a troubled triangle

IntroductionHaleh Esfandiari, Director, Middle East ProgramAfghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan can be char-acterized as three neighbors each followingtheir own agendas. In the quarter-centurysince the Islamic Republic came to power inIran, the countries have been going throughrelationship phases that can be referred to atbest as not so smooth—if not hostile attimes. Iran shares more than 500 miles of itsborder with each Afghanistan and Pakistan.The populations in both Afghanistan andPakistan are comprised of a Sunni majorityand Shiite minority. As the only Shiite coun-try in this Troubled Triangle, Iran is com-pelled to react to events affecting Shiites inAfghanistan and Pakistan.

In 1997, when the Hazaras were massacredand a number of Iranian diplomats were killed

in Mazar-i Sharif, Iran amassed its troops atthe border with Afghanistan. It took a greatdeal of effort and diplomacy to diffuse the ten-sion between the two countries. WhilePakistan had relations with and condoned theactions of the Taliban, Iran condemned theTaliban’s treatment of women and the excessesthat were perpetrated under the name ofIslam. Iran supported the anti-TalibanNorthern Alliance and later established closecontacts with Isma’il Khan, the post-Talibangovernor of Herat. Iran’s relations withPakistan have been both bumpy and intimate.Iran’s ability to buy nuclear facilities fromPakistan attests to a closeness of relationsbetween influential elements in both govern-ments. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s close relation-ship with the U.S. has created much concernamong the Iranian leadership.

MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM

A Troubled Triangle:Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan in Strategic Perspective

Afghanistan: Crossroads ofa Troubled Region 4

Pakistan-Iran-AfghanistanRelations: Looking Beyond

the Troubled Triangle 8

Iran’s Strategic Perspective on Afghanistan

and Pakistan 12

SPRING 2005

OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES

This publication was made possible through a grant from the Ford Foundation and the supportof the Open Society Institute.

As part of an ongoing series on Iranian for-eign policy toward its eastern neighbors, theMiddle East and Asia Programs of theWoodrow Wilson International Center forScholars hosted a meeting on April 24, 2005entitled “A Troubled Triangle: Afghanistan,Iran, and Pakistan in Strategic Perspective.” Atthis meeting, co-sponsored with the AschianaFoundation, speakers analyzed howAfghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan evaluate eachother from a strategic standpoint. Three expertsin the field, Larry P. Goodson, Ayesha Siddiqa,and Vali Nasr, spoke at the Wilson Center andaddressed relations between these countries.

Larry P. Goodson referred to Afghanistan asa place where superpowers of the 19th century,Britain and Russia, and now Iran and Pakistan,play out their strategic rivalries. After theSoviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989,Pakistan and Iran strove to influence variouswarring factions in the country. [See the websiteof the Wilson Center’s Cold War InternationalHistory Project for a summary of the event,“Towards a International History of the SovietInvasion of Afghanistan 1980–1989”www.wilsoncenter.org/cwihp]. Dr. Goodson dis-cussed how the events of 9/11 provoked theU.S. to become involved directly in the regionby overthrowing the Taliban and forging astrategic alliance with Pakistan, leaving Iranout of the equation. He noted that PresidentHamid Karzai’s Afghan government has triedto diffuse the tension by reaching out to Iranand Pakistan. It is easier for Afghanistan to fos-ter a close relationship with Pakistan than withIran, Dr. Goodson explained, since such coop-eration is blessed by the U.S. On the otherhand, Dr. Goodson noted that Karzai needsIran’s cooperation for economic developmentand political stability.

Ayesha Siddiqa called the relations betweenthe three countries “uneasy” and “difficult.”Putting this relationship in a historical context,she explained Pakistan’s desire to be the domi-nant Islamic and strategically secure country inthe region. She described relations betweenPakistan and Iran under the Iranian monarchyas very close, noting that Iran even helpedPakistan with technical assistance during the

MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES SPRING 2005

About the Middle East Program

The Middle East Program was launched in February 1998 in light ofincreased U.S. engagement and the profound changes sweeping acrossmany Middle Eastern states. In addition to spotlighting day-to-day issues, theProgram continues to concentrate on long-term developments and theirimpact on political and social structure, economic development, and rela-tions with the United States.

