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A320

ENGINEERING

CONTINUATION TRAINING

Q3 & Q4 2013

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Contents:

1 Introduction & review of approval changes relating to the A320 2 ADs 3 A320 MOR – Maintenance Related

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1 Introduction / Changes to the A320 approval The A320 approval remains passive. As a result of this change, the company is no longer permitted to maintain or return to service any A320 aircraft under its EASA Part 145 approval. The approval being made passive is reflected in MOE Part 1.9 as follows:

As a result, the requirements of Technical Procedure 14 apply and require only Mandatory items to be covered as part of Continuation Training.

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2 A320 Airworthiness Directives (Note that engine “shop” visit & structural ADs and some revised ADs are not listed).

AD No Description 2011-0137R1 Class Divider Spring Damper

AD No Description 2012-0100R3 Aft Pylon – Rib 5

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AD No Description 2013-0149 Broken Centre Wing Box Struts

AD No Description 2013-0153 Oxygen – Pax Gaseous Oxygen System (GOS)

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AD No Description 2013-0202 LGCIU Wiring Modification

AD No Description 2013-0261 Side Box Beam Flange Inspection – Frame 43 Area

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AD No Description 2013-0278 Oxygen – Pipe Corrosion

AD No Description 2013-0302 Stabilisers – Composite Rudder Side Shell Thermography

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AD No Description 2013-0310 Tack & Rivet Holes in Fitting Brackets at Frame 50

3 A320 Family – Maintenance Related MOR The following are maintenance related MOR from the UK CAA MOR digest. As the information is protected and strictly controlled by the UK CAA, it is respectfully requested that this information is not circulated. British Airways A320 Incorrect maintenance procedure performed for ADD with air conditioning pack. In order to comply with MEL item 21-52-01A procedure the faulty air conditioning pack nr2 should have been locked out. A procedure for a different aircraft serial number had been performed in error. Nr2 air conditioning pack locked out in accordance with correct MEL procedure. CAA Closure: The original MEL reference was wrong as per the details in the report, the original engineer who raised the defect in fact raised the fault as a "Pack 2 Fault" and not as a "Pack 2 Regulator Fault" which does not require the Pack Valve locking out. After a long discussion it would appear this has come about after a de-brief of the off going crew. (Pre-conditioned to the symptom, not what was actually written) additionally the MEL is very confusing at best so this has added to the problem. The engineer understands his error and has committed to study the MEL to further improve his knowledge. The second engineer, tried to discuss the defect with the Captain (under training), who was adamant that the MEL to be applied was 21-52-01D (which was also wrong).

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A lack of familiarity of the MEL on behalf of both the engineers and the crew have contributed to these errors combined with commercial pressures during a short turnround time. The organisation has identified the training needs of the engineers. British Airways A319 Significant amounts of smoke emitting from both engines after pushback. ECAM message 'F/CTRL SLAT TIP BRAKE FAULT' triggered. After landing checklist actioned and engine nr2 shutdown. ATC reported a significant amount of smoke appearing to come from LH engine followed by smoke from RH engine. Reports confirmed by nearby Ops vehicle. A/c towed back to stand. CAA Closure: A review of the aircraft Tech Log identified that there was oil reported in turbine guide vanes of nr2 engine two months before. Oil consumption was monitored to be 0.16 quarts per hour over last six hours with only one quart uplift and an ADD was raised to monitor. The ADD was cleared on 30 Oct 2012 with no further oil evidence in turbine. The aircraft then flew over 290 sectors without a repeat report until 26 Dec 2012 where oil in turbine and white smoke on shutdown was evident again. The oil was cleaned from the turbine area and engine run carried out with only momentary white smoke reported from exhaust on start up and shutdown. A tail pipe inspection did not identify oil, but a fine debris/swarf was noted on top of exhaust cone. The aircraft was taken off service for detailed investigation which included inspection of pressure and scavenge filters and identified shiny black deposits, but cleared as seal material. SB 72-0461 was actioned which involves inspecting the pressure, scavenge and oil jet lines for coking and inspection of the nr5 bearing compartment for coking. All pipes were replaced along with the oil jet to nr5 bearing. An idle and high power run was performed with no reported oil in turbine. Further troubleshooting was performed for smoke from exhaust and for oil around the engine core area. All MCDs were inspected and a swab taken from exhaust cone area 10 /12 o’clock position, viewed from rear, and stage 7 turbine blades inspected for oil wetness. Oil consumption also checked to be within AMM limits. A high power engine run was actioned and the engine released to service following inspection to confirm no oil in turbine or from disturbed hardware. During the subject event, an unrelated defect meant the aircraft had to return to stand and after engine shutdown, smoke was again reported from nr2 engine exhaust. The aircraft was taken off service and the engine was replaced and consigned to Roll Royce for further investigation. It was confirmed that oil was evident in the exhaust and turbine blades, however there is no evidence of jet pipe fire. No root cause yet determined. Monarch A320 Escape path photo-luminescent strip failure. Following reports from cabin crew that the photo-luminescent strips on the floor did not glow when cabin lighting was turned off, an inspection was carried out. It was discovered that the protective blue filter covering the strips had not been removed prior to installation. Blue filter removed and strips are now green and yellow in colour and charge correctly when exposed to cabin lighting. British Airways A320 Nr1 engine thrust reverser cracked with two raised rivets. Speed tape applied and aircraft despatched according to incorrect Structural Repair Manual (SRM) reference.

