option: Congress could reaffirm its commit-ment to section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Actby holding hearings on AID’s implementation ofthis legislation and the institution created to doso (ATI—Appropriate Technology International).These hearings could consider whether section 107should be amended to alter its language callingfor “labor-using” technology. Recent recognitionexists that low-resource producers face periodiclabor shortages; thus sometimes “labor-using”technology can be inappropriate to their needs.

Option: Congress could design a program tolink U.S. experts in technology for low-resourceproducers to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s(USDA) international training activities in orderto increase their relevance to African conditions.This would require that USDA involve non-USDA staff such as returned Peace Corps volun-teers, field representatives of private and volun-tary organizations, and researchers in “alterna-tive” agriculture.

A Worldwide Network for Agricultural Research

Finding: The United States is in a uniqueposition to encourage strong nationaland international agricultural research fa-cilities in Africa. The inclusion of farmersand herders in this work, as well as thewidespread dissemination of its results,is vital to making research effective.

The United States has played a major role insupporting agricultural research in Africa, bothvia the international agricultural research centersand via programs coordinated by U.S. universi-ties. The United States supplies approximately 20percent of the core budget for the ConsultativeGroup on International Agricultural Research(CGIAR), which sponsors the international cen-ters, and also supports staff and students. Someuniversities have a long history of internationalactivity but their programs have shifted accord-ing to changing African and American views ofthe most appropriate U.S. assistance.

Congress is involved directly in determininghow U.S. scientists take part in African research.Many U.S. university programs, for example,

13

were instigated after Title XII of the Foreign As-sistance Act made special AID programs availa-ble to them. Experts suggest that past approachesto support African research need to be supple-mented with new programs. These should give in-creased attention to developing national researchcenters in Africa and providing additional train-ing for African agricultural scientists at home,rather than in the United States, Such effortswould benefit agricultural research while build-ing local institutions and management capacity,another vital African need.

A consensus exists that alleviating two keyproblems could increase the effectiveness of agri-cultural research. First, low-resource producersneed to be incorporated into the process of de-signing, planning, and evaluating research. And,second, research results should be disseminatedwidely and effectively.

Option: Congress could direct increased re-sources into national research centers and univer-sities in Africa by: helping to develop expandedAfrican graduate programs in food production;encouraging U.S. universities to increase coop-erative programs with national universities; pro-viding funds for USDA and State Agricultural Ex-periment Stations to work with African nationalcenters on problems of common interest— e.g.,sorghum breeding or dairy production; makingAmerican researchers available to help Africancountries develop agricultural training programsfor Africans in Africa or other appropriate devel-oping countries.

Option: Congress could establish a way for U.S.technology to be used to disseminate agriculturalinformation in Africa. This might include: increas-ing the availability and interpretation of satelliteimagery on natural resources for African govern-ments; encouraging microcomputer manufactur-ers to provide agricultural services that are suit-able for African conditions; ensuring that all U.S.support for international, regional, and nationalresearch centers provides adequate funds for in-ternational travel, documentation and distribu-tion of findings, and purchase of relevant pub-lications.

Option: Congress could highlight the currentand potential benefits, both to Africa and the

United States, of farmer/researcher cooperationby holding hearings on farming systems researchas it is conducted in the United States and inAfrica.

Agricultural Extension Services:Delivering the Goods

Finding: Agricultural extension systems inAfrica generally are ineffective at eitheridentifying food producers’ constraintsor disseminating information on technol-ogy, credit, or inputs.

Despite having formal extension systems inplace, most African countries’ extension servicesgenerally are ineffective in transferring informa-tion and inputs. Most: a) lack clear goals and ob-jectives; b) provide little support for or few in-centives to staff working with low-resourceproducers, especially women; c) coordinate poor-ly with research institutes in identifying the ma-jor constraints of low-resource producers; and d)may promote technologies that primarily benefitthe wealthy rural producers.

Numerous attempts have been made to providealternative extension models, improve infrastruc-ture and supervision for staff, and increase thefrequency of in-service training courses. Congresshas provided support for development of Africanextension systems by both AID and USDA. Con-gress could act to strengthen existing African sys-tems further.

Option: Congress could investigate the prob-lems facing African extension systems and themost effective U.S. role to meet the needs of low-resource producers in increasing food production.This could include input from AID, USDA, theWorld Bank, and others.

Option: Congress could direct AID to identifyextension problems unique to each country. AIDmission staff could interview agriculture officialsand local university staff and hold workshops tosolicit the views of local leaders and low-resourceproducers.

The Pressure for Reform

Finding: African governments, though fac-ing increasing external pressure for

14

change, generally support economic pol-icies that favor urban consumers at theexpense of incentives for low-resourcefood producers.

During the last two decades, African govern-ments generally have opted for economic policiesthat favor urban consumers. Prices paid to pro-ducers for food crops have been artificially low,while inflated currencies and increased interna-tional borrowing allowed relatively inexpensivefood and consumer goods to be imported.

Now, African governments face several con-flicting forces that threaten their economic inde-pendence. The International Monetary Fund(IMF) and the World Bank are increasing the re-strictions on foreign assistance and reschedulingloans. Many governments find it difficult to fulfillthese strict conditions while simultaneously pur-suing their own national priorities.

Option: Congress could assist African govern-ments, via U.S. participation in policymaking atthe IMF and the World Bank, by encouraginggreater cooperation between these organizationsand African governments. Congress could exam-ine the feasibility and desirability of monetary pol-icies advocated by African countries such as moregradual currency devaluation, longer loan repay-ment periods, and appropriate conditions for fur-ther loans.

Option: Congress could require that AID reporton uses of the Economic Support Fund (ESF) toalleviate international debts in African develop-ing nations, including the role of the ESF to ab-sorb the effects of rapid increases in the price offood and consumer goods in urban areas,

The Resource Base: KeepingRenewable Resources Renewable

Finding: African governments and interna-tional donors exhibit a limited commit-ment to controlling the degradation ofAfrica’s natural resource base.

Deforestation, loss of soil fertility, and othertypes of land degradation are major problems inAfrica. They are caused by increasing pressure ona finite natural resource base and unsustainableagricultural development.

Sustainable food production requires the inte-gration of sound environmental policies into agri-cultural programs. Experts in developing coun-tries note the continuing need for increasedamounts of information on the environmental im-pacts of technologies that are part of U.S. devel-opment projects. Congress could assist this proc-ess in several ways.

Option: Congress could require that AID reporton efforts agencywide and within the Africa Bu-reau in particular to fulfill the requirements of sec-tion 118 (c)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act thatthe environmental consequences of developmentprojects and programs be considered.

Option: Congress could investigate the statusof AID’s environmental profiles for African coun-tries and mandate that the profiles be integratedinto the agricultural development strategies.

Option: Congress could provide funds for a sig-nificant increase in the number of appropriatelytrained environmental field officers for AID fieldmissions and regional offices.

Chapter 2

Introduction

Chapter 2

Introduction

In November 1974 the World Food Conferencewas convened to address grave concerns over thefuture world supply of food. The conference de-clared that:

[A]ll governments should accept the removalof the scourge of hunger and malnutrition . . . asthe objective of the international community asa whole, and accept the goal that within a dec-ade no child will go to bed hungry, that no familywill fear for its next day’s bread, and that no hu-man being’s future and capacities will be stuntedby malnutrition (U.S. Congress, Oct. 1984).

A decade has passed since this declaration wasmade but much of Africa is once again facing afamine of enormous proportions. The United Na-tions’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)estimates that during the past year 150 millionpeople were living in countries that suffered severefood shortages as a consequence of the drought(Levy, 1984). Catholic Relief Services (CRS), theprivate organization with major responsibility fordistributing emergency food aid in Ethiopia (the

country hardest hit by the drought), estimates thatin that country alone, 6 million to 10 million peo-ple are facing starvation. This crisis has promptedmassive emergency food assistance from numer-ous donors, including the United States. Whilethese deliveries are essential to avoid massive star-vation, the long-term resolution of African foodproblems must entail efforts to increase Africa’sability to feed itself.

It is this goal of increased food production inAfrica that this report addresses. In particular, thisreport examines what technologies are needed andhow they may best be made available. The reportdefines various issues in technology development,technology transfer, and technical assistance thatcould be considered by the U.S. Congress in forg-ing an effective strategy to assist African coun-tries to enhance their food production. The re-port also addresses problems African governmentsface in increasing food production, given that theresponsibility for achieving this goal lies primar-ily with them.

FOOD PROBLEMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Sub-Saharan Africa is facing its second severefood crisis in a little over a decade. Chronic fooddeficits have reached a point where, according tothe U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA),nearly 5 million tons of food aid will be requiredduring 1984-85 just to maintain current per capi-ta consumption levels. Some 10 million tonswould be required to reach minimum acceptablenutritional levels, according to dietary standardsestablished by the World Health Organization(WHO) and FAO. These figures represent 40 per-cent of the requirements for all developing regionsof North Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and LatinAmerica (USDA, July 1984b).

In examining the total food aid needs of all de-veloping countries, a recent report suggested that:

In 1984-85, it is estimated that total food aidin cereal from OECD donor countries will be ap-

proximately 9 million tons. Of this total, theUnited States will contribute approximately 5 mil-lion tons. When compared to the 12 million tonsneeded to sustain current consumption levels andhigher quantities to improve diets, it appears thatdonor countries must greatly increase the quan-tity of food assistance in the short term andheighten efforts to assist developing countries im-prove their own agricultural production in thelong term (Andreas Task Force, 1984).

The current African drought, which began inthe southern region in 1981 and spread throughthe Sahel in 1982, continues to have a major im-pact on crops and livestock in many countries.About 30 countries are suffering from abnormalfood shortages according to recent FAO figures.The FAO World Food Program Task Force iden-tified 10 sub-Saharan African countries as “crisiscountries for the 1984-85 crop year” and othersmay be added to the list (U.N. FAO, Sept. 1984).

17

18

While the drought has focused international at-tention on the region, its effects represent only“the most extreme and distressing aspects of themore pervasive economic crisis in Africa” (WorldBank, 1984a). The prevailing conditions simplyhighlight the long-term unfavorable trends thathave been developing in Africa for the last twodecades.

A unique combination of constraints charac-terizes this region and helps to explain, in part,why the “Green Revolution,” which dramaticallyraised food production in other developing regionshas, to date, bypassed sub-Saharan Africa.

● Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region of theworld where the rate of population growthwill continue to rise during the 1980s (fig. 2;table 1). The 1980 population of 359 millionprobably will double by the turn of the cen-tury and more than triple by 2020 (WorldBank, 1984a).

● Generally speaking, the region suffers fromconsiderable political instability. One in 200Africans is a refugee. With only one-tenth ofthe world’s population, Africa contains at

Figure 2.— Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and LatinAmerica Population Growth Rates, 1950-2000

3,0k&.4w?iwwwm’s

j 2.8

1,8 i 4 t * 1 k I i I1950 1955-60 1965-70 1975-80 1985-90 1995-2000

YearsSOURCE: U.N. Population Trends and Policies. vol. 1, /n: US. Department of

●

Table 1 .—Population Growth Rates

Agriculture, “Food Problems and Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa,”Development Digest, vol. XIX, No. 4, Oct. 1981.

least one-quarter of the world’s refugees(World Bank, 1984a).Low and erratic rainfall, short growing sea-sons, low soil productivity, and continuingsoil degradation and deforestation due tohuman activities make raising agriculturalproductivity in many parts of sub-SaharanAfrica more difficult than in most develop-ing regions. Much of the potential grazing

in Sub-Saharan Africa

Region and country 1970-75 1985-90 Region and country 1970-75 1965-90Percent Percent

The Sahel:Chad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.00 2.16Gambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.92 2.13Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.42 2.74Mauritania . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.99 2.35Niger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.68 2.97Senegal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.37 2.55Upper Volta. . . . . . . . . . . . 2.27 2.49

West Africa:Benin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Cameroon . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ghana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Guinea-Bissau . . . . . . . . .Ivory Coast . . . . . . . . . . . .Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Nigeria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Sierra Leone . . . . . . . . . . .Togo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.701.842.702.381.512.512.292.672.412.74

2.802.453.192.681.942.792.573.092.652.49

Central Africa:Angola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.27 2.73Central African

Republic . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.09 2.59

Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Equatorial Guinea . . . . . .Gabon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Zaire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

East Africa:Burundi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ethiopia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Kenya. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Rwanda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Sudan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tanzania . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Southern Africa:Botswana . . . . . . . . . . . . .Lesotho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Malawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . .Namibia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Swaziland . . . . . . . . . . . . .Zambia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . .Madagascar . . . . . . . . . . .

2.441.711.002.47

2.602.393.383.042.652.563.022.93

2.271.922.522.322.842.733,133.352.42

2.841.96

.902.85

2.722.603.453.143.002.943.203.09

2.992.322.742.643.072.923.383.602.79

SOURCE: United Nations, World Population Trends and Policies 1977 Monitoting Report, In: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Problems and Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa, Foreign Agricultural Research Report No. 188, August 1981, p. 38.

19

land is unusable because of tsetse fly in-festation.

● The colonial legacy in Africa left fewertrained people and institutions than in otherdeveloping regions. Despite impressive gainsin levels of education since independence,sub-Saharan Africa still has proportionatelyfewer skilled people than other developingregions. African countries in general alsohave poorly developed infrastructures.

● Government policies in most African coun-tries have adversely affected food produc-tion, including: an urban bias in developmentstrategies, a lack of attention to low-resourcefarmers (the base of the food production sys-tem), a lack of price incentives for farmersto grow food crops, often inappropriate andinefficient government involvement in themarketing and distribution of agricultural in-puts and outputs, and often inappropriateimport and fiscal policies (U.S. AID, 1983;World Bank, 1981).

● Projects directed at increasing agriculturalproduction by donors and African govern-ments have often been poorly conceived andmanaged. In some cases the result has beena worsening of the situation because of ma-jor damages to the resource base.

This combination of demographic pressures,environmental constraints, political impediments,limited trained personnel, and inadequate institu-tional and management capacity has resulted ina variety of symptoms that currently plague theregion and threaten to worsen in the future:

● Africa’s population growth rate, about 3 per-cent per year, is outpacing growth in foodproduction, which is about 1.8 percent peryear (World Bank, 1984a; USDA, 1981). Theresult has been a steady decline in per capitafood production over the last two decades(fig. 3; table 2).

● Consequently, Africa, which was essentiallyself-sufficient in food production 20 yearsago, now imports 20 percent of its cereal re-

Figure 3.— Index of Per Capita Food Production,1961-65 to 1983 (1961-65 Average = 100)

125120 -

Latin America115 -110 ~ ‘ .-105 * :

u

1961-65 1970 1975 1980 1983average

Year

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture, In. World Bank, Toward SustainedDevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1984

●

●

quirements. Between 1970 and 1980 cerealimports tripled while the cost of those im-ports increased 600 percent, further strain-ing limited financial resources (Christensenand Witucki, 1982; Huddleston, 1984).Sub-Saharan Africa is the only developingregion in the world where levels of nutritionhave declined in recent years. Despite ma-jor increases in food imports and food aid,it is estimated that 20 percent of the popula-tion of Africa consumes below-minimum ca-loric levels for maintaining good health(World Bank, 1984a).The rate of urban growth, at 5 to 7 percentper year (a 7 percent growth rate results ina doubling of population in about 10 years),is the highest in the world, although the levelof urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa is rela-tively low compared with other developingregions. Immigrants to Africa’s cities oftencome from impoverished rural areas andtheir movements add to the destabilizing ef-fects of rapid urbanization.The region has shown a declining per capitaGross Domestic Product (GDP) accompaniedby fiscal and balance-of-payment problems,oppressive debt burdens, dwindling reservesof foreign exchange, and deteriorating termsof trade (World Bank, 1983).

20

Table 2.—Food and Agriculture in Selected Countries

Average index of foodVolume of food imports Food aid in cereals production per capita,

(000 metric tons) (000 metric tons) 1979-811974 1981 1970 1980 1969 – 1971 = 100

Angola . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Benin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Burundi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Cameroon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .CAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Chad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Congo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ethiopia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Ghana . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .lvory Coast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Lesotho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Liberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Madagascar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Malawi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mali . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mauritania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Niger, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Nigeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Rwanda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Senegal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Sierra Leone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Somalia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tanzania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Togo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Uganda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Upper Volta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Zaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Zambia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Zimbabwe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14987

817

5034

11817763

172154942

11417

28111562

155389

3341

7242

127125431

63799

3439356

Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,880 9,099 876 2,213 91a

(+134%) (+153%)aAverage (mean), weighted by population.

SOURCE: World Bank, World Development Report, 1983, ln: U..S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Feeding the World’s Population: Developments intheDectdeFollwing the World Food Conference of 1974 (Washington, DC: US. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 76.

AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Sub-Saharan Africa is at least twice the size ofthe entire U.S. and is made up of 45 countries (fig.1, ch. l) with diverse climatic, environmental cul-tural, socioeconomic, and political characteris-tics. To understand the limitations and possibili-ties of increasing food production in Africa, it isessential to examine African agricultural systemscarefully. Varying soils and climatic and ecolog-ical factors define a multitude of ecological sys-tems ranging from the hot, humid rainforests ofthe Congo River Basin, to the highlands of Kenya

and Uganda, to the tall and short grass savannasthat grade into the Sahara Desert to the north andthe Kalahari and Namib Deserts to the southwest.For a more in-depth analysis of African agricul-tural systems, see Moran (1979) and Ruthenberg(1980).

Despite the considerable diversity of agricul-tural systems in Africa, some broad generalize-tions can be made regarding ’’typical” character-istics and general trends.

21

Of the approximately 400 million people inAfrica, at least 70 percent live in rural areas. Thevast majority of these represent subsistence farm-ers and pastoralists. While production generallyis geared toward subsistence levels, these low-resource producers also provide the major sourceof food for the rural and urban sectors, and rawmaterials for export and domestic manufacturing(Lele, 1981). With 30 to 60 percent of GNP beingderived from agriculture, the need for a healthyagricultural sector is evident.

Africa is often misleadingly characterized ashaving low population densities and abundantavailability of land (Moran, 1979). While thesefactors might suggest favorable conditions, inlarge measure they simply reflect the poor envi-ronmental condition of much of the continent:low, unreliable rainfall and poor soils. In fact,human populations in Africa tend to be stronglyclustered around water supplies, roads, and areaswith better soil. Even where populations are lowin absolute terms, they are high relative to thelimited carrying capacity of the land. Large areasof land are not available for settlement becauseof rock outcrops, tsetse flies, river blindness, orother similar causes. On most of the remainingland, once one takes into account carrying capac-ity, the population is sufficient to stress the envi-ronment (Moris, 1984).

Fourteen sub-Saharan countries have inade-quate amounts of land “to support on a sustain-able basis populations as large as those alreadyreached in 1975” assuming subsistence food levels(World Bank, 1984b). These countries representone half of the 1981 populations and approxi-mately one-third of the region’s land area.

Land tenure patterns, though changing, are rel-atively egalitarian. Farms are generally small, with2 to 10 acres under cultivation at any one time(Eicher and Baker, 1982). Labor comes from theentire family with women playing a major rolein food production and contributing significantlabor to cash crop production and animal rear-ing. Land preparation traditionally has been ac-complished through slash and burn techniquesand planting has been rotated with long fallowperiods, usually at least 8 years. Because of in-creased population pressure on land, however,

these practices are becoming less and lessprevalent.

Farmers often engage in intercropping—thestaggered planting of several varieties of crops inthe same field. Although often not recognized assuch by outsiders, these complex cropping pat-terns are adaptations to the delicate environmentin recognition of the soil’s susceptibility to leach-ing and erosion. Intercropping also is less riskyand better suited for subsistence farming to pro-vide family food supplies. For similar reasons,farmers sometimes cultivate several separate fieldssimultaneously. Intercropping has the particularbenefits of providing extended soil cover for mois-ture retention, making better use of soil and water,and decreasing weed growth.

Farmers in Africa make relatively little use ofsystematic irrigation or commercial inputs suchas fertilizers. Yields per hectare of staple crops arelower in Africa than in other developing regions(fig. 4).

Availability of arable land, until relatively re-cently, was sufficient in most countries to sustainthe traditional (land extensive, low input, rota-tional, long fallow period) agricultural systemswithout presenting major problems. Today, how-ever, increased population pressure has resultedin increasing pressure on the land. The need forincreased production has led to expanded use ofmarginal land with low and unreliable produc-tivity. In addition, fallow periods have been re-duced leading to even further declines in yields.Savannas, which traditionally have been used forherding, are now being converted to permanentcultivation. These factors contribute to seriousdegradation of the natural resources.

Cattle and other livestock play a critical rolein the total economy of many African countries,particularly in arid and semiarid areas where agri-cultural production is more uncertain. In evalu-ating agricultural development schemes andevolving agricultural systems, particularly mixedcrop-livestock systems, it is important to under-stand the role livestock play and can play as asource of food and investment (see Box A). Prac-tically all producers maintain some form of live-stock. In some circumstances livestock can useavailable resources more effectively than crops

22

8 0 0

700

600

500

4001965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977

YearsSOURCES: Latin America and Asia—Food Production Yearbook, Sub-Saharan

Africa-ESCS estimates, In: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food Prob-lems and Prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa, Foreign AgriculturalResearch Report No. 166, August 1981.

amining strategies for enhancing yields that re-quire the farmer to purchase inputs (Brumby,1984).

Photo credit: Emment George, U.S. Agency for International Development

Livestock products supplement the protein supplies,income, and prestige of many African households, inaddition to contributing foreign exchange as exports.In mixed farming systems, livestock also are used for

plowing. Here, two Maasai herders watch overcattle in Tanzania.

U.S. INTERESTS IN ASSISTING DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The United States is in a real sense the creationof European foreign aid, received in relativelysmall amounts at critical points in our history, ap-plied with energy and ingenuity by Americans toAmerican resources . . . . The early experience ofthe United States demonstrates the value of for-eign aid for the military security and economicdevelopment of a young, threatened, and relative-ly poor nation. With the help of foreign grants,military assistance, loans and other capital invest-ments, the national independence of the UnitedStates was secured, our essential economic foun-dations established, and our own economic de-velopment begun (U.S. AID, n.d. ).

The United States began its own foreign aidprograms with the Marshall Plan, the massiveU.S. assistance program to rebuild Europe afterthe devastation of World War II. Aid to devel-oping countries officially began in 1950 whenCongress passed the Act for International Devel-opment. Despite the proliferation of U.S. foreignaid legislation and changes in strategy and focus,the reasoning for U.S. interest has remained fairlyconstant.

In general terms, foreign aid is seen as a mech-anism to promote U.S. economic and national se-

23

Box A.—Trends in Livestock Development

The Sahelian drought of 1968-74 focused international attention on African pastoral societies. Theovergrazing and famine that followed the absence of rains convinced some environmentalists (Hardin,1968; UNCOD, 1977) and economists (Monod, 1975; Konzacki, 1978) that traditional pastoral societiesfailed to manage their resources effectively.

Based on this assumption, range management interventions were supported by both the Agencyfor International Development (AID) and the World Bark. The early projects either attempted to settlethe pastoralists within western style ranches (to introduce range management techniques for the increasedmarketing of the animaIs) or to “expand" grazing opportunities into seasonal rangeland by drilling deepwells. However, these interventions generally caused severe deterioration of the range and adverselyaffected socioeconomic conditions. Proliferation of wells in the Sahel introduced additional livestockinto seasonally grazed areas and caused severe overgrazing (Clark, 1977; Glantz, 1976). Ranches intro-duced in East Africa and Botswana have shown disastrous results, in some cases, completely degradingboth the vegetation and soils of the area (Horowitz, 1979; Banks, 1981).

Now a growing awareness exists of the complexity of livestock systems in Africa. ‘They differ strik-ingly on the degree of movement involved, from highly mobile nomadic systems to relatively sedentaryones . . . . In some of the intermediate rainfall areas, livestock production is integrated with croppingand farmers take care of their own animals . . . “or in other areas” . . . crop producers consign animalcare to specialized herder groups” (Institute for Development Anthropology, 1982). Within livestockproduction systems, livestock serve many purposes. They serve as a source of milk, meat, social pres-tige, capital, savings, draft power for plowing, and insurance against drought (Hjort and Dahl, 1976;Institute for Development Anthropology, 1982).

Several national and international research centers now generally agree on the types of researchthat can appropriately benefit livestock producers (Horowitz, l@). The systems approach used to inte-grate livestock and cropping systems shows promise in providing solutions to problems of low-resourceproducers. One organization, the International Livestock Centre for Africa (ILCA), views poor animalhealth and nutrition during dry seasons as the main constraint to increased production. ILCA emphasizesresearch on mixed farming systems as its main objective, providing a forage-legume link between crop-ping and livestock enterprises and increasing yields in both. Alleycropping, for-ample, can increasecrop yields and provide browsing for small ruminants by itercropping trees such as leucaena with cerealcrops. In the semiarid zones, intercropping millet and Cowpeas can increase yields and improve the value

of forage (ILCA, 1984). - % ,.. . ~,,ILCA and others are conducting zone on the control of the tsetse-trans-

mitted trypanosomiasis, the people with few livestock, range man-agement for communal livestock _. However, much needsto be done in improving feeds, and decreasingcalf mortality rates. - -. ::%, ,,,~ ~7 . , . . -. . .+.

curity interests. More specifically, the economicargument is made that assisting the developingcountries helps “convert the threat of economicchaos into long-range opportunities: the buildingof new trading partners, and new free societiesof private enterprise” (Andreas Task Force, 1984).Developing countries represent 40 percent of U.S.export markets and are the fastest growing mar-ket, by value, for U.S. goods and services. A large

part of U.S. assistance spending comes back inthe form of demands for American goods andservices. It has been estimated that about 70 per-cent of bilateral U.S. assistance disbursements and50 percent of our contributions to multilateral de-velopment banks are spent on U.S. goods andservices (U.S. Department of State, 1983). Devel-oping countries are particularly important mar-kets for agricultural products, with 20 percent of

2 4

U.S. farm acreage devoted to producing for them(U.S. Department of State, 1983). Every billiondollars of farm exports generates another 25,000to 30,000 jobs in the United States (Andreas TaskForce, 1984).

In terms of security interests, aid is seen as anon-military tool to achieve numerous foreignpolicy objectives including:

●

●

●

●

●

promoting regional and economic stability,encouraging democracy,securing or maintaining access to strategic fa-cilities,countering Soviet influence,encouraging cooperation with the U.S. on in-ternational-issue (U.S. GAO, 1983).

The plight of the developing world poses athreat to our own security. A contented UnitedStates cannot live unscathed in a world of hungerand famine. Nor can the United States live un-harmed in a world of seething unrest and unstablegovernments that hunger and famine creates (An-dreas Task Force, 1984).

The United States depends on developing coun-tries for a number of important commodities andAfrica possesses a significant share of many ofthese. For example, the United States imports over90 percent of its cobalt, bauxite, and manganese.Zaire and Zambia are the world’s leading produc-ers of cobalt and together provide about sO per-cent of U.S. import requirements. Guinea hasmore than a quarter of the world’s bauxite re-serves and provides some 30 percent of U.S. im-ports. Gabon provides 26 percent of total U.S.import requirements of manganese, which in 1983reached 99 percent (Kamarck, 1982; U.S. Depart-ment of the Interior, 1984a, b).

Each of these materials has vital industrial andmilitary applications. Concern exists that strate-gic materials from Africa are particularly suscep-tible to interruption due to instability in manysupplier countries. The argument is made thateconomic assistance acts as a stabilizing factor andcements U.S.-supplier country ties, thereby reduc-ing the threat of supply disruptions.

Beyond the arguments related to U.S. economicand security interests, more altruistic motivationshistorically have played a large part in develop-ment assistance. The arguments of humanitarianor moral obligations to alleviate suffering in the

world have been used effectively to generate con-siderable support, particularly during periods ofcrisis such as drought, famine, and other naturaldisasters.

Conflicts may arise between U.S. interests inassisting sub-Saharan African countries andbroader domestic and foreign policy goals. In par-ticular, the objective of making Africa more food-self-sufficient may conflict with United States de-sires to expand international markets for its agri-cultural products. The Overseas Private Invest-ment Corporation (OPIC), the Federal agencycreated to mobilize and facilitate “the participa-tion of U.S. capital and skills in the economic andsocial development of less developed countries, ”places high priority on export development. How-ever, the General Accounting Office (GAO) notesthat OPIC should “explore possible conflictswhich might arise between country developmentobjectives and U.S. export interests” (U.S. GAO,Feb. 1981).

The objective of greater agricultural develop-ment in the Third World quickly confronts thequestion of competition with U.S. exports for ex-isting markets. Short-run competitive relation-ships will, of course, arise. However, the real in-terest of American agriculture is in expanding thetotal world market . . . rather than obtainingslightly larger shares of a stagnant or shrinkingmarket (Andreas Task Force, 1984).

The divergence of interests, however, threatensto widen, especially given U.S. efforts to expandits agricultural exports significantly in the shortterm as a means of reducing its overall trade def-icits. This issue raises a number of issues relatingto agriculture, technology, and assistance for sub-Saharan Africa which the Congress shouldaddress.

Agricultural surpluses traded on new interna-tional markets transformed the United States intothe prime world agricultural exporter. This pro-voked a continuing debate regarding the appro-priate U.S. role in world agriculture: Should theUnited States be the “breadbasket of the world”(with potential long-run depletion of its naturalresources)? Or should the United States act astechnical assistance provider to help less devel-oped countries strengthen their own agriculturalsystems (with long-term prospects of LDCs reduc-ing their need for American agricultural importsand eventually even competing with U.S. importsin world markets)? (USDA, 1984c).

Chapter 3

Issues inTechnology Development

Chapter 3

Issues in Technology Development

The best hope for increasing food supplies inAfrica lies with the low-resource farmers andherders who provide an overwhelming propor-tion of the region’s food. Yet can these people behelped to increase their production enough to feedtoday’s populations, let alone the additionalmillions who will be added as Africa’s populationgrows?

American expertise can have a role in this ef-fort. This section explores the types of technol-ogy needed to face this future growth, includingthe role agricultural research plays in developingsuitable technologies. In particular, it looks atwhat types of technology are suitable for Africancultures and environments. Later sections of thisreport focus on issues in technology transfer, tech-nical assistance, and the responsibilities of theAfrican governments themselves.

The issues examined here include the suitabilityof existing technologies and their appropriatenessfor conditions likely in Africa’s future, the indirectrole that nonagricultural technologies can serveto increase food production, how the UnitedStates and other nations can best share their scien-tific and research expertise, how current researchinformation can be shared most effectively, andthe need for food producers to have an expandedrole in planning and implementing agricultural re-search.

Issue 1: Many technical solutions introduced intosub-Saharan Africa for food production are notsuitable for present conditions nor for condi-tions likely to prevail in the near future.

Preliminary Findings●

●

Increased food production requires increaseduse of well adapted existing technologies andnew ones. The most suitable technologies prob-ably will be consistent with traditional Africanagricultural methods, reflect local conditions,be affordable, locally produced and repairable,and involve low risks and low inputs.

Large demographic changes are under way inAfrica, and innovative agricultural technologies

●

●

●

●

●

●

relevant to these changes—e.g., urban agri-culture—are needed but largely unexplored.

Few technologies have been designed for low-resource food producers who generally seek tominimize risk rather than maximize production.A growing consensus is emerging that devel-oping these technologies deserves high priority.

Technology development should consider thestatus of the natural resource base, its inherentcapabilities, and the potential impacts of newtechnologies, but often this is not done. Re-sources are degraded or susceptible to degrada-tion in many parts of Africa. Important dif-ferences exist between the African and U.S.resource base.

An integrated or “systems” approach to tech-nology development is promising but seldomtaken. Too often technologies are developedpiecemeal with little regard for long-term sus-tainability. For example, work on crops andtrees is not integrated with animal productionsystems even though many producers combinethem.

The social and cultural situations into whichtechnologies are introduced are vital but oftenoverlooked—e.g., often women’s unique rolesin African agriculture, pastoralism, and forestryare underemphasized.

Conditions in the United States are significantlydifferent, ecologically and socially, for mostagricultural technology developed in the UnitedStates to be transferred directly to sub-SaharanAfrica. Much U.S. technology requires levelsof technical and managerial support that nowcannot be met in Africa.

Expanded agricultural research is needed ontraditional staple food crops and small-scalefood production instead of continued empha-sis on cash crops.

Discussion

The decline in per capita food production inAfrica has stimulated a reexamination of the types

27

—

28

of agricultural technology chosen for developmentand transfer. Hindsight has shown that introduc-tion of Western technologies into peasant com-munities often has proved inappropriate (Altieri,1984; Harwood, 1979). Some agricultural tech-nology has worked against the natural resourcebase, further undermining food production (Com-mins, 1984; Twose, 1984). Also, population dis-tribution between inland/coastal and rural/urbanareas is shifting and total population is increas-ing rapidly (figs. 5 and 6). As such, specializedtechnologies may be needed to produce sufficientfood. Large demographic shifts, continuing envi-ronmental degradation, as well as numerous proj-ect failures, suggest that some changes in technol-ogy development are needed.

A consensus is emerging on the kinds of tech-nology most needed to meet Africa’s future foodneeds. Participants in OTA’s workshop describedthese technologies as: low risk, resource-conserv-ing, small-scale, locally produced, affordable,easily repaired, and based on traditional meth-ods. Also, technologies must be suited to laborconditions because “production cycles alternateshort periods of intense work, requiring a sea-sonally effort-saving form of investment and in-put, with long periods of ‘underemployment’ “

Figure 5.— Population Projections for Sub-SaharanAfrica: 1985-2025

1 91

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020

YearsKey:

+ Mid-Afr ica

0 East Afr ica

SOURCE: United Nations Population Projections, Medium Variant, 1980.

(Lipton, 1977c). Participants also noted, however,that many technologies must be tailored to theparticular site of application and the expectedusers. Therefore, generalizations cannot be madeabout the best technology for all types of produc-tion, regions, and countries because of the var-ied conditions and varied agricultural productionsystems.

The adaptation and use of traditional agricul-tural methods is expected to be an essential start-ing point (U.N. FAO, April 1984; Wad, 1984).Traditional agricultural systems include: agrofor-estry, multiple cropping, minimum tillage, covercropping, living mulches, small-scale irrigation,and large and small livestock management. Com-monly, traditional technologies have been over-looked by researchers, governments, and donorsdespite their prevalence and advantages. For ex-ample, 98 percent of cowpeas grown in Africa areinterplanted with other crops (Francis, et al.,1976). Yet intercropping has received little re-search attention. This is a traditional technologyto:

. . . promote diversity of diet and income source,stability of production, minimization of risk, re-duced insect and disease incidence, efficient useof labor, intensification of production with limited

Figure 6.—Urban Population Projections for

700

600

$ 5000.-

~ 4 0 0co“: 3007Q: 200

100i

of

.Sub-Saharan Africa: 1985-2025

1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2010 2020

YearsKey:

+ Mid-Afr ica

● West Africa

SOURCE: United Nations Population Projections, Medium Variant, 1980.

29

Photo credit” George Scharffenberger, OTA

Traditional agricultural methods are appropriate starting points for developing improved agricultural technologies. IITAis researching the traditional risk-reducing, yet efficient, practice of intercropping (e. g., cowpeas and cassava).

resources and maximization of returns under lowlevels of technology (Altieri, 1983).

Kitchen gardening, an agricultural activity per-formed almost exclusively by African women, isanother largely neglected traditional technology.These gardens often contribute to household in-come, show higher per-acre yields than fieldcrops, and are the places where producers exper-iment with new seeds, new inputs, and new plant-ing technology. Yet often they are perceived bydonors and researchers as women’s hobbies andusually do not receive funding, inputs, technicalassistance, nor research in proportion to their im-portance (Tendler, 1982).

Urban agriculture is another use of traditionaltechnologies that may be of increasing impor-tance. Almost all African countries are urbaniz-ing more rapidly than other low- and middle-income countries while overall development isslower; most growth is occurring in each coun-try’s largest city (PADCO, 1982). Many urbanresidents face problems obtaining affordable andreliable food supplies, although food prices havebeen kept artificially low in many urban areas.Urban Resource Systems, Inc., estimates that the

incidence of malnutrition is accelerating morerapidly in cities than rural areas of developingcountries and that the urban poor consume fewerfood calories than their rural counterparts.

