advancing charlotte: a police foundation assessment of the ...€¦ · pillar 4: social media and...

DRAFTAdvancingCharlotteReport–09/18/2017 1

AdvancingCharlotte:APoliceFoundation

AssessmentoftheCharlotte-Mecklenburg

PoliceDepartmentResponsetothe

September2016Demonstrations

FrankStraub,PhD;RobertoVillaseñor;JeffreyBrown;JenniferZeunik;BenGorban;EddieReyes

September2017


TableofContents

ExecutiveSummary................................................................................................................4

TheFoundation:AddressingUnderlyingChallengesinCharlotte............................................5The“CharlotteWay”........................................................................................................................6

IncidentandCMPDResponseDescription..............................................................................8Tuesday,September20,2016...........................................................................................................8Wednesday,September21,2016–Thursday,September22,2016.................................................12Thursday,September22,2016–Friday,September23,2016.........................................................14Friday,September23,2016–Saturday,September24,2016..........................................................14Sunday,September25,2016–Monday,September26,2016.........................................................15Monday,September26,2016–Tuesday,September27,2016........................................................15

Pillar1:Policies,Protocols,andStrategies.............................................................................16Analysis..........................................................................................................................................16SummaryAnalysis..........................................................................................................................18Recommendations..........................................................................................................................20

Pillar2:TrainingandDe-Escalation........................................................................................21NorthCarolinaBasicLawEnforcementTraining.............................................................................21CMPDrecruitandin-servicetraining..............................................................................................22CMPDspecializedtraining..............................................................................................................23ConstructiveConversationTeamtraining.......................................................................................24Recommendations..........................................................................................................................24

Pillar3:EquipmentandTechnology.......................................................................................26Introduction...................................................................................................................................26Equipment......................................................................................................................................26Technology.....................................................................................................................................31Recommendations..........................................................................................................................32

Pillar4:SocialMediaandCommunication.............................................................................34Demonstratorscontrolledthenarrative.........................................................................................34Publicinformationandmedia........................................................................................................37Citywidecommunicationandcollaboration....................................................................................38Recommendations..........................................................................................................................39

Pillar5.TransparencyandAccountability..............................................................................41......................................................................................................................................................44Accountability................................................................................................................................44Recommendations..........................................................................................................................51

Pillar6:Police-CommunityRelationships...............................................................................53Duringthedemonstrations.............................................................................................................53TheRoleoftheClergy....................................................................................................................54Sincethedemonstrations...............................................................................................................54Recommendations..........................................................................................................................55

Conclusion.............................................................................................................................58


AppendixA:Recommendations.............................................................................................59

AppendixB:CharlotteandCMPDBackgroundandGovernance.............................................62TheCityofCharlotte.......................................................................................................................62TheCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment..............................................................................62GovernanceStructureofCMPDandtheCityofCharlotte...............................................................63

AppendixC:Methodology.....................................................................................................66

AppendixD:AbouttheAuthors.............................................................................................69

AppendixE:AboutthePoliceFoundation..............................................................................72


ExecutiveSummaryTheSeptember20,2016,officer-involvedshootingofKeithLamontScott,andthedemonstrationsthatfollowedinCharlotte,tookplacewithinamilieuofsimilareventsincitiesacrossAmerica.ProtestsinNewYork,Ferguson,NorthCharleston,Baltimore,Minneapolis,BatonRouge,andDallasdemonstratedthegrowingtensioninpolice-communityrelations,andanincreasingpropensityforangerandatitsmostextreme,violence.Whilethedemonstrationswereinresponsetoanofficeruseoflethalforce,eachdemonstrationandthesubsequentlawenforcementresponseprovideslessonslearnedfortheinvolvedjurisdictions,andthenation.Theunderlyingissuesthatprecipitatedtheeventsaresimilar:officeruseoflethalforce;previousofficer-involvedincidentsthatinmanycasesremainunresolvedinthecommunity;historicalracialchallenges;socioeconomicimmobility;perceivedaccountabilityandtransparencyissues;and,fragilerelationshipsbetweenthepoliceandthecommunity.Issuesregardingrace,policeuseofforce,andagrowinglackoftrustincommunitiesofcolorfueledthedemonstrationsinCharlotte.TheissuesandtensionalsocreatedanopportunitythatactivistsfromoutsidethecityleveragedtofurthertheirnationalagendaandtocausechaosanddestructioninCharlotte.Theinfluenceandreachoftheirsocialmediapresencefueledtheembersofdistrustandignitedtheemotionsofthecommunityandthenation.TheCityofCharlotterequestedthatthePoliceFoundationconductanindependentreviewoftheCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment’s(CMPD)responsetothedemonstrationsthateruptedfollowingtheSeptember20,2016officerinvolvedshooting.Thecity’srequestdemonstratestheirdesiretolearnfromtheeventsandtousethisassessment,inpart,tohelpthecityhealandmoveforwardinaconstructivemanner.WhiletheassessmentteamfoundthattheCMPDactedappropriatelyandinlinewiththeirpoliciesandprocedures,italsoidentifiedareasinwhichtheCMPDcouldimproveitspolicies,practicesandoperationstostrengthenthedepartment’srelationshipwiththecommunityitserves,preventandrespondtofutureinstancesofcivilunrest.Thereportisorganizedby“pillars”underwhichcriticalissuesarediscussedandrecommendationsprovided:

• Pillar1:Policies,Protocols&Strategies;• Pillar2:Training&De-Escalation;• Pillar3:Equipment&Technology;• Pillar4:SocialMedia&Communication;• Pillar5:Transparency&Accountability;and• Pillar6:Police-CommunityRelationships.

Whileournationstrugglestoaddressrace,policeuseofforce,transparencyandaccountability-theCityofCharlotte,itspoliticalandcommunityleaders,andtheCMPDaretobecommendedfortheirgenuineinterestinidentifyingcollaborativeandconstructivestepstoacknowledgetheimpactofitshistoryandbuildafuturebasedonhealingandtransformation.


TheFoundation:AddressingUnderlyingChallengesinCharlotteTheCityofCharlottehashadalonghistoryofprosperitywovenintodynamicracerelationsdatingbacktoitsestablishmentin1775.1Duringinterviews,focusgroups,andlisteningsessions,somecommunitymemberstiedtheevolutionofpolicingpracticesintheUnitedStates,andparticularlyinCharlotte,tothe19thcentury“slavepatrols”andcontinuetovoiceconcernsthatthosepracticesstillinformCharlotte’spolicingtactics.2Foritspart,theCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment(CMPD),hasworkedhardtobuildandmaintainrelationshipswithallsegmentsoftheCharlottecommunity.Indeed,recentCMPDleadershiphasprioritizedproactiveprogramsthat,“reachintocommunitiesthroughdesignatedcommunitycoordinators,citizenforumsandoutreachtohighschoolstudents.”3In2003,theCMPDadoptedCommunityProblemOrientatedPolicing(CPOP),tobuildrelationshipsandpartnershipsbetweenpoliceandneighborhoods,businessesandgovernmentagencies.4Thisinitiativeaimedtoaddresscommunityissuesandconcerns,andbyworkingcollaboratively,tomovethecommunityandpolicerelationsforward.AlthoughtherelationshipbetweentheCMPDandCharlottecommunitymembershasgenerallybeenapositiveandprogressiveone,thelonghistoryofracerelationsinCharlotte,andpoliceuseoflethalforcecontributedtotheunderlying,andgrowingtensionsthatfueledthedemonstrationsthatfollowedtheSeptember20,2016officerinvolvedshooting.Manycommunitymembersbelievedthatalackofaccountabilityandtransparencyexistsonthepartofthepolicedepartment,andexpressedangeroverpreviousinstancesinwhichCMPDofficersusedlethalforceandwereneithercharged,oriftheywerecharged,wereacquitted.5Forthosecommunitymembers,the2013officer-involvedshootingofJonathanFerrellservesasavividexampleofapoliceuseofforceincidentthatremainsunresolved,andasourceofangeranddistrust.6KeithLamontScottwasthesixthperson—andthefourthblackperson—tobefatallywoundedbyCMPDofficerssinceSeptember2015.7Theofficer-involvedshootingsaddedtothe

1“TheCharlotte-MecklenburgStory.”Charlotte-MecklenburgLibrary.2017.http://www.cmstory.org/timeline(accessedSeptember14,2017).2AssessmentteaminterviewwithCharlotte-MecklenburgOpportunityTaskForcemember.June8,2017.3Lacour,Greg.“WhereIsCharlotteGoingWithCommunityPolicing.”CharlotteMagazine.July18,2016.http://www.charlottemagazine.com/Charlotte-Magazine/July-2016/Where-Is-Charlotte-Going-With-Community-Policing/(accessedSeptember14,2017).4Stephens,DarrelW.CommunityProblemOrientedPolicing:TheCharlotte-MecklenburgExperience.December2003.http://www.popcenter.org/library/unpublished/ProblemAnalysisTools/192_Community_Problem_Oriented_Policing.pdf(accessedSeptember14,2017).5AssessmentteamfocusgroupwithCharlotte-Mecklenburgcommunitymembers.April12,2017.6CommunityStakeholderListeningSessionwithCharlotte-Mecklenburgcommunitymembers.April12,2017.7Kaleem,JaweedandJennyJarvie.“Charlotte,N.C.,hasprosperedinrecentyears,butmanyblackresidentshavebeenleftbehind.”LosAngelesTimes.September22,2016.http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-charlotte-racial-tensions-20160922-snap-story.html(accessedSeptember14,2017).


community’snarrativethatthejusticesystemprotectedpoliceofficersandfailedpersonsofcolor.The“CharlotteWay”Throughouttheinterviews,governmentofficials,businessleaders,andcommunitymembersallusedthephrase–the“CharlotteWay”—todescribethecity’sresponsetochallengingsituationsandcircumstances.However,thecontextinwhichthephrasewasusedwasjustasdividedasthoseusingit.Forsome,thephrasereferstotheabilityofCharlottetorespondtothemostdifficultsituationswithpeaceandcivility.Fortheseindividuals,the“CharlotteWay”recognizestheabilityofcityleaderstocometogetherandaddressdeep-seededcommunityissuesincludingracialsegregationandsocio-economicchallenges.8Asaformercityleaderexplained,“Iftherewasarealcrisisinthecommunity,Icould,insideoftwohours,identifyeverysignificantleaderandconvenetheminthemayor’sconferenceroom[todevelopaplantosolvethecrisis].”9ManyoftheleadersinterviewedbelievedthatinthewakeoftheKeithLamontScottincident,andthedemonstrationsthatfollowed,theyhadcometogethertodiscussnextstepsandtoreunitethecommunity.10Forothersthough,thephraseimpliesthatthecityisonlycommittedtofindingeasyandshort-termfixesinsteadofactualsolutions;totalkinsteadoftodo;andisacontinuousreminderoftheimplicitbiasandlatentdiscriminationofthesystem.11Fortheseindividuals,the“CharlotteWay”representsacitygovernmentthatismoreconcernedwithpreservingthe“Uptown”areaandcontinuingtoattractnewbusinesses,whiledisregardingseriousissuessuchasfailingschools,alackofsocialservices,chronicunemployment,andincreasingcostoflivingthatfueledthedemonstrations.12IntheaftermathoftheSeptember20,2016officerinvolvedshooting,andthedemonstrationsthatfollowed,theCityofCharlottehastakenconstructivestepstohealandtomovethecityforward.TheCharlotte-MecklenburgOpportunityTaskForcehasacknowledgedthat:

Segregationbypoverty,wealth,andrace/ethnicityaremostapparentinCharlotte-Mecklenburgwhenwelookatmapsofthecountythatrevealanundeniable‘crescent’

Oflower-opportunityneighborhoodswrappingaroundtheprosperousareas.

8AssessmentteaminterviewwithCharlotte-Mecklenburgbusinessleader.June6,2017.9Portillo,Ely.“McCollonCharlotteprotests:‘Ifwejustmouthplatitudesandthinkeverything’sgoingtobefine,it’snot.’”October4,2016.TheCharlotteObserver.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/business/biz-columns-blogs/development/article105886132.html(accessedSeptember14,2017).10Assessmentteaminterviewswithcommunityorganizersandreligiousleaders.April11,April12,April13,andJune6,2017.11AssessmentteaminterviewwithCharlotte-MecklenburgOpportunityTaskForcemember.June8,2017.12AssessmentteaminterviewwithCharlotte-MecklenburgOpportunityTaskForcemember.June8,2017.


Formanywhoviewourcommunityasabeaconofprosperityandliveinrelative comfortandaffluence,Charlotteseemedanunfathomablesettingforracialprotests. However,forthosewhosevoiceshavebeenignoredormissedinourcollectivegazing atcivilprogress,itwasnorevelationthatlong-standingfrustrationwasfinallybeing airedinthestreets.13TheCityandtheCMPDhaveaskedforanindependentreviewofthedepartment’sresponsetothedemonstration,andtheyhavenotwaitedforthePoliceFoundation’sreport,butratherimplementedaseriesofstrategiestorebuildtrustandstrengthencommunity-policerelations.Thisreportprovidesfurtheropportunitiesforprogress,dialogue,healingandtransformation.

13Charlotte-MecklenburgOpportunityTaskForce.TheCharlotte-MecklenburgOpportunityTaskForceReport.LeadingonOpportunity.March2017.https://leadingonopportunity.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/20170320_LeadingOnOpportunity_Report.pdf(accessedSeptember15,2017).


IncidentandCMPDResponseDescription14

Tuesday,September20,2016Atapproximately3:54p.m.,theCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment(CMPD)wasengagedinanofficer-involvedshootingofKeithLamontScott.15TheshootingtookplaceattheVillageatCollegeDownsapartmentcomplexlocatedinthecity’sUniversityDistrict.16Withinminutesoftheshootingalargenumberofresidentsgatheredat,andaround,theshootingscene.Thecrowdcontinuedtogrowthroughouttheeveningashomicideandcrimescenetechniciansgatheredevidenceandconductedtheinvestigation.17By8:45p.m.,thecrimescenewasclosedinconsiderationofthesafetyofinvestigatorsandcrimescenetechnicians,asthecrowdcontinuedtogrowandbecomemoreagitated.18Atonepointthecrowdpreventedapolicevehiclefromleaving,jumpingonitandattemptingtotipitoverwiththeofficerinside.19Atapproximately9:00p.m.,theOperationsCommanderonscene(aCaptain),requestedthattwo(2)CivilEmergencyUnit(CEU)squadsrespondtothescene.20Bythistime,approximately150peoplehadgathered,21someofwhomwerebelievedtobefromoutsidethecity.22Uponarrival,CEUofficersassistedintheremovalofdetectives,crimescenetechnicians,andofficersfromthescene.RecognizingthatthepresenceofCEUofficersintacticalequipmentwasadding

14WhilesomeinformationregardingthedemonstrationsandCMPDresponsewasprovidedtotheassessmentteambycommunitymembersduringinterviews,andsomeoftheinformationwascorroboratedthroughopensourcemediaresearch,manyofthedetailsnecessarytobuildthetimelinewereavailableonlythroughtheswornaffidavitofCMPDMajorCampagna.15Price,Mark.“Charlottepoliceshootingandprotesttimeline:Howtheprotestsstarted,spreadandcityreaction.”TheCharlotteObserver.September21,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article103131242.html(accessedSeptember7,2017).16Marusak,JoeandMarkWashburn.“CMPDreleasesfullvideooffatalKeithLamontScottshooting.”TheCharlotteObserver.October4,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/special-reports/charlotte-shooting-protests/article105978672.html(accessedSeptember7,2017).17Price,Mark.“Charlottepoliceshootingandprotesttimeline:Howtheprotestsstarted,spreadandcityreaction.”TheCharlotteObserver.September21,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article103131242.html(accessedSeptember7,2017).18Portillo,Ely.“Charlottepolicedetailarsenalof‘paincompliance,’teargasusedduringriots.”TheCharlotteObserver.October28,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article111048527.html(accessedSeptember7,2017).19Gordon,Michael,MarkWashburn,andFredClasen-Kelly.“Insidethe48hoursthatshookCharlotte:Asrocksflew,riotcopsfledforsafety.”October28,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article111056262.html(accessedSeptember7,2017).20AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.21Portillo,Ely.“Charlottepolicedetailarsenalof‘paincompliance,’teargasusedduringriots.”TheCharlotteObserver.October28,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article111048527.html(accessedSeptember7,2017).22Assessmentteaminterviewswithlocalcommunityleaders.April11,2017.


tothetension,andtode-escalatethesituation,theCommanderrequestedabustoremovetheCEUofficersfromthescene.23At10:00p.m.,whennewsreportersatthescenebeganbroadcastinglive,thecrowdbecamemoreagitated,andshortlythereafter,beganthrowingbottlesandthenrocksattheofficers.24ACaptainwasstruckintheheadbyarock.Hewasremovedfromthescenehavingsustainedaconcussionandreceivedten(10)stichestoclosethewound.Anotherofficerwasstruckinthehand,whichwaslaterdeterminedtobefractured.25Asthecrowdcontinuedtothrowrocksatofficers,theofficersdeployedhandheldgascanistersinanattempttodispersethecrowdandprotectthemselves.26Approximatelyfifteen(15)officerswerehurtbyrocksandotherthrownobjects.Thebuseventuallyarrived,howevertheCEUofficerswereunabletoboardthebus,asitwassurroundedbythecrowdwaspreventedfromleaving.Thebuswasdamagedbyobjectsthrownatitbypersonsinthecrowd.27At10:30p.m.,theOperationsCommanderusedthebus’sPAsystemtoissueadispersalorderandwarnthecrowdthatchemicalagentswouldbedeployed.Thecrowddidnotdisperseandcontinuedtothrowrocksattheofficers.CEUdeployeda“stingergrenade”28immediatelyfollowedbyaTripleCaserCScanister29toclearthecrowdinfrontofthebus.30Thebuswasabletodriveawayfromtheimmediatescene,31howeverCEUofficerswereunabletoboardthebusandtheycontinuedtobehitbyrocks.32

23AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.24TomMcKay.“CharlottepolicekillblackfatherKeithL.Scottwhilesearchingforunrelatedsuspect.”Mic.September20,2015.https://mic.com/articles/154727/charlotte-police-kill-black-father-keith-l-scott-while-searching-for-unrelated-suspect#.y5nZZSDY4(accessedSeptember7,2017).25AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.26MarkPrice.“Charlottepoliceshootingandprotesttimeline:Howtheprotestsstarted,spreadandcityreaction.”TheCharlotteObserver.September21,2017.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article103131242.html(accessedSeptember7,2017).27AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.28TheStingerGrenadeisacombinationLessLethalImpactMunitionsandDiversionDevice.Itisamaximumeffectdeviceasitdeliversuptofourstimuliforpsychologicalandphysiologicaleffect:rubberpellets(180.32inch),light,soundandoptionalchemicalagentorOC.29TheTripleChaserisapyrotechnicgrenadeconsistingofthreeseparatecanisterspressedtogetherwithseparatingchargesbetweeneachsection.Whendeployed,thegrenadewillseparateintothree(3)distinctsub-munitionsspreadapproximately20feetapart.TheyarehandtossedmunitionsusedtodeployCN,CSandsmoke.30AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.31“Raw:ProtestsinCharlotteAfterPoliceShooting.”AssociatedPress.September20,2016.https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wcFKtv18Xbc(accessedSeptember7,2017).32AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.


Atapproximately10:50p.m.,CEUofficersformedtwolines,onefacingnorthandtheothersouthtoprotectthemselvesfromthecrowdthatencircledthemandcontinuedtothrowrocksattheofficers.Severalofficerswereinjured.33At10:56p.m.,anotherdispersalorderwasgivenoverthebus’sPAsystem.Thecrowdwasadvisedthattheywereengaginginanillegalassemblyandiftheyfailedtodisperse,chemicalagentswouldbedeployed.34Whenthecrowdfailedtodisperse,CMPDhandtossedgascanistersandthecrowdbackedawayallowingthebustoleavethearea.35AftergrenadiersthrewmultiplemunitionsoutinfrontoftheCEU,theywereabletopullbackfromthecrowd.36OnceCEUpulledback,personsinthecrowdbrokeoutthewindowsofamarkedpolicevehicleandtooktheofficerspersonnelgearfromthecar.Whenahelicopterreportedthatpersonswereremovingariflecasefromthevehicle,CEUengagedandrecoveredtherifle.Atthistimeapproximately,50CEUofficersandmorethan200protestorswereatthescene.37At11:25p.m.,CEUissuedanotherdispersalorderusingapatrolvehicle’sPAsystem.Whenthecrowdfailedtodisperse,CEUdeployedcrushablefoam-nosedmunitionsthatdeliveredOCpowdertopersonsthrowingrocks.38CEUalsouseda40-mmmuzzleblast39todeployCSpowder,andhandtossedsmokeandCSgasmunitions.40Atapproximately12:00a.m.,shieldsarrivedandweredistributedtotheCEUofficers.41

33AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.34AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.35“Charlottefacesunrestafterdeadlypoliceshooting.”WBTV.September20,2016.http://www.wbtv.com/story/33141522/charlotte-faces-unrest-after-deadly-police-shooting(accessedSeptember7,2017).36AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.37AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.38AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.39The40-mmMuzzleBlastprovidesinstantaneousemissionofachemicalagentdirectlyatoronriotous,non-compliantpersonsclosetoapolicelineorwithinaconfinedspace.Munitionsaredeployedfroma40mmlauncherandspraya30’coneofCSpowderoutthefrontofthelauncherdevice.40Portillo,Ely.“Charlottepolicedetailarsenalof‘paincompliance,’teargasusedduringriots.”TheCharlotteObserver.October28,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article111048527.html(accessedSeptember7,2017).41AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.