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Aircraft offered to crew in this condition, crew unable to assess damage due to the speed tape. When aircraft arrived at destination engineering removed speed tape to reveal that there were two cracks with approx 30 rivets loose or broken. On discussion with engineers it was discovered that the wrong SRM had been used to despatch aircraft and, the aircraft should not have been despatched in this condition. CAA Closure: Our investigation found low-level lapses of awareness of the operators procedures by the contracted line team. The contracted line team had looked to the operators Maintrol for assistance but confusion around damage scope was evident and ultimately, it has been made clear to the contracted party that the operators Maintrol are purely for advice and the responsibility lay with the line engineers. This created confusion as with other operators that the line team work with, this is not the case and other Maintrol ‘s provide a technical function. The lack of detailed SRM knowledge and the inevitable time pressure of Line is a also a mitigating factor. Line staff have been advised to perform inspections according to applicable work package task cards as soon as possible after arrival. If uncertainties arise about an observed defect/deviation from standard condition engineers have to call for adequate assistance on site. Once an aircraft condition does not allow dispatch, on site engineers will consult the operators Maintrol/Engineering for further action. The operator has taken suitable actions regarding the relevant personnel with a training package to support recertification. The event has also been highlighted to relevant staff. British Airways A319 Fumes in the cabin throughout the flight causing cabin crew illness. A 'burning rubber' smell persisted throughout the flight in the cabin and flight deck. Three cabin crew members had to use oxygen and a PAN was declared on arrival to request paramedics. No adverse effects reported on passengers. CAA Closure: During investigations, both engines were run at varying power settings. All possible combinations of air conditioning packs on/off were tried with various cabin temperatures selected, engines and APU running, with no smells apparent. Engine boroscopes and APU black light inspections were also carried out, with no faults discovered. Air conditioning pack 1 ram air inlet actuator displayed a fault in the CFDS last leg report and it then failed a BITE test. This was subsequently replaced. Workshop reports show that the actuator was in poor condition with defective bearings and signs of wear. It is considered that a faulty pack ram air inlet actuator may have caused a hotter than normal air conditioning pack, as if the actuator did not operate correctly the air supply used to cool the air conditioning pack may have been insufficient. This could lead to deposits on the air conditioning pack becoming dispersed and entering the air supply which may have been the smell that the cabin crew reported. Both air conditioning packs have subsequently been purged as part of the troubleshooting, removing contamination from the bleed ducts and Environmental Control System. A review of the Quick Access Recorder shows that all cabin zone temperatures were at a normal level. The individual duct temperatures are not recorded. The Tech Log showed that the aircraft was not de-iced at the point of departure which ruled out this possible external cause. No further reports of any smoke/fumes events since this incident. EasyJet A319 Dual radio altimeter (RA) failure. Aircraft had an existing ADD for RA2 inop. During the flight RA1 developed an intermittent fault during descent and then failed completely. MOC advised crew to reset the C/B but this was not successful. A direct law landing was carried out and completed with no issues.

