africa and the mediterranean: evolving security dynamics after the arab uprisings

8/12/2019 Africa and the Mediterranean: Evolving Security Dynamics after the Arab Uprisings

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MEDITERRANEAN PAPER SERIES 2014

AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEANEVOLVING SECURITY DYNAMICS

AFTER THE ARAB UPRISINGS

Andrea Dessi

Dario Cristiani

Wolfgang Mhlberger

Giorgio Musso
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Cover photo: Te Battle o Ras Lanu, Libya, March 2011. Olivier Blaise
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E S D A U

M P S

F

Andrea Dess,2Dario Cristiani,3Wolfgang Mhlberger,4and Giorgio Musso5

1 This study is based on research completed in January 2014, and does not reflect subsequent developments.

2 Ph.D. candidate, London School of Economics and Political Science, and junior researcher, Middle East andMediterranean Programme, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome.

3 Ph.D. candidate, Kings College London, and senior analyst, Peace & Security Programme, Global Governance Institute(GGI), Brussels.

4 Senior researcher, Middle East and North Africa Programme, National Defence Academy, Vienna.

5 Postdoctoral fellow, Department of Political Sciences (DISPO), University of Genova. The author can be reached [email protected].

Foreword

Andrea Dess . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

The Sahelian Crisis and the Arab Spring

Dario Cristiani . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Last Exit Sirte: Libyas Fragile Security Climate in

the Aftermath of Civil War and Intervention

Wolfgang Mhlberger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Troubled Waters: Egypts African Policy from the Islamists to the Military

Giorgio Musso . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
mailto:giorgio.musso%40unige.it?subject=mailto:giorgio.musso%40unige.it?subject=


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Security Redux

Three years since the Arab uprisings, securityhas again emerged as the dominant analyticalframework through which events in the

Middle East and North African (MENA) region arebeing judged and interpreted by the outside world.The initial optimism that many had welcomed thespread of popular protests with in 2011 is steadilybeing replaced by a more somber realization thatthe slow, and in some cases non-existent, pace ofsocio-political reform in Arab transitional countriesis creating a breeding ground for resentment amidst

the flourishing of sectarianism, extremism, andpolitical violence across the Arab world. The hopesand ideals that had sparked the toppling of long-standing authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt,and Libya summarized by the slogan bread,dignity, and social justice seem like a distantmemory as the promise of a new Arab awakeningcollides with the harrowing scenes coming fromSyrias civil war, a deep political and security

vacuum in post-Gaddafi Libya, and tentative, butgrowing, signs that Egypt might well be headedtoward a prolonged period of domestic turmoil.

To make matters worse, the string of terroristattacks carried out in countries across North Africaand most recently in Kenya and Nigeria, havereaffirmed the persistent threat posed by variousextremist movements whose transnational natureand loose affiliation with continue to representa fundamental security challenge for regionalgovernments and the transatlantic communityalike. While the appeal of al-Qaedas radicalideology was widely believed to be receding in thewake of the Arab uprisings, today the tide appears

to be turning. Syria has replaced Iraq as a majortraining ground and magnet for extremist groups,while across North Africa, a growing number of

jihadist movements are taking advantage of thegeneral confusion, lack of security, and political orconstitutional crises in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libyato reassert their activities and expand their reach

southwards into Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chadin the African Sahel region.

From the perspective of the United States andEurope, powers that under the umbrella ofNATO directly contributed to the collapse of theGaddafi regime in Libya, attention has shiftedfrom those countries directly affected by the Arabuprisings to a wider appreciation of the regionaldynamics unleashed by these transformations.In this context, security concerns whetherthey be related to terrorism, immigration, energyflows, political Islam, or the prospect of a gradualSomalization of an important Mediterraneancountry like Libya have no doubt returned todominate transatlantic dealings with this extendedgeographical area. The threat perception hasbeen further increased by the declining abilityof transatlantic powers to influence events inthe Arab world and by the growing realizationthat the policies of regional states such as SaudiArabia, Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt are advancingindependently from and often counter to those of the United States and Europe.

In light of these developments, this study takesstock of the current security dynamics across theSouthern Mediterranean and African Sahel sincethe advent of the Arab uprisings. In so doing, itwidens the scope of analysis from a purely NorthAfrican focus to a more in-depth understanding ofthe profound links connecting the Mediterranean,Africa, and the wider Arab world. By focusing onthree specific components the African Sahelregion, post-Gaddafi Libya, and Egypts Africanpolicy under the Muslim Brotherhood the studywill shed light on the deeply intertwined natureof the security threats that have arisen across thisarea and the impossibility of decoupling eventsoccurring in the Maghreb from those taking placefurther south in the African Sahel region.


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While indeed always present, the deeplinks connecting Africa with the SouthernMediterranean have been clearly reaffirmed in thewake of NATOs intervention in Libya, which pavedthe way for a renewed transatlantic engagementin the Southern Mediterranean and, subsequently,in the African Sahel region. The Libyan campaignimmediately gave rise to Western fears thatinstability and violence in Libya, coupled with thethreat of migration flows, arms smuggling, anda possible disintegration of that country, couldeventually have disastrous repercussions further

south, especially in the Sahel region. Indeed, thecollapse of law and order in Libya set in motion achain of events that contributed to the expansionof jihadist movements into the Sahel and, mostnotably, to the destabilization of Mali, in turnleading to the more recent French-led interventionin that country in early 2013. Conversely, however,instability, lawlessness, and the rise of extremistideologies in the Sahel, and especially in theMauritania-Mali-Niger region, have also posed afundamental security challenge to North Africancountries such as Algeria and Morocco and serve

as a destabilizing force that could radicalizeand undermine the delicate political transitionsunderway in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt.

While the transatlantic powers France inparticular have demonstrated a willingness to actmilitarily in order to respond to short-term securitythreats in both North Africa (Libya) and the Sahel(Mali), more long-term assistance in the post-intervention phase has been lacking. Today, neithergovernment in Libya nor Mali enjoys a completemonopoly over the use of organized force or is

capable of extending central authority over largeexpanses of their national territory. This situation iscreating a dangerous political and security vacuumon Europes southern doorstep, which is promptlybeing exploited by a whole range of extremistmovements and criminal networks. If left to fester,this lawlessness could spread, contaminating and

destabilizing an expanse of land that stretchesacross the African continent from Mauritania onthe Atlantic Ocean through Libya, Mali, Niger,Chad, Sudan, and finally Somalia in the Horn ofAfrica, with potentially disastrous consequences inboth the humanitarian and security realms.

Security concerns tied to terrorism, armssmuggling, and the collapse of law and orderacross Libya are analyzed here in detail as are theireffects on the Sahel region and on the delicatepolitical transitions underway across North Africa.Each author completes his analysis by advancinga series of policy recommendations on ways toimprove U.S. and European policies toward thiswider geographical area, remedy some of theshortcomings of the past, and highlight certainpriority areas for action that demand a moreconcerted, ambitious, and long-term commitmentby the transatlantic community.

The African Sahel

Chapter one of the study focuses on the complexityand underlining causes of instability that have

characterized the Sahel region both past and presentA fine line is drawn between the socio-economic,environmental, and political causes of this instabilityand the more visible security threats tied to jihaditerrorism and the presence of deeply rooted criminanetworks throughout this area. The analysis thereforhighlights both the historical roots of this instabilityand the more recent evolution of these threats in thewake of the Arab uprisings, drawing a link betweenNATOs intervention in Libya and the subsequentFrench mission in Mali. The author highlights howthe traditional, security-first policies adopted by

the transatlantic community since September 11,2001, have done little to address the underliningcauses of instability among them socio-economicmarginalization, environmental degradation, andweak state authority that have long plagued thisgeographical space. In order to be effective, suchpolicies should be accompanied by a wider strategy


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to de-escalate tensions among regional players Morocco and Algeria in particular in orderto favor regional cooperation in the security andintelligence fields. Most importantly, however, suchpolicies cannot focus solely on the security realmand should also extend to long-term financial andtechnical assistance for the building of institutionsacross Sahelian states, increasing socio-economicdevelopment as well as responding to the effectsof environmental degradation and food insecurity.Ultimately, the prospect of widespread state failureacross the Sahel would have dangerous repercussions

on the entire African continent, potentially rollingback some of the limited security achievementsreached not only in countries such as Tunisia,Algeria, Mali, Chad, and Niger, but also furtherafield in Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, and Egypt.