At1:35a.m.,protestorsmovedontoInterstate85andusedbarrelsandbarricadestoblockthehighwayinbothdirections.42Motoristsreportedthatrockswerethrownattheirvehicles,43atractortrailerthatwasstoppedonthehighwaywasbrokeninto,andfireswereset.44CEUrespondedtothehighwaytoprotectthepersonswhosevehiclehadbeenstoppedonthehighwayandwerebeingvandalizedbypersonsinthecrowd.45At3:00a.m.,CMPDgaveadispersalorderusingaBearcat’sPAsystem.Thecrowdfailedtodisperseandcontinuedtoloottractortrailersandsetthecontentsonfire.46CEUdeployedstingergrenadesandpockettacticals,47aswellasusedfireextinguishersfromthetruckstoputoutthefires.48At3:14a.m.,CEUdeployedstingergrenadesandCSgas,byhand,astheofficerscontinuedtogethitbyrocks,alternatorstakenfromthetrucksthatwerebrokeninto,andotherobjects.49Thecrowdbegantodisperse,withsomepersonsheadedtowardcommercialareaswheretheireffortstoforceentryintoaWalmart,50aQTconveniencestore,andaCircleKwerestoppedbyofficers.51CMPDendedoperationsat4:00a.m.Duringthenight,twenty-three(23)officerswereinjuredbyrocksandotherobjectsthrownatthembythecrowd.52

42AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.43Marusak,Joe,ElyPortillo,MarkPrice,andAdamBell.“Charlottefacesaftermathofprotestsignitedbyfatalpoliceshooting;16officersinjured.”TheCharlotteObserver.September20,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article103009432.html(accessedSeptember8,2017).44“OvernightProtestsDisruptCharlotteAfterFatalPoliceShooting.”NBCNews.September21,2016.https://www.nbcnews.com/slideshow/overnight-protests-disrupt-charlotte-after-fatal-police-shooting-n651901(accessedSeptember8,2017).45AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.46AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.47ThePocketTacticalGrenadeisasmall,lightweight,easilycarrieddevicethatprovidesamediumvolumeofchemicalagentorsmoke.Pelletizedchemicalagentorsmokeisdischargedthroughone(1)gasportlocatedatthebottomofthecanister.Itisahand-tossedmunition.48AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.49AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.50Price,Mark.“Charlottepoliceshootingandprotesttimeline:Howtheprotestsstarted,spreadandcityreaction.”TheCharlotteObserver.September21,2017.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article103131242.html(accessedSeptember7,2017).51AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.52AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.


Wednesday,September21,2016–Thursday,September22,2016

At7:00p.m.,alargegroupofapproximately1,000personsgatheredatMarshallPark.53Justpriorto8:00p.m.,thecrowdbrokeintotwogroups–onemarchingtoLittleRockAMEZionchurchandtheothertowardtheEpicenter.54NeithergrouphadaparadepermitandwasinviolationofCityCodeSection19-312,whichstates,“[n]opublicassemblyorparadeispermittedunlessapermitallowingsuchactivityhasbeenobtained,andremainsunrevoked…”55CMPDdecidedtoallowthemarchtocontinuewithoutthepermitandbikeofficersaccompaniedthepedestrianstoprotectthemfromvehicles.56ThegrouparrivedattheEpicenteratapproximately8:02p.m.,andinitiallystoodinthebottomlevelofthemulti-storymall,chantingandspeaking.TherewasnopolicepresenceinsidethevenueexceptforaCMPDcaptain.57Atsomepoint,alargegroupmovedontoprivatepropertyanduptothethirdflooroftheEpicenter.58At8:19p.m.,theCaptainand911callersreportedbreakingwindows,lootingandthethrowingofchairsandotherobjects.Inresponse,theCaptainrequestedCEUtorestoreorderasthegroupwasnolongerprotestingandwasnowengagingincriminalactivityonprivateproperty.59At8:25p.m.,aCEUplatoon,ledbyaCaptainarrivedinthearea.SeeingthecrowddispersingfromtheEpicenter,theCaptainstagedtheplatoonintheelevatorlobbyoftheOmniHotelsoasnottoantagonizethecrowd.However,thecrowdfollowedtheofficersandCEUmovedoutofthelobbyandestablishedalineoutsidethegaragearea.Thecrowdengagedtheofficers,

53AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.54Boraks,David.“PeacefulProtestsGiveWayToANightOfViolence.”WFAE.September22,2016.http://wfae.org/post/peaceful-protests-give-way-night-violence(accessedSeptember7,2017).55“Section19-312.–Publicassemblyandparadepermits.”CodeofOrdinancesCityofCharlotte,NorthCarolina.August31,2016.https://library.municode.com/nc/charlotte/codes/code_of_ordinances/264937?nodeId=PTIICOOR_CH19STSIOTPUPL_ARTXIPUASPA_S19-311DE(accessedSeptember8,2017).56AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.57AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.58Garloch,Karen.“PolicereviewingWednesdayshooting;eyewitnessessaypoliceescalatedtension.”TheCharlotteObserver.September22,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article103567052.html(accessedSeptember7,2017).59AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.


throwingwaterbottlesandotherobjectsattheofficersincludingafuselitexplosivedevice.60Arequesttodeploygaswasdeniedduetounrelatedcrowdsinthearea.61At8:31p.m.,JustinCarr,aprivatecitizen,wasshot.62Personsinthecrowd,someofthemfaithleaders,believedthatthevictimwasshotandkilledbyarubberbulletfiredbythepolice.63ThevictimwaslocatedandmovedbehindtheCEUlineandwasextricatedbyaBearcatbecausemedicalpersonnelwereunabletorespondthroughthecrowdtotreatthevictim.Severalpolicevehiclesintheareaweredamagedandarespondingofficerwashitwithawrenchthrownbysomeoneinthecrowd.64Between8:40–8:45p.m.,threeCEUplatoonsestablishedalinebetweentheOmniHotelandtheBankofAmericabuilding.65AsdamageandlootingcontinuedinsidetheEpicenter,bottles,largerocksandpiecesofconcretewerethrownatCEUofficers,aswellasa“romancandle”orsimilarfirework.66Between8:58and9:10p.m.,three(3)dispersalordersweregiventothecrowdviaaLongRangeAcousticDevice(LRAD)inEnglishandSpanish.WhenthecrowdfailedtodisperseCEUdeployedhandtossedsmokeandsubsequentlyCSgas.ACEUCaptainwasstruckintheface,treatedandreturnedtohispost.CEUpushedthecrowdoutoftheEpicenter.67Between9:16p.m.and1:47a.m.,thecrowd,pursuedbyofficers,continuedtomovethroughtheUptownareadamagingandlootingpropertiesaswellasaggressivelyengagingCMPDunits.6860AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.61Portillo,Ely.“Charlottepolicedetailarsenalof‘paincompliance,’teargasusedduringriots.”TheCharlotteObserver.October28,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article111048527.html(accessedSeptember7,2017).62Price,Mark.“ManadmitstoshootingbystanderatCharlotteprotests,prosecutorsays.”TheCharlotteObserver.September26,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/special-reports/charlotte-shooting-protests/article104237666.html(accessedSeptember7,2017).63Garloch,Karen.“PolicereviewingWednesdayshooting;eyewitnessessaypoliceescalatedtension.”TheCharlotteObserver.September22,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article103567052.html(accessedSeptember7,2017).64AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.65AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.66Domonoske,CamilaandChristopherDeanHopkins.“N.C.GovernorDeclaresStateofEmergencyAfter2ndNightofUnrestinCharlotte.”NPR.September21,2017.http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/09/21/494957808/police-and-protesters-clash-in-charlotte-for-2nd-night-after-shooting(accessedSeptember8,2017).67AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.68AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.


Between10:00and10:15p.m.,CEUdeployedhandtossedCSgascanistersafterdispersalorderswereissuedandthecrowdfailedtodisperse.Handtossedsmokewasdeployedafteragroupofmotorcyclesandfourwheelersarrivedin,andsubsequentlyrefusedtoleavethearea.Atapproximately11:37p.m.,officersengagedagroupofindividualsthrowingobjectsatthemfromalightrailbridgewithaPepperballgun.69At1:47a.m.,CMPDgavethefinaldispersalordertothecrowdremainingatTradeandTryonStreets.ThecrowddispersedasCEUarrestteamsmovedtowardthem.70Thursday,September22,2016–Friday,September23,2016

AlargegroupofclergyandothercitizensjoinedthecrowdonThursday,intentonkeepingcontrolandpeaceoverthecrowdandtostandbetweentheprotestorsandthepolice.Theireffortsprovedgenerallysuccessfulandminimaluseofcrowdcontrolmeasureswerenecessaryfortheremainderoftheprotestmarches.Bicycleofficersescortedthemarchersandprotectedthemfromvehiculartraffic.71Atapproximately10:30p.m.,asmallgroupshutdownInterstate277.72DispersalordersweregivenusingthePAsystemonaCMPD“mule”(anall-terrainvehicle).73Whenthecrowdfailedtodisperse,CEUofficersusedphysicalforceandPepperballgunroundstomovethecrowdofftheinterstate.Thiswasthelastuseofchemicalagentsduringthistime-period.74Thecrowddispersedontheirownatapproximately2:00a.m.75Friday,September23,2016–Saturday,September24,2016

69AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.70AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.71Peralta,Katherine.“ActsofkindnesssetadifferentmoodfornightNo.3ofCharlotteprotests.”TheCharlotteObserver.September23,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article103652777.html(accessedSeptember7,2017).72Off,Gavin,AnnDossHelms,andMarkWashburn.“ClashwithpoliceonI-277onlyconfrontationinlatestprotests.”TheCharlotteObserver.September22,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article103589352.html(accessedSeptember7,2017).73AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.74Peralta,Katherine.“ActsofkindnesssetadifferentmoodfornightNo.3ofCharlotteprotests.”TheCharlotteObserver.September23,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article103652777.html(accessedSeptember7,2017).75Peralta,Katherine.“ActsofkindnesssetadifferentmoodfornightNo.3ofCharlotteprotests.”TheCharlotteObserver.September23,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article103652777.html(accessedSeptember7,2017).


Theprotestgroup,escortedbyCMPDbicycleofficersmarchedonUptownareastreetsuntilapproximately2:20a.m.,76withoutanysignificantincidents.77Sunday,September25,2016–Monday,September26,2016AgroupofprotestorsarrivedatBankofAmericaStadiumpriortogametime.78Bicycleofficersmaintainedingressandegressroutesforpedestriansattendingthegame.MarchesoccurredinandaroundtheUptownarea,howevertheyrequiredminimalpoliceassistanceastheyremainedonsidewalks,didnotobstructtrafficandcompliedwithcityregulations.79

Monday,September26,2016–Tuesday,September27,2016

MondaywasmarkedbyamarchledbytheNAACPandaCharlotteministerthatoccurredwithoutincident.80Also,someprotestorsdidgointothelobbyoftheGovernmentCenterandsomedemonstratorsenteredtheCouncilChamberfortheCityCouncilmeeting.81WhiletheyalsogatheredintheGovernmentCenteraftertheCityCouncilmeeting,noorganizedmarchesorlarge-scaledemonstrationsoccurredafterwards.82

76AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.77“Day5ofCharlotteprotests.”WCNC.September24,2017.http://www.wcnc.com/news/local/keith-scott-shooting/day-5-of-charlotte-protests/325182932(accessedSeptember7,2017).78“CMPDarrestsmanwithconcealedweaponoutsideBankofAmericaStadium.”WCNC.September25,2017.http://www.wcnc.com/news/local/keith-scott-shooting/cmpd-arrests-man-with-concealed-weapon-outside-bank-of-america-stadium/325283382(accessedSeptember7,2017).79Boraks,David.“AfterProtests,CharlotteTakesABreatherWithAPanthersGame.”WCNC.September25,2016.http://wfae.org/post/after-protests-charlotte-takes-breather-panthers-game(accessedSeptember7,2017).80“UnityRallyForJustice&Transparency.”NorthCarolinaNAACPFacebook.September26,2016.https://www.facebook.com/events/305869303103750/(accessedSeptember7,2017).81Harrison,Steve.“CharlottemayorfacesfuriouscrowdatCityCouncilmeeting.”TheCharlotteObserver.September26,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/special-reports/charlotte-shooting-protests/article104252096.html(accessedSeptember7,2017).82AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.


Pillar1:Policies,Protocols,andStrategiesTheCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartmenthaslongbeenrecognizedforitscommunitypolicingpoliciesandstrategies.Manyelectedofficials,policeleadersandcommunitymembersbelievedthatCMPD’straditionofcommunitypolicingwouldguidetheCitythroughthechallengesfacingthenation.Indoingso,theyfailedtorecognizethatmanymembersoftheCharlottecommunitysharedtheconcernsofprotestorsinothercitiesregardingofficerinvolvedshootings.EmbersburnedjustbelowthesurfacefromCharlotteincidentsthatremainedunresolved.TheofficerinvolvedshootingofKeithScottignitedthoseembers,andCharlottebecamethefocalpointofprotestsandriot.TheCMPDhaddevelopedandputinplacepolicies,proceduresandstrategiesinpreparationforthe2012DemocraticNationalConvention,aswellastoprotectlargepubliceventspriortoandfollowingtheDNC.TheseproceduresandstrategiesprovidedasolidfoundationfortheCMPD’sresponsetotheeventsthatbeganonSeptember20,2016,howeverastheeventsunfolded,theCMPDwaschallengedbythegeographicareainwhichtheinitialprotestserupted;thefast-movingcrowds;theimpactofsocialmedia;thelevelofviolence;and,themobilizationanddeploymentofitspersonnelandresources.Despitethesechallenges,theCMPDdemonstratedprofessionalismandrestraintasitendeavoredtobalancetheFirstAmendmentrightsoftheprotestorsagainstthesafetyofthecommunityanditsofficers.Analysis

TheCMPDrespondedtothesceneoftheofficerinvolvedshooting,establishedincidentcommand,andinitiatedaninvestigationconsistentwiththedepartment’spoliciesandprocedures.Asthecrowdgrew,theon-scenecommanderrequestedadditionalofficerstoassistwithscenesecurity,traffic,witnessinterviewsandtransportation.Itappearsthatthesizeofthecrowdgrew,inpart,becauseofsocialmediapoststhatdrewpersonstothescenefromoutsideoftheneighborhoodandtheCityofCharlotte.CMPDwasunawareofthesocialmediaposts,andwasinitiallyunpreparedtomanagethesizeand/oraggressivenessofthecrowd.83ConsistentwithCMPDStandardOperatingProcedure(CEUSOP#1-CivilEmergencyUnit)theon-sceneCommanderrequestedtwoCivilEmergencyUnit(CEU)squadstorespondtothesceneinresponsetothesizeandaggressionofthecrowd.“ThemissionoftheCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartmentCivilEmergencyUnit(CEU)istoprotectlivesandpropertybymaintainingcommunityorderduringincidentsofcivilunrestthroughacontingencythatutilizesspeciallytrainedandequippedpersonnel.”83AccordingtoauseofforcereportpreparedbyaCMPDSergeant,“thetwentytothirtyCEUofficersarenotenoughtomaintaincontrolduetothewide-openspacesintheareasurroundingOldConcordRoad.”


TheCEUprovedessentialforremovinginvestigatorsandtechniciansfromthescene;protectingofficersandcommunitymembers,andlimitingtheamountofpropertydamagethatoccurredduringthenightandearlymorning.WhentheCommanderrecognizedthatthepresenceofCEUofficerswascontributingtothecrowd’saggressiveness,theCommanderrequestedabustotransportthesquadsfromtheimmediatearea.However,oncepersonsinthecrowdrefusedtoallowapolicevehicletoleaveandcauseddamagetothevehicle;threwrocksandotherobjectsattheofficerscausinginjury;andrefusedtoallowthebusand/orCEUofficerstoleavethescene–chemicalagentsweredeployed.ConsistentwithCMPDStandardOperatingProcedure(CEUSOP#2–UseofChemicalAgents)andCMPDStandardOperatingProcedure(CEUSOP#3–UseofSpecialtyImpactMunitions)theon-sceneCommanderissueddispersalorderstothecrowdaswellaswarningsthatchemicalagentswouldbedeployed.Itappears,basedonareviewofCMPDrecords,thatthedepartmentrecordedtheuseofchemicalmunitionsandtheirusewasconsistentwithprocedure,includingobtainingauthorizationfromasupervisorpriortotheirdispersal.Writtenreportswerepreparedbytheincident(s)supervisorandweredocumentedintheIACMSUseofForcepacketconsistentwithCMPDStandardOperatingProcedure(CEUSOP#2–UseofChemicalAgents).Throughouttheevening,officerswerepeltedwithrocksandotherobjects.Anumberofofficers,includingcommand-levelpersonnelwereinjured.Policeandcivilianpropertywasdamagedandtrafficdisrupted.Inresponse,CMPDpersonnelcontinuouslyattemptedtode-escalatethesituationanddemonstratedtremendousrestraintandprofessionalisminresponsetotheaggressiveandviolentactionstakenbypersonsinthecrowd.

AswasthecaseonTuesdayevening,theCMPDrespondedinamannerconsistentwiththedepartment’spoliciesandprocedures-strivingtobalancetheFirstAmendmentrightsoftheprotestorswiththerightsofprivatepropertyownersandtheinterestsofthepublic(CMPDDirective600-14–PassiveProtestandPeacefulDemonstrations);de-escalatecitizen-policeencounters;and,deployedchemicalagentsinresponsetosignificantthreatstothesafetyofthecommunitywhenprotestorsrefusedtoterminatetheiractionsandcomplywithlawfulorderstodisperse(CEUSOP#2–UseofChemicalAgents).TheCMPDconductedaUseofForceinvestigationregardingtheuseofaPepperballgunbyanofficerinresponsetoobjectsbeingthrownoffthelightrailbridgeatofficers.TheinvestigationdeterminedthattheofficerwasinstructedtodeploythePepperballgunbyaCEUsergeantandthedeploymentwasconsistentwithCEUSOP#3–UseofSpecialtyImpactMunitions: Thedeploymentanduseofthesedevicescanassistinachievingthegoalofprotection oflifeandpropertyand/ortherestorationoforder…Circumstancesjustifyingtheuseof Munitionsinclude,butarenotlimitedto:(1)Restorationormaintenanceoforderduring Riotsorcivildisturbances;(2)safelycontrollingviolentpersons.


Althoughthedeploymentwasjustified,theinvestigationdeterminedthatthePepperballgunwasdirectedagainstapersonwhomayormaynothavebeenresponsibleforthrowingobjectsthatstruckofficers.AccordingtoCMPDStandardOperatingProcedure–CEUSOP#3–UseofSpecialtyImpactMunitions: Regardlessofthesituationorthemunitions,shotplacementisanimportant considerationforofficersdeployingimpactmunitions.Shotplacementiscriticaltothe successfuloutcomeofthesituationandminimizestheriskofseriousinjuryordeath. Whenmakingtheshotplacementdecisiontheneedforimmediateincapacitationmust beweighedwiththepotentialofcausinginjury.SummaryAnalysis

EmergencyMobilizationPlanTheCMPDimplementedthedepartment’sEmergencyMobilizationPlanassoonastheincidentcommanderatthesceneoftheofficerinvolvedshootingrecognizedthatheneededadditionalresourcestoprotectthecommunity,privateproperty,CMPDpersonnelandassets,aswellastostabilizetheincident. TheobjectiveoftheCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment’s(CMPD)Emergency MobilizationPlan(EMP)istoquicklydispatchpersonneltoneededareas,executing theIncidentCommandSystem(ICS)tomanagethesceneandinformation.TheEMPrecognizesthat“emergenciesbynaturetendtobedangerous,dynamic,complexandconfusing”–thiswascertainlythenatureoftheeventsthatunfoldedoverthenextweek.Socialmedia,drivenbypostsfromprotestors,createdanovel,dynamic,dangerousandcomplexoperatingenvironmentfortheCMPDandforCharlotte’selectedofficials.ThisoperatingenvironmentattimesoverwhelmedtheCMPDandchallengedthedecision-making,policies,procedures,practicesandtrainingofthedepartment’sleadershipandpersonnel.Despitethechallengesandtheactsofviolencecommittedbymanyprotestors,theCMPDrespondedwithprofessionalismandrestraint.UseofForceThroughouttheCMPD’sresponsetothedemonstrations,officersactedinamannerconsistentwiththedepartment’spoliciesanddirectivesregardinguseofforce(CMPDInteractiveDirectivesGuide600-019–UseofLessLethalForce): CMPDrecognizesandrespectstheintegrityandparamountvalueofhumanlife. ConsistentwiththisprimaryvalueistheDepartment’sfullcommitmenttoonly useforcewhenitisreasonablynecessary…Thenecessityofthelevelofforcedepends ontheseverityofthecrime,whetherthesubjectposesandimminentthreattothe officersorothers,andwhetherthesubjectisactivelyresistingarrestorattemptingto


evadearrestbyflight.TheCMPDconfrontednumeroussituationsinwhichpersonsengagedinthedemonstrationstookviolentaction,throwingobjectssuchasrocks,cinderblocks,glassbottles,alternators,wrenches,andfireworks,thatcausedinjurytocommandpersonnelandofficers.Personsengagedinthedemonstrationsalsodamagedprivateproperty–buildingsandvehicles,aswellasCMPD/Cityproperty;andcommittedcriminalacts.Inresponse,theCMPDusedforceonlywhenitwasreasonablynecessarytostoptheviolenceandtoprotectthemselves,privatecitizens,andproperty.CivilEmergencyUnitTheCivilEmergencyUnit(CEU)playedanintegralroleintheCMPD’sresponsetotheprotestsandtheviolence,consistentlybalancingtheFirstAmendmentRightsoftheprotestorswiththeirresponsibilitytoprotectpersonsandpropertybymaintainingcommunityorderduringthecivilunrest.Despitebeingpeltedwithrocks,bottles,fireworksandotherobjectsthatinjuredCommandpersonnelandCEUofficers,theUnit’sresponse,includingtheuseofmunitionsandforce,wasmeasuredandconsistentwithdepartment’sdirectivesandstandardoperatingprocedures.CEUcommandpersonnelandsquadleaderscloselymonitoredthebodypostureandemotionsofofficersduringtheprotests,removingofficersthatshowedsignsofanxietyorappearedtobelosingcontrolfromtheline.Additionally,CEUcommandpersonnelandsquadleadersmanagedtheUnitsbyescalatingandde-escalatingtheirresponsebasedontheactionstakenandthethreatposedbytheprotestors.84Itisimportanttonote,thatontheeveningoftheofficerinvolvedshooting(Tuesday,September20,2016),theCMPDencountereddifficultiesdeployingequipmentfromitscentralizedwarehousetoCEUsquads.Forexample,CEUdidnotreceiveshieldsuntil12:00a.m.,approximatelytwo(2)hoursaftertheofficerswerepeltedwithrocksandotherobjectsthatcausedinjurytocommandpersonnelandofficers.ItshouldalsobenotedthatCEU,andtheCMPDoverall,hadfocusedtheirplanningandtrainingexercisesforaresponsetodemonstrationsandcivildisturbanceincidentsintheUptownareaofCharlotte(thecity’sbusinessandentertainmentcenter).TheUptownareaislaidoutinagridthatprovidesopportunitiestolimitandcontrolcrowdmovements.TheruralareaofthecitywheretheofficerinvolvedshootingandinitialprotestsoccurredcreatedsignificantchallengesforCEUpersonnelandresourcedeploymenttoarapidlymovingandsocialmediainformedgroupofprotestors.