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The replacement RA2 was fitted and RA1 was reset and tested on the ground and appeared to have had a one-off fault. A review of the flight data afterwards showed an RA1 fault to be present which implicated the coaxial cable between the antenna and transceiver. EasyJet A319 Correction fluid used contrary to company procedures. Correction fluid has been used to alter the state of the CRS. This is contrary to eTPM procedures, 02-19, para 3.5 (d) and 06-02, para 3.2. British Airways A319 Aircraft returned to service without mandatory corrective action being taken after cracks were discovered. During review of feedback for mandatory inspection A320-53-1258 TOI 10145342 it was noted that there appeared to be no outgoing messages to Airbus regarding the repair to be actioned in case of crack findings. Airbus has been contacted and they have found no communication traffic. The aircraft was removed from service until the necessary approval was received. A search of documents against this aircraft showed no ITI raised to record the damage found and necessary rework approval for continued airworthiness. The mandatory text in work card states *If cracks are found Contact Airbus and apply corrective action defined by Airbus before the next flight.* This was not done at the time and the aircraft was returned to service. Also no details of the crack damage found, was recorded. Documents scanned and attached. The report sheet for A320-53-1258 DCN 75 showed the side box beam upper flange FR43 LH 'AFT HOLE CRACKED' and side box beam upper flange FR43 RH 'AFT HOLE CRACKED'. British Airways A320 RH fan cowl found not attached at front hinge. During scheduled fan cowl removal on nr2 engine, it was found that the cross over fitting was not connected to the fan cowl front hinge. The bolt was installed with a washer and tight nut through the fan cowl hinge. The fitting was correctly fitted to the LH fan cowl. British Airways A320 Fumes detected throughout aircraft during climb. Aircraft returned. Fumes initially apparent during pushback but dissipated after engine start. Fumes returned after take-off and notably increased when selecting packs to normal flow. Approaching FL300 crew elected to don oxygen masks and return. QRH for smoke/fumes consulted and initial items actioned. Bleeds selected off after normal landing. CAA Closure: Investigation found both oil supply / return tubes to the APU oil cooler defective with the retention clamps for tube end connections distorted. One tube was found extremely loose and had been allowing oil to escape into the APU bay. From further investigations it would appear that one of the pipes had not been pushed in squarely and as such was seated at an angle and not fully located. This misalignment was sufficient to allow oil to pass the 'O' rings and leak external to the oil cooler. The Quality Dept are to follow up this report to further investigate the reasons for the incorrect pipe fitting. It was also unclear when distortion of the securing brackets occurred, to which the Quality Dept will be following up.

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British Airways A319 PAN declared due to ECAM warning indicating loss of yellow system hydraulic fluid. ECAM actions taken. A/c landed safely with emergency services in attendance. No signs of leak until a/c had reached the stand, when large quantities of hydraulic fluid and smoke were seen pouring out of nr1 engine pylon. Reporter concerned over fire hazard with hydraulic fluid leaking onto hot ducting in the pylon. CAA Closure: Investigations found that the leak emanated from the high-pressure hydraulic line at the nr2 clamp in the mid pylon area of the nr2 engine. The leak was due to chaffing between yellow system high pressure hydraulic line p/n D2901005100700 and its clamp. Significant chafing was also found at the nrs 1, 3 and 4 clamps, however there were no leaks at these locations. The chafing is a result of stress in the hydraulic lines when they are installed. At manufacture the lines were produced with a very large tolerance in the bends and resulted in hydraulic lines that did not fit properly. Airbus is aware of problems and as a result issued SIL 29-100 which recommends inspections of the hydraulic lines in the mid pylon area to identify signs of chafing. They have also introduced new modified hydraulic lines with a reduced bend tolerance. The operator has implemented the recommendation of the SIL and inspections of the mid pylon area will be carried out on all affected aircraft during scheduled C Check maintenance inputs. They have also carried out a review of the spare hydraulic pipes held in stock to ensure that the full range of replacement pipes affected are available should the need arise. EasyJet A319 Aircraft operated for three days with a level one 'no dispatch' ADD. Flight crew arrived at the aircraft and checked the Tech Log. There was a level one ADD for AIR RH wing leak fault which is a no dispatch MEL entry. ADD had been open for three days. Aircraft had been operating under MEL item 36-00-01A for three days. MOC consulted and local engineers called. It was decided to do an engine ground run to investigate the fault. Engines were started with engine bleed valves selected closed and 'ECAM Air RH wing leak' appeared with no maintenance messages. It was decided this confirmed a leak detector fault which is a no dispatch item. The crew did not accept the aircraft. A further Tech Log entry was made to reflect the known situation, and the aircraft was left with maintenance staff for further investigation. CAA Closure: After being briefed by the Captain regarding the defect and on completion of the R WING AIR LEAK checks and WING LOOP C/B's RESET being unable to clear message, the Engineer on duty had declared the aircraft AOG, as MEL 36-22-02A did not have any provisions to permit service and MOC was informed. Passengers and crew disembarked and trouble shooting was performed to find any leaks. MOC called to say that if there is NO AIR LEAKS, NO BMC FAILURE and there is an AIR BLEED MAINT. MSG on the STATUS SD PAGE, the aircraft can be dispatched as per MEL 36-22-02A with reference to the note (FAILURE OF ONE LOOP IN ONE OR BOTH WING L/E IS INDICATED BY A MAINT.MSG DISPLAYED ON THE STATUS SD PAGE) refer Item 36-00-01 AIR BLEED MAINT. MSG. Considering the information from the MOC Duty Engineer and together with the Outbound Captain, all parties read the note on MEL 36-22-02A and the situation on aircraft matched the conditions: 1) No BMC FAILURES; 2) MESSAGE SHOWS R WING LOOP B; 3) MAINT.MSG ON STATUS SD PAGE. MOC Duty Engineer contacted the Chief Captain Pilot and he himself contacted the Outbound Captain, therefore it was understood that if there is a MAINT. MSG on SD page together with R WING AIR LEAK, the aircraft could be dispatched IAW MEL 36-22-02A as mentioned by the MOC Duty Engineer.

