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DOI: 10.1177/0001699362006001031962 6: 22Acta Sociologica

Sidney VerbaStudy

Political Participation and Strategies of Influence: A Comparative

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Political Participationand Strategiesof Influence: A ComparativeStudy*)

by Sidney Verba**)

Democracyrefers in some rough way to the degreeto which power and in-fluence over significant decisions for a society is diffused throughout that society.Political participation, therefore,will increase the extent to which a nation isdemocratic onlyinsofar as such participation involves at some point influenceby the participant over governmental decisions. Participatory acts whose mainfunction is to express support for the government are important,but not as crucialto democracyas are acts that involve influence.

The influence of a group or individual over a governmentaldecision may bedefined as equalto the degreeto which governmentalofficials act to benefit thatgroup or individual because the officials believe that theywill risk some de-privation(theywill risk their jobs, be criticized, lose votes) if theydo not soact. Thus influence involves both the outcome of the decision,(it will, to someextent, be more advantageousto the influential groups or individual than it wouldhave been if that group or individual has not been influential), and the motivesof the decision-makers (theyact to benefit the group because theybelieve theywill otherwise suffer some deprivation).The latter criterion is important.Officialsmay act to benefit a particular group for a variety of reasons; out of a feelingofpaternalism,for instance. But it is onlywhen officials act because they fear theconsequences of not so acting, that a group may be considered to be influentialand a participant in the decision.

This paper is part of a largercomparative study of attitudes toward politics and citizen-ship in Germany, Italy, Mexico, Great Britain, and the United States being carriedon under the direction of Gabriel A. ALMOND and the author. Further material onthe study will be reported in a forthcoming publicationby the study directors. Thestudy is sponsored by the Center of International Studies of Princeton University, andis supported by a grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.The material reportedis based on approximately 1000 interviews carried on in eachnation using a national, multi-stageprobabilitysample.

Center of International Studies,Princeton University.

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Influence,and consequentlydemocracy,are defined in terms of the way inwhich governmentalelites make decisions. But the problemof studyingthe wayin which such decisions are made is enormous, especially when one is dealingwith an entire nation,or as in this paper, with five nations at once. No such at-tempt is made here. Rather, this paper concentrates not upon the perceptionsandbehaviors of governmentalelites but upon the perceptionsand behaviors of theordinarycitizen. It will report some preliminaryresults to a series of surveyquestionson the amount of influence individuals believe theycan exert over thegovernment, and the ways in which theywould go about it. The paper will con-centrate on differences among the five nations surveyed - - the United States,Britain, Germany,Italy, and Mexico. In subsequentpublications, attempts willbe made to exploreand explainthese differences further.

We are interested in the perceptionof the ordinaryman as to how much in-fluence he has over the decisions of his government. Thinking that one can in-fluence the government or even attemptingto influence government is not thesame as actually influencingit. An individual may think he has influence overdecisions or he may attempt to exert influence over decisions,and the govern-ment official may be unmoved. Conversely,he may believe that all governmentdecisions are made without any consideration of his needs and desires and of theneeds and desires of his fellow citizens, when, in fact, government officials con-stantly try to calculate the reactions of groups to their acts. In the latter case, anindividual will exert influence without beingaware he is doingso.

If the degreeto which individuals believe they can influence the course ofgovernmentaldecisions is not necessarilyrelated to their actual level of influence,whystudytheir subjectiveviews as to their competence?There are several reasons.The perceptionthat one can participate furthers such participation: if an individualbelieves he has

influence,he is more

likelyto

attemptto influence the

govern-ment. A subjectivelycompetent citizen, therefore,is more likely to be an activecitizen. And if government officials do not necessarilyrespondto active influenceattempts,theyare more likely to respondto such attempts to influence than to apassivecitizenry that makes no demands. If the ordinarycitizen, on the otherhand, perceivesgovernment policyas beingfar outside of his sphereof influence,he is unlikelyto attempt to influence that policy and government officials areunlikelyto worry about the potential pressure that can be brought to bear on

them. Thus the extent to which citizens in a nation perceivethemselves as compe-tent to influence the government should be closely related to the extent of demo-cracy in that country.

A good deal of the influence that individuals and groups exert over theirgovernment may not involve any conscious attempt on their part to influence. Asour concept of influence specifies,governmentalofficials are beinginfluenced if



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theyrespondto what theyconsider a possible deprivation.This impliesthat thecitizen or group of citizens from whom they fear some deprivationmay, at thetime the government officials are acting, neither have attemptedto influence theseofficials nor intend so to

attempt.The

governmentofficials act in

anticipationof

certain consequences if theydo not so act. They believe that if theydo not actto benefit a group, that group will at some pointin the future withdraw its sup-port or its vote. In many respectsa good deal of the influence that the ordinarycitizen has over the decisions of the government officials may be of this anti-

cipatorytype.But if one is interested in the extent of the perceptionthat one can influence

the government, one will have to concentrate on more overt and conscious attemptsto affect actions of the government. Several questionsmay be asked about consciousattempts to influence the government:

1. Under what circumstances will an individual make some conscious effortto influence the government?Direct politicalinfluence attempts are rare. For theordinarycitizen, the activities of government - - even local government - - mayseem quitedistant. At the time that a decision is beingmade, the citizen will notbe aware that it is beingmade or of what its consequences for him are likely tobe. It is likely then, that onlyin situations of some stress in which a governmentactivity is perceivedto have a direct and serious impactupon the individual willa direct influence attempt be triggeredoff.