84AssessmentteaminterviewwithCMPDSpecialOperationsCommander.June7,2017.


RecommendationsRecommendation1.1:TheCMPDshouldidentifyandengageincontinuedopportunitiesandstrategiesthatpromoteeffectivedialoguebetweenthedepartmentandthecommunityaroundraceandpolicing.Recommendation1.2:TheCMPDshouldcontinuetobuildonitstraditionofcommunitypolicingtoidentifyopportunitiesforthecommunitytoparticipateinthedevelopmentofthedepartment’spolicies,proceduresandpractices.Recommendation1.3:TheCMPDshouldcontinuetosupporttheConstructiveConversationProgram,expandingitinternallyandfurtherengagingthecommunity.Recommendation1.4:TheCMPDshouldcontinuetoreviewitsmobilizationplansforpersonnelandresourcestomakethemmoreagileinresponsetocriticalincidents.Recommendation1.5:TheCMPDshouldreviewitsCEUtrainingtoaccountfortheevolvingnatureofdemonstrationsandprotests.Recommendation1.6:TheCMPDshouldinvolvethecommunityinthedevelopmentofrobustcommunicationandcommunityengagementdirectivesandstrategiesforengaginginrespectfulandconstructiveconversationsandde-escalationduringresponsetomassdemonstrations.Recommendation1.7:TheCMPDshoulddevelopandimplementpoliciesandproceduresthatincreasesituationalawarenessinanticipationofandduringdemonstrationsandactsofcivildisobediencewithaspecificemphasisonsocialmedia.Recommendation1.8:TheCMPDshoulddeveloppoliciesandproceduresthatusesocialmediato“push”informationtothecommunityandquicklydisseminateaccurateinformationinresponsetorumorsandfalseaccusations.


Pillar2:TrainingandDe-Escalation

“Lawenforcementofficersneedtocontinuouslytrainforpre-plannedandspontaneouseventswherelargecrowdsgather.Largecrowdscanbecomeunrulyandriotscanensueiflawenforcementofficersarenottrainedproperlyincrowdcontrol

tacticsandtechniques.”85

Uniformandconsistenttrainingoflawenforcementpersonnelisthefoundationofsuccessfulagencies.Trainingpreparesofficersforthevarioussituationstheymayencounterdaily,andpreparesthemtoaddresscircumstances—suchascivildisturbances—thatoccurinfrequentlybuthavelastingimplications.Intoday’senvironment,officers,supervisors,andseniorandexecutivestaffmembersmustbepreparedtomanagecrowdcontrolateventswherecommunitymembersseektoexpresstheirConstitutionalrightstofreespeechandassembly.PoliceleadersandofficersshouldbewelltrainedinNIMSandICS,crowdmanagement,MobileFieldForce(MFF)operations,authorizeduseofforce,constitutionallyprotectedbehaviors,communicationandde-escalation,biasawareness,proceduralandimpartialpolicing,culturalresponsiveness,andcommunitypolicing.TheCMPD’strainingintheseareas,aswellasidentifiedneedsforfurthertrainingintheseareas,playedasignificantroleinitsresponsetotheSeptember2016demonstrations,particularlyintheinitialdays.Electedofficials,departmentheads,andpoliceleadersshouldrecognizethecomplexityofcivildisturbances,andalsodevelopandpracticetheskillsandtacticsnecessarytorespondtothem,usingnotonlyonlineandclassroomtrainingbutalsotabletopandotherreality-basedexercises.Effectiveandappropriatetraining,basedonthebestpracticesofpolicing,isessentialtokeepingcommunitymembersandpoliceofficerssafeduringbothroutineoperationsandcriticalincidents.NorthCarolinaBasicLawEnforcementTrainingTheNorthCarolinaCriminalJusticeEducation&TrainingStandardsCommissionmandatesallentrylevellawenforcementofficerstobecertifiedbycompletingits16-week,616-hourBasicLawEnforcementTraining(BLET)curriculumandtesting.86Thecurriculumiscomprisedof36

85McCarthy,Garry.“TestimonytothePresident’sTaskForceon21stCenturyPolicing.”January30,2015.UnitedStatesDepartmentofJustice.Washington,DC:OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices.https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/submissions/McCarthy-Garry-Testimony.pdf(accessedAugust28,2017).86NorthCarolinaDepartmentofJustice.“BasicLawEnforcementTraining.”http://www.ncdoj.gov/getdoc/082c4314-b82d-4cd0-bb91-104e0f9d2bbd/Basic-Law-Enforcement-Training.aspx(accessedAugust28,2017).


blocksofinstruction,practicalexercises,andothertestsontopicsincluding:communicationskillsforlawenforcement,ethicsforprofessionallawenforcement,crowdmanagement,andpatroltechniques—however,nospecificinstructionontheNationalIncidentManagementSystem(NIMS)andtheIncidentCommandSystem(ICS),norMobileFieldForce(MFF)areprovided.87CMPDrecruitandin-servicetrainingIndividualagenciesmayalsosupersedethehourrequirementsoftheBLETcurriculumandincludeadditionalcourses.TheCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment(CMPD)added65.5hourstotheBLETcurriculumandtesting,includinganadditionalhourforcrowdmanagementtraining.88UponcompletionoftheincreasedBLETtrainingcurriculum,theCMPDalsomandatesthatallrecruitscompleteitsagencyacademyof171hoursofdepartment-specifictraining.89Duringthistime-period,recruitsreceiveeighthoursofinstructiononcommunicationskillsand16hoursofcrisisinterventiontraining,alongwith16hoursofscenario-basedtraininginwhichrecruitsarerequiredtoutilizeonlycommunicationskillstocalmhostileindividuals.RecruitsalsoreceivefourhoursofDiversityTraining,sevenhoursofoleoresincapsicum(OC)Training,fivehoursofDe-escalationTraining,andfourhoursofCommunityEnrichmentinstruction.90ForCMPD,de-escalationmeans,“thetacticsortechniquesusedbyofficerswhenfacedwithhostilepersonswhetherunderarrestorjustacitizencontact.Thegoalistogaincomplianceorcooperationthroughverbaldialogueandnon-confrontationalbodylanguage,butifforcemustbeused,tousetheleastamounttoeffectivelycontroltheperson.”91TheCMPDacademy,however,doesnotrequirethatrecruitsreceiveanytrainingonNIMSandICSnorMFForcompleteanyadditionaltrainingoncrowdmanagementandcontrol.Additionally,theNorthCarolinaCriminalJusticeEducation&TrainingStandardsCommissionrequireseverylawenforcementofficerinthestatetocomplete24hoursofin-servicetrainingannually:fourhoursoffirearmstrainingandqualification,12hoursofrequiredin-servicetrainingtopicsselectedbytheCommission,andeighthoursoftopicschosenbyindividual

87BLETTopicHoursList–CMPDTotalHoursandRequiredHours.Charlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment.ProvidedbyCMPDmajortoAssessmentTeaminpaperonJune29,2017.ReviewedbyAssessmentTeamJune–September2017.88BLETTopicHoursList–CMPDTotalHoursandRequiredHours.Charlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment.ProvidedbyCMPDmajortoAssessmentTeamelectronicallyonJune29,2017.ReviewedbyAssessmentTeamJune–September2017.89BLETTopicHoursList–CMPDTotalHoursandRequiredHours.Charlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment.ProvidedbyCMPDmajortoAssessmentTeamelectronicallyonJune29,2017.ReviewedbyAssessmentTeamJune–September2017.90BLETTopicHoursList–CMPDTotalHoursandRequiredHours.Charlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment.ProvidedbyCMPDmajortoAssessmentTeamelectronicallyonJune29,2017.ReviewedbyAssessmentTeamJune–September2017.91Charlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment.“OverviewofCMPDDe-escalationTraining.”ProvidedbyCMPDmajortoAssessmentTeaminpaperonJune29,2017.ReviewedbyAssessmentTeamJune–September2017.


agencies.In2016,therequiredtrainingtopicsselectedbytheCommissionincluded:humantraffickingawareness,foundationsinhistoricalandinstitutionalracismandracialequity,andlegalupdatesandfirearmslaws.92TheCMPDrequiredallswornofficerstocompletetheCALEA-mandatedtraininganduseofforcepolicyreviewregardingOC/Batonandsubjectcontroltraining,twohoursofde-escalationtraining,andscenario-basedtrainingthatinvolvedcounteringpoliceambushes.93ThemandatoryCMPDin-servicetrainingin2015alsoincludedcrisisinterventiontraining,MentalHealthFirstAid,andinstructiononculturalproficiency.94CMPDspecializedtrainingSeparatefromthenormaltrainingregimen,theCMPDhasalsoprovidedspecializedtrainingandequipmentinpreparationforlargeeventshostedinthecity,includingthe2012DemocraticNationalConvention(DNC).InpreparationfortheDNC,approximately1,200CMPDofficersreceivedspecialcrowdmanagementandMobileFieldForce(MFF)trainingfromtheU.S.DepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS),primarilythroughtheFederalEmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA)fromAugust–December2011.TheCMPDofficersalsoreceivedtrainingfocusedonfacilitatingpeacefulandlawfuldemonstrations;legalguidelinesrelatedtoFirstAmendmentrightsandpassiveandpeacefuldemonstrations;and,tacticstoleveragebicycles,horses,motorcycles,andfieldofficerstoensurethesafetyofdemonstratorsandofficers.95TheCMPDCivilEmergencyUnit(CEU)alsopurchased300publicorderbicycles,16utilitytaskvehiclesoutfittedwithadditionalresponseequipment,and50dual-sportmotorcycles.96However,whileaspectsofMFFwereincorporatedintootherCMPDtrainings,membersoftheCEUaretheonlyCMPDemployeeswhocontinuetoreceiveMFFtrainingsincetheDNC.In2016,CEUmembersreceived17hoursofMFFtraining:fourhoursofmovements,fourhoursofchemicalmunitionsforspecializedofficers,eighthoursofscenario-basedtraining,andonehourofonlinetraining.In2015,CEUmembersreceived30hoursofMFFtraining:10hoursofscenario-basedtraining,eighthoursofchemicalmunitionsforspecializedofficers,eighthoursofdeviceextractionschoolforspecializedofficers,andfourhoursofmovements.97Therefore,

92“2016In-ServiceTopicsOnline.”OnlineTraining.NorthCarolinaJusticeAcademy.http://ncja.ncdoj.gov/acadisonline.aspx(accessedAugust29,2017).93Charlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment.“OverviewofCMPDDe-escalationTraining.”ProvidedbyCMPDmajortoAssessmentTeaminpaperonJune29,2017.ReviewedbyAssessmentTeamJune–September2017.94Charlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment.“OverviewofCMPDDe-escalationTraining.”ProvidedbyCMPDmajortoAssessmentTeaminpaperonJune29,2017.ReviewedbyAssessmentTeamJune–September2017.95Monroe,RodneyD.“TestimonytothePresident’sTaskForceon21stCenturyPolicing.”January30,2015.UnitedStatesDepartmentofJustice.Washington,DC:OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices.https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/submissions/Monroe-Rodney-Testimony.pdf(accessedAugust28,2017).96Command,Control,andCoordination:AQuick-LookAnalysisoftheCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment’sOperationsduringthe2012DemocraticNationalConvention.March2013.UnitedStatesDepartmentofJustice.Washington,DC:BureauofJusticeAssistance.https://www.bja.gov/publications/2012-dnc-quick-look.pdf(accessedAugust29,2017).97Charlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment.“CMPDTrainingOverview.”ProvidedbyCMPDmajortoAssessmentTeaminpaperonJune29,2017.ReviewedbyAssessmentTeamJune–September2017.


undoubtedly,someoftheofficershadnotreceivedthistrainingpriortorespondingtothedemonstrationsinSeptember2016.ConstructiveConversationTeamtrainingSincethedemonstrations,CMPDofficershavebegunreceivingConstructiveConversationTeam(CCT)training.TheconceptofCCTwasdevelopedbytheCMPDincollaborationwithCharlottecommunitymemberswhoparticipatedinthedemonstrations.Thetrainingbeganwithaninitialgroupofapproximately50CMPDofficers—manyofwhomrespondedtoatleastonenightofthedemonstrations—assignedtopositionsthroughoutthedepartmentandfocusedonenhancinginteractionswithcommunitymembers,particularlyincriticalincidents,bycombiningclassroominstructionandscenario-basedtraining.Thetraininginstructedofficerstoactivelylistentocommunitymembersevenifitinvolveswithstandingsomeverbalabuse;toconveytothecommunitymemberthattheyareactivelylisteningandtryingtoconnect;andtobeabletoprovidecommunitymemberswithinformationandanswerstotheirquestionsregardingCMPDpolicies,training,statistics,andothergeneralquestionsasked.98GiventhesuccessoftheCCTatotherdemonstrationsandofficer-involvedshootingssinceSeptember2016,CMPDisrequiringallswornpersonneltocompleteCCTtraining.99Recommendations

Recommendation2.1:TheCMPDshouldconductathoroughreviewofitsacademycoursesandhours,anditsadditionstotherequiredBLETcourses,toemphasizeempatheticdialogueandnon-confrontationalconversationswithcommunitymembers.Trainingthatreflectstheneedsandcharacterofthecommunityisimportantforenhancingtransparencyandcreatingabetter-informedagencyandpublic.Thereviewshouldinclude:theIntegratingCommunications,Assessment,andTactics(ICAT)guide—which“takestheessentialbuildingblocksofcriticalthinking,crisisintervention,communications,andtactics,andputsthem98Charlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment.“ConstructiveConversationTeamTraining.”ProvidedbyCMPDmajortoAssessmentTeaminpaperonJune29,2017.ReviewedbyAssessmentTeamJune–September2017.99AssessmentTeaminterviewwithCMPDmajor.June5,2017.

CMPDCCTTrainingwithcommunitymembers.Source:http://www.charlottestories.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/campagnatraining.jpg.


togetherinanintegratedapproach;”100lessonslearnedandbestpracticesidentifiedinafter-actionreportsfromcivildisturbancesinMinneapolis,St.LouisCounty,Baltimore,andothercitiesthatexperiencedcivildisturbances;and,otherde-escalationandCrisisInterventionTraining(CIT)strategies.

Recommendation2.2:TheCMPDshouldcontinueengagingcommunitymembersinthetrainingprocess.TheConstructiveConversationTeamtrainingincludesexercisesinwhichactivistsfromtheCharlottecommunityengageinthesamebehaviorsthattheyengageinduringtheirdemonstrations.Traineesarethenrequiredtode-escalatethedemonstratorsusingonlycommunication.Thetrainingsessionthenendswiththecommunitymembersandofficersexplainingtheirperspectivesandactionstooneanother,tofacilitatelearningandunderstanding.Thisshouldcontinueandexpandedtoothertrainingsthatimpactcommunitymembers,includingtrafficenforcementandCMPDhistory.Recommendation2.3:CurriculatotrainallCMPDpersonneloncrowdmanagementstrategiesandtacticsshouldbedevelopedfromcurrentbestpractices,policyrecommendations,andlessonslearnedfromafter-actionreviewsofsimilarevents.Ataminimum,futuredepartment-widetrainingsshouldinclude:basicprinciplesofMobileFieldForceoperations,movements,andproblemsolving;FirstAmendmentrightsandprotections;and,NIMSandICS.Particularattentionshouldbegiventotheroleofpatrolofficers,whomaybethefirstonthesceneofanescalatingevent.Suchofficersandtheirsupervisorsshouldbetrainedonmakinginitialassessmentsandprovidinginformationthatwillinformincidentmanagementdecisionandensureanappropriateresponseatthedivisionanddepartmentlevel.

100PoliceExecutiveResearchForum.“ICAT:IntegratingCommunications,Assessment,andTactics.”http://www.policeforum.org/icat-training-guide(accessedAugust30,2017).


Pillar3:EquipmentandTechnologyIntroductionSincethepoliceresponsetothemassdemonstrationsinFerguson,Missouri,anationaldiscussion—specificallyconcerning,“policetactics,weaponry,andresourcesthatappearmorecloselyakintomilitaryoperationsthandomesticlawenforcement”—hasshinedalightontheevolutionofresponsetoFirstAmendment-protectedactivities.101However,effectiveandsafemanagementofmassdemonstrations—especiallymobiledemonstrations—reliesheavilyonmaintaininganddeployingthenecessarycivildisturbanceequipmentattheappropriatetimesandlevels.CMPDcommandstaffadvisedtheydeployedresourcesandequipmentinathoughtful,well-timed,andwell-plannedmanneraspartofatieredapproachthatwasformedonthebasisoflessonslearnedfromhostingthe2012DemocraticNationalConvention(DNC)andwatchinglawenforcementresponsestosimilardemonstrationsnationwide.102Ontheotherhand,communitymembersallegethat,“CMPDanditsofficersundertookactionswhichwerepurposefullydesignedtofrightenandpunishdemonstratorsbyinflictingharm,”andthatdemonstrators,“weremetwithamilitarizedresponsebyCMPD.”103EquipmentOverthecourseoftheresponsetothedemonstrationsinSeptember2016,theCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment(CMPD)andtheNorthCarolinaArmyNationalGuard(NCANG)deployedequipmentthatcanbedividedintothreecategories:personalprotectiveequipment(PPE),less-lethaldevices,andbicycles.104PersonalProtectiveEquipmentLawenforcementagencies,whileprioritizingofficersafety,mustcarefullyconsiderthebalancebetweentheneedforprotectionandtheimagepresentedbyafrontlineofofficerscladin

101InstituteforIntergovernmentalResearch.2015.After-ActionAssessmentofthePoliceResponsetotheAugust2014DemonstrationsinFerguson,Missouri.COPSOfficeCriticalResponseInitiative.Washington,DC:OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices.https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p317-pub.pdf(accessedAugust31,2017).102AssessmentTeaminterviewwithCMPDcaptain.June7,2017.103BraxtonDavidWinston,IIetalv.CityofCharlotteetal.“ComplaintforInjunctiveRelief.”October21,2016.http://photographyisnotacrime.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/Charlotte-Uprising-Lawsuit.pdf(accessedSeptember1,2017).104Straub,Frank,HassanAden,JeffreyBrown,BenGorban,RodneyMonroe,andJenniferZeunik.2017.MaintainingFirstAmendmentRightsandPublicSafetyinNorthMinneapolis:AnAfter-ActionAssessmentofthePoliceResponsetoProtests,Demonstrations,andOccupationoftheMinneapolisPoliceDepartment’sFourthPrecinct.Washington,DC:OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices.https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/maintaining-first-amendment-rights-and-public-safety-in-north-minneapolis/(accessedAugust30,2017).


PPE.105WhilePPEhastraditionallybeenthoughttohaveadeterrenteffectonviolentbehavior,inrecentevents,policedepartmentsequippedwithPPEhavebeenperceivedascontributingtotheescalationofdemonstrations,bybeingportrayedinthemediathroughaheavy-handedormilitaristiclight.106ThistrendcontinuedinCharlotte,whereCMPDCEUofficerswearingadditionalPPEwererepeatedlyphotographedstandinginatacticallineacrossfromdemonstrators.107EachCEUofficerisissuedPPEthatincludesahelmetwithaclearfaceshieldthathasafour-digitnumberprintedoneachsideinlargewhitefont,whichcorrespondstoamasterequipmentroster,tofacilitateidentificationofofficerswearingthePPEbybothsupervisorsandmembersofthepublic.Theofficersarealsoissuedarmandlegpads,gloves,andexternalvests.Theyalsocarrylongbatonsandshields.Duringinterviews,CMPDofficersnotedthattheCEUofficersandtheiradditionalequipmentwererequiredbecauseofthevolatilityandhostilityofthedemonstratorsattimes,andmultiplesevereinjuriessufferedbytheircolleagues.108Asdemonstratorsarrivedatthesceneoftheincidentinever-growingnumbers,someoftheinitialrespondingofficersbelievedtheywereunderdressedandill-equippedtomaintaintheirsafetyandsecurityaswellasthesafetyandsecurityofthescene,necessitatingtherequestfortheCEUsquads.109However,communitymembersperceivedtheCEUofficers’attireandequipmentasominousandpreemptivelycombative.110SomeofthedemonstrationleadersclaimthatthedeploymentofCMPDofficersin“riotgear”andthearrivaloftheNCANGinHumveesandarmoredvehiclesonlyservedtoinstigateandenflameindividualswhoweretheretoseekanswersandjustice.111Less-lethaldevicesLawenforcementofficersgenerallyonlydeployless-lethaldevicesinresponsetoescalatingviolenceordisorderduringcivildemonstrations.Muchlikeequipmentthough,departmentsmustbalancetheneedfordeploymentofsuchdevicesagainsttheperceptionsandimplications

105Straub,Frank,HassanAden,JeffreyBrown,BenGorban,RodneyMonroe,andJenniferZeunik.2017.MaintainingFirstAmendmentRightsandPublicSafetyinNorthMinneapolis:AnAfter-ActionAssessmentofthePoliceResponsetoProtests,Demonstrations,andOccupationoftheMinneapolisPoliceDepartment’sFourthPrecinct.Washington,DC:OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices.https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/maintaining-first-amendment-rights-and-public-safety-in-north-minneapolis/(accessedAugust30,2017).106Straub,Frank,HassanAden,JeffreyBrown,BenGorban,RodneyMonroe,andJenniferZeunik.2017.MaintainingFirstAmendmentRightsandPublicSafetyinNorthMinneapolis:AnAfter-ActionAssessmentofthePoliceResponsetoProtests,Demonstrations,andOccupationoftheMinneapolisPoliceDepartment’sFourthPrecinct.Washington,DC:OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices.https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/maintaining-first-amendment-rights-and-public-safety-in-north-minneapolis/(accessedAugust30,2017).107Clasen-Kelly,Fred.“DidCMPDusetoomuchshowofforce—ortoolittle—duringprotests?”CharlotteObserver.October31,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article111593532.html(accessedAugust31,2017).108AssessmentTeaminterviewwithCMPDcaptain.June7,2017.109AssessmentTeaminterviewwithCMPDcaptain.June7,2017.110AssessmentTeamfocusgroupwithcommunitymembers.June7,2017.111AssessmentTeamfocusgroupwithcommunitymembers.June7,2017.