Post-Gaddafi Libya

Chapter two zeroes in on Libya since the overthrowand killing of Colonel Gaddafi in October 2011to focus on the monumental challenges facing thecountry in the domestic security realm. Nowhereare Western concerns more pronounced than in

this major Mediterranean country, which is theprimary departure point for migrants attemptingto reach the shores of Southern Europe andan important energy provider for the EU. Theweakness of the Libyan central government,whose authority barely covers the capital, and theabsence of the states monopoly on the use of forceare highlighted as the top challenges facing theLibyan transition. Special attention is dedicatedto the panoply of different, and often competing,militias that sprung up across the country duringthe revolution and that, following the collapse

of the Gaddafi regime, have begun competing tosecure influence and economic privileges in thenew Libya. The challenge is compounded by thegrowing influence and spread of jihadi ideologiesacross the country and the resulting proliferationof bombings, targeted killings, and attacks against

both foreign and domestic targets in many partsof Libya. Transatlantic powers bear certainresponsibilities for the current state of affairs in thecountry and yet, to date, Europe and the UnitedStates have not done enough to support Libyapost-intervention. Given the high stakes involvedboth for the immediate region and the widerinternational community, a close analysis of thehighly complex domestic security setting will yieldimportant insights into the challenges facing post-Gaddafi Libya and help identify priority areas ofaction for the transatlantic community. Ultimately,

warns the author, Libyas fractured securitymakeup is breeding popular resentment against thecentral authorities in Tripoli as well as a growingdisillusionment with politics and the wider processof democratic transition.

Egypts African Policy under

the Muslim Brotherhood

The third and final chapter of the study focuseson the Africa policy of Egypts first Islamistgovernment in an effort to determine whetherpolitical Islam was deployed as a diplomatic tool

to advance and improve Egypts influence in thecontinent. In this context, the evolving relationshipbetween the Egyptian Muslim BrotherhoodsFreedom and Justice Party (FJP) and Sudansruling National Congress Party (NCP) itself apolitical expression of the Muslim Brotherhood(MB) is dissected in detail in light of the fearscoming from different quarters that the new-foundideological affinity between the two ruling partiesmight set the stage for an emerging Islamist axisalong the Nile river. Concerns in this regard werefurthered by reports of Irans increased ties with

Sudan and growing activism across Africa. TheMBs handling of the Nile dossier, traditionally anumber one foreign policy priority for Egypt inAfrica, is analyzed in detail, particularly in relationto Egypts and Sudans opposition to any revisionof the water shares allocated to countries along


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the Nile. Overall, due to his short time span inpower, dire domestic challenges, and the necessityof not alienating the West, Morsis ascent to powerdid little to change the fundamental contoursof Egypts Africa policy, much less introduce anIslamist coloring to Egypts foreign policy goals.In this context, and following the abrupt overthrowof Morsi by the Egyptian military in late June2013, the transatlantic community should focuson pressuring Egypt not to stray from the armysso-called democratic road map and insist onthe transparency and inclusiveness of any new

transition. The protests that spread across Sudanin late September 2013 reminded the regime andobservers alike of the degree to which those samesocio-economic causes that sparked protestsacross North Africa in 2011 are also present inthat country. Prolonged turmoil in Sudan wouldhave worrying consequences for Egypt, SouthSudan, the Horn of Africa, and the wider continent,creating conditions similar to those currentlyplaguing Libya, the wider African Sahel, Somalia,or Egypts Sinai Peninsula. Such a scenario must beavoided at all costs. The announcement by Sudans

President al-Bashir of his intention not to run inthe 2015 national elections should be welcomed asan opportunity for a new transatlantic engagementwith the country that aims to foster regionalcooperation on such contentious issues as theNile Valley, conflict in the Darfur region, and theindependence of South Sudan.

Challenging Regional Rivalries, Fostering

Socio-Economic Development

The multiplication of closely interlinked securityconcerns that have arisen throughout Africa, the

Mediterranean, and the wider Arab world pose afundamental challenge to regional governmentsand the transatlantic community alike. Thesecurity vacuum in Libya, combined with theweak state structures that characterize countriesin the African Sahel region and the presence of

deeply rooted jihadist groups in nearby countriessuch as al-Shabab in Somalia or Boko Haram inNigeria, means that criminal networks of smugglersand jihadists enjoy relative freedom across thisarea as well as a wealth of potential technical andlogistical support for their subversive activities.This makes efforts to curtail their influence all themore complex, especially in light of the traditionalinterstate rivalries that continue to plague thisexpanse of land and prevent the articulation ofcommon approaches and cooperation againstthese threats. While indeed of grave concern, one

potentially positive trend related to these emergingsecurity dynamics is that they affect all states inthe area. The emergence of shared concerns tied tosecurity could therefore set the stage for a growingappreciation of the benefits brought by increasedregional cooperation, in turn helping to build trustand overcome some of the traditional rivalries thathave long hampered state-to-state relations.

While the transatlantic communitys ability toinfluence events in this part of the world has nodoubt declined since the Arab uprisings, Europe

and the United States still retain significantweight in the technical, military, and economicspheres. Regional cooperation in the securityand intelligence fields should be promoted,as should the domestic counter-terrorismcapabilities of states, but such policies should alsobe accompanied by a more long-term approachto strengthen the socio-economic and politicalstanding of these states. Ultimately, it is grievancestied to marginalization and the lack of opportunitythat guarantee fresh recruits for extremist groupsactive across this area. In the long-run, therefore,

socio-economic development and the buildup oftransparent and legitimate institutions capableof securing the rights and aspirations of thepopulations of this area will be the key to defusingmany of the security concerns that have (re)surfaced across this extended geographical spacesince the advent of the Arab uprisings.


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The Sahel: A Space of Transition

The Sahel as a geopolitical space is structurallyunstable. The best word to describe the Sahelin its multiple aspects is transition. It is a

space of transition ecologically, but also politicallyand culturally. From a geographical point of view,it stretches from Senegal and Mauritania on theAtlantic coast of Africa to Eritrea on the Red Sea,dividing the Sahara to the north and the tropicalsavannas to the south. Sahel means coast/frontier.Indeed, this territory is an exemplar frontier,dividing two more or less defined geopolitical and

cultural macro-blocks. Historically, it was a bufferzone, dividing the so-called White Africa theMaghreb from the Black sub-Saharan Africa.Concerning religion, the Sahel marks a boundarybetween Muslim-majority areas to the north andthe Christian-majority areas south of the Sahel.Ethnically, the Sahel is rather fragmented: it isan area where races intermingle. Arabs, Tuaregs,and black African ethnic groups like the Fulani,the Songhai, the Hausa, and a multitude of othergroups populate these lands. Sometimes, racialdivisions have contributed to conflict in Sahelian

countries, as in Sudan and Mali, or stratification, asin Mauritania.1

Conceptually, heterogeneity, disorder, andcomplexity rather than homogeneity, order,and simplicity can be considered the threecharacterizing features of this space. The complexgeophysical environment made it historicallyhard to establish an effective control overthese territories. It is a space of movement andencounter; borders are porous and ill-defined,and indeed this is the region of nomadismpar

excellence. The formal and modern nationalborders of the states, established in the colonialera, represent only a cartographic reality. Weberianstate control is generally weak or non-existent

1 Alex Thurston, I mille volti del Sahel, Limes, No. 5, November2012, pp. 39-46.

and the cohesiveness of societies, which are oftenonly formally national, is low. In its more concretepower dynamics, the territory is actually controlledby those living on the land. Tribal networks, localidentities, and loyalties represent the actual socio-political backbone of this space and are much moreimportant than the many central governmentswhose influence is frequently limited to the capital.2

Various forms of resistance to the centralauthorities attempts to achieve a complete controlof these areas still exist, challenging the alreadyweak structures of these post-colonial states. AfterSeptember 11, 2001, the Sahel turned into a majorhotspot for asymmetric threats: smuggling, humantrafficking, terrorism, latent ethnic conflicts, thepresence of rebel groups, hunger, food insecurity,and environmental degradation.3Before September11, this region was substantially ignored from aglobal geopolitical perspective. Aside from Frenchinvolvement, which rests on historical and culturallinks associated with its colonial past and thecomplementary role of this region in the widerpower dynamics of competition in North Africa,

the relative geopolitical value of the region wasextremely weak. However, the terrorist attacks inNew York and Washington changed the perceptionof Americans, and, in a way, of Europeans as well.This pushed both actors to engage the region moreintensively.