2. What method will be used in the influence attempt?Some major dimensionsalongwhich the method used can vary include: whether or not the attempt ismade through legitimatechannels; whether the attempt is violent or non-violent;whether the individual attempts to influence the government alone or attemptsto enlist the support of others; and, if he seel;s support, whose support does he

seek.3. What is the effect of the influence attempt?The problemof the extent to

which the government official changeshis behavior in response to some influenceattempt on the part of a citizen is beyondthe scope of this study. However, sinceit concentrates on the perspectivesof the citizen, we shall consider his view as tothe likelihood that an attempt made byhim to influence the government wouldhave any effect. That, after all, is a keyquestion. ,.

The Distriblltion

of SlIbjectlle Competence:Does an individual feel he can

influence his government?How would he go about it? Would it make anydifference? Respondentswere asked questionsthat attemptedto placethem inhypotheticalstress situations. Each respondentwas asked to suppose that a lawwere beingconsidered by the national legislature that he considered very unjustand harmful. Could he do anythingabout it and, if so, what? He was then asked



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how much effect he thoughtany action he took would have, and how likely itwas that he actually would do something. A similar set of questionswas askedabout an unjustand harmful regulationbeingconsidered bythe most local govern-mental

unit.1)These

questionsattemptedto getsome

notion of the respondentsviews as to the extent of his political competence and, more important,of thestrategyof influence open to him.

The questionas to the amount of influence the ordinaryman has is a funda-mental political one and the response to it reflects an individuals perceptionofthe nature of his government and of his own role as a citizen. Let us look at

responses as to how amenable to influence is a local government. This is a goodplace to start because the impactof local government tends to be more immediate.

And, for obvious reasons, peoplein all countries tend to think that one can domore about a local regulationthan about a law considered by the national legis-lature. But what is striking are the sharpdifferences among nations in the numberwho think theycan do somethingand in what these peoplethink theycan do. Inresponse to the questionon whether one can do anything about a local law that isunjust American and British respondentsmost frequentlysay that there is some-thingtheycan do. More than three-quartersof the peopleinterviewed in each ofthese two countries express the opinionthat theyhave some recourse if theybelievethe local government is planninga law theyconsider unjust. (The data on whatindividuals say theycan do about a local regulationis reportedin Table 1. Thefigures we are consideringhere are near the bottom of the table.) In each country,only17 % say that there is nothingthey can do. In the other three countriesover 30 % of those interviewed report that there is nothingtheycan do in sucha situation. In Germany more people(62 ~o) say theycan do something than inMexico and Italy (52 % and 51 ;~o ) .In the latter two countries, respondentsaremore

likelyto say

theydo not know what

theycan do.

Clearlythen the

imagesthat citizens have of their roles and potentials differ from nation to nation. Britons

1) The exact question wording on the national government was:- Suppose a law were being considered by (Appropriate national legislaturespecifiedfor each nation) which you considered to be unjust or harmful, what do you think youcould do?- If you made an effort to change this law, how likely is it that you would succeed?- If such a case arose, how likely is it you would actuallytry to do somethingabout it ?The exact

question wordingon the local

governmentwas.

- Suppose a regulationwere being considered by (Most local governmental unit.Town? Village? Etc. specified) which you considered very unjust or harmful, whatdo you think you could do?- If you made an effort to change this regulationhow likely is it that you would suc-ceed ?- If such a case arose, how likely is it that you would actuallydo somethingabout it?



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Table 1: What citizens would do to try to influencetheir local gOfernmenl, bynation.

*)The total percentage is less than the total of the individual cells since some respondentsgave more than one answer.

&dquo;&dquo;&dquo;)This row includes only the respondents who repliedthat they could do something, butdid not mention workingwith others. Hence, the total is less than some of the individualcategorieswhich contain respondents who may have mentioned both group activity andan individual activity.



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and Americans are more likely to think of themselves as competent to influencetheir local government than are peoplein the other three countries.

That an individual believes there is somethinghe can do if the government is

planningan

unjustor

unfair act does notmean

that he will in fact try to dosome-

thing. This was a hypotheticalsituation and,of course, one does not really knowwhat respondentswould do if theyever were in fact faced with such a challengingsituation. But theywere asked for their opinionson whether or not theyactuallywould act. In all countries many who say theycan do somethingabout an unjustregulationreport that in fact theyprobablywould do nothing.But the numberwho reportthat there is at least some likelihood that theywould make an effort,reflects the same national pattern reportedabove. 58 % of the American re-

spondentsand 60 ~/oof those in Britain say that there is some likelihood that theywould actually make an effort to influence an unjustregulation. In Germany44 %made some such affirmation, while in Italy 41 % of the respondentssay thatthe might act in these circumstances. (The questionwas, unfortunately,not askedin a comparableform in Mexico.) The American and British respondentsexpressa willingnessto act much more frequentlythan do the respondentsin Germanyand Italy.