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This was followed for the next 3 days but on the 23-09-13 only ECAM AIR R WING appeared therefore, MEL that was raised no longer was valid if there is no MAINT MSG on SD. This was how the Eng, Captain, MOC Eng, and the Chief Pilot understood the release of the aircraft which was signed by the Engineer on duty and accepted by the outbound captain. Consulting the operators MEL item 36-22-02 there is no doubt that if one loop detects a wing leak and a message is displayed, that is a NO-GO condition. After confirming the R WING LOOP B and after consulting Operator technical staff, the Engineer on duty changed his decision. The contributing factor for Engineer on duty changing its initial decision is inserted in a cultural issue, which is related with human factors (complacency). This behaviour, passengers on board, the time pressure to release the aircraft to service, and Operator technical opinion contributed for the reduction the engineer level of confidence to make a correct evaluation of the maintenance scenario. A quality note was distributed in order to alert the engineers that all Customer/Operator/CAMO technical opinion should always be evaluated by comparing with all collected facts, as the final responsibility always belongs with the engineer that releases the maintenance task and not to the Customer/Operator/CAMO. British Airways A319 Birdstrike damage on radome and aileron. Daily inspection performed by SRT. Crew walk round reported damage on the RH aileron and evidence of a birdstrike on the radome. British Airways A320 Escape slide door assist bottles in disarm configuration. Door 1L, 1R and door 2R assist bottles in disarm configuration with the striker retracted. Door 1R bottle also had door actuator rig pin installed. CAA Closure: It was found that task cards to restore the ARM position after DRX Safety Pin Guide Fitting-Lube task to the emergency door had not been raised with the workpack thus the door remained in the dis-armed position. It was found that no robust review process by Part M for task cards written by a sub-contracted Part 145 organisation was in place. Action items have been raised against the organisation for clear departmental responsibilities allocated and defined. British Airways A320 Incorrect part fitted, spoiler elevator computer (SEC). During a review of serviceable stock in the stores, an unserviceable SEC unit was found and noted to have been removed from the aircraft and replaced with a unit which was of the incorrect standard. The aircraft therefore, had been operating in a non-certified configuration. British Airways A320 Brake pressure plate cracked in four places. Aircraft unserviceable. During the external inspection of the aircraft prior to the first sector of the day, two cracks were observed on the nr3 brake pressure plate. A Daily Check had been carried out overnight with no reports. Engineer checked the plates upon arrival and observed a further two cracks making it a total of four. Reporter states that this is the third occasion in two weeks where the plates were cracked. On the first occasion a/c dispatched with brakes deactivated.