Yet, years later, the results still appear particularlydeficient. The United States perceives this regionprimarily or almost entirely through the prism ofterrorism. For instance, September 11 changed

2 The parasovereignity concept associated with the process of

administrative decentralization of the Malian state in the 1990sis a good example of the weight of localism in the region. SeeGeorge Klute, De la chefferie administrative la parasouver-ainet regionale, in Andr Bourgeot (ed.), Horizons nomades en

Afrique sahlienne. Socit, dveloppement et dmocratie, Paris,Karthala, 1999, pp. 167-181.

3 Alain Antil, Le Sahel: une zone grise aux portes du Maghreb,in Khadija Mohsen-Finan (ed.), Le Maghreb dans les relationsinternationales, Paris, Editions CNR, 2011, pp. 291-308.

T S C A SD C1


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the perception of some U.S. officials about thesituation in Algeria. This laid the foundationsfor a rapprochement that in turn was also aidedby the efforts of Algerian President AbdelazizBouteflika to rehabilitate his countrys imageon the international scene. Moreover, therebranding of GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour laPrdicament et le Combat) into AQIM (al-Qaedain the Islamic Maghreb) in late 2006 substantiallyaugmented the importance of this region in theeyes of Washington.4Although this change ledto significant operational consequences only in

2007 and early 2008, the simple presence of anal-Qaeda-affiliated movement amplified U.S. threatperception. The implementation of the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI)5andthe creation of the United States Africa Command

4 The GSPC, later the AQIM, are the two most recent majordeclinations of Algerian jihadist terrorism. The GSCP was asplinter group of the Groupe Islamique Arm(GIA), the mosteffective violent terrorist group operating in Algeria duringthe civil war, which was one of the bloodiest conflicts everwitnessed in the region. Throughout the 1990s, the GIA madeno distinction between Algerian security forces and the civilian

population, and even carried out a series of operations in France.In 1998 former GIA member Hassan Hattab broke away fromthe organization and founded the new GSPC with the explicitgoal of avoiding the unnecessary targeting of civilians. The riseof the GSPC coincided with a dramatic strategic shift. Betweenthe late 1990s and early 2000s, the civil war had slowly turnedfrom an all-out conflict into a low-intensity insurgency, as theAlgerian authorities carried out a series of high-profile arrestsand successful military operations while offering an amnestyto the remaining jihadi fighters. In 2003, Hattab was oustedand replaced first by Nabil Sahraoui and then, after Sahraouisdeath in 2004, by Abdelmalek Droukdel. In 2007, the GSPCofficially rebranded itself as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb(AQIM), thus marking its affiliation with global jihadist strategyand tactics. In the wake of this, AQIM carried out some of itsmost devastating attacks in April and again in December 2007,striking at the heart of Algiers and causing dozens of casualties.

These attacks underlined AQIMs new tactics, as the group usedsuicide bombings in a similar fashion to insurgents in Afghani-stan and Iraq.

5 Known also as the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Partner-ship, this was a plan by the United States to fight terrorism andassist regional governments in strengthening their capacity tocontrol effectively their national territories in trans-SaharanAfrica. It is an inter-agency plan, as it combines civil as well asmilitary elements in its implementation.

(AFRICOM)6

are the two most important U.S.initiatives in the region. Both seek to counterterrorist threats and support regional countries intheir efforts to increase dialogue and coordinationin the security field.

The approach of the European Union (EU)followed more or less the same general patternin terms of the time frame for new initiatives,although with some significant differences. Inmore substantive terms, the EUs approach towardthe region was and remains largely shaped anddominated by France. That is primarily due toFrances colonial past and its knowledge of theterritory, which is characterized by intricate socialand political dynamics. In a way, French activism isalso one of the underlining reasons for the eruptionof this cycle of crisisin the Sahel. In the wake of therather muscular approach adopted during the ArabSpring, Paris was the most vocal European actoradvocating a military intervention against Gaddafiand one of the leading countries in terms of directmilitary engagement in Libya. The war in Libya,indeed, turned into a major element triggering a

wider dynamic of crisis in the Sahel, at the coreof which is Mali and its implosion under the jointeffects of a Tuareg rebellion and the penetration ofnarco-Jihadist groups.7

From Benghazi to Gao: The Arab Spring

and Regional Instability

The 2011 Libyan crisis soon emerged as a majorcatalyst for wider dynamics of insecurity acrossNorth Africa, encompassing not only the countries

6 Established in 2007, AFRICOM is one of nine Unified

Combatant Commands of the United States Armed Forceswith headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. It has responsibilityfor military operations and military relations with 53 Africannations except Egypt. As of October 1, 2008, it has responsibilityover the TSCTI. See http://www.africom.mil.

7 Dario Cristiani and Riccardo Fabiani, From Disfunctionalityto Disaggregation and Back? The Malian Crisis, Local Playersand European Interests,IAI Working Papers, No. 13|08, March2013, http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1107.pdf.
http://www.africom.mil/http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1107.pdfhttp://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1107.pdfhttp://www.africom.mil/


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of the Maghreb but, above all, their southernSahelian neighbors. The disintegration of theLibyan state created apower vacuumthat wassoon exploited by regional terrorist groups andcriminal networks. Libyas inability to secure its4,000 kilometer-long Saharan borders and Gaddafisweapon arsenals triggered flows of weaponsheading both westward and eastward. Severalcountries had to face social crises triggered bythe inflow of refugees fleeing Libya and headingto surrounding states whose stability was alreadyprecarious, such as Niger. Further aspects that

demonstrate the adverse regional effects of theLibyan crisis are:

the return of heavily-armed tribal fightersto their countries of origin after the Libyanconflict;

the psycho-political concerns of some otherregional countries, such as Algeria, regardingthe intervention of European countries on thesoil of a neighboring country; and

the impact of the collapse of Gaddafis

Jamahiriya on wider Africa, a continentparticularly dependent on Libya in economic aswell as diplomatic terms.

In the Sahelian strip, the Libyan revolution hadespecially severe consequences in terms of risinginsecurity and the deterioration of the alreadystructurally fragile political and economic balancesof the area. The strategic links between the warin Libya and the deterioration of the securityenvironment in the Sahel is thus evident. Forgeopolitical reasons, Libya has always been an

important player in this space.

However, Libyas role became more relevantfollowing Gaddafis Pan-African shift in the early1990s,8which was part of a wider change in Libyan

8 Hussein Solomon and Gerrie Swart, Libyas Foreign Policy inFlux,African Affairs, Vol. 104, No. 416, July 2005, pp. 469-492.

foreign policy following the end of the Cold War.9

In the Sahel, Gaddafi played a stabilizing role interms of diplomatic engagement and economicpresence. Although Libya and Mali do not sharedirect borders, Gaddafis intense relationship withMali explains why the Libyan war had a directimpact on the deteriorating security situation inthe latter country. Although not sufficient, the endof Gaddafis rule was necessaryin triggering theMalian crisis, since Malis security and economicdependence on Gaddafi was substantial. TheMalian economy has been largely supported

by Libyan money, and Gaddafi, through hisinstrumental patronage of the Tuaregs, playeda fundamental role in brokering the peaceagreements between the Malian and Nigeriengovernments and the Tuareg rebels that weresigned in the Libyan oasis city of Sabha in October2009. As such, Gaddafis downfall represented amajor element triggering the dynamics of regionalcrisis now engulfing the Sahel since many Tuaregfighters, some of them part of the Libyan army, fledLibya and returned to Mali with weapons, training,and money.10

The Sahel after the French-Led

Intervention in Mali

The Libyan civil war, the destabilization of Mali,and the French-led intervention in that countryhave considerably changed the strategic profile ofthe Sahelian region. As such, all the countries ofthe strip were later affected by the consequences ofthis reshuffle. Among the countries of the Sahelianstrip, Niger is by far the one suffering the worstconsequences of the intervention. Limited resourcesand the significant presence of Tuareg groups

9 George Joff and Emanuela Paoletti, Libyas Foreign Policy:Drivers and Objectives,Mediterranean Paper Series, October2010, http://www.gmfus.org/archives/libyas-foreign-policy-drivers-and-objectives.