Lastly, there is some evidence that the subjectiveestimate of ones propensityto act in such a challengingpolitical situation is not completelyunrelated to actualattempts to influence the government. In all five nations a substantially largerproportionof those respondentswho say there is somethingtheycan do about alocal unjustregulation(let us, for convenience, call them &dquo;localcompetents&dquo;)report some experiencein attemptingto influence the local government than isreportedamong those who say there is nothingtheycan do. These data are reportedin Table 2.

Table 2 : Proportion of those respondentswho .ray theyhave attempted to influencethe localgovernment among local competents and local non-competent.r.

(Numbers in parentheses refer to the base upon which percentage was calculated.)



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At this pointwe are merelydescribingdifferences among nations in the politicalattitudes of respondents.In this connection it is clear that the frequencywith whichindividuals report that theycould have some effect upon a law contemplatedbythe local government differs from nation to nation. The

explanationof these dif-

ferences is more difficult. At least part of the explanationof the differences inthe degreeto which individuals believe theyare politically competent rests uponthe differingstructures of government. The individual who says he can do nothingto oppose the local government may be makinga quite realistic appraisal of hispotentialities. Thus the lower frequencyof subjectivepolitical competence in Italy,for instance,may be largely a reaction to a political structure - - the Italian pre-fecture system - - that does not allow the individual to be politically competent.It

is not that individuals choose to be uninfluential. It may be that theyhaveno

choice.-

The frequencywith which individuals say theycould exert some influence overthe local government is clearly a case in which attitudes are affected significantlybygovernmentalstructure (althoughthere is evidence that theyare not completelydetermined by these structures).Let us turn to a more significant aspectof politicalcompetencethan the extent to which individuals believe themselves competent;an

aspectof

competencethat is not as clearly affected bythe structure of the local

government. This is the strategy an individual would use in attemptingto in-fluence the government. The way in which those individuals who report that theycould influence the government reporttheycoul,l go about exertingthis influenceis, of course, important.It makes a difference whether an individual has, on theone hand, onlythe nguest notion as to vrhat he can do in such a situation or onthe other, a clear and explicit view of the channels open to him for expressinghis pointof view. It also makes a difference what resources he believes he hasavailable to use in

sucha

situation. Furthermore, the strategythatan

individualwould use will naturallyhave an effect on the extent to which his subjectiveviewof his ability to influence will represent real influence potential - - that is, re-present the sort of activity that has some chance of changing the behaviors of thegovernment officials. Lastly, byconcentratingon how [hose who think they canhave influence would go about exertingthat influence, we can partially eliminate(but onlypartially) the effect of the differingdegreesto which local govern-ments are amenable to influence. We shall deal primarilywith those who think

theyhave influence, the &dquo;localcompetents&dquo;,and ask how theywould exert thatinfluence.

The StrategyofInflllCnce: The strategies of influence that individuals reporttheywould use are summarized in Table 1. Consider first the questionof whatsocial resources the individual feels he has available to him in attemptingto in-



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fluence the local government. When one looks at the individual and his govern-ment, one is tempted to see him as lonely, powerless,and somewhat frightenedby the immensityof the powers he faces. Whatever the validity of this view maybe in terms of the actual amount of

powerthe

averageman has and the

socialresources to him, our data suggest that a largenumber of our respondentsthinkof themselves neither as powerlessnor, what is more important,as alone,in theirrelationship to the government.

This fact is reflected in the data reportedin Table 1. A number of respondentsbelieve that theycan enlist the support of others in their attempts to influencethe government. What is most striking is the variation from country to countryin the numbers who feel theycan call on others to aid them. In the United States,59 % of the respondentsindicate that theywould attempt to enlist the supportof others if theywish to change a regulation theyconsider unjust. At the otherextreme, only8 ~o of the Italian samplemention the use of this social resource.In the other countries, the percentages reportingthat theywould try to enlist thesupport of others varies from 36 ~o in Britain, to 28 ~ in Mexico, to 22 ~/oinGermany.2)

Who is it that citizens would enlist to support them ? Individuals as we knoware

members ofa

largenumber of social structures. Theyare

not merelycitizensof their nations; they are members of families,communities, churches, voluntaryassociations,trade unions and a myriadof other groups and organizations.Muchhas been written about the importantrole of formal organizationsin the politicalprocess - - in particular, the role of political parties and formal associationalinterest groups. But what the data show most strikingly is that when it comes tothe support that individuals believe they could enlist in a challengingpoliticalsituation, theythink much more often of enlisting the support of the informalface-to-face groups of which they are members than they think of enlistingthesupport of the formal organizationswith which theyare affiliated.