“Meanwhile, for millions of the urban poor, thepotential capacity of the urban system to producefood may be a factor on which their survival mayhinge” (Boyden and Celecia, 1981; Nelson andMandl, 1978). Methods such as intensive cultiva-tion, rooftop gardening, comporting, urban for-estry, irrigation using renewable energy for pump-ing, aviculture, and aquiculture can be used toincrease urban food supplies.

Urban agriculture projects exist in some Africancountries, their contribution to nutrition is docu-mented, and their special importance during foodshortages is easily observed (see Urban ResourceSystems, Inc., 1984). For example, open lands areused by the unemployed to grow vegetables andfuelwood in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (OXFAM,1983; Wade, 1983). The City Council in Lusaka,Zambia, began an Urban Agriculture and Nutri-tion Project in 1977 (Wade, 1983), receiving someassistance from UNICEF and an American PVO.

.

30

This program maintains demonstration vegetablegardens in several squatter settlements and on ur-ban fringe lands. Lusaka planned a special urbanagriculture and nutrition service to promote ur-ban food production (Ledogar, 1978). Home foodproduction also is part of a local development planfor areas near Douala, Cameroon (Barbedette,1978).

Steady use of many kinds of existing technol-ogies during the 1980s and 1990s could increasefood production substantially. First, however,African countries would need to determine andeliminate non-technological constraints, such aspricing policies. Africa also faces a number ofspecial technical problems requiring new techno-logical approaches. Important research areasinclude: plant breeding for unfavorable environ-

ments,mental

soil and water conservation, environ-monitoring, mechanization, fodder crops,

livestock immunization, fisheries estimates, andlivestock management. The aim should be:

. . . small scale but highly productive and eco-logically sound permanent farming systems thatnot only take advantage of such modern inputsas better varieties, mineral fertilizers and mechan-ical equipment, but also make full use of cropresidues for animal feedings, and of crop and ani-mal residues and nitrogen-fixing crops to main-tain fertility. These are likely to be increasinglybased on the close integration of crop, livestockand forestry production, and in some cases fishproduction as well (U.N. FAO, April 1984).

Research to help develop such technologiesseems to be scarce. As much as 98 percent of the

31

world’s modern technological capacity is concen-trated in the industrialized countries (Singer,1977). An estimated 90 percent of all scientific re-search conducted worldwide takes place in devel-oped countries and is directed specifically to theirown needs (Perez, 1978).

Trends in American agriculture make it unlikelythat most U.S. technologies will be appropriatefor Africa. U.S. research on small farms, for ex-ample, comprises only a fraction of the annualFederal research budget. Plant breeders in theUnited States generally have not sought to adaptcrops to unfavorable environmental conditions(Boyer, 1982) and research on technologies to limitfarm and ranch inputs such as water, fertilizers,and pesticides has not received much attention.A few notable exceptions exist, however, such asresearch conducted at the Rodale Research Cen-ter in Pennsylvania (U.S. Congress, OTA, Oct.1983). Some experts contend, though, that thetechnical feasibility of developing “low-input”technology for agriculturally marginal areas is un-known (Ruttan, 1982).

Much American agricultural technology hasbeen described as “high tech. ” It involves com-plex and expensive machinery, integration of largeamounts of information from distant sources, andhigh managerial skills. These features significantlylimit its applicability in Africa. In addition, U.S.climate, soils, natural vegetation, and domesti-cated animals are different in important waysfrom those in Africa. Therefore, American tech-nology commonly is not suitable for direct trans-fer overseas, and care must be taken to evaluateits suitability before introduction.

Some argue, however, that much developed-country research is adaptable or transferable todeveloping countries. Authors of the 1971 U.N.World Plan of Action called for developed coun-tries to divert a specified part of their domesticresearch efforts toward technology appropriatefor developing countries (Singer, 1977). Basic re-search on plant and animal physiology is one ex-ample. If U.S. universities conducted research onimportant African crops, the results would be ex-pected to be useful in Africa.

In fact, however, Africa’s staple food cropshave not received major research worldwide

(U.N. FAO, April 1984) and different uses of thesame crops in different countries may limit wide-spread use of research results. Sorghum, for ex-ample, is used in the United States for livestockfeed and syrup. In Africa, it is used for humanfood and brewing beer. These uses require differ-ent crop research strategies. Research programsfor millet, cassava, yams, cowpeas, and open-pollinated corn have begun only recently, and “thescale of worldwide research effort on individualstaple food crops has been in inverse ratio to theirimportance in Africa” (U.N. FAO, April 1984).

U.S. technology, in its broadest definition, isused extensively to train many African agricul-tural students in the United States. Such trainingis often inappropriate for the conditions to whichthe students will return. Thus the need to provideeducation and training in Africa is stressed in-creasingly. U.S. training is likely to remain nec-essary in the short term until African educationalinstitutions can fully develop. Indigenous insti-tutions, American faculty, and foreign studentsin the U.S. could benefit if foreign graduatestudents at American universities conducted re-search in their own country or in countries hav-ing similar environments.

Congress has attempted to encourage a newgeneration of technologies for developing coun-tries. In 1975, the Agency for International De-velopment (AID) was directed to support the de-velopment and dissemination of “capital-savingtechnology” in section 107 of the InternationalDevelopment and Food and Assistance Act. AIDdefined this as technology that: requires little cap-ital per worker, is small-scale, easily replicable,easily serviced and operated by untrained users,and involves local people and resources. AIDresponded by establishing a private nonprofitgroup, Appropriate Technology International(ATI), providing policy directives to missions, anddesigning two systems to make technological in-formation available to project staff.

Despite this encouragement, problems in devel-oping, introducing, and using such technologiescontinue. An analysis conducted by the GeneralAccounting Office (U.S. GAO, 1984) found thatAID’s management does not encourage use of cap-ital-saving technology, that the information sys-

32

terns have severe weaknesses, and that ATI is usedlittle by AID country missions. Another analysisfound that capital saving technology projectscompared favorably with “appropriate technol-ogy” projects in the United States but almost allwere plagued by planning and/or implementationproblems (Associates in Rural Development,1982). AID evaluated ATI’s worldwide work in1982 and found that it seems to have had littleimpact in the four African countries studied, butthe potential is growing in Kenya (Samper, 1982).

Issue 2: The development of some types of non-agricultural technologies is important to en-able women farmers and herders to increasefood production as well as to ensure thatforeign assistance reaches the poorest ruralresidents.

Preliminary Findings●

●

●

Poor rural residents without land may benefitmore from nonagricultural assistance and tech-nologies—e.g., income-generating projects suchas soap-making or crafts.

Certain labor-saving household technologiescould allow women producers to devote moretime to agriculture. These include improvedwater systems, more accessible fuelwood sup-plies, and improved methods for processing,storing, and preserving foods.

Improved human and animal health also areimportant factors in increasing food production.

Discussion

With the New Directions legislation of 1973,the goal of helping those most in need in devel-oping countries became an explicit part of U.S.foreign assistance. The results of this directive arefar from clear, however, and questions remainabout the size and structure of the poorest popula-tions in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere (Tendler,1982). These unanswered questions have impor-tant implications for technology development. Alarge part of the income of the poorest farm house-holds may be earned in nonagricultural activities(Chuta and Liedholm, 1984). For these people,activities such as small-scale trading, crafts, fish-ing, and peddling, may be important (Tendler,

1982). Only some of these activities require agri-cultural technology.

Time to devote to agriculture can be a limitingfactor for women producers in Africa. Increas-ing agricultural production may depend, there-fore, as much on developing improved technol-ogy to save them time in other activities and atcrucial periods during the growing season as itdoes on improved agricultural technology.

Most rural African women work 9 to 10 hoursa day in the fields, then spend as many as 7 or8 more hours fetching water, collecting and car-rying fuelwood, looking after children and the

Photo credit: World Bank Photo by Ray Witlin

A woman in Burkina Faso roasting groundnuts whilewatching her child. Nonagricultural technologies thatreduce some of the labor constraints that women facein fuelwood and water collection could allow them

more time for agricultural activities.

33

elderly, cooking and preserving food, and help-ing to store and market crops (Carr, 1978). Also,they may grow vegetables or make soap to earncash for school fees and food items such as saltand sugar. And they take part in community proj-ects such as building roads.

Technologies intended to provide lighting andincrease the efficiency of cooking have attractedmuch attention as ways to lighten women’s bur-dens. Planners felt that improved stoves, for ex-ample, could decrease alarming deforestation andreduce time spent on fuelwood collection. Manyof these projects have been less successful thanwas hoped, however. It seems that the timewomen spent collecting fuelwood and the mag-nitude of deforestation attributed to their activi-ties were overestimated (Tinker, 1982). In addi-tion, sometimes the perceived needs of womendiffered from what projects offered. More recentefforts—e.g., to introduce solar ovens and makesimple adjustments to currently used stoves—aremore successful (Tinker, 1982).

African women themselves have identified theneed for new water technology to ease the bur-dens of carrying water daily for drinking, cook-ing, washing, and irrigation:

Evidence shows that life for the rural womanhas been getting harder over recent years. Wor-sening drought conditions in many African coun-tries mean that women have to walk further dis-tance and for more months during the year tocollect water. A recent study in Ethiopia revealedthat in 75 percent of the households under survey,the women spent 3 hours or more on a singlejourney to collect water. Women in many villagesin Upper Volta set out to collect water at dawnand rarely return with their daily supply beforenoon (Carr, 1978).

Evidence exists that food production may in-crease when water technology improves. In Kenya,for example, the installation of tin roofs for rain-water collection saved 2 to 10 hours per day perhousehold. Women expanded their gardens andraised more chickens and pigs for urban marketsas a result (Tinker, 1981).

African women also have noted the need fortechnologies suited for transporting small loadsof fuelwood, water, and produce, and improved

technologies for food processing. The latter in-clude grinding mills for producing flour fromcorn, millet, sorghum, and rice, a task that cantake 1 to 2 hours each day (Carr, 1978). Someestimates suggest that food processing and prep-aration take more time and energy than either col-lecting firewood or water (Tinker, 1982).

Considerable evidence exists that disease is animpediment to agricultural development and thusfood production in some parts of Africa (Ruttan,May 1984). Agriculture is impossible due to on-chocerciasis (river blindness) in some fertile rivervalleys in West Africa. It appears that diseasevectors increase as cultivation increases, even-tually causing abandonment of the cleared land.Trypanosomiasis, carried by the tsetse fly, is aserious public health problem, and it makes live-stock production impossible on approximately 6million square miles of land. Technologies areavailable to prevent or cure some tropical diseasesbut often their application is costly. Research inbiotechnology may make new low-cost technol-ogies available but its application is, in somecases, decades away (U.S. Congress, OTA, 1985).

Issue 3: Disagreement exists regarding the op-timal way for the United States to supportscientists and provide funds for research onAfrican food production.

Preliminary Findings●

●

●

●

An integrated system of national and regionalagricultural research institutions in developedand developing countries tied to the interna-tional research network has great potential buthas yet to be achieved.

U.S. contributions of personnel and funds tothe International Agricultural Research Centershave been vital to their substantial successes.

National agricultural research centers in Africaneed strengthening and this could require a ma-jor U.S. commitment.

American institutions have played and continueto play important roles in educating Africanscientists. The tailoring of certain programscould be improved to fit the situations studentsface at home—e.g., by providing in-country

34

●

●

●

●

training or training in comparable developingcountries.

Few U.S. universities can sustain the long-termcommitment required for African technologydevelopment and transfer because: 1) fundingis tied to short-term contracts and assignments,2) the number of American scientists with train-ing and experience under conditions differentfrom the U.S. temperate zone is limited, and3) few U.S. universities and colleges provide in-centives for faculty to conduct overseas agri-cultural research.

Arguments exist regarding the best roles forAmerican scientists and universities to play inAfrican development. Some universities are at-tempting to “internationalize” their charters andto increase their involvement in development.At the same time, some developing countriesseek to decrease the role of expatriates, limitingopportunities for U.S. personnel.

Non-land grant universities and smaller landgrant institutions have not played a large partin international agricultural development efforts.

The 1890 colleges have conducted research forsmall, low-resource farmers in the U.S. Theirexpertise may prove to be relevant to develop-ing countries. Long-term overseas work mayjeopardize their local programs, however, be-cause their scientific staff usually is small.

Discussion

Many experts acknowledge that the global agri-cultural research system has weaknesses that needto be improved (Eklund, 1983; World Bank,1984a). However, they have not agreed on thebest way to achieve this nor the optimal roles ofthe different institutions that comprise the system:the international agricultural research centers, na-tional and regional agricultural research institu-tions in Africa, and developed-country researchfacilities, especially universities.

Most American assistance for multilateral agri-cultural research is channeled through the globalnetwork of international agricultural researchcenters funded by the Consultative Group on In-ternational Agricultural Research (CGIAR). Thir-teen centers exist; four are located in Africa and

most of the others have significant programs there(table 3; app. A). The United States has provided19 to 28 percent of the annual core funding forCGIAR since 1972 (CGIAR, 1983).

The Centers have contributed to increases infood production in developing countries and gen-erally are regarded as successful innovations(Schultz, 1984). Their greatest impact has beenin breeding high-yielding varieties of wheat andrice (Plucknett and Smith, 1982). The perceptionexists that they have made the “easy” researchgains, though, and are beginning to lag in usingrecent biological advances (Ruttan, 1983), Fund-ing is expected to remain relatively constant afterspectacular increases in the 1970s.

Debate continues regarding the proper level andform of U.S. support for CGIAR. Some note theincrease in U.S. bilateral assistance and fear thatthe longstanding U.S. commitment to CGIAR iswaning (Scharffenberger, 1984). On the otherhand, some U.S. university officials contend thatAID allocates money to the international centersat the expense of support for American institu-tions (Campbell, 1983).

Most experts, however, recognize the need fora cooperative, not competitive, global agriculturalresearch system. Also, a consensus exists that na-tional and regional facilities in Africa deserve in-creased support in order to make the entire sys-tem most effective (Lele, 1981; World Bank,1984a). Links between the international and na-tional centers are important as well as links amongnational institutions (Ruttan, Sept. 1984).

National agricultural research centers in devel-oping countries expanded greatly in the last dec-ades. Most of the growth occurred in a few coun-tries, however, and Nigeria is the only Africannation among them. Ruttan (Sept. 1984) lists sev-eral concerns regarding these national efforts inAsia, Latin America, and Africa:

●

●

●

●

investment in facilities appears to exceed thatin scientific staff development,administrative burdens stifle research,frequently locations are chosen without ade-quate regard for factors that contribute tosuccess,often research budgets do not reflect the eco-nomic importance of particular commodities,

35

Table 3.-Centers Supported by the CGIAR, 1984

1984 budgeta

Acronym Research Geographic (millions of(year established) Center Location programs focus dollars)

IRRI (1960) International Rice Research Institute

CIMMYT (1966) Centro International de MejoramientoMaiz y Trigo

IITA (1967) International Institute of TropicalAgriculture

C I A T ( 1 9 6 8 ) Centro International de AgriculturalTropical

CIP (1971) Centro International de la PapaWARDA (1971) . West African Rice Development

AssociationICRISAT (1972) International Crops Research Institute

for the Semi-Arid Tropics

I L R A D ( 1 9 7 3 ) International Laboratory for Researchon Animal Diseases

I B P G R ( 1 9 7 4 ) International Board for Plant GeneticResources

ILCA (1974) ., International Livestock Center forAfrica

IFPRI (1975) International Food Policy ResearchInstitute

ICARDA (1976) International Center for AgriculturalResearch in the Dry Areas

ISNAR (1980) International Service for NationalAgricultural Research

Los Banes, Phillipines RiceRice based cropping

systemsMexico City, Mexico Maize

Bread wheatDurum wheatBarleyTriticale

Ibadan, Nigeria Farming systemsMaizeRiceSweet potato, yamsCassava, cowpea,

lima bean, soybeanCali, Colombia Cassava

Field beansRiceTropical pastures

Lima, Peru PotatoMonrovia, Liberia Rice

Hyderabad, India ChickpeaPigeonpeaPearl milletSorghumGroundnutFarming systems

Nairobi, Kenya TrypanosomiasisTheileriosis

Rome, Italy Plant genetic sources

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Livestock productionsystems

Washington, DC, U.S.A. Food policy

Aleppo, Syria Farming systemsWheat, barley,

triticale, broadbean, lentil,chickpea, foragecrops

The Hague, Netherlands National agriculturalresearch.

Global 2 2 5Asia

Global 21,0GlobalGlobalGlobalGlobalTropical Africa 21 2

GlobalTropical Africa

GlobalGlobalLatin AmericaLatin AmericaGlobalWest Africa

GlobalGlobalGlobalGlobalGlobalSemi-Arid tropicsGlobalGlobalGlobal

Tropical Africa

Global

Dry areas of WestAsia and NorthAfrica

23,1

1092 9

221

9.7

3 7

12,7

4 2

20.4

Global 35

aCGIAR Supported core budget, net of capital, at the bottom of the bracket (from 1983 Integrative Report)

SOURCE: Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research ‘The CGIAR in Africa “ Washington, DC 1984

●

●

●

analysis of research priorities is not well- ities. Most smaller countries, with populationsinformed, ranging from 2 million to 10 million, have the re-leaders of some research systems appear to sources to develop their own research systems inpresume that research can be done without 10 to 20 years. National research systems inscientists, smaller developing countries, such as Sierra Le-a number of national systems are vulnerable one, may require a generation to reach theirto cycles of donors’ development policies. ultimate size —little larger than a branch station

in Texas. They will remain dependent on the in-Ruttan notes further that both African govern- ternational agricultural research centers, multina-

ments and donors will face critical questions as tional firms, and developed countries for muchthey develop national agricultural research facil- agricultural technology. But they need the scien-

36

tific capacity to draw on the global researchsystem.

U.S. universities are an important part of thatglobal system and have been involved in inter-national work for decades. Massachusetts StateCollege worked with Japan in 1876; other univer-sities followed in the early 1900s. The pace ac-celerated after 1949, when President Trumandedicated the United States to helping develop-ing countries. Large numbers of U.S. universityfaculty work in developing countries now. Wash-ington State University, for example, has formalexchange agreements with 17 countries, and morethan 120 faculty had foreign assignments in 1983(Yates, 1984).

The type of international work that universitiesconducted has shifted with time. In the 1950smany universities attempted to transfer Ameri-can agricultural technology directly. By the 1960stheir attention shifted to institution-building.These activities decreased and research efforts in-creased in the late 1960s and early 1970s whenAID funding for universities peaked (figs. 7 and8). More recently, universities and individualAmerican scientists have worked with the globalnetwork of international agricultural researchcenters and contracted for AID mission-orientedwork (Perez, 1978).

Figure 7.—AlD-Financed University Contracts andGrants for Technical Assistance to Host

Countries–In Millions, Fiscal Years 1970-8@

$200 ~ I 1

$150

01970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1976 1977 1978 19791980

Fiscal yearsb

aData do not include AID grants and loans involving host country contracts withU.S. universities.

bData for fiscal year 1975 are not available.

SOURCE: General Accounting Office, AID and Universities Have Yet to Forgean Effective Partnership to Combat World Food Problems, ID-82-3,Oct. 16, 1981.

Many evaluations of universities’ involvementin international activities were completed in the1960s and 1970s. U.S. personnel made a large con-tribution to overseas successes, but some commonproblems were noted. These included: lack oflong-term planning, difficulties in the AID/univer-sity relationship; lack of social, cultural, and po-litical sensitivity on the part of the U.S. personnel;lack of planning and coordination by funders,universities, and developing country institutions;and inappropriate education for developing-country students in the United States (Perez,1978). Some of these evaluations recommendednew American institutions to remedy these prob-lems. The Gardner Report (1964), for example,suggested forming a National Institute for Edu-cation and Technical Cooperation to take overU.S. development-related research and mobilizeuniversity involvement in developing countries.

The Federal Government provides substantialassistance to U.S. universities for internationalagricultural development. Few State governmentshave supplied the charter or the funds for similarefforts. Citizens in some States feel that theiruniversities should work on State problems andthat international work leads to increased com-petition for markets between local farmers andranchers and their developing country counter-

Figure 8.—AlD-Financed University Contracts andGrants for Technical Assistance to Host Countries—

In Numbers of Contracts and Institutions,Fiscal Years 1970-80a

120

100

20n

Ti t le X11 legis lat ionpassed December 1975

❑ l l n n r iI I 9 1 1 1 I 1 1 I Ill I I I 1 I 1 I I 1

1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980

Fiscal yearsb

aData do not include AID grants and loans involving host country contracts with

U.S. universities.bData for fiscal year 1975 are not available.

SOURCE: General Accounting Office, AID and Universities Have Yet to Forgean Effective Partnership to Combat World Food Problems, ID-82-3,Oct. 16, 1961.

37

parts. A few State universities, however, havechanged their original charters to reflect their viewof more global responsibilities, and Federal pro-grams have increased universities’ interest andability to fulfill them.

The university must provide educational op-portunities that will enable the citizens of our stateand nation to make sound decisions based on anawareness of the global environment in which welive and work , . . .Our students and clientele[must be] able to see the relationships that willcontinue to bind this country more closely to theglobal community . . . this 1 believe to be one ofthe premier responsibilities of the global univer-sity (Yates, Executive Vice President and Provost,Washington State University, 1984).

Title XII of the Foreign Assistance Act, passedin 1975, provides the rationale and means bywhich universities have become more involved ininternational agricultural research and develop-ment. It committed U.S. universities and collegesto help soIve food problems in developing coun-tries. The General Accounting Office reports that“Title XII has been instrumental in bringing newvigor and awareness to international work in theU, S.-university community” (U.S. GAO, 1981).But GAO also notes that U.S. universities havelimited capacity to take part effectively in theseAID programs due to deterrents to faculty over-

seas assignments, sporadic funding from AID, in-come tax burdens on faculty, and cumbersomeAID contracting procedures. AID faces similarconstraints due to skepticism in AID missionsabout the relevance of involving U.S. universitiesas “partners in development” and some experi-ences with poor university performance.

Some universities have not been drawn into thisinternational work extensively, and concerns ex-ist that Title XII contracts are awarded on the basisof geographic politics more than expertise. In ad-dition, some technologies—e.g., biotechnologies—are being developed largely outside of the land-grant system in private universities and researchfirms. This raises questions whether certain tech-nologies may be unavailable to developing coun-tries because of the funding structure for inter-national agricultural work in the United States.Similarly, some experts contend that the 1890Land Grant Colleges (table 4) have not partici-pated in overseas research in proportion to theirpotential. Since their creation, the 1890 institu-tions have been involved extensively in domesticcommunity development under conditions thatparallel those in developing countries (Williams,1979). Shortage of qualified personnel, however,has led them, like some other universities, some-times to substitute outside contractors on AID

Table 4.—The 1890 Institutions Were Added to the Land-Grant System toCompensate for Exclusion of Blacks From the 1862 Land-Grant Universities

I n s t i t u t i o n L o c a t i o n

Alabama A&M University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Alcorn State University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .University of Arkansas—Pine Bluff. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Delaware State College. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Florida A&M University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Fort Valley State University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Kentucky State University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Langston University. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Lincoln University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .University of Maryland-Eastern Shores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .North Carolina A&T . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Prairie View A&M University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .South Carolina State College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Southern University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tennessee State University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Tuskegee Institute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Normal, ALLorman, MSPine Bluff, ARDover, DETallahassee, FLFort Valley, GAFrankfort, KYLangston, OKJefferson City, MOPrincess Anne, MDGreensboro, NCPrairie View, TXOrangeburg, SCBaton Rouge, LANashville, TNTuskegee, AL

Virginia State College . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Petersburg, VASOURCES B D May berry, “Mechanisms for the Delivery of Appropriate Technology —Extension,” The Unique Resources of

the 1890 Land-Grant Institutions and Implications for International Development, Thomas T. Williams (ed ) (BatonRouge, LA: Southern University Unemployment-Underemployment Institute, 1979), p 42; Southeastern Consortiumfor International Development, Washington, DC

38

projects and has resulted in an uneven achieve-ment record.

U.S. agricultural colleges are in transition, withmore women, minority, and urban students enter-ing. The effect of these trends on the conduct andcontent of domestic and international research anddevelopment activities is unknown.

Issue 4: Research information on science, tech-nology, and development is less effective thanit could be because it is not adequately coordi-nated, shared, or disseminated.

Preliminary Findings●

●

●

●

Limits to the flow of research information re-sult in needless duplication of effort and slowerprogress.

Research findings sometimes are not dissemi-nated across national boundaries and institu-tional affiliations.

Advancing information technologies, such ascommunication satellites and microcomputers,have the potential to make large amounts ofinformation available at low cost to users scat-tered around the world.

This potential remains largely unrealized in de-veloping countries because many lack the in-frastructure to provide adequate power or torepair programming.

Discussion

Leaders in developing countries called upon theU.N. Education, Scientific, and Cultural Orga-nization (UNESCO) for a “new world informa-tion order. ” One of their concerns was ensuringaccess to information technology. Evidence ex-ists that problems with sharing information con-tinue and that some of the thornier policy issuesremain. For example, problems are expected toarise from different national philosophies and lawsregarding flow of data and from connecting in-formation systems across national boundaries(U.S. Congress, OTA, 1981).

Traditional methods of sharing agriculturalinformation exist and some contend that inter-national cooperation in agricultural research isincreasing. Today, some 100 international agri-

cultural networks exist worldwide, ranging frominternational nurseries to teams working on spe-cific problems (Plucknett and Smith, 1984). Com-munication problems affect these groups, althoughmost publish newsletters and hold workshops todisseminate their findings. Feedback within thenetwork may be slow and links between networksand outside scientists may be weak.

Information dissemination on small-scale tech-nologies is considered critical. Both Volunteers inTechnical Assistance (VITA) and Volunteers inAsia organize data bases on these technologies(U.S. AID, 1981). The nature, scope, and levelof information needed by various recipients variesas widely as the sources of information. “To buildreliable, comprehensive, and up-to-date servicesis obviously a major undertaking and will be quitecostly” (Singer, 1977).

Groups such as the United Nations IndustrialDevelopment Organization (UNIDO) and the In-ternational Development Centre in Ottawa, Can-ada, also stress the need for information technol-ogies as development tools. In March, UNIDOsuggested that developing countries build in-digenous capabilities for information manage-ment. One concept it endorsed was a low earthorbit satellite as a low-cost communication toolfor a variety of uses by widely scattered people(VITA, 1984). Uses might include broadcastingmessages and transmitting documents, thus cir-cumventing cumbersome international mails.

Satellite systems, like many contemporary com-munication technologies, rely on computers.While some developing countries have computersystems that are reliable, stories abound of com-puters idled because no one can use them or be-cause simple repairs cannot be made locally. Agri-cultural problems in sub-Saharan Africa oftenresult from the lack of basic infrastructure: serv-ices and facilities such as roads, tools, and repairand storage facilities may be missing. The role forelaborate technology such as computers and sat-ellites and their actual costs must be evaluatedcarefully if they are to compete for funds with in-frastructural development.

Generally, the United States has well-developedservices for sharing agricultural research informa-tion via mail systems, telephones, libraries, and

39

publishing houses, and the United States is aleader in advanced electronic communications.These systems are being used to benefit Africancountries, but problems remain. For example,computer use in the United States by governmentdonors and private voluntary organizations (PVOs)is accelerating. Many PVOs face “significant prob-lems in the selection of hardware and design ofsoftware” (Biddle, 1984). The Agency for Inter-national Development has a computerized systemto make project descriptions and other informa-tion available. It is beset by problems, however,including lack of completeness, definitional incon-sistency, and incompatibility with other data sets.The holdings of American libraries related toAfrica are relatively weak. The Library of Con-gress, for example, does not have an extensive col-lection of African national documents (Moris,1984).

Issue 5: Food producers have a limited role inagricultural research and this decreases theeffectiveness of the research.

Preliminary Findings●

●

●

●

●

Experts increasingly call for greater producerinvolvement in identifying problems for re-search and in developing and testing new tech-nologies.

Examples suggest that this approach better en-sures that research meets the needs of its usersand increases the likelihood of a project’ssuccess.

Methods of conducting and evaluating on-farmresearch are not well-developed.

Many institutions working with subsistenceproducers are not structured to encourage in-volvement of farmers and herders.

Participatory research and planning requiresformal coordination among food producers, ex-tension workers, and researchers.

Discussion

Experts in agricultural development have agrowing belief that the present organizationalframework of agricultural research and develop-ment does not serve the interests of many devel-

oping countries. This has prompted a search fornew structures that will reach more rural people.

It is generally accepted that farmers and herdersmust be involved in later stages of technologytransfer such as technology evaluation and exten-sion. Studies of technology transfer in the last 30years show that failure often resulted becauseclients were not involved effectively (Jedlicka,1977).

Recent evidence indicates that producers’ in-volvement in earlier stages—i.e., in identifyingagricultural problems for investigation and plan-ning and participating in research—is crucial also.Subsistence farmers have been effective in plan-ning and designing research, especially in identi-fying important environmental features (Jedlicka,1981). Also, farmers have carried out their ownexperiments, sometimes making agronomic break-throughs before researchers (Howes and Chambers,1979) and integrating biological, economic, en-vironmental, and social factors in their decisions(Francis, 1981).

The challenge is to devise a system of researchthat involves small producers and integrates on-farm work with established national programs(Whyte, 1981). Some research of this type com-bines: 1) research on multiple cropping systemsinstead of monoculture, 2) research on the roleof animals in farming systems, 3) on-farm testingin addition to experiment station work, 4) an em-phasis on interdisciplinary collaboration, and 5)the participation of people responsible for exten-sion and economic development.

This type of research has had some notable suc-cesses. The value of involving farmers in all stagesof project work in Ethiopia, Egypt, Pakistan, andIndia has been noted (Lowdermilk and Lattimore,1981). The unique vitality of Israeli agriculturalresearch in which farmers are also researchers wasidentified recently (U.S. Congress, OTA, May1983).

Numerous factors make such research difficult.These include nonsupportive research organiza-tions and government agencies and the complex-ities of conducting on-farm research. Participatoryresearch is a more complex form of interdisciplin-ary research and requires high levels of com-

40

petence and experience. Few successful models ofinterdisciplinary research exist (Rhoades andBooth, 1983). Also, lack of political and admin-istrative continuity among local groups and in-ternational donors is a major problem. Economicand cultural gaps between producers and research-ers also may hinder cooperation.

In the United States, farmers and ranchers areinvolved in setting research priorities through gov-ernment agency users’ groups and through their

representatives in farm, ranch, and commodityorganizations. Attempts to involve the rural poorby developing similar organizations in Africa gen-erally have not succeeded. Some attribute thesefailures to the imposition of organizations by “out-siders. ” They contend that meaningful participa-tion must come about through the emergence oflocal people’s own organizational choices, but fewexamples exist yet (Oakley and Marsden, 1984).

Chapter 4

Issues in Technology Transfer

Chapter 4

Issues in Technology Transfer

Developing technologies suitable for Africa isonly one step in helping increase food production.Those technologies also must be adapted anddisseminated among the African people. This callsfor successful technology transfer—another areawhere the United States has expertise to share.U.S. agriculture is vastly different from Africanagriculture, so U.S. involvement must be consid-ered carefully. The technologies used will need tobe different, as will the extension systems usedto distribute them. The most effective technologytransfer will be based on unique African socialand agronomic conditions.

This chapter examines a number of importantissues in the realm of technology transfer. For in-stance, should certain groups of people be iden-tified for special assistance? How can women, thecritical labor force in African food production,be integrated more effectively into the technol-ogy transfer process —including improved accessto extension services and credit? And how can ex-tension services in Africa be improved to meetproducers current needs while preparing them forthe future’s even greater food demands?

Issue 6: The possibility of directing agriculturalproject assistance to meet the needs of spe-cific target groups continues to be debated.

Preliminary Findings●

●

●

It is difficult to define explicitly and to dividethe “poorest of the poor” into categories suchas smallholders, landless, and urban or ruralun/underemployed.

Directing project assistance to specific targetgroups may alienate those other groups ex-cluded and the national staff and donor rep-resentatives responsible for implementingprojects.

However, if women and other disadvantagedproducers are not identified as groups that re-quire additional technological assistance, proj-ect planning and implementation may ignoretheir problems and benefit them little.

●

●

●

Both donors and African governments need im-proved definitions for low-resource producersand other categories of the poor.

A low-resource producer is one who lacks ac-cess to natural resource, economic, and/or tech-nological inputs to overcome constraints to in-creased food production.

National development plans do not necessarilyindicate African- governments’ commitment tolow-resource producers.

Discussion

The magnitude of the problem seems over-whelming; substantial numbers of poor people ex-ist in the developing countries. However, deter-mining the number of people who lack sufficientincome for adequate subsistence remains difficult.For example, the U.N. Food and AgricultureOrganization and the World Bank provide dif-ferent estimates of 450 million and 1.3 billion, re-spectively, as the number of people living belowsubsistence level in all developing countries (Eicher,Mar. 1984).

There is no question that Africa contains someof the world’s most impoverished countries andpeople.

A few statistics provide stark evidence thatAfricans are the poorest of the world’s poor.Three out of five are chronically malnourished.Twenty-two of the world’s 36 poorest countriesare in Africa. For every 1000 African childrenborn, 120 will die before their first birthday.Eighty percent of the continent’s population haveno access to adequate health services and only onein four has safe water to drink. Africans diesooner (average age 49) and are less literate (only36 percent) than in any other part of the world(Swift, 1984).

Other figures are equally disturbing. For exam-ple, Kenya and Ethiopia had 55 and 68 percent,respectively, of their 1975 populations below anincome level sufficient to provide adequate nu-trition (Chenery, 1979). The total number of pooris difficult to estimate, as are the relative num-

43

44

bers between countries. Compared with Tanzania,which has an annual per capita GNP of $280,Chad, with only $80 per capita, seems dismallypoor. But Tanzania has an official inflation rateof 13 to 30 percent and scarce foreign exchange.Both of these factors severely affect the poorest20 percent of the population. Zimbabwe, on theother hand, is classified as a middle income coun-try with an average per capita GNP of $850. Butthe country experiences large differences in incomedistribution. How can the poor of Zimbabwe becompared with those of Chad and Tanzania?

Economic development has many definitionsand models. Concern about beneficiaries is com-mon. “Trickle down” or “over” or “up” indicateperceived mechanisms for ensuring distributionof the returns from agricultural production. Sometechnological developments have been relativelyclass neutral. In Zimbabwe, introduction of themaize hybrid SR 52 was adopted by a large ma-jority of small farmers (Eicher, 1984). Generally,however, research, economic, and extension in-stitutions have developed and transferred tech-nology, information, and benefits to relatively fewfarmers. Development assistance has not beendirected toward the poorest of the African coun-tries, either in total assistance (Lappé, 1980), oras agriculture, nutrition, and rural developmentassistance (U.S. AID, 1984). Some of the moredisadvantaged smallholders lack reliable access toaffordable land, credit, and labor and receive lessdevelopment assistance than “progressive” farmers(Wortman and Cummings, 1978).

U.S. development assistance, since 1973, hasbeen mandated to help the poorer segments of therural population. However, given the presentlevels of development assistance and the projectapproach used by AID, difficult problems existin assisting target groups. The problems includelack of target group definitions, unreliable dataon these groups, and lack of sustainable andreplicable agricultural development programs thatwill reach them (Tendler, 1982; Esman, 1978). Inrural areas, for example, how do the “poorest ofthe poor” differ from smallholders or subsistencefarmers? Are the “poorest of the poor” actuallyfarmers or are they the landless rural inhabitantsor migrants to the satellite communities of thelarger urban areas? Are they seasonal farm la-

borers who supplement their income with othersources of income? Are they men or women orboth? Are other strategies necessary for meetingthe needs of the poor without natural resourcesversus the poor without money?