ofleveragingthemagainstdemonstrators.112Especiallygiventherecentmediaportrayalsoflawenforcementandtheimpactsofdemonstratorslive-streamingfootageofofficersnationwideutilizingless-lethaloptions,agenciesmuststronglyconsidertheimplications,evenifpoliciesandproceduresallowfortheirdeployment.AccordingtoaPoliceExecutiveResearchForum(PERF)reportonmanagingmassdemonstrations:

“Use[oflesslethaldevices]mustbebalancedagainstthethreatfacedbyfrontlineofficers,aswellasthegoalsofficersareattemptingtoaccomplish(e.g.,contain,makearrests,quelldisorder).Theoptionshouldbeusedonlyuntilthedesiredeffectisachieved.Useshouldbefrequentlyreassessedtoensurecontinuedneedfordeployment.”113

TheCMPDacknowledgeddeployingless-lethaloptionsoverthecourseoftheresponsetothedemonstrationsinSeptember2016.Thefirstnight—aftermembersofthecrowdthrewbottles,rocks,andotherprojectiles—ahandheldgascanisterwasdeployed.114Additionally,aftermembersofthecrowdofdemonstratorsencircledabusthatarrivedtoextricateCEUandotherCMPDofficersfromthesceneandcontinuedtothrowprojectiles,astingergrenade(rubberpelletsandoleoresincapsicum(OC)spray),andaTripleChaserCScanisterweredeployed.AsthedemonstrationscontinueddownOldConcordRoad,additionaldispersalordersweregivenbeforeanotherroundofmunitionswerethrown.WhenthatprovedineffectiveincalmingthecrowdCEUagaindeployed,“crushablefoamnosedmunitionsthatdeliverOCpowder…40mmmuzzleblastCSpowdermunitions,andhandtossedsmokeandCSgasmunitions.”115AsthedemonstrationscontinuedonSeptember21,somedemonstratorsattheEpiCentrebecameincreasingagitatedanddestructive,lootednearbystores,andattemptedtolightadumpsteronfire.Aftermultipledispersalordersweregiven,andwereignoredbythosewhoremained,CEUdeployedhand-tossedsmoke,CSgas,andalongrangeacousticdevice(LRAD)

112Straub,Frank,HassanAden,JeffreyBrown,BenGorban,RodneyMonroe,andJenniferZeunik.2017.MaintainingFirstAmendmentRightsandPublicSafetyinNorthMinneapolis:AnAfter-ActionAssessmentofthePoliceResponsetoProtests,Demonstrations,andOccupationoftheMinneapolisPoliceDepartment’sFourthPrecinct.Washington,DC:OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices.https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/maintaining-first-amendment-rights-and-public-safety-in-north-minneapolis/(accessedAugust30,2017).113PoliceManagementofMassDemonstrations:IdentifyingIssuesandSuccessfulApproaches.2014.(Washington,DC:PoliceExecutiveResearchForum).http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series/police%20management%20of%20mass%20demonstrations%20-%20identifying%20issues%20and%20successful%20approaches%202006.pdf(accessedSeptember1,2017).114AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.115AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.


multipletimes.116Onlyhand-tossedsmokewasutilizedbecauseofthepotentialdangersofCSgastomotorvehicles.117Thefinaluseofless-lethalcrowdcontrolagentsoccurredonSeptember22,whenCEUagaindeployedPepperballroundstomovedemonstratorsoffI-277.118Again,priortothePepperballroundsbeingused,multipledispersalordersweregivenoveraPAsystemonanarmoredvehicle.119Eachofthesedeployments,theequipmentused,andtheinvestigationsintotheirusewereconsistentwithCMPDDirective600-019(UseofLessLethalForce).Thedirectiveapprovesuseofless-lethalequipmentincludingbeanbagrounds,chemicalirritants,andrubberpellets.120Additionally,thedirectivespecifiesthatonlyofficerswhoareauthorizedandtrainedintheuseofthesetypesofequipmentmayutilizeless-lethalequipmentandwhen,“TheCivilEmergencyUnitorotherspecializedunitusesthelesslethaloption(s)todisperserioters,mobs,crowds,orbarricadedsubjects…thecommanderofthatunitwillcompleteoneSupervisor’sInvestigativeReport.”121Thesereportswerecompletedeveryday,whichwasacknowledgedbycommunitymemberswhoparticipatedinthedemonstrations.122BicyclesThroughoutthepeacefulhoursofthedemonstrations,theCMPDcapitalizedonthepromisingpracticeofdeployingbicycleunitstomanagethecrowdsexercisingtheirFirstAmendmentrights.123OfficersonbicycleswereutilizedtoprotectthedemonstratorsastheymovedintoandarounduptownCharlotteandontoI-85andI-277andtodirecttrafficaroundthedemonstrators.Whenneeded,theofficerswerealsoabletoutilizetheirbicyclesasbarriersto

116AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.117AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.118AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.119AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.120600-019UseofLessLethalForce.CMPDDirectives.May12,2016.http://charlottenc.gov/CMPD/Documents/Resources/CMPDDirectives.pdf(accessedSeptember1,2017).121600-019UseofLessLethalForce.CMPDDirectives.May12,2016.http://charlottenc.gov/CMPD/Documents/Resources/CMPDDirectives.pdf(accessedSeptember1,2017).122AssessmentTeamfocusgroupwithcommunitymembers.June7,2017.123Straub,Frank,HassanAden,JeffreyBrown,BenGorban,RodneyMonroe,andJenniferZeunik.2017.MaintainingFirstAmendmentRightsandPublicSafetyinNorthMinneapolis:AnAfter-ActionAssessmentofthePoliceResponsetoProtests,Demonstrations,andOccupationoftheMinneapolisPoliceDepartment’sFourthPrecinct.Washington,DC:OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices.https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/maintaining-first-amendment-rights-and-public-safety-in-north-minneapolis/(accessedAugust30,2017).


mitigateaggressiveactionsbythedemonstratorsandmaintainingressandegressintoprivatefacilitiesthatwerebeingblockedbydemonstrators.124OtherSpecializedEquipmentAttimesduringtheirresponsetothedemonstrations,CMPDofficersrequiredspecializedequipmenttoensurecommunityandofficersafety.WhilesomedemonstratorssuggestedthattheBearcatandtheLRADwereunnecessaryandservedasexamplesofthedepartment’sproclivitytosuppresstheirFirstAmendmentprotectedactivity,theequipmentwasneededandwasusedappropriately.IntheearlymorninghoursofSeptember21,2016,afterdemonstratorsbeganbreakingintostoppedtrucksandignitingafireonInterstate85,officersdetermineditwasunsafeforthemtomoveclosertodispersethegroup.Dispersalordersweregivenbyusingthepublicaddress(PA)systemonanarmedpersonnelcarrier(APC),knownasaBearcat.TheBearcatwasalsousedontheeveningofSeptember21,2016,toextricateshootingvictimJustinCarr.Manydemonstratorsbelievedthepolicewereresponsiblefortheshooting,andblockedmedicalfirstrespondersfromthescene.TheBearcat,whichhadbeenstationedacoupleblocksawayfromtheEpiCentre,wasimmediatelybroughtintoextricatetheshootingvictimsothathecouldbetreatedandtransportedtothehospital.125Lateron,assomeofthedemonstratorscausedmorechaos—breakingintoandlootingtheEpiCentreSundriesstoreandthrowingbottlesofliquor,rocks,andconcreateatCMPDofficers—threedispersalordersweregivenutilizingaLongRangeAcousticDevice(LRAD).Whilethishadatemporaryimpactonthesizeandlocationofthecrowd,approximatelythree(3)hourslatertheLRADwasneededagain,thistimetogivefivedispersalorders.126AnLRADisadevicethatbroadcastsmessages,warnings,notificationsandothercommandsapproximately1.5milesintolargecrowdsinamannerthatissafeforbothlawenforcementandmembersofthecrowd.127RegionalresourcesAsthelargestlawenforcementagencyintheregion,theCMPDgenerallyprovidesresourcesandpersonneltosmalleragenciesviamutualaid.However,giventheseverityofthedemonstrations,theCMPDrequestedmutualaidinthisinstance.IttooklongerthanexpectedfortheCMPDtoreceivemutualaidresourcesrequestedfromsmallernearbyagenciesandfor

124AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.125AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.126AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.127“LawEnforcement.”LRADCorporation.https://www.lradx.com/application/law-enforcement/(accessedSeptember14,2017).


largeragenciesinRaleighandGreensborotoarriveoncethedemonstrationsbecameespeciallyviolentanddestructive.128ThisprecipitatedswitchingCMPDofficersto12-hourshifts,declaringaStateofEmergencytostandupaplatoontoassistwiththeresponse,anddeployingtheNCANG.TechnologyTheroleofcamerasTechnology—particularlybody-worncameras(BWCs)—playedanintegralroleinfuelingthefrustrationsofthedemonstrators.AsdescribedinCMPDDirective400-006(BodyWornCamera(BWC)),BWCsare,“utilizedbyofficerstopromotetransparencyinaccordancewithstatelawandaccountabilityforofficersandthecommunitythroughobjectiveevidence.”129AlthoughalluniformedofficersinvolvedintheinitialincidentwerewearingBWCs,theCMPDinitiallydeclinedtoreleasethevideos.Thedecisionenflamedthedemonstrators.Bodyworncamerasareimportantassetsduringdemonstrationsastheyprovideanopportunitytorecordverbalandphysicalexchangesbetweendemonstratorsandthepolice–protectingallpartiesfromfalseaccusationsasdemonstratedduringtheRepublicanNationalConventioninCleveland,Ohio.130TheCMPDleveragedfootagerecordedbyitshelicopteraswellastrafficandothercamerasduringthecourseofthedemonstrationstoassesstheactionsofparticipantsandofficers.TheCMPDcollectedalmost80hoursoffootagefromthedemonstrationsthatfocusedonconfrontations,includingtheshootingofJustinCarr.131

128AssessmentteamfocusgroupwithCMPDcommandstaff.April12,2017.129400-006BodyWornCamera(BWC).CMPDDirectives.May8,2017.http://charlottenc.gov/CMPD/Documents/Resources/CMPDDirectives.pdf(accessedSeptember1,2017).130Command,Control,andCoordination:AQuick-LookAnalysisoftheClevelandDivisionofPoliceOperationsduringthe2016RepublicanNationalConvention.PendingPublication.UnitedStatesDepartmentofJustice.Washington,DC:BureauofJusticeAssistance.131Miller,DougandBruceHenderson.“Just-releasedpolicevideoshowsprotestsgrowingafterScottshooting.”September12,2017.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/article172888376.html(accessedSeptember14,2017).


RecommendationsRecommendation3.1:TheCMPDshouldcontinuethepracticeofdeployingbicycleofficersduringdemonstrationsandmassgatherings.Bicycleofficerswerewell-receivedbydemonstrators.Recommendation3.2:Conductaregionalinventoryofassets,orcreatearegionalCouncilofGovernments(COG),toassistincidentcommandersinidentifyingpotentialresourcesattheirdisposalthatmayassistthemintheirefforts.ACOGbringstogetherleadersfromregional,

EffectiveUseofEquipmentandTechnologyinMassDemonstrations

Bicycles:Duringthe2016PresidentialNominatingConventions,theClevelandDivisionofPolice(CPD)andPhiladelphiaPoliceDepartment(PPD)strategicallydeployedbicycleunitsinthepre-planneddemonstrationsitesandalongdesignatedparaderoutes.Theseunitswereeffectiveinprovidingrapidandtactical,yetnon-militaristicapproachestocrowdmanagement;tocordoningoffrestrictedpedestrianroutes;anddivertingtraffic.SomeofthePPDbicycleofficersengagedinconversationswithdemonstratorsandusedtheirbikestomoreeasilydistributewaterduringtheexcessiveheat.Officersalsousedtheirbicyclesastemporarybarricadestoisolatedemonstratorswhowereincitingviolence,andtoseparateprotestgroups.Body-WornCameras:TheClevelandDivisionofPolice(CPD)alsooutfittedeveryofficerwithcrowdmanagementand/orarrestresponsibilitieswithabody-worncamera(BWC)duringthe2016RepublicanNationalConvention.TheCPDorderedspecially-designedmountssothatcrowdmanagementandarrestteamofficerscouldaccommodatetheirprotectiveequipmentandrequiredmutualaidofficerstohaveBWCsaswell.TheBWCswererequiredtoimprovetransparencyasCPDofficersprotectedtheConventionandaccountabilityforallpublic-facingofficers.

UnmannedAircraftSystems:Somepolicedepartmentshavealsohadsuccessinusingunmannedtechnologytoprotectofficerandcommunitysafety.Unmannedaircraftsystems(UAS),forexample,havetheabilityto,“amongotherbenefits,helpfindlostpersons,protectpoliceofficersduringsearchesforarmedsuspects…andaidindisasterreliefandrecovery.”Theycanalsoprovidereal-timesituationalawarenessandkeepbothofficersandthecommunitysafeduringlargedemonstrations,bymonitoringgroupmovements.DuringSuperBowlXLVin2011,theArlington(Texas)PoliceDepartmentutilizedaUAStoconductsecurityandtovisuallyinspecttheroofofAT&TStadiumbeforeandduringthegame.PoliceDepartmentsconsideringutilizationofUASshouldincludethecommunityintheanalysisanddecisiontoacquirethem.Sources:1)Command,Control,andCoordination:AQuick-LookAnalysisoftheClevelandDivisionofPoliceOperationsduringthe2016RepublicanNationalConvention.PendingPublication.UnitedStatesDepartmentofJustice.Washington,DC:BureauofJusticeAssistance.2)ManagingLarge-ScaleSecurityEvents:APlanningPrimerforLocalLawEnforcementAgencies.PendingPublication.UnitedStatesDepartmentofJustice.Washington,DC:BureauofJusticeAssistance.3)Valdovinos,Maria,Specht,James,andZeunik,Jennifer2016.LawEnforcement&UnmannedAircraftSystems(UAS):GuidelinestoEnhanceCommunityTrust.Washington,DC:OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices.https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/UAS-Report.pdf(accessedSeptember13,2017).


state,andfederalagenciestoidentifywhatresourceseachjurisdictioncanbringtobearinacriticalincident.Understandingwhatresourcesareavailableandthetimeitwilltakeforthoseresourcestoarriveonsceneaheadoftimeisinvaluabletodecision-makersduringacriticalincident.Recommendation3.3:TheCMPDshouldestablishacommitteethatincludestheCountyAttorney,theCountyProsecutor,andthecommunitytocollaborativelycreateaprotocolfordeterminingtheappropriateprocessforreleasingBWCfootageincriticalincidents.Whileitisunderstandablethateachcriticalincidentwillinvolveauniquesetofcircumstances,havingacollaboratively-createdprotocolfordeterminingtheappropriateprocessforreleasingBWCfootagewillhelptoalleviatemanyoftheissuesthataroseinthisinstance.Recommendation3.4:TheCMPDshouldequipofficerswithbodyworncameras,especiallyofficersassignedtoitsCivilEmergencyUnit(CEU).TheuseofBWCsduringtheRepublicanNationalConventiondemonstratedthebenefitsofrecordinginteractionsbetweenlawenforcementpersonnelandpersonsparticipatingindemonstrations.


Pillar4:SocialMediaandCommunicationTraditionalmediaandsocialmediacommunicationplayedsignificantrolesandprovidedmultipleadvantagestotheactiviststhroughoutthedemonstrationsinCharlotte.DemonstratorsreliedprimarilyonFacebookLive—afeatureontheFacebookmobileapplicationthatallowsFacebookuserstobroadcast“live”totheirfriendsandfollowersaswellasspecificgroupsandeventpagesaseventsunfolded.132UsingFacebookLiveandTwitter,activistsquicklytookcontrolofthenarrativebybroadcastingvideosandimagesthatfurtheredtheirperspectives.Asthedemonstrationsprogressed,theseindividualscontinuedtoleveragetheirsocialmediafollowingsto:broadcasttheirnarrativeandtheircallsforjustice,sharetheirperceptionsandperspectivesofthelawenforcementresponse,andspreadrumorsfromtheirdifferentlocations.Theyalsoutilizedsocialmediatoarrangemultiplemeetinglocationsthroughoutthecityandtocoordinatetheirnextstepswhengroupswerelargeenoughtocausedisruptions,intentionallyoverwhelmingand“outmaneuvering”thetraditionalresponsesoftheCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment(CMPD).Mostimportantly,thestrategicuseofsocialmediabydemonstratorsandactivistsaffordedthemtheopportunitytocontrolthenarrative,fromthebeginning,andmiredtheCMPDPublicAffairsOfficeandcommandstaffinacycleofconstantlyrespondingversusproactivelydisseminatingaccurateandtimelyinformationtodispelrumorsandcorrectfalsestatements.DemonstratorscontrolledthenarrativeFromthebeginning,personsatthesceneusedsocialmediatovoicetheirfrustrations,andtocontrolthenarrative.Themessagewasthatthiswasthelatestcaseof“anofficer-involvedshootingofanunarmedAfrican-American.”Numerouspeopleatthescene,particularlystudentsthathadjustgottenoffaschoolbus,usedFacebookandTwittertospreadthenarrativethatMr.Scottwaswaitingunarmedforhissontogetoffthebuswhenhewasconfrontedbypolice.133134ThiswasaccentuatedbythelivestreamofMr.Scott’sdaughter,whoindicatedthatherfatherwasreadingabookandwaitingforherbrothertogetoffthebuswhenhewas,“shotforbeingblack”andthattheCMPDinvestigatorshadplantedtheguninherfather’struck,andwerelyingaboutthepresenceofa

132Greenberg,Julia.“ZuckerbergReallyWantsYoutoStreamLiveVideoonFacebook.”Wired.April6,2016.https://www.wired.com/2016/04/facebook-really-really-wants-broadcast-watch-live-video/(accessedAugust24,2017).133Assessmentteamfocusgroupwithcommunityactivistsanddemonstrators.June7,2017.134AccordingtotheDistrictAttorney’sOffice,duringthesubsequentinvestigation,“TheSBIfoundnocredibleevidencethatScottwasreadingorpossessedabookwhenheencounteredlawenforcement.Further,theSBIdeterminedtherewasnocredibleevidencefoundtosubstantiatethe‘planting’oralteringofanyevidence.”See:DistrictAttorney’sOffice,26thProsecutorialDistrictofNorthCarolina.TheKeithLamontScottDeathInvestigation.November30,2017.http://www.charmeckda.com/news/113016_1.pdf(accessedSeptember14,2017).


gunonthenews.135Thevideostreamsalsoincludedimagesofherconsolingherbrotherwhentheyfoundoutthattheirfatherwaspronounceddeadatthehospital.136Fueledbythevideos—whichwentviralandwereviewednearly500,000timeswithinfivehours137—andthenarrativethatanotherunarmedblackmalehadbeenkilledbylawenforcement,activistsrushedtothescene.138Almostassoonastheyarrived,theactivistsalsotooktotheirsocialmediaaccountstolive-streamfromthescene.139Somelive-streamedconversationswithindividualswhoclaimedtheyhadwitnessedtheincident,whileotherscapturedtheirownperspectivesoftheincreasingnumberofdemonstratorsandencouragedtheirfollowerstojoin.Othersfocusedonthepoliceresponsetothecrowds,andtheescalationoftensionasthenightprogressed.140Theabilityofsocialmediatoquicklymobilizelargenumbersofpeopleallowedthemtooverwhelmand“outmaneuver”theCMPDofficersatthescene.WhileCMPDpulledofficersfromnearbydivisionsandtheon-sceneoperationscommanderrequestedtwoCivilEmergencyUnit(CEU)squads—whoformedupwiththeirgearanddeployedtothesceneasquicklyaspossible—thenumberofdemonstratorscontinuedtogrowexponentially.Asanexample,at9:39p.m.,therewereapproximately150demonstrators,butonly20–30CEUofficers,andahandfulofotherCMPDofficers,atthescene.141TheunevenratioofdemonstratorstoCMPDofficersatthescenewasexacerbatedbytraditionalmediaoutlets.AccordingtotheCMPD,whenmediaoutletsarrivedatthesceneoftheincidenttoprovidelivebroadcastsfortheir11:00p.m.news,thedemonstrators’levelofirritationincreaseddramatically.142Infact,itwasapproximately15minuteslaterthataCMPD

135LyricYourAdorableScott.FacebookLivevideo.September20,2016.https://www.facebook.com/keirramsprettybabe.scott/videos/1099055070172542/(accessedAugust24,2017).136LyricYourAdorableScott.FacebookLivevideo.September20,2016.https://www.facebook.com/keirramsprettybabe.scott/videos/1099055070172542/(accessedAugust24,2017).137Peralta,Katherine.“SocialmediaplaysgrowingroleinpoliceshootingsliketheoneinCharlotte.”CharlotteObserver.September21,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article103303997.html(accessedAugust22,2017).138AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.139Peralta,Katherine.“SocialmediaplaysgrowingroleinpoliceshootingsliketheoneinCharlotte.”CharlotteObserver.September21,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article103303997.html(accessedAugust22,2017).140Peralta,Katherine.“SocialmediaplaysgrowingroleinpoliceshootingsliketheoneinCharlotte.”CharlotteObserver.September21,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article103303997.html(accessedAugust22,2017).141AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.142AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.


captainwasstruckwitharock,ahandheldgascanisterwasthrown,andnumerousrocksstruckotherofficers.143Additionally,assoonasCMPDofficersdeployedastingergrenade(rubberpelletsandOCspray)andanotherless-than-lethalmunitions,thelive-streamingandsocialmediapostsrestarted.Someofthelive-streamerscontinuedtoencouragetheirfollowerstoraiseawarenessofthedemonstrationsbysharingtheirvideosandtofurtherspreadthenarrativefromthoseclaimingtohavewitnessedtheincident.144OthersfocusedtheirsmartphonesontheresponsebytheCMPD,questioningwhythedepartmentneededofficersin“riotgear”torespondtoasetofangry,butpeaceful,demonstrators“whoonlywantedanswerstotheirquestions.”145AsthedemonstrationscontinuedintotheearlymorninghoursofSeptember21,2016,sotoodidtheinfluenceofsocialmedia,particularlyunderthehashtags#KeithLamontScottand#CharlotteProtests.146SomeactivistscontinuedtoencouragetheirfollowerstocometothescenetoprovideadditionalnumbersastheyplannedonwalkingontothenearbyInterstateandshuttingitdown,147orsimplyrequestingthatfollowers,“BRINGWATERANDFIRSTAIDKITS”tothedemonstratorsthathadbeenaffectedbychemicalmunitions.148Thehashtagswerealsousedtoorganizegroupsofdemonstratorsinmultiplelocationssimultaneously—atacticthatwasmeanttooverwhelmtheCMPDanditsabilitytorespondeffectivelytomultiplesites.WhenthedemonstrationsmovedtotheEpiCentrethefollowingday,socialmediaagainplayedaninstrumentalroleinacceleratingviolenceandpropertydestruction.Afteranindividualwasshot,activistsimmediatelytooktotheirsocialmediaaccountstoclaimthatCMPDwasresponsiblefortheshooting.149Infact,manycommunitymemberscontinuetobelievethatCMPDwasresponsibleforhisdeath.150151

143AffidavitofMajorMichaelCampagna.Winstonetal.v.CityofCharlotteetal.CaseNo.3:16-ev-729.October24,2016.144MillsShakaZuluGill.September20,2016.https://www.facebook.com/millsthefuture(accessedAugust22,2017).145Assessmentteamfocusgroupwithcommunityactivistsanddemonstrators.June7,2017.146Peralta,Katherine.“SocialmediaplaysgrowingroleinpoliceshootingsliketheoneinCharlotte.”CharlotteObserver.September21,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article103303997.html(accessedAugust22,2017).147MillsShakaZuluGill.September20,2016.https://www.facebook.com/millsthefuture(accessedAugust22,2017).148Peralta,Katherine.“SocialmediaplaysgrowingroleinpoliceshootingsliketheoneinCharlotte.”CharlotteObserver.September21,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article103303997.html(accessedAugust22,2017).149Clasen-Kelly,Fred,MichaelGordon,andMarkWashburn.“Evenafterarrest,manyask:WhokilledJustinCarr?”TheCharlotteObserver.November12,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article114396493.html(accessedAugust23,2017).150Assessmentteamfocusgroupwithcommunityactivistsanddemonstrators.June7,2017.151Accordingtotwoforensicsexperts,arubberbulletdidnotkillJustinCarr.See:Gordon,Michael;FredClasen-Kelly;and,MichaelGordon.“Forensicsexperts:RubberbulletdidnotkillprotesterJustinCarr.”TheCharlotteObserver.November18,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article115654038.html(accessedSeptember17,2017).