In all countries, the numbers are few who say that theywould work throughtheir political party if theywere attemptingto counteract some unjustregulationbeingconsidered by the local government. Less than 1 cle af the respondents - -with the exceptionof Germany,where the figure is about 3 % - - mention thattheywould work through their political party. Clearly, no matter how importantthe role of

political parties maybe in democratic societies,

relativelyfew citizens

2) Since question wording can seriouslyaffect responses, it is important to note here thatthe notion that one can enlist the support of others was in no way suggested by thequestion or by the interviewers probing of the question. Interviewers were carefullyinstructed not to ask such questions as: "Is there anyone you could get to help you?"or "Would you attempt to do this alone or with other people?"



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think of them first as the place where support may be enlisted for attempts toinfluence the government.3)

In all countries,more individuals report that theywould attempt to work throughother formal

organizedgroupsthan would

attemptto work

through politicalparties. But even when one considers the entire range of formal organizationsto which peoplemay belong,the numbers who report theywould enlist the sup-port of these organizationsis small, in no country going above 5 0~0of all therespondents(as seen on Table 1) or 9 ,~oof the local competents.4)Of course,not all respondentshave some formal organizationat their disposal. Such or-ganizationsare most frequentin some nations than in others. And the percentagewho reportmembershipdiffers substantiallyfrom country to country. Furthermore,not all formal organizationsare equallypolitically relevant. But even if one con-siders onlythose respondentswho belongto some formal organizationthat theyreportis involved in politics,the percentage invokingsuch membershipin a stresssituation is much smaller than the percentage who are members. In the UnitedStates where such membershipare most frequent,228 respondentsreport member-ship in some organizationthat theyconsider to be involved in some way withgovernment or politics,but only 35 Americans report that they would workthrough such an organizationif theywere tryingto influence a local regulation.In Italy where such membershipsare least frequent,we find the same pattern.Fifty-six Italians belongto some organization theybelieve is involved in politicalaffairs, but only13 Italians would work through a formal organizationif theywere tryingto influence a local regulation. The greatestfrequencyof mention offormal organizationis found in Germany,but it is still onlyhalf as frequentasthe frequencyof membershipin a politicallyrelevant organization.

3) To some extent the infrequent mention of a political party in this context probablyunderstates the role of parties in this influence process. Many more respondents men-tioned contacting government officials. If they explicitlymentioned that the partisanaffiliation of the official was relevant in given them access to him, they would be codedas working through a party. But many may have considered this affiliation relevant,even if it was not mentioned.

4) The percentage of respondents mentioning a particular strategy of influence can becomputedeither as a percentage of the entire population or as a percentage of the localcompetents - - in this latter case, that is, as a percentage of those who feel there is

something theycan

do. Both figuresare

important.The

first figure reflects frequencyof certain types of political behavior in a nation. But if we are interested in how nationsdiffer in the strategiestheir citizens will use, we must use the second figure - - thepercentage of local competents who would use a particularstrategy - - for, otherwise,,differences between nations in the percentage choosing a particular strategy might bemerely a reflection of the fact that there are more in one country than another whoreport that there is "nothing" theycould do.



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That formal organizationsare rarely invoked as the resource that individualswould use if theywere tryingto enlist some support for their attempt to influencethe government does not mean that these organizationsare unimportantpolitic-

ally. Theystill

operateon what we have called the

passivelevel - - that

is,the

citizen has influence over government officials bybeinga member of such a group,but he does not necessarilymake any overt attempt to influence the government.

And this sort of influence is of a great significance, perhapsof greater overallsignificancethan the overt influence attempts that citizens from time to time willmake. Furthermore though individuals would not use their formal organizationsas the means to influence the government directly, such formal membershipenhances the prospects that an individual will believe himself capableof influ-

encingthe government and will in fact makesome

such attempt.Thus,even

though he does not directly use his group membershipin attemptingto influencethe local government, an individual may, for a varietyof reasons, developgreaterself-confidence in his own politicalcompetencethrough organizationmember-ship.5)

CooperativePolitical Behavior: If one is interested in who it is that citizens be-lieve theycan enlist to support them if theyare tryingdirectly and consciouslyto influence an act of their local government, one must turn to the informal face-

to-face groups to which theybelong.In all countries,respondentsmore frequentlymention enlisting the support of such groups - - arousingtheir neighbors,gettingfriends and acquaintancesto support their position, circulating a petition - -than theymention usingsome formal organization.This is seen in the top rowof Table 1. The differences among nations are quite sharphere. These dif-ferences are highlightedif one considers the proportionof local competents(i. e., those who believe theycan influence the local government)who say theywould cooperate with their fellow citizens in attemptingto influence the govern-ment : 73 % of American local competents would use informal groups, whereasonly13 ~/oof Italian local ccompetents and 22 % of the German would do so.In Mexico, though the proportionof local competents is relatively low, the pro-portionof these local competents who would work through informal groups isquitehigh, - - 50 %. And in Britain, the proportionof local competents whosay theywould seek the cooperationof others is about as great, - - 43 %.