Differing opinions exist on the best methods foreffectively reaching the poorer smallholders. Somespecialists propose that development assistancedirected towards the poor should be replaced witha more general production approach accepting the

. . . necessity and the desirability of workingwith existing power structures and the most pro-gressive and dynamic elements in the rural areas,hoping that over the long term, questions of in-come inequalities and other problems can be ad-dressed as they emerge” (Morss and Morss, 1982).Attempts to target specific groups for develop-ment assistance may irritate donors and recipi-ent governments and possibly lead to impracticalprojects with few long-term benefits (Morss andMorss, 1982). Another view assumes the failureof the target approach has been the inability toconsider adequately the different categories of im-poverished groups, the impacts of technology onthem, and the suitable assistance programs thatmeet their articulated needs.

Commonly, agricultural development projectshave implicitly assumed the existence of an eco-nomically homogeneous “peasantry,” overlook-ing the class and income divisions which dividemost rural populations.

The rural poor, while sharing a common pov-erty, are comprised of many social groups, dif-fering in occupation, location, sex, status, and re-ligion (Uphoff, et al., 1979).

It seems important that donors and host gov-ernments together determine the needs of variouspoor rural groups. Some groups of rural poor maynot even be reached through agricultural devel-opment projects and may require other assistanceapproaches. Uphoff, Cohen, and Goldsmith (1979)and Esman (1978) identify five distinct groups ofpeople in this category who have marginal or noaccess to land.

1. Agricultural workers: landless people whoseasonally sell their labor to work on farms.

—

45

2. Non-agricultural workers: landless who aremarginally in the formal economic sector orengage in informal economic activities.

3. Marginal tenant farmers: those landless ormarginally landless who gain access to kind throughcontractual agreement with other farmers.

4. Marginal farmers: those who have title orcustomary rights to small or marginal farms.These farmers face production constraints due toa lack of water, credit, technology, markets, andgood quality land.

5. Non-sedentary rural households: nomadic orsemi-nomadic pastoralists and other migratorygroups who lack recognition of their legitimateland rights and who face increasing natural andeconomic degradation of their land and water re-sources. Within this group there are several sub-groups characterized by their access to and con-trol of livestock,

Clearly, certain groups face special constraintsbecause of their perceived social status. Womenand ethnic minority groups of some countriesespecially face more severe problems with accessto land, credit, suitable technology, and politi-cal forums.

Data on the number of landless in Africa arescarce. However, one study provides informationwhich questions the assumption that there is abun-dant underused land of decent quality. Averagefigures indicate that 8 to 10 percent of rural Africais landless and up to 30 percent of the ruralpopulation is near-landless (Esman, 1978).

Among the landless, refugees represent prob-ably the poorest class of people in Africa. The ex-act number of people in this group is very diffi-cult to determine because of their mobility andbecause famine and civil strife cause constantlyshifting environmental, social, and political con-ditions. Refugee populations in several countries(e.g., Botswana and Somalia) have been settledand are involved in integrated rural developmentprojects. Some settled populations have producedhigh agricultural returns. In Botswana, for exam-ple, two refugee communities have per hectareyields that are higher than contiguous areas (Dis-trict Agricultural Officer, 1982). However, mostrefugee populations are composed of pastoralists

who are being forced to settle in refugee campsin marginally productive areas and to adapt toa new way of food production. It is unlikely thatthese groups will be able immediately to producesufficient food for their own subsistence or forsurplus.

Alternative approaches to project assistancemight include increased emphasis on integratedrural development, increased levels of fundingallocated to “grass roots” organizations, and in-creased program funding for research. Partici-pants at the OTA workshop were concerned thata target approach toward groups of poor, out-side the existing administrative structure, couldnot alleviate poor people’s problems. Therefore,they advocated the more integrated approach todevelopment. Concern exists, though, that thepoor will be left out if there are no attempts tointegrate them into national, regional, and localplanning efforts.

Addressing common constraints of low-re-source producers seems necessary. Eicher andBaker (1982) and others have defined “small-holders” to be those farmers who produce on 2to 10 acres of land, use mostly family labor, tilltheir land with mostly hand tools, and maintaina small capital stock. Esman (1978) adds that thesemarginal producers face severe constraints to in-creased food production. OTA’s definition of low-resource producers incorporates the above char-acteristics of Eicher and Baker but adds that low-resource producers are those smallholders andherders who often face major constraints in theiraccess to economic, natural, and technological re-sources. The farmer must face constraints suchas access to reliable productive land, affordablecredit, timely inputs, extension advice, draftpower, agricultural training, decent producerprices, and seasonable labor. Migratory and semi-nomadic herders face constraints in access to live-stock, reliably productive range, veterinary andextension services and management advice, reli-able dry season watering points, and technologieson forage crops that will decrease dry season nu-tritional stress.

The consensus of the OTA workshop was thatboth African governments and donor agenciesneed to improve definitions for the target group

46

of low-resource producers, which represents themajority of constrained rural producers; deter-mine the constraints that these producers face andreasonable interventions to overcome them; andensure that this group is integrated into develop-ment program planning. Equally important re-mains the goal of meeting the needs of those poorwho can only marginally be assisted by improvedagricultural technologies, identifying ways to gen-erate income and provide basic needs.

Issue 7: Women contribute significantly to foodproduction in Africa, but have limited accessto extension services, credit, and training.

Preliminary Findings●

●

●

●

●

●

The prevailing model of African agriculturecontends that men are the farm managers.However, up to 33 percent of farm managerssouth of the Sahara are women, and in the re-maining households, women do significantfarm work.

Women contribute substantial amounts of la-bor, capital, and management toward the pro-duction of Africa’s food. Estimates of women’scontribution range from 60 to 80 percent, al-though regional differences exist.

In addition to their agricultural contribution,women also do most household chores, suchas collecting firewood and water, cooking,repairing and maintaining the compounds,childcare, and marketing surplus garden crops.

Women are as innovative as their male coun-terparts in adopting new technologies, yet theyreceive only a fraction of the services and havefewer contacts with extension staff.

Women represent only a minute portion of theagricultural extension staffs. Because of culturalnorms, male extension workers generally willnot consult with women farmers in the house-hold without the presence of an adult malefamily member, even if the woman is the farmmanager.

Most agricultural training programs for womendo not stress agricultural production but tendto be oriented toward home extension.

●

●

●

●

Women have little access to formal institutionalcredit because they usually lack the access toland, livestock, and other forms of collateral.

Women hold few policy and managerial posi-tions within agricultural ministries, especiallythose positions relating to animal and crop pro-duction, research, and field services.

Community meetings are traditionally seen asa forum for men to discuss issues affecting thecommunity and for government extension staffto discuss new agricultural strategies and proj-ect proposals. Women are almost always ex-cluded from these meetings or are too busy toattend.

Women ususally are not included in plan-ning projects intended to increase food pro-duction.

Discussion

This one they call ‘farmer’; send in teachers toteach him to farm (while I’m out growing thefood); lend him money for tractors and tillers(while I’m out growing the food); promise himfortunes if he’d only raise cotton (while I’m outgrowing the food); buy our land from him to addto your ranches (while I’m out growing the food). . . No, I daren’t stop working . . . and I won’tabandon that thing I was born for: to make suremy children have food in their bellies (Taylor,1984).

African women play a major role in food pro-duction. Women’s labor and management con-tribute significantly to food production, with esti-mates ranging from 60 to 80 percent in manyplaces (Boserup, 1970; Tinker, 1981). These fig-ures may not include women’s sizable livestockactivities (McDowell, 1984. Furthermore, in mostagricultural systems, it is difficult to distinguishbetween food and cash crops, since many cerealcrops qualify as both. Women are expected tocontribute work toward the production of cashcrops, and their labor provides a significant pro-portion of the total agricultural component ofGross Domestic Product (GDP). Men, however,are generally the recipients of the income gener-ated. Because of the extremely important rolewomen play in agriculture, a more complete

47

Photo credit. World Bank Photo by Ray Witlin

Afr ican women cont r ibute a substant ia l amount o f the to ta l labor to the product ion o f food crops.Here, Senegalese women harvest sorghum.

knowledge of the constraints women face in agri- model. It can not automatically be assumed thatcultural production is necessary. Therefore, it is each household is a self-contained unit with allnecessary to understand not only the agricultural the household members cooperating and sharingresponsibilities of women but also the intra- responsibilities and management functions. Morehousehold dynamics. appropriately, a woman’s role in food production

In farming, men and women traditionally as-sume responsibilities for certain tasks. Social,cultural, economic, and environmental conditionsusually are factors in the labor patterns of bothrural men and women. Men generally clear, pre-pare, and plow the land, and women plant, weed,harvest, process, and store the food crops. How-ever, there are many regional variations in this

could be considered as semi-autonomous withlevels of cooperation among household membersdiffering with each household (Gladwin, et al.,1984).

Cultural differences, demographic and socio-economic conditions, and labor availability allproduce variations in the general model. Some ofthese include situations where:

48

1.

2.

3.

4.

Some farm operations are shared by themembers of the household. The division oflabor might be dependent on such factors asseasonal availability and the value of cashcrops relative to food crops. The patternmight follow that described above, but womenmight have to do some of the typically“male” tasks.Women and men of the same householdshare the responsibility for a common fieldon which cash crops are grown, but thewomen produce food crops on separatefields. Presumably, the labor patterns willbe similar to the general model, but the manprobably will have control of the woman’slabor and the cash returns from the crops.The woman usually will provide separate la-bor and management for the food crop field.Women and men grow separate crops, eitheron common or on separate fields. For exam-ple, groundnuts and beans might be viewedas a woman’s crop, while maize is a man’s.Women are the household heads and respon-sible for all the management and most of thelabor (Spring, 1984).

The most typical model in pastoral and mixedagricultural systems has men responsible for thecare of larger livestock (e.g., cattle) and womenresponsible for smaller ruminants (goats andsheep). Men are usually entitled to the returnsfrom the sale of cattle and women are responsi-ble for milking and allocation of the milk betweenthe needs of the family and the herd (Hjort andOstberg, 1978; Spencer, 1973). However, otherpatterns developed out of expediency includewomen sharing all livestock responsibilities withmen, caring for different types of livestock (e.g.,goats and sheep), doing different tasks than menwith all the livestock, or taking care of all the live-stock (Spring, 1984). Women, generally, cultivatethe food crops for family consumption, especiallyin situations where the men are mostly absenttending herds (Spencer, 1965; Spencer, 1973;Gulliver, 1955).

Women usually handle most of the domesticchores, including the collection of firewood (forcooking) and water often from distant sources,cooking, cleaning, and childcare. A typical rural

women’s day averages 13 to 15 hours and it is notunusual to see women hoeing with babies strappedto their backs.

Male migration to urban areas in search of em-ployment adds to the burden imposed upon ru-ral African women. With the male absent fromthe household the women must organize labor forland clearing and plowing and the managementof cattle. Women also become de facto heads ofhousehold and farm managers. As Tinker notes:

Today between 25 and 33 percent of all house-holds are de facto headed by a woman due to di-vorce, death, desertion, long-term migration, orbecause she never married. These female headedhouseholds constitute the poorest group in everycountry (Tinker, 1981).

In several countries, the figures are even higher:e.g., Botswana: 40-45 percent (Bond, 1974), Le-sotho: 67 percent (Spring, 1984). However, thismanagerial role has not been recognized andwomen still are excluded from institutional in-volvement in agricultural planning, credit for pro-duction, access to de facto or de jure title to land,extension services, and farm production training.Instead, women generally receive traditional train-ing in nutrition, health, home extension, andhandicraft production.

Access to extension services is extremely impor-tant, but these systems frequently fail to contactwomen. For many social and political reasons,large amounts of agricultural information andservices are directed toward the “progressive”male farmer (Berger, et al., 1984; Roling, et al.,1981). Extension agents are restricted by culturalnorms from approaching female heads of house-hold without a man present. They also receive fewincentives for approaching women and poorerfarmers who lack access to sufficient land and in-come to purchase agricultural inputs. The assump-tion is that this information will be disseminatedfrom the “progressive” male farmers to householdmembers and other farmers in the community, butquite often this is not the case (Fortmann, 1978).

In summary, the problems that women face re-garding access to agricultural services are:

1. Male planners and extension staff viewwomen as the domestic labor force in the

49

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

household who also provide agricultural la-bor; women are seen as “farmers’ wives”(Spring, et al., 1983).Women have few channels for communicat-ing their problems to local leaders or to gov-ernment agricultural staff.Most research information transferred byagricultural extension staff is aimed at thosefarmers who have capital for such practicesas land clearing and plowing and introduc-tion of mechanical planters, fertilizer, andgrain-milling equipment. Usually only menare able to take advantage of these innova-tions. As a consequence, increased landunder cultivation exacerbates the labor bur-den on women or eliminates some of wom-en’s extra income-earning activities.Limited research exists on methods to alle-viate the production labor constraints ofwomen (in hoeing, planting, weeding, har-vesting, and processing), and few attemptshave been made to disseminate informationuseful to women by institutionalized agricul-tural extension programs. Women receivefewer visits from extension agents than mendo (Fortmann, 1978; Staudt, 1975; Spring,et al., 1983).Women farmers are less likely than men tohave sufficient income to purchase necessaryagricultural inputs (Berger, et al., 1984).Access to land is necessary for agriculturalcredit and for membership in most agricul-tural societies that distribute inputs, infor-mation, or technical assistance (Berger, et al.,1984; Moris, 1981; Schumacher, 1981).Even though women tend to be as innovativeas men (Fortmann, 1981; Staudt, 1975),seldom are they selected for farmer trainingcourses. When they are, they are often toobusy to attend or cannot organize childcare,or attend to find that only home economiccourses in nutrition and family welfare areoffered.

The OTA workshop participants and other ex-perts find it is extremely important that the con-straints rural African women face are addressed.The problems in reaching women are partly po-litical and partly institutional. Political problems

such as access to land and participation in thedecisionmaking process at the local, district, andnational levels could be addressed by Africangovernments if increasing the food contributionof female headed households is a priority. Sev-eral possible changes have been proposed thatwould contribute to assessing the needs of womenfarmers and provide services that they could use:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

Recruitment of additional female extensionstaff. Extension staffs in most African coun-tries are predominantly male. Men make upbetween 94 and 99.7 percent of the staff inthose countries with more than 20 extensionagents (Berger, et al., 1984). It is assumedthat female extension staff will contact womenmore frequently than male staff. Therefore,priority could be placed on recruiting morefemale extension staff.Training courses for all extension staff thatexplain the role of women in agriculture andthat develop techniques designed to encour-age the participation of women farmers inthe delivery of extension services.Introduction of village level women para-professionals to work with women farmers(Ministry of Agriculture, 1983).Incentive systems for extension staff that en-courage working with low-resource pro-ducers, especially women.Ensure that women have access to credit, ei-ther by developing appropriate credit insti-tutions or expanding indigenous credit so-cieties.Design village based programs aimed wherewomen gather—e.g., at village water points.Include women as beneficiaries of land re-form or allocate them rights of use to landin traditional systems.Ensure that farmer training courses stress-ing food production techniques are availableto women on an equal basis with men.Emphasize the use of farming systems research(FSR) to investigate the intrahousehold dy-namics within farms. For each situation andcondition, it is important to identify goals,decision criteria, and the context of the deci-sions for women (Gladwin, et al., 1984;Spring, 1984).

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Photo credit: US. Agency for International Development

Many organizations have called for changes in agricultural extension systems to meet the needs of low-resource producers,especially women. One suggestion is to work with groups of people where they normally gather. Village water supplies,

like this one in Niger, offer opportunities to reach women without disrupting their work activities.

Issue 8: Extension systems in Africa lack clearobjectives and adequate structure for increas-ing food production.

Preliminary Findings●

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●

●

Extension systems are in place in most Africancountries, but generally seem to be ineffectivein transferring information between farmersand researchers.

The objectives of extension programs com-monly are confusing to the field staff or thefarmers.

Farmers often have inappropriate expectationsof extension.

African extension systems frequently have fewtechnical innovations to propose to farmers asoptions to current technology because research-

●

●

●

ers and the extension service are in differentministries (or divisions) and usually coordinatepoorly.

Extension services generally have few subjectspecialists who can communicate effectivelywith both researchers and extension staff.

Agricultural research and extension servicescommonly do not take into account the needsof low-resource farmers. Most planning andimplementation have been centralized and theinnovations introduced tend to be directedtoward more “progressive” farmers.

The U.S. research and extension model assumesthat the existing technological base is under-productive and that technological innovationscan increase farm productivity.

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● The U.S. land grant model of agent/farmer in-teraction, which uses applied research, couldbe modified to suit specific country conditionsin Africa.

Discussion

One institution directly involved in technologytransfer is the agricultural extension service. Ona day to day basis, staffs attempt to transfer in-formation on available technologies and farmingpractices to farmers. The United States and manyother donors have spent several billions of dollarson developing and strengthening extension sys-tems (Watts and Claar, 1983). But these attemptshave failed to contribute significantly to increasesin food production or to reach the poorer seg-ments of agricultural societies (Moris, 1981; An-thony, et al., 1979; Richardson, 1983), Someproblems of African extension systems most fre-quently mentioned are inappropriate models,poorly defined goals and objectives, poor orga-nization, inadequate human and financial re-sources, lack of suitable technology to extend, fail-ure of agricultural ministries to identify targetgroups, loss of skilled field staff due to promo-tion, predominantly male staffs ignoring womenproducers, and the lack of remuneration, trans-portation, and respect for the field agents (Kellogg,1983; McDowell, 1984; Moris, 1981; Spring,1984).

The historical development of Africa deter-mined the evolution of most extension systems.In Francophone Africa, the French extensionmodel (sometimes combined with the U.S. landgrant system) was based on a cash crop economy.The British introduced an extension system in EastAfrica and parts of West Africa designed to stim-ulate production of food and cash crops for theBritish market, even though the domestic Britishmodel for extension was based on food produc-tion (Watts and Claar, 1983). In each of theseareas fragments of these models still remain andaffect the objectives of the systems.

The model that the United States has been pro-moting in many areas of Africa is based on theU.S. land grant system of research, education, andoutreach. Using this system, attempts have beenmade to transfer both international and national

research to “progressive” farmers and herders,assuming that the adoption of innovative agricul-tural techniques will be passed on to other low-resource producers. However, “[developing coun-tries] have systems oriented to serving govern-mental needs. They stress things, not people. Theyare not client-centered and not well set up to reachsmall farmers, to create credibility or to transferknowledge” (Watts and Claar, 1983).

Five general approaches to agricultural exten-sion exist in Africa. They are: 1) the conventionalor innovation-centered approach, based on apackage of innovations to be distributed to indi-vidual farmers, usually the more “progressive”ones; 2) the commodity-focused approach, basedon the promotion of a single cash crop and theinputs necessary for a timely harvest and a suit-able remuneration for the producers; 3) commu-nity development-cum-extension approach, whichintegrates agricultural extension with other com-munity development activities; 4) the “animationrurale” or extension techniques used to organizegroups of producers to solicit needs and provideinformation relevant to those needs; and 5) thefarmer-focused or the Training and Visit Systemapproach, which emphasizes providing recom-mendations based on the circumstances of thefarmer, regular in-service training for the exten-sion agents, tightly scheduled visits to the farmers,and close supervision (Pickering, 1984).

Problems exist with each of these approaches.The conventional approach generally involves theintroduction of relatively expensive technicalpackages of inputs. Because of the risk involvedwith the expense of the complete package, it isdifficult for low-resource producers to adopt anyof these innovations. Consequently, frustratedagents work mostly with the more “progressive”farmers who have the financial means to purchasethe packages, and the majority of low-resourceproducers are excluded. Since the agents workalmost exclusively with wealthier farmers orherders, perceived problems that require furtherattention of research institutes do not representthe problems of low-resource producers (Stavis,1979).

The commodity approach obviously does lit-tle to promote the increased production of food

52

crops as it deals exclusively with the productionof a single cash crop. It can be directed towardsmall holders, but as with the conventional sys-tem, the tendency generally requires expensivepackages of innovations.

The “animation rurale” approach, by workingwith groups of producers, has the advantage ofreaching more farmers and herders with limitedstaff. Not only does this allow the extension sys-tem to reduce costs but the technique provides astructure for optimizing economies of scale insome farm operations and gives them some con-trol over the extension system (Stavis, 1979). Thedisadvantage some see is that local groups are dif-ficult to form (Pickering, 1984). However, thisproblem often can be overcome by working withindigenous groups instead of introducing newones.

The community development-cum-extensionapproach is criticized because it diffuses the ex-tension efforts among too many activities anddiminishes the impact that extension agents canhave on introduction of agricultural technologies(Pickering, 1984). However, enough concern wasexpressed at the OTA workshop about agricul-tural development proceeding in a manner iso-lated from rural development to justify examin-ing this approach.

Finally, the Training and Visit System (TVS)approach represents the World Bank’s attempt tostrengthen conventional extension systems. Exten-sion agents are being supported with in-servicetraining, closer supervision, and infrastructuralsupport. Also, they are relieved of many of theirnon-agricultural responsibilities. The system alsois designed to ensure that extension supervisorswork with a limited number of agents and thatthe agent/farmer contacts are regularly scheduled(Benor and Harrison, 1977). The system gener-ally uses contact with individual producers butcan be used for group extension activities. Theadvantage of the approach is that it strengthensexisting systems and provides regular in-servicetraining. The disadvantages are: 1) it requires ahigh level of recurrent costs that most Africangovernments cannot afford and 2) by reinforcingexisting systems, it may affect little the informa-tion flow to low-resource producers, may ignore

indigenous production techniques, and may con-tinue to promote technological packages that areinappropriate to local social, environmental, andeconomic conditions.

OTA has developed several conditions for thesuccessful transfer of technology (Box B). Onenecessary condition requires that both users andtransfer agents be involved in the choosing, plan-ning, and implementation of the technology sothat it meets the actual needs of the user. This en-sures a two-way educational process; the agentrelating technical and institutional support infor-mation, and the farmer identifying constraints andneeds. Generally, extension agents deliver themessage or physical inputs to the community andmeasure the outputs. This organizational struc-ture allows no opportunity for feedback fromfarmers to reach the researchers and assumes thatthe government agricultural hierarchy knowswhat is best for the farmers (Nobe, 1983; Moris,1981).

Another equally important condition is that thetechnology be adapted to the users’ local bio-physical and socioeconomic situations. This im-plies that extension systems not only have to in-troduce technologies that fit the local conditionsbut also must be sensitive to the existing farmingsystems and indigenous technologies. The exten-sion system should be able to transfer informa-tion in both directions. The farmers’ problemsneed to be presented to agricultural researchersand policy staff, while the researchers need topresent suggested improvements back to thefarmers.

To reach low-resource producers effectively andincrease food production, African governmentsand donor agencies must establish clear objectivesfor agricultural development, target group(s), andalternative structures for agricultural extensionsystems that assist in meeting objectives. An ef-fective extension system should: 1) provide mech-anisms for research/extension coordination, 2)establish clear terms of reference that rural peo-ple understand and support, 3) develop methodsfor understanding the constraints of and provid-ing opportunities for low-resource producers, 4)identify indigenous agricultural technologies anddetermine their effectiveness, and 5) function onthe premise that client participation is crucial.

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Box B.—Conditions Necessary for Successful Technology Transfer

The OTA assessment on technologies to sustain tropical forest resources identified a number of neces-sary conditions for successful technology transfer. For most technologies, the lack of these conditionsseems to be constraining wider adaptation and adoption:

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

●

Technology is transferred most effectively by direct people-to-people actions. People who are toadapt and apply the technology need to learn it directly from people who have experience applying it.

The technology needs to be adapted at the user’s end to local biophysical and socioeconomic con-ditions.

Well-qualified people with knowledge about the technology are needed on the source end of thetransfer, and receptive, capable people are needed on the receiving end. These people maybe localtransfer agents or they may be the end users.

Another type of actor, the “facilitator, “ is also necessary. Facilitators understand the technologytransfer process, including the market for the technology and its products and the political, social,and economic constraints and opportunities that affect all the other actors.

Users and transfer agents should be involved in choosing the technologies and in planning and im-plementing the transfer process so that the technology and the transfer meet actual needs and areappropriate for the local situation.

All parties involved-source, transfer agents, facilitators, and end users-must feel that they arewinners and must, in-fact, be winners. Each actor’s self interests should be identified at the startof the technology transfer process so that they can be addressed.

Each participant must be aware of subsequent steps in the transfer process so his or her actionsare appropriate to the late steps. This requires early definition of roles for each person involved.

The environment for technology demonstrations should be similar to the environment that will ex-ist during subsequent steps of the transfer process. Pilot transfer projects should not be unrealisticallyeasy.

The initial commitment of resources to the process should be sufficient to carry the technology transferuntil it is self-supporting.

The transfer process must include mechanisms through which all participants can contribute effec-tively to interim evaluations and improvements.

SOURCE U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies to Sustain Tropical Forest Resources, Summary (Washington, DC: U.S. Government PrintingOffice, March 1984).

[T]he fundamental problem lies not, as is com-monly assumed, between researchers and exten-sionists . . . much more serious was a failure byboth research and extension to perceive farmers’problems from the farmer’s own perspective . . . .If research and extension are to offer useful rec-ommendations to farmers, they must look at thewhole farming system (Collinson, 1984).

A farming systems research (FSR) approachprovides a methodology that has promise. Far-ming systems research is “an approach to agri-

cultural research and development [of technology]that views the whole farm as a system” (Shaner,et al., 1982). The primary goal of FSR is to in-crease the productivity of the farming systemgiven the complete range of societal goals and theconstraints of the farming systems (Gilbert, et al.,1980). Characteristics of FSR include: 1) location-specific research, 2) development of improvedtechnologies for a target group of farmers, 3) aninterdisciplinary nature, 4) an iterative approachto technology development, 5) using the house-

54

hold as the management unit, and 6) farmer par-ticipation in the research development (CIMMYTEconomics Staff, 1984; Shaner, 1983).

Figure 9 indicates this step-wise technologicaltransfer process with sufficient feedback provi-sions to ensure the development of technologiesappropriate to farmers’ needs. OTA workshopparticipants felt that FSR could be a very usefulmethod for determining farmers’ constraints anddeveloping technologies with the farmers (on theirfields) instead of for them. However, since AIDis questioning the cost-effectiveness of the ap-proach, the OTA workshop participants felt thatthe approach needs to be simplified and needs toincorporate conventional extension systems in theprocess.

Agricultural extension remains ineffective in theidentification of farmers’ constraints and in sup-plying useful technology in response to these con-straints. African governments could develop con-cise objectives that stress the need for farmerparticipation, coordination between researchersand extension, and alternative approaches fordealing with low-resource producers. However,even with more effective extension systems, onething should be emphasized.

Figure 9.—integrating Farming Systems Researchand Agricultural Extension for Technology Transfer

On-farm research activities

SOURCE: Willis W. Shaner, “Linking Extension with Farming Systems Research,”In: Knowledge Transfer in Developing Countries, J. B. Claar and L. H.Watts (eds.), Proceedings of a Conference on International Extension,Steamboat Springs, CO, July 1983.

[Extension programs by themselves in theabsence of land tenure reforms and vigorous,egalitarian input supply programs, should not beexpected to reverse the trend toward concentra-tion of assets in the rural society, or to save thesmall, poor, or inefficient farmer. They can, how-ever, assure that the small farmer is not disadvan-taged with regard to information (Stavis, 1979).

Issue 9: The lack of training and back-up supportfor extension field staff contributes to inade-quate information transfer.

Preliminary Findings●

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Physical constraints affecting extension agentshave been lack of transportation, decent hous-ing, in-service training, access to information,and remuneration/incentives for working in ru-ral areas with few services.

Extension agents sometimes act as input dis-tributors instead of information disseminators.

Field agents have been burdened with a sub-stantial number of nonagriculturally relatedactivities that limit extension work.

The agent/farmer ratio remains low in mostcountries, which encourages a “progressive”farmer approach instead of a broader group ap-proach.

Inadequate numbers of well-trained field staffis a problem. The recruitment of field staff usu-ally is biased toward urban residents with lit-tle farm experience. Excellent staff are promotedout of the field; no incentives are offered to con-tinue working in rural areas.

Overemphasis is placed on paper work insteadof field accomplishments.

Agricultural training institutes generally havetaught extension staff individual farmer inter-vention techniques. Group extension activitiesusually are given low priority.

In-service training is limited and does not pro-vide opportunities for staff to provide feedbackto trainers.

Discussion

Extension services, as with most institutions inAfrica, suffer from weak human resources devel-

55

opment. Depending on the area, a typical exten-sion agent is expected to communicate with be-tween 100 and 800 farm families (Anthony, et al.,1979; Pickering, 1984). In addition, the agent alsowill have several nonagriculturally related tasksto accomplish. These include attending monthlyagricultural meetings that may require severaldays of travel time, distributing agricultural in-puts, monitoring credit collection, settling localdisputes between farmers, and serving as a localgovernment agricultural representative (Watts andClaar, 1983). These impositions on the staff serve

to limit motivation. Most extension agents livein fairly remote areas, lack adequate housing andtransportation, receive low salaries comparedwith urban counterparts, are given inadequatetechnical information and moral support, receivelittle in-service training, and perceive limited po-tential for career advancement (Moris, 1981;Hyden, 1983; Watts and Claar, 1983).

As a result of the extended network and lackof support, an extension agent generally respondsin at least two detrimental ways. One is that the

Photo credit. Ray Witlin of the World Bank

Agricultural extension systems are generally weak and offer few incentives for staff to work in the more remote areaswith low-resource producers, especially women. Here, an agricultural demonstrator shows male farmers of the Casamance

region of Senegal how to use a single-furrow plow.

56

agent realizes the physical constraints (and thelack of incentives to operate otherwise) and limitsthe number of field visits to those farmers whoare either immediately accessible or “progressive”enough to more readily accept government ad-vice and/or inputs. The agent will also attendcommunity meetings where contact with a largerbody of farmers is possible. The other responseis that a growing emphasis is placed on quantifica-tion of inputs and outputs to justify the extensionagent’s existence. The agent then becomes a dis-tributor of inputs, not an extension agent. Nei-ther one of these responses results in an extensionagent who communicates with target groups offarmers or who is an active disseminator of tech-nology based on perceived and/or articulatedfarmers’ problems.

In the past several years, the World Bank ini-tiated an extension support program that was de-signed to eliminate some of these problems. Theprogram, called the Training and Visit System(TVS), strengthens the extension system by se-parating it from other conflicting responsibilitiesand through credibility-building support pro-grams. Moris (1981) identifies other reform meas-

ures of the TVS as: assignment of a reasonablenumber of farm families to each agent, provid-ing reasonable supervisor/agent ratios, identifica-tion of innovations that will have an immediateimpact, intensive in-service training on a sched-uled basis, provision of methods for the improve-ment of farm management before encouragingpurchased inputs, developing contact links withresearch bodies, and providing sufficient trans-port and incentives for the contact staff.

The TVS deals with the credibility, institutionalweakness, and incentive issues. Criticisms of thesystem are that: 1) it is based on the false assump-tion that exogenous technologies exist that aresuitable for local ecological, social, and economi-cal conditions, 2) it requires large recurrent bud-gets to operate, and 3) it does little to eliminatethe male bias in extension systems. However, asothers have indicated, the TVS does a great dealto strengthen the inadequate human resourcescomponent of extension systems. It could beevaluated further to determine its role in upgrad-ing existing extension systems, especially with re-spect to FSR.

Chapter 5

Issues in Technical Assistance

Chapter 5

Issues in Technical Assistance

Technology development and technology trans-fer are of course key to American efforts to in-crease food production in Africa. But the effec-tiveness of these efforts depends in large part onthe effectiveness of technical assistance programs.That leaves a major question: is it possible to de-termine if assistance—whether through public orprivate channels—is working?

This section discusses issues relating to the ef-fectiveness of technical assistance, some directedat U.S. Government policies and others at non-governmental organizations and private busi-nesses. For instance, how are assistance effortshindered by the lack of clear U.S. goals and lackof long-term U.S. commitment to development?Are the impacts of large amounts of aid propor-tionately effective? How can assistance programsbe evaluated to determine if they were successful?And what roles can private businesses and non-governmental organizations be expected to playin increasing food production?

Issue 10: U.S. foreign aid to Africa operates with-out clear goals and objectives and without along-term commitment to development.

Preliminary Findings●

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Foreign aid benefits the United States substan-tially, both economically and politically, butthis has not been made clear to the Americanpublic. Therefore, development assistance re-mains controversial, with little constituency forreform.

Increasing agricultural production, as well asfood security, in sub-Saharan Africa requiresa long-term commitment to development withcontinued technical support and assured funding.

Long-term technical assistance is difficult toprovide under the short-term political condi-tions common to American foreign assistance.

Development priorities and initiatives shift fromadministration to administration as foreign pol-icy goals and AID staff change.

Countries’ eligibility for technical assistancechanges, sometimes frequently, as a result ofinternal and external political changes.

Administration policies may conflict with pre-viously legislated goals; competition betweenold and new initiatives and thus staff confusionmay result.

Foreign aid projects usually are too short tohave long-term, positive impacts on the diffi-cult agricultural problems in sub-SaharanAfrica.

The trend in length of projects conducted byAID cannot be determined because of problemswith the data base.

Discussion

American foreign aid provides substantial ben-efits to the United States. For this reason, it hasreceived the strong support of every administra-tion since World War II.

Congress has been less steadfast in its supportof U.S. foreign aid. Historically, U.S. security andpolitical benefits have been regarded as the mostimportant ones. Some Members recognize thatlarge amounts of U.S. foreign aid money returnto the United States as purchases of U.S. goodsand services. In fact, procurement policies ensurethat most foreign aid funds are spent in the UnitedStates. Therefore, foreign aid has economic bene-fits at home and overseas. Other Members ofCongress have advocated foreign aid on human-itarian grounds.

Still other Members of Congress can be de-scribed as:

advocates of particular development strat-egies—e. g., women in development;supporters of new approaches—e.g., theAfrican Development Foundation;uninterested parties because the foreign aidbudget item is relatively small; andcommitted adversaries on the grounds thatforeign aid is a bad investment, harming the

59

—

60

United States and the recipients (Morss andMorss, 1982).

The American public, as a whole, is not an en-thusiastic or reliable supporter of foreign aid. Lesssupport exists for foreign aid than any other typeof Federal spending according to recent Louis Har-ris surveys (Morss and Morss, 1982).

The diversity of congressional interests, the lackof a strong public constituency, and most Presi-dents’ disinterest in the specifics of foreign aid billshave led to “grab-bag” legislation. Currently, AIDdevelopment projects must meet some 75 legisla-tive and statutory requirements before approval(Commission on Security and Economic Assist-ance, 1983). In addition, Congress has demon-strated a wide array of concerns during reviewsof U.S. foreign aid, “concerns that frequently havelittle to do with the congressional intent reflectedin its own aid legislation” (Morss and Morss,1982). In recent years so little congressional in-terest has existed that it was difficult to enactforeign aid authorization and appropriation bills(Newels, 1984).

U.S. foreign assistance programs that haveemerged from these considerations are designedto: 1) promote support for humanitarian relief ef-forts, 2) foster export expansion, 3) enhance astable international economy, 4) expand supportfrom other Western donors through multilateralinstitutions, 5) support regional peace initiatives,6) provide security for friendly governments, and7) counter Soviet and Soviet-supported influence.These goals sometimes are not compatible nor arethey generally translated into measurable objec-tives in set time frames. In addition, their rela-tive priorities and relative effectiveness are opento varying interpretations (Wilhelm, 1983).

U.S. foreign aid is now near an all-time-low lev-el as measured in percentage of gross nationalproduct and constant dollars. The proportion ofbilateral development funding aimed at Africa hasdecreased recently, but other programs for Africahave increased due to larger emergency food de-liveries under Public Law 480 and proposals fornew programs (Newels, 1984). In 1983, the Sec-retary of State established a bipartisan commis-sion to conduct a comprehensive review of thegoals and objectives of American programs and

to identify ways to increase support for them. TheCarlucci Commission concluded that:

In Africa there is an economic crisis of majordimensions that will call for a serious long-termresponse by the U. S., the donor, and the recipi-ent countries. Failure to deal with these problemscan have serious security implications (Commis-sion on Security and Economic Assistance, 1983).