PublicinformationandmediaTheCMPDPublicAffairsOfficeisstaffedbytwocivilianmembersandsupportedbytwolieutenants.152ThePublicAffairsDirectorisaformerpoliceofficerandmediareporter,andthePublicAffairsCoordinatorisaformermediareporterwhoalsoservedinothercivilianpositionswithintheCMPD.Together,theOfficeisresponsibleformanagingrelationshipswiththenewsmedia,postingontheCMPD’ssocialmediaaccountsandwebsite,andmanagingrelationshipswiththepublic.Duringthedemonstrations,thePublicAffairsOfficeandtheCMPDcommandstaff,wereunabletoeffectivelyleveragetraditionalandsocialmediatocommunicatewiththepublic,dispelrumorsandcorrectfalsestatements.Theinitialmediaandpublicaffairsstrategywastonotreleaseinformationregardingtheofficerinvolvedshootingortorespondtoquestionsraisedbydemonstratorsatthesceneuntilthefactscouldbedeterminedandappropriatelydisseminated.Thedepartmentdidnotrespondtotheinitialflurryofrumorsrelatedtotheshooting,nordidtheyleveragethemediaasanoutreachtooltoencouragethecommunitytoremaincalm.TheseearlydecisionswerenotsharedbythePublicAffairsOfficewhoarguedforamoreaggressivemediaresponse.153Whilesocialmediawasubiquitousforthedemonstrators,andaffordedthemtheopportunitytofirmlygrasptheattentionandthenarrativeofthenewsmedia,theCMPDwasalmostentirelysilentuntilitwastoolate.AstandardstatementprovidingpreliminaryinformationabouttheincidentandindicatingthatHomicideUnitdetectiveswereconductinganinvestigationintotheofficer-involvedshootingwaspostedonthedepartment’swebsitealmost90minutesaftertheincident,154however,neitherthestatement,norasummaryorlinkofitwassharedonanyofthedepartment’ssocialmediaaccounts.Infact,thedepartmentdidnotleverageitssocialmediaaccountstodiscussanythingrelatedtotheincidentuntilnearlyfivehoursaftertheincidentoccurredandeventhosepostsonlyprovidedinformationaboutofficerinjuriessustainedduringthedemonstration.155TheinitialsilencewasexacerbatedbythefactthatoneofthePublicAffairsOfficeemployeeswasoutofthecountrywhentheofficerinvolvedshootingoccurredandthedemonstrationsbegan,forcingtheremainingpublicinformationofficertooperatebetweenthecommandcenteratCMPDHeadquartersandthescene.Asaresult,thePublicAffairsOfficewasonlyabletorespondtoinformationinthenewsandonsocialmediainsteadofproactivelypushing

152“OfficeoftheChief.”Charlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment.http://charlottenc.gov/CMPD/Organization/Pages/Office-of-the-Chief.aspx(accessedAugust24,2017).153AssessmentteaminterviewwithCMPDPublicAffairsOffice.June6,2017.154CityofCharlotte.“MediaReleasesfortheScottcase.”September20,2016.http://charlottenc.gov/newsroom/releases/Pages/MediaReleases_Scott-case.aspx(accessedAugust24,2017).155Charlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartmentTwitteraccount.September20,2016.https://twitter.com/CMPD/status/778449789134344192?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=http%3A%2F%2Fmashable.com%2F2016%2F09%2F21%2Fcharlotte-police-shooting-social-media%2Fandhttps://twitter.com/CMPD/status/778437983942782976?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cbsnews.com%2Fnews%2Fperson-killed-in-officer-involved-shooting-in-charlotte-north-carolina%2F(accessedAugust24,2017).


informationanddetailstothecommunitytopreventrumorsandinaccurateinformationfromcontrollingthenarrative.

CitywidecommunicationandcollaborationAfundamentalprincipleofcrisisandcivildisturbanceresponseisthataneffectiveresponserequirescommunication,collaboration,andpartnerships.EspeciallyinacivildisturbanceorothercriticalincidentthatmayrequireajointresponsefromtheCity,mutualaidagencies,andtheState,theimportanceofcommunication,collaboration,andpartnershipsisevenmoreimperative.Asexemplifiedbytheinconsistentmessaging,multiplemediastrategies,andstrainedrelationships—highlightedbythemayoropenlydisagreeingwithandchallengingthechief,thecitycouncil,andthegovernor—itwasclearthatlackofcommunication,collaboration,andpartnershipsimpactedtheresponseinCharlotte.BythenightofSeptember21,2016,thepreviouslyout-of-townPublicAffairsOfficeemployeereturned,andajointinformationcenter(JIC)wasestablishedatCMPDHeadquarters.AJICprovidesconsistent,accurate,andunifiedmessagingfromalldisciplines,agencies,andresponders.156TheJICinCharlotteincludedpublicinformationandpublicaffairsofficersfromotherfirstresponderagenciesinthecityandotherrelevantpartnersandstakeholders,butwasstillunabletoeffectivelymanagetheresponsetomediarequests.

156AuroraCentury16TheaterShooting:AfterActionReportfortheCityofAurora,Colorado.April2014.Arlington,VA:TriDataDivision,SystemPlanningCorporation.https://www.policefoundation.org/critical-incident-review-library/aurora-century-16-theater-shooting-after-action-report-for-the-city-of-aurora/(accessedAugust24,2017).

MessagingDuringaCriticalIncidentDuringtheDecember2,2015terroristattackinSanBernardino,California,theSanBernardinoCountySheriff’sDepartment(SBCSD)leveragedsocialmediatoeffectivelycommunicatewiththepublic.TheSBCSDsocialmediaspecialistusedTwittermorethan40timestoinformfollowersaboutdevelopmentsthroughouttheday,includingtheofficer-involvedshootingwiththesuspects.Atthesametime,otherofficersintheSBCSDPublicAffairsUnitwerefocusedonlocalandcablenewsstations,monitoringwhatwasbeingrelayedtothepublic.Theunitalsousedaninteractivescreenwithonlyverifiedinformationthatcouldbereleasedtothemediaandthepublic,whichhelpedensureconsistentmessaging.Thisstrategyalsoeffectivelyreducedthenumberofphoneinquiriesfromthepress,whichhadtheadditionalbenefitofrelievingstafftoattendtootherresponsibilities.Source:Braziel,Rick,FrankStraub,GeorgeWatson,andRodHoops.2016.BringingCalmtoChaos:ACriticalIncidentReviewoftheSanBernardinoPublicSafetyResponsetotheDecember2,2015,TerroristShootingIncidentattheInlandRegionalCenter.CriticalResponseInitiative.Washington,DC:OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices.https://www.policefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/Bringing-Calm-to-Chaos-Final-1.pdf(accessedSeptember13,2017).


However,themayorchosenottosendarepresentativefromherofficetotheJIC,preferringtohandletherequestsfromthenewsmediaandhercity-basedsocialmediaprofilesseparately.Somemembersofthecitycouncilalsochosetoengagethemediaontheirowncreatingmultiplesourcesofinformationandinconsistentmessagingfromthecity.DuringasimilarsituationinMinneapolis,MN,inconsistentmessagingbetweenthechiefofpolice,thecitycouncil,andthemayoralsoimpactedtheabilityofthepolicedepartmenttoeffectivelyandefficientlyresolvetheincident.Thecitycouncilandthemayor,eachactingontheirowngivenauthorityandaccord,involvedthemselvesinnegotiatingwithdemonstrators,andmadepublicstatementswithoutcoordinatingamongelectedofficialsorthepolicedepartment.157InCharlotte,themayoralsomadepublicstatementsthatcriticizedthechief’sdecisionnottoreleasethevideofootagefromtheofficerinvolvedshooting,andcalledonthechieftoreleaseit.Themayorwroteanemailtothechiefsothattherewasapublicrecordofherdisagreement.158Evendaysaftertheincident,themayorcriticizedthechiefwriting,“[t]helackoftransparencyandcommunicationaboutthetimingoftheinvestigationandreleaseofvideofootagewasnotacceptable…”159Themayor’sdecisiontocreatediscrepanciesinthepublicmessagingcontributedtothemediawhirlwindthattheCMPDPublicAffairsOfficehadtoreacttoduringtheincidentresponse.Inanoperationofthismagnitude,itiscrucialthatofficialscollaborate,respecteachother’sareasofauthority,responsibility,andoperationalexpertiseandclearlycommunicateandarticulatethoserolestoavoidunnecessaryconflict.160RecommendationsRecommendation4.1:TheCMPDshouldhaveestablisheditsJointInformationCenter(JIC)earlierandshouldhaveusedittomonitormediabroadcastsandsocialmedia.Socialmediaplayedasignificantroleintheabilityofdemonstratorsto“outmaneuver”theCMPDresponse,

157Straub,Frank,HassanAden,JeffreyBrown,BenGorban,RodneyMonroe,andJenniferZeunik.2017.MaintainingFirstAmendmentRightsandPublicSafetyinNorthMinneapolis:AnAfter-ActionAssessmentofthePoliceResponsetoProtests,Demonstrations,andOccupationoftheMinneapolisPoliceDepartment’sFourthPrecinct.Washington,DC:OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices.https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/maintaining-first-amendment-rights-and-public-safety-in-north-minneapolis/(accessedAugust24,2017).158AssessmentTeaminterviewwithMayorRoberts.April11,2017.159Roberts,Jennifer.“MayorRoberts:LackoftransparencyinKeithScottcasewasunacceptable.”CharlotteObserver.September26,2016.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/opinion/op-ed/article104283806.html(accessedAugust24,2017).160Straub,Frank,HassanAden,JeffreyBrown,BenGorban,RodneyMonroe,andJenniferZeunik.2017.MaintainingFirstAmendmentRightsandPublicSafetyinNorthMinneapolis:AnAfter-ActionAssessmentofthePoliceResponsetoProtests,Demonstrations,andOccupationoftheMinneapolisPoliceDepartment’sFourthPrecinct.Washington,DC:OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices.https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/maintaining-first-amendment-rights-and-public-safety-in-north-minneapolis/(accessedAugust24,2017).


becausetherewasnobodyfromthecityortheCMPDfollowingnewsmediaandsocialmediarelatedtothedemonstrations.HavingaJICwouldhavealleviatedsomeofthesechallenges.

Recommendation4.2:TheCMPDshouldcreateaclearanddetailedmediastrategyorpolicytoguidethedepartment’suseoftraditionalnewsmediaandsocialmedia,particularlyduringcriticalincidents.Recommendation4.3:TheCMPDandCityofficialsshouldcoordinatemessagingandtalkingpointspriortomakingpubliccommentstoensureunityofmessageandfocusontheoverallmissionofsafeandeffectiveresolutionofcriticalincidents.Inconsistent,andattimescontradictory,publiccommentsmadebythemayorandthechiefofpolice,anddisagreementsbetweenthemayorandcitycouncil,themayorandthechief,andthegovernorcreatedcleardivisionsthatwereguidedbypoliticsinsteadofwhatwasbestfortheCityofCharlotteandtheCMPDresponse.

Recommendation4.4:TheCMPDshouldcontinuetoprioritizelocalmediaoutletscoveringcriticalincidentbyprovidingthemadditionalinterviewsandexclusiveinformation.Thisstrategybuildsrelationshipswithlocalmediaoutletsinthecitywhoknowthecitybest,andwhowillcontinuetoprovidecoverageofthecitylongafterthecriticalincidentisover.

Recommendation4.5:TheCMPDshouldenhanceitsuseofsocialmediatoengagecommunitymembersanddemonstratorsbefore,during,andaftermassgatheringsanddemonstrationstodisseminateaccurateinformationandcorrecterroneousinformation.Recommendation4.6:CMPDPublicAffairsUnitaswellastheCityofCharlotteCommunicationsshouldstudycriticalincidentreviewsandincorporatelessonslearnedfromtheseincidentsintotheirpublicinformationstrategies.


Pillar5.TransparencyandAccountability

“Lawenforcementagenciesshouldestablishacultureoftransparencyandaccountabilityinordertobuildpublictrustandlegitimacy.Thiswillhelpensure

decisionmakingisunderstoodandinaccordwithstatedpolicy.”161–Recommendation1.3oftheFinalReportofthePresident’sTaskForceon21stCentury

Duringinterviews,focusgroups,andtownhallmeetingsinCharlotte,manycommunitymembersadvisedthattheydesiredmoretransparencyandaccountabilityfromthepolicedepartment.Communityleadersandactivistsexpressedfrustrationthattheyhadnotreceivedathoroughbriefingregardingtheofficer-involvedshootingofKeithLamontScottorthepoliceresponsetothedemonstrations.Recognizingandrespondingtothecommunity’sconcernstheCMPDhastakenstepstoincreasetransparencyandaccountability.Inthatregard,theCMPDhasimplementedthefollowing:

• TransparencyWorkshops:TheCMPDTransparencyWorkshopsprovideanopportunityformembersofthedepartmenttoengageinopendialoguewithcommunitymembers.Theworkshopsarethree-dayeventsthat,“givecommunitymembersaninsideunderstandingofCMPD’sprocesses,services,andoperations.ThemissionofCMPDTransparencyWorkshopistoworktowardsstrengtheningcommunityrelationships,increasingthecommunityunderstandingofpolicework,aswellasequippingcitizenstoprovideproductiveandmeaningfulinputintohowtheirpolicedepartmentfunctions.”162Areasofworkshopfocusincludestaffinganddeploymentofofficers,crimefightingandcommunityengagementstrategies;arrest,searchanduseofforcelawsandpolicies;andaccountabilityandinvestigationofpolicemisconduct.163

• PublicationofalldepartmentalpoliciesontheCMPDwebsite:TheCMPDproactivelyposteditsfullsetofdirectives,codeofethics,andrulesofconductonitswebsite(http://charlottenc.gov/CMPD/Pages/Resources/DepartmentDirectives.aspx).

161President’sTaskForceon21stCenturyPolicing.2015.FinalReportofthePresident’sTaskForceon21stCenturyPolicing.Washington,DC:OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices.https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf162“CMPDTransparencyWorkshops:YourOpportunitytoMakeaDifference.”Charlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartmentwebsite.2017.http://charlottenc.gov/CMPD/Organization/Pages/OfcoftheChief/TrainingAcademy/Transparencywkshp2017.aspx(accessedSeptember11,2017).163CMPDTransparencyWorkshops:YourOpportunitytoMakeaDifference.”Charlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartmentwebsite.2017.http://charlottenc.gov/CMPD/Organization/Pages/OfcoftheChief/TrainingAcademy/Transparencywkshp2017.aspx(accessedSeptember11,2017).


• InternalAffairsAnnualReports:TheCMPDpublishesannualInternalAffairsReportsthatincludedetaileddataandanalysisoncomplaintsagainstofficers,disciplinaryaction,useofforce,incustodydeathsandvehiclepursuits.Thereportsalsotracktrendsovertheyearstoshowcomparativeanalysistheseareas.(http://charlottenc.gov/CMPD/Organization/Pages/OfcoftheChief/Internal-Affairs.aspx).

• ConstructiveConversationTeams&Training:TheCMPDConstructiveConversationTeamsareteamsofofficersspecificallytrainedtoengage,educateandlistentocommunitymembers,particularlyregardingcontroversialissuesoramidconflict.Trainingfortheofficersincludesscenariobasedtrainingthatrequiresofficerstoshowpracticalapplicationofthelistening,de-escalationandrespondingskillstheylearn.164

Collecting,Analyzing&ReportingPoliceDataNationally,policedepartmentshavebeenworkingtoincreaselevelsoftransparencybybettercollecting,analyzingandpublishingrawpolicedata–releasingittothepubliconitswebsite,throughtheirCity’sdataportalorthroughtheNationalPoliceDataInitiative(PDI).AccordingtotheFinalReportofthePresident’sTaskForceon21stCenturyPolicing:

“Toembraceacultureoftransparency,lawenforcementagenciesshouldmakealldepartmentpoliciesavailableforpublicreviewandregularlypostonthedepartment’swebsiteinformationaboutstops,summonses,arrests,reportedcrime,andotherlawenforcementdataaggregatedbydemographics…Whenseriousincidentsoccur,includingthoseinvolvingallegedpolicemisconduct,agenciesshouldcommunicatewithcitizens andthemediaswiftly,openly,andneutrality,respectingareaswherethelawrequiresconfidentiality.”165

TheCityofCharlotteandCMPDrealizetheimportanceofprovidingaccesstoopendata.ThroughitsCMPDOpenDatapage,theCityofCharlottemakesCMPDdataavailableonofficer-involvedshootings,useofforce,andtrafficstops,aswellasotherdepartmentalstatistics.Additionally,CMPDparticipatesinthePoliceDataInitiative(PDI),providingaccesstotheirdatatobeviewedandanalyzedthroughthenationalPDIportal.

164ConstructiveConversationTeamtraininginformationsheet.ProvidedtoAssessmentTeambycommunitymemberinpersononApril11,2017.ReviewedbyAssessmentTeamApril–September2017.165President’sTaskForceon21stCenturyPolicing.2015.FinalReportofthePresident’sTaskForceon21stCenturyPolicing.Washington,DC:OfficeofCommunityOrientedPolicingServices.https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_finalreport.pdf


OpenDatainPolicingSince2009,thecreationanduseofopendataissteadilygrowing.Severalmajorcityandcountylawenforcementagencies,aswellasothergovernmentagenciesarereleasingsummaryandstatisticaldataincriminaljusticedomains.Citizens,webandmobileappdesigners,andresearcherscanperformanalysisofindividualorcombineddatasets,ifthedataisgeocoded.Therearemultiplebenefitsofopendata:• Communityanalysisofopendatacouldyieldimportantinsightsintopolicing:opendataallows

communitygroups,suchasacademicinstitutionsandbusinessestoyieldnewperspectives.Also,policedatacouldbeanalyzedinnewwaysorcombinedwithotherrelevantdatatoimproveareaslikeofficersafety.

• Opendatacanhelpthecommunityunderstandwhatpolicedoandprovideopportunitiesfortwo-wayengagement:neighborhoodleaders,mediaandcitizenscansharetheirperspectiveswithpoliceagenciesandcreatepartnerships.

• Opendatademonstratestransparencyandcanpromotelegitimacy:providingopendataonthepartoftheagencyshowsitswillingnesstobetransparent,andtheacceptanceofaccountabilitypromoteslegitimacythatultimatelyaffectscommunityengagementandcanreducecrime.

• Publicsafetydataisimportantinaddressingbroadercommunityconcerns:opendataallowsothersystemsorareasofnon-policedatasetstobeleveragedwithpolicingissues–creatingabetterunderstandingoftherelationshipsbetweenthetwoandtoimprovebroadercommunityissueslikehealthcareandeconomicconcerns.

• Openinglawenforcementdatacanhelpidentifynewtoolsandbetterprocessestoimprovepublicsafety:companiesinthescienceandtechnologyfieldcanuseaccesstopoliceshareddatatobetterunderstandtheissuespoliceface.Inturn,models,crimefightingtoolsandtechnologiescanbedevelopedtoenhancetheworkoflawenforcement.

Formoreinformationaboutopendata,visittheopendataplaybookat:http://archive.codeforamerica.org/practices/open/open-data.Source:PoliceFoundation.FiveThingsYouNeedtoKnowAboutOpenDatainPolicing.April2015.https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-open-data-policing/(accessedSeptember11,2017).


AccountabilityTheCMPDunderstandsthatallegationsofpolicemisconductcansignificantlyeroderelationshipswiththecommunity.Toaddresstheseissues,thedepartmentandtheCityhaveputintoplacearobustsystemofbothinternalandexternalaccountabilityforpoliceservices.TheInternalAffairsProcessAccordingtotheCMPDwebsite,“TheCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartmentInternalAffairsBureauwillacttopreservepublictrustandconfidenceinthedepartmentbyconductingthoroughandimpartialinvestigationsofallegedemployeemisconduct,byprovidingproactivemeasurestopreventmisconduct,andbyalwaysmaintainingthehigheststandardsoffairnessandrespecttowardscitizensandemployees.”166Todoso,thefollowingprocessesareinplacetoensurethattheCMPDaddressescomplaints,assignsappropriatedisciplinaryaction,andmonitorsproblematictrendsinpolicepractice.TheCMPDInternalAffairs(IA)Divisionisresponsiblefordocumentinginternalandexternalcomplaints,takingproactivemeasurestopreventmisconduct,investigatingseriousallegationsofmisconduct,reviewinginvestigationsofmisconductconductedbyfieldsupervisors,facilitatingadjudicationofallegations,andpreparingcasesappealedtothecommunityoversightboard.