10 Des centaines de combattants touaregs pro-Kaddafi rentrentau Niger et au Mali,Jeune Afrique, August 30, 2011, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20110830085808.
http://www.gmfus.org/archives/libyas-foreign-policy-drivers-and-objectiveshttp://www.gmfus.org/archives/libyas-foreign-policy-drivers-and-objectiveshttp://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20110830085808http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20110830085808http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20110830085808http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20110830085808http://www.gmfus.org/archives/libyas-foreign-policy-drivers-and-objectiveshttp://www.gmfus.org/archives/libyas-foreign-policy-drivers-and-objectives


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within its borders pushed Niger to maintain acautious approach vis-a-visthe crisis. This explainsthe relatively low diplomatic profile adopted by theNigerien government, which remained focusedon its domestic problems. Reducing the risk of aTuareg rebellion in its territory was the primaryconcern.11Ultimately, the authorities welcomedthe French intervention as an effective way toresolve the crisis and prevent the granting ofTuareg autonomy in Northern Mali and Nigersupported Paris with about 500 soldiers,12despitethe possible domestic consequences.13

However, the twin terrorist attacks in Niger claimedby the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in WestAfrica (MOJWA)14and a group led by MokhtarBelmokhtar15demonstrated how the countryremains vulnerable to jihadist activity. The Frenchmilitary intervention in northern Mali resulted

11 Issoufou veut lunion nationale au Niger, en pleine crise auMali voisin, aBamako.com, December 18, 2012, http://news.abamako.com/h/9863.html.

12 They were part of the ECOWAS-sponsored and African-ledInternational Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). On July 1 ,

2013, AFISMA transferred authority to the UN Multidimen-sional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).Established by UN Security Council resolution 2100 of April 25,2013, its focus is on supporting the political process in Mali andcarrying out a number of security-related tasks. Formally, themission has been asked to support the transitional authorities ofMali in the stabilization of the country and implementation ofthe transitional roadmap, focusing on major population centersand lines of communication, the protection of civilians, humanrights monitoring, the creation of conditions for the provisionof humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons,the extension of state authority, and the preparation of free,inclusive, and peaceful elections. See http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma.

13 Mali: le Niger autorise lenvoi de troupes, Le Point, January17, 2013, http://www.lepoint.fr/t/1-1616099.

14 MOJWA is a splinter group from AQIM that became knownin late 2011, when the organization claimed responsibility forthe kidnapping of Italian and Spanish aid workers near Tindouf,Algeria. Its leader is the Mauritanian-born Hamada OuldKheiru.

15 Signatories in Blood is a splinter group from AQIM foundedby Belmokhtar in late 2012 as a result of his difficult relationswith AQIMs leadership.

in a regional dispersion of militant groups. Mostimportantly, it has totally disrupted the traffickingof drugs, weapons, and migrants in the region,dismantling the networks operating through thisarea and pushing traffickers to find new routes.These routes consequentially moved to othercountries to carry out their mix of smuggling andminor jihad. AQIM and all the other local jihadistgroups are actively involved in this trafficking. Assuch, their movement also changes according to theredefinition of smuggling routes.16Niger has thusturned into a battleground and transit route for

regional jihadists and criminals. This was furtherreinforced by the shift in the gravitational center ofSahelian jihadism. Chaos in Libya, especially in thesouth, has allowed jihadist groups to increase theirpresence there, using this space as a platform tolaunch attacks throughout the region.

In the case of Niger, insecurity is also augmentedby its border with Nigeria. In the past, BokoHaram members escaping Nigerian security forcesallegedly crossed borders, moving into Niger.17The

jihadist presence in Nigeria affects Nigers security

through another channel as well: the currentviolence in northern Nigeria is pushing peopleto seek refuge in Niger. In June 2013, the UnitedNations refugee agency estimated that about 6,000people had fled to Niger from northeast Nigeria.18This stream is only the latest refugee crisis thatNiger has faced over the past two years. In 2011,Ivorian refugees fled their country followingpost-electoral violence. Nigerien workers in Libyaescaping the civil war also fled to Niger, while thecountry subsequently had to face a huge number

16 Dario Cristiani, Directions in North African Jihadism in thePost-Mali Conflict Environment, Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 11,No. 11, May 30, 2013, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40959

17 Nigers Growing Jihadist Problem, Stratfor Global Intelli-gence, June 7, 2013.

18 UNHCR,More than 6,000 people flee to Niger from north-eastNigeria, June 11, 2013, http://www.unhcr.org/51b73c169.html.
http://news.abamako.com/h/9863.htmlhttp://news.abamako.com/h/9863.htmlhttp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusmahttp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusmahttp://www.lepoint.fr/t/1-1616099http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40959http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40959http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40959http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40959http://www.lepoint.fr/t/1-1616099http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusmahttp://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusmahttp://news.abamako.com/h/9863.htmlhttp://news.abamako.com/h/9863.html


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of refugees following the crisis in northern Malithat broke out in early 2012.19Moreover, Niger alsosuffers from structural problems concerning foodinsecurity and widespread poverty. As such, theseregional influxes of migrants represent a majorgovernance challenge, threatening the capacity andstability of the country.

Finally, the widespread presence of French assetsthroughout the country, mainly in the uraniumindustry, represents another element of concernfor the government in Nigers capital, Niamey.Following the military intervention in Mali, Franceonce again became a major target of jihadistrhetoric and accusations, as shown by the wordsof senior AQIM member Abu Obeida Yusuf al-Annabi, who called on Muslims to attack Frenchinterests worldwide.20

Besides Niger, the wider Sahelian crisis and thewar in northern Mali posed major problems forMauritania also in terms of domestic stability andits regional role. The peoples of Mauritania andMali are bound in a net of deep historical, social,and cultural linkages, with the Arab people of Maliconsidering Mauritanian moors as an extensionof their larger tribal community. As such, theirsecurity is historically intertwined. The refugeeproblem is a serious concern for Mauritania. About70,000 people escaping the Malian war moved toa single settlement in Mbera, in the Mauritaniannortheast. Most of them refused to return to Mali,fearing ethnic cleansing and inter-communitarianretaliation. Mauritania is characterized by thepresence of long-standing ethnic, racial, and socialcleavages. As such, any regional polarization of thefragile traditional and communitarian balances inSahelian countries risks having an impact on the

19 UNHCR, UNHCR Operation in Niger, December 2013, http://data.unhcr.org/SahelSituation/download.php?id=826.

20 France says taking AQIM threat seriously aftervideo, Reuters, May 7, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/07/us-france-aqim-idUSBRE9460H320130507.

social and national cohesiveness of Mauritania byweakening inter-communitarian relations.21

Moreover, regional terrorist organizations representa major concern for Mauritania as well. Over thepast few years, the government in Nouakchott hasplayed an important role in contrasting terrorism inthe region, particularly under the rule of PresidentMohamed Ould Abdel Aziz. These counter-terrorist policies have also created some strainsbetween Mauritania and certain countries in theregion, such as Mali and Algeria. In the case of theformer, Mauritanian and Malian authorities havebeen at odds regarding their respective policies

vis-a-vis the spread of terrorism in the region,with the former adopting a more security-mindedapproach against the latters more cautious attitude.In the second case, Algeria did not appreciate theattempt by Mauritania to play a more proactive rolein regional counter-terrorist efforts, consideringthis an encroachment on Algerias traditionalleadership role. During the Tuareg and Islamistuprising in northern Mali, Mauritania swayedbetween supporting the idea of a foreign-led armed

intervention in the country and prioritizing thediplomatic option.22The government has beenreluctant to play any major role in this crisis,mainly because of the domestic problems AbdelAziz faces and Mauritanias limited financial andmilitary resources. Since the beginning of militaryoperations in Mali, Mauritania has officiallysupported this intervention, while rejecting the ideaof sending troops to its neighbors territory.23

21 Al-Mokhtar Ould Mohammed, Mauritania Pays Price forWar in Mali,Al-Monitor, May 12, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.

com/pulse/security/2013/05/mauritania-suffers-war-mali.html.22 Mauritania rules out Mali intervention,AFP, August6, 2012, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g7RjSm6Thth-m-0RaSzBj9ZWjvpQ?docId=CNG.10ab554f47cde815049e86198d163c9b.1e1.