The Commission also suggested that the UnitedStates:

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increase foreign aid funding;expand support for foreign aid among Fed-eral leaders and the public;use aid to support economic policy reformsand promote the private sector;increase concessionality of military aid;increase flexibility in aid;establish a new Federal agency to coordinateand administer foreign aid programs;adopt a country approach to aid;increase emphasis on science and technology,human resources development, and institu-tion-building;support development objectives of the Foodfor Peace Program;ensure integrated programs for sub-SaharanAfrica and the Caribbean Region; andimprove evaluation of bilateral and multila-teral programs (Commission on Security andEconomic Assistance, 1983).

The proposed Federal agency was the Commis-sion’s recommendation for dealing with the frag-mented nature of foreign assistance programs. Itreflects Commission members’ perceptions that allforms of foreign assistance need to be integratedinto programs in which funding levels, related ac-tivities, and degree of concessionality are basedon both the recipients’ needs and U.S. objectives(Wilhelm, 1983). This proposed agency has notbeen established, although some of the Commis-sion’s other recommendations have been imple-mented.

The Agency for International Development(AID) is charged with implementing most U.S. bi-lateral foreign aid policies. The congressionalmandates in 1973 known as “New Directions” in-troduced new concerns into the design of AIDprograms (Morss and Morss, 1982). Interpreta-

61

tion of the legislation has been difficult, with AIDfavoring projects with visible short-term effectsrather than long-term projects with less immedi-ate benefits (Stokeld, 1982). In addition, short-term shifts in the proportion of assistance desig-nated for military, economic security, and devel-opment programs occur and are controversial(Newels, 1984; Commission on Security and Eco-nomic Assistance, 1983).

The eligibility of particular countries for foreignassistance changes with political changes in theUnited States and in the host country. For exam-ple, assistance to Tanzania and Ethiopia was af-fected by shifts to socialist policies in these coun-tries, despite the avowed humanitarian purposesof some assistance. This problem is likely to in-crease as the U.S. Government funds larger por-tions of the private and voluntary organizations’budgets. Their ability to respond to humanitarianneeds for agricultural assistance may be decreasedby their closer ties to U.S. foreign policy.

The effects of such policy shifts on technologycan sometimes be direct. For example, Congressenacted section 107 of the International Develop-ment and Food Assistance Act of 1975, authoriz-ing AID to expand its efforts with capital-savingtechnology. AID has emphasized private sectorinitiatives since that time and some AID staffperceive that the two efforts conflict (U.S. GAO,1984).

Agriculture is the central focus of much Amer-ican aid to Africa, reflecting a wide consensus in-side and outside of the American Government thatagricultural development is the most importantlong-term concern for the entire African continent(Whitaker, 1984). AID allocates about 60 percentof its African assistance to agriculture, or approx-imately $150 million in fiscal year 1985 (U.S. Con-gress, Committee on Appropriations, 1984). De-bate continues whether development assistance toAfrica remains too low or is poorly balanced withother types of assistance.

The U.S. Government has struggled to deter-mine the most effective type of rural developmentaid for decades (Ruttan, 1982; 1983). Communitydevelopment was emphasized in the 1950s. In the1960s, donors supported narrower agriculturalproduction programs and institution-building.

“Integrated rural development” was popular in theearly 1970s, only to be replaced by the “basicneeds” approach in 1973. Now the “basic needs”approach is being severely questioned. The num-ber of families whose most basic needs are notmet continues to grow (Ruttan, World Develop-ment 12(4), 1984) and, especially in Africa, reli-able food surpluses do not exist (Eicher and Baker,1982).

Finding an appropriate niche for American in-volvement is essential, given a limited foreign aidbudget and continuing severe food problems (Fal-con, 1984). The Carlucci Commission notes thatthe United States is virtually alone among bilateraldonors in supporting projects developed by resi-dent staff. Critics claim that this approach leadsto fragmentation. For example, AID supports ap-proximately 1,000 projects in Africa now (Eicher,October 1984). Suggestions for new approachesinclude:

greater multilateral coordination with indi-vidual donors assuming responsibility for aidto certain regions of the world or sectors ofactivity; andgreater emphasis on general long-term pro-gram aid instead of specific project aid, espe-cially in agricultural research.

Issue 11: The evaluation process used by AIDdoes not enable a consistent determination ofthe effectiveness of the Agency in providingtechnologies to low-resource producers.

Preliminary Findings

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AID evaluations prior to 1980 measured proj-ect inputs and outputs and were weak on anykind of qualitative or quantitative informationregarding other types of positive outcomes ofthe AID projects.

AID’s Africa Bureau developed guidelines in1982 for evaluating the rate of technology adop-tion for its projects. The guidelines have notbeen used consistently and AID plans to discon-tinue them.

Too much attention is paid to starting new proj-ects and not enough to implementing and eval-uating existing ones.

62

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The problem at AID missions is part attitudinaland part staffing; most missions have too manyobligations for the size of their staffs.

Evaluation reports commonly are not taken ser-iously by the mission directors. They appar-ently consider evaluation a peripheral activity,do not have full-time evaluation officers, andsee little value in using evaluations in the de-sign stage of new projects.

Host country counterparts usually do not par-ticipate in the evaluation process because theprocess is seen as being negative and they donot wish to be involved in a process that mayinfluence their own standing in the government.

Intended beneficiaries of projects are seldom in-cluded in the evaluation process. This partici-pation could assist project implementors in de-termining socioeconomic impacts.

Duration of projects is too short to measureresults effectively and establish continuity; feed-back is needed during the life of the project.

AID handbooks require that AID missions usepast project experience in designing new proj-ects. However, this guidance is not consistentlyfollowed or enforced by AID.

African ministry planners and beneficiaries areseldom involved in the evaluation and designphases of AID projects.

In-service training of AID mission staff may notinclude guideline; on evaluation procedures andthe importance of feedback planning.

Discussion

AID’s effectiveness in transferring technologyappropriate to increasing food production by low-resource producers in Africa can be measured byits own project evaluations. Any agency involvedin project design and implementation must be ableto learn constructive lessons from past perform-ance to improve ongoing and future project de-sign. Through interviews and other research,OTA examined the AID evaluation process.

Stressing field autonomy, the AID missions de-termine which projects in their respective port-folios require mid-term and final evaluations. The

projects selected represent the development em-phasis of the mission’s Country DevelopmentStrategy Statement (CDSS). For example, a mis-sion concentrating a substantial portion of itsbudget on FSR would presumably want to iden-tify a larger number of its FSR projects for eval-uation.

The Africa Bureau of AID/Washington receives2-year evaluation plans of each mission. The Bu-reau identifies larger issue areas for evaluation anddetermines if the composite evaluation plans fromeach mission will gather the necessary informa-tion. If not, the Bureau requests additional infor-mation or conducts its own evaluation to gatherthe necessary information. The Bureau then ap-proves the respective mission plans for the reviewof the Center for Development Information andEvaluation (CDIE).

The CDIE oversees AID’s evaluation process.This center reviews mission evaluation plans andthe Africa Bureau, conducts assessments (impactevaluations on selected topics), and provides in-formation on development theory, past AID proj-ects, and technical data through its developmentinformation system.

In 1979, AID re-established its Africa Bureauevaluation unit. Its evaluation officer requesteda study by the U.S. Department of CommerceCensus Bureau on the effectiveness of the AIDevaluation process regarding its appropriate tech-nology projects. The Census Bureau concludedthat AID missions did not use project evaluationsbecause the evaluations contained little informa-tion for subsequent project design. Specifically,“technology transfer for the purpose of the proj-ect was not defined, adoption was not defined,the variables needed for monitoring adoptionwere not identified and the degree to which tech-nology existed prior to project implementationhad not been measured” (U.S. Department ofCommerce, 1983). A separate report also con-cluded that the AID evaluation process producedno comparative or consistent data with which tocompare projects within the AID portfolio (Asso-ciates in Rural Development, 1982). Finally, anAID-commissioned impact assessment concludedthat the absence of information on project char-acteristics makes a comparative analysis of AID’s

63

projects difficult (Crawford and Barclay, 1982).However, a more fundamental question remainson the value of the original project goals and ob-jectives. Crawford and Barclay (1982) identifiedsome of the major problems with evaluating theeffectiveness and goals of AID in conducting re-search for small farmers.

[T]here [is no] guarantee that the original proj-ect objectives are realistic and can themselvesserve as an adequate basis for evaluating projectperformance. Project goals and purposes aresometimes written to guide the authorization ofproject funds rather than to guide project evalua-tion. The majority of sample projects, at leastnominally, concentrated on research whose ulti-mate goal was to benefit small farmers. General-ly, the projects concentrated on crops that smallfarmers grew or worked in resource poor areaswhere small farmers and the rural poor comprisemost of the population. Except to note that thiswas the project goal, however, evaluations gavelittle attention to measuring the success of suchefforts or evaluating alternative methods of reach-ing the smallscale farmer (Crawford and Barclay,1982),

In an attempt to develop procedures that AIDcould use to collect uniform data for project com-parison, the Census Bureau proposed 11 guide-lines that all evaluations were to address. Theguidelines contained categories for the measure-ment of those constraints the project attemptedto overcome, technologies introduced and re-placed, justification for the assumptions that thebeneficiaries would adopt the technologies, post-project adoption rates, the type of technologytransfer system, and the impact on the intendedbeneficiaries. The guidelines were approved foruse by the Africa Bureau in March 1982.

Recent OTA interviews with AID officials in-dicate that AID has not consistently used theguidelines and feels that the guidelines should bediscontinued. In their place, AID will propose thatevaluations outline some general problems so thatcommon concerns and experiences can be com-piled for use by project design personnel. How-ever, this approach may not provide comparativedata to determine the impacts of projects uponintended beneficiaries or excluded groups, espe-cially women.

OTA finds that sufficient evidence exists to in-dicate that at present the AID evaluation processserves little purpose in assisting project design of-ficers and certainly gives little comparative infor-mation of the impact of AID’s projects upon therural poor. AID’s efforts to strenghten its evalua-tion capacity could be strongly supported. WithinCongress, AID, and host country ministries, theevaluation process could be seen in a more posi-tive perspective. An audit process is less effectivethan one that encourages the use of qualitativeand quantitative information for improved proj-ect design. However, AID could do much moreto ensure that the beneficial or adverse impactsupon groups of rural poor are measured. Themost beneficial change would be to involve hostcountry planners and project beneficiaries in theevaluation process in a manner that allows ob-jective criticism of projects without punitive re-sponses from the government or AID.

Issue 12: The results of recipient countries re-ceiving large quantities of confessional foodaid are not clear.

Preliminary Findings●

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Food aid is an important type of developmentassistance. The need for food aid in Africa willpersist because of constraints on agriculturalproduction in drought-prone and other areas.

The impacts of confessional food aid sometimesare negative; food aid can displace indigenousfarmers from the marketplace, shift dietarypreferences, decrease incentives for increasinglocal food production, and discourage recipi-ent governments from undertaking needed agri-cultural reform.

Goals of donor and recipient countries, andlong-term versus short-term interests of each,may conflict when donors provide largeamounts of food aid regularly. For example,arguments exist whether commodity benefitshave been achieved along with developmentbenefits in the Public Law 480 programs.

Development programs may be forced to com-pete with food aid programs, given the down-ward trend in overall foreign assistance.

64

Certain U.S. States benefit substantially fromsales of Public Law 480 commodities. Expertsdisagree regarding the current and future im-portance of Public Law 480 in disposal of U.S.surpluses.

Discussion

In 1984, the U.S. celebrated the 30th anniver-sary of its primary food aid program, Food forPeace (the Agricultural Trade Development andAssistance Act of 1954, Public Law 480). Amend-ments during its three decades have shifted theprogram from local currencies to dollars, deletedreferences to the use of American surpluses, andtied food aid to development assistance and pol-icy reform in recipient countries.

Public Law 480 has three components as a re-sult of these amendments. Title I provides favor-able terms for financing private sales of commod-ities to “friendly” countries. Title II authorizesemergency donations handled by internationalagencies and U.S. private and voluntary groups.Title III provides food for resale and then localuse of the proceeds for approved projects or pol-icy initiatives (USDA, July 1984a).

The total African Public Law 480 program infiscal year 1984 was estimated at $258.9 millionwith about one-fifth of that amount supplied asemergency food aid. AID proposed that the pro-gram for fiscal year 1985 be funded at $234.7 mil-lion, without including estimates of emergencyneeds (U.S. Congress, Committee on Appropria-tions, 1984). The current famine has acceleratedshipments of Public Law 480 commodities; alloca-tions approved in the first month of fiscal year1985 are approximately 75 percent of total ship-ments in fiscal year 1984 (Cook, 1984). Food aidis expected to be a continuing need in Africa, espe-cially in the areas where climate fluctuates widelyand more droughts are probable.

This program has been an important source ofemergency food aid for African countries. Also,Public Law 480 benefits the United States substan-tially: 12 American States each sell approximately$50 million of agricultural products annually;most other States sell smaller amounts (USDA,July 1984a). Doubts exist, however, about itslong-term effects on agricultural development and

whether it is the best method to achieve some-times conflicting goals. Despite repeated attemptsto evaluate Public Law 480’s effects on individ-ual countries, the program continues to facecharges that:

Public Law 480’s main beneficiaries are Amer-ican farmers and the U.S. merchant marine. Pub-lic Law 480 has bankrupted poor farmers, encour-aged the welfare ethic in recipient countries andsquandered billions of tax dollars (Bovard, 1984).

Food aid never constitutes a lasting solution toproblems of hunger and food production. It maysave lives in emergencies but even then donorsmight not anticipate needs or make deliveries ina timely fashion. Large quantities may strain thecapacity of recipient countries to store and dis-tribute products efficiently (Matzke, 1984; Okig-bo, 1982).

Other fundamental questions about food aidare asked. Critics charge that food aid prolongsdependence and hampers efforts to increase foodproduction in recipient countries. The main dan-gers are:

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encouraging postponement of overdue agri-cultural reforms in recipient countries, thuscreating artificial food “emergencies” and de-tracting from the effectiveness of agriculturaldevelopment assistance;making domestic markets unpredictable anddiscouraging local producers from increas-ing production;shifting dietary preferences to wheat accel-erates demands for that grain. Many Afri-can countries cannot produce wheat for cli-matic reasons and thus may become perma-nently dependent on imports; andnot reaching the people in most need nutri-tionally (Clay and Singer, 1982; Matzke,1984).

No consensus exists on these broad questions.But Clay and Singer (1982) note that widespreadcriticism of Public Law 480 has been replaced bymore ambivalent views of its potential positiveand negative effects.

The General Accounting Office has investigatedmany aspects of this program, publishing 28 re-ports from 1976 to early 1984. Their findingsinclude:

65

. f ..=, . ,- - . . -“ vs .,, . .

-# .. .

. . -

., ‘1.,.* .,.

Photo credit: F. Botts of United Nations/FAO

The role of food aid continues to be controversial. As an emergency measure, it is crucial during times of drought andfamine. However, the long-term effects may produce disincentives to increased food production. Here, Burkina Faso

villagers collect emergency food aid during the Sahelian drought of 1973.

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U.S. costs could be cut by more timely col-lection of local currencies, altering cargo pref-erence laws, and shipping with long-termcountry and regional requirements in mind;limited attempts to use Title III for agricul-tural reform are unsuccessful and constrainedby U.S. and recipient country administrativeproblems;Public Law 480 funds could be used in inno-vative ways—e.g., for developing irrigationprojects;closer watch should be kept on equitable dis-tribution of aid to refugees, monitoring andauditing of commodity transport, and theprograms in certain countries; andAID needs to document that food aid doesnot increase disincentives to local food pro-

duction and that sales under Title I help thepoor.

Title III, the Food for Development section, isintended to contribute to long-term agriculturalgains in sub-Saharan Africa. Its multi-year agree-ments are unique in Public Law 480 programs.To the extent that these funds are used for agri-cultural projects, agricultural technology will playan important role in the program. The role ofprojects versus policy planning has been the sub-ject of considerable debate within the program,however. The Office of Management and Budg-et has been a major advocate of decreasing proj-ect spending, sometimes at odds with the U.S. De-partment of Agriculture and U.S. AID (Garzon,1984). Criticisms are made that projects are poorly

66

formulated. They are not commonly oriented totechnologies suitable for low-resource producers.

The number of countries that take part in Ti-tle III programs is small: only six agreements weresigned in its first 4 years; two of these were in sub-Saharan Africa (Senegal and Sudan). Other po-tential recipients in Africa “are unable to signagreements because of internal instability, polit-ical differences with the USA or reasons of polit-ical ideology” (Garzon, 1984). Since 1981 whenGarzon completed his analysis, the number ofcountries signing Title III agreements has declinedand GAO questions the merits of continuing theprogram.

Issue 13: Private voluntary and nongovernmen-tal organizations (PVOs) may have particularlyuseful roles in African agricultural develop-ment, but these are neither clear nor constant.

Preliminary Findings●

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PVOs have played a major part in U.S. devel-opment assistance, first by providing humani-tarian, then social and economic developmentaid.

Often their work with technology has been lim-ited due to lack of interest and expertise anda low level of technical back-up, but this ischanging.

The roles of PVOs are shifting as governmentfunds supplement private contributions.

These shifts may require that more attentionbe paid to identifying PVOs’ particular strengthsand to designing, managing, and evaluatingprojects with these strengths in mind.

Discussion

Many PVOs played an important historical rolein Africa. The provision of social services, in-cluding emergency food relief, new schools, roads,and irrigation facilities, has been an important andsuccessful role for many. For example, “a studycovering the 1969 to 1973 period found thatchurch organizations provided about 20 percentof the total hospital and maternity beds in allAfrica” (Tendler, 1982). These programs mayhave had small overall impacts on development

but their local impacts appear to be significant(Sommer, 1977).

In the past 20 years many PVOs shifted theirwork from disaster and food relief toward devel-opment assistance. This shift can be attributedboth to the PVOs’ assessments of the roots of pov-erty and to AID’s congressionally mandatedattempts to bring PVOs into the developmentprocess. Now AID provides PVOs with severalhundred million dollars annually. Twelve to six-teen percent of AID’s development and disasterassistance funding is available to PVOs due to1981 congressional action (U.S. AID, May 1982a).

Private voluntary organizations are diverse.They vary in size, budget, ideology, degree of spe-cialization and expertise, use of volunteers, age,program content, structure, and style of opera-tion. The large disaster and development groups,such as CARE and Catholic Relief Services, gen-erally have large budgets and close ties to the U.S.Government. Often the religious PVOs generallyare smaller, but have large numbers of people lo-cated in villages. For example, about 8,450 Amer-ican missionaries work in Africa (Hayden, 1984).Humanitarian groups, like religious PVOs, main-ly rely on private contributions. A distinct set ofthese organizations focuses specifically on tech-nical assistance—e.g., Volunteers in TechnicalAssistance (VITA) and Technoserve. In addition,individual PVOs are joined in various permanentand temporary coalitions.

While these differences make generalization dif-ficult, PVOs commonly perceive themselves as acommunity with common characteristics. One setof features that many American PVOs claim toshare is: the lack of public appreciation for theirwork in developing countries and consequentproblems with fund-raising, the predominance ofU.S. Government influence, the nature of theirleadership, and the difficulties inherent in oper-ating overseas programs (Biddle, 1984).

Another set of characteristics allegedly describesthe way PVOs work. These features are acceptedinside and outside of the community to such anextent that Tendler (1982) describes them as “arti-cles of faith” (table 5; see also Hyden, 1983). Thepeople who accept these articles advocate an ex-panded role for PVOs in American development

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Table 5.—The Role of Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs): Articles of Faith

T h e m e Assumpt ions of PVOs

Reaching the poor . . . . . . . . . . ●

Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ●

Process v. outcome . . . . . . . . . ●

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The public sector . . . . . . . . . . . ●

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Flex ib i l i t y , exper imenta t ion . . ●

Local institutions . . . . . . . . . . . ●

cost . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ●

long experience working with the poorinclude poor beneficiaries in decisionmaking processinterested in long-term process, not execution of specifictasksfunction to establish process for poor people to gaincontrol of livesnot interested in output measures of traditionalevaluationsdeal “people-to-people,” not government-to-governmentdo not channel money through the public sectorcan be flexible and experimental because they are small,not in the public sector, and do not have to show fastresultshave special ability to work with and strengthen local,private institutionscan benefit the poor at lesser cost than large publicsector organizations

SOURCE: Adapted from: Judith Tendler, Turning Private Voluntary Organizations into Development Agencies: Questions forEvaluation, U.S. AID Program Evaluation Paper No. 12 (Washington, DC U.S. AID, April 1982)

assistance. Most aid recipients appear to agree thatPVO aid is flexible, honest, prompt, coordinatedwith other efforts, available to needy and remoteareas, and open to experimentation (Sommer,1977). Critics note, however, that PVOs do notnecessarily exhibit such features as flexibility andcontinuity. Therefore, the degree to which thesefeatures are accurate is important in consideringthe future role of PVOs in development assistance.

Problems in evaluation have hindered a clearunderstanding of what PVOs do well and whatthey do uniquely. Evaluations of PVO work havebeen a continuing concern of donors, and the co-hesiveness of the PVO community is illustratedby its collective lack of enthusiasm in respond-ing to these concerns. Often external evaluationsare feared because of their potential for divertingefforts from “important” activities, because theyrepresent an outside intrusion, because they mayaffect the organization negatively, or because theyare perceived to be highly political (Tendler,1982). The 1973 Foreign Assistance Act began thetrend to regular evaluation. As AID made moremoney available to PVOs, it also required greateraccountability. Difficulties persist in measuringproject significance versus operational perform-ance and in including intended beneficiaries in theevaluation process (Sommer, 1977).

Relations between governments and PVOs havechanged as governments have come to rely moreupon them. PVOs often maintain an adversarial

rhetoric about their advantages over governmentassistance and their need for independence. Infact, however, the operations of many groupshave become closely tied to government aid invarious ways. Some of the larger relief organiza-tions receive nearly 80 percent of their funds fromthe U.S. Government (Sommer, 1977).

Government/PVO relations also take otherforms. In some cases, PVOs serve as innovatorsfrom which governments learn and replicate proj-ects. This role seems less common than PVOs con-tend, however, and perhaps is limited to newPVOs in early stages of growth. In other cases,PVOs serve as precursors to governments, fillinga need until governments are able or willing toaddress the same problems. PVO/government re-lations can be categorized more generally andcompletely as complementary, filling unoccupiedterritory, competitive, brokering, replicating, orgovernment takeover (Tendler, 1982).

Many of these relations are replete with am-bivalence. Some PVOs refuse all governmentfunds to avoid: 1) compromising their programs,2) appearing to be linked to official U.S. Govern-ment policy, and 3) accepting government plan-ning and evaluation methods.

PVO involvement in agriculture has increasedrecently. For example, several groups made par-ticular contributions in bringing “Green Revolu-tion” technology to the poor (Sommer, 1977).

68

However, Tendler’s (1982) analysis suggests thatagricultural assistance has certain characteristicsthat may make PVO success in this area difficult.Many agricultural projects require a high degreeof expertise. This is not compatible necessarilywith the more generalist nature of many PVOs.It appears that the benefits of-agricultural projectsare especially vulnerable to monopoly by the richand, while PVOs are generally regarded as par-ticularly sensitive to reaching the poor, sometimesthis cannot be documented. Many within the PVOcommunity dispute Tendler’s findings. They arguethat limited agricultural expertise is required for

work with simple technology for low-resourcefood producers and that professionalism is risingamong PVO staff.

Good relations and frequent interactions withlarge government donors are particularly impor-tant in relation to technical areas such as agricul-tural research. The smallness of most PVOs meansthat they must rely on the large donors for state-of-the-art information on effective developmentmethods. In most cases, PVOs have limited sup-port systems to provide technical information tovolunteers in the field. Therefore, cooperation,

69

not competition, is likely to benefit large donorsand PVOs.

Some assert that “governments stand to bene-fit tremendously by allowing private and volun-tary efforts to take root in society and therebyprovide effective entry points for public sector in-puts” (Hyden, 1983). How best to accomplish thisis not clear. Certain trends in PVO aid exist: 1)greater attention to long-term development, 2) ac-cepting professional consulting roles, and 3) great-er recognition that development education in theUnited States is important. If PVOs continuealong this route, they would continue to supple-ment government aid programs but perhaps losetheir pioneering role (Sommer, 1977). Their con-sulting role is likely to bring them into greater con-flict with for-profit firms engaged in similar work.

Sommer urges that American PVOs seek newroles, cooperating with other PVOs worldwide.Such cooperation, especially with local AfricanPVOs, is an explicit objective of some groups.American PVO leaders, however, note the diffi-culties of coordinating international and local ef-forts (Biddle, 1984). Special considerations applyto working with African PVOs. Generally, localPVOs are not strong. They have received littlerecognition in their own countries and are weakerthan those in other developing countries. Theymay offer an important way to compensate forgovernment failures and complement more appro-priate government efforts, but they will need out-side assistance for some time in order to developa stronger local base (Hyden, 1983).

Issue 14: The extent to which American busi-nesses will provide technical assistance tolow-resource food producers is limited.

Preliminary Findings

● The U.S. Government is beginning a major ini-tiative to bring American private enterprise intodevelopment assistance, but it appears thatmost investment will be outside of the agricul-tural sector.

. Technology developed by multinational firmsfor poor countries often emphasizes capital in-tensive inputs rather than technologies moreappropriate to the needs of the low-resourceproducers.

●

●

●

●

●

Private investment generally goes to morewealthy developing countries with more devel-oped infrastructures, more developed markets,and greater political stability.

Problems of accessibility, limited capital, andneeds for varied packaging make low-resourceproducer markets unattractive to agribusi-nesses.

Incompatibility exists between the profit-max-imizing strategies of agribusiness and risk-aver-sion practices of low-resource producers.

U.S. private sector involvement in agriculturaltechnology for low-resource farmers in sub-Saharan Africa is primarily in the form ofdevelopment assistance programs financedthrough the U.S. Agency for International De-velopment.

Certain critical components of agricultural de-velopment assistance probably will not andcannot be provided by the private sector.Therefore, a unique obligation remains for theFederal Government.

Discussion

The Federal Government is encouraging theU.S. private sector to invest in low-income de-veloping countries. It has established such bodiesas the Bureau of Private Enterprise within theU.S. Agency for International Development andthe Overseas Private Investment Corporation(OPIC). The objective of encouraging U.S. pri-vate sector investment in developing countries isto boost trade, create jobs, nurture indigenous en-trepreneurial activity, develop management skills,and provide increased capital flows into countries.

Private enterprise is seen as “the engine thatmakes growth occur most quickly” (U.S. AID,May 1982b). The focus of these initiatives will beon those developing countries with more devel-oped infrastructures and markets and which dis-play sociopolitical atmospheres conducive to freemarket initiatives. As a result, the primary bene-ficiaries will likely be the relatively wealthy coun-tries in the developing world, despite efforts toencourage investments in the poorest countries.

While the goals mentioned above would bene-fit an African country’s overall economy, the abil-

70

ity of U.S. private enterprise to benefit the agri-cultural sector directly, and in particular assistlow-resource producers in increasing food produc-tivity, is uncertain.

Direct private investment in agriculture in Afri-ca historically has been in large plantation-typeagriculture emphasizing export crops. Even in thisarea, however, investments have been limited inrecent years largely due to concerns over nation-alization or other government interventions.Rather, most transactions have been sales of in-puts and purchases of outputs for processing (Lip-ton, 1977a).

While up to 90 percent of farming in Africa isdone by the traditional sector, this group remainsa “peripheral” market for agribusiness productssuch as seeds, fertilizer, agricultural chemicals,mechanical motive power, and processing equip-ment (Turner, 1984). Only about 10 percent ofpurchased farm inputs in Third World countriesgo to farmers cultivating under 10 acres of land(Lipton, 1977b).

While the low-resource producer markets foragricultural inputs are potentially very large, theyare not spectacularly lucrative. Western-basedsuppliers face a variety of problems including:

1. Problems of accessibility, both physical andmental: Poorly developed infrastructuresand the remoteness of many producers re-sult in high transportation costs. Makinglow-resource producers aware of availableproducts and encouraging them to use themcan cause further problems with inappro-priate scale of use.

2. Possible unsuitability of available technol-ogies: Most technology is designed aroundWestern (capital intensive) agricultural sys-tems and is not suitable for low-resource pro-ducers in developing countries.

3. The pattern of government policies and pri-orities in poor countries: In many countriesthere is a reliance on quasi-governmentalbodies to handle distribution and purchases.There are also inadequate incentives for foodproduction in the rural sector in most coun-tries (Lipton, 1977b).

The great bulk of world trade in agriculturalinputs is between developed countries. As such,

the products of agribusiness are designed to meetthe needs of developed country commercial agri-culture rather than those of the peasant farmer.The technologies developed are most often inap-propriate for the rural sector in sub-SaharanAfrica and can cause serious problems. “The in-creased use of agricultural inputs [tends] to mod-ify and, in some cases, distort the farm structurein these countries to accommodate the new in-puts” (Clayton, 1977).

Western manufacturers, in general, have diffi-culty adapting to low-resource producer markets.In particular, conflicts arise between the indus-tries’ desire to exploit economies of scale in re-search, design, transport, and storage, and theirneed to adapt to low-resource producers’ inputrequirements and local circumstances (Mackin-tosh, 1977). Low-resource producers require amultitude of package types, chemical formula-tions, languages, soil conditions, and active in-gredients. Providing safety instruction and follow-up monitoring, particularly on potentially toxicinputs, present further problems (Lipton, 1977d).

Limited liquidity and difficulties in obtainingcredit cause serious problems for businesses try-ing to expand markets to low-resource producers.Perhaps more difficult to overcome, however, isthe divergence between profit-maximizing strat-egies of agribusiness firms and the risk-aversionpractices of low-resource producers.

[A]gribusiness has been conditioned by and hasresponded to the capitalistic, profit maximizingagriculture of the developed world. The operat-ing environment of the peasant farmer is very dif-ferent from this. [They] often operate within avicious cycle of poverty which limits [their] farm-ing objectives and opportunities for farm inputs.[Their] energies are constrained by limited knowl-edge, inadequate land and capital resources, arisky physical economic environment and inade-quate infrastructure (Clayton, 1977).

To take advantage of the potential traditionalsector market, it is essential to account for theneeds of the low-resource producer, Clayton(1977) suggests some steps that should be taken:

1. adapt farm inputs to match the scale of peas-ant farming,

71

2. improve the marketing and distribution ofinputs to the advantage of small farmers, and

3. temper straight commercial objectives totake account of the real development needsof poor countries.

In emphasizing the role of private enterprise asan agent for development in Africa, some peoplebelieve that the U.S. comparative advantage inagriculture and the major importance of agricul-ture to African economies make this sector an ap-propriate focus for U.S. agribusiness involvement(Andreas Task Force, 1984). However, the tech-nologies and agricultural system that have enabledthe United States to become the “breadbasket ofthe world” are not necessarily transferable toAfrica. Thus the idea of comparative advantage,at least in terms of technology transfer, losesvalidity, Witness OPIC’s efforts to expand its in-surance and lending for agricultural projects butits difficulty in finding suitable projects (AndreasTask Force, 1984). OPIC’s 1983 annual report sug-gests that of 104 projects supported, only 9 werelocated in sub-Saharan Africa, and of these nonewere directly related to agriculture.

The current development agency focus on ru-ral development projects has provided a boom tothose businesses who produce for low-resourceproducers, the so-called “appropriate technology”firms. Indications are, however, that most of theseexporting firms lie outside the United States.Many operate in countries that have historic co-lonial ties to their markets, although India andChina present serious competition because of theirlarge domestic markets that support export sales(Turner, 1984).

The United States also seems to be disadvan-taged due to a more contentious factor—the prac-tice of certain countries (e.g., France and Japan)to heavily link their foreign aid policies to theirindustrial policies in an effort to expand their mar-kets into developing countries. The result has beena frustration on the part of American firms whothink they are losing ground in developing-coun-try markets as a result. This has prompted in-creased pressure on the U.S. Government topractice a similar strategy (U.S. Congress, JointEconomic Committee, 1982; Commission onSecurity and Economic Assistance, 1983). For the

most part, the United States has refrained fromlinking its foreign aid policies and industrial pol-icies because it recognizes the need to “press hardfor free markets, open access to markets, and forthe overall benefits of comparative economicadvantage in producing and distributing the freeworld’s products and services” (Andreas TaskForce, 1984).

The vast majority of agricultural equipmentsales to African countries come from Westernmanufacturers. United Nations figures indicatethat of the estimated $1 billion of agriculturalequipment sold to Africa (most representing trac-tors and tractor-drawn implements for the com-mercial agricultural sector), local manufacturersaccount for only $150 million (Turner, 1984).There is a growing sense, however, that “large-scale imports of basic equipment can only be ashort- to medium-term solution to supplying theAfrican farmer. If programs to improve produc-tivity are to be sustained, equipment will have tobe supplied from within Africa itself for foreignexchange consideration if nothing else” (Turner,1984),

While it is unlikely that most African countrieswill be able to develop indigenous industries toproduce large equipment in the near future, thepotential for further development of smaller scaleindustries, especially those that could meet theneeds of low-resource producers (e.g., small-scalemachinery, implements, and fertilizers) can beseen as a realistic short-term goal. However, prob-lems have been encountered by such businessescurrently operating in Africa. A 1983 U.N. Indus-trial Development Organization (UNIDO) reportstates that the approximately 70 companies inAfrica producing for the traditional sector were“in crisis, with nearly all facing financial and struc-tural difficulties and many in danger of goingbankrupt or being forced to diversify out of agri-cultural machinery supply. ”

Many of the problems these companies face arecommon to much of African industry: shortageof spare parts and raw materials, and a lack oftechnical and management skills. These latter con-straints provide an area where U.S. private sec-tor involvement could prove very useful, such asthe International Executive Service Corps (IESC).

72

Other problems exist that are particular to pro-ducing for the low-resource producer: general in-solvency of the clients and consequent limitedmarket size. In addition, government policies havesometimes exacerbated problems (Turner, 1984).These problems would also be encountered byU.S. investments and are, in large part, respon-sible for the limited investment in African coun-tries. Sub-Saharan Africa represents a mere 2percent of total U.S. direct investment abroad(Stokeld, 1982).

The above analysis provides a rather skepticalview of any extensive U.S. private industry in-volvement in Africa. Perhaps it should be clarifiedthat this skepticism is focused on the ability ofU.S. agribusiness to assist directly with the tradi-tional African agricultural sector. There are areasof agricultural sector development where U.S. pri-vate investment may prove much more effective

and profitable, particularly in such areas as foodprocessing and marketing infrastructure. How-ever, in developing mechanized food processingoperations, consideration should be given to theimpact on the low-resource producers, particu-larly potential adverse impacts on income gener-ation through their own processing activities.

The creation of a free enterprise environmentmay result in a greater shift of low-resource pro-ducers away from a largely subsistence economytoward a market economy, The greater liquidityand market structure this creates would likely pro-vide increased incentives for private sector invest-ment in low-resource producers. In the meantime,however, profitability in such investments is lim-ited, particularly in the poorer countries in sub-Saharan Africa. As such, increasing productivityin this sector will continue to rely predominantlyon investments from the public sector.

Chapter 6

Issues for theAfrican Governments

Chapter 6

Issues for the African Governments

Technology development, technology transfer,and technical assistance each have an importantfunction to perform if food production in Africais to be increased. The primary responsibility forimproving food production, however, lies withthe African governments themselves. What isneeded is a continuing, active commitment to foodproduction—an ability to translate rhetoric intoaction.

This chapter examines the many, sometimescomplicated, issues for which the African govern-ments themselves are responsible. One critical is-sue facing African governments is their inadequateinstitutional foundation, which makes it difficultto plan and manage far-reaching developmentstrategies. African governments also face increas-ing pressure to reform economic policies. An issueoften neglected in the face of more visible or im-mediate problems is the status of the natural re-source base; a firm commitment to sustain theirnatural resources is essential to long-term agricul-tural development in Africa.

Issue 15: The commitment of African govern-ments to sustaining the natural resource baseis critical to long-term agricultural devel-opment.

Preliminary Findings●

●

●

Research on soil erosion and conservation inAfrica is weak or non-existent. Few countrieshave conservation programs capable of deal-ing with the magnitude of the problems theyare facing.

Conflicts exist at the national level betweenshort-term objectives of meeting immediateneeds and long-term objectives of maintainingnatural resources.