166“InternalAffairsBureau.”Charlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment.2017.http://charlottenc.gov/CMPD/Organization/Pages/OfcoftheChief/Internal-Affairs.aspx(accessedSeptember14,2017).

PoliceDataInitiative

ThePoliceDataInitiative(PDI)isanationalnetworkdesignedtoenhanceunderstandingofcrimeandpublicsafetyaccountabilitybetweenlawenforcementandthecommunity.Todate,over130lawenforcementagenciesnationwide,largeandsmall,havejoinedthiscommunityofpractice.Throughthisnetwork,agencieslearnfromeachotherandadaptsuccessfulapproachesfromotherjurisdictionstotheirownlocalprioritiesandconditions.Asthefieldofopendatainpolicingisrelativelynew,participatingagenciescantailortheirshareddatatotheircommunity,whileusinginnovativeapproaches-withoutjeopardizingprivacyinterestsofcitizens,andpromotingtrust,legitimacyandtransparency.Lawenforcementagenciesvoluntarilycommittomakingunrestricteddataeasilyavailabletothepublic.Agencieshavecollectivelyreleasedmorethan200setsofdata,representingcrime,citizencallsforservice,arrestsandcitations,policeresponsetoresistance,assaultsonofficers,trafficstops,agencytraining,departmentcharacteristics,communityengagementandmore.Thedataispublishedandmaintainedbythelocalagenciesthemselves,andthePDInationalwebsitemerelyservesasaportaltoviewthechosendata.Alistingofallparticipatingagenciesandtheirdatasetscanbefoundon(http://www.policedatainitiative.org/),highlightingthegreatworkofusingdataforcivicengagement.


CMPDComplaintProcess167

TheCMPDIADivisioninvestigatesallegationsofsignificantconcerntothecommunity.AllegationsofmisconductnottakenoverbyIAareinvestigatedbyasupervisorintheemployee’schainofcommand.Onceaninvestigationiscomplete,dependingontheallegation,thecomplaintiseitherreviewedbytheemployee’schainofcommandorbyanIndependentChainofCommandReviewBoard.ComplaintinvestigationscompletedbyInternalAffairsaremostoftenadjudicatedbyanIndependentChainofCommandReviewBoard.TheseBoardsarecomprisedofsupervisorsandcommandstaffmembersfromthroughouttheDepartment,aswellasarepresentativefromtheCommunityRelationsCommittee.TheChainofCommandBoardmakesoneofthefollowingdeterminationsontheallegation:• Sustained:Theinvestigationdisclosedsufficientevidencetoprovetheallegationmadeinthecomplaint.• NotSustained:Theinvestigationfailedtodisclosesufficientevidencetoproveordisprovetheallegationmadeinthecomplaint.

• Exonerated:Theactsthatprovidedthebasisforthecomplaintorallegationoccurred,buttheinvestigationrevealedthattheywerejustifiedlawfulandproper.

• Unfounded:Theallegationisfalse.168IAwillnotifyallcomplainantsofthefinaldetermination.DisciplinaryactionisassignedbytheChiefofPoliceifanallegationisfoundtobesustained.CommunityOversightinCharlotte

167Moredetailedinformationanddataoncomplaints,investigationanddisciplinaryactioncanbefoundintheCMPDInternalAffairsAnnualReports.http://charlottenc.gov/CMPD/Organization/Documents/OfcoftheChief/InternalAffairs/IA_anlrpt2016.pdf(accessedSeptember17,2017).1682016CMPDInternalAffairsAnnualReport.http://charlottenc.gov/CMPD/Organization/Documents/OfcoftheChief/InternalAffairs/IA_anlrpt2016.pdf(accessedSeptember17,2017).

Source:CMPDwebsite.http://charlottenc.gov/CMPD/Pages/Commendation-Complaint_Process.aspx


AlternativemeasuresareavailabletocitizensofCharlottewhoarenotsatisfiedordisagreewiththedecisionsmadeoractionstakenbytheChiefofPolice-theCommunityRelationsCommittee,theCivilServiceBoard,andtheCitizenReviewBoardareallinplacetoprovidecommunityinputandoversightintoCMPDprocessesandprocedures.CommunityRelationsCommitteeTheCommunityRelationsCommittee(CRC)oftheCityofCharlotte,“actasresidentadvisorswhoprovideprofessionalstaffaninsightfulgatewaytocurrenthumanrelationsissues.ThisuniqueorganizationalstructureallowsCitystafftocaptureabroadcommunityperspectiveanddevelopinformedandappropriatehumanrelationsservices.”169Dividedintosixsubcommittees,theCRCadvisestheCityonabroadrangeofCityfunctions.OneofthosesubcommitteesfocusesonPolice-CommunityRelations.Thissub-committeeservesindependentlyfromtheCMPDandprovidesacommunityvoiceregardingtheDepartment’sdisciplinaryprocess.170MembersoftheCRCserveasvotingmembersoftheChainofCommandBoardwhomakedeterminationsregardingcomplaintsmadeagainstofficers.171Inaddition,membersoftheCharlottecommunitycanfilecomplaintsagainstofficersaswellasappealsthroughtheCRC.TheCRCprovidesastaffmembertoassistcitizenswiththeprocessoffilingacomplaintoranappeal,andprovidethemwithinformationregardingthestatusoftheiractionthroughouttheprocess.172

169“CommunityRelations.”CharlotteWebPage.http://charlottenc.gov/crc/meetthecommittee/Pages/default.aspx.170CMPD2016InternalAffairsAnnualReport.ViewedonSeptember8,2017.http://charlottenc.gov/CMPD/Organization/Documents/OfcoftheChief/InternalAffairs/IA_anlrpt2016.pdf171AssessmentteaminterviewwithCharlotte-MecklenburgCommunityRelationsExecutiveDirector.April13,2017.172AssessmentteaminterviewwithCharlotte-MecklenburgCommunityRelationsExecutiveDirector.April13,2017.


TheCivilServiceBoardTheCivilServiceBoard(CSB)iscomprisedofninemembers–sixappointedbyCityCouncilandthreeappointedbytheMayor.TheCSBapproveshiring,promotions,andrecommendationsforterminationsofpoliceofficersandfirefighters.Additionally,theCSBhearsappealsofdisciplinarydecisionsthatresultinanemployeebeingsuspendedfromduty.AppealsofsuspensionsareheardbythreeCSBmembers.IftheChiefofPolicerecommendsterminationtotheCSB,theCSBmakesthefinaldeterminationafterahearingbeforefiveCSBmembers.



CitizensReviewBoardTheCharlotteCitizensReviewBoard(CRB)iscomprisedof11members–fiveappointedbytheCharlotteCityCouncil,threebytheMayor,andthreebytheCityManager.TheCRBservesasanadvisorybodyfortheChiefofPolice,theCityCouncilandtheCityManager,andhearsappealsfromcitizensoncomplaintsmaderegardingprofiling;arrest,searchandseizure;dischargeoffirearmwithinjury;unbecomingconductanduseofforce.CitizensfiletheappealwiththeCityClerk’sOffice,andthecommunityrelationscommitteewillassistthecitizenwhohasfiledtheappealiftheyarerequestedtodoso.TheCRBmeetswiththerelevantpartiesanddeterminesifenoughevidenceexiststosupportthefactthattheChiefofPolicemadeanerrorinassigningdisciplineinthecase.TheCRBmakesarecommendationtotheCityManagerandtheCityManagermakesthefinaldetermination.RecentchallengestotheauthoritygrantedtotheCharlotteCRBhasbeenthetopicofmuchdiscussion.ManyinthecommunitywouldliketoseetheCRBhavesubpoenapowerthatwouldenablethemtocompelofficersandotherstotestifyinanappeal.173However,NorthCarolina’sDillon’sRulehasprecludedtheCityofCharlottefrombeingabletograntthatauthoritytotheCRBwithouttheexplicitapprovaloftheStateofNorthCarolina.174

173AssessmentteaminterviewwiththeCharlotteCitizenReviewBoardrepresentatives.April12,2017.174AssessmentteaminterviewwiththeCharlotteCitizenReviewBoardrepresentatives.April12,2017.



ChallengestoAccountability-TheImpactofDillon’sRuleWhiletheCMPDhastakenstridestoensureandenhanceinternalandexternalaccountability,thegovernanceofcitiesbytheNorthCarolinastatelegislature—alsoknownas“Dillon’sRule”or“theDillonRule”—andlimitedcapacityforHomeRulehasimpactedtheabilityoftheCMPDandtheCityofCharlottetomakesubstantivechangestotheCitizensReviewBoardandotheraccountabilitymeasures.“Dillon’sRuleallowsastatelegislaturetocontrollocalgovernmentstructure,methodsoffinancing,itsactivities,itsprocedures,andtheauthoritytomakeand

LawEnforcementAccountability:ContemporaryModelsofCivilianOversight

Generally,civilianoversightworksoutsideoftheswornchainofcommandtoprovideamechanismthatallowsforholdingofficersaccountable.IntheUnitedStates,thereareover200oversightentities-eachjurisdictionhavingitsownpolitical,culturalandsocialenvironmentsthatinfluencethedevelopmentoftheentity’sorganizationalstructureandlegalauthority.Thereisnoonesizefitsallapproachandnotwomechanismsoperateinthesamemanner.ThreemaincategoriesofcivilianoversightofpolicehavebeenidentifiedintheDepartmentofJustice’sOfficeofJusticePrograms(OJP)andtheNationalAssociationforCivilianOversightofLawEnforcement(NACOLE):

• Investigation-FocusedModel:operatesseparatefromthelocalpoliceorsheriff’sdepartment.Oversightagenciesofthistypeundertakeindependentinvestigationsofindividualallegationsofmisconductagainstpoliceofficer(s).

• Review-FocusedModel:assessthequalityoffinalizedcomplaintinvestigationsundertakenbythepoliceorsheriff’sdepartment’sinternalaffairsunit.Reviewagenciesaretypicallystaffedbyvolunteerboardsandcommissions,andmaybeinvolvedinhearingappeals,holdingpublicforumsandmakingrecommendationsforfurtherinvestigationofallegations.

• Auditor-MonitorFocusedModel:takesavarietyoforganizationalforms,yetallarecenteredonlargescale,systematicpolicereformofpoliciesandprocedurestoimprovepoliceorganizations.Theymayreviewinternalcomplaintinvestigationprocesses,evaluatepolicepolicies,activelyparticipateinopeninvestigationsandconductwide-scaledanalysesofpatternsofofficercomplaints.

• HybridModel:sharesfunctionsofmultiplemodels.

Mediationisalsoanimportanttool/programforcivilianoversight,andcanalsobeinplacewithinaninternalaffairsunit.Mediationcanmakeasignificantlong-termdifferenceinofficer-citizeninteractions-restoringtrustbysharingperspectivesandunderstandingbothcitizenandofficer’sactions.Formoreinformationoncivilianoversightandaccountabilitypolicing,visittheNationalAssociationforCivilianOversightofLawEnforcementathttp://www.nacole.org/andthePoliceAssessmentResourceCenterathttp://www.parc.info.Source:JosephDeAngelis,RichardRosenthal,andBrianBuchner(2016).CivilianOversightofLawEnforcement:AssessingtheEvidence.OJPDiagnosticCenterandNACOLE.Retrievedfromhttps://www.ojpdiagnosticcenter.org/sites/default/files/custom_content/documents/resource_library/NACOLE_AssessingtheEvidence_Final.pdf


implementpolicy.”175Itisderivedfroman1868IowacourtrulingandwasappliednationwidebasedonU.S.SupremeCourtrulingin1907.176AccordingtotheSupremeCourt,municipalgovernmentsreceivetheirpowersexpresslyfromthestategovernment,andessentiallyexisttoperformthetasksofthestateatthelocallevel.Ontheotherhand,HomeRuleindicatesthatlocalcommunitiescanexerciselegislativeauthoritywithoutstateinterference.StatesthatassertbothDillon’sRuleandHomeRule,generallyleaveanymattersthatarenotaccountedforinstatelegislationorthestateconstitutiontoindividualjurisdictionstoaddress.177Specifically,accordingtoChapter160A-4oftheNorthCarolinaGeneralStatutes,“ItisthepolicyoftheGeneralAssemblythatthecitiesofthisStateshouldhaveadequateauthoritytoexecutethepowers,duties,privileges,andimmunitiesconferreduponthembylaw.”178Inthisinstance,somecommunitymembersarefrustratedthateventhoughCMPDhassupportedgivingsubpoenapowertotheCitizensReviewBoard,theycannotdosowithouttheapprovalofthestatelegislature.UnderDillon’sRule,becausetheCityofCharlottehasnotbeendelegatedtheauthoritytoexercisethepowertomakechangestotheCitizensReviewBoard—andmunicipalitiesandcountiesmayonlyexercisethosepowersthathavebeendelegatedtothembytheGeneralAssembly—thegrantingofsubpoenapowertotheCitizenReviewBoardhasnotoccurred.PromisingModelstoStrengthenAccountability–Tucson,AZCitiesmustdevelopaccountabilityprocessesthatworkbestforthem,inconjunctionwiththecommunitytofurtherco-producepublicsafety.InTucson,AZforexample,thepublichasaccesstwoseparatereviewprocessestoreviewtheworkoftheInternalAffairsSectionoftheTucsonPoliceDepartment.ThefirstisanIndependentPoliceAuditorwhoworksdirectlyfortheCityManagerandhasnoorganizationalconnectiontothepolicedepartment.Thisindividualisthefirststopforacitizenwithacomplaint(theywouldthenforwardthecomplainttotheDepartmentforfollow-up),ortheAuditorcouldserveasaresourceandcomplainttakerifthecitizenfeltthatIAdidnothandletheircomplaintproperly.TheAuditorhastherighttoreviewallIAcomplaintfilesandisprovidedamonthlyreportfromIAconcerningallinitiatedandconcludedcomplaintsreceived.ThesecondalternativemethodavailabletothepublicistheCitizen’sPoliceAdvisoryReviewBoard.TheBoardconsistsofanappointeefromeachCouncilMemberandtheMayor(seven(7)

175NationalLeagueofCities.“CityRightsinanEraofPreemptive:AStatebyStateAnalysis.”DownloadedonSeptember1,2017fromhttp://nlc.org/sites/default/files/2017-03/NLC-SML%20Preemption%20Report%202017-pages.pdf.176Hunterv.CityofPittsburgh.207U.S.161.(U.S.SupremeCourt,1907).https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/207/161/case.html(accessedSeptember17,2017).177Russell,HonorableJonD.andAaronBostrom.Federalism,DillonRuleandHomeRule.January2016.AmericanCityCountyExchange:Arlington,VA.https://www.alec.org/app/uploads/2016/01/2016-ACCE-White-Paper-Dillon-House-Rule-Final.pdf(accessedJune26,2017).178“Chapter160A.CitiesandTowns.”NorthCarolinaGeneralStatutes.http://www.ncleg.net/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/PDF/ByChapter/Chapter_160A.pdf(accessedJune27,2017).


total).TheBoardhasstaffassignedtoitfromthePoliceDepartment,theCityAttorney’sOffice,thePoliceLaborUnit,theCityClerk’sOfficeandtheIndependentAuditor.TheBoarddoesnothavesubpoenapowerorinvestigatorypower,butcanadviseCityleadershipiftheyfeelthepolicearenotconductingafairandimpartialinvestigationandresolutionsofthecomplaintsbroughtforward.Bothentitiesgivemechanismstothepublicthatdonottrustpolicetodoagoodinvestigationoftheircomplaints.Inaddition,thepolicechiefinTucsonemploysastandingChief’sAdvisoryBoardconsistingofmembersofthecommunity-bothbusinessandresidential,laborrepresentatives,anddepartmentmembers.TheroleofthisboardistohavedirectaccesstotheChiefofPoliceonaregularbasistoensurethattheChiefisgettinginformationasunfilteredaspossible,andthecommunityfeelsheardbyadecision-maker.TheChiefinTucsonfoundtheBoardtobesousefulthatheexpandedontheideaandrequiredeachgeographicpatroldivisioncommandertodevelopaDivisionAdvisoryCouncilconsistingofmembersfromtheirpatroldivision.Thisprovedtobeanexcellenttoolforthemtogetinformationfromresidentsandbusinesspeopleoftheirpatroldivisionsonwhatwasoccurringinthedivision,andwhatwerethemostpressingproblemsfacingthedivision.Itprovedausefultooltoredirectresourcesandtoopenfurtherchannelsofcommunicationwiththecommunitywhereofficersheardthatthemostpressingcommunityissueswereoftennottheonesweexpected.Italsoservestoincreasetrustandtransparency.RecommendationsRecommendation5.1:TheCMPDshouldworkwiththecommunitytodevelopandpublicizedirectivesregardingbody-worncamera(BWC),particularlyregardingthereleaseofBWCfootageandofficer-involvedshooting(OIS)investigationstoimprovetransparency.Thisincident,specificallythedebateoverthereleaseoftheBWCfootage,highlightsthedifficultyofhavinganoutsideagencyconductOISinvestigations.Outsideagenciesmaybelessresponsive,becauseoftheirindependence,totheneedsofthelocalcommunityandpolicedepartmentstoreleaseinformation.Recommendation5.2:TheCMPDshouldcontinuetobuildoneffortstoreachoutandengagethecommunitywheretheyare.

Recommendation5.3:TheCMPDshouldconsiderdevelopingandexecutingstandardizedprocess(es)fromwhichtocollectandanalyzeinputfromthecommunityregardingtheirexpectationsandsatisfactionofpoliceservices.Thiscouldincludeconsistentuseofacommunitysurveytocollectcitizenexpectationandsatisfactioninformation.

Recommendation5.4:TheCMPDshouldregularlyanalyzeandpublishcommunitysatisfactiondatacollected.Recommendation5.5:TheCMPDshouldcontinuetoworktomanagetheirmessageandtelltheCMPDstory–boththegoodandthebad.TheCMPDcouldbettermanagetheirmessage


andengageastrategytoeducatethecommunityoneffortsinwaysthatreachallsegmentsofthecommunity.Thisstrategywilllikelybemulti-faceted–engagingtraditionalandsocialmediaandfacetofacedialogue.Recommendation5.6:TheCMPDshouldworktogetherwiththeCityofCharlottetodevelopstrategiesthateducatethecommunityontransparencyandoversightefforts,aswellasotherrelevantstrategiesongoingcity-wide.ThisstrategywillfosterasenseofindependencefromtheCMPDcontroland/orthatapplytotheentirecitywheneducatingthecommunityabouttheComplaintProcess,theCitizenReviewBoard,andDillon’sRule.Recommendation5.7:TheCMPDshoulddevelopaspecificstrategyandpolicytokeepthecommunityapprisedtheireffortsinresponsetosignificant/criticalincidentstodemonstratetransparencyandcommunityengagement,aswellashighlighttheiroutreachandpartnershipefforts.Recommendation5.8:CMPDshouldensurethatalldataprovidedisaccurate,coordinated,easytoaccessandco-located.Thiswillensurethatthereareasfewconflictsaspossiblethatcanleadtoaccusationsofmisinformationanduntruthfulness.A“onestopshop”shouldexistfortheinformationthatthepublicmostoftenrequests,sothattherelessconfusionastowhatthepublicneedstodotogetthatinformation.Whilethereisan“OpenDataSource”tabontheCMPDhomepage,itdirectstoadifferentpagethantheCommunitySafetydataavailableontheOpenCharlottewebsite.Additionally,theCMPDannualreportsarenoteasilyavailableoneitherofthesepages,butcanbefoundontheInternalAffairsBureau,whichrequiresasearchonthewebsite.


Pillar6:Police-CommunityRelationshipsTherelationshipbetweentheCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment(CMPD)andthecommunityhasgenerallybeenapositiveandprogressiveone.CMPDhasastronghistoryofreachingouttothecommunitytofosterandmaintainrelations.ManycommunitymembersspokepositivelyabouttheirinteractionswithCMPDpersonnelpriortotheSeptember20,2016officerinvolvedshootingandthedemonstrationsthatfollowed.Communityandbusinessleadersaswellasresidentscitedprogramssuchas“CoffeewithaCop,”“CopsandBarbers,”and“BlueandBusiness”asexamplesofCMPDleadershipengaginginanddirectingitsofficerstoestablishrelationshipsbetweenthemselvesandthecommunitytheyserve.Duringthe2012,DemocraticNationalConvention(DNC),CMPDcommandstaffwereinthefieldoverthecourseoftheevent,andleveragedtheirpre-existingpersonalrelationshipswithleadersofkeydemonstrationgroupstomitigatepotentialconflicts,includingresolvinganunplannedmarchonanunapprovedroute.179DuringthedemonstrationsHowever,whenspeakingabouttheKeithLamontScottincident,activistsandresidentsexpressedconcernregardingCMPD’sresponsetotheincident,aswellastothedemonstrations.Somedescribedthepresenceofofficersinriotgear,thedeploymentofchemicalmunitions,andtheuseofspecializedvehiclesasexcessive.OtherscriticizedthelackofinformationprovidedbytheCMPDregardingtheofficerinvolvedshooting.Stillothersclaimedthatwhenthemayorinstitutedamidnightcurfew,herdeclarationwasbroadcastonnewsoutletsandtheCitytweetedaboutit,butCMPDofficersassignedtotheEpiCentrefailedtonotifydemonstratorsthatthecurfewhadbeenimposed.Theseandotherissues–createdan“usversusthem”perspectiveintheeyesofsomecommunitymemberswhoparticipatedinthedemonstrationsandrepresentedasignificantdeparturefromtheCMPDtraditionofcommunitypolicing.CMPDcommandstaffmembers,aswellasrankandfileofficersinterviewedbythereviewteamfelt“betrayed”bytheactionstakenbythedemonstrators.CMPDpersonnelfeltthatwithinhoursoftheofficer-involvedshooting,theywereunderattack,withrocks,bottlesandotherobjectsthrownatthemcausingbodilyinjuryanddamagetopolicevehiclesandotherequipment.Thesameofficerswhohadworkedtobuildstrongrelationshipswiththeircommunityfeltthatthedepartmentwasneveraffordedtheopportunitytothoroughlyinvestigatetheincident,toshareinformationwiththecommunity,ortonegotiatewithdemonstratorsbecausethingsspunoutofcontrolsoquickly.

