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A320

ENGINEERING

CONTINUATION TRAINING

Q3 & Q4 2015

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY

Contents:

1 Introduction & review of approval changes relating to the A320

2 ADs

3 A320 MOR – Maintenance Related

4 A320 Cowlings left unlatched

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1 Introduction / Changes to the A320 approval

The A320 approval was made active again in the Summer of 2014 to establish a line station in Libya. Due to the civil unrest in that country, the contract has been terminated and the line station closed.

2 A320 Airworthiness Directives (01/01/15 to 01/09/15)

(Note that engine “shop” visit & some structural ADs and revised ADs are not listed).

AD No.: 2014-0217R1

ATA 22/31 Auto Flight / Instruments – Stop Rudder Input Warning – Installation / Activation

Manufacturer(s):

Airbus (formerly Airbus Industries)

Applicability:

Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A318-121, A318-122, A319-111, A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-111, A321-112, A321-131, A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers

Reason:

Revision of previous AD relating to possibility of exceeding the allowable load limits on the vertical tail plane which could lead to, if not corrected, in the worst case, detachment of the vertical tail plane in flight and consequent loss of the aeroplane. Calls for the Introduction of warning(s)

AD No.: 2015-0021

ATA 71

Powerplant – Aft Engine Mount Retainers – Inspection /Replacement.

Manufacturer(s):

Airbus (formerly Airbus Industries)

Applicability:

Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A319-111, A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216, A321-111, A321-112, A321-211, A321-212 and A321-213 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

Reason:

During in-service inspections, several aft engine mount retainers, fitted on aeroplanes equipped with CFM56-5A/5B engines, have been found broken

To address this potential unsafe condition, EASA issued AD 2013-0050 to require detailed inspections (DET) of the aft

engine mount retainers and the replacement of all retainers with dull finish with retainers having a bright finish

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY

AD No.: 2015-0026R1

ATA 57

Wings – Wing Bottom Skin at Main Landing Gear Rib 5 – Inspection

Manufacturer(s):

Airbus (formerly Airbus Industries)

Applicability:

Airbus A319-115, A319-132, A319-133, A320-214, A320-216, A320-232 and A320-233 aeroplanes, manufacturer serial numbers (MSN) 5817, 5826, 5837, 5848, 5855, 5864, 5875, 5886, 5896, 5910, 5918 to 6705 inclusive (except MSN 6622, 6646 and 6659), 6710, 6721, 6732 and 6743.

Reason:

During production of wings, a number of taperlok fasteners were found failed after installation. The fasteners in question are located at the Main Landing Gear (MLG) reinforcing plate, bottom wing skin and Gear Support Rib 5 lower flange. Based on the results of the preliminary investigation, this affects only certain A319 and A320 aeroplanes delivered since January 2014. This condition, if not detected and corrected could reduce the design safety margin of the structure.

AD No.: 2015-0036R1

ATA 53

Fuselage – Fuselage Skin Repairs – Inspection

Manufacturer(s):

Airbus (formerly Airbus Industries)

Applicability:

Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A318-121, A318-122, A319-111, A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-111, A321-112, A321-131, A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

Reason:

Thresholds defined in the current Structural Repair manual (SRM) for the A320 family skin repairs

are insufficient to detect possible cracks which appear after repairs. The findings are limited to 1.2 mm fuselage skin and cover all cut-out external repairs. The internal repairs are not affected.

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY

AD No.: 2015-0038

ATA 71

Powerplant – Forward Engine Mount – Inspection

Manufacturer(s):

Airbus (formerly Airbus Industries)

Applicability:

Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A319-111, A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216, A321-111, A321-112, A321-211, A321-212 and A321-213 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

Reason:

Under test a CFM56-5A/5B forward engine mount experienced a failure before reaching the threshold/interval for the detailed inspection of that forward engine mount, as identified in Airbus A318/A319/A320/A321 Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) For the reasons described above, this AD requires implementation of a reduced threshold and interval for the detailed inspections (DET) of the forward engine mount on both right hand (RH) and left hand (LH) sides, as specified in the ALS, task 712111-01.

AD No .: 2015-0051

ATA 54

Nacelles / Pylons – Aft Pylon Moveable Fairing Rib 5 – Inspection / Repair

Manufacturer(s):

Airbus (formerly Airbus Industries)

Applicability:

Airbus A318-121, A318-122, A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-131, A321-231 and A321-232 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers that have received Airbus modification (mod) 33847 (IAE V2500 engines) or mod 33687 (PW6000 engines) in production, which introduce an improved aerodynamic pylon shape.