The belief that cooperationwith ones fellow citizens is both a possiblepoliticalaction and an effective one, it may be

suggested,representsa

highlysignificantorientation from the pointof view of a democratic political system. The diffusionof influence over political decisions bywhich we define democracyimpliessome

5) The relationship between organizationmembership and political attitudes will be dis-cussed in a forthcoming publication.



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cooperativeability among the citizenry. This cooperationwould appear to benecessary in terms both of the amount of influence the ordinaryman could other-wise expect to have and the results of the influence of the ordinaryman on

governmentaldecisions.

By definition,the

&dquo;average&dquo;mans influence over the

government must be small. Comparedwith the forces of the government and thestate he is a frail creature indeed, and this would applyto local as well as nationalgovernment. If the ordinaryman is to have any influence vis-a-vis the govern-ment, it must be in concert with his fellows. Secondly,uncooperativeand com-pletely individualistic influence attempts could onlylead to dysfunctionalresultsfrom the pointof view of the output of a democratic government. Everyindividualdemand cannot be met or the result will be chaos. If the government is to be

responsiveto the demands of the ordinaryman, those demands must be aggreated,and the aggregationof interests impliescooperationamong men. The aggregationof interests involved in the cooperationof groups of like-minded individuals isaggregationon a rather low level, but it does suggest a propensityto work togetherwith ones fellows that is relevant for largerpolitical structures as well. In anycase, one may suggest that the citizen who believes that he can work cooperativelywith others in his environment if he wants to engage in political activity has aquitedifferent perspectiveon politicsfrom the individual who thinks of himselfas a lone political actor.

Furthermore, the notion that one can affect a government decision by bringingones peers into the disputeis a highlypolitical notion. It represents a fairly clearattempt to use politicalinfluence in ones relations with government officials.The invocation of others in the disputeindicates that in this way the individualhopesto bringpressure on the officials, to threaten them with some deprivationif theydo not accede to his demands. The threat that many make - - whether itbe the threatened loss of votes or of support, or the threat of publiccriticism - -is, other thingsbeingequal, greater than the threat that one can make. Thus theindividual who mentions gettingothers to joinhim in his disputewith the govern-ment is more likely to be an individual who sees himself as able to influence hisgovernment. And the variation among the five nations in the frequencieswithwhich such groups are mentioned reflects a varyingdistribution of such citizencompetence.

Lastly, the importanceof this propensitytoward cooperationwith ones fellow

politicalactors is stressed not

merelybecause such behavior has

significantconse-

quences for a political system, but because it is a type of behavior which cannotbe understood and explainedsolely in terms of differences in the structure oflocal government. The difference between the individual who respondsthat hewould write a letter to the local council and the individual who respondsthat hewould write a letter to the local council and try to induce his friendsto do like-



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wise cannot be explainedbydifferences among nations in the structure and powersof their respective local councils.6)Furthermore, as we shall see shortly, thepropensityto cooperate politicallycan not be explainedin terms of differinglevelsof social and economic

developmentin the five nations. The

originof this

prop-ensity toward political cooperationmust be soughtelsewhere.7)Though the use of primarygroups as a resource for influence is most common

in the United States, Britain and Mexico, several interesting differences betweenthe United States and Britain on the one hand and Mexico on the other in this

respectmust be mentioned. The notion that one can mobilize an informal groupto aid one in the process of attemptingto influence the government, appears tobe of greater significancefor the actual exercise of influence in the former two

6) This is not completely true. Governmental structure may be more amenable to groupinfluence in some countries than in others. But this is more likely to be the case becauseof experience in the past with such groups, rather than formal structure. On the otherhand, there is no doubt that certain structures of government foster such banding to-gether"protests more than others. Structures where power is diffused among a largenumber of autonomous or semi-autonomous boards and councils and the like (especiallyelected boards and councils)are more likely to foster such protest than structuresdominated by a centrallyappointed official whose domain includes a larger area (aswith the Italian prefectsystem). But this is an example of the general proposition thatthere will be an interaction between political orientation and political structure. In thiscase, however, the explanation of the originsof this group-forming attitude in termsof formal structure alone would be quite hard. One has to look beyond the structureof the local government.

7) The relationshipbetween social and economic groupings and the propensity to formgroups will be discussed at the end of the chapter. The explanation of this group-formingpropensity in terms of social values and partisanfragmentation will be attemptedin forthcomingpublication.That

one can

show the relationship between social grouping and the propensity to formgroups as well as attempt an explanation for this propensity in terms of other attitudesillustrates the advantage of "discovering" this group-formingpropensityin a study basedon a systematicsurvey rather than "discovering" this group-formingpropensity throughthe sort of keen but unsystematic observation of a writer like Tocqueville - - whocertainlynoticed and was impressed by the way in which political groups could beeasily formed when needed in the United States.In the first place, one now knows about the relative propensitiesto form groups ina new way. Those of us who work on studies of this sort like to think that the dataare more reliable when systematicallygathered.Secondly,the knowledge is more precise.One cannot only distinguishamong nations more finely, one can specifywho it is withinthe nation who is likely to think of forming groups of this sort. And lastly, one canexplore the roots of this group-formingpropensity by seeingthe ways in which thoseindividuals who think of forming such groups differ from other respondentswho donot. Thus, not only is the knowledge more precise, it is more useful since it can leadto further knowledge.