179Command,Control,andCoordination:AQuick-LookAnalysisoftheCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment’sOperationsduringthe2012DemocraticNationalConvention.March2013.UnitedStatesDepartmentofJustice.Washington,DC:BureauofJusticeAssistance.https://www.bja.gov/publications/2012-dnc-quick-look.pdf(accessedAugust29,2017).


Intheend,theofficerinvolvedshootingandthedemonstrationshavecausedboththecommunityandtheCMPDtostopandthinkaboutthestepsthatneedtobeputinplacetorestoretrustandrebuilddamagedrelationships.TheRoleoftheClergyTheroleoftheclergybefore,during,andafterthedemonstrationsreflectthechanginglandscapeofreligiousleadershipinthecommunity.Immediatelybeforethedemonstrationsbegan,someclergymembersintheCharlotteareahostedtrainingsonnon-violentcivildisobediencetechniquesandcommunityorganizingintheirbasements.180ThesetrainingswereintendedtoreminddemonstratorsoftheirConstitutionalrightsandwhattodowhentheywereapproachedbylawenforcement.Manyfaithleadersalsohelpedtoorganizeorderlydemonstrations,andreinforcedtheimportanceofbeingnon-violent.Duringthedemonstrations,someoftheseclergymemberswerealsoonthefrontlinescreatingasafetybufferbetweenthedemonstratorsandtheCMPDofficersandopenlinesofcommunicationwithCMPDexecutives,urgingthemtoprovideanswerstotheirquestionsandengageindiscussionswithgroupsofcommunitymembers.Leadershiptensionsbetweentheolder,establishedclergyandyoungerclergy,weakenedcallsforunityandnon-violence.Infact,oneoftheonlytopicsthattheclergymembersinterviewedbythereviewteamagreedonwasthatconstantcompetitionbetweenfaithleadersexistedformediaattentionduringthedemonstrations.Leadershipconflictsanddivisionsamongfaithleaderscontributedtothelackofunityamongthedemonstrators,andcausedCMPDofficersandcommandstafftoquestiontherelationshipsthattheybelievedtheyhadestablishedwithfaithleaders.Therewasalsoacleardisconnectbetweenthefaithleadersandtheyoungerdemonstrators,withmanyyoungprotestleadersdismissingclergyasbeingout-of-touchwiththeirfeelingsandsentiments.Inadditiontoallthis,bothclergyandyouthleaderssaythattheywereunabletocontrolorinfluencepeoplewhocamefromoutsideoftheCharlottecommunitytoparticipateinthedemonstrations,manyofwhomcametoconfrontthepolice,causechaosanddestruction.SincethedemonstrationsSincethedemonstrations,manycommunityleadersgavemultiplesuggestionstoimprovecommunity-policerelations,including:increasingthebasepayofentry-levelofficerstoattractdiversecandidates;requiringadditionalscreeningduringthehiringprocess;andmandatingproceduraljusticeandimplicitbiastraining.SomecommunitymemberssuggestedthattheCMPDimplementaculturalbiastestforpoliceofficercandidates.

180AssessmentteaminterviewwithCharlottereligiousleaders.June6,2017.


ManycommunitymembersexpressedtheirdesiretohavemoreopportunitiestoinformallyinteractwithmembersoftheCMPDandpointedtofootpatrolsasamuch-neededprogram.Clergygroupshaveheldmeetingswithpoliceleaders,andyouthleadershavecreatedprogramsdesignedtoincreasepositiveinteractionwithyoungpeopleandpoliceofficers.CitybusinessleadershavecreatedtheCharlotte-MecklenburgOpportunityTaskForcetoaddresslatentsocialissues.Citypoliticalleadershavepenneda“lettertothecommunity,”affirmingtheircommitmenttomoveforwardfromthispoint.Theyhaveheldforumsandcommunitydiscussions,includingproactivelycallingforthiscriticalincidentreview.However,thedominantcommunityrequestistohavemoreopportunitiestoengagewithChiefPutney.Inresponse,inJuly2017,CMPDandChiefPutneyaddedtwonewassistantchiefpositionsinanefforttobetterservethecommunityandtoaffordChiefPutneymorefreedomtofocusonpartnershipswiththecommunity.181RecommendationsRecommendation6.1:TheCMPDshouldcontinuetoinvestincommunitypolicingefforts,particularlyindiversecommunities,toincludeacknowledgingthehistoryofracerelationsinthecommunityanddevelopaprocessandprogramstowardsreconciliation.HistoricalandcontemporarytensionsbetweencertaincommunitymembersandgroupsandtheCMPDcontinuetoinformperceptionsofthepolice.Oneprogramsuggestedbycommunitymembersinvolvescopstalkingtosomeoftheelderlyresidentsofcolor,sothatcommunitymemberscansharetheirpastandpresentexperiencesofpolicing.Recommendation6.2:TheCMPDshouldengageinone-on-oneorsmall-groupengagementandrelationship-buildingprogramsinthespecificcommunitiesmostaffectedbyviolenceandnegativeperceptionsofthepolice.Bringingofficersintochurchesintheareastheypolice,expansionofprogramssuchasCopsandBarbers,andpoliceparticipationinneighborhoodcommunityorsportseventswerealsorecommendedasopportunitiesfortheCMPDtoengageindividualandsmallgroupsofcommunitymembers.Morethanoneresidentalsosuggestedreopeningpolicesubstationsinareasseverelyaffectedbyviolencetofacilitatepolice-communityrelations.TheCMPDandCharlotte-MecklenburgSchoolsshouldalsoworktogether

181Charlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartmentFacebookpage.July13,2017.https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1509464969128054&id=124757580932140(accessedAugust30,2017).


tofacilitateopportunitiesforCMPDandyouthtobuildpeer-to-peermediationandprovideadditionalopportunitiesforpolice-youthdialogueduringclasses.

Recommendation6.3:TheCMPDshouldexpanditsfootpatrolpilotprogramtothecommunitiesmostaffectedbyviolenceandnegativeperceptionsofthepolice.InJune2017,theCMPDbeganafootpatrolprogramintwoneighborhoods—PlazaMidwoodandNorthDavidson(NoDa)—thatwerechosenbecausetheyareemergingentertainmentdistrictswithincreasingfoottraffic.182However,communitymembersinotherneighborhoodsinCharlottesuggestedthatthepilotingoffootpatrolsinup-and-comingneighborhoodswasyetanotherindicationthattheyareunimportant.Recommendation6.4:TheCMPDshouldaugmentitsincreasedfocusonbuildingrelationshipsonsocialmediawithincreasedopportunitiestoprovidefeedbackinperson.Recommendation6.5:TheCMPDshouldidentifyandworkcloselywithemergingandtraditionalcommunityleaderstoensureinclusionandrepresentationfromallmembersofthecommunity.Tensionswithinthecommunitycomplicatedthelawenforcementandcityresponsetothedemonstrations.Thesedemonstrationsidentifiedgenerationaldivisionsinthecommunity,andspecificallyfaith-basedleadership,aroundpolicinginCharlotteandhowtoresolvecertainissues.TheCMPDshouldensureitidentifiesmembersofbothgroupstoworkwith,includingparticipatinginfaith-leddiscussionsonpolicingandcommunitiesofcolorthatincludebothsupportersandcriticsoftheCMPD.Recommendation6.6:TheCMPDshouldmorefullyengagecommunitymembersinstrategichiringandpromotions,training,policydevelopmentandotheractivitiestoimprovecommunity-policerelationsandprovidethecommunityavoiceandmeaningfulinvolvementinhowitspolicedepartmentoperates.TheCMPDshouldconsidercreatingaCaptain’sCommunityStakeholderGroupineachofthegeographicdivisions,andanoverallChief'sCommunityStakeholderGrouptofacilitateinformationsharingandproblemsolvingregardingissuesfacingspecificsectorsofthecommunity,andtoaddressbroaderissues.Communitymembersexpressedconcernsaroundrecruitmentandtrainingofofficers,theneedforimplicit-biastraining,andarequestforimplicit-biasscreeningduringrecruitment.Inaddition,severalcommunitymembersrecommendedthataftereveryofficer-involvedshooting,theofficerinvolvedshouldbere-trainedbeforebeingallowedtoresumestreetduties.

182Wester,Jane.“PolicestartfootpatrolsforPlazaMidwood,NoDatonight.”TheCharlotteObserver.May31,2017.http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/crime/article153555589.html(accessedSeptember12,2017).


FootPatrolSuccessStory:Evanston(IL)PoliceDepartment

Afterrepeatedrequestsbythecommunity,theEvanstonPoliceDepartment(EPD)reinstatedfootpatrolinthedepartment’sfifthward,apredominantlyblackneighborhoodtroubledbygangsandviolence.Aspartofthefootpatrolstrategies,officerswerenotgenerallyresponsiblefortakingcallsforservice,butrespondtoin-progresscallsinthearea.Bynotansweringcallsforservice,thefootpatrolofficerswereaffordedmoretimetofocusoncommunicating,engaging,andbuildingrelationshipstoimprovesafetyintheareaandencourageresidentstofeelmorecomfortablewiththepolice.Bydeployingtwoofficersonfoot,tocoveraonesquaremileareafromTuesdaythroughSaturdayintheafternoonandevening,thenumberofpositiveinteractionswiththecommunityincreased.Throughtheirinteractionswiththecommunity,theEPDregularlymetwithcommunitymembersattheirhomes,participatedincommunityevents,routinelyacceptedrequestsfromcommunitymemberstoattendtheirevents,andhosted“coffeewithacop.”Asaresultofthefootpatrolstrategy,officershavedevelopedworkingrelationshipswithreligiousleaders,communitymembers,andvulnerableyouth,andplantoextendtheiroutreachtoat-riskgroups. Source:BrettM.CowellandAnneL.KringenPh.D.(2016).EngagingCommunitiesOneStepataTime:Policing’sTraditionofFootPatrolasanInnovativeCommunityEngagementStrategy.https://www.policefoundation.org/publication/engaging-communities-one-step-at-a-time/(accessedSeptember11,2017).


ConclusionLikemanycommunitiesacrossthenation,Charlottesuffersfromapainfulhistoryofracerelationsandperceivedinjustices,notonlyatthehandsofthepolice,butalsothroughouttheeconomicandsocialconstructofthecity.TheSeptember20,2016shootingofKeithLamontScott,inadditiontotheofficer-involvedshootingspriorandsince,continuetoopenwoundsthathavenotfullyhealed.WhiletheCMPDcannotsolveallofthepastandpresentinjusticesinCharlotte,theycanworkhandinhandwiththecommunitytoeasetensionsandcontinuetosupportasafeandjustCharlotte.Itisourhopethattherecommendationsinthisreportwillprovidetangiblestepsthatthepoliceandthecommunitycantaketogethertocontinuetobuildontheworkthathasalreadybeendone.Theonlywaytoaddresscommunity-policerelationshipsistostrengthenandsustainopen,honest,andcivilconversationandactiononthepartoftheboththepoliceandthecommunitytoworktowardunderstandingandhealinginCharlotte.


AppendixA:RecommendationsRecommendation1.1:TheCMPDshouldidentifyandengageincontinuedopportunitiesandstrategiesthatpromoteeffectivedialoguebetweenthedepartmentandthecommunityaroundraceandpolicing.Recommendation1.2:TheCMPDshouldcontinuetobuildonitstraditionofcommunitypolicingtoidentifyopportunitiesforthecommunitytoparticipateinthedevelopmentofthedepartment’spolicies,proceduresandpractices.Recommendation1.3:TheCMPDshouldcontinuetosupporttheConstructiveConversationProgram,expandingitinternallyandfurtherengagingthecommunity.Recommendation1.4:TheCMPDshouldcontinuetoreviewitsmobilizationplansforpersonnelandresourcestomakethemmoreagileinresponsetocriticalincidents.Recommendation1.5:TheCMPDshouldreviewitsCEUtrainingtoaccountfortheevolvingnatureofdemonstrationsandprotests.Recommendation1.6:TheCMPDshouldinvolvethecommunityinthedevelopmentofrobustcommunicationandcommunityengagementdirectivesandstrategiesforengaginginrespectfulandconstructiveconversationsandde-escalationduringresponsetomassdemonstrations.Recommendation1.7:TheCMPDshoulddevelopandimplementpoliciesandproceduresthatincreasesituationalawarenessinanticipationofandduringdemonstrationsandactsofcivildisobediencewithaspecificemphasisonsocialmedia.Recommendation1.8:TheCMPDshoulddeveloppoliciesandproceduresthatusesocialmediato“push”informationtothecommunityandquicklydisseminateaccurateinformationinresponsetorumorsandfalseaccusations.Recommendation2.1:TheCMPDshouldconductathoroughreviewofitsacademycoursesandhours,anditsadditionstotherequiredBLETcourses,toemphasizeempatheticdialogueandnon-confrontationalconversationswithcommunitymembers.

Recommendation2.2:TheCMPDshouldcontinueengagingcommunitymembersinthetrainingprocess.Recommendation2.3:CurriculatotrainallCMPDpersonneloncrowdmanagementstrategiesandtacticsshouldbedevelopedfromcurrentbestpractices,policyrecommendations,andlessonslearnedfromafter-actionreviewsofsimilarevents.


Recommendation3.1:TheCMPDshouldcontinuethepracticeofdeployingbicycleofficersduringdemonstrationsandmassgatherings.Recommendation3.2:Conductaregionalinventoryofassets,orcreatearegionalCouncilofGovernments(COG),toassistincidentcommandersinidentifyingpotentialresourcesattheirdisposalthatmayassistthemintheirefforts.Recommendation3.3:TheCMPDshouldestablishacommitteethatincludestheCountyAttorney,theCountyProsecutor,andthecommunitytocollaborativelycreateaprotocolfordeterminingtheappropriateprocessforreleasingBWCfootageincriticalincidents.Recommendation3.4:TheCMPDshouldequipofficerswithbodyworncameras,especiallyofficersassignedtoitsCivilEmergencyUnit(CEU).Recommendation4.1:TheCMPDshouldhaveestablisheditsJointInformationCenter(JIC)earlierandshouldhaveusedittomonitormediabroadcastsandsocialmedia.

Recommendation4.2:TheCMPDshouldcreateaclearanddetailedmediastrategyorpolicytoguidethedepartment’suseoftraditionalnewsmediaandsocialmedia,particularlyduringcriticalincidents.Recommendation4.3:TheCMPDandCityofficialsshouldcoordinatemessagingandtalkingpointspriortomakingpubliccommentstoensureunityofmessageandfocusontheoverallmissionofsafeandeffectiveresolutionofcriticalincidents.

Recommendation4.4:TheCMPDshouldcontinuetoprioritizelocalmediaoutletscoveringcriticalincidentbyprovidingthemadditionalinterviewsandexclusiveinformation.

Recommendation4.5:TheCMPDshouldenhanceitsuseofsocialmediatoengagecommunitymembersanddemonstratorsbefore,during,andaftermassgatheringsanddemonstrationstodisseminateaccurateinformationandcorrecterroneousinformation.Recommendation4.6:CMPDPublicAffairsUnitaswellastheCityofCharlotteCommunicationsshouldstudycriticalincidentreviewsandincorporatelessonslearnedfromtheseincidentsintotheirpublicinformationstrategies.Recommendation5.1:TheCMPDshouldworkwiththecommunitytodevelopandpublicizedirectivesregardingbody-worncamera(BWC),particularlyregardingthereleaseofBWCfootageandofficer-involvedshooting(OIS)investigationstoimprovetransparency.Recommendation5.2:TheCMPDshouldcontinuetobuildoneffortstoreachoutandengagethecommunitywheretheyare.


Recommendation5.3:TheCMPDshouldconsiderdevelopingandexecutingstandardizedprocess(es)fromwhichtocollectandanalyzeinputfromthecommunityregardingtheirexpectationsandsatisfactionofpoliceservices.

Recommendation5.4:TheCMPDshouldregularlyanalyzeandpublishcommunitysatisfactiondatacollected.Recommendation5.5:TheCMPDshouldcontinuetoworktomanagetheirmessageandtelltheCMPDstory–boththegoodandthebad.Recommendation5.6:TheCMPDshouldworktogetherwiththeCityofCharlottetodevelopstrategiesthateducatethecommunityontransparencyandoversightefforts,aswellasotherrelevantstrategiesongoingcity-wide.Recommendation5.7:TheCMPDshoulddevelopaspecificstrategyandpolicytokeepthecommunityapprisedtheireffortsinresponsetosignificant/criticalincidentstodemonstratetransparencyandcommunityengagement,aswellashighlighttheiroutreachandpartnershipefforts.Recommendation5.8:CMPDshouldensurethatalldataprovidedisaccurate,coordinated,easytoaccessandco-located.Recommendation6.1:TheCMPDshouldcontinuetoinvestincommunitypolicingefforts,particularlyindiversecommunities,toincludeacknowledgingthehistoryofracerelationsinthecommunityanddevelopaprocessandprogramstowardsreconciliation.Recommendation6.2:TheCMPDshouldengageinone-on-oneorsmall-groupengagementandrelationship-buildingprogramsinthespecificcommunitiesmostaffectedbyviolenceandnegativeperceptionsofthepolice.

Recommendation6.3:TheCMPDshouldexpanditsfootpatrolpilotprogramtothecommunitiesmostaffectedbyviolenceandnegativeperceptionsofthepolice.Recommendation6.4:TheCMPDshouldaugmentitsincreasedfocusonbuildingrelationshipsonsocialmediawithincreasedopportunitiestoprovidefeedbackinperson.Recommendation6.5:TheCMPDshouldidentifyandworkcloselywithemergingandtraditionalcommunityleaderstoensureinclusionandrepresentationfromallmembersofthecommunity.Recommendation6.6:TheCMPDshouldmorefullyengagecommunitymembersinstrategichiringandpromotions,training,policydevelopmentandotheractivitiestoimprovecommunity-policerelationsandprovidethecommunityavoiceandmeaningfulinvolvementinhowitspolicedepartmentoperates.


AppendixB:CharlotteandCMPDBackgroundandGovernanceTheCityofCharlotteTheCityofCharlotte,NorthCarolina,ishometoapproximately842,051people,andistheseatofMecklenburgCounty,whichhasapopulationofapproximately1,054,835people.183CharlotteisthelargestcityinNorthCarolinaandoneofthe25largestcitiesintheUnitedStates;consistentlyranksasoneofthefastestgrowingcitiesforbusinessesandcareers;and,isoneofthetop10citiesfornewlywedstoliveandworkandtop10citiesforinformationtechnologyjobs.CharlotteisalsohometoanumberofFortune1000companies—includingBankofAmericaandLowe's—andishometomultipleprofessionalsportsteamsandvenues—includingtheCarolinaPanthers,theCharlotteHornets,theNASCARHallofFame,andtheU.S.NationalWhitewaterCenter.184Thesejobopportunities,attractions,andthesixcollegesanduniversitiesareresponsibleforbringingapproximately26.8millionvisitorsannuallytotheCharlotteregion.185TheCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment“TheCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartmentwillbuildproblem-solvingpartnershipswithourcitizenstopreventthenextcrimeandenhancethequalityoflifethroughoutourcommunity,alwaystreating

peoplewithfairnessandrespect.”186

TheCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment(CMPD)wasofficiallyformedin1993,whentheCharlottePoliceDepartmentandtheMecklenburgCountyPoliceDepartmentmerged,butthehistoryofpolicinginthecitydatesbackmorethan140years.CMPDcurrentlyemploysapproximately1,900swornofficersand514civilianemployees,andissupplementedbynearly500volunteers,makingitoneofthelargeststateandlocallawenforcementagenciesbynumberoffull-timeswornpersonnelandthelargestmetropolitanpolicedepartmentbetweenAtlantaandWashingtonD.C.187CMPDisledbythechiefofpolice,twoassistantchiefs,andfivedeputychiefs,whooverseefourservicegroups—AdministrativeServices,FieldServices,

183“QuickFacts:Charlottecity,NorthCarolina;MecklenburgCounty,NorthCarolina.”U.S.CensusBureau.https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/charlottecitynorthcarolina,mecklenburgcountynorthcarolina/RHI125216(accessedJuly12,2017).184“AboutCharlotte–theQueenCity.”CityofCharlotte.http://charlottenc.gov/AboutCharlotte/Pages/AboutTheQueenCity.aspx(accessedJuly12,2017).185CharlotteRegionalVisitorsAuthority.Charlotte:TheVisitorEconomy.January2017.http://www.crva.com/sites/default/master/files/FactSheet-January2017.pdf(accessedJuly13,2017).186InternalAffairsBureau.2016InternalAffairsAnnualReport.Charlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment.June2017.http://www.charlottenc.gov/CMPD/Organization/Documents/OfcoftheChief/InternalAffairs/IA_anlrpt2016.pdf(accessedJune29,2017).187Reaves,BrianA.CensusofStateandLocalLawEnforcementAgencies,2008.July2011.U.S.DepartmentofJustice,BureauofJusticeStatistics:Washington,DC.https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf(accessedJune27,2017).