Reason:

An operator of A320 family aeroplanes reported an in-flight loss of the Right Hand (RH) aft pylon moveable fairing tail cone on a post mod 33847 pylon. The investigation results indicate that the incident was caused by cracks in the aft pylon moveable fairing Rib 5.

Requires repetitive detailed inspections (DET) of the Aft-pylon moveable fairings and, depending on findings, accomplishment of the applicable corrective actions

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY

AD.:2015-0062

ATA - 53 Fuselage – Keel Beam Side Panels – Inspection

Manufacturer Airbus (formerly Airbus Industrie)

Applicability Airbus A319-111, A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-231, A320-232 and A320-233 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers, except those having embodied Airbus modification (mod) 30355 in production.

Reason During certification structural fatigue tests, several cases of structural damage (cracks) have been found on keel beam side panels. Cracks were observed on both sides of the keel beam around the rivets below the center wing box between frame (FR) 40 and FR 42, and in part of the area of the upper elliptical cut out forward of FR 41. This condition, if not detected and corrected, would adversely affect the structural integrity of the aeroplane. To address this unsafe condition, DGAC

AD.:2015-0080 ATA 27

Flight Controls – Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer Actuator – Identification / Replacement

Manufacturer Airbus (formerly Airbus Industrie)

Applicability Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A318-121, A318-122, A319-111, A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-111, A321-112, A321-131, A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

Reason During tests on a similar designed actuator used on another Airbus type a partial loss of the no-back brake (NBB) efficiency was experienced. Investigation results concluded that this particular malfunction was due to an ageing/endurance issue of the surfaces of the NBB carbon friction disks, leading to a partial loss of braking efficiency in some specific aerodynamic load conditions This condition, if not detected and corrected, and in conjunction with the power gear train not able to keep the ball screw in its last commanded position, could lead to an uncommanded movement of the THS, possibly resulting in loss of control of the aeroplane

This AD requires the removal from service of each affected THSA

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY

AD.:2015-0088RI ATA 27

Flight Controls – Elevator Aileron Computers – Replacement / Software Update

Manufacturer Airbus (formerly Airbus Industrie)

Applicability Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A318-121, A318-122, A319-111, A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-111, A321-112, A321-131, A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers (MSN).

Reason This is a revision to 2015-0088 and corrects the list of effected ELACs adding an extra Part No which was inadvertently omitted. NB The latest elevator aileron computer (ELAC) standard, L97+, implements enhanced Angle of Attack (AOA) monitoring in order to better detect cases of AOA blockage, including multiple AOA blockage.

AD.:2015-0117

ATA 35 Oxygen – Chemical Oxygen Generators – Replacement

Manufacturer Airbus (formerly Airbus Industrie)

Applicability Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A318-121, A318-122, A319-111, A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-111, A321-112, A321-131, A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232 aeroplane models, all manufacturer serial numbers, except those that have embodied Airbus modification 33125 (gaseous system for all oxygen containers) in production.

Reason Reports have been received indicating premature ageing of certain chemical oxygen generators, Part Number (P/N) 117042-XX (XX representing any numerical value), manufactured by B/E Aerospace. Some operators reported that when they tried to activate generators, some older units failed to activate. Given the number of failed units reported, all generators manufactured in 1999, 2000 and 2001 were considered unreliable

Consequently, EASA issued AD 2014-0275 (later revised) to require identification and replacement of the affected oxygen generators.

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY

AD.:2015-0135 ATA 34 Navigation – Angle of Attack Sensors –

Replacement

Manufacturer Airbus (formerly Airbus Industrie)

Applicability Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A318-121, A318-122, A319-111, A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-111, A321-112, A321-131, A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers.