23 La Mauritanie loue lintervention et appelle un dialogueinter-malien,Alakhbar, February 16, 2013, http://fr.alakhbar.info/6045-0.
http://data.unhcr.org/SahelSituation/download.php?id=826http://data.unhcr.org/SahelSituation/download.php?id=826http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/07/us-france-aqim-idUSBRE9460H320130507http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/07/us-france-aqim-idUSBRE9460H320130507http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/05/mauritania-suffers-war-mali.htmlhttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/05/mauritania-suffers-war-mali.htmlhttp://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g7RjSm6Thth-m-0RaSzBj9ZWjvpQ?docId=CNG.10ab554f47cde815049e86198d163c9b.1e1http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g7RjSm6Thth-m-0RaSzBj9ZWjvpQ?docId=CNG.10ab554f47cde815049e86198d163c9b.1e1http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g7RjSm6Thth-m-0RaSzBj9ZWjvpQ?docId=CNG.10ab554f47cde815049e86198d163c9b.1e1http://fr.alakhbar.info/6045-0http://fr.alakhbar.info/6045-0http://fr.alakhbar.info/6045-0http://fr.alakhbar.info/6045-0http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g7RjSm6Thth-m-0RaSzBj9ZWjvpQ?docId=CNG.10ab554f47cde815049e86198d163c9b.1e1http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g7RjSm6Thth-m-0RaSzBj9ZWjvpQ?docId=CNG.10ab554f47cde815049e86198d163c9b.1e1http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5g7RjSm6Thth-m-0RaSzBj9ZWjvpQ?docId=CNG.10ab554f47cde815049e86198d163c9b.1e1http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/05/mauritania-suffers-war-mali.htmlhttp://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/05/mauritania-suffers-war-mali.htmlhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/07/us-france-aqim-idUSBRE9460H320130507http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/07/us-france-aqim-idUSBRE9460H320130507http://data.unhcr.org/SahelSituation/download.php?id=826http://data.unhcr.org/SahelSituation/download.php?id=826


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Finally, although a relatively distant neighbor,Chads involvement in the Malian crisis hasgradually intensified. Initially, the Chadianauthorities were reluctant to take part in themilitary force that France aimed to assemble inorder to tackle the crisis. This diffidence wasmainly due to the difficult relations betweenFrench President Franois Hollande and ChadianPresident Idriss Deby Itno, who later repositionedhimself, joining the French-led initiative. Chadbecame the first African state to commit troopsto the stabilization of northern Mali.24This quick

diplomatic reorientation can be explained by Chadsdesire to improve its ties with France and to play anincreasingly prominent role in the region.

The Sahel and the Maghreb: Between Crisis

and Interdependence

The crisis in the Sahel has also had a direct impacton balances in the Maghreb. The two areas arebound in a mutual, although unbalanced, strategicrelationship. The Maghrebi system is made up ofstates that are much more effective and structuredthan those in the Sahel. Their capacity to manage

the challenges coming from their southernneighbors are thus stronger, notwithstandingthe fact that the sovereign capacity of Maghrebicountries does diminish going southward. Forinstance, the ability of Algerian security forces toeffectively control Algerias southern borders andregions remains problematic despite the fact thatAlgeria remains one of the strongest and mosteffective states in the entire region. The terroristattack carried out in early January 2013 in thesouthern Algerian town of In Amnas serves asa reminder of the difficulties facing Maghrebi

countries in their efforts to secure their southernborder regions.

24 Mali. Renforts tchadiens Kidal alors que les Franaissapprochent des otages dtenus par Aqmi, Le courrier delAtlas, February 6, 2013, http://www.lecourrierdelatlas.com/409706022013Mali-Renforts-tchadiens-a-Kidal-alors-que-les-Francais-s-approchent-des-otages-detenus-par-Aqmi.html.

Sahelian states, on the other hand, suffer from amuch stronger inability to effectively manage thepolitical and security challenges coming from thenorth. The already mentioned harsh geophysicalenvironment, their loose national cohesiveness,and their inability to exert effective sovereigntyover their own national territories all make itparticularly complex for them to cope with thesecurity and political challenges emerging inthe wider North African region. Moreover, theinsecurity of Sahelian states is also amplifiedby their turbulent southern neighborhood. The

Sahelian states are thus also affected by the generalinstability characterizing central Africa. Theirlimited national political and economic resourcesfurther their inability to respond effectively to thesedifferent regional threats.

The presence of such a strip of crisis south of theMaghreb represents a major challenge for thefuture stability of the entire region and the smoothadvancement of their revolutionary transitions.However, at the same time, it also representsan opportunity to foster a more effective and

meaningful dynamic of regional cooperation,above all among the two major powers of theNorth African strategic environment: Algeria andMorocco.

Algeria has been, for its geographical depth,strategic interests, historical past, and militarycapabilities, the most involved country in thegeopolitical dynamics of the Sahel. In the contextof the Arab Spring, Algeria was a rather particularcase. It was commonly thought that Algeria wasamong the strongest regional candidates for violentrevolution. Yet this did not happen, for a variety ofreasons related to peculiar circumstances associatedwith Algerian history.25Currently, Algiers isburdened by a series of domestic problems,

25 Louisa Dris-At Hamadouche, LAlgrie face au printempsarabe: lquilibre par la neutralisation des contestations, Conflu-ences Mditerrane, No. 81, 2012, pp. 55-67.
http://www.lecourrierdelatlas.com/409706022013Mali-Renforts-tchadiens-a-Kidal-alors-que-les-Francais-s-approchent-des-otages-detenus-par-Aqmi.htmlhttp://www.lecourrierdelatlas.com/409706022013Mali-Renforts-tchadiens-a-Kidal-alors-que-les-Francais-s-approchent-des-otages-detenus-par-Aqmi.htmlhttp://www.lecourrierdelatlas.com/409706022013Mali-Renforts-tchadiens-a-Kidal-alors-que-les-Francais-s-approchent-des-otages-detenus-par-Aqmi.htmlhttp://www.lecourrierdelatlas.com/409706022013Mali-Renforts-tchadiens-a-Kidal-alors-que-les-Francais-s-approchent-des-otages-detenus-par-Aqmi.htmlhttp://www.lecourrierdelatlas.com/409706022013Mali-Renforts-tchadiens-a-Kidal-alors-que-les-Francais-s-approchent-des-otages-detenus-par-Aqmi.htmlhttp://www.lecourrierdelatlas.com/409706022013Mali-Renforts-tchadiens-a-Kidal-alors-que-les-Francais-s-approchent-des-otages-detenus-par-Aqmi.html


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speculation about the health of President AbdelazizBouteflika, and a political stalemate associated withthe forthcoming presidential elections in 2014. Yetit remains the regional actor with the strongestpotential assets to deal effectively with instabilityin the region, and Algeria could eventually emergeas a primary diplomatic and stabilizing actor in theSahel.

Historically, Algeria has played a major mediatingrole in regional disputes, for example in brokeringseveral peace agreements between Tuareg groupsand the Malian authorities.26Nevertheless, it hasnever attempted to increase its direct influencein the area, a consequence of Algerias anti-imperialist foreign policy stance, which is a majorcharacteristic of its international posture since itsindependence.27Above all, following the declineof the GIA (Group Islamique Arme)28and theemergence of the splinter GSPC (later AQIM),the Sahelian space was increasingly perceived byAlgerian authorities as a space of opportunity tomarginalize its domestic terrorist threat. Indeed,the successful counter-terrorism policies of Algiers

pushed terrorists southward, and in the aftermathof the split between GIA and GSPC, the latterprogressively shifted its operational base fromKabylia in the northeast of the country to theAlgerian Sahara. This geographical shift was thencompleted under AQIM with a notable operationalchange, shifting from a pure jihadist movementto a hybrid narco-jihadist organization, thus

26 Pierre Boilley, Les Touaregs Kel Adagh. Dpendances et rvoltes:du Soudan franais au Mali contemporain, Paris, Karthala, 1999,pp. 495-534.

27 Nicole Grimaud, La politique extrieure de lAlgrie: 1962-1978, Paris, Karthala, 1984.

28 James Le Sueur,Algeria Since 1989. Between Terror andDemocracy, London, Zed Books, 2010, pp. 122-168.

completing the Sahelization of the group.29

Themovement of Algerian terrorists from the northto the south of the country was a major strategicsuccess for the Algerian state, although in the longrun, it has represented an element that has stronglyundermined the stability of the region. For Algeria,reducing these groups from a national threat to alargely external-based element was nevertheless amajor achievement.