The combination of increased population pres-sure on the land and the degree of land degra-dation that continues to occur in many partsof Africa suggest that the resource base mayno longer be able to support a continuation ofmany traditional agricultural practices.

●

●

●

●

●

An urgent need exists in many countries to re-duce the rate of land degradation, reclaim landalready degraded, and introduce or adapt pro-duction methods that fit the constraints of thenatural resource base.

In examining strategies for reducing land deg-radation, an integrated approach should betaken that looks at the entire productionsystem.

For conservation programs to be effective,support and involvement are needed from therural population. It is unlikely that simplylegislating programs will work.

Problems of environmental degradation in Afri-ca are quite different from those in indus-trialized countries. In Africa, environmentalproblems stem predominantly from poverty.Development and industrialization are per-ceived as cures for, rather than causes of, envi-ronmental degradation.

Environmental awareness by African govern-ments is a relatively recent phenomenon and,unlike in most developed countries, it has beenstimulated from outside the country. There issome suspicion and apprehension by manyAfrican governments that outside emphasis onenvironmental issues represents efforts to stemindustrial development in Africa.

Discussion

The magnitude of problems facing most coun-tries in sub-Saharan Africa is enormous. Theseproblems are due not only to food shortages butalso are a result of economic woes resulting fromstagnant economic growth and an inability to gen-erate adequate foreign exchange. In addition, sev-eral countries are facing civil strife or are engagedin war. In light of the immediacy of these prob-lems, it is understandable why countries havebeen unable or reluctant to address the longerterm questions of degradation of their natural re-sources.

75

— —

76

Compounding the problem is the difficulty ofthe task at hand. Hudson (1983) takes the perspec-tive of relating the problems facing Third Worldcountries’ efforts at soil conservation to those inthe United States:

If you think you have problems in making soilconservation work in the United States, spare thethought for countries in the Third World, wherethe problems are much worse and the difficultiesof applying solutions are much greater. [If] soilconservation cannot be made to work effectivelyin the United States, with all the advantages ofresearch, extension, and conservation services,plus wealthy, educated farmers on good land withgentle climates—if with all these benefits conser-vation is not successful—then what hope is therefor struggling countries that have few, if none,of these advantages.

Land degradation is caused by a variety of ofteninterrelated processes: soil erosion, deforestation,overgrazing, waterlogging and salinization, dam-age by sedimentation, inefficient cultivation prac-tices, shortened fallow periods, and spreading des-erts (McPherson, 1984). In terms of its impact onAfrica’s agriculture, the implications are alarm-ing. Estimates suggest that with the current rateof soil loss, Africa could experience a decline inits potential rain-fed crop production of about 15percent during the next two decades (McPherson,1984).

The problems stem largely from the poor qual-ity of African soils. The continent did not experi-ence the glaciation that created the more robustsoils in other continents. In general, African soilstend to be highly weathered, with a low humuscontent (which is important for providing nutri-ents and retaining moisture) and are very suscep-tible to damaging processes such as erosion andleaching (Lofchie and Commins, 1984). Some soilsthat are rich in nutrients and capable of support-ing relatively intensive agriculture do exist in theregion, however, such as the volcanic soils of theKenyan Highlands.

Ecological variability (fig. 10) presents prob-lems in itself as it adds complexity to the task offormulating “environmentally conscious agricul-tural planning” (Lofchie and Commins, 1984).Adding further complexity is the variability of

social and cultural factors that play a large rolein land use patterns.

In formulating strategies to combat land deg-radation, it is important to look at the full arrayof human activity that contributes to the prob-lem in a given region. The diversity and interrela-tionships of these anthropogenic modifications ofthe environment were examined for the West Afri-can Sahel (National Research Council, 1984). Ninemajor activities were defined that contributed tothe decline in the region’s ability to support humanpopulations: bush fires, trans-Saharan trade, sitepreferences for settlements, gum arabic trade,agricultural expansion, proliferation of cattle, in-troduction of advanced firearms, development ofmodern transportation networks, and urbani-zation.

Most tropical forests in Africa also are severelythreatened as a result of stress on the system. InIvory Coast, for instance, timber cutting for ex-port has resulted in a shrinking of the forest toone-third of its size only 25 years ago (Lofchie andCommins, 1984).

Most likely peasant farmers and pastoralists areaware that some of their activities damage theirresources. But few alternatives exist because theyare striving to meet the most basic needs (Hud-son, 1983). This is particularly true regarding sub-sistence producers faced with the need to moveinto marginal lands (see Box D). The responsibilityfalls on the governments to address the problem.

In describing the solutions needed for one formof environmental degradation, Erik Eckholmwrote that “desertification is seldom a technicalproblem that can be solved with an injection ofknowledge and money alone. It is a socio-eco-nomic and developmental problem linked to basicpatterns of national life . . . (solutions) requiredifficult political, cultural and bureaucratic reform”(Cross, 1983). It is unlikely, however, that simplylegislating programs of land use would be effec-tive. To succeed, conservation efforts must havesupport “from below, ” as they will have to do thework. Full involvement of the rural sector is re-quired (Hudson, 1983).

Research on soil erosion and conservation isweak or nonexistent in Africa. Some basic theory

77

40”

30“

20”

10°

0°

10°

20”

30 G

40 G

Figure 10.— Ecological Areas of Africa

30” 20° 10° 0° 10° 20° 30” 40” 50° 60°

/ / l x / / I \ \ \ \

●

Tropical forests

Tall grass savanna

Short grass savanna

Desert

Mediterranean

Humid subtropical

Highlands

Temperate prairieor grassland

0 400 800 ml

0 600 1200 km

40°

30°

20°

10°

o“

10°

20°

30°

400

20° 10° 0° 10° 20° 30° 40” 50° 60”

SOURCE Adapted from P. O’Meara and P Martin (eds.), Africa, Indiana University Press, In: E. F. Moran (cd.), “Changing AgriculturalSystems in Africa,” Studies in Third World Societies, No. 8, July 1979.

can be applied generally but site specific data is scientists, since this is not a priority field in mostrequired. Some regions can make use of interna- African countries (Hudson, 1983).tional or national research centers, but many can-not. In addition, national research organizations Fundamental differences exist in how environ-have difficulty obtaining information. There are mental problems are viewed in Africa and in de-a limited number of experienced soil conservation veloped countries. In Africa, environmental prob-

78

79

ures alone might not be enough. According to FAO’s calculations, seven sub-Saharan countries-Burundi,Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, and Somalia-would not achieve self-sufficiency in foodin the year 2000 (when their combined population is expected to reach about 80 million) even if theiragricultural techniques were to match those now found on commercial farms in Asia and Latin America.

Spanish S a

Morocco

/

LAlgeria

L

Chad ) Sudan

Rat io of populat ion-L

Gabonsuppor t ing capaci ty to Congactual Modulation (denisty , 1975

I

Less than 1.0

1.0-5.0

5.1 and above 7

Data not avai lab le 1

lems are predominantly related to poverty. Indeveloped countries environmental problems areoften related to industrialization. In Africa, there-fore, development and industrialization are seenas cures, rather than causes, of environmentalproblems (Howard-Clinton, 1984).

A further problem exists in how certain Africangovernments perceive developed countries’ em-

phasis on African environmental problems. SomeAfrican governments view this concern as a meansof retarding African industrialization. Howard-Clinton (1984) sees this related to the evolutionof environmental awareness among African gov-ernments. Unlike the experience of most devel-oped countries, concerns over environmental is-sues were addressed to governments from outsidetheir borders (many starting with 1972, U.N. Con-

80

ference on the Human Environment in Stock-holm), rather than by national scientists or envi-ronmentalists and the general public (Howard-Clinton, 1984). It is in this North-South contextthat this apprehension exists.

In examining the benefits of conservation ef-forts, a long time-frame is required. This presentsserious problems for both African governmentsand African farmers and pastoralists.

. . . [T]he managers of . . . national land re-sources are also . . . political leaders. Their timescale seldom extends beyond the date of the nextelection. On the whole, they are not interested inlong-term conservation. The farmer’s [and herd-er’s] economic cycle is even shorter. [They are]probably working on cash flows over 12 months,so it is unreasonable to expect [them] to pay nowfor preserving the land for posterity. That is a lux-ury [they] cannot afford (Hudson, 1983).

In examining who should pay for conservationprograms, in wealthier countries it makes senseto have this cost borne by those who use or de-grade resources. In developing countries, how-ever, the poor farmers and herders simply can-not afford this; therefore, the burden falls on thegovernment. A financial commitment of this levelis a major undertaking for any government.United Nations figures suggest that to rehabilitateall damaged irrigated land, half the affectedrangelands, and 70 percent of rain-fed farmlandover the next 20 years would cost $48 billion(Cross, 1983).

Some encouraging signs exist that some govern-ments, supported by the rural sector, are takingaction. Most notable is Kenya, which mobilizedits national institution “Harambee” (meaning “self-help”) and, with strong support from PresidentDaniel Arap Moi, has developed a major soil con-servation program. In addition, in 1982, FAOpublished a “world soil charter” as a means of en-couraging government support for soil conserva-tion efforts. Without such efforts, the charterpredicts, productive capacity of land could de-crease 20 percent by the end of the century (Cross,1983).

While it is apparent that successful efforts toreduce land degradation will require firm com-mitments by national governments, there are

ways U.S. assistance could be effective. One isobviously through financial support, such asthrough World Bank conservation projects. In ad-dition, the United States could take better accountof the particular environmental constraints in as-sisting African governments plan agricultural de-velopment strategies. “The relationship betweenenvironmental deterioration and agricultural stag-nation is still too often ignored in the formula-tion of strategies” (Lofchie and Commins, 1984).The United States could also assist African gov-ernments in compiling an inventory of resourcesand assist in the development of baseline data onresource degradation in order to identify areasmost seriously affected.

An integrated approach to solving land degra-dation, and development problems in general,should be taken. There is a “need to look at theentire production system and to understand in-terrelationships between people and such compo-nents as food crops, livestock and feed supplies,trees, soil fertility, water quality and quantity, andhousing supplies” (McPherson, 1984). Recent re-search efforts show promising results in address-ing certain aspects of land degradation throughstrategies using an integration of crops, animals,and trees (Brumby, 1984).

Issue 16: Institutional and human resource de-velopment in Africa is inadequate, thus mak-ing improved indigenous management sys-tems critical.

Preliminary Findings●

●

●

●

Institutions, especially those engaged in re-search and training, are less developed in Africathan in Latin America or Asia.

Some government institutions face major prob-lems trying to coordinate the large amounts ofproject aid supplied by many donors.

Proliferation of donor projects allows little in-stitutional continuity; few incentives exist forhost countries to plan programs that they trulyneed.

Many projects fail because of administrativeweaknesses and incompetence.

81

●

●

●

●

●

Indigenous institutions are subject to the samedevelopment shifts as donor agencies.

Countries have different approaches to man-agement, and Western models, based on indus-trial societies, may be inappropriate.

Human resource development is inadequate. In-ternational and national training programscommonly are insufficient to fill the number ofneeded research and planning positions. Na-tional in-service training courses are usuallyweak in disseminating new information.

Training Africans too often is done in theUnited States when local and third country lo-cations may be more appropriate.

African universities generally are undersup-ported and underused in research activities. Fe-whave any or adequate graduate level programs.

Discussion

The successful transfer of technologies dependson the availability of institutions that can effec-tively manage development programs. Problemsexist at different levels with African institutionsthat deal with both program and project devel-opment. Some of the problems are inherent inbureaucracies everywhere but some raise ques-tions about the assumptions and structure of ef-ficient African management systems. Some prob-lems relate to individual human factors and someare due to inefficient levels of financial and humanresources. Government institutions in most Afri-can countries have been inundated with donorproject assistance for rural development. The pro-liferation of aid renders many ministries incapableof coordinating donors’ projects and interests. TheMinistry of Agriculture in Malawi, for example,reported 44 donor-financed projects in 1981(Morss, 1984). Coordination of this number ofprojects requires inter- and intra-ministerial co-ordination that can strain existing staff levels. Co-ordination is also hampered by power strugglesbetween various ministries. Delegation of respon-sibility is then transferred to local governmentunits with few human and financial resourcesavailable to implement rural development projects(Morss and Morss, 1982).

Donors have attempted to strengthen institu-tions through infrastructural support and overseastraining. Buildings have been constructed forschools, research stations, and ministry and localgovernment office space. Staff members from cen-tral ministry levels have attended U.S. univer-sities, but they usually obtain undergraduate andgraduate degrees in technical areas. Technical staffsometimes acquire limited management and or-ganizational skills through short courses on ru-ral development and management planning givenby organizations like the USDA graduate school.With this limited managerial training, techniciansfrequently become ineffective managers.

The options normally available to correct weakinstitutional development imply more donor as-sistance for graduate level technical and manage-ment training. There have been calls for additionalfunding from several sources (Lele, 1981; WorldBank, 1981). However, an increasing number ofpeople recognize that human resource develop-ment through overseas training may not improvemanagement skills significantly. Organizationaland social realities in Africa may necessitate alter-native management strategies—ones that may notseem as efficient initially but which fit into thecultural setting. Until then, project implementa-tion and technology transfer will continue to bedifficult and non-replicable once donor agencyrepresentatives leave. African management sys-tems share similarities that may be contrary toWestern management ideals. Some of these are:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

flexible attitudes that regard “contracts” asconditional based on the outcome of unspe-cified events.policy that is not dependent on precedent.Decisions are spontaneous and usually havelittle institutional memory.flexible attitude toward time managementdue to high levels of uncertainty in mostAfrican developing countries.bureaucracies that are structurally over-developed and hierarchically complex.limited opportunities for advancement cre-ating competitive struggles. Therefore, fewalternative policy suggestions are made forfear of alienating superiors (Moris, 1981; Hy-den, 1983).

82

Management systems could develop accordingto African desires and expectations so that incen-tives exist for project implementation and main-tenance. African governments could “identify newmanagement training methods that enable man-agers to become more effective in the Africanenvironment” (Hyden, 1983). Donors, on theother hand, could relinquish some control overthe use of their funds to ensure that recipientgovernments have some interest in maintainingand replicating beneficial projects. Donors couldconsider the possibility of providing program sup-port instead of project support as a means ofallowing governments more autonomy (Morss,1984).

By far the most unquestionable though unquan-tifiable benefit of education to Africa would bethat of learning by doing, which is now lost tothat ever growing and changing expatriate com-munity. It is ironic that most African countriesdo not have the capacity to propose alternativeplans to those presented by donors for using do-nor funds to reflect their own long-term needs forhigher education (Lele, 1981).

Issue 17: Though facing increasing external pres-sure to change, African governments maintaineconomic policies that generally favor urbanconsumers instead of providing incentives forlow-resource producers.

Preliminary Findings●

●

●

●

●

Keeping the urban prices of food, goods, andservices low is important to African gov-ernments.

Agricultural policies in most African countriesapparently provide little incentive for increas-ing smallholder production.

Several African governments provide quasi-governmental marketing outlets for agriculturalproduce, which may set prices, supply inputs,and market produce.

Official market grain prices are set artificiallylow to ensure subsidized food prices for the ur-ban populace and thus political stability,

Many feel that little indigenous pressure existsfor agricultural policy reform; thus many ex-ternal financial institutions and some donors

are taking measures to influence African poli-cies by providing conditional assistance.

International financial institutions and AIDgenerally support a package of macroeconomicmeasures intended to stimulate export trade, re-duce spending, and increase incentives for in-creased agricultural production.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) usu-ally recommends devaluation of local currencyto stimulate export trade. This measure, how-ever, raises the cost of all imported farm inputs(e.g., fertilizer and implements) and importedfood.

Both of these internal economic adjustments af-fect the ability of the low-resource producersto invest in increased food production technol-ogies and diminish the internal purchasing pow-er of the poor.

Numerous factors affect the productivity offood crops, and increases in production priceswithout other policy changes may not increasethe production of food crops.

Pressure for policy reforms is a very sensitiveissue because-it involves the question of nation-al sovereignty.

Discussion

The long-term decline in food production inAfrica has been blamed on many factors: lack ofincentives for producers, lack of appropriate re-search on food crops, poorly developed extensionand management systems, general insensitivity tocultural and environmental conditions, failure ofgovernments to deliver physical and economic in-puts on time, and inability to identify the prob-lems facing low-resource producers. Another fac-tor receiving major attention is the impact ofmacroeconomic policy upon agricultural pro-duction,

During the past two decades, African govern-ments generally opted for economic policies thatfavor urban consumers. Up until 1979, prices paidto farmers in most countries were set below worldmarket commodity levels so that urban foodprices could be kept low (Christensen and Wi-tucki, 1982). Trade policies and official currency

83

overvaluation also allowed the importation of rel-atively inexpensive food and consumer goods(Christensen, et al., 1984),

African governments now face several conflict-ing forces that threaten to undermine their owneconomic independence. During the early 1970s,the commercial banks offered relatively low-in-terest loans and because many African govern-ments depend on external sources of capital fordevelopment, these loans were attractive. Thisborrowing, and that necessitated to meet late1970s balance of payments deficits, left sub-Sa-haran Africa with projected average annual com-mercial amortization payments of $8 billion, ex-clusive of International Monetary Fund (IMF)obligations of $1.6 billion (Browne, 1984).

In response to growing debt, they have turnedto the IMF to reschedule some of their loans.However, the IMF loans require the fulfillmentof certain conditions including:

1.

2.

3.

4.5.6.

devaluation of local overvalued currenciesto match internal rates of inflation;limitations on the level of domestic spending,including wage ceiling levels and the elimi-nation of subsidies on consumer goods;elimination of unprofitable government en-terprises (e.g., marketing parastatals);relaxation of price controls;increase in interest rates; andexpansion of exports and reduction of im-ports (Browne, 1984).

Several countries (e.g., Tanzania and Nigeria)have resisted the IMF measures and maintain thatthey are too severe, especially in the short run.Most developing countries rely on one or two ma-jor export crops (e.g., cocoa, coffee, tea, or cot-ton) for foreign currency, and devaluation of localcurrency theoretically makes exports more attrac-tive to other countries. But levels of demand forthe exports is fairly inelastic for many of thesecommodities because of consumer preferenceswithin developed countries. Devaluation con-versely causes increasing prices for imported con-sumer goods, and shifting demands affect theprices of other domestic goods. Therefore, to de-veloping countries, raising the ceiling of price con-trols and devaluation of local currencies probablymean increasing costs for imported food to ur-

ban consumers, a restriction in the availability ofbasic goods and services, and increasing costs forimported agricultural inputs (especially fertilizers),while not necessarily increasing export revenueto compensate for the costs of such policychanges. In the short-run, African governmentsexpress concern over the possibility of politicalinstability, substantial protests, or food riots.

The World Bank and AID, among others, alsostress the importance of governments developingagricultural policies that encourage small produc-ers to increase production of food and cash crops(World Bank 1981; U.S. AID, 1982). Althoughthe World Bank argued that price incentives weremost important in 1981, more recently they havesuggested that improving the performance of theagricultural sector means more than “getting yourprices right” (World Bank, 1984a). However, theyappear to require that several conditions similarto those of the IMF be met to receive continueddevelopment assistance (Stokeld, 1982). Agricul-tural policy adjustment includes support for in-frastructural research, extension, and human re-source development but primarily stresses theneed for macro- and micro-economic reforms. Forexample, AID considers an appropriate policyframework as one that:

. . . relies largely on free markets, the provisionof production incentives [which] are affected bydirect attempts by government to influence theprices of food or agricultural products and inputs,but in many countries macro-economic policiesaffecting exchange rates, interest and wage ratesand tariffs and taxes have an even more power-ful impact on incentives to produce, employ, con-sume, save, and invest (U.S. AID, 1982).

Increasing producer prices paid to agricultur-alists and herders may exacerbate the problem forAfrican governments. Without subsidies, theprices of domestic agricultural products will in-crease along with those of imported food stuffs.Evidence exists suggesting that increases in pro-ducer prices for a specific crop will stimulate moreland to come under cultivation and higher totalyields for that crop (Christensen and Witucki,1982), But it is not clear who would benefit. Withno new technologies available, production in-creases will require more inputs of fertilizers andpurchased inputs. Therefore, the farmers most

— — .

84

likely to benefit are those who can afford to pur-chase the necessary inputs, not the overwhelm-ing number of subsistence farmers who may notbe engaged in agriculture as a full time occupa-tion (Christensen, et al., 1984; Christensen andWitucki, 1982; Eicher and Baker, 1982).

Price incentives for one crop (e.g., maize) mayalso cause producers to shift their emphasis be-tween crops, not increase production (Eicher andBaker, 1982). A number of non-price factors mayinstead affect the level of productivity substan-tially compared with the effects of producer priceincreases. Lack of reliable rainfall, timely deliv-ery of agricultural inputs, seasonal labor, exten-sion advice, suitable technologies, and market-ing infrastructure remain serious constraints.

For the African herder, livestock may representmore than an economic good. The number ofstock accumulated depends on many complex so-cial, environmental, and political decisions in ad-dition to economic responses. Increased prices willnot necessarily bring more cattle into the market-place (Horowitz, 1979).

The calls for more reasonable macroeconomicpolicies and appropriate incentives to rural pro-ducers seem valid. It appears that the rural sec-

tors of many African countries require some in-centives and support for increasing production.However, the conditions for IMF loans and con-tinuing multilateral and bilateral developmentassistance could be more palatable politically toAfrican governments. Donors could do more torecognize the constraints that African govern-ments face. A recent study indicates that only 20percent of the African countries following the IMFeconomic adjustment programs met the proposedeconomic growth targets. In light of this, thereare several ways that the IMF could assist Africandeveloping countries without stripping them oftheir autonomy. The IMF could show more flex-ibility in working with the African governmentsin working out longer term devaluation and costreduction measures. Further, the political and eco-nomic realities of African countries have to beconsidered by the IMF when negotiating, for itcontinues to be the responsibility of the Africangovernments themselves to readjust their econo-mies (Mtei, 1984).

It should be understood that for any programto be successful, it must be supported by the peo-ple of the country implementing the program, andthe atmosphere of peace and social stability mustprevail (Mtei, 1984).

Appendixes

Appendix A

List of Additional Reviewers

These persons, in addition to participants in OTA’s September workshop, reviewed the draft TechnicalMemorandum:

Claudia CarrDepartment of Conservation and Resource StudiesUniversity of CaliforniaBerkeley, CA

Kay DaviesWomen in DevelopmentU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentWashington, DC

Carl EicherDepartment of Agricultural EconomicsMichigan State UniversityEast Lansing, MI

Louise FortmannDepartment of Forestry and Resource ManagementUniversity of CaliforniaBerkeley, CA

Cal MartinAfrica Bureau AFR/TRU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentWashington, DC

Jon MorisDepartment of Sociology, Social Work,

and AnthropologyUtah State UniversityLogan, UT

Haven NorthEvaluation Branch PPC/DCIEU.S. Agency for International DevelopmentWashington, DC

Vernon RuttanDepartment of Agricultural and

Applied EconomicsUniversity of MinnesotaSt. Paul, MN

George ScharffenbergerU.S. Peace CorpsWashington, DC

87

Appendix B

The CGIAR in Africa

Considerable interest exists in the work of the in-ternational agricultural research centers that are partof the Consultative Group on International Agricul-tural Research (CGIAR). This short description of theCGIAR’s work in Africa was prepared by the CGIARoffice in Washington, DC, and appears with permis-sion.

Introduction1. This paper presents a brief overview of the role

and activities in Africa of the 13 international agricul-tural research centers (IARCs) funded by the Consul-tative Group on International Agricultural Research(CGIAR). Four of the centers are located in Africa andmost of the other centers have significant programsin Africa.

2. The CGIAR was organized in May 1971 to bringtogether countries, public and private institutions, in-ternational and regional organizations, and represent-atives from developing countries in support of a net-work of international agricultural research centers andprograms. The basic objective of this effort was then,and is now, to conduct research to produce technolo-gies or technology components that will lead to an in-crease in the quantity and improve the quality of foodproduction in the developing countries, The researchsupported by the Group concentrates on those criti-cal transferable aspects of food production in the de-veloping countries that are not adequately covered byother research facilities, and which are of wide use-fulness, regionally or globally. Currently, the CGIARnetwork is involved in research on nearly all of themajor food crops and many of the farming systemsin the major ecological zones of the developing world(table B-l).

3. The international center’s research and trainingactivities deal with crops and livestock that encom-pass three-quarters of the food supply of the de-veloping countries. These centers have already madesignificant contributions toward increasing food pro-duction in the developing countries. The total systemis small, however, with expenditures of less than $200million in 1984, compared to an estimated $2.6 bil-lion spent by developing countries in 1980, and proj-ect loans/credits for agricultural research by the WorldBank and IDA of $1.0 billion since 1980.

Current Activities4. Africa figures very prominently in the current

work programs of the international agricultural re-

88

search centers funded through the CGIAR. Four of the13 centers have their headquarters in African coun-tries, and all the others have outreach activities thatinvolve African countries in various ways. Table B-2shows there were 291 IARC staff stationed in West,East, and Southern Africa in 1983 and that 122 of themwere outside the four countries hosting Centers, mostlyin outreach or “country programs. ” Outreach activi-ties usually take the form of cooperative researchprograms in conjunction with national or regionalinstitutions, or with other international institutionsoperating in Africa.

5. IARCs headquartered in Africa. The four centersthat have their headquarters in Africa are the Inter-national Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), theInternational Livestock Center for Africa (ILCA), theInternational Laboratory for Research on Animal Dis-eases (ILRAD), and the West Africa Rice DevelopmentAssociation (WARDA).

6. IITA (the International Institute of Tropical Agri-culture), located in Ibadan, Nigeria, was the first in-ternational agricultural research center on the Africancontinent. In the CGIAR system, IITA has worldwideresponsibility for the improvement of cowpea, yam,cocoyam, and sweet potato, and regional responsibil-ity for cassava, rice, maize, and soybean. Another im-portant program is devoted to improving traditionalfarming systems. The object of the farming systemsprogram is the development of more productive andecologically sound alternatives to traditional systemsof bush fallow and shifting cultivation. IITA worksin a number of African countries, usually with fund-ing specially provided for work in specific countries,on programs relating to one or more of the crops forwhich it is responsible or on farming systems, Fromits inception, IITA has been strongly identified withresearch on important food crops of the humid tropicalareas of Africa.

7. ILCA (the International Livestock Center for Afri-ca), located at Addis Ababa in Ethiopia, was estab-lished in 1974 to assist national efforts in tropicalAfrica by carrying out research and development onimproved livestock production and marketing systems,by training livestock specialists in their region, and bygathering documentation useful to the African live-stock industry. ILCA is one of the two CGIAR centersin Africa devoted to livestock research. ILCA is pri-marily concerned with the improvement of livestockproduction systems. Dealing with livestock in the con-text of deeply traditional, complex and diverse farm-

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Table B-1 .–Centers Supported by the CGIAR, 1984

1984 budgeta

Acronym Research Geographic (millions of(year established) Center Location programs focus dollars)

IRRI (1960) International Rice Research Institute

CIMMYT (1966) Centro International de MejoramientoMaiz y Trigo

Los Banes, Phillipines

Mexico City, Mexico

IITA (1967) International Institute of Tropical Ibadan, NigeriaAgriculture

CIAT (1968) Centro International de AgriculturaTropical

CIP (1971) Centro International de la PapaWARDA (1971) West African Rice Development

AssociationICRISAT (1972) International Crops Research Institute

for the Semi-Arid Tropics

ILRAD (1973) International Laboratory for Researchon Animal Diseases

IBPGR (1974) International Board for Plant GeneticResources

ILCA (1974) International Livestock Center forAfrica

IFPRI (1975) International Food Policy ResearchInstitute

ICARDA (1976) International Center for AgriculturalResearch in the Dry Areas

ISNAR (1980) International Service for NationalAgricultural Research

Cali, Colombia

Lima, PeruMonrovia, Liberia

Hyderabad, India

Nairobi, Kenya

Rome, Italy

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Washington, DC, U.S.A.

Aleppo, Syria

The Hague, Netherlands

RiceRice based cropping

systemsMaizeBread wheatDurum wheatBarleyTriticaleFarming systemsMaizeRiceSweet potato, yamsCassava, cowpea,

lima bean, soybeanCassavaField beansRiceTropical pasturesPotatoRice

ChickpeaPigeonpeaPearl milletSorghumGroundnutFarming systemsTrypanosomiasisTheileriosisPlant genetic sources

Livestock productionsystems

Food policy

Farming systemsWheat, barley,

triticale, broadbean, lentil,chickpea, foragecrops

National agriculturalresearch

Global 2 2 5Asia

Global 21 0GlobalGlobalGlobalGlobalTropical Africa 21 2

GlobalTropical Africa

GlobalGlobalLatin AmericaLatin AmericaGlobalWest Africa

23.1

GlobalGlobalGlobalGlobalGlobalSemi-Arid tropicsGlobal 9 7GlobalGlobal 3.7

10929

221

Tropical Africa 127

Global 4 2

Dry areas of West 20.4Asia and NorthAfrica

Global 35

aCGIAR supported core budget net of capital at the bottom of the bracket (from 1983 lntegrative Report )

SOURCE: Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research ‘The CGIAR in Africa," Washington, D.C. 1984

ing systems, ILCA is more concerned with systemsanalysis and management approaches and techniquesthan with individual commodities. Although cattlehave received much research attention from ILCA,sheep and goats have also received considerable atten-tion. ILCA focuses its research efforts on four ecolog-ical zones—arid, subhumid, humid, and highlands.ILCA’s Humid Zone Program is based at IITA and thetwo centers cooperate in farming systems research inwhich animals do or may play an important role.

8. ILRAD (the International Laboratory for Re-search on Animal Diseases) was established in 1974in Nairobi, Kenya, to assist in the development of ef-fective controls for two major African livestock dis-eases: trypanosomiasis and theileriosis (East Coast Fev-er). Together these two diseases prevent livestockproduction in vast areas of a number of developingcountries in Africa. The total foregone production—not only in milk and meat production, but also in pro-duction of leather, wool, fertilizer, animal power and

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92

animal by-products—is incalculable. Both diseases arecaused by parasites that are transmitted by insect vec-tors; the tsetse fly carries trypanosomes while tickstransmit theileriosis. In both cases, the relationshipsamong parasites, hosts and vectors are subtle andcomplex; intervention is difficult. ILRAD’s emphasisis to identify and exploit disease control methods thatrely on the immunological responses of the hostanimals. ILRAD works with other institutions to poolanimal disease and production skills toward the solu-tion of livestock problems in Africa. For example,ILCA and ILRAD work together with ICIPE (the In-ternational Center for Insect Physiology and Ecology)in a Trypanotolerance Network to study relationshipsof the parasite, the vector, the animal, and animalmanagement in livestock that have some tolerance totrypanosomiasis. ILRAD hosts staff of several otherCGIAR centers, including ILCA, at its headquartersin Nairobi.

9. WARDA (the West Africa Rice Development As-sociation), located in Monrovia, Liberia, is a regionalorganization to promote self-sufficiency in rice in 15countries of West Africa. The CGIAR helps to sup-port the research activities of WARDA. WARDAseeks to develop improved rice varieties adapted to theregion’s agroclimatic and social conditions, and to de-velop improved farming systems that are appropriateto improved rice varieties and to socio-economic andagricultural conditions of the region. The WARDAprogram concentrates on four systems of rice produc-tion—mangrove swamp rice (somewhat saline condi-tions), irrigated rice, upland (rainfed) rice, and deepwater rice.

10. IARCs With Programs Located in Africa. In ad-dition to the four centers whose headquarters are inAfrican countries, seven other centers have staff sta-tioned in Africa engaged in a variety of activities incooperation with national research institutions. Theseven are the Centro International de AgriculturalTropical (CIAT), the International Maize and WheatImprovement Center (CIMMYT), the InternationalBoard for Plant Genetic Resources (IBPGR), theInternational Potato Center (CIP), the InternationalRice Research Institute (IRRI), and the InternationalCenter for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas(ICARDA). All of these centers are working on a rangeof crops that are important staple foods throughoutAfrica.

11. CIAT (the International Center for TropicalAgriculture) with headquarters in Colombia, has re-sponsibility for the world germplasm collection ofcassava and, in cooperation with IITA, is involved insupplying germplasm for cassava improvement pro-grams in Africa. It carries on similar work for the com-

mon bean in East Africa and is now building up a ninemember team to work on bean improvement there.CIAT has a large tropical pastures program in LatinAmerica and is working to develop relationships be-tween it and forage research efforts in humid and sub-humid zones of Africa, particularly with ILCA.

12. CIMMYT (the International Maize and WheatImprovement Center) is headquartered in Mexico, butthe center has a number of ongoing programs in Afri-ca. Some of these programs are supported by bilateraldonors, and most are run on a cooperative basis withnational institutions. The CIMMYT Maize Programhas had staff working in national programs in threeAfrican countries—Ghana, Tanzania, and Zaire. Theoldest of these programs began in 1973. CIMMYT alsohas a joint African maize program with IITA, locatedat Ibadan, Nigeria. The Wheat Program has staff mem-bers assigned to the East Africa regional programwhich includes 17 countries, from Ethiopia in the northto Lesotho in the south. In addition, the EconomicsProgram has a regional economist headquartered atILRAD in Nairobi who works with national researchprograms in Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, and Zambia.Training is an important part of CIMMYT’s contri-bution to African agriculture; during the period 1971-83, 187 trainees from tropical Africa were involved inthe maize in-service training course, while from 1966-83, 96 trainees were involved in wheat in-service train-ing. CIMMYT also provides at its headquarters andfield research sites in Mexico training opportunities forvisiting scientists from Africa.

13. IBPGR (the International Board for Plant Gen-etic Resources), located in Rome, was established topromote an international network of genetic resourcescenters to further the collection, conservation, docu-mentation, and use of plant germplasm. AlthoughIBPGR provides services to national and internationalorganizations, it also supports and encourages researchin genetic resources by other IARCs and national pro-grams. It works closely with other centers in theCGIAR system. The IBPGR has sponsored a numberof collecting missions in various African countries, no-tably in West Africa, and, from time to time, has sta-tioned staff in Africa over extended periods of time.

14. ICRISAT (the International Crops Research In-stitute for the Semi-Arid Tropics) has its headquartersin Hyderabad, India, but much of its work is applica-ble to, designed for, and takes place in, semi-arid areasof Africa. The two major cereal crops for which it isresponsible, sorghum and millet, are major staplesespecially in West Africa, and groundnut is a majorcrop in many parts of the continent. In 1983 ICRISAThad scientists posted to Bukina (sic) Faso (UpperVolta), Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and the Sudan.

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ICRISAT’s work in West Africa has, in the past, takenplace within the national research programs and hasbeen largely designed to facilitate transfer of technol-ogy from India. It has become apparent that the typesof sorghum and pearl millet varieties that gained sub-stantial acceptance in India were not adapted to theecological conditions and farm family needs in WestAfrica. As a result ICRISAT has decided to establisha research subcenter for the difficult environment ofthe Sahel in which it would have the facilities and ca-pability to carry out the complete range of researchactivities needed. The ICRISAT Sahelian Center, be-ing located near Niamey, Niger, should serve the long-er term needs of the region. ICRISAT is in the processof establishing a regional team at Bulawayo, Zimbab-we, to meet the needs of Southern Africa and a re-gional team in Kenya to meet the needs of EasternAfrica. Discussions are underway on the Center’s in-volvement in a regional grain legume program forSouthern and Eastern Africa. Between 1974 and 1983ICRISAT provided in-service training to 210 research-ers from West Africa, 103 from Eastern Africa, and51 from Southern Africa; another 31 researchers fromAfrica were Research Fellows or Research Scholars.

15. CIP (the International Potato Center), locatedin Peru, maintains several staff members in East Afri-ca. Potatoes are not very widely grown in most Afri-can countries, but are of increasing importance. A re-gional scientist is located at ILRAD in Nairobi. Thisscientist oversees the cooperative research and train-ing activities in the area. Two staff members reside inRwanda and one lives in Burundi; their responsibilitiesinclude research on potato in those countries. Otherregional representatives are stationed in Egypt andTunisia. CIP also supports work of local scientists inEthiopia and Kenya. A country network, PRAPAC(Programme Regional d’Amélioration de la Culture dePomme de Terre en Afrique Centrale), which includesBurundi, Rwanda, and Zaire was established in 1982.The network carries out research and training ac-tivities.