The Middle East Program draws on domestic and foreign regionalexperts for its meetings, conferences, and occasional papers. Conferencesand meetings assess the policy implications of long-term political, social,and economic developments in the region and individual states; the MiddleEast's role in the international arena; American interests in the region; thethreat of terrorism; and strategic threats to and from the regional states.

The Program pays special attention to the role of women,youth, civil society institutions, Islam, and democratic andautocratic tendencies. In addition, the Middle East Programhosts programs on cultural issues, including contemporaryart and literature in the region.

• Current Affairs: The Middle East Program emphasizes analysis of cur-rent issues and their implications for long-term developments in the region,including Arab-Israeli diplomacy, Iraq and its neighbors, political partici-pation, globalization, technology transfer, U.S. foreign policy, economicand political partnerships, and the impact of developments in CentralAsia and the Caucasus.

• Gender Issues: The Middle East Program examines employment pat-terns, education, legal rights, and political participation of women in theregion. The role of women in advancing civil society, the problem of traf-ficking in women, and the attitudes of governments and the clerical com-munity toward women's rights are areas to which the Program devotesconsiderable attention. The Program also has a keen interest in exploringwomen's increasing roles in conflict prevention and post-conflict recon-struction activities.

• Islam, Democracy and Civil Society: The Middle East Programmonitors the growing demand of people in the region for democratiza-tion, accountable government, the rule of law, and adherence to interna-tional conventions on topics such as human rights and women's rights. Itcontinues to examine the role of Islamic movements in shaping politicaland social developments and the variety of factors that favor or obstructthe expansion of civil society.

Director, Dr. Haleh EsfandiariAssociate, Jillian FrumkinAssistant, Julia Bennett

Special thanks to: Jillian Frumkin for coordinating this publication; JuliaBennett and Evan Hensleigh for their editing assistance; and Lianne Hepler fordesigning the Occasional Paper Series. Photos by David Hawxhurst.

1965 Indo-Pakistani War with India. Dr.Siddiqa argued that as Pakistan’s interests inCentral Asia grew, Pakistan distanced itselffrom Iran and established closer ties withAfghanistan. Since 9/11, Pakistan and the U.S.have had close ties, and Pakistan has embraceda continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan.Nevertheless, Pakistan has strongly opposedany military intervention against Iran, lest itlead to destabilization in the region. Dr.Siddiqa emphasized the importance of consid-ering relations between the neighbors in thecontext of external foreign powers’ influenceon the region.

Dr. Nasr talked about the Iranian perspec-tive vis-à-vis Pakistan and Afghanistan, argu-ing that throughout the 1980s, an alliance wasforged between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan tobuild a “Sunni wall” that would limit Iran’sinfluence on the Shiite populations of itsneighboring countries. After 9/11, he said,Iran’s objectives included ensuring that the“Sunni wall” was dismantled, gaining influ-ence in Afghanistan once the Taliban wasdefeated, and rekindling a dialogue withWashington based on cooperation in

Afghanistan. Dr. Nasr explained that Iranwould benefit from a stable Afghanistan and acentral government that can control the flowof drugs into Iran and entice Afghan refugeesin Iran to return to Afghanistan. Dr. Nasr alsonoted that Iran is concerned about the ever-growing rapprochement between the U.S. andPakistan’s government, particularly regardingthe possibility of U.S. military bases inAfghanistan and Pakistan—especially insouthern Baluchistan. The most contentiousissues between Iran and Pakistan are the devel-opment of Iran’s nuclear energy and Pakistan’sinvolvement through A.Q. Khan, as well asIran’s recent rapprochement with India.