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On the second occasion which occurred only two days ago, crew were nearly convinced by the engineer that they could dispatch with no action needed. Previous occasion explained and after engineer consulted manual he found that a crack in the plate is a no dispatch item. Brake unit had to be replaced. EasyJet A319 Incorrect installation of alternate brake control unit (ABCU). While performing task card on flushing of air data system nr2, the ABCU was found to be only electrically installed. ABCU left on insulation blankets, four bolts not installed. Unit inspected and reinstalled iaw AMM and operator informed. CAA Closure: The most likely scenario is that the ABCU was removed for access to the area behind the ABCU for another task, but there is no evidence to support this. Unfortunately it is not possible to investigate this further and positively determine where this error has occurred. EasyJet A319 Incomplete actions during maintenance. Aircraft had a blue system hydraulic pump fail. The pump was replaced and the aircraft departed. Engineer called MOC and advised that the clamp for the cooling duct was not fitted prior to release. MOC advised Ops and the aircraft was declared AOG. The area of the pump and ducting was inspected with no damage found and the clamp/bracket was despatched to the aircraft, fitted, tested and the aircraft declared serviceable. CAA Closure: During installation there was an incident with hydraulic fluid coming into contact with the technician's eyes. The technician was using personal glasses at the time. Safety glasses were available. The incident resulted in a break in the pump installation sequence and clamping of the hose was missed. Subsequent verification procedures did not revealed any malfunction. Tools verification and loose item check was only carried after aircraft departure. With tools / loose items verification procedure carried out after aircraft departure, loose clamp was found. The root cause was that time pressure was exacerbated due to passengers and crew being on board during the maintenance activity. Remedial actions taken; Acquisition of new safety goggles and the requirements will take into account the comfort factor for engineers that use personal glasses. This verification action will be replicated for other self protective equipment. A Quality Notice has been issued to remind engineers of the good practice of returning 3 steps back every time a task handover/interrupted occurs. In case of incidents the 2nd engineer shall recheck the tasks performed by the injured engineer. A Quality Notice was issued reminding engineers to perform the tool check prior to issuing the CRS. EasyJet A319 Station failing to comply with maintenance safety procedures, no evidence of secondary inspection carried out. During a random sampling of Tech Log pages, it was noticed that both engine cowls had been opened to enable maintenance to take place.

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There was an entry in the Tech Log to that effect. The subsequent closing of the cowlings was noted in the 'action taken' block but there was no evidence of a second independent inspection being carried out. CAA Closure: The engineer was contacted. He did the independent inspection iaw e-TPM 06-09 rev 09 chapter 3.2 / Group 2. The engineer performed the inspection twice, as the same engineer, as allowed by e-TPM. He did mention the “duplicate/independent” inspection in the W/O 4158956, but did not certify for the process twice. A second Tech log entry had not been opened in the Log book regarding the independent inspection performed as he was not sure about the process. The process and e-TPM has been reminded in the quality note 2013-12, dispatched to the line station on 20 Sept 2013. British Airways A319 Severe damage to RH landing light discovered during flight crew pre-flight inspection. RH landing light missing with just loose wires found. Engineering Daily Check had failed to note that the light was missing. Further inspection found evidence of a birdstrike in the adjacent area. CAA Closure: During the flight crew walk-round inspection it was discovered that the RH landing light sealed beam assembly was damaged with the filament assembly hanging from the unit retained with the power supply cables. The operator's Daily Check for the type includes a "General visual Inspection of Right / Left wing from ground as far as visible iaw AMM task 05-25-00-200-001, including landing light and cleanliness". The flight crew notified engineering of the landing light condition and Engineering subsequently replaced the sealed beam assembly after further inspection. A bird strike inspection as required by the AMM was also carried out which identified no additional contact areas beyond the immediate vicinity or damage. Blood stains were removed from the area around the landing light and the flaps, suggesting that the initial bird strike occurred with the flaps deployed, possibly during approach. A maintenance error investigation concluded that the root cause of the event was the failure of the staff member to correctly carry out the Daily Check inspection and was determined that the maintenance error was a mistake. Remedial action to be carried out by way of additional training and completion of three Daily Checks carried out under direct supervision. Easyjet A320 FOD reported on runway. Aircraft lining up reported FOD on the runway. On investigation it was discovered that it was speed tape roll which had originated from an aircraft following engineering work. Company contacted and engineer concerned realised that that the speed tape had been inadvertently left in the subject aircraft's undercarriage bay. This error is claimed to have been caused by human factors due to workload. EasyJet A319 Blocked pitot tube found on walk around. Tech Log entry from previous day indicated a discrepancy between the two PFDs and the ISIS airspeed.

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Engineering had cleared the aircraft to operate, however during a walk around the Captain's pitot tube was found to be partially blocked with either a large insect or bird debris. Engineering called to rectify. Monarch Airlines A321 Loose object found on top of nr2 engine pre-cooler. When inspecting nr2 engine for leakage the panel over the engine precooler was removed. On removal of panel a pair of crank nosed pliers were found laying on top of the precooler. The pliers had no identification marks. An inspection of the area where the pliers were found revealed no defects. British Airways A319 Incorrect routing of cable assembly on nr2 engine. During maintenance, the rearmost fan cowl latch on nr2 engine was found to be contacting the EEC fan harness during fan cowl opening/closing, thereby causing cable chafing and support clip displacement. The cable assembly appeared to be incorrectly routed and therefore susceptible to damage. Assessment, repair and rerouting of damaged cables carried out. A320 Monarch Loose APU panel. When replacing APU inlet actuator with access panel opened, it was found that the 'cat walk' panel had not been installed and was found lying loose. Four bolts were found in the APU firewall structure.