In the development of the wider MaghrebiSahelian crisis, Algeria was particularly suspiciousof any external involvement in regional affairs,sticking firmly to the principle of non-interference.In March 2011, Algeria voted against the ArabLeagues resolution calling for a no-fly zone overLibya, fearing that it would have been a firststep toward the intervention of foreign groundforces and stressing the need to preserve Libyassecurity and territorial integrity.30In the Maliancrisis, Algiers was initially the main supporter ofthe diplomatic track, which was also backed bythe U.S. government, in opposition to ECOWASand Frances preferred military option. However,

disagreements between the two camps alwaysremained contained, as Algeria never ruled themilitary option out as a last resort. Indeed, thedevelopments on the ground and the eruptionof the crisis in Mali pushed Algeria to shift itshistorical approach toward external interventionin foreign countries. That was a rather notableshift, showing the capacity of Algerian authoritiesto adapt pragmatically to major changes. It is,however, likely to remain temporary, not implyingany major doctrinal change in Algiers.

29 Dario Cristiani and Riccardo Fabiani, Al Qaeda in the IslamicMaghreb (AQIM): Implications for Algerias Regional and Inter-national Relations, IAI Working Papers, No. 11|07, April 2011,http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1107.pdf.

30 Diaa Hadid, Arab League asks for no-fly zone over Libya,Associated Press, March 12, 2011,http://arabnews.com/middleeast/article314838.ece.
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Morocco, on the other hand, has always thoughtof its power projection into the Sahel as a functionof its position in the Maghrebi geostrategicenvironment. As such, the Sahel was consideredinstrumental in trying to weaken the influence ofAlgeria in the same area. In strategic terms, theSahel acquires importance in the eyes of Moroccofor its potential for crisis and instability associatedwith illegal trafficking. The major direct threat forMorocco coming from the Sahel is representedby narcotics, for which Moroccos Mediterraneancoast represents the final African terminal before

the narcotics are transported to Europe. In thecurrent crisis, Moroccos role has been limited,as Rabat does not share a border with Mali andits financial and military resources also remainlimited by regional standards. Morocco, therefore,did not have a very strong influence on regionaldevelopments. During the crisis in Mali, forinstance, Morocco supported the deployment ofFrench forces by opening its air space, althoughthis decision had only a minor effect on the actualevolution of military operations.31

Libya and Tunisia, which are both still engulfedto different extents in their problematic domestictransitions, also played a rather limited role in thecurrent crisis. As noted earlier, Libya was a majorSahelian player under Gaddafi. However, at themoment, its role as a foreign policy actor in theregion remains limited for a number of reasons:the inability of Libyan elites to produce a coherentand consistent foreign policy, the ideologicalreaction against Gaddafis foreign policy, and thepredominance of domestic issues in the currentpolitical agenda of the Libyan government.

Meanwhile, Tunisia has substantially supportedthe role of Algeria while formally condemning the

31 Le Maroc affirme son soutien politique linterventionfranaise au Mali, RFI, January 26, 2013, http://www.rfi.fr/node/914666.

French military intervention.32

The latter decisionwas instrumental in reducing the potential of adomestic crisis associated with rising domestic

jihadism and spillover effects from the regionalcrisis. Appealing to the Islamist sectors of society bysupporting their views on the conflict was a way toreduce the potential of domestic tension associatedwith a Western intervention against Islamist playersin a regional country. Tunisia, however, has triednot to openly antagonize France, which remains itsmajor external supporter.33

Transatlantic Partnership andthe Sahelian Crisis

Initially, the United States was particularly reluctantto be directly involved in the Sahelian crisis.34In theLibyan conflict, its role was essential. No NATO-led intervention would have been possible withoutWashingtons assent. In the Libyan case, Obamastressed that the intervention was functional to U.S.national interests while also emphasizing that thiswas not an Iraqi-style mission.35However, in theMalian crisis, a series of considerations preventedthe United States from pursuing a greater, direct

involvement. The forthcoming U.S. presidentialelections, the economic crisis, and the psychologicaburden of the attack in Benghazi that led to thedeath of the U.S. ambassador to Libya all influencedObamas reluctance to get involved in Mali. Yet,once the French-led military campaign started, theUnited States markedly increased its role, providing

32 La Tunisie contre lintervention franaise au Mali, aBamako.com, January 16, 2013, http://news.abamako.com/h/11367.html.

33 Christopher Alexander,Tunisia. Stability and Reform in the

Modern Maghreb, London, Routledge, 2010, pp. 89-96.34 Mark Hosenball and Tabassum Zakaria, French urgency, U.Scaution collide in Mali operation, Reuters, January 26, 2013,http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/26/us-usa-france-mali-idUSBRE90P04N20130126.

35 Helene Cooper, Obama Cites Limits of U.S. Role in Libya,The New York Times, March 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/world/africa/29prexy.html.
http://www.rfi.fr/node/914666http://www.rfi.fr/node/914666http://news.abamako.com/h/11367.htmlhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/26/us-usa-france-mali-idUSBRE90P04N20130126http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/26/us-usa-france-mali-idUSBRE90P04N20130126http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/world/africa/29prexy.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/world/africa/29prexy.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/world/africa/29prexy.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/world/africa/29prexy.htmlhttp://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/26/us-usa-france-mali-idUSBRE90P04N20130126http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/26/us-usa-france-mali-idUSBRE90P04N20130126http://news.abamako.com/h/11367.htmlhttp://www.rfi.fr/node/914666http://www.rfi.fr/node/914666


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sensitive intelligence and logistical support.36

This was consistent with the wider perceptionand aims of the United States in the region. U.S.interest in the Sahel covers both security/militaryand economic interests. Washington perceives thisarea as being geopolitically vulnerable because ofits low demographic density and porous borders,seeing this region primarily as the new front inthe global war against terrorism.37Since 2002, theUnited States has sought to facilitate cooperationamong governments in the region and strengthentheir capacity to combat criminal networks, but

also to prevent terrorist groups from establishingbases in this region as they succeeded in doingin Afghanistan before September 11.38As such,terrorism and wider geostrategic considerationsdrive Washingtons policies in the region. Thisarea is seen primarily as a source of potentialcrisis and destabilization associated with jihadistdynamics. Yet the larger crisis in the MaghrebSahelian region, although worrisome, triggered aselective response on the part of the United States.Washington is now seeing the consequences of theoverstretch of power during the first decade of the

21stcentury. Today it is much more selective inchoosing where and when to intervene, and it hasshifted parts of the burden to its European allies.Intervention is always seen as the last resort, andObamas foreign policy approach is less muscularthan that of his predecessor.

Unsurprisingly, the EU adopted a largely reactivestance concerning the crisis in Mali and, moregenerally, toward the deteriorating security

36 Adam Entous, David Gauthier-Villars and Drew Hinshaw,

U.S. Boosts War Role in Africa, The Wall Street Journal, March4, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324539404578338590169579504.html.

37 Yahia H. Zoubir, The United States and MaghrebSahelSecurity, International Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 5, September 2009,p. 989, http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2009/85_5zoubir.pdf.

38 Ibidem.

environment of the Sahel over the past three years.Despite all the institutional innovations broughtabout by the Lisbon Treaty, the EUs responseconcerning the Sahel was characterized by a ratherdeep disagreement among its member states. Inthe end, the EU produced a European Strategy forSecurity and Development in the Sahel39whoseconceptual roots can, however, be traced back todiscussions on the region launched in 2008 by theFrench EU presidency. This underlines once againthe dependence of the EU on France concerningits policies in the region. Although formally

comprehensive in scope, in the end this strategyproved to once again be centered on what hasbeen the EUs major preoccupation concerning theregion over the past ten years: the eradication of theterrorist threat. Indeed, the only geographical mapincluded in the European strategy on the Sahel isa map of al-Qaeda activities in the region, a visibleexample of how the terrorist threat representsthe primary EU concern. This approach alsoemerged in the EUs approach toward the Maliancrisis: attention rose only after the north fell intothe hands of Islamist groups that were heading

southward, triggering the French-led armedintervention. In fact, this can hardly be defined asa European intervention given the weak supportfor France from other member states. In the wakeof French intervention, the EU simply finalized itsplans for the launch of a Common Security andDefense Policy (CSDP) mission to support thetraining and reorganization of the Malian militaryon January 17, 2013 and whose declared aims arein line with the guidelines of the EU Strategy forthe Sahel.40However, in more concrete geopoliticalterms, pushing the jihadist groups operating in

39 European Union External Action Service, Strategyfor Securityand Development in the Sahel, Brussels, March 2011, http://eeas.europa.eu/africa/docs/sahel_strategy_en.pdf.

40 Council of the European Union, EU training missioninMali established (5428/13), Brussels, January 17, 2013, http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/134748.pdf.
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Mali back to their desert strongholds was the actualaim of the French intervention, an aim shared by allthe European countries given that the deteriorationof the security environment in the Sahel wasperceived as a major and direct security threat toEurope.