16. IRRI (the International Rice Research Institute),located in the Philippines, has a liaison scientist forthe African region who is based at IITA in Nigeria andwho works closely with WARDA and with nationalinstitutions. Because within the CGIAR system IITAhas responsibility for research on rice in Africa, IRRIdoes not have a major direct presence in Africa but,through its International Rice Testing Program (IRTP),IRRI makes advanced rice materials available toWARDA and to various interested national institu-tions. IRRI has recently engaged in discussions of thefeasibility of contracting for an outreach program inMadagascar which has rice production systems quite

similar to those of Asia. Two scientists are in Egypton a similar arrangement.

17. ICARDA (the International Center for Agricul-tural Research in the Dry Areas), located in Syria, hasa program on faba beans (also known as broad orhorse beans) in Egypt and the Sudan, and has stationedstaff in those countries to help carry out the research.More recently, a research team has been stationed inTunisia to work on barley and legume improvementwith national research institutions in North Africa.ICARDA is developing working relations with ILCAin areas of livestock/crop production integration.

18. Other IARCs That Work in Africa But Do NotHave Resident Staff in the Continent. The remainingtwo centers do not have resident staff in Africa, buttheir work includes activities directly or indirectly re-lated to Africa. The centers concerned are the Inter-national Service for National Agricultural Research(ISNAR), and the International Food Policy ResearchInstitute (IFPRI).

19. ISNAR (the International Service for NationalAgricultural Research), located in The Hague, was or-ganized in 1980 to assist developing nations to improvetheir national agricultural research capability. ISNARhas already been invited to assess the strengths andweaknesses of several national research systems inAfrica, and has completed assessments of Bukina [sic]Faso (Upper Volta), Ivory Coast, Kenya, Madagascar,Malawi, Rwanda, and Somalia. ISNAR is deeply in-volved in a large project under the Cooperative De-velopment for Africa Group to help upgrade agricul-tural research training.

20. IFPRI (the International Food Policy ResearchInstitute), located in Washington, DC, works on pol-icy issues relating to food and agriculture. IFPRI is de-voting about 30 percent of its research to projects re-lated to Africa, compared to about 18 percent duringthe past ten years. Published IFPRI Research Reportsinclude studies on Food Security in the Sahel, Agri-cultural Research Policy in Nigeria and growth link-ages in Nigeria (sic) and Kenyan agricultural exports.Proceedings of a major policy conference on acceler-ating growth in Sub-Saharan Africa is in the processof being published.

Impact of the CGIAR in Africa21. A great deal of attention is being given by the

CGIAR to the various African countries. As alreadymentioned, four of the centers are located in Africa,the largest number in any continent, and most of theothers have stationed senior scientific staff to resideand work in various African countries. Research bythe IARCs has already shown its relevance and use-

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fulness for African agriculture, but adoption has beenslowed by the general anti-agricultural policies ofmany African countries, the low level of infrastruc-ture development, and the lack of inputs.

22. Improved maize lines from CIMMYT havehelped to raise yields in Zaire and Tanzania, whileIITA has developed maize lines with resistance to thedevastating streak virus, and efforts are currentlyunder way by a joint CIMMYT/IITA program totransfer streak resistance to local African maizecultivars. This will enable farmers to grow their accus-tomed local varieties while ensuring protection againstthe damaging streak virus disease.

23. CIP, in cooperation with national research in-stitutions, has released potato varieties that yield wellunder farm conditions in Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya,and Rwanda. In cooperative work with ILCA, CIP hasobtained yields of 80 tons per hectare in the Ethiopianhighlands; such yields could increase farm incomesdramatically.

24. WARDA has tested and released a number ofimproved rice varieties for its West African membercountries. Significant potential improvements exist forirrigated and deep-water rice.

25. IITA has made significant progress in develop-ing high-yielding cassava varieties that are resistant tothe destructive complex of diseases and insects that at-tack cassava in Central and West Africa. Some of thiswork was done in cooperation with the national pro-gram in Zaire. IITA has also made major progress inbiological control of damaging cassava pests, particu-larly the cassava mealybug. The IITA cassava im-provement program is a good example of the need forlong-term research in Africa on major intractable prob-lems. IITA uses germplasm from CIAT’s major cassavagermplasm collection in its improvement work.

26. IITA has developed sweet potato lines that arevery resistant to attack by the sweet potato weevil,a major cause of post-harvest losses in that crop. Theseresistant lines are protected naturally from such insectattack, and spraying of insecticides is not required.

27. IITA and ILCA have worked to develop and im-prove alley-cropping, a form of agroforestry in whicharable crops are grown between rows of perennial treecrops that can be used for several purposes such as fod-der, wood fuel, and green manure.

28. ILCA, working with ILRAD and ICIPE (the In-ternational Center of Insect Physiology and Ecology),has developed a network to improve research and thedevelopment of information on trypanotolerant live-stock in Africa. The network, which concentrates notonly on trypanotolerant cattle but also on tolerant

sheep and goats, places major emphasis on improv-ing research and development activities in national in-stitutions, and will help to provide guidance and fi-nancial support for participating scientists andinstitutions. ILCA has also been successful in usingmilk cows for animal traction in the Ethiopian high-lands, thus providing a potential for the dual use ofthese cows by small farmers.

29. The above are but a few of the activities andaccomplishments of the IARCs in their work relatingto Africa. Many other opportunities exist; to capitalizeon them will require commitment to agricultural de-velopment by African governments and improved re-search and extension services.

Issues and Options30. It is generally agreed by agricultural research

authorities and development experts that Africancountries should devote more attention and give higherpriority to agriculture. Production must be increasedand productivity improved. Much needs to be done,including reinforcement of policies that provide bet-ter incentives for farmers and the development of moreproductive agricultural systems. Each African coun-try needs to build up a strong technology through re-search, and effective extension and information serv-ices that can assist farmers to increase productivity.The IARCs can be a good resource for national insti-tutions in meeting such needs. However, in most cir-cumstances, the services provided by IARCs can beof good use only where effective national programsexist. The IARCs can and do play a role in strengthen-ing national institutions, but other international andbilateral organizations must provide financial supportand technical assistance. In recent years the WorldBank has identified national agricultural research asan area that requires more investment in most devel-oping countries. Other multilateral and bilateral orga-nizations have reached similar conclusions and are alsogiving increased attention to this need.

31. It is clear that the IARCs are generating, and willcontinue to generate, improved agricultural technol-ogy for Africa. Such technology can be adopted morequickly and effectively by nations that themselves pos-sess an effective agricultural support capability. Broadcooperation by national, regional and international or-organizations will be required to strengthen Africaninstitutions to the level needed, and at the pace re-quired.

—CGIAR SecretariatOctober 1984

Appendix C

“Rural Africa: Modernization, Equity, andLong-Term Development,” by Uma Lele;

and “Facing Up to Africa’s Food Crisis,”by Carl K. Eicher

The preceding OTA report is not intended to be a comprehensive treatment of all the issuesrelated to food production and agricultural development in sub-Saharan Africa. Other authorshave addressed different sets of issues from their own perspectives.

Two important analyses of the problems faced by Africa follow. Uma Lele’s article reflectsher perspective as chief of development strategy for the World Bank and as an African. Thearticle by Carl K. Eicher represents the thinking of an American academic with extensive experi-ence in Africa.

Both articles were published in their present form in Agricultural Development in the ThirdWorld 1 in 1984. Lele’s article first appeared in Science in 1981. Eicher’s paper was originallypublished in Foreign Affairs, also in 1981. Both articles appear with the permission of the authorsand publishers.

1Carl K. Eicher and John M. Staatz (eds. ), Agricultural Development in the Third World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1984), pp. 436-479.

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RuralEq

Africa: Modernization,uity, and Long-Term

Development

UMA LELE

INTRODUCTION

Within less than a decade Africa is facing a second severe foodcrisis. The poor crop can yet again be explained as a result ofdrought. But the continent’s growing vulnerability to crop failuresis by no means unexpected. In most African countries it appears to

be part of a long-term trend. Data on African countries, especially for subsis-tence production, are too poor to permit precise estimates, ’ but annual rates ofincrease of major staple food crops in sub-Saharan African seem to have beenabout 2 percent during the 1960s and early 1970s, compared with almost 3percent in Asia and over 3 percent in Latin America.2 Productivity increases inhybrid maize in some selected areas, such as the highlands of Kenya, have beenimpressive. However, on the whole, increases in the production of major cerealsand root crops—maize, sorghum, millets, and cassava-have come aboutthrough increases in the area under cultivation rather than through gains inproductivity per unit of input. This is in sharp contrast to even South Asia, whichis generally perceived as laggard in development but where substantial produc-tivity gains were experienced in food crop production in the 1970s. Per acreyields of many subsistence food crops appear to have stagnated or even declinedin many African countries, as, for instance, in Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Sudan.

Because of higher population growth, the annual rates of increase in produc-tion required to meet consumption needs by 1990 are also estimated to be higherfor sub-Saharan Africa-about 4.4 percent, compared with 4 percent for Asia.3

If present trends continue, Africa will increase its dependence on food imports

both over time and relative to other developing continents. Undernourishment is

expected to become far more widespread, even though alternatives to cereals andstaples, such as bananas and other fruit, fish, and animal products, have been farmore important sources of calories in many parts of Africa than in South Asia,which has a similar per capita income. Indices of ill health and infant mortality inAfrica are already among the highest in the developing world and are not ex-pected to decline significantly in the next decade.

UMA LELE is division chief, Development Strategy Division, Economics and Research Staff, TheWorld Bank, Washington, D.C.

Reprinted from Science, 6 February 1981, pp. 547-53, with omissions and revisions, by permis-sion of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the author. Copyright © 1981by the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

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Compared with the poor performance of food production, export crop produc-

tion has been more varied among African countries since independence. Produc-tion of cotton, tobacco, cocoa, and coffee rose significantly in some countriesuntil the 1960s, but during the 1970s and early 1980s production of major exportcrops has either stagnated or declined in many countries.4 Nigeria, for instance,became a substantial net importer of edible oils, of which it was previously a netexporter. Groundnuts in Mali, cocoa in Ghana, cotton in Sudan, and cotton,sisal, coffee, and cashews in Tanzania all provide examples of stagnancy ordecline in production.

Rural-urban income disparities are already high in Africa, the ratios typicallyranging between 1:4 and 1:9, compared with many countries in Asia, with ratiosbetween I:2 and 1:2.5. But because agricultural sectors have been stagnant orslow-growing even relative to the poorly performing industry and services sec-tors, these disparities are worsening in many cases. Kenya, Malawi, and IvoryCoast are the few exceptions where until recently economic growth has beenimpressive, but the distribution of benefits between agriculture and industry andwithin agriculture in these countries has been particularly unequal. The WorldBank’s World Development Report 1981 estimates that per capita incomes inlow-income African countries—countries where the annual per capita income isless than three hundred dollars—decreased 0.4 percent per year on the averageduring the 1970s, compared with a 1. I percent annual increase in low-incomeAsia, Even the middle-income African countries experienced per capita incomegrowth rates of only 0.4 percent per annum, compared with 5.7 percent in thecorresponding countries in East Asia and the Pacific.5

Worse yet, prospects for overall economic growth in low-income Africa ap-pear much poorer than in the rest of the developing world. The World Develop-ment Report projects the likely average annual growth rates of per capita incomefor the high case in low-income Africa during the 1980s to be only 0.1 percent,compared with 2.1 percent for low-income Asia. To reverse these long-termtrends requires a clear understanding of the causes of poor past performance.

This chapter argues that most African countries are not giving priority to thedevelopment of peasant agriculture. There is not even much understanding ofwhat is required to develop it. As a result, the domestic resources that are spenton agruculturc go largely to pay for the growing wage bill of an inadequatelyequipped and inadequtitely operating public sector or to ineffectivc subsidies.The fragmented donor community has focused largcly on project financing,mainly of capital expenditure and technical assistance. Project financing hasbeen rapidly increasing over time, directed mainly toward the rural poor. Currentand past donor investments are having little impact, however, not only in theshort run but in laying the foundations for long-term development as well. Theproject approach often results in poor policies, a shortage of maintenance andoperating funds, and a shortage of qualified staff, hence often a major depletionof capital.

The Asian experience suggests that agricultural development requires largeamounts of resources. Donors should give special attention to broadening theirsupport of education substantially and supporting not just primary but middle-and high-level of training of nationals in technical fields to develop a science-based peasant agriculture. This not only would help to create national policy,planning, and implementing capacity but would support a diverse network ofinstitutions required for development, in addition to those operated by govern-

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ments. Major investments are also needed in transport and communications,many of which will have to be highly capital-intensive. With such a reoriented

emphasis, and guaranteed long-term assistance tied to concrete indications of

national commitment, at least long-term prospects could improve significantly.

THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF PEASANT AGRICULTURE

As in many parts of low-income Asia, such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, India,Bangladesh, and Thailand, in Africa concern for economic development is pri-marily a concern about agricultural and rural development. Between 80 and 90percent of the nearly 400 million people in sub-Saharan Africa live in rural areas.Most derive their subsistence from meager crop and livestock production andsurvive on annual per capita incomes of less than U.S. $150. Although produc-tion is geared largely to subsistence, the rural sector is also the major source offood for urban consumption and of raw materials for exports and for domesticmanufacturing. Except in a few mineral-producing countries such as Zaire, Zam-bia, and Nigeria, agriculture constitutes the largest income-generating sector,contributing up to 40 percent of the gross national product of many Africancountries. Between 70 and 80 percent of the annual export earnings of manycountries is derived from three to six agricultural commodities, Direct and indi-rect taxes on agriculture are the most important source of government revenues.Although the estate sector is an important producer of marketed surpluses of

certain crops in certain countries, a major share of the total production andmarketed surplus nevertheless comes from the smallholder sector. Not only isbroad-based agricultural development thus crucial for increasing incomes, em-ployment, and export earnings, but raising the incomes of the rural poor isessential for raising government revenues and creating a domestic market for thegoods and services produced in a growing urban manufacturing sector.

POLICIES AND STRATEGIES SINCE INDEPENDENCE

T H E “ MO D E R N I Z A T I O N N o w ” AP P R O A C H

Rhetoric and plan documents in almost all African countries make reference tothe key role of the agricultural and rural sector in Africa’s modernization. Sincethe disastrous drought of 1973–74 self-sufficiency in food has become a majorobjective, often supported by donor-financed projects. The need for increasingexport earnings is also being recognized more urgently, the balance of paymentsdifficulties having grown with the rising cost of imported energy and manufac-tured goods. Despite the growing awareness and the increased number of pro-jects, however, unlike in Asia, there is not yet the basic conviction among manyAfrican policy makers that the smallholder agricultural sector can and will haveto be the engine of broad-based economic development and eventualmodernization.

Modernization is taken to mean mainly industrialization and the commercial-ization of agriculture, largely through mechanized, large-scale farming. Thefluctuating prices of primary exports explain the desire to industrialize, as doesthe relative ease of setting up factories and state farms compared with the organi-zationally far more demanding development of peasant agriculture. In its broad-

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est sense the objective of modernization is, of course, shared extensivelythroughout the developing world. It is the short time perspective of the Africanexpectations that poses a problem, especially given the much poorer institutionaland trained manpower base that Africa inherited at independence. Goren Hydenaptly contrasts the eloquent Tanzanian President Nyerere’s slogan ‘‘We must runwhile others walk’ with China’s strategy of modernization by the year 2000.6

The frequently noted perception of peasant agriculture as a “holding sector’ is,however, by no means unique to Africa. At an earlier stage, India’s firstfive-year plan ( 195 I -56) incorporated community development and promotion

of cottage and small-scale industry essentially as stopgap arrangements to ensure

rural welfare and employment until industrialization could absorb the growingpool of surplus agricultural labor. 7 The more dynamic development strategy,oriented toward small-farmer productivity, which is now being implementedsuccessfully in many parts of India came into ascendancy only in the mid- 1960s,with technological change made possible by the new high-yield cereals. As isargued below, in Africa the view of agriculture as a holding sector and the‘ ‘Modernization Now’ strategy have had many of the same consequences for thedevelopment of peasant agriculture in more free-enterprise, growth-orientedNigeria and Zambia as in Ethiopia and Tanzania, which show greater concernabout income distribution and class formation.

GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE

Planning the use of government finances for agricultural development is, ofcourse, not easy for most African countries becausc of great fluctuatons in theirexport earnings. Their bureaucracies are less experienced than those of theirAsian counterparts, which experience similar fluctuations in earnings. Latelytheir ability to plan has been further eroded, as has that of other developing

countries, by the declining purchasing power of their export earnings, as importprices of oil and industrial goods have soared. In constant dollars, the purchasing

“power of exports from fourteen principal countries in Africa fell try about 40percent from 1973 to 1980.8

Even within these all too obvious constraints, however, far fewer resources areplowed back into agriculture by most African countries than would seem justi-fied. lntrrcountry comparisons are exceedingly difficult, owing to definitional,data, and other measurement problems, but in the 1970s around 10 percent orless of the planned development expenditure was allocated to the agriculturalsectors in Kenya and Mali, compared with 31 percent in India during its firstfive-year plan in 195 I and 20 percent of the much larger absolute investment inthe subsequent three plans. In Zambia the total agricultural budget may havedecreased in real terms by an annual average of slightly over 9 percent in the late1970s, reflecting general budgetary cuts. Malawi is one of the few exceptions inAfrica; it appears to have allocated close to 30 percent of the known plannedpublic expenditures to agriculture. However, even there, because of the morefavorable tax, wage, and pricing policies toward the estate sector, large-scaleproduction has grown at an annual rate of close to 17 percent since 1968, with 70percent of the share in exports. The corresponding production increase in thesmallholder sector has been only 3 percent a year, even though services topeasant agriculture generally operate far more effectively in Malawi than inseveral neighboring African countries.

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Large-scale farming per se is far less important a portion of total production orexports in Tanzania than in Malawi. However, government policies of “villag-ization ” of peasant producers, combined with pronouncements of the need forcooperative cultivation and actual haphazard attempts (o introduce it, have hadan adverse effect on smallholder incentives and production. Several other seem-ingly well-motivated government initiatives to raise peasant productivity haveended up being poorly implemented. These have led, for instance, to unre-alistically high production and input-use targets, the consequent indiscriminatepromotion of fertilizer use, and discouragement of interplanting of crops (whichis traditionally done by peasants to reduce risks of crop failure) as not being‘‘modem. ” These government initiatives, combined with unreliable provision ofagricultural extension, credit, and output marketing, rather than enabling pro-ducers to raise overall agricultural productivity, have resulted in producers’responding mainly to changing relative prices of food and export crops. Thefailed government initiatives have in turn led to an increased official tendency tolook toward large-scale mechanized and irrigated production to guarantee foodand export surpluses. Like Tanzania, many other countries have already investedor have plans to invest substantial resources in large-scale state farms, but therecord of public-sector farming is very poor throughout Africa, and large sub-

sidies are required for these operations.Irrigation will have to become important ultimately, as the vast, less costly

possibilities of increasing production under rain-fed conditions begin to be ex-hausted. For the short run, however, in most of Africa there is not the complexinstitutional and managerial capacity to operate irrigation systems indigenously.The frequently costly rehabilitation (at five thousand to fifteen thousand dollarsper hectare) being undertaken in many of the existing schemes illustrates theproblem.

I NCENTIVES TO P EASANT P RODUCERS

Peasant agriculture is highly taxed by fixing low prices for its products and byovervaluing the national currencies vis-à-vis those of importing countries. Agri-

cultural taxation helps keep urban food prices low and finances modernizationthrough many capital-intensive investments, such as construction of new capitalcities, stadiums, manufacturing and processing plants, and airports. Agricultureis, of course, the most important sector and hence has to be the major source ofrevenue. However, traditionally it was taxed because peasants were perceived asirrational, lazy, and unresponsive to price incentives. The resulting tax practiceswere inherited by independent governments from colonial administrations. Evi-dence of producer response has mounted, however. In turn, relative officialproducer prices of food and export crops have been changed in many countries inthe last decade, first in order to achieve food self-sufficiency and more recentlyto promote exports. Relative prices have in fact been easier for governments toinfluence than technology or quality of services. Thus, while the composition offood and export crops has changed, overall productivity has stagnated. Theproducer’s share in the total net market value of the output has frequently re-mained very low. In Sudan, the rate of taxation on cotton farmers reached 35percent in the late 1970s; in Mali it ranged from 36 to 69 percent on cotton, 52 to65 percent on groundnuts, and 23 to 63 percent on sorghum and millets. Evenafter allowance is made for the subsidies received by farmers on fertilizer and

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credit, the effective rate of taxation amounted to 24–61 percent for cotton and48-65 percent for groundnuts in Mali.

Again, the inadequate recognition of producer incentives is by no meansconfined to Africa. Theodore W. Schultz’s Transforming Tradiliona/ Agricul-ture, which included examination of the peasant irrationality hypothesis, wasprompted by similar observations in developing Asia in the early post-indepen-dence period. 9 In Asia these attitudes, trends, and perceptions have been muted,however. In fact, an articulate pro-agriculture lobby has been created withinmost governments in Asia. What accounts for these differences? In comparisonwith Africa (with a few exceptions, such as Kenya), in most of Asia there hasbeen greater overt discussion of policy issues, both domestically and betweendomestic and outside scholars. More widespread formal education and trainingof policy makers and administrators in Asia has been helpful, as has their greaterexposure to the farming communities through Ionger practical work experi-ence.10 New technological possibilities and increased use of purchased inputs

have also changed the’perspective on price incentives. Now several rural devel-

opment projects in Africa have gradually begun to produce a similar cadre ofknowledgeable Africans in several countries, but their numbers arc small be-cause of government and donor policies to be described later.

A large part of the agricultural budget in many countries is spent on sub-sidies-over 70 percent in Zambia. But contrary to general opinion, many of thesubsidies provided in the agricultural sectors in the hope of increasing overallpeasant production do not compensate effectively for high rates of taxation. Forinstance, fertilizer subsidies frequently only help alleviate the high cost of pro-duction of inefficient domestic fertilizer plants or the high cost of their localdistribution. General subsidies on interest rates and inputs largely benefit thealready better-off commercial farmers. 11 A policy followed in many Africancountries of uniform pricing of output, involving complex cross-subsidies oftransport and other handling costs across regions, has achieved regional equity,especially where few attractive enterprises exist, but has discouraged crop spe-cialization to exploit different natural resources among regions.

INPUT AND OUTPUT MARKETING

Input and output marketing and processing facilities are almost always oper-ated by semiautonomous government or parastatal agencies or by largely govern-ment-initiated cooperatives on a monopoly basis. Public marketing agencies tendto be high-cost operations because of overstaffing, poor financial control andaccountability, and inexperienced management. If an informal traditional marketoperates, it is only tolerated rather than helped to improve. 12 Frequently it isactively discouraged. The eviction of largely Asian-dominated trade throughOperation Maduka in Tanzania and the massive expulsion of Asians in Ugandaillustrate the point. A strong desire to abolish exploitation of nationals by otherraces is understandable, even if such exploitation is imputed rather than real. Buteven Nigeria, which has a buoyant, largely indigenous small-scale traditionaltrading sector, adopted a policy of public-sector monopoly of the distribution offertilizer. Tanzania has similarly discouraged its own enterprising tribes fromtrading, among other things by instituting some four hundred parastatals and overeight thousand village cooperatives, which are expected to provide most of thepublic services.

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Some of these same policies are followed for almost the same political andbureaucratic reasons in most Asian countries, but the consequences there are farless severe. The degree of government control is more limited, there is greateradministrative capacity to exercise it, and there has been more development ofprivate institutions and transport and communication networks. In Africa, inputsare more frequently late, inadequately labeled and packaged, and in wrongcombinations. Marketed surpluses are often not picked upon time, first paymentsto farmers are inordinately late, promised second payments rarely materialize, anddamages to crops in storage and handling are extensive. Discouragement ofprivate retail trade has affected rural supply of even the most basic day-to-daynecessities in some countries, thus further reducing incentives for producers toconsume, save, or invest. Institutional pluralism needs to be given major consid-eration as an element of development strategy in Africa.

AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH, EXTENSION, TRAINING,

AND SOCIAL SERVICES

Whereas there is indiscriminate government intervention in some areas ofpolicy, there is neglect of others, for instance, agricultural research, extension,and development of trained manpower. This neglect is due partly to inadequaterecognition of the importance of these services and of the time required toestablish effective institutions and delivery systems and partly to preoccupationwith politically more expeditious short-run objectives. The role of donors in thisregard should not be underrated and is discussed later. The diversion of scarcefinancial and manpower resources to purposes that the private sector could wellbe allowed to serve is also a handicap.

Because of the inadequate provision of recurrent resources, the research,extension, and training facilities that do exist are frequently underfinanced andpoorly maintained. As President Nyerere observed in his famous speech “TheArusha Declaration: Ten Years After, ” the pressure to maintain and even expandpublic-sector employment is so high that the wage bill is difficult to control. 13

Consequently, there are not enough public funds for transport allowances forfield staff to carry out research trials and extension demonstrations nor for spareparts, maintenance and operation of stores, processing facilities, research sta-tions, vehicles, and roads. The general situation is one of ill-trained, unmoti-vated, unsupervised, and demoralized field staff in many sectors. Of course thereare notable exceptions, such as the Kenya Tea Development Authority and theAgricultural Marketing Corporation in Malawi. Inadequacy and depletion ofcapital and government services over time are far more severe in areas wheredonor projects do not exist, inasmuch as these areas do not benefit from prioritybudgetary allocations. But the implementation of budgets also needs to be im-proved, as frequently even the resources allocated are not spent.

Social services suffer from many of the same problems. For example, lack orpoor quality of water supply in many rural areas of Africa leads to ill health.

Time spent in fetching water reduces time available for agricultural activities.lack of health facilities similarly reduces labor productivity in agriculture. Ab-sence of primary education results in limited access to services and employmentopportunities in towns. Demand for social services is therefore widespreadthroughout Africa. On the other hand, public resources to pay the recurrent costsof providing social services are generally too limited to permit blanket coverage.

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Either a high degree of selectivity or greater direct cost recovery is thereforerequired in the provision of such services. AS many harambee("self-help")schemes in Kenya illustrate, rural people are glad to contribute their own re-sources, provided the services are responsive to precise local demands and reli-

able, lOW-COSt delivery is assured. Tanzania’s example indicates, however, thatfor a combination of welfare and political reasons, governments refrain from costrecovery and genuine local involvement in planning and implementation. Tan-zania’s policy of universal provision of services through central financing has

undoubtedly achieved results in some areas. According to official data, theproportion of the eligible population enrolled in primary schools went up from 28percent in 1960 to over 90 percent in the late 1970s. The ratio of population withaccess to safe water has gone up from 13 percent in 1960 to about 40 percent inthe 1970s. To a lesser extent, most African countries have expanded coverage ofsocial services in a similar way, but the overall result is still inadequately fi-nanced services, with substantial demands on government resources.

Government objectives of modernization also exacerbate manpower shortagesin the traditional sector. The low status of the traditional rural sector and theunattractive living conditions and facilities, in contrast to the urban or the large-scale agricultural sector, often deter qualified nationals from serving the needs ofpeasant agriculture. On the other hand, demand for education in Africa is one ofthe strongest in the developing world. The governments have allocated substan-tial portions of their own resources to education, with different emphases onprimary and higher education, depending on their ideology. Because Tanzaniahas largely emphasized primary education, the enrollment ratio in secondaryschools in Tanzania only went up from 2 percent at independence to 4 percent bythe late 1970s, and from nearly zero to 0.3 percent in higher education. Theshortage of middle- and higher-level technical and administrative manpower isconsequently extremely severe. In Kenya, budgetary allocations to secondaryand higher education have been expanding more rapidly, and private-sectorexpansion is permitted more liberally. As a result, 18 percent of the eligiblepopulation is enrolled in secondary schools and 1 percent is in higher education.Even then, middle- and higher-level manpower shortages are considerable, es-pecially in technical fields such as accountancy, financial aid and physical re-sources management, agronomy, plant breeding, and mechanical and civil en-gineering. On a unit basis, skilled labor in African countries typically costsbetween three and ten times as much as in many Asian countries. The averageannual salary of a research scientist in the 1970s was below ten thousand dollarsin Asia, compared with thirty-four thousand dollars in East Africa. 14 And, ofcourse, not nearly enough scientists are available even to rehabilitate, let alone toexpand, the national research systems in Africa.

To summarize, the “Modernization Now” objective and the consequent na-tional policies, investment priorities, and attitudes toward smallholder agricul-ture explain the poor performance of the agricultural and rural sectors in manyAfrican countries. In contrast, the Asian and, to a very limited extent, theAfrican experience indicate that greater trained manpower, combined with long-er developmental experience by nationals, leads to a better time perspective onmodernization and, more support of peasant agriculture.

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AFRICA’S SPECIAL CHALLENGES

The frequent comparisons with low-income Asia in the previous discussionshould not lead one to overlook the problems peculiar to Africa. Low rainfall,poor soils, and the highly diverse ecological conditions within individual coun-tries make raising agricultural productivity much more difficult in many parts ofsub-Saharan Africa than in Asia, with its extensive scope for small- and medium-scale irrigation and its more fertile soils.

Several seemingly favorable natural features of Africa, such as the low densityof population, pose difficult rural development problems in the short run. In thelate 1970s, population densities ranged from 6 persons per square kilometer inSomalia and Sudan to 90 in Nigeria. This is in contrast to a density of 155 in thePhilippines, 200 in India, and 620 in Bangladesh. Farms are considerably largerand landlessness is less prevalent in Africa than in most Asian countries. Howev-er, extensive land use is itself a result of the unreliable and low rainfall and poorsoils referred to above, which lead to shifting cultivation and widespread nomad-ism in many parts of Africa. Low density also makes for much higher per capitacosts of providing roads, schools, and agricultural services in Africa than inAsia.

There are also apparent contradictions. In the African farming system seasonallabor shortages are a far more limiting factor in increasing productivity than inAsia, especially in view of the low level of African agricultural technology.Thus, selective use of mechanization in the private sector may be economicallyjustifiable. And yet unemployment and underemployment of rural labor are alsoincreasing, particularly where population pressure on land is rising rapidly. Withrising fuel costs, mechanization—now often operated through the public sec-tor—is frequently highly uneconomical. The more intermediate forms of tech-nology that are used extensively in Asia, such as the ox plow, would be far moreefficient where the tsetse fly has been controlled. 1 5

Cattle are an important element of Africa’s agriculture. The tradition of indi-vidual ownership of cattle, combined with communal grazing rights, has resultedin overgrazing and declining productivity. For decades technicians have stressedthe need for restocking and pasture improvement, but these have proved elusivebecause of the complex sociocultural and environmental factors that operate innomadic social systems and the absence of more profitable and less risky ways ofinvesting the surplus resources of cattle owners.

Low population density also explains the extreme inadequacy of roads, rail-ways, and waterways, although even in this respect there is considerable diver-sity. Small countries with greater population density, such as Kenya and Malawi,are less hampered by inadequate transport than are large countries such as Sudan,Somalia, Ethiopia, and Tanzania. And yet investments in the road system havealso been greater in Kenya and Mulawi than in many other African countries.Road mileage per square mile of land area is only 0.02 in Sudan, 0.1 in Zambia,and 0.15 in Zaire, compared with 0.23 in Kenya and 0.31 in Malawi.

Limited growth of sedenary cultivation has also meant more limited evolutionof - indigenous technology and skills in blacksmithing, carpentry, crafts, man-ufacturing, and trading than is typical of most Asian countries, though there aredistinct differences between the more developed West African societies andthose of East Africa. The range of farm implements, ox plows, and animal -driven modes of transport used extensively in other parts of the developing world

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are not prevalent even today in much of traditional rural Africa. on the contrary,with the advent of colonialism there was a ‘‘technological leap’ toward tractors,combine harvesters, and modern means of transport, so that at independenceAfrica was left with greater technological dualism than was prevalent in most ofcolonial Asia.

For these various reasons, the challenges to agricultural research systems inAfrica are by far the greatest in the world, combining constraints posed byecological, demographic, technical, and institutional factors. 16 International ag-ricultural research institutes such as the International Institute of Tropical Agri-culture in Nigeria and several others, financed by the Consultative Group onInternational Agricultural Research, have already begun to address some of theseproblems. However, substantial additional investment is required in scientificresearch at the national and regional levels to develop profitable technologicalpackages to suit the highly diverse conditions and reduce the risks now encoun-tered in their adoption by low-income farmers. In some extremely marginalareas, such as parts of the Sahel in the north and Lesotho in the south, it may notbe possible to increase productivity in present subsistence crops enough to makethem a primary source of livelihood. Alternatives, including migration to moreproductive areas where labor-intensive, high-value horticultural crops can beproduced, may have to be examined. These are costly options demanding consid-erable organization.

The situation with respect to trained manpower can be best appreciated bysome comparisons with Asia at the time of independence. In 1960 even theeducationally most advanced African countries, Ghana and Nigeria, had only 4percent of the population of secondary-school age enrolled in school, comparedwith 8 percent in Bangladesh, 10 percent in Burma, 20 percent in India, and 26percent in the Philippines. By the late 1970s the percentage in Nigeria had goneup to 13; by then it was 23 for Bangladesh, 22 for Burma, 28 for India, and 56for the Philippines.

However, as may be seen in Ghana, Uganda, and Ethiopia, which have beenbetter endowed with trained manpower than other African countries, without aconducive political environment little development is possible even with trainedmanpower. Many African countries have not yet fully achieved national unity orgained domestic political stability, the colonial powers having established na-tional borders without regard to traditional land rights and tribal cohesion. Re-sources and attention sorely needed for rural development have often been diver-ted to internal conflicts, border wars, and maintenance of domestic politicalcontrol.

Development of administrative capability will also take a long time. At inde-pendence, often there was a virtual absence of strong national, regional, andlocal government administrations of the types that existed in South Asia. Colo-nial agricultural development policies were geared almost exclusively to theexpansion of export crop production for the metropolitan countries. Researchwas largely concentrated on export crops.

17 Agricultural extension, input sup-ply, credit, and marketing and processing facilities were also highly fragmented.Recent efforts-for example, in Tanzania and Kenya-to decentralize admin-istrative systems to make them more responsive to rural people’s needs, whilejustified in the long run, have only exacerbated administrative weaknesses in theshort run because the existing administrative manpower has had to be spread

38-85(, o - 85 - 8 : ~1, 3

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thinly between the central ministries of agriculture and transport and [he provin-cial administration.

Africa thus starts with considerable odds against development. And yet thereis immense potential for productivity increases, not simply in Sudan and thehighlands of eastern and southern Africa, where it is commonly recognized, butin much of the rest of Africa, in the humid and semihumid tropics and the parts ofthe savanna that receive adequate rainfall.

THE DONOR’S ROLE

The experience of Asian countries indicates that in addition to providing directfinancial support, international assistance can play an important role in the longrun by increasing national consciousness about peasant agricultural develop-ment, by improving the rationale for policies, by making the effect of alternativepolicy options on different sectors or income groups more explicit, and bygradually strengthening those national forces that can lobby for policy changes.Changing the distribution of basic assets or political power so that, for instance,cooperatives will effectively include the poor and subsidies will not go to the richis far more difficult to achieve from outside. National will and capacity areneeded to this end.

Concern and debate about the equity issue in the international donor communi-ty have been extensive since the “green revolution’ and the perceived failure ofthe trickle-down approach to reach the poor.

18 Since the world food crisis of

1973-74 the objective of national self-sufficiency in food, and subsequently abroader set of issues such as assurance of basic needs, environmental protection,and women’s rights, have begun to receive international attention. The seeming-ly long time required to achieve the green revolution in Asia has created impa-tience in the donor community to achieve results, and with the widening scope ofthe development debate, the areas for achieving results have broadened.

Aid in the form of grants and low-interest loans has increased substantiallyover time in Africa. For the late 1970s, aid ranged between $20 and $40 a yearper capita in Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Ivory Coast. Mali, Cameroon,Zambia. and Malawi to as high as $50 to $120 in the smaller countries ofBotswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland. In many countries it constitutes a quarteror more of the total annual investment and over half the investment in agricultureand rural development. Even Bangladesh, which is one of the largest recipients

of aid in Asia, received only about $10 of concession] aid a year per capita inthe late 1970s.