* * *Many thanks to Robert Hathaway, Director ofthe Asia Program, his wonderful colleagues,and especially Wilson Lee, who was the drivingforce behind putting this meeting together.Many thanks also to the Middle East Program’sAssociate, Jillian Frumkin, and Assistant, JuliaBennett, for their organizational skills andwork on this publication. Finally, thanks to theMiddle East Program’s intern, Evan Hensleigh,for his programming assistance.

3


Afghanistan’s status as a regional actor hasalways been a mixture of hinterland, bufferstate, and crossroads, often all at the same time.Indeed, Afghanistan was always considered theland beyond the “back of beyond.” As a hinter-land, its rugged terrain and geographical posi-tion in the heart of inner Asia made it remote.This was especially so following the decline ofthe Mongol Empire and the opening of sealanes of economic transport in the 16th centu-ry, which reduced the importance of arduousoverland trade via the historic Silk Road.Afghanistan’s increasing remoteness in the 19thand 20th centuries contributed to its lack ofeconomic development upon independence in1919 and in the decades that followed.

As a buffer state, Afghanistan stood betweenexpansionist Russian and British empires dur-ing the 19th century “Great Game,” and thenbetween their successors in the 20th century,the Soviet Union and the United States, whocompeted for Afghanistan’s affections andinfluence through aid and diplomacy.Afghanistan has also become a place wherePakistan and Iran’s own geopolitical ambitionsand rivalries could play out. Each country haslong sought to thwart the other, and their rival-ry grew increasingly problematic with thedemise of the Soviet Union and the desires ofboth countries to expand their influence in theregion through Afghanistan.

It is as a crossroads that Afghanistan has itsmost enduring status, captured romanticallyin modern imagination as a southern hub ofthe ancient Silk Road. Indeed, whileAfghanistan has always been a place throughwhich commerce passed, it has also been ahighway for some of history’s most celebratedmilitary leaders and their armies, fromAlexander to Genghis Khan to Tamerlane tothe founders of the Moghul Dynasty in India.In the modern era, Afghanistan has continuedto be shaped, despite its forbidding terrain, bythe armies and traded goods that pass across itsborders, whether the Soviet Army in 1979 or

the burgeoning heroin traffic some 25 yearslater. As a crossroads, Afghanistan is also thelinchpin of Asia, tying together Central Asia,Southwest Asia, and South Asia, and linkingPersian, Pakistani, Indian, Chinese, Russian,and Turkic cultures.

Modern HistoryThe events of the last quarter-century openedAfghanistan up to substantial outside influ-ences yet again. This time, the country hasbeen transformed by full-scale invasion andoccupation by Russian and Central Asian mil-itary forces with alien socio-economic-politicalsystems; a concomitant refugee flow thatregionalized the Afghanistan problem; cross-border insurgency out of Pakistan, and less soIran; and a subsequent sense by Afghanistan’sneighbors that their continued meddling inAfghanistan’s affairs was warranted and neces-sary after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Unionjust three years after its withdrawal fromAfghanistan opened up the prospects of tradewith Central Asia, a region long closed to itssouthern neighbors — which fully re-energizedAfghanistan’s crossroads status again. Yet,Afghanistan’s renewed regional centrality alsoemboldened its neighbors, freed from the longSoviet shadow at last, to begin usingAfghanistan as a convenient backyard for theirregional geopolitical aspirations.

Thus, during the 1990s through late 2001,as the country convulsed in a long civil warfought by internal militias who were proxyarmies for regional rivals, legal trade throughAfghanistan languished while illegal smugglingand the drug traffic grew. GulbuddinHekmatyar’s Hezb-i Islami and later theTaliban were supported by Pakistan. TheHazara party Hezb-i Wahdat was supported byIran. Rashid Dostum’s Uzbek militia Jumbish-i-Milli was supported by Russia andUzbekistan. The Tajik-dominated Shura-i-Nazar of Ahmad Shah Massoud was supported4

Afghanistan: Crossroads of a Troubled RegionBy Larry P. Goodson, Professor of Middle East Studies, U.S. Army War College

Larry P. Goodson

by Iran, Russia, India, and other regionalactors. Much of this regional geopolitical med-dling was made possible by American disen-gagement following the Soviet withdrawal,proving that whatever Afghanistan was to itsregional neighbors, to much of the world itremained a backwater, or hinterland, still.