Conclusion

The Malian crisis, the geographical core ofthe current Sahelian instability, has shown aparticularly relevant development: a majorconvergence of interests between regional powers

Algeria and Morocco, African actors such asECOWAS, and external powers such as Franceand the United States. Although occasionaland specific, this convergence could bear somepositive effects on the stability of the region inthe medium term, like triggering a process ofpolitical integration and increasing reciprocalconfidence among the major actors of the area. Theend of Gaddafi eliminated a major obstacle for amore intense and meaningful process of regionalintegration in the Maghreb.41In this respect, it issignificant that, following the regime change in

Libya, Morocco and Algeria, whose relations havealways been particularly troubled and complex,42began a slow but nevertheless important processof rapprochement.43Historically, it is clear that thetense relationship between Algiers and Rabat wascritical in order to foster or impede processesof regional integration and mutual understanding.44That is why these two countries, for geographical,

41 Gaddafis relations with his Maghrebi neighbors were alwaysparticularly troublesome. See John P. Entelis, Libya and itsNorth African Policy, in Dirk Vandewalle (ed.), Libya Since1969. Qadhafis Revolution Revisited, Basingstoke and New York,

Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 173-190.

42 Michael J. Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb, London,Hurst, 2013, pp. 265-282.

43 Riccardo Fabiani, Marocco-Algeria: il disgelo possibile,Limes, No. 5, November 2012, p. 175-182.

44 Michael J. Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb, cit., pp.282-283.

historical, and demographic reasons, remain thetwo indisputable linchpins of the region; everyattempt at settling regional issues and boosting thestability of the entire area depends substantiallyon the willingness of Morocco and Algeria tocooperate.

A virtuous process of regional integration in theMaghreb may also have wider benefits for theSahel. A settlement of long-standing conflictsand the quelling of geopolitical tensions amongthe two major Maghreb powers will also help thestabilization of their southern neighborhood, sinceit will likely bring a more coherent and functionaldivision of diplomatic labor among countriesinterested in these issues. As such, Algeria remainsa major cornerstone for the stabilization of theSahelian region. Its reluctance to engage moreproactively in regional affairs may represent anobstacle. However, as demonstrated in the caseof the French-led intervention in Mali, Algerianelites can change their stance if specific geopoliticalcircumstances occur. Over the past few years,Algeria has engaged with some of the countries

of the area, for instance in regional counter-terrorist activities, but its actual engagement hasremained limited. Moreover, Algeria demonstrateda reluctance to bring Morocco into regionalcounter-terrorist structures. A rapprochement inthe Maghreb will thus also have positive effectsin the Sahel, reducing the zero-sum perceptionsstill informing the regional policies of the majorcountries of the region. As such, increasing thefocus on Algeria as a major cornerstone for thestabilization of the south may prove to be mostsuitable way to reduce local threats while avoiding

a major, direct engagement on the part of Europeancountries and the United States.

For the United States and the EU, what is needed isa substantial shift in focus. The EU is rhetoricallycommitted to adopting a comprehensive approach,but in practical terms, focuses on the issue of


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terrorism and security. Another major element ofits common strategy should be that of sustainingthe territorial integrity of Mali, since the challengesto its national unity have yet to be quelled. Aboveall, the EU should try to act as a diplomaticfacilitator, pushing authorities to engage withall parties in the political spectrum. The pre-electoral45agreement between Malian authoritiesand Tuareg groups is positive46but is only a firststep. The Malian crisis has shown that a muchgreater preventive strategy is needed to avoid the

45 In Mali, presidential elections were held on July 28, 2013,with a second round run-off held on August 11, 2013. IbrahimBoubacar Keta defeated Soumala Ciss. Previously, he wasprime minister from 1994 to 2000 and president of the NationalAssembly from 2002 to 2007.

46 Signed in June 2013, this was a 12-page preliminary agree-ment paving the way for government troops to return to thelast rebel-held town of Kidal ahead of presidential elections inJuly 2013. It also recognized the territorial integrity of Mali andproviding for disarmament of rebel groups. See http://peace-maker.un.org/mali-accord-preliminaire-elections2013. For thejoint declaration of the government and the MNLA see http://peacemaker.un.org/mali-adhesion-accord-preliminaire2013.

deterioration of the security environment in somecountries. As such, the EU and the United Statesshould, for instance, more thoroughly support somegovernments, such as Niger, that are increasinglysuffering because of these elements of crisis. Finally,the United States and the EU may also have a sayconcerning diplomatic dynamics in the Maghreb.The fragile elements of rapprochement betweenAlgeria and Morocco that emerged recently need tobe strengthened, as this may bear several positiveconsequences for the Sahelian region as well.
http://peacemaker.un.org/mali-accord-preliminaire-elections2013http://peacemaker.un.org/mali-accord-preliminaire-elections2013http://peacemaker.un.org/mali-adhesion-accord-preliminaire2013http://peacemaker.un.org/mali-adhesion-accord-preliminaire2013http://peacemaker.un.org/mali-adhesion-accord-preliminaire2013http://peacemaker.un.org/mali-adhesion-accord-preliminaire2013http://peacemaker.un.org/mali-accord-preliminaire-elections2013http://peacemaker.un.org/mali-accord-preliminaire-elections2013


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proliferated weapons for personal security.47

But, more worryingly, newly elected democraticinstitutions such as the General National Congress(GNC) are identified as the major culprits for thisstate of affairs. Against the backdrop of an urgentneed to reassert public order and safety, the processof consensus-finding or decision-making betweenpolitical parties is considered a waste of time, andtrust in democratic mechanisms to cope with thelooming security crisis is dwindling. Emerging callsto put an end to political parties altogether seem agood indicator of the mood in certain quarters.

In response to the problematic evolution of thesecurity landscape, Prime Minister Ali Zeidanreverted to setting up an emergency cabinet in earlyAugust 2013 consisting of himself, the ministerof defense, the minister of interior (whose seatis vacant at the time of writing), the minister of

justice, the foreign minister, and the minister offinance. Furthermore, the GNC empowered NouriSahmein, president of the Congress and de factohead of state, to take all necessary measures toaddress the crises.48Noteworthy as it seems, a

state of emergency as practiced in neighboringTunisia and Egypt is not an option since no securityapparatus would be capable of enforcing it. Thissimple fact epitomizes the current conundrum as well as its potential for further catastrophicevolution.

By highlighting the evolving security situationsince the start of the Libyan upheaval and byanalyzing the shape, configuration, and clout ofthe emerging security sector including official,

47 The looting of weapon caches during the uprising resulted in

a proliferation that provided fighting units with the necessarymunitions but also introduced weapons to households, wherethey are still kept as a fallback option.

48 On August 5, 2013, the General National Congress (Libyasparliament) authorized the president to take urgent measures touphold security in all parts of the country. Cf. United NationsSecretary General, Report on the United Nations Support Missionin Libya(S/2013/516), September 5, 2013, para. 22, http://www.un.org/Docs/journal/asp/ws.asp?m=S/2013/516.

Introduction

The security climate in Libya two years afterthe end of the February 17 Revolution ischaracterized by three problematic trends:

a combination of lawlessness and impunity,continued score-settling, and increased Islamistmilitancy. Systematic intimidation and the lackof effective rule of law have led to widespreadimpunity for criminal offenses or terrorist acts. Ina parallel process, self-appointed revolutionariescarry out revenge attacks against former Gaddafiloyalists as well as newly appointed security

personnel, while tribes repeatedly engage indeadly clashes over old grievances related to landownership and trans-border trade. In this generalatmosphere of insecurity and instability, extremistmilitants are thriving and carving out their owndomains of control and influence.

At the institutional level, the security sector ismaking little progress to establish itself as guarantorof the states monopoly on force. This is due to theslow buildup of the army, a dysfunctional policeforce, and, above all, the deeply fragmented nature

of the security apparatus in its post-revolutionaryform. It also results from the ad-hoc integration ofentire former non-state armed groups (NSAG) innewly created security bodies. Symptoms and thecauses of this more-than-volatile domestic settinginclude the necessarily time-consuming training ofnew officers to rescind the inverted age-pyramid ofthe armed forces, policemen who prefer to call thepara-state Supreme Security Council for support incase of emergency, and the questionable allegianceof commanders and their units who have nominallybeen inserted wholesale into new security forces.