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countries. Earlier it was pointedout that those who reporttheycan do somethingabout an unjustlocal law (the local competents)are much more likely also toreportsome experiencein attemptingto influence the government. If we look

onlyat the local

competentsand ask how those who would work

through groupsand those who would attempt to influence the government alone differ in termsof the extent of their experiencein attemptedinfluence,we find that in theUnited States and Britain those who would work through groups are more likelyto be those who have had experiencein attemptingto influence their local govern-ment. In the United States 36 ~oof those who report theywould work throughinformal groups (n: 547) report experiencein influence attempts,whereas only25 % of those local competents who would use some other strategy (n: 198)

reportsuch experience.In

Britain the parallel figuresare

23 % for thosewho

mention informal groups (n: 315) and 15 % for other local competents (n: 414).On the other hand, in Mexico, those who mention informal groups are a bit lesslikely to be the experiencedrespondents - -7 ~o report experienceof those whomention informal groups (n: 339) as against10 % of the other local competents(n: 344).8)

Furthermore, in the former two countries,the use of informal groups as a meansof influencingthe government is seen not onlyas a means to protestbut as thekey to effective protest. In order to test the extent to which individuals felt theycould influence their local government, respondentswere asked another question:&dquo;Ifyou made an effort to change this regulation, how likely is it that you wouldsucceed?&dquo;Of interest to us here is that a large number of American and Britishlocal competents volunteered the statement that their protest would have somelikelihood of success onlyif others joinedwith them. (The percentages were 30 %in the United States and 20 % in Britain. ) In Mexico,though a goodpercentagefelt that there was some likelihood that theywould succeed if theyattemptedtoinfluence their local government, fewer than 10 % of the Mexican respondentssuggestedthat this would onlybe the case if theyhad the support of others. Thus,though the use of informal groups is perceivedas a means of influence in Mexico,it is not yet perceivedas the keyto effective influence.9)

One further difference deserves mention. In the United States and Britain, the

8) In Germany, those local competents who mention informal groups are somewhat less

likelyto be

experienced.17 % of those who mention informal groups

(n: 126) reportexperience as against 23 % of local competents who do not mention such groups(n:460).. In Italy, those local competents who mention groups are slightly more likelyto be experienced:16 % (n: 67) as against13 % (n: 438) of those who do not mentiongroups.

9) In Germany the percentage of local competents who mentioned that theywould succeedonlyif others joinedthem was 12 %; in Italy it was 5 %.



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use of informal groups as a means of influencinga governmentaldecision is con-sidered much more appropriateon the local level than on the national level. Inthe United States 73 % of the local competents report that theywould work

through informal groups in attemptingto influence the local government, whereasonly38 % of the national competents (i. e., those who believe they could dosomethingif the national government were consideringa law theythoughtun-just) would work through such groups. In Britain, similarly, 43 % of the localcompetentswould work through informal groups, while only28 % of the nationalcompetentswould do so. On the other hand, in Mexico, the proportionof localand national competents who would use informal groups is about the same - -50 ~o of local competentsmention informal groups as the means theywould useto influence the local government and 46 jo of national competents say that thisis the means theywould use to influence the national government. The fact thatthe use of such groups is more closelyrelated both to experienceand to expectationsof success in Britain and the United States than in Mexico, coupledwith the factthat such strategy is considered more appropriatein connection with the localgovernement in the former two countries suggests that such informal group strategyis based on a more realistic appraisal of the potentialities of such a strategy - -a realistic appraisalderivingfrom actual experiencewith such groups on thelocal level. In Mexico, this influence strategyis less well groundedin actual localexperience.

Individllal Acttities. Among those respondentswho spokeof themselves asactingas individuals in an attempt to influence the government there is somevariation,as Table 1 indicates,in the strategies theymention. In the United Statesand Britain respondentsare more likely to say that theywould approachan electedgovernment official rather than an appointedofficial of the bureaucracy.In Mexicoand

Italy, respondentsare as likely to say theywould direct their protest toward

one typeof official as toward the other. In Germany,in contrast, more respondentsmention appointedofficials than mention elected officials as the target of theirprotest. It is tempting to consider these results to be a reflection of a more highlydevelopedpoliticalcompetencein the United States and Britain. A protestto anelected official would appear to be inherentlymore of a political protestin thesense of involvingan impliedthreat of deprivationto the official if he does notcomply - - since the loss of the vote is the most usual deprivationwith which

the individualcan threaten an

offendingofficial. To some extent this

maybe an

explanationof the differences among the nations in the chosen targets of in-fluence attempts, but it is more likely that these differences merelyreflect dif-ferences in the relative positionand importanceof elected and appointedofficialswithin the structures of local governments in the respectivenations.