September 11, 2001 changed the strategiccalculus concerning Afghanistan and its neigh-bors, and importantly, the change in the calcu-lus began in Washington. Prior to 9/11,Washington had limited influence in theTroubled Triangle of Afghanistan, Iran, andPakistan, as it had undergone diplomatic dis-engagement with all three countries. TheUnited States has had a troubled relationshipwith Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution,which led to a suspension of diplomatic rela-tions by the U.S. in 1980 and extensive eco-nomic sanctions. Iran’s pursuit of weapons ofmass destruction and known links to Islamistterrorist groups led to a further deteriorationfollowing 9/11, and Iran was listed as a mem-ber of the “Axis of Evil” by President GeorgeW. Bush in January 2002. The U.S. also hadno diplomatic relations with the Taliban gov-ernment in Afghanistan and had imposedsanctions there in 1999 over the Taliban’srefusal to hand over Al-Qa’ida terrorist master-

mind Osama bin Laden. While the U.S. didhave diplomatic relations with Pakistan on9/11, official disapproval of the military coupthat brought General Pervez Musharraf topower was issued in October 1999 and furtherstrained what were already very cool relations,due to Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998.Sanctions on Pakistan had been imposed bythe U.S. in 1998 and were strengthened fol-lowing the military takeover in 1999.

September 11, 2001 caused the UnitedStates to see the world in terms of the GlobalWar on Terrorism threat, prompting a funda-mental change to its policy of trying to containand isolate that threat in the Troubled Triangle.A full re-engagement with Afghanistan wasfacilitated initially through a military effort totopple the Taliban, as well as with some quietback-channel cooperation with Iran to producethe Bonn Accords, which would provide thefoundation for the subsequent successful polit-ical transformation of Afghanistan. Americanengagement with Iran was short-lived, as neo-conservative voices grew dominant within theU.S. foreign policy community. Iran’s geo-graphic position and Pakistan’s role as a patronof the Taliban made rehabilitating the floun-dering relationship with Pakistan an urgentAmerican priority; and the “You’re either with 5

AFGHANISTAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS RESULTS - 2004 Leading Candidate by Province

KHOSTKarzai 96%

PAKTIA

Karzai

96%

LOGARKarzai 87%

KABULKarzai 53%

NANGERHARKarzai 95%

NOORISTANKarzai 58%

KUNARHAKarzai 95%

KAPISAQanooni 41%

PARWANQanooni 58%

PANJSHERQanooni 94%

BADGHISKarzai 61%

HERATKarzai 58%

FARAHKarzai 75%

NEEMROZKarzai 89%

HELMANDKarzai 90%

KANDAHARKarzai 91%

ZABULKarzai 86%

PAKTIKAKarzai 88%

GHAZNIKarzai 52%

WARDAKKarzai 61%

BALKHKarzai 30%

KUNDUZKarzai 46%

LAGHMANKarzai 88%

GHORQanooni 46%

FARYABDostum 73%

JOZJANDostum 78% TAKHAR

Dostum 39%

SAR-I-PULDostum 48%

SAMANGANQanooni 38%

DIAKONDYMohaqiq 84%

BAMYANMohaqiq 76%

BAGHLANQanooni 39%

BADAKHSHANQanooni 40%

UROZGANKarzai 77%

Not AvailableAhmadzaiAryanAsifiDabirDostumGianiJalalKarzaiKhalizaiMangalMansoorMohaqiqNedseeNirabiPeframQuanooniRashidSerat

Source: http://www.elections-afghanistan.org.af/Election%20Results%20Website/english/english.htm


6

us or against us in the fight against ter-ror” message of President Bush forced hiscounterpart in Pakistan to choose the U.S.1

Lastly, the U.S. needed access to northernAfghanistan and thus rapidly strengthened tiesand developed military bases in Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Suddenly,Afghanistan became the center of a web ofAmerican and international attention, whichcame just in time, as the Taliban and Al-Qa’idawere preparing for a final solution to the north-ern minorities problem.