InvestigativeServices,andSupportServices.188TheFieldServicesGroupisseparatedintoFieldServicesNorthandFieldServicesSouth—eachledbyadeputychief—andfurtherdividedinto13geographically-arrangedpatroldivisions(depictedinFigure1).189Figure1:CMPDPatrolDivisions

GovernanceStructureofCMPDandtheCityofCharlotteThegovernancestructures—ofthepolicedepartmentbycityofficialsandofcityofficialsbystategovernment—factoredintotheresponsetotheSeptember2016demonstrations.AttheCitylevel,accordingtoSection4.01ofthecitycharter,“TheCityshalloperateundertheCouncil-Managerformofgovernment,”whichdividesrolesandresponsibilitiesbetweenelectedofficials—acitycouncilof11membersandamayor—andanappointedcitymanager(depictedinFigure2).190AccordingtoSection2.03ofthecitycharter,theCityCouncilmustbe

188“OurOrganization.”http://charlottenc.gov/CMPD/Organization/Pages/default.aspx(accessedAugust5,2017).189“OurResponseAreas.”http://charlottenc.gov/CMPD/ResponseAreas/Pages/default.aspx(accessedJune27,2017).190“Sec.4.01–Formofgovernment.”MunicipalCodeCorporationandtheCityofCharlotte,NorthCarolina.2003.


comprisedof11electedmembers—sevenaccordingtogeographicaldistrictsandfourat-large.191TheCityCouncil,“shallappointtheCityManager,CityClerk,andCityAttorney;”192“establishbyappropriateordinancesasystemofpersonneladministration…governingtheappointment,promotion,transfer,layoff,removal,discipline,andwelfareofCityemployees;”193“createandestablish,byordinanceorresolution,suchotherauthorities,boards,andcommissionsasitmaydeemnecessaryorappropriatetotheadministration,regulation,andoperationofservices,activities,andfunctionswhichthecityisauthorizedbylawtoperform,regulate,andcarryon;”194and,also“setpolicy,approvethefinancingofallCityoperationsandenactordinances,resolutionsandorders.”195RelativetoCMPD,accordingtoSection16.27,“Thepersonnelofthepolicedepartmentshallconsistofachiefofpoliceandsuchotherofficersandemployeesasmaybeauthorizedfromtimetotimebythecouncil.”196AlongwiththeCityCouncil,theMayorofCharlotteisanelectedpositionwithstatutoryrolesandresponsibilities.AccordingtoSection3.23,“ExceptforCouncilappointmentstocommittees,boards,andcommissions;itsemploymentoftheCityManager,theCityAttorneyandtheCityClerk;itsinternalaffairsandmatterswhichmustbeapprovedbythevoters,theMayormayvetoanyactionadoptedbytheCouncil,”“shallhaveavoteinconsiderationofamendmentstozoningordinances”undercertaincircumstances,and,“shallhaveavoteintheconsiderationoftheemploymentordismissaloftheCityManager,theCityAttorneyandtheCityClerk.”197Additionally,asmentionedinSection3.24,“TheMayorshallbeexofficiomemberofallboardsorcommissionselectedorappointedbytheCouncilortheMayor,andhe

https://library.municode.com/nc/charlotte/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTICH_CH4AD(accessedJune26,2017).191“Sec.2.03–ElectionofCouncilmembers.”MunicipalCodeCorporationandtheCityofCharlotte,NorthCarolina.2003.https://library.municode.com/nc/charlotte/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTICH_CH2EL_S2.03ELCOME(accessedJuly12,2017).192“Sec.4.02–AppointmentsbyCouncil.”MunicipalCodeCorporationandtheCityofCharlotte,NorthCarolina.2003.https://library.municode.com/nc/charlotte/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTICH_CH4AD(accessedJune26,2017).193“Sec.4.05–Personneladministrationstandards.”MunicipalCodeCorporationandtheCityofCharlotte,NorthCarolina.2003.https://library.municode.com/nc/charlotte/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTICH_CH4AD(accessedJune26,2017).194“Sec.5.01–PowersofMayorandCouncil.”MunicipalCodeCorporationandtheCityofCharlotte,NorthCarolina.2003.https://library.municode.com/nc/charlotte/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTICH_CH5AUBOCO(accessedJuly12,2017).195“AboutCharlotteCityGovernment.”CityofCharlotte.http://charlottenc.gov/government-site/Pages/AboutUs.aspx(accessedJune26,2017).196“Sec.16.27–Composition.”MunicipalCodeCorporationandtheCityofCharlotte,NorthCarolina.2003.https://library.municode.com/nc/charlotte/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICOOR_CH16PO(accessedJuly12,2017).197“Sec.3.23–Quorum;procedure;voting.”MunicipalCodeCorporationandtheCityofCharlotte,NorthCarolina.2003.https://library.municode.com/nc/charlotte/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTICH_CH4AD(accessedJune26,2017).


shallserveuponthesameinanadvisorycapacityonlyandshallnothaveavote,”198TheMayoralsorepresents,“theCityinanofficialcapacityatthestatecapitalinRaleigh,inWashingtonandinternationally,”and,“innationalorganizationsthatworkonissuesthatareimportanttobothCharlotteandthenation.”199Finally,thecitymanageradministersthepoliciesanddecisionsmadebycitycouncilandoverseestheday-to-dayoperationsoftheCitygovernment.200RelativetoCMPD,accordingtoSection16.26thechiefofpoliceoftheCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartmentissubjecttothegeneralsupervisionofthecitymanager.201

Figure2:CityofCharlotteGovernanceStructure202

198“Sec.3.24–Powersanddutiesofmayor.”MunicipalCodeCorporationandtheCityofCharlotte,NorthCarolina.2003.https://library.municode.com/nc/charlotte/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTICH_CH4AD(accessedJune26,2017).199“CityCouncilFAQs.”http://charlottenc.gov/CityCouncil/Pages/FAQs.aspx(accessedJune27,2017).200“AboutCharlotteCityGovernment.”CityofCharlotte.http://charlottenc.gov/government-site/Pages/AboutUs.aspx(accessedJune26,2017).201Sec.16.26–Controlandsupervision.”MunicipalCodeCorporationandtheCityofCharlotte,NorthCarolina.2003.https://library.municode.com/nc/charlotte/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=PTIICOOR_CH16PO(accessedJuly12,2017).202CityofCharlotte:CityManager.http://www.ralphandersen.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Brochure-Charlotte-City-Manager.pdf(accessedJune27,2017).


AppendixC:MethodologyAttherequestoftheCityofCharlotte,andthechiefoftheCharlotte-MecklenburgPoliceDepartment(CMPD),andtheCharlottecommunity,thePoliceFoundationcreatedanassessmentteamtoconductacriticalincidentreviewandprovidetechnicalassistancetosupportimplementationofrecommendationandtofurtherstrengthenrelationshipsinCharlotte.Theassessmentteam,comprisingsubjectmatterexpertsinlawenforcement,police-communityrelations,andpublicsafety,203developedacomprehensivemethodologytothoroughlyreviewandassessthepublicsafetyresponsetothedemonstrationsthatfollowedtheofficer-involvedshootingthatbeganonSeptember20,2016.Theassessmentapproachinvolvedthreemeansofinformationgatheringandcollection:(1)on-sitedatacollection,(2)resourcematerialreview,and(3)off-sitedatacollectionandresearch.Eachmethodisdescribedinmoredetailbelow.On-SiteDataCollection

Theassessmentteamconductedtwositevisitsin2017:April11-13andJune5-9.Duringthesesitevisits,theassessmentteamconductedsemi-structuredindividualinterviewsandmeetingswithcitygovernmentofficials;CMPDcommandstaffandofficers;and,communityleadersandmembers.Morethan100individualswereinterviewedduringthesesitevisits,includingthefollowing:

§ CityofCharlotteMayor§ CityCouncilmembers§ CMPDChiefofPoliceandcommandstaff§ CMPDCivilEmergencyUnitmembers§ CMPDPublicInformationOfficers§ CMPDofficers§ CharlotteOfficeofEmergencyManagementexecutive§ Charlottereligiousandcommunityleaders§ Charlottecommunitymembers§ Charlottebusinessleaders

Duringthefirstsitevisit,theassessmentteamalsohostedaCommunityStakeholderListeningSession,whichprovidedcommunitymemberstheopportunitytogiveinputonpolice-communityrelationships.

203AssessmentTeambioscanbefoundinAppendixDofthisreport.


TheassessmentteamalsovisitedOldConcordRoadandtheVillageatCollegeDownstogainperspectiveofthelocales,distances/proximities,andchallengesrelatedtocrowdcontrolandrespondingofficersestablishingon-sceneincidentcommand.ResourceReview

TheassessmentteamcollectedandreviewedrelevantCMPDpolicies,procedures,trainingcurricula,after-actionreports,data,andotherdocumentsprovidedbyCMPD.Eachresourcewasreviewedtobetterunderstandthedepartment’sresponsetothemassdemonstrationsituationsthatoccurredinthedaysthatfollowed.Materialsreviewedincludedthefollowing:

§ CMPDDirectives§ CMPDstandardoperatingproceduresandEmergencyOperationsPlans§ Trainingcurricula,outlines,andworkshopmaterials§ CMPDsocialmediacontent§ IACMSUseofForceSynopses§ IACMSOfficerInjurySynopses§ TheCharlotte-MecklenburgOpportunityTaskForceReport§ CharlotteCityCouncilLettertotheCommunity§ ListofcommunitydemandsprovidedtoCMPD

Theteamalsoreviewedhoursofnewsmediaandsocialmediafootagefromthedemonstrations,readopensourcemediaarticles,andreviewedsocialmediacontentregardingtheincident.Off-SiteDataCollection

InadditiontotheinformationcollectedfromCharlotte,andtogroundtheassessmentinnationalstandards,modelpolicies,andbestpractices,theassessmentteamresearchedandreviewedscholarshiponmassdemonstrations,withanemphasisonde-escalationprocedures.Theyalsoreviewedandanalyzedrelevantcriticalincidentreviewsandafteractionreportsfromnationalandinternationalincidents.Otherareas,suchtheNationalIncidentManagementSystem(NIMS),IncidentCommandSystem(ICS),andotherrelevanttopicspublishedbyresearchersfromacademiaandfromorganizationsincludingthefollowing:

§ U.SDepartmentofHomelandSecurity§ U.S.DepartmentofJustice§ FederalEmergencyManagementAgency§ InternationalAssociationofChiefsofPolice§ PoliceExecutiveResearchForum§ PoliceFoundation


Analysis

Theassessmentteamusedthetotalityoftheinformationcollectedtoconductagapanalysis,whichfocusedonidentifyingkeyareastodevelopasetofrecommendationsforthecityofCharlotte,CMPDandthecommunity.Therecommendationsprovidedinthisreportarealsoapplicabletolawenforcementagenciesandcommunitiesacrossthenationfacedwithrespondingtosimilarincidents.Itshouldalsobenotedthattherecommendationsinthisdocumentnotonlyrelatetolawenforcement,butalsohaveimplicationsforelectedofficials,communitymembers,andotherstakeholderswhoplayedaroleinthecriticalincidentanddemonstrationsinCharlotte.


AppendixD:AbouttheAuthorsChiefFrankStraub(Ret.),PhD.,DirectorofStrategicPrograms,providedon-siteprojectmanagement,coordinatingtheworkofsubjectmatterexpertsandprovidinglawenforcementguidanceandexpertisetotheproject.Hemanagedthedocumentreviewprocessandworkedtoensurethatallon-andoff-sitedecisionsandactivitiesmetprojectgoals.A30-yearveteranoflawenforcement,Dr.StraubcurrentlyservesastheDirectorofStrategicStudiesforthePoliceFoundation.HelastservedasthechiefoftheSpokane(Washington)PoliceDepartment,wherehereceivednationalrecognitionforthemajorreformsandcommunitypolicingprogramsheimplementedandsignificantcrimereductionsachievedduringhistenure.Dr.StraubalsoservedasdirectorofpublicsafetyfortheCityofIndianapolis,Indiana,duringwhichtimetheIndianapolisMetropolitanPoliceDepartmentreducedhomicidestothelowestlevelin20years.Dr.StraubhasalsoservedasthepublicsafetycommissionerfortheCityofWhitePlains,NewYork,wherehisdepartmentreducedseriouscrimeby40percent.Heestablishedthefirstpolice-communitymentalhealthresponseteaminWestchesterCountytoproactivelyassistpersonschallengedbymentalillness,homelessness,anddomesticviolence.Dr.StraubpreviouslyservedasthedeputycommissioneroftrainingfortheNewYorkCityPoliceDepartmentandasafederalagent.HeholdsaBAinPsychologyfromSt.John’sUniversity,andMAinForensicPsychologyfromJohnJayCollegeofCriminalJustice,andaPhDinCriminalJusticefromtheCityUniversityofNewYork’sGraduateCenter.Heco-authoredabookonperformance-basedpolicemanagementandhaspublishedseveralarticlesregardingcommunitypolicing,policereform,andjailmanagement.ChiefRobertoVillaseñor(Ret.),providedon-andoff-siteexpertiseonlawenforcementtraining,policiesandprocedures,particularlycommunity-policerelations.Healsoservedasawritertothefinalreport.ChiefVillaseñorservedwiththeTucsonPoliceDepartmentforover35years,andservedfromMay2009untilhisretirementinDecember2015astheChiefoftheDepartment.HeservedineverydivisionandbureauoftheDepartment,toincludePatrol,Investigations,InternalAffairs,BikePatrol,PIO,HostageNegotiations,CommunityPolicing,AdministrationandCommunications.AsanAssistantChieffornineyears,hecommandedallfourbureaus,andservedastheUnionLiaisoninvolvedindisciplinegrievancesandlabornegotiations.Hiscareerhistoryandassignmentshavegivenhimathoroughunderstandingofallfacetsofpolicingandpolicemanagement.ChiefVillaseñorservedonseveralstateandnationalboardsandcommittees,toincludetheArizonaHIDTA(Chairman),TheArizonaAssociationofChiefsofPolice(President),thePoliceExecutiveResearchForum(PERF)ExecutiveBoard,theFBICJIS/UCRWorkingGroup,andtheCustomsandBorderProtection(CBP)EthicsandIntegrityAdvisoryPanel.In2014VillaseñorwasappointedbyPresidentObamatothePresident’sNationalTaskForceon21stCenturyPolicing,andin2015wasappointedbyArizonaGovernorDougDuceytotheArizonaCriminalJusticeCouncil.HeholdsaB.S.degreefromParkUniversityandaM.Ed.fromNorthernArizonaUniversity.HeattendedthePERFSeniorManagementInstituteforPolice(SMIP),UniversityofCaliforniaatLongBeachLeadershipDevelopmentSeries,theFBINationalAcademy,andtheFBINationalExecutivesInstitute(NEI).Throughouthiscareer,inadditiontonumerousCommendationsandLettersof


Appreciation,hereceivedtheDepartment’sMedalofDistinguishedService,threeMedalsofMerit,andwasOfficeroftheYearfor1996.In2015TheTucsonBranchoftheNAACPpresentedhimanawardfor“PursuingLibertyintheFaceofInjustice”,andtheTucsonHispanicChambernamedhimasthe2015ArizonaPublicServantoftheYear.

ReverendJeffreyBrown,providedinputandexpertiseon-andoff-siteincommunityengagement.Hecoordinatedcommunityinput,facilitatedlisteningsessions,andservedasacontributortothefinalreport.Rev.Brownisanationallyrecognizedleaderandexpertincoalition-building,gangs,youth,andurbanviolencereduction.Hehasover20yearsofexperienceofgangmediationandinterventionanddevelopingdialoguesinpolice/communityrelationsintheUnitedStatesandaroundtheworld.Hehasdevelopedexpertiseinhelpingfaith-basedorganizationsandlawenforcement,amongotherkeystakeholders,increasetheircapacityforsolvinggangviolenceinthecommunity.Hisworkbuildsontheideathatwhilecommunitypolicingisaneffectivepolicingtool,inmanyurbanareas,therelationsbetweentheurban,oftenminoritycommunityandlawenforcementispoor,whichinhibitseffectivepolicingandpreventsthecommunityfromgettingthequalityoflifeitdeserves.Rev.Brown’sexperiencehasledtohissuccessfulworknationallyincitieslikeBoston,Massachusetts;Camden,NewJersey;andSalinas,Californiatohelpbuildastrongcommunitycomponentintoanypublicsafetycrimereductionstrategy.Rev.BrownisthefounderofRECAP(RebuildingEveryCommunityAroundPeace),anewnationalorganizationorganizedtoassistcitiesbuildbetterpartnershipsbetweencommunity,government,andlawenforcementagenciestoreducegangviolence.Heisalsooneoftheco-foundersoftheBostonTenPointCoalition,afaith-basedgroupthatwasanintegralpartofthe“BostonMiracle”—aprocesswherethecityexperienceda79percentdeclineinviolentcrimeinthe90s—andspawnedcountlessurbancollaborativeeffortsinsubsequentyearsthatfollowedtheBostonCeasefiremodel.Rev.BrownconsultswithmunicipalitiesandpolicedepartmentsonissuesaroundyouthviolenceandcommunitymobilizationandhasprovidedexpertisetoFortune25corporationsandtheWorldBankforthepast14yearsonCollaborativeLeadershipandManagingChange.InOctoberof2014,Rev.BrowntraveledtoFerguson,MissouritobeapartofanationalclergygrouptosupporttheeffortsofHandsUpUnitedandtoparticipateinandserveasabufferbetweenresidentsandthepoliceduringprotests,aswellastoassistinmovingforward.JenniferZeunik,DirectorofPrograms,providedoverallprojectstructureandoversight.Sheworkedwithprojectstaffindrivingtowardgoalsanddeliverablesandcoordinatedactivityofon-andoff-siteassessmentteammembersandprojectstaff.Shealsoservedasawriter,editorandqualitycontrolmanageronthefinalreport,ensuringreportcohesionandclarity.Ms.Zeunikhas20yearsofpublicsectorandnonprofitprojectmanagementexperience,workingcloselywithalllevelsofgovernment.Inhercareer,Ms.Zeunikhasprovidedstrategicmanagementexpertisetointernational,federal,state,andlocalcriminaljusticeclientsfocusedonjusticepolicyresearch,businessdevelopmentactivities,programmanagement,strategicplanning,trainingandtechnicalassistancemanagement,anddevelopmentofstrategiccommunications.Sheservedasaleadwriteronnumerouspublishedreportsthroughouthercareer,includingtheIACPNationalPolicySummitonCommunity-PoliceRelations:AdvancingaCultureofCohesionandTrustReport,aswellastheCOPSOffice–fundedPoliceFoundation


CollaborativeReformInitiative:AnAssessmentoftheSt.LouisCountyPoliceDepartmentandtheSanBernardinoTerroristShootingcriticalincidentreport,BringingCalmtoChaos.

BenGorban,PolicyAnalyst,providedon-andoff-siteinputforprojectsupportaswellasdocumentwriting,review,andediting.Mr.GorbanisaPolicyAnalystwithovereightyearsofexperiencesupportinglaw-enforcementrelatedprojects,includingtheprovisionoftechnicalassistanceandpolicyanalysissupportonprojectsrelatedtocounteringviolentextremism,communitypolicing,andtheroleofsocialmediainlawenforcement.Mr.Gorban’sareasofexpertiseincluderesearch,resourcedevelopment,andinformationdissemination.HereceivedhisM.S.inJustice,LawandSocietyfromAmericanUniversityin2011andreceivedhisBAinbothPhilosophyandJustice,LawandSocietyfromAmericanUniversityin2009.

DeputyChiefEddieReyes(Ret.),Sr.LawEnforcementProjectManager,ChiefReyesprovidedon-andoff-siteprojectinputduringsitevisits,datacollectionandinformationinterpretation.HealsoreviewedandanalyzedpolicyandotherrelevantmaterialsandservedasacontributortotheAdvancingCharlottefinalreport.ChiefReyeshasextensiveexperienceincommunitypolicingandworkingwithdiversegroupsinthecommunity.HecommandedfieldoperationsandcriminalinvestigationsforAmtrakPolice,andhas25yearsofservicewithAlexandriaPoliceDepartment,whereherosetoDeputyChief.HewasalsoappointedtotheVirginiaLatinoAdvisoryBoardandtheCommissiononImmigration.Healsohasextensiveexperienceincommunicationsandinteroperability.HeholdsaBachelor’sdegreeinCriminalJusticefromNewMexicoStateUniversity.ChiefReyesearnedaGraduateCertificateinPublicAdministrationwithaconcentrationinAdministrationofJusticeatGeorgeMasonUniversityinFairfax,VA.

PoliceFoundationProjectStaff204BlakeNorton,VicePresidentandChiefOperatingOfficer,providedhigh-levelstrategyandcoordinationandservedastheprimaryliaisontotheCityofCharlottethroughouttheproject.

SiobhanScott,ProjectAssociate,providedon-andoff-siteprojectandtechnicalsupport.

JoyceIwashita,ProjectAssistant,providedoff-siteprojectsupport.

204Projectstaffbioscanbefoundathttps://www.policefoundation.org/


AppendixE:AboutthePoliceFoundationThePoliceFoundationisanationalnonmember,nonpartisan,nonprofitorganizationthathasbeenprovidingtechnicalassistanceandconductinginnovativeresearchonpolicingfornearly45years.TheprofessionalstaffatthePoliceFoundationworkcloselywithlawenforcement,communitymembers,judges,prosecutors,defenseattorneys,andvictimadvocatestodevelopresearch,comprehensivereports,policybriefs,modelpolicies,andinnovativeprograms.Theorganization’sabilitytoconnectclientdepartmentswithsubjectmatterexpertise,supportedbysounddataanalysispractices,makesusuniquelypositionedtoprovidecriticalincidentreview,trainingandtechnicalassistance.ThePoliceFoundationhasbeenontheforefrontofresearchingandprovidingguidanceoncommunitypolicingpracticessince1970.AcceptanceofconstructivechangebypoliceandthecommunityiscentraltothepurposeofthePoliceFoundation.Fromitsinception,thePoliceFoundationhasunderstoodthattoflourish,policeinnovationrequiresanatmosphereoftrust;awillingnesstoexperimentandexchangeideasbothwithinandoutsidethepolicestructure;and,perhapsmostimportantly,arecognitionofthecommonstakeoftheentirecommunityinbetterpoliceservices.ThePoliceFoundationpridesitselfinanumberofcorecompetenciesthatprovidethefoundationforcriticalincidentreviews,includingahistoryofconductingrigorousresearchandstrongdataanalysis,anExecutiveFellowsprogramthatprovidesaccesstosomeofthestrongestthoughtleadersandexperiencedlawenforcementprofessionalsinthefield,andleadershipwithahistoryofexemplarytechnicalassistanceprogrammanagement.OtherPoliceFoundationcriticalincidentreviewsinclude:• ManagingtheResponsetoaMobileMassShooting:ACriticalIncidentReviewofthe

Kalamazoo,Michigan,PublicSafetyResponsetotheFebruary20,2016,MassShootingIncident

• MaintainingFirstAmendmentRightsandPublicSafetyinNorthMinneapolis:AnAfter-ActionAssessmentofthePoliceResponsetotheProtests,Demonstrations,andOccupationoftheMinneapolisPoliceDepartment’sFourthPrecinct

• BringingCalmtoChaos:AcriticalincidentreviewoftheSanBernardinopublicsafetyresponsetotheDecember2,2015terroristshootingincidentattheInlandRegionalCenter

• AHeistGoneBad:APoliceFoundationCriticalIncidentReviewoftheStocktonPoliceResponsetotheBankoftheWestRobberyandHostage-Taking

• PoliceUnderAttack:SouthernCaliforniaLawEnforcementResponsetheAttacksbyChristopherDorner.205

205ViewtheentirePoliceFoundationCriticalIncidentReviewLibrary:www.incidentreviews.org.