Large numbers of aid agencies are involved in assistance to Africa, withrelatively little coordination as to objectives, strategy, degree of continuity, andareas of assistance. Coping with the complex and differing procedures and largeflows of aid is exceedingly difficult for the inadequately staffed bureaucracies ofmost African countries. 20

Apart from targeting more donor-financed projects toward the rural poor, therehas been much evolution in the concept of project assistance in recent years, 21

Projects no longer focus solely on export crops, but are increasingly concernedwith development of food crops for domestic consumption. They are morestrongly geared to institution building, such as strengthening the project-planningand implementing capacity of the national ministries of agriculture, of the

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provincial, regional, district, and local administrations, and of the financing andmarketing entities that provide field services. This is in contrast (o the earlierapproach of "enclave" projects, which were implemented mainly through sepa-rate autonomous entities created for the purpose. The new projects also showgreater concern for employment, training of local staff, and the use of localmaterials and techniques. They also anticipate more explicitly the need for recur-rent financing and for financing of several time phases . They are also more likelynow to include support for policy units and monitoring and evaluating to ensuregreater flexibility and learning by doing.

Despite these major improvements, donor-financed projects are having a verylimited impact, especially in light of the resources expended. This holds irrespec-tive of whether their achievements are judged by inputs, such as numbers of localand expatriate staff recruited, research trials carried out, amounts of fertilizer andother inputs distributed, vehicles purchased, buildings and roads constructed ormaintained, or amount of data collected or analyzed by evaluation units; or bythe end results, such as increases in yields, numbers of staff trained, or admin-istrative and financial procedures instituted.

What explains the limited impact’? The gulf between the donors’ largely equi-ty-oriented objectives and the national government’s goal of modernization hasremained wide in Africa. Instead of examining the actual policies, strategies, andinstitutional frameworks of national governments and assessing the extent towhich they are conducive to rural development, donors have largely taken gov-ernment rhetoric and plan documents as indications of national commitment andpriorities. Donors have concentrated on project aid as a way of influencing thesepriorities; in so doing, they frequently have exacerbated the problems of Africa'srural development in a variety of ways.

First, the simultaneous shift by much of the international community to thealleviation of rural poverty, in the face of obvious shortages of national man-power, resources, and institutional capacity, has led to underutilization and poormaintenance of donor investments. For a variety of reasons, donors have gener-ally preferred to finance mainly capital expenditures, that is, equipment and civilworks, rather than the recurrent expenditures required to maintain or operatethese and other related investments.

Second, despite much evolution in the right direction, the need for assistancein increasing national capacity for policy development has been underrated. Inaddition, a number of questionable showpiece investments by governments havebeen made possible by generous financial support from the donor community.There are a number of reasons for such assistance: a wish to respond to nationaldesires; an expectation of quick, visible results; the promotion of exports fromdonor countries; the vying among donor agencies to finance projects likely toappeal to their own domestic constituencies; the donors’ need to meet their ownquotas of assistance; and some understandable errors in judgment. However,there are other factors: the first relates to the provision of technical assistance inthe short run, the second to the expansion of secondary and higher-level educa-tion to help broaden the capacities of nationals over the long run.

According to some estimates. as much as 75 percent of the technical assistanceused in the developing world is used in Africa. In the short run. technicalassistance has permitted the planning and implementation of development pro-jects on a scale that would not have been possible otherwise. However, expatri-ates are becoming less acceptable in sensitive managerial or policy-making posi-

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tions in most African countries. Their numbers have been growing for more thana decade since independence, mainly in technical and advisory Positions. Theirhigh salaries and benefits create resentment among nationals. Even when highlyqualified in their specialties, they are not generally effective in working in analien environment.

Increasing high-level education and training of nationals is therefore criticalfor augmenting Africa’s managerial and policy-making capacity, even thoughthe results will take a long time to achieve. Expansion of basic, primary, voca-tional, and adult education has been supported strongly by donors as a way ofincreasing the supply of field staff, meeting the basic-needs objectives, andincreasing the receptivity of rural populations to agricultural and other innova-tions. Some high-level technical training of Africans is also being undertaken byseveral bilateral donors, such as the U.S. Agency for International Developmentand the British Overseas Development Ministry, which have traditionally sup-ported this activity. But on the whole, expansion of secondary and higher educa-tion has not received the priority it requires from donors. Frequently the shortageof people with the necessary educational qualifications is so great that even thosefunds that are provided by donors for higher-level on-the-job training remainunused.

The gains to be had from basic, adult, and primary education are undoubtedlyconsiderable, as evidence from Asia indicates. It is also clear, however, that inAfrica at present the shortage of educatcd and technically trained cadres ofnationals who can devise effective national strategies and policies is a far greaterconstraint to the alleviation of rural poverty than is the illiteracy or lack ofreceptivity of the rural population. Once again, the question is one of balance andpriorities at a given stage of development. Evidence, mainly from Asia and LatinAmerica, has also led to anxiety about increasing the ranks of the educatedunemployed in developing countries. The perceived indifference of some of theeducated urbanites to the largely rural needs of their own countries has led theinternational community to a general disenchantment with higher education.Perhaps implicit in this is the feeling that in comparison with the need to trainlower-level staff, expanding the supply of high-level educated personnel is un-necessary or antithetical to the egalitarian objectives of rural poverty alleviation.

Contrary to these perceptions, an increase in the supply of educated personnelwould not only improve national systems but also reduce salaries of the edu-cated, including those of teachers, thus reducing income inequalities as well asthe cost of further investment in education and a range of other developmentactivities. By far the most unquestionable though unquantifiable benefit of highereducation to Africa would be that of learning by doing, which is now lost to theever-growing and changing expatriate technical community. It is ironic that mostAfrican countries do not have the capacity to propose alternative plans to thosepresented by donors for using aid funds—plans that would reflect the countries’own long-term needs for higher education.

The need for substantial investment in physical infrastructure in larger coun-tries such as Sudan and Tanzania and in landlocked countries such as Zambiaalso requires critical examination by donors. Maintenance of past infrastructurehas frequently been neglected, and not enough resources have been devoted todevelopment of trunk roads, railways, and waterways by national governmentsand donors. Feeder-road development has received considerably more support,but the lack of an effective national transport network makes investment in feeder

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roads ineffective. Again, some of [he same reasons that apply to education andtraining explain this neglect, in particular the perception that capital-intensiveinfrastructure is not so necessary for reaching the poor, especially in the shortrun. A more appropriate balance between the objectives of immediate alleviationof poverty and the long-term development needs of more resource-intensiveinvestments is required.

IMPLICATIONS FOR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT

The problem of Africa’s rural development is not one of not knowing in broadterms what needs to be done to support peasant agriculture. The prospects forturning the present gloomy trends around are considerable. At the national level,the most fundamental problems are attitudes and vested interests. The subsis-tence rural sector must be seen as critical for economic development and must begiven the priority that it urgently requires. At the international level, it is evidentthat current donor approaches of project aid, although perhaps far more essentialin Africa than in many countries in Asia, are by themselves not enough to dealwith Africa’s complex developmental needs. A major reconsideration of thebalance of assistance, including the donors’ role in education, infrastructure, andlong-term policy planning and implementation, is required. Only then can therebe a useful discussion of development priorities with nationals. The question ofreordering priorities will require a major review by the donor community as awhole, and even if the question is resolved adequately, the reordering of pri-orities will take at least a decade to show major results. But the prospects for the1990s will then be considerably better than those for the 1980s. It is also the onlyway to reduce Africa’s growing dependence on outside aid.

NOTES

I thank H. S. Bienen, W. V. Candler, J, M. Cohen, S. D. Eccles, A. O. Falusi, L. S. Hardin, G.Hyden, N. Islam, W. A. Lewis, J. W. Mellor, M. Mensa, T. W. Schultz, and two unknownreviewers for Science for comments on earlier drafts. The views expressed in the article are my ownand do not necessarily represent those of The World Bank.

1. Uma Lele and Wilfred Candler, “Food Security in Developing Countries: National Issues, ”chapter 14 in this book; International Food Policy Research Institute, A Comparative Study of FAOand USDA Data on Production, Area, and Trade of Major Food Staples, Research Report no. 19(Washington, D. C., October 1980).

2. International Food Policy Research Institute, Food Needs of Developing Countries: Projectionsof Production and Consumption to 1990, Research Report no. 3 (Washington, DC., December1977), table 3, p. 33.

3. Ibid., table 1, p. 22.4. K. Anthony; B. F. Johnston; W. O. Jones; and V. Uchendu, Agricultural Change in Tropical

Africa (Ithaca: Come]] University Press, 1979).5. World Bank, World Development Report 1981 (New York: Oxford University Press for the

World Bank, 1981), table 1.1, p. 3.6. Goren Hyden, in Papers on the Political Economy of Tanzania, ed. K. S. Kim, M. Mabele,

and M. J. Schultheis (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1979), 5-14.7. See Holdcroft, chapter 3 in this volume.-ED.8. The countries are World Bank members with populations over two million, plus Mauritius.9. T. W. Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture (New Haven: Yale University Press,

1964). [See also the discussion of Schultz’s work in chapter 1 of this book.-ED. 1

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10. Journals such as the Economic and Political Weekly have provided an irr,poflant forum for avigorous domestic discussion of planned priorities in India in which innumerable external analystshave participated.

11. Uma Lele, “Cooperatives and the Poor: A Comparative Perspective, ” World Development 9( 1981): 55-72. [See also Adams and Graham, chapter 21, and Gonzalez-Vega, chapter 22, in thisvolume .-E~. ]

12. “There is no official policy towards the unofficial market, ” a comment of a senior official ofone of the African ministries of agriculture, states the problem well.

13. Goren Hyden, Beyond Ujamuu in Tanzania: Underde\’elopment and an Uncaptured Peasant-ry (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980), 133; Uma ble, The Design ojRura/ Devek~pmenf: Lessons\rom Africa. 2d ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).

14. P, Oram, Currenl and Projected ARriculturul Research li’xRendlfure.v and S[aflin Developing

Counwm. Intcma(wnd l;~x~ policy R~~~r~h ln~ll(u(~ w~)rkln~ P~Pcr. nO Jo (Washington, D.c.,1978), 6.

15. The tsetse fly IS the vector of trypanosornidsi~, or sl~cping slckncss! Which is endemic in mypans of sub-Saharan Afrwa. -Er>.

16 H. Ruthenberg, Farming S.vsfems in fhe Tropi(s (oxford: cl~rcndon. 1976). See also Schultz,chapter 23; Evenson, chapter 24; and CIMMYT Ekonomlcs Staff. chapter 25. in this volume.

17 See Evenson, chapter 24 in this volume .—l%.18. See chapter I in this volume .—E[>.]9. World Bank, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Afrl~u: An &v~afor Action (Wash-

mg[on, D. C., 198 I )20. See Eicher, chaplcr 31 in this volume .—E[~.21. Lele, The Design of Rural Development

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Facing UpFood

to Africa’sCrisis

C A R L K E I C H E R

The most intractable food problem facing the world in the 1980s isthe food and hunger crisis in the forty-five states in sub-SaharanAfrica—the poorest part of the world. Although the crisis followsby less than a decade the prolonged drought of the early 1970s in

the Sahelian states of West Africa, weather is not the main cause of the currentdilemma. 2 Nor is the chief problem imminent famine, mass starvation, or thefeeding and resettling of refugees. Improved international disaster assistanceprograms can avert mass starvation and famine and assist with refugee resettle-ment. Rather, Africa’s current food crisis is long-term in nature, and it has beenbuilding up for two decades; blanketing the entire subcontinent are its twointerrelated components—a food production gap and hunger. The food produc-tion gap results from an alarming deterioration in food production in the face of asteady increase in the rate of growth of population over the past two decades. Thehunger and malnutrition problem is caused by poverty: even in areas where percapita food production is not declining, the poor do not have the income orresources to cope with hunger and malnutrition.

Twenty of the thirty-three poorest countries in the world are African (WorldBank 1982).3 After more than two decades of rising commercial food importsand food aid, the region is now experiencing a deep economic malaise, withgrowing balance-of-payment deficits and external public debts. The world eco-nomic recession has imposed a severe constraint on Africa’s export-orientedeconomies. Prospects for meeting Africa’s food production deficit through ex-panded commercial food imports thus appear dismal. Donors have responded tothese difficult problems by increasing aid flows to the point where Africancountries now lead the list of the world’s aid recipients in per capita terms.4

Furthermore, the World Bank report Accelerated Development in Sub-SaharanAfrica ( 1981)5 advocates a doubling of aid to Africa in real terms by the end ofthe 1980s. But the crisis cannot be solved through crash food production projectsor a doubling of aid. Sincc the food and hunger crisis has been in the making forten to twenty years, solutions to the crisis cannot be found without facing up to anumber of difficult political, structural, and technical problems over the nextseveral decades.

Key questions and policies that must be examined include: What is the recordof agrarian capitalism and socialism? Why did the green revolution by-passAfrica’? What lessons have been learned from crash food production projects in

—

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the Sahel and the development strategies of the 1970s—integrated rural develop-ment, helping the poorest of the poor, and the basic needs approach? Are techni-cal packages available for small farmers to step up food production in the 1980s?Can foreign aid assist in the alleviation of the food production crisis and eco-nomic stagnation?

OVERVIEW OF AFRICA’S ECONOMY

Despite the fact that Africa is an extremely diverse region, several commonfeatures frame the boundaries for addressing its food crisis. First, populationdensities in Africa are extremely low relative to those in Asia. The Sudan, forexample, is two-thirds the size of India, but it has only 18 million people ascompared with 670 million in India. Zaire is five times the size of France and hasonly a small percentage of its arable land under cultivation. But some countriesare near their maximum sustainable population densities, given present agr-icultural technology and available expertise on soil fertility. Much of the arableland in Africa is not farmed because of natural constraints such as low rainfalland tsetse flies, which cause human sleeping sickness and virtually preclude theuse of approximately one-third of the continent, including some of the best-watered and most fertile land.6

Second, most of the economies are open, heavily dependent on internationaltrade, and small: twenty-four of the forty-five countries have fewer than 5 mil-lion people, and only Nigeria has a gross domestic product larger than that ofHong Kong (World Bank 1981, 2). Small countries have special problems inassembling a critical mass of scientific talent and in financing colleges of agricul-ture and national agricultural research systems,

Third, all but two African states—Ethiopia and Liberia-are former colonies.7

The colonial legacy is embedded in the top-down orientation of agriculturalinstitutions and the priority given to medicine, law, and the arts rather thanagriculture in African universities and partially explains the low priority thatAfrican states have assigned to agriculture and to increasing food productionover the past twenty-five years.

Fourth, Africa is an agrarian-dominated continent where at least three out offive people work in agriculture and rural off-farm activities. Moreover, sinceagricultural output accounts for 30–60 percent of the gross domestic product inmost countries, the poor performance of the agricultural sector over the past twodecades has been a major cause of poverty and economic stagnation.

Fifth, Africa’s human resource base is extremely weak relative to those ofAsia and Latin America. In most countries, even after twenty years of indepen-dence, there are still only small pools of agricultural scientists and managersbecause of the token priority that colonial governments gave to educatingAfricans.

PROFILE OF AFRICAN AGRICULTURE

Although there are more than one thousand different ethnic groups in Africaand wide differences in farming and livestock systems by agroecological zones,the following overview pinpoints the major features of African agriculture andsome of the d inferences between it and agriculture in Asia and Latin America. 8

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For the most part, land ownership in Africa is remarkably egalitarian as con-trasted with that in Latin America. The uniform agrarian structure is partially afunction of colonial policies that prohibited foreigners from gaining access toland in some parts of the continent, such as West Africa. But in Zambia andZimbabwe, colonial policies promoted a dual structure of large and small farms(Blackie 1981).

Empirical research has shown that African farmers, migrants, and traders areresponsive to economic opportunities. Although custom, local suspicions, jeal-ousies, ignorance, and fatalism can play a role in inhibiting the introduction ofchange in a particular situation, these variables do not serve as a general explana-tion of rural poverty (Jones 1960).

Africa is a region of family-operated small farms, in contrast to Latin Amer-ica, where land ownership is highly concentrated. The typical smallholder hasfive to fifteen acres under cultivation in any one year and frequently has as muchor more land in fallow in order that soil fertility can be gradually restored. Thus,it is more accurate to describe most African farming systems as land-extensivefarming systems rather than land-surplus systems. The typical smallholder givesfirst priority in terms of land preparation, planting, and weeding to growingstaple foods (such as millet, sorghum, yams, cassava, white maize, and beans) tofeed his family and second priority to producing cash crops such as coffee,cotton, and groundnuts for the market.

Family labor supplies the bulk of the energy in farming, unlike in Asia, wherethe main energy source is oxen. The short-handle hoe and the machete are themain implements used in land preparation and weeding. Rural nonfarm activitiesaccount for 25–50 percent of the total time worked by male adults in farmhouseholds over the course of a year in Africa. Unlike in Asia, there is nolandless labor class in most African countries because of the presence of idleland.

Land tenure in Africa can be characterized as a communal tenure system ofpublic ownership and private use rights of land (Cohen 1980). The combinationof private use rights and communal control over access to land allows families(u) to continue to farm and graze the same land over time and to transfer theseuse rights to their descendants and (b) to have the right to buy and sell rights totrees (such as oil palm and cocoa) through a system of pledging. There is noactive rural land market in most countries. Land tenure and lurid use policy issueswill be of strategic importance in the 1980s and 1990s as the frontier phase is

exhausted, land markets emerge, irrigation is expanded, and herders shift fromnomadic to semi nomadic herding and sedentary farming systems that integrate

crops and livestock.Unlike in Asia, where two or three crops are grown sequentially over a twelve-

month period, most African farmers produce only one crop during the rainyseason and engage in some form of off-farm work during the dry season. irriga-tion is a footnote in most countries because farmers can produce food and cashcrops more cheaply in rainfed farming systems.

Rural Africa is at a crossroads. Farming and livestock systems are complex,heterogeneous, and changing. African villages are experiencing major changesin response to the penetration of (he market economy, drought, explosive rates ofpopulation growth, and the oil boom in countries such as Nigeria and Gabon. Forexample, the oil boom in Nigeria has escalated rural wage rates, induced migra-

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tion from northern Cameroon and Niger, and provided a market for livestock andfood crops from neighboring countries.

The subsistence farmer producing entirely for his family’s consumption is hardto find in Africa today except in special cases where inadequate transport, re-bellion, or political unrest have forced farmers to withdraw from the market andproduce for their subsistence needs (such as in Uganda and Guinea in the 1970sand in Tanzania in the early 1980s). In the 1980s and 1990s, village institutionswill be under pressure as rural Africa shifts from extensive to intensive farmingand livestock systems in response to the decline in the ratio of land to labor.Inequality between countries—for example, Upper Volta and the Ivory Coast—and within countries-for example, southern and northern Sudan—will likelyincrease in the coming decades.

UNDERDEVELOPED DATA BASE

Africa has a weak and uneven data base, and there is a need to interpret officialstatistics with caution. For example, accurate data on acreage under cultivationand yields are available for only a handful of counties. Estimates of land underirrigation vary from 1 percent to 5 percent. Estimates of the size of nationallivestock herds are notoriously suspect because of cattle tax evasion. Even tradedata must be carefully examined. For example, official data on cocoa exportsfrom Togo in the 1970s included a large volume of cocoa from Ghana which wassmuggled into Togo. Data on rural income distribution are available for only afew countries. Agricultural statistical agents in most countries rely heavily onguesstimates from extension agents, and they have been known to revise theirfigures to bring them into line with published estimates from international agen-cies. The combination of underdeveloped data and the case study nature (villagestudies, for example) of much of the research in the past decade makes it difficultto generalize about the sources of agricultural output and the causes of poverty,malnutrition, and lagging food production.

There is also a need to beware of the pitfalls of studies [hat present the resultsof survey research, such as farm management and nutrition surveys, in terms ofaverages. For example, data showing that farmers produce enough food to feedeach family member an average of two thousand calories a day during a givenyear are meaningless if some family members do not have enough food tosurvive during the ‘‘hungry season. Moreover, the use of averages promotesthe view that there is a homogeneous or classless rural society and that interven-tions designed to improve the average incomes in an area will automaticallyimprove the incomes of all people, including those on the lower end of theincome scale. Numerous researchers have shown that rural inequality is anintegral part of Africa’s history, that inequality may increase as a result oftechnical change, and that assistance to particular groups of people will have tobe carefully targeted.

In summary, although a few scholars talk glibly about average sorghum yieldsfor a country, the “African case, ” and uncritically use Africa-wide figures (forexample, that women produce at least 80 percent of the food in Africa), seriousscholars wisely eschew generalizing about even a subregion such as West Af-rica-an area as large as the continental United States.

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FOOD AND POPULATION TRENDS

Looking at Africa’s food production trends, population growth, food imports,and poverty, the overriding pattern emerges clearly: since independence Africa’shistorical position of self-sufficiency in staple foods has slowly dissipated (FAO1978). Over the 1960-80 period, aggregate food production in Africa grew veryslowly—by about 1.8 percent per year, a rate below the aggregate growth rate ofAsia or Latin America. However, the critical numbers are not statistics on total

food production but per capita figures. The U.S. Department of Agriculture(1981) statistics show that sub-Saharan Africa is the only region of the worldwhere per capita food production declined in the 1960-78 period, In addition,the average per capita calorie intake was below minimum nutritional levels inmost countries. g

The per capita figures reflect the fact that Africa is the only region of the worldwhere the rate of growth of population actually increased in the 1970s. Theannual population growth rate in Africa was 2.1 percent in the mid 1950s and 2.7percent in the late 1970s and is projected to increase throughout the 1980s until itlevels off at about 3 percent by the 1990s (United Nations 1981 ). Underlying theupward population trend is a young age structure. The average African womanproduces six living children in her reproductive years.

There is little hope for reducing fertility levels in the 1980s because of acomplex set of factors, including the economic contribution of children to farm-ing and rural household activities, the pro-fertility cultural environment, thefailure of family planning programs to date, the pro-natal policies of some states,such as Mauritania, and the indifference of most African heads of state andintellectuals to population growth in what they consider to be a land-surpluscontinent. But explosive rates of population growth cannot be ignored muchlonger. For example, Kenya’s annual rate of population growth of more than 4percent implies a doubling of population in about seventeen years (Kenya 1981).In Senegal, where 95 percent of the population is Muslim and the Muslim leadershave great political power, the government is moving gradually on populationintervention as it expands demographic research and quietly opens child andmaternal health clinics in urban areas. In sum, for a variety of reasons, it isalmost certain that most states will move slowly on population-control policiesduring this decade. As a result, population growth will press hard on foodsupplies, forestry reserves, and livestock and wildlife grazing areas throughoutthe 1980s and beyond.

Food imports are another important dimension of the critical food situation.Many countries that were formerly self-sufficient in food significantly increasedtheir ratio of food imports to total food consumption in the 1960s and 1970s.According to USDA figures, food imports are dominated by grain imports-especially wheat and rice-which have increased from 1.2 million tons a year in1961 –63 to 8 million tons in 1980, at a total cost of $2.1 billion. Significantly,commercial imports of food grain grew more than three times as fast as popula-tion over the 1969–79 period. Rising food imports are attributed to many factors:lagging domestic production; structural and sectoral shifts arising from suchfactors as the oil boom in Nigeria and the increase in minimum wages in Zim-babwe following independence; increasing urbanization; the accompanying shiftof consumer tastes from cassava, yams, millet, and sorghum to rice and wheat;availability of food aid on easy terms; and overvalued foreign exchange rates,

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which often make imported cereals cheaper than domestic supplies. Althoughdata on food aid are imprecise, food aid represented about 20 percent of Africa’stotal food imports in 1982. Wheat, wheat flour, and rice dominate overallimports.

Given the intimate linkage of hunger and malnutrition to poverty, economists,nutritionists, and food production specialists are coming to agree that food andpoverty problems should be tackled together. For if rural and urban incomes areincreased, a large increment of the increased income of poor people (50–80percent) will be spent on food. 10 Unless food production is stepped up, anincrease in rural and urban incomes will simply lead to increased food prices andfood imports and a hardship on families in absolute poverty. Conversely, whileexpanded food production should be the centerpiece of food policy in Africa inthe 1980s, food policy strategies must go beyond crash food production cam-paigns to deal with poverty itself because expanded food production by itself willnot solve the basic problem of poverty.

Africa’s food and poverty problems should not be allowed to overshadowsome impressive achievements of the continent over the past twenty-five years.Foremost is the increase in average life expectancy-from an estimated thirty-eight years in 1950 to almost fifty years in 1980. This 30 percent increase is oftenoverlooked by those who are mesmerized by rates of economic growth. More-over, the achievements in education have been impressive in some countries, andthere has been a vast improvement in the capacity of countries such as Nigeria,Kenya, the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Malawi to organize, plan, and managetheir economies.

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF POVERTY AND THE NEGLECT OFAGRICULTURE

From this overview, one can see that while most Africans are farmers andAfrica has enormous physical potential to feed itself, there are substantial bar-riers to tapping this potential. Experts from academia, donor organizations, andconsulting firms emphasize post-independence corruption, mismanagement, re-pressive pricing of farm commodities, and the urban bias in development strat-egies. Year after year, African heads of state point to unfavorable weather intheir appeal for food aid. In fact, the food production crisis stems from a seam-less web of political, technical, and structural constraints which are a product ofcolonial surplus extraction strategies, misguided development plans and pri-orities of African states since independence, and faulty advice from many ex-patriate planning advisers. These complex, deep-rooted constraints can only beunderstood in historical perspective starting with the precolonial and colonialperiods (Eicher and Baker 1982).

The colonial period formally began when the colonial powers met at the BerlinCongress in 1884 and decided how Africa should be partitioned among the mainEuropean powers. Until the past decade, much of the literature by economists onthe colonial period has been pro-colonial. For example, Bauer boldly asserts that“far from the West having caused the poverty in the Third World, contact withthe West has been the principal agent of material progress there” (Bauer 1981,70). But empirical research over the past two decades has shown that colonialapproaches to development created a dual structure of land ownership in somecountries and facilitated the production and extraction of surpluses--copper,

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gold, cocoa, coffee, and so on—for external markets while paying little attentionto investments in human capital, research on food crops, and strengthening ofinternal market linkages. For example, colonial governments gave little attentionto the training of agricultural scientists and managers. By the time of indepen-dence in the early 1960s, there was only one faculty of agriculture in French-speaking tropical Africa. Between 1952 and 1963, only 4 university graduates inagriculture were trained in Francophone Africa, and 150 in English-speakingAfrica (McKelvey 1965). In 1964, 3 African scientists were working in research

stations in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania (Johnston 1964).Many colonial regimes focused their research and development programs on

export crops and the needs of commercial farmers and managers of plantations.In fact, Evenson ( 1981 ) points out that in 1971 cotton was the only crop thatenjoyed as much research emphasis in the Third World as in industrial coun-tries. 11 The mosest investment in research on fOO d crops could be defendedduring the colonial period because the rate of population growth was low—lpercent to 2 percent per annum-and surplus land could be “automatically”brought under cultivation by smallholders. But with annual rates of populationgrowth now approaching 3–4 percent in some countries, researchers must devotemore attention to food crops and the needs of smallholders and herders. Althoughthe debate on colonialism will continue for decades, we have established thesimple but important point that contemporary agricultural problems can only beunderstood by serious analysis of colonial policies and strategies.

FIVE DEBATES ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE IN THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD

Africa’s food and poverty problems are also a product of misguided policies,strategies, and priorities over the past two decades. In the post-independenceperiod since 1960, African states have engaged in five key debates on food andagriculture. The first was over the priority to be given to industry and agriculturein development plans and budget allocations, As African nations became inde-pendent in the late 1950s and early 1960s, most of them pursued mixed econo-mies with a heavy emphasis on foreign aid, industrial development, education,and economic diversification. For example, the late President Kenyatta promotedcapitalism and encouraged investors "to bring prosperity" to Kenya. A smallnumber of countries such as Mali, Ghana, and Guinea shifted abruptly to revolu-tionary socialism in the early 1960s. But whether political leaders were espous-ing capitalism or socialism, they generally gave low priority to agriculture.African leaders, like former colonial rulers, thought agricultural developmentwould simply reinforce dependency. They tended to view agriculture as a back-ward sector that could provide surpluses-in the form of taxes and labor-tofinance industrial and urban development. Agricultural policies in many capital-ist and socialist countries supported plantations, state farms, land settlementschemes, and the replacement of private traders and moneylenders with govern-ment trading corporations, grain boards, and credit agencies. The effects of thesepolicies on agricultural production were typically inhibiting, in some cases high-ly so.

The second debate was over the relevance of Western neoclassical models

versus the “political economy” (stressing dependency and class structure) andradical models of development. As Western economists assumed important roles

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in helping to prepare development plans and served as policy advisers in the early1960s, Western modernization and macroeconomic models were introduced intoAfrica. The dominant neoclassical models emphasized the industrial sector as thedriving force of development and the need to transfer rural people to the indus-trial sector. These models had three major shortcomings. First, they assumed thatone discipline—economics — could provide answers on how to slay the dragonsof poverty, inequality, and malnutrition. As Hirschman ( 1981 ) reminds us, de-velopment is a historical, social, political, technical, and organizational processwhich cannot be understood by means of a single discipline. Second, the citieswere unable to provide jobs for the rural exodus because of trade union pressurethat elevated minimum wages in government and in industry and capital-inten-sive techniques in the industrial sector (Byerlee et al. 1983). Third, the neoclassi-cal growth models were unable to provide a convincing micro understanding ofthe complexity of the agricultural sector—the sector that employs 50–95 percentof the labor force in African states. Although these models were technicallyelegant. they seem remarkably naive today because they assigned a passive roleto the agricultural sector.

The vacuity of the Western neoclassical models of development and theirfailure to come to grips with the broad social, political, and structural issues, aswell as the complexities of the agricultural sector, opened the door for thepolitical economy and dependency models to emerge in the 1960s and gain alarge following among African intellectuals. 12 The models that emerged in Af-rica were greatly influenced by Latin American dependency writers. SamirAmin, an Egyptian economist, has been the preeminent proponent of the depen-dency and underdevelopment paradigm of development in Africa over the pasttwo decades. 13 The political economy literature attempts to link rural povertyand underdevelopment to historical forces, world capitalism, and surplus ex-

traction. The political economy models have made a valuable contribution instressing the need to understand development as a long-term historical process,the need to consider the linkages between national economies and the worldeconomic system, and the importance of structural barriers (for example, landtenure in Zimbabwe and Zambia) to development. But there is little empiricalsupport for many of the assertions made by some of the political economyscholars.

The question remains, Can political economy and dependency scholars movebeyond their abstract models to develop models based on studies of the behaviorof African farmers and herders, on African institutions, and on micro/macrolinkages in order to provide policy guidance in a continent in which the majorityof the people are farmers?

The third debate---over agrarian capitalism versus socialism-has been one ofthe most emotional topics over the past thirty years; it will continue to dominatediscussions on politics, development strategies, and foreign aid in the 1980s.Even though it is difficult to define African socialism, about one-fourth of thestates now espouse socialism as their official ideology. The experiences ofGhana and Tanzania are well documented. Four years after Ghana became inde-pendent, President Nkrumah abruptly shifted from capitalism to a socialist strat-egy that equated modernization with industritilization and large-scale farmingand state control over agricultural marketing. Ghana was unable to assemble thetechnical and managerial skills and incentive structure to operate its vast systemof state farms, parastatals, and trading corporations. The failure of agrarian

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socialism has imposed a heavy toll on the people of Ghana (Nweke 1978; andKillick 1978).

Tanzania’s shift to socialism in 1967 produced a voluminous literature, inter-national press coverage, massive financial support from international donors-especially Scandinavian countries and the World Bank—and attention from po-litical leaders and intellectuals throughout Africa. 14 The vision of agrarian so-cialism is set forth in President Nyerere’s essay “Socialism and Rural Develop-m e n t . But after seventeen years of experimentation, it seems fair to examinethe balance sheet on socialism in a country where 80 percent of the populationlive in rural areas. The Tanzanian experiment is floundering in part because ofthe quantum jump in oil prices in the mid 1970s and the conflict in Uganda butbasically because of the sharp decline of peasant crop production15 and produc-tion on government-managed coffee, tea, and sisal estates. one cannot overlookTanzania’s gains in literacy and social services, but one may legitimately worryabout their sustainability over the longer term without increased rural incomes orexceptionally heavy foreign aid flows. There are many unanswered questionsabout Tanzania’s experiment with agrarian socialism, such as why PresidentNyerere authorized the use of coercion to round up farmers living in scatteredfarmsteads and forced them to live in villages. Many pro-Tanzania scholarsavoid this topic. But the failure of Tanzania to feed its people explains whyTanzania is no longer taken seriously as a model which other African countrieswant to emulate. 16

Agrarian socialism is now under fire throughout Africa: after twenty years ofexperimentation, presently no African models are performing well. Even Benin,Mozambique, and Guinea are silently retreating from some of the rigidorthodoxy of socialism. What are the reasons for the failure of agrarian socialismto date’? First, and most important, socialist agricultural production requires avast amount of information and managerial and administrative skills in order tocope with the vagaries of weather, seasonal labor bottlenecks, and the need foron-the-spot decision-making authority. In most African countries. the criticalshortage of skills and information is the biggest enemy of agrarian socialism. Noamount of socialist ideology can substitute for the lack of soil scientists, manag-ers, bookkeepers, mechanics, and an efficient communication system. Second,many parastatals, state farms, and government-operated grain boards have beenplagued with overstaffing, corruption, mismanagement, and high operatingcosts. Because these constraints cannot be easily overcome, it is unlikely thatAfrica will make much progress with socialist agriculture in this century.

As the pendulum swings from socialism to private farming and private tradersin the 1980s, it is important to stress that to put all or most of the weight onideology— capitalism or socialism—is to ignore an important lesson learned overthe past thirty years in the Third World, namely, that ideology is but one variableinfluencing the outcome of agricultural development projects. The ‘‘correct’choice of ideology cannot in and of itself assure successful development. Exam-ples of failure under both capitalist and socialist models are too numerous toconclude otherwise.

The fourth debate was over the use of pricing and taxation policies to achieveagricultural and food policy objectives. The first issue here is whether Africansare responsive to economic incentives. Empirical research has produced a con-sensus that African farmers do respond to economic incentives as do farmers inhigh-income countries but that Africans give priority to producing enough food

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for their families for the coming one to two years (Helleiner 1975). The nextquestion is whether African states have pursued positive or negative pricing andtaxation policies for agriculture.

17 Numerous empirical studies across the conti-

nent have provided conclusive evidence that many countries (both capitalist andsocialist) are maintaining low official prices for food and livestock in order toplacate urban consumers. The impact of these negative policies dampens incen-tives to produce food and livestock for domestic markets and encourages blackmarket operations and smuggling across borders.

For example, starting in the mid 1960s Tanzania paid farmers throughout thecountry a uniform price for maize in order to achieve equity objectives. But thispolicy discouraged regional specialization, increased transportation costs, andencouraged smuggling across borders. In Mali, the government pricing policyfor small farmers in a large irrigated rice production scheme in 1979/80 could belabeled “extortion.” A meticulous two-year study has shown that it cost farmers83 Malian francs to produce a kilo of rice but that the government paid farmersonly 60 Malian francs per kilo (Kamuanga 1982), Does it seem irrational thatfarmers smuggled rice across the border into Senegal, Niger, and Upper Volta,where they secured 108–28 Malian francs per kilo?

Not only food crops are subjected to negative pricing policies; export crops arealso heavily taxed. In an analysis of pricing and taxation policies for major cropsin thirteen countries over the 197 1–80 period, the World Bank concluded that,taking the net tax burden and the effect of overvalued currency into account,producers in the thirteen countries received less than half of the real value of theirexport crops (World Bank 1981, 55). These examples and other studies carriedout over the past two decades provide solid evidence that African states are usingnegative pricing and taxation policies to pump the economic surplus out ofagriculture.