Reason An occurrence was reported where an Airbus A321 aeroplane encountered a blockage of two Angle of Attack (AOA) probes during climb, leading to activation of the Alpha Protection (Alpha Prot) while the Mach number increased. The flight crew managed to regain full control and the flight landed uneventfully. When Alpha Prot is activated due to blocked AOA probes, the flight control laws order a continuous nose down pitch rate that, in a worst case scenario, cannot be stopped with backward sidestick inputs, even in the full backward position. If the Mach number increases during a nose down order, the AOA value of the Alpha Prot will continue to decrease. As a result, the flight control laws will continue to order a nose down pitch rate, even if the speed is above minimum selectable speed, known as VLS. This condition, if not corrected, could result in loss of control of the aeroplane. NB This AD revises several previous ADs and changes compliancy dates but still calls for replacement of certain P/N A of A sensors

AD.:2015-0164 ATA 25

Equipment / Furnishings – Overhead Stowage Compartment Attachments – Modification

Manufacturer Airbus (formerly Airbus Industrie)

Applicability Airbus A321-211 and A321-231 aeroplanes, manufacturer serial numbers 3191, 3217, 3241, 3251, 3267, 3334, 3459, 3493, 3507, 3552, 3566, 3587, 3645, 3681, 3764, 3784, 3847, 3867, 3920, 3934, 3938, 3951, 3981, 4058, 4074, 4099, 4103, 4116, 4148, 4184, 4189, 4194, 4217, 4224, 4230, 4266, 4271, 4274, 4292, 4299, 4338, 4341, 4369, 4387, 4416, 4430, 4461 and 4500.

Reason The overhead stowage compartments (OHSC), located at Frame 47.2 left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) side of the fuselage in certain aeroplanes are currently installed with a flat headed pin at the upper attachment point. This attachment may fail during the life of the aeroplane if maximum loading is experienced in certain phases of flight. For the reason described above, this AD requires modification of the affected OHSC attachments

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY

AD.:2015-0170

ATA 92 Electric and Electronic Common Installation – Cockpit Panel Bracket – Inspection

Manufacturer Airbus (formerly Airbus Industrie)

Applicability Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A318-121, A318-122, A319-111, A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-111, A321-112, A321-131, A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers, except those on which Airbus modification (mod) 35869 has been embodied in production

Reason During an unscheduled maintenance operation on an A330 aeroplane, the 10VU rack was removed for access and cracks were discovered on 10VU rack side fittings on lugs 1, 3 and 4. As a similar design is installed on A320 family aeroplanes, a sampling review was done to determine the possible fleet impact. The result showed that several aeroplanes had cracked or broken 10VU rack side fittings. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to a high vibration level on the primary flight- and navigation displays during critical flight phases (take-off and landing), possibly creating reading difficulties for the crew. For the reasons described above, this AD requires repetitive detailed inspections (DET) of the affected 10VU rack fitting lugs and, depending on findings, accomplishment of a repair.

FAA-2015-15-12 Airbus ATA 53/44 Cracking of the in-flight entertainment system radome

assembly.

Manufacturer Airbus (formerly Airbus Industrie)

Applicability Certain Airbus Model A318, A319, and A320 series airplanes modified by a particular supplemental type certificate (STC) holder

Reason This AD was prompted by reports of cracks found during inspections of the in-flight entertainment system radome assembly. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in the in-flight entertainment system radome assembly, which could result in the radome (or pieces) separating from the airplane and striking the tail, consequently reducing the control of the airplane. This AD requires detailed inspections for cracks in the radome assembly, and replacement of the radome if necessary

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY

AD.:2015-051 ATA 53

Fuselage – Pressure Panel Longitudinal Beams – Inspection / Repair / Modification

Manufacturer Airbus (formerly Airbus Industrie) Applicability Airbus A318-111, A318-112, A318-121, A318-122, A319-

111, A319-112, A319-113, A319-114, A319-115, A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-211, A320-212, A320-214, A320-215, A320-216, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-111, A321-112, A321-131, A321-211, A321-212, A321-213, A321-231 and A321-232 aeroplanes, all manufacturer serial numbers (MSN), except those having embodied modification (mod) 151574 in production.

Reason During fatigue tests, cracks were found around the fasteners connecting the pressure panel with the flexible bracket at fuselage frame (FR) 36, adjacent to the longitudinal beams on left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) sides. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could impair the structural integrity of the aeroplane NB this AD supersedes earlier ADs on the same subject and includes further inspections for extra cracks which have come to light.

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY

3 A320 Family – Maintenance Related MOR

The following are examples of maintenance related MORs taken from the UK CAA MOR digest for the first part of 2015. As the information is protected and strictly controlled by the UK CAA, it is respectfully requested that this information is not circulated. NB A318/319/320/321 all annotated as A320 Easyjet A320 Uncommanded trim wheel movement.