As a consequence of this murky constellation,popular distrust in the capability of the securityapparatus to assert law and order is on the riseand explains the motivation to stick to widely

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para-military, and non-state armed groups thischapter will shed light on the detrimental impactthat lawlessness and insecurity are having onLibyas post-revolutionary transition. Startingwith a short overview of the Gaddafi-era securityapparatus, it describes the implications of the civilwar and continues with an analysis of the post-conflict setting. Highlighting the risks of a failed-state scenario, the chapter concludes with severalrecommendations for the transatlantic community.

Gaddafis Era Security: Anarchy Controlled

At the end of the Libyan uprising in 2011, not onlywas Colonel Gaddafi lynched by an armed groupin Sirte and his relatives either executed (his sonMuatassim), arrested (Saif al-Islam), or dispersedto neighboring countries (his daughter, Aischa,fled to Algeria, his son, Saadi, now resides in Niger,and Ahmed Qadhaf ad-Dam, his cousin, fled toEgypt from where he was extradited in late summer2013), but the entire Jamahiriyya system came to anabrupt, screeching halt. Simultaneously, the sharedgoal of various militias, namely Gaddafis demise,evaporated, setting the stage for the next scene,

a drama whose unfolding we also witness in thereconfiguration of the security sector.

Gaddafis idiosyncratic political system flanked bydeliberately weak and dysfunctional institutionshad been, amongst other outcomes, a provider ofrelative internal stability through the systematicsuppression of dissent or by offering economicor political incentives for co-option. In order touphold his regime, an elaborate and repressivesystem composed of a multitude of bodies coveringthe tasks of the secret police, political police,

ideological control (Revolutionary Committees),and a Republican Guard with the sole purpose of

protecting the inner circle (rijal al-khajmaor menof the tent) of power, had been created.49

Ever since he achieved power via a putsch in 1969,Gaddafi hailing himself from the armed forces grew deeply distrustful of the military. In orderto pre-empt any potential threat to his rule, thearmy was sidelined, weakened, and even sent to warin the far south bordering Chad. Gaddafi employeda whole set of steps and methods to hinder theemergence of a potential power-center. First of all,the purpose of the army was limited to territorialdefense and the upholding of national sovereignty.In this way, it was never allowed to become thebackbone of the state, unlike the traditional role thearmed forces played in neighboring Egypt. He didthis by allowing little new blood into the militarysystem, creating an inverted age pyramid of manysenior, older personnel and only limited numbersof foot soldiers at the operative level.50Effectively,only the elite units under the direct command ofhis sons51enjoyed substantial military power, wereequipped with the best weapons, and trained tocounter regime threats, such as the armed upheaval

in 2011.Gaddafis suspicion of the armed forces grewafter the attempted coup in July 1975.52In a movethat might also have been a means to deflect themilitarys might away from domestic affairs and tothe international scene, Gaddafi launched a waragainst Chad. This military adventure, dubbedthe Toyota War, lasted from 1978 to 1987 and

49 Amal Obeidi, Libyan security policy between existence andfeasibility: an exploratory study, Paper presented at a GCSPseminar, October 2004, ftp://budgie3.ethz.ch/gcsp/e-tilljune06/

meetings/Research_Seminars/Security-Med/2004/Libya.pdf

50 Interview with Major-General Abdelsalim al-Hasi (J3),Tripoli, June 2012.

51 For example, the 32nd Brigade under Khamis Gaddafiscommand.

52 See Moncef Ouannes,Militaires, lites et modernisation dans laLibye contemporaine, Paris, LHarmattan, 2009.
ftp://budgie3.ethz.ch/gcsp/e-tilljune06/meetings/Research_Seminars/Security-Med/2004/Libya.pdfftp://budgie3.ethz.ch/gcsp/e-tilljune06/meetings/Research_Seminars/Security-Med/2004/Libya.pdfftp://budgie3.ethz.ch/gcsp/e-tilljune06/meetings/Research_Seminars/Security-Med/2004/Libya.pdfftp://budgie3.ethz.ch/gcsp/e-tilljune06/meetings/Research_Seminars/Security-Med/2004/Libya.pdf


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effectively sapped the energies of the militaryapparatus, ultimately leading to the exile of KhalifaHeftar, the general in charge of the campaign.Heftar tried a return to Libya after Gaddafisdownfall but his reputation as a CIA affiliate andU.S. proxy stopped him short from re-launching adomestic career.

Even though the army did venture into cross-border conflicts such as the Chad campaign,regular units generally remained sidelined,decentralized, and devoid of the appropriate meansand equipment. The explanation for Gaddafisthirst for weapons, as highlighted by the huge armydepots that were ransacked during the 2011 civilwar and that would appear to contradict the armyspoor equipment, is two-fold. On one hand, theysupposedly served as a logistical base for possiblemilitary action during a Cold War escalation. Onthe other, the Revolutionary Committees were theones in charge of protecting these storage sites, notthe regular army.

A plurality of security agencies were set up toprovide internal stability by checking on dissent,

providing intelligence, fighting Islamist militancy,and ultimately assuring regime survival via broad-based repression. This plethora of domestic securityforces can most aptly be described with the termsecurocracy. At the core of its functionality wasthe role of key tribes (the Qadhadfa, the Megarha,and other allies), which were linked to Gaddafi byclientelistic dependence and loyalty in the securityapparatus. The intelligence sector in particularfunctioned according to this kinship mechanismand was based on a high diversification of tasks.

The major threats to stability that theJamahiriyyahad to cope with were political opposition (bothliberal and Islamist), organized crime, and illegal

migration.53

In particular, the threat of unmitigatedmigratory flows was skillfully used and abused byGaddafi as a domestic and foreign policy tool asan exertion of pressure on the European Unionand its member states. Political opposition waseven chased and eliminated abroad, and regionalor tribal grievances were often channeled by aclientelistic system favoring faithful Arab tribes tothe detriment of disloyal ones and penalizing ethnicminorities such as the Toubous and Berbers.54

Radical and militant Islamists certainly representedthe biggest threat to regime stability, a trend thatis currently resurfacing, in particular in the restiveEastern Cyrenaica region. They were the mostbrutally subdued element of Gaddafis securityequation. Even in prison, they were still heavilysuppressed, as the 1996 massacre in the Abu Salimprison has shown55. Ironically, it was only a fewmonths before the start of the unrest in Libya that afoundation under the aegis of Gaddafis son Saif al-Islam eventually found an agreement with formerhardcore Islamist fighters from the Libyan IslamicFighting Group (LIFG). These jihadists agreed to

sign a so-called recantation document (Murajaat),repudiating their violent inclinations and sealinga sort of truce with the regime.56However, withthe upheaval turning into a revolution, they alsotook up arms and freed huge parts of Eastern

53 Hanspeter Mattes, Challenges to Security Sector Governancein the Middle East: The Libyan Case, paper presented at theDCAF workshop on Challenges of Security Sector Governancein the Middle East, Geneva, July 12-13, 2004, http://www.dcaf.ch/Event/Workshop-on-Challenges-to-Security-Sector-Gover-nance-in-the-Middle-East.

54 Issa Abdelmajid Mansour, Libye: le chef des Toubousdnonce un nettoyage ethnique au sud du pays,Jeune

Afrique, March 28, 2012,http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20120328150456.

55 For more background, see http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/27/libya-abu-salim-prison-massacre-remem-bered.

56 Victor Kocher, Bekehrung libyscher Islamisten, NeueZrcher Zeitung, April 10, 2010, http://www.nzz.ch/aktuell/startseite/bekehrung-libyscher-islamisten-1.5411412.
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The situation quickly degenerated into an armeduprising, with several army units stationed ineastern Cyrenaica defecting following a call fromGeneral Abdelfatah Younis (minister of interioruntil his defection from the regime on February22, 2011). However, not all defecting soldiers

joined the ranks of the emerging militias.59As aconsequence of the armys partial disaggregation,several weapons depots were looted, giving riseto uncontrolled arms flows, the effects of whichcan still be observed well beyond Libyas borders.This trend, coupled with the setting-up of small

irregular combat units, eventually led to a full-scalemilitarization of the conflict, with governmentforces pitted against various non-state armedgroups mainly formed on a restricted parochiallevel to ensure local security.

As the army split into loyal and defecting units,the role of Gaddafis elite units rose to the fore.The Khamis brigade (or 32ndarmored brigade)was sent to the front lines in eastern Cyrenaica.Generally speaking, the regular armed forcesquickly proved to be the ineffective and disloyal

hollow shell Gadda

africa and the mediterranean: evolving security dynamics after the arab uprisings

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