18 A simple but powerful conclusion emerges from this experience:

African states should overhaul the incentive structure for farmers and livestockowners and adopt increased farm income as an important goal of social policy inthe 1980s. Moreover, increasing incentives to farmers and herders is a strategicpolicy lever for attacking poverty and promoting rural employment,

The fifth debate—about the green revolution and the African farmer+ on-cerns what can be done to increase the low cereal yields in Africa. A dominantcause of rural poverty is the fact that 60-80 percent of the agricultural labor forceis producing staple foods at very low levels of productivity. While foodgrainyields in Latin America and Asia have increased since 1965, those of Africa haveremained stagnant. Over the past twenty years, the green revolution debate hasfocused on whether African states could import high-yielding foodgrain varietiesdirectly from International Agricultural Research Centers in Mexico, the Philip-pines, and other parts of the world or whether improved cereal varieties could bemore efficiently developed through investments in regional and national researchprograms in Africa.

Twenty years ago, foreign advisers were optimistic about transferring greenrevolution technology to Africa, but after two decades of experimentation theresults are disappointing. In fact, the green revolution has barely touched Africa.For example, ICRISAT's transfer of hybrid sorghum varieties from India in thelate 1970s to Upper Volta, Niger, and Mali was unsuccessful because of unfore-seen problems with disease, variability of rainfall, and poor soils. 19 Moreover,the green revolution crops—wheat and rice-that produced 40–50 percent in-creases in yields in Asia are not staple foods in most of Africa .*” Knowledgeable

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observers agree that African farming systems are extremely complex and that thedevelopment of suitable technical packages requires location-specific research bymultidisciplinary research teams supported by strong national research programson the staple foods of each country (Norman 1980).

These five debates illustrate the complex set of problems that have preoc-cupied African states over the past two decades as they have tried to find ameaningful role for their agricultural sector in national development strategies.Throughout much of the post-independence period, most states have viewedagriculture as a backward and low-priority sector, have perpetuated colonialpolicies of pumping the economic surplus out of agriculture, and have failed togive priority to achieving a reliable food surplus (food security) as a prerequisitefor achieving social and economic goals. The failure of most African states todevelop an effective set of agricultural policies to deal with the technical, struc-tural, institutional, and human resource constraints is at the heart of the presentfood crisis. Part of the failure must be attributed to the colonial legacy and part tothe hundreds of foreign economic advisers who have imported inappropriatemodels and theories of development from the United States, Europe, Asia, andLatin America. In the final analysis, agricultural stagnation in capitalist Zaireand Senegal, socialist Tanzania and Guinea, and many other countries must alsobe placed before heads of state and planners who have promoted prematureindustrialization, built government hotels, airlines, and large dams with negativeinternal rates of return, 21 and spent tens of millions of dollars building villas forheads of state for the annual meetings of the OAU. Moreover, most Africanpolitical leaders have also exhibited a fundamental misunderstanding of the roleof agriculture in national development when 60-80 percent of the people are infarming. Unfortunately, these mistakes in dealing with agriculture over the pasttwenty years cannot easily be overcome through crash production projects anddoubling of aid over the 1980-90 period.

POLICY DIRECTION FOR THE 1980s AND 1990s

Africa’s inability to feed itself amid vast amounts of unused land and recordlevels of foreign aid is, on the surface, one of the major paradoxes in ThirdWorld development. What should be done? While the several notable recentreports on Africa’s food and economic problems agree on the severity of the foodand hunger crisis, each of these assessments underemphasizes the mistakes ofAfrican states and in a somewhat self-serving fashion overstresses the need formore foreign aid. Almost all of the reports implicitly assume that capital, ratherthan human resources, is the most pressing constraint in rural Africa. Thispreoccupation with capital is understandable because foreign aid institutions suchas the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and the WorldBank have a fixation on capital transfers. Moreover, Third World countries havefocused on capital transfers and the need to increase aid in the north/southdialogues, and many donors and African heads of state equate a doubling of aidwith an attack on poverty in Africa. The Lagos Plan of Action, which wasadopted by the heads of state and government in Lagos in April 1980, has littlenew to say about agricultural development except that food production should beaccelerated with the aim of achieving self-sufficiency (OAU 1980). The WorldBank’s report Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (1981) correctly

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singles out domestic policy issues as the heart of the crisis, but it also advancesan unsupported appeal for donors to double aid to Africa over the 1980-90period. Further, while the World Bank report criticizes large-scale irrigationprojects, it does not report the Bank’s own difficulties (and those of most of theother donors) in designing sound livestock projects. The World Food Council’s(1982a) report on the African food problem correctly notes the overemphasis onproject-type aid, the excessive number of foreign missions (for example, UpperVolta received 340 official donor missions in 1981), and the small percentage ofaid funds for food production projects, but it skirts many of the political andstructural barriers to change. The World Food Council’s (1982b) report by theAfrican ministers of agriculture avoids the topic of population growth, the em-pirical record of agrarian socialism, and the disastrous performance of state grainboards. New approaches are needed. The following discussion spells out a com-prehensive approach for the 1980s and 1990s.

S T E P S T O M E E T T H E C R I S I S

Solutions to Africa’s food and poverty problems must, first of all, be long-term. Second, they require a redirection in thinking about agriculture’s role indevelopment at this stage of Africa’s economic history and about the need for areliable food surplus as a precondition for national development. Third, there is aneed for both African states and donors to admit that the present crisis is notcaused by a lack of foreign aid. In fact, in many countries current aid flowscannot bec absorbed with integrity. Hence, donors are part of both the problemand the solution. The Berg report underplays these issues in its unsupported casefor doubling aid to Africa by the end of the 1980s (World Bank 1981). Fourth,there is a riced to recognize that the lack of human resources is an overridingconstraint on rural change in Africa. In fact, the human resource constraintseverely limits the amount of aid that can be effectively absorbed in the short run.In order to buy time to lay a foundation for long-range solutions, it will benecessary to rely on a number of holding actions. Examples include expandedcommercial food imports, food aid, and promoting seasonal and internationalmigration until more land is brought under irrigation and higher rainfall areas canbe cleared of tsetse flies and river blindness. But these holding actions must notbe allowed to substitute for efforts towards long-range solutions.

Three steps should be taken now to start the process of formulating longer-term approaches. First, African states, donors, and economic advisers shouldjettison the ambiguous slogans such as “National Food Self-Sufficiency, ”‘‘Food First, ’ and “Basic Needs."22 Although these have a powerful emotionaland political appeal, they offer little help in answering the key question: Whatblend of food production, food imports, and export crops should be pursued toachieve both growth and equity objectives’? The concept of national food self-sufficiency should be scrapped as a rigid target because it promotes autarchy andignores the historical and the potential role of trade in food and livestock prod-ucts between African states. In summary, there is a need to return to the basics ofagricultural development: investments in human resources and agricultural re-search, policy and structural reforms that will help small farmers and herders,revamping the incentive structure, changing the role of the state,23 and strength-ening the administrative capacity to design and implement projects andprograms.

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The second immediate step should be the phasing out or restructuring of someof the crash food production projects—that is, seed multiplication, irrigatedwheat schemes, livestock schemes, and integrated rural development projects—that are floundering. Many of these crash projects were hastily assembled overthe past decade without a sound technical package and without being tested in apilot phase. These unproductive projects consume scarce high-level manpower,perpetuate recurrent cost problems, and create a credibility problem for bothAfrican policy makers and international donors. Particularly important is thereassessment of integrated rural development IlRD) projects. The weakness ofmost IRD projects—their lack of emphasis on food production and income-generating activities-can be corrected by restructuring some of the projectsrather than phasing them out. Other projects that have been implemented inadvance of a sound knowledge base, like those in livestock, should be eitherphased out or scaled down and continued as pilot projects for a five-to-ten-yearperiod. A five-to-ten-year pilot phase is unheard of in Africa, but in projects likethose in livestock it is a necessary period for solving technical problems anddeveloping appropriate local institutions to solve such key issues as over-stocking.

The third immediate step is to scale down the state bureaucracy, the statepayroll, and state control over private farmers and private traders. After twentyyears of experience with parastatals, the record is clear: parastatals (public enter-prises) are ineffective in producing food, are no more efficient than privatetraders in foodgrain marketing, are almost all overstaffed,24 and serve as asponge for foreign aid. As the number of parastatal employees increases, thepressure intensifies for donors commensurately to increase their contributions tomeet the payroll of the expanded bureaucracy. The parastatal disease is wellknown, but it is not given much attention in the reports cited above, except in theWorld Bank’s Accelerated Development report, which should be applauded forits candor on this topic.

The fourth step is to realize that a food policy strategy cannot be pursued inisolation from livestock and export crop policies nor in isolation from policies todeal with rural poverty. A food policy strategy should not rule out the expansionof export crops, because expanded farm income, through food sales, exportcrops, and off-farm income, and productive rural employment are prerequisitesfor solving rural poverty problems. Moreover, although food aid can help therural poor in the short run, the expansion of productive rural employment isfundamental to coping with rural poverty in the long run.

FOOD POLICY STRATEGIES

The starting point for food policy analysis in each country should be thedevelopment of a food policy strategy with two goals in mind: achieving areliable food surplus (based on domestic production, grain storage, and interna-tional trade) and reducing rural poverty by focusing on measures to help smallfarmers produce more food for home consumption and more food, cash crops,and livestock for the market so that they can purchase a better diet.25 But a wordof caution is in order: food policy analysis is every bit as complex and as delicateas family planning.

26 The rice riots in Monrovia, which left more than onehundred dead in 1979, and the sugar riots in Khartoum and other major cities in

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the Sudan following the doubling of sugar prices in 1981 are reminders of thenarrow range of options for policy makers on food policy issues. Consequently,as experiences from the Sudan, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and Kenya (outlined below)illustrate, most countries will move very slowly on policy reforms unless spurredby famine, a reduction in foreign-exchange earnings from petroleum, or coordi-nated donor leverage to link long-term food aid with policy reforms.

The Sudan provides a conspicuous example of the difficulty of mobilizing theagricultural sector as an engine of growth and expanded food production. In themid 1970s the international press frequently asserted that the Sudan could be-come the ‘‘breadbasket of the MiddIe East’ by drawing on several billion dollarsof OPEC loans and gifts to develop its vast reserve of idle land. The issue today,however, is not one of exporting food to the Middle East but one of the Sudan’sinability to feed its 18 million people. The Sudan was forced to rely heavily onfood aid in the early 1980s in order to cope with severe balance-of-paymentproblems and inflation. Although the Sudan has historically excelled in cottonresearch, it has devoted only token attention to research on food crops. As longas the Sudan continues to receive food aid and has hopes of striking oil in thesouthern part of the country, there is little likelihood of policy reforms.

In Zimbabwe, the legacy of the colonial policy of promoting a dual structureof large farms for white farmers and small farms for Africans in poor naturalresource regions presents a classic efficiency/equity dilemma for the Mugabegovernment (Zimbabwe 1981 ). In the early 1980s Zimbabwe was a significantmaize exporter based largely on the surpluses produced by its thirty-five hundredlarge farmers. But the maize exports were heavily subsidized, and in 1982 thegovernment reconsidered its role as a food security safety net for the southernAfrican region. In 1982 Zimbabwe increased price incentives for soybean oilrelative to maize in order to meet the domestic shortage of cooking oil. AlthoughZimbabwe gains political prestige by exporting maize to black Africa, it realizesthat it cannot continue to subsidize maize exports at a time when it is facing largebudget deficits.

On the eve of independence in 1960, Nigeria was a net exporter of food,mainly oil palm and groundnuts. But during the 1960s Nigeria pursued import-substituting industrialization, taxed its farmers heavily through export marketingboards, experimented with land settlements, and promoted government planta-tions. In 1970, ten years after independence, Nigeria was importing food, and by1981 food imports from the United States alone totaled more than $1 billion.Petroleum exports have enabled Nigeria to pay for food imports and buy time.Although Nigeria is far ahead of most Francophone African countries in trainedagricultural manpower, Idachaba (1980) reported that more than 40 percent ofthe positions for senior agricultural researchers in the eight major research sta-tions were vacant in 1978. The government recently concluded that it will taketen to fifteen years to achieve self-sufficiency in food production. Nigeria hasnow formed a high-level Green Revolution Committee to address its food prob-lem (Abalu 1982).

Although Kenya is widely regarded as an agricultural success story of the1960s and 1970s, Kenya was confronted with food shortages in 1980 and 1981and was forced to import maize, wheat, and milk powder. Although adversegrowing conditions contributed to the food shortages of the early 1980s, theNational Food Policy paper (Kenya 1981) reveals that other factors were under-mining Kenya’s capacity to feed itself. These included the unprecedented 4

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percent rate of growth of population, the decline in wheat production followingthe transfer of large farms to smallholders, and a smallholder credit repaymentrate of 20 percent. The message of the National Food Policy paper is clear:Kenya has a major food production constraint that cannot be overcome exceptthrough large investments in agricultural research, irrigation, and land reclama-tion in the 1980s and 1990s. But one wonders why the National Food Policypaper paid lip service to population growth.

These case studies illustrate the complexity of Africa’s food problems and theneed to analyze each country’s problems on a case-by-case basis. Moreover,food policy analysis requires more than the preparation of a National Food Policystrategy paper over a two-to-six-month period. Food policy analysis is an on-going process that will undoubtedly occupy the attention of policy makers andresearchers throughout the 1980s and 1990s.

FOOD A ID LE V E R A G E

A major issue in achieving policy reforms is whether donor agencies andcountries can or should use food aid leverage to promote the required changes. Inexistence for almost thirty years, food aid is now a topic of growing interest inAfrica. Although there is unanimity on using food aid for humanitarian pur-poses-for example, feeding refugees-food aid for development is more con-troversial. The opposition to this sort of food aid-where food is sold at conces-sional terms and extended as grants for food-for-work programs-comes fromevidence that food aid ( 1 ) can reduce the pressure on recipient countries to carryout policy reforms; (2) can depress farm prices; (3) is unreliable;27 and (4) canpromote an undesirable shift in consumption patterns that will increase ratherthan reduce dependency or require subsidies (such as wheat production in WestAfrica) to maintain the Western-acquired consumption pattern.28

Food aid programs are firmly institutionalized with donors. Food aid ac-counted for approximately 40 percent of all U.S. economic assistance to Africaover the 1970–80 period. Even Japan started to dispose of some of its surplus

rice in Africa in the early 1980s. To date, there has been little solid academicresearch on the role of food aid for development purposes in Africa. Moreover,the evaluation of food aid is usually assigned to junior officers in many bilateralagencies. Hence, evaluation studies of food aid by donors should be taken with agrain of salt. The food aid experience in Asia and Latin America, however,shows that the availability of food aid can take the pressure off recipient nationsto carry out internal policy reforms.

A compelling case can be made for linking food aid with policy reforms inmajor food-deficit countries in Africa through the development of food policyreform packages. These reform packages will be useless, however, unless thereis an agreement by donors to make three- to five-year forward food aid commit-ments in exchange for internal policy reforms. Countries such as Mali and theSudan would be good test cases for linking food aid to tough domestic policyreforms. But unless donors agree to meet minimum forward food aid levels,African states can easily postpone policy reforms and continue to rely on apatchwork of bilateral food aid programs.

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Beyond policy reforms, a long-range solution to food and hunger problemswill depend, to a large degree, on achievements in agricultural research. Au-thorities on food production and livestock projects in the field now commonlybemoan the lack of proven technical packages for small farmers in dry-landfarming systems throughout Africa and the uniformly unfavorable technical con-ditions (low rates of growth, disease) for livestock production. Significant in-creases are needed over the next twenty years in research expenditures on dry-land farming systems with emphasis on food crops (white maize, yams, cassava,millet, and sorghum) and on livestock.

An expanded research program on food and livestock should be viewed in atwenty-year time frame because problems such as low soil fertility and livestockdiseases cannot be resolved through a series of short-term, ad hoc researchprojects. The U.S. experience, wherein forty years ( 1880– 1920) were spentdeveloping a productive system of federal and state research programs, should beheeded by donors who are likely to expect major results in three to five yearsfrom new research projects in Africa.

Research on irrigation is particularly important and should be accelerated inthe coming decades. The knowledge base for irrigation in Africa is meager.Irrigation has played a minor role in Africa except in large-scale projects in theSudan and in Madagascar, where there is a history of irrigation by small farmers.The cultivated land under irrigation is probably less than 5 percent in most othercountries (as compared with an estimated 30 percent in India). Following the1968–74 drought in the Sahel, there was considerable optimism about the role ofirrigated farming in “drought-proofing” the region. Due to numerous technicaland administrative problems and human resource constraints, however, the pro-jected expansion of irrigation in the Sahel is behind schedule, and it is certainthat irrigation will not play a significant role in the Sahelian states until early inthe next century.

Although research on the economics of irrigation is fragmentary, the limitedresults provide support for a smallholder irrigation strategy in the 1980s, withpriority given to ground-water development with small pumps, land reclamationthrough drainage and water control, and an increase in small-scale projects thatare developed and maintained by groups of farmers with their own family labor.A small-scale irrigation strategy is advocated because the cost of bringing morerainfed land under cultivation is substantially less than the cost of leveling andpreparing land for large-scale irrigation. For example, recent irrigation projectsin Niger, Mauritania, and northern Nigeria each had costs of more than tenthousand dollars per hectare at 1980 prices (World Bank 1981, 79). On the otherhand, farmers in Senegal have cleared and prepared their own land for irrigation,expending several hundred hours of family labor per hectare. Although irrigationwill not be a panacea for the recovery of the Sahel nor for feeding Africa in the1980s and 1990s, a long-term research program on the human, technical, andinstitutional dimensions of irrigation should be initiated in the immediate future.

It remains to be seen whether donors will have the courage to view researchand graduate training within Africa as a long-term investment and whether theywill provide guaranteed funding for a minimum of ten years. Another importantissue is whether country priorities of bilateral donors will remain stable enoughto assure African countries of continuity in funding over a ten-year period. A rule

127

of thumb is that an African country should never embark on a long-term programto upgrade its national agricultural research system with major support from onlyone bilateral donor. But as we point out below, co-financing by six to eightdonors can create as many problems as it solves.

IN V E S T M E N T I N H U M A N R E S O U R C E S

A third essential component of a long-range strategy is massive investments inhuman capital formation, including graduate training of several thousand agri-cultural scientists and managers. This is necessary to replace the foreign ad-visers, researchers, managers, and teachers in African universities and to meetthe needs of a science-based agriculture in the next century. Since it takes ten tofifteen years of training and experience beyond high school to develop a researchscientist, the investments in human capital will not produce payoffs for Africauntil the 1990s.

Building graduate agricultural training programs within Africa necessitates areexamination of the role of the African university in national development andthe relevance of some of the present undergraduate degree programs. For exam-ple, in 1982 the Faculty of Law and Economics in the University of Yaounde inCameroon was turning out graduates with degrees in law and economics whoended up on the unemployment lines in Yaoundé. The time is propitious forAfrican universities to move from undergraduate to graduate training programsin science and agriculture. Before graduate education is expanded, however,some questions should be raised about priorities in undergraduate education andthe relevance of the curriculum. Undergraduate degree programs in agriculture inmany universities are still embarrassingly undervalued and underfunded whencompared with programs in law, medicine, and history. For example, the Uni-versity of Dakar in Senegal was formally established in 1957, and in 1960 theSenegalese assumed its administration. In 1982 there were approximately twelvethousand students in the University of Dakar, of whom several thousand spe-cialized in law and economics. Not until 1979 was a National School of Agricul-ture established at Thies, near Dakar, to offer undergraduate training in agricul-ture. That university-level teaching of agriculture was not initiated until nineteenyears after Senegal’s independence reflects an enduring colonial legacy as wellas the government’s ambivalence about agriculture’s role in national develop-ment.

Although the structural reforms entailed in redesigning African universities toserve rural Africa will require decades to resolve, it is time for donors to stopmerely paying lip service to African universities. Whereas donors embracedAfrican universities in the 1960s, they generally withdrew their support in the1970s as they promoted crash food production and IRD projects and investedheavily in international agricultural research centers. Money saved ($ 100 millionto $200 million) from phasing out the floundering crash projects cited above canbe reallocated to selected African universities with emphasis on faculties ofagriculture. Donors should press for long-term structural reform of the curricu-lum in universities in exchange for long-term aid commitments of ten to twentyyears.

In 1982 graduate-level education for African students in the United States cost$1,850 per month, or $39,000-$55,000 for a Master’s degree over a twenty- tothirty-month period. Donors should gradually phase out Master’ s-level training

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128

programs in agriculture and related fields infaculty members should be sent to Africa toexcellence in graduate training in eight to ten

the United States. Instead, U.S.help develop regional centers ofAfrican universities over the next

ten to fifteen years. In order to achieve this goal, donors will have to give greatlyincreased priority to aiding African universities, including ten-year authoriza-tions to foreign universities to provide teachers for graduate instruction andresearch. In the final analysis, the initiative for this second phase—graduatetraining in agriculture in African universities—will have to come from withinAfrica.

D E A L I N G W I T H R U R A L P O V E R T Y

The fourth component of a long-range solution to Africa’s food crisis will be

an ongoing effort to address the hunger/malnutrition/poverty problem. Ruralpoverty is potentially a much more difficult problem to solve than the foodproduction gap, but self-sufficiency in food production will be a bogus achieve-ment if the poor do not have access to a decent diet. A society cannot expect tomove from a low- to a middle-income stage of development if two-thirds of itspopulation are producing millet, sorghum, maize, and yams at stagnant levels ofoutput. Agricultural research on foodgrain production is a prerequisite to increas-ing food production. Moreover, since jobs cannot be created in urban areas forall the unemployed, a rural investment strategy should also facilitate the expan-sion of rural small-scale industries that are labor-intensive and can providejobs .29

IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREIGN AID

The implications of all this for the foreign assistance community flow quiteclearly from the foregoing analysis. Currently, forty donors are moving fundsand technical assistance through a patchwork of several thousand uncoordinatedprojects in support of agricultural and rural development throughout Africa. Inturn, African states are allocating a high percentage of a scarce resource—trainedagricultural professionals—to meet the project reporting requirements of donors,and African governments are asking donors to pay the recurrent costs—salaries,petrol—of the aid-funded projects. In short, both donors and recipients areprisoners of projects and slogans, and they are caught in a vicious circle. Shouldaid to Africa be doubled in real terms during this decade? The answer depends onwhether donors and African states can replace the short-term approaches withlong-term investments and address the following in a consistent manner:

1. Food security policies and strategies. Donors should urge African policymakers to focus on policies and strategies to achieve a reliable food surplus(food security) based on local production, storage, and international trade.Despite the pleas of international journalists who urge donors to increasethe number of food production projects, a single food policy reform inMali—raising official farm prices-may be more effective than twentynew food production projects. Donors should concentrate their resourceson helping-local professionals develop an improved micro foundation forfood policy analysis that addresses the constraints on achieving a reliable

129—

2.

3.

4.

food surplus, with emphasis on food production, storage, and internationaltrade.Long-term investments. Emphasis should be placed on reducing the num-ber of tiny projects (such as producing visual aids for the livestock servicein a Sahelian country), increasing the lifetime of aid projects, and increas-ing the volume of aid in program grants that are tied to policy reforms.Long-term investment programs like ten-year research projects, five-to-ten-year pilot livestock projects, twenty-year programs to develop collegesof agriculture, and five-year food aid/policy reform packages should beperceived not as luxuries but rather as prerequisites to solving Africa’stechnical, structural, and human capital constraints.Technology generation within Africa. Professional agriculturalists in mostdonor agencies privately concede that there is currently an excess of donorfunds in search of agricultural production projects supported by agriculturalresearch findings that have been tested and proven on farmers’ fields. Inshort, the international technology transfer model has failed in the directtransfer of foodgrain varieties from Mexico or India to Ghana, Lesotho,and Upper Volta. What can be done? In my judgment, donors should (a)admit that the international technology transfer model is not producing theexpected results, (b) maintain but not increase investments (in real terms)in the four International Agricultural Research Centers (IARCs) in Africa,and (c) increase the level of financial assistance to national agriculturalresearch systems and to faculties of agriculture in African universities.

Although the U. S., Mexican, and Indian foodgrain varieties are notdirectly transferable to Africa, some of the processes these countries usedto generate technology appropriate to the needs of their farmers in dry-landareas are applicable in helping to strengthen faculties of agriculture inAfrican universities and national agricultural research services. For exam-ple, the U.S. dust bowl crisis in Kansas and Oklahoma in the 1930s gaverise to the U.S. Soil Conservation Service, research on new varieties,irrigation, and other techniques which transformed the dust bowl into ahighly productive area of American agriculture over a thirty-year period. Inthis process, U.S. colleges of agriculture played a strategic role, in cooper-ation with local and state organizations and with the U.S. Department ofAgriculture.Co-financing. Co-financing of aid projects by donors is a growing problemin Africa because typically six to eight donors each underwrite a piece of anagricultural project. Co-financing is attractive because it spreads the riskfor donors and reduces the dependency of African states on one donor. Butco-financing is proving to be a liability for institution-building projectssuch as research institutes and extension schools. The recipient institutionsare caught in a cross fire of imported perspectives from technical advisers,a hodgepodge of buildings. and dubious gifts of equipment from around theworld. Moreover, the administrators of these Iocal institutions are over-whelmed by the administrative and reporting requirements of the donors.At most, two donors--me for infrastructure and one for technical as-sistance and training—should be allowed to assist any one institution. ButAfrican states will have trouble getting weaned away from co-financingbecause they are using this device to pay for part of their recurrent budgetdeficits and the payroll of the state bureaucracy. so

5. Foreign private investment. A major topic of debate is whether foreignprivate investment, especially multinational firms, can contribute to theresolution of Africa’s food and poverty problem. A related question iswhether bilateral aid should assist foreign private firms in establishingfertilizer plants, processing plants, and in some cases large-scale foodproduction projects. Just as the roles of women in African developmentcannot be analyzed in isolation from those of men, the role of the privatesector can only be analyzed in relation to public investments. The poorrecord of food and livestock production projects throughout Africa over thepast ten years provides ample proof that many of these projects fail becausepublic-sector investments were not made in agricultural research to developprofitable packages for rainfed farming, prevention and control of animaldisease, rural roads, and schools to train agricultural managers. Public-sector investments can either facilitate or destroy the conditions for capital-ists to function in a market-oriented economy.

In general, inadequate infrastructure, local managerial skills, and techni-cal constraints severely limit the scope for foreign private investment infood production projects and in agroindustries in Africa. Although someforeign firms prospered in colonial periods, when they were given choiceland and protected markets, since independence there have been manyfailures, including the recent efforts of U.S. firms to produce food inGhana, Liberia, and Senegal. As a rule of thumb, if foreign private firmsengaged in food production projects do not receive special subsidies, theycannot compete with African smallholders who have a knowledge of localclimate, pests, and soils and are willing to produce food on their own landat rates of return of seventy-five cents to three dollars per day for familylabor. Moreover, the large capital-intensive plantations and ranches em-phasized by foreign private firms should be questioned on social groundsbecause they do not produce the badly needed jobs in an area of the worldwhere seasonal unemployment is widespread. Foreign private enterprise,however, can contribute to Africa’s food system in countries such as Cam-eroon, Kenya, the Ivory Coast, and Zimbabwe, which have a good in-frastructure and need international managerial skills and capital for invest-ments in food processing plants and in fertilizer and agricultural inputindustries. But in the final analysis, the focus of foreign aid should be onmaking public investments in roads, universities, and research stations tohelp African capitalists—small farmers and herders-produce food fortheir families and for urban and rural people.

Aid flows to Africa have grown dramatically in recent years: net official aid in1980 was $13.70 per capita in Africa, compared with an average of $9.60 for alldeveloping countries. In the Sahelian region of West Africa per capita aid wasrunning from $35 to $50 per person in 1982. In many circles in Africa there is afeeling that the continent is already’ too heavily dependent on aid and foreigntransactions relative to the scarcity of African professionals to implement theprojects. In fact, in many countries the critical constraint is not land or capital buthuman resources. This simple fact is overlooked by many donors-including theWorld Bank. The World Bank, under Robert McNamara, dramatically increasedlending in the 1970s, and it has appealed to donors to double lending to Africa inthe 1980s. The unsupported case for doubling aid to Africa in the 1980s, in the

131

light of the acute lack of human resources, is, in my judgment, a major flaw inthe Berg report (World Bank 1981). If, however, donors take a broad view of theneed for massive, long-term public investments in agricultural research, roads,faculties of agriculture in African universities, and land transfer funds (for exam-ple, for Zimbabwe) and if African countries change their agricultural develop-ment strategies and priorities and introduce policy

desirable for donors to double aid to Africa in realperiod.

SUMMARY

reforms, then it may beterms over the 1980–90

To sum up, agricultural development is a slow and evolutionary process, and itis up to African states and donor agencies to jettison the crash project approachand start now to lay the foundation for long-term investments to solve the foodproduction and poverty problems over a ten-to-twenty-year period. Unless stepsare taken in the 1980s to overcome these basic technical, political, structural, andpolicy constraints, many African states may end up in the 1990s as permanentfood-aid clients of the United States, the European Economic Community, andJapan,

NOTES

1. Africa is defined here to include all states in sub-Saharan Africa except the Republic of South

Africa

2. Low and unstable rainfall is a common problem in the Sahelian region of West Africa, parts ofthe Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, and Botswana But erratic rainfall, likeany other single factor, cannot explain the steady erosion in Africa’s capacity to feed itself.

3. Per capita GDP ranges from $120 in Chad to $1,150 in the Ivory Coas(. Although per capitatncome is an imperfect measure that is not well suited to international comparisons, there is noquestion that rural poverty is a major problem throughout Africa. But because of access to land andthe absence of a landless labor class, one does not witness in Africa the grinding poverty that is sopervasive in Haiti, Bangladesh, and India,

4. The average aid flows in the eight Sahelian countries was abeut $50 per capita in 1982 (USAIDt982, 5). Kenya received $450 million of foreign assistance in 1982, or about $25 per person.

5. Commonly known as the Berg report because Elliot Berg was the study coordinator.6. Tsetse con;rol is a long-term and costly activity that includes clearing of vegetation that harbors

flies, spraying, release of sterile male flies, and human settlement.7. But Ethiopia was under Italian occupation from 1936 to 1941.8. For more information see Ruthenberg 1980; and Eicher and Baker 1982.9. The USDA figures on per capita food production trends in Africa over the past two decades

(USDA 198i ) should be treated as rough estimates because population and production data for two ofthe large countries-Nigeria and Ethiopia-m open to question. Since Nigeria and Ethiopia togetherhave about one-third the population of Africa, data distortions in these countries could affect theoverall averages for Africa.

10. See Mellor, chapter 10 in this volume.t 1. See Evenson, chapter 24 in this volume.12. For an ass&sment of the modernization, dependency, and political economy models see

Young 1982 and Leys 1982.13. See the discussion of Amin’s work in chapter 1 of this volume.14. Tanzania received $2.7 billion of Official Development Assistance—a record in Africa--+ver

the ten-year period 1973-82.15. The sharp decline in real producer prices in the 1970s was undoubtedly an important contribu-

tor to the decline in output, Ellis ( t982) reports a 35 percent decline in the price- and income-terms oftrade of peasant crop producers over the 1970–80 period.

132

16. Tanzania is slowly dismantling its state control over agriculture following the 1982 Task ForceReport (Tanzania 1982) and pressure from donors. lle new agricultural policy (Tanzania 1983) hasreintroduced cooperatives, turned some government estates over to village cooperatives. and encour-aged foreign private investment in tea and sisal production.

17. Positive and negative pricing and taxation policies are shotihand references to the internalterms of trade between agricultural and nonagricultural products. Negative pricing and taxationpolicies mean that the terms of trade of agriculture are deliberately depressed by government policies(see Krishna, chapter 11 in this volume).

18. The following political constraints are partially responsible for the negative policies towardsexport crops: need for foreign exchange, politically powerful trade unions and urban groups, thedemands of the military, and the absence of alternative ways to tax agriculture when land is notregistered and the government does not have enough skilled people to collect land or incomes taxes.The net result of these constraints is that African political leaders have little room to maneuver onpricing policies for export crops. Hence, the neoclassical economist who argues that “getting pricesright’ is the core of the development problem is overlooking the imper#ive of political survival inAfrica.

19. The International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (lCRISAT) has itsheadquarters in Hyderabad, India. Recently, ICRISAT made a major policy decision to reemphasizethe direct transfer of cereal varieties from Asia to the Sahelian countries and to constmct a Sahelianresearch center on a five-hundred-hectare site near Niarney, Niger. The scientific staff of the Saheliancenter will cany out long-term (ten-to-twenty-year) research on meal production in the Sahel. Thisis further evidence that agricultural development is a slow and evolutionary process.

20. But wheat and rice consumption are increasing in urban areas throughout Africa.21. For example, the $900 million Diama and Manantelli dams aloog the Senegal River are

projected to have negative internal rates of return.22. Although the World Bank was a staunch advocate of basic needs stntegies in the late 1970s, it

has recently abandoned its support for this dubious concept. Still the International Labour Officecontinues to confuse African states with recent basic needs missions to Zambia, Tanzania, andNigeria (ILO 1981).

23. The state should play a less direct role in agricultural production and marketing and emphasizeindirect approaches such as agricultural research, extension. credit, and educational programs to helpsmall farmers and herders.

24. Although the government of Senegal dissolved its grain board-ONCALin 1980, a largepercentage of the employees were transferred to other government agencies.

25. See Timmer, chapter 8 in this volume.26. Food policy analysis requires a large amount of micro information on production, consump

tion, nutrition, and the functioning of markets, but this information is not ● vailable in most Africancountries. Although the World Food Council reported that nineteen African countries were preparingnational food strategies in 1981, many of these exercises wem pqamd in capital cities in three to sixmonths, and many of them are likely to be forgotten in three to six months.

27. For example, U.S. food aid to Mozambique was cut off for six mooths in 1981 (see Anderson1981).

28. The bulk of U.S. food aid-60 percent to 70 percmtt-is in the form of wheat and wheat floureven though wheat is not a staple food in most of rural Africa.

29. For empirical support showing that a mral investment strategy for Srnallholdem and small-scale industry can achieve both growth and employment objectives see the results of a nationwidesumey in Sierra Leone (Byerlee et al. 1983).

30. For example, the government agency responsible for the development of the Senegal RiverValley—SAE&was assisted by thirteen donors in 1982. SAED employed one thousand workersand encountered an $8.5 million recurrent budget deficit in 1982. SAED asked the thirteen donors topay two-thirds of the cost of the deficit.

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Government Printer.

Appendix D

List of Acronyms

AAAS

ADFAID

ATICDIE

CDSS

CGIAR

ESFFAO

FSRGAOGDPGNPICRW

IITA

ILCA

—

——

——

—

—

——

————.

—

—

American Association for theAdvancement of ScienceAfrican Development FoundationU.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopmentAppropriate Technology InternationalCenter for Development Informationand Evaluation (AID)Country Development StrategyStatementConsultative Group on InternationalAgricultural ResearchEconomic Support FundU.N. Food and AgriculturalOrganizationFarming Systems ResearchU.S. General Accounting OfficeGross Domestic ProductGross National ProductInternational Center for Research onWomenInternational Institute of TropicalAgriculture (CGIAR)International Livestock Center forAfrica (CGIAR)

ILO –IMF –O E C D –

OPIC –

OTA –

P.L. 480 –

PVO –TVS –U.N. –UNCOD –UNESCO –

UNICEF –U N I D O –

U S D A –VITA –WHO –WID –

InternationalInternationalOrganization

Labor OrganizationMonetary Fundfor Economic

Cooperation and DevelopmentU.S. Overseas Private InvestmentCorporationOffice of Technology Assessment,U.S. CongressPublic Law 83-480 (AgriculturalTrade Development and AssistanceAct)Private Voluntary OrganizationTraining and Visit SystemUnited NationsU.N. Conference on DesertificationU.N. Education, Scientific, andCultural OrganizationU.N. International Children’s FundU.N. Industrial DevelopmentOrganizationU.S. Department of AgricultureVolunteers in Technical AssistanceU.N. World Health OrganizationWomen in Development Office (AID)

135

1 -.

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.. .

I

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