Setting trim IAW normal after start procedures, it became apparent the pitch trim wheel was motoring to its limits whichever way the trim wheel had been moved. Sought advice from MOC & returned to stand.

Easyjet A320 Smoke in cabin. Smell and light smoke reported in the cabin by cabin crew when the apu bleed was switched on. Bleed switched off and the smell dissipated. Moc called and an Engineer attended the aircraft. Tech log raised and smell in aircraft report generated. Swapped to another aircraft to continue the service. The entire was prior to boarding passengers. NB this is a recurring problem with the A320 family manifesting itself as unusual smells or smoke often associated with starting the APU

Easyjet A320 Loss of FO's speed tape during descent. In descent, FO who was pm, noticed he had lost his speed tape, which had reverted to grey and red warnings. No accompanying ecam. Air data was switched to fo3 which brought screen back. Status was now showing cat3 single only. Air data put back to norm and screen remained ok. Remained cat3 single.

Thomas Cook Airlines A321 First Officer's lap belt detached from seat frame. During cruise FO adjusted seat belt lap straps and the right hand side detached from the seat frame. Aircraft had just returned from a C check.

Easyjet A320 Gear up lock failed. After raising gear "Gear not locked" and "Gear doors not closed" displayed on ECAM. Gear recycled as per ECAM instructions and gear retracted normally. Aircraft diverted at request of Ops.

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Easyjet A320 Aircraft released without completion of applicable maintenance task. Subject aircraft suffered a failure of the blue hydraulic system electric pump during flight. Upon arrival, the aircraft was declared AOG. Investigations revealed hydraulic electric pump replacement was required. The replacement of the hydraulic pump was performed however the case drain filter replacement appears to not have been carried out. No evidence of the filter replacement being carried out on either the TLP or applicable work order. Aircraft maintenance manual task 29-12-51-400-001-a. Installation of the electric pump requires the replacement of this filter as part of the electric pump replacement. The required filter was ordered against the subject work order but was not booked out. This could just be a paper work discrepancy. This issue was brought to the attention of MOC by fleet engineering staff.

Easyjet A320 Navigation system failure resulting in loss of air data during windshear go-around and flap overspeed.

MEL item requires in icing conditions to turn off ADR 2. CM1 PF due conditions. Radar vectored approach to rwy 23. wind (ATIS) 150/17, normal ils (albeit very turbulent) down to 900ft approx. Reactive windshear warning from a/c so cm1 "windshear toga" upon selecting TOGA thrust, we lost all speed, heading and flight guidance (f/d), FMA indications together with a/pilot, a/thrust and I glimpsed multiple ECAM on e/wd. (I am unable to tell what they were as once we levelled off they had disappeared). Since losing all the flight data I decided to try to turn ADR 2 back on in an attempt to regain indications, this worked but as we regained indications we were above flap limit speed and we got a flap overspeed I conf 1+f. Upon reinstating adr2 we regained heading, speed, f/d, a/thrust and FMA. FMA stated 2fd2 so I tried to reinstate a/p 2 but to no avail. We informed ATC we had a navigational failure and was told to maintain heading and climb 4000ft. Once we levelled off and were happy that the a/c was flying safely I did DODAR and nits, due to the workload I asked the cm to do a pa to passengers citing windshear. once, at this point I thought I would try to turn ADR 2 off again for a bit of diagnosis upon switching off we lost all the previously mentions indications, so turned it back on again. I asked ATC for delaying vectors (10mins) to prepare for the next approach which again was a radar vectored ILS to rwy 23 (still with ADR 2 on) approach was gusty and mod/severe turbulence as on the previous approach, with a high workload for us both, stable at 500 at 300ft approx we lost the a/thrust, I decided to continue, just in the flare we got a strong gust of approx 33kt we landed left of the centreline and fully use of rudder to get back towards the centreline. When we arrived on stand I phoned duty pilot and talked through with him. The engineers turned up to diagnose and I believe that we also had a FAC 2 fault (which was not presented on ECAM).

Easyjet A320 Landing gear brakes locked during landing.