Lastly, in consideringthe strategies that local competents say theywould use,



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it is importantto note that not all those who say theycould do somethingabouta local regulationtheyconsider unjusthave any clear strategyin mind. As Table 1indicates, 12 % of the Italian respondentssay that they can &dquo;protest&dquo;if facedwith a regulationtheyconsider unjust, but when asked how or to whom theycan protest,giveno more specific reply. The 12 % who would &dquo;protest&dquo;representabout one-fourth of all Italian local competents. While this answer shows a higherlevel of subjectivecompetencethan the answer that one could do nothing (theright to gripeand complainbeingperhapsone of the last and most basic of demo-cratic rights), it certainly reflects little awareness of the politicalchannels throughwhich one mighteffectively approach the government. 10)

Distrib&dquo;tionpat/ems of influenceand inflllence JI1Rlt~lrJ:The datapresentedso far indicate some rather sharpdifferences among the nations. But the data are

rather crude,representing,as theydo, national totals. One would want to go furtherand seek some explanationfor these differences. This will not be attemptedinthis paper, but the questionwill be considered of the extent to which such dif-ferences are explicablein terms of differences in the social class compositionsofthe samplesfor the various nations (and, since these were national samples,inthe social class compositionsof the nations.)We shall consider three questions:the extent to which the attitudes

reportedin the

previoussection are related in

similar ways to social groups in the five nations (does, for instance,perceivedinfluence increase with social class in all five nations?);the extent to whichdifferences among nations diminish when one compares similar social groups;and the extent to which differences among differingsocial groups within a singlenation are greater or less than differences among similar social groups across thenations. The answer to the last question, of course, dependson the first two. If,when one controls for some social class variable,one finds that the frequencyof a

politicalattitude varies sharplyand in a similarmanner with that variable from

nation to nation and that the differences among nations tend to disappear,one willthen find that differences among groups within a nation are greater than dif-ferences among similar groups across the nations.

The answers to these three questionswill helpus decide if the differences inpoliticalattitudes discussed in the earlier part of the paper are, in some sense,&dquo;real&dquo;differences in political style among the nations,or if theyare explicableinterms of differinglevels of social and economic

developmentin the various nations

- - in terms, for instance, of the fact that there are many more respondentswith

10) The data on the response to the question about the national government cannot be dis-cussed here. In general,there is less competence expressed in connection with an unjustact of the national government, but the patterns of differences among the nations areabout the same.



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37

no education in our Italian and Mexican samplesthan in the other nations. If apoliticalattitude varies sharplywith a social attribute in all the nations, if thedifferences among the nations tend to diminish when one controls for the socialattribute, and if those of a

particularsocial

groupare more like others of a similar

social group in other nations than theyare like their fellow citizens of a differentsocial group one probablyhas a political attitude less intrinsic to the political stylein a particular nation and more dependenton the level of social and economicdevelopmentin the nation. On the other hand, if the attitude is not closely relatedto social grouping,if all groups in a nation are likely to respondthe same way,and in ways that differ from similar groups in other nations; if therefore, anItalian from the upper class is more likely to respondlike an Italian of the lowerclass than like

a Germanof the upper class,

one

is probablydealingwithan

aspectof political style more intrinsic to a particular nation. As an indicator of social group, we shall use the respondentseducational at-

tainment. This is selected because it is a social attribute that is closely related topoliticalattitudes and that differs sharply in its distribution from nation to na-tion. (For instance,35 % of the sample in the United States did not go beyondprimaryschool education,in contrast with 69 ~o of the Italian sample.)It willnot be possibleto report data for other social attributes, but suffice to say that the

pattern of attitudes one would find if one considered such characteristics as oc-cupationor income would be almost identical.

As FigureI clearly pointsout, in all countries the more education an individualhas, the more likely is he to consider himself capableof influencingthe localgovernment; that is, to be what we have called a local competent. (The percentageof individuals who say theycould affect a local law is measured on the verticalaxis; the level of education on the horizontal.)Fifty-eight percent of those whodid not get beyondprimaryschool are local competentsin the United States;94 %of those with some collegeeducation are. And the pattern repeatsitself in eachcountry. This then is a clear uniformityacross national lines. No matter what thefrequencyin a nation of local competence, the incidence of this competenceisgreater among those with highereducation.

What about the questionof the differences among and within nations? Thequestionis a bit harder to answer for differences exist both among educationalgroups within the same country (as the slopesof the lines indicate)and withinsimilar educational groups among nations (as the different lengthsof the linesindicate.) Some differences among nations diminish significantly within matchededucational groups. For instance,though the national totals for local competentsare quite different as between the United States and Germany,the differencesbetween the two countries almost disappearwhen similar educational groups arecompared.On the other hand, the two pairs of nations that are most similar in



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39



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terms of the national totals, the United States and Britain, on the one hand, andMexico and Italy on the other, differ somewhat more from each other withinmatched educational groups than theydo on the national level. This is the case

amongthose with

primaryschool education in the case of the United States and

Britain,where Britons show a higherrate of citizen competence,and in all edu-cational groups for Italy and Mexico,with the Mexicans showingsomewhat highercompetence on the lower two levels and somewhat lower competenceon the higherlevel.