On landing during deceleration (at about 100 kts), the plane starting veering to the right in a quick and abrupt movement. The brakes were released and the movement stopped. Quickly thereafter same thing happened again. We noticed the temperature on brake No 4 went up to 710 degrees. Aircraft brought to a stop on the runway and ATC notified. Aircraft unable to move as brake No. 4 permanently locked. After a BSCU reset (A/SKID / NWS) the brake No 4 released and we were able to taxi to stand. Fire brigade inspected wheel/tire. No damage found. Cabin crew and pax briefed / debriefed. Techlog entry made. NB Similar Incident reported at later date

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British Airways A320 During function check of ram air turbine, blue hydraulic electric pump seized. During function check of ram air turbine, blue hydraulic electric pump seized. Pump replaced and rat function performed again causing a second pump seizure. Troubleshooting led to a damaged blue hydraulic system check valve. Check valve replaced as per amm: 29-12-36-400-001-a. Rev: 63 and blue hydraulic electric pump replaced again. Rat function now satisfactory. Due to suspect check valve (still in my possession if further investigation required)

British Airways A320 Windshield arcing followed by cracking.

At 5000ft after departure, windshield arcing noticed in top right corner of right windshield. QRH 8.13 Windshield/window arcing actioned, cb AF03 pulled and arcing ceased. Approximately 1 minute after cb pulled bang heard and windshield seen to be cracked. QRH 8.14 actioned and internal pane assessed as intact. Elected to cruise at FL180 and 250kts. Elected to cruise at FL180 and 250kts. Maintrol informed and consulted. Flight continued and landed uneventfully.

Monarch Airlines Ltd A320 Flaps locked on approach. On approach to runway 33 Flap 1 was requested at approximately 3700ft. Flap 1 was selected which was followed by an ECAM caution F/CTL FLAPS LOCKED wing tip brake. Flaps locked at 0 with slats operating normally. ATC informed and radar vectors requested to perform ECAM actions and calculate landing distance required. Landing distance available was greater that landing distance required so the decision was made to land. ATC informed and radar vectors requested to the ILS for runway 33. A flapless landing was performed with an approach speed of 157kts. Aircraft taxied to stand with no further problems. Investigation under 201413511.

4. Accident to Airbus A319-131 at LHR 24th

May 2013 - loss of Fan Cowl doors from both engines.

During take-off from runway 27 left at LHR the fan cowls detached from both engines damaging the aircraft and a number of aircraft systems. The crew elected to return to LHR however on approach leaking fuel from a damaged fuel pipe on the Right engine ignited and an external fire developed. The crew shut down the Right engine and the aircraft made a successful single engine emergency landing.

The subsequent investigation determined that a maintenance error had resulted in both

the Left and Right Fan cowls being left unlatched following overnight scheduled maintenance on the aircraft. The unlatched condition of the fan cowl doors was not identified prior to the aircraft’s departure the next morning by Maintenance, the Flight Crew or the Tug Team

This, and numerous other similar events, shows that Airbus A320-family aircraft have a

history of departing with the fan cowl doors unlatched. It is also evident that, in practice, the flight crew walk-around inspection is not entirely effective in detecting unlatched fan cowl doors and therefore a design solution is necessary. Enhanced methods of detection through design solutions are being considered by the aircraft manufacturer.

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY

Previous to this accident there had been 34 other instances of cowl loss on A320 family

aircraft made up of 21 on V2500 powered a/c and 13 on CFM56-5 powered a/c. Subsequently following this accident there have been three more reports of A320 cowl loss.

For a visual appreciation of the hardware involved and the various conditions which must

be recognized please read on!

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY

Fig 2(a) Right Hand engine showing gap with nose cowl when not locked and Fig 2(b) subsequent Engine damage

Fig 3 Fan Cowls Opening / Closing (V2500)

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY

Fig 4 Showing various latch conditions

The investigators concluded that a number of organizational factors were contributory to this maintenance error. The operator has subsequently taken action to address these issues.

As a result of this investigation, five Safety Recommendations have been made concerning:

1. Fatigue risk management (recommendation to EASA); 2. Fan cowl door position warnings (recommendation to EASA); 3. Fan cowl door certification requirements (recommendation to EASA); 4. In-flight damage assessments by cabin crew (recommendation to operator) and 5. Aircraft evacuation procedures (recommendation to operator).

NB For a full discussion on the Human Factors elements (includes organizational factors) involved in this accident please refer to the HF section of this Continuation Training Document

Conclusion

Look out for the obvious and if necessary you may have to kneel down to take a closer look at the four latches - don’t be part of the next incident.

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FOR REFERENCE ONLY