What about the problemof which are greater,national differences or educationaldifferences? The measure of this is rough,but if one compares the range betweenthe highestand lowest nation within each educational group with the rangebetween the highestand lowest educational group within each nation, the resultssuggest that there is certainly as much if not, on the average, more variation amongeducational groups within a single nation than among those with similar edu-cational attainment in different nations. The range between the nation with the

greatestfrequencyof local competentsand the nation with the smallest frequencyis28 percentage points(betweenBritain and Italy) on the elementaryschool level,22 percentage points (againbetween Britain and Italy) on the secondaryschoollevel, and 18 percentage points(between the United States and Italy) on theuniversitylevel. Within each nation, on the other hand, there is about as muchif not more difference among the differingeducational levels in the frequencywith which respondentsbelieve themselves competent to influence the govern-ment. The ranges between the educational group that most frequentlyreports it-self competentto influence the government (thosewith some universityeducationin each nation)and the group that least frequentlyreportssuch competence (thosewith onlyprimaryeducation or no education in each country)are: United States,36 percentage points; Britain, 19 percentage points; Germany, 26 percentagepoints; Italy,31 percentage points; and Mexico,30 percentage points. These figurescompare extremes in terms of education and in terms of nation. But theydo suggestthat in terms of overall local competence, similar educational groups comparedcross-nationallyare at least as similar and perhapsmore similar than are differenteducational groups within a nation.

So far we have considered the extent to which individuals believe they caninfluence a local unjustregulation.But the strategyan individual would use maybe more

importantthan the

simpledistinction of whether or not he thinks he

can do anything.In particular the belief that one can cooperate with ones fellowcitizen as a means of influencingthe government appears to be important.Doesthis particularpoliticalstrategydependto as large an extent upon educational attain-ments as does the existence of local competence?The data in FigureII suggestthat this is not the case. The percentage of local competents who would work



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through informal groups varies sharplyfrom country to country even within eacheducational group, but varies very little among educational groups within theindividual countries.11)Only in the United States does the frequencywith whichsuch activity is mentioned vary

directlywith educational attainment, and even in

this case the relationshipis not as strong as that between education levels in termsof local competencein general. Consider againthe contrast between the UnitedStates and Germany.When we consider similar educational groups, German and

American respondentshardlydiffer in the frequencywith which theysay thatthere is somethingtheycan do about a local unjustregulation. But if we comparethe percentage of the local competents who would cooperate with their fellowcitizens, we see that on each educational level, German respondentsare much less

likelyto

mention such activity. Furthermore,more

highlyeducated

Germanre-

spondentsare no more likely to talk of such activity than are less highlyeducatedones. In general, unlike the situation in relation to overall local competencewherethe range of difference among nations was no greater and perhapsa little lessthan the range of variation among educational groups, the variation among nationsin the frequencywith which politicalcooperationis mentioned is much greater onall educational levels than in the variation among educational groups within a

nation.12)Here, then, may be a pattern of political behavior whose existence is

independentof the educational level in a nation. Education, the data suggest,may lead individuals to believe that they can influence their government, nomatter what country theylive in (providing,of course, that there is at least someinstitutional structure to support this). The data also suggest that as the overalleducational levels of nations rise, theywill become more similar in this respect.But education does not necessarily increase the potentiality that individuals willcreate groups to support them. The ability to create political structures throughcooperationwith ones fellow citizens in time of stress seems to be typical of somenations and not of others. It is an element of politicalstyle,not a result of edu-cational attainment.

The data on differences among social groups in citizen competencesuggestthat it makes a great deal of difference who you are within your own countrywhether or not you believe yourselfable to influence a local regulation. If youhave more education,a higherstatus or are male, you are clearly more likely toconsider yourselfcompetent. In this sense, ones self-perceptionsof ones role as

11 ) The data are calculated as a percentage of local competents not of the total population.This is to isolate the political strategy that competents would use from the fact that the

frequency of competents differs from country to country.12) The difference between the pattern in relation to the extent to which individuals think

they have influence and that in relation to their strategy of influence is quite strikingifone compares Figures 1 and 2.



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a citizen vary greatly with ones social position within a nation. But whetheror not the local competent believes that his friends and neighborsare availableto helphim in a situation of this sort dependsrelatively little on his social positionwithin

a

nation,but dependsheavilyon

what nation he happensto be in. Politicalcompetence,thus,grows with highereducation or occupationalstatus, but the styleof political competenceseems to be rooted more in generalpoliticalculture.13)

13) As mentioned earlier, a similar pattern would appear if one controlled for other in-dicators of social group. The intriguing question is, of course, how does one explainthe differences in propensity to form groups if such social variables do not explainit.In a forthcomingpublicationby the author and Gabriel A. Almond, an answer will besuggested.

acta sociologica 1962 verba 22 42

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