The Afghanistan that the U.S. and interna-tional community re-discovered following9/11 was a wasteland, destroyed utterly by thequarter-century of comprehensive war. Thisreality meant that Afghanistan had to haveanother, hopefully temporary, status — that ofward of the U.S. and international communi-ty. Thus, Afghanistan’s foreign relations sincethe fall of the Taliban have been primarilyshaped by its position as a ward of the interna-tional community, particularly of the UnitedStates. Although Afghan President HamidKarzai has made multiple state visits to both

Pakistan and Iran since 2002, his major for-eign trips continue to be to the U.S. The inter-national community has also deepened itsinvolvement in Afghanistan, most notablywith the growing role of the North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) in running theInternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF)there and expanding its control from Kabulinto the northeastern and north-central partsof the country.

The Triangle TodayThe current situation in the region is that theU.S. — which has become an increasingly con-fident and engaged, although still somewhatreluctant, hegemonic actor — shapes eachcountry’s strategic calculus toward the other.Although Iran has managed to strengthen itscommercial influence in western Afghanistansubstantially, regional meddling in Afghanaffairs has been significantly constrained.Operating under Washington’s strategicumbrella, Karzai now has a window of oppor-tunity to re-develop the Afghan state withoutthe overweening involvement of meddlesomeneighbors. The son of a prominent Pushtuntribal leader, Karzai is acceptable to Pakistan,which wants a return on its prolonged andsizeable investment in Afghanistan. Karzai hasalso taken care to placate Iranian interests tosome extent, but buoyed by his close friend-ship with Washington, mostly he has concen-trated on the enormous job of rebuilding theAfghanistan state and society. Afghanistan hasreabsorbed over two million refugees in thelast three years, reducing the Iranian andPakistani refugee burdens. Important tradelinks through western Afghanistan have re-opened, and Iranian commercial initiatives arebenefiting from the development of the mostrehabilitated road network in Afghanistan bytrucking significant consumer goods intoAfghanistan and on into Pakistan. Deals forelectricity supply in western Afghanistan nowexist with both Iran and Turkmenistan.

Afghanistan’s major imperative withPakistan is the ongoing support the Talibancontinue to enjoy in that country, especially inthose Pakistani provinces and areas adjoiningAfghanistan, such as Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier Province, and the FederallyAdministered Tribal Agencies, or FATA. Mucheffort has been expended on altering that sup-portive relationship, as Afghanistan’s 2,250-kilometer border with Pakistan remains disput-ed and highly porous, traversing some of themost rugged and remote terrain on the planet.A Tripartite Commission of military and diplo-matic officials from Afghanistan, Pakistan, andthe United States was established in 2003 to

Operating under Washington’sstrategic umbrella, Karzai now

has a window of opportunity tore-develop the Afghan state with-out the overweening involvement

of meddlesome neighbors.

Notes1. President George W. Bush,in an Address to a Joint Sessionof Congress and the AmericanPeople on September 20, 2001.www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/print/20010920-8.html

7

expand security cooperation between the threecountries. The Commission has since metmore than ten times, stabilizing border prob-lems between Pakistan and Afghanistan andplaying an important role in facilitatingPakistan’s unprecedented security cooperationin the FATA, where Washington continues tobelieve that senior Al-Qa’ida leaders are holedup. In 2004, the Pakistani Army deployed70,000 troops into the FATA, primarily intothe South Waziristan Agency, in cooperationwith American-led operations on the Afghanside of the border. Similar operations areplanned for 2005. The U.S. has played a keyrole on the Tripartite Commission, especiallyin the Global War on Terrorism context, asU.S. commander in Afghanistan LieutenantGeneral David Barno is also a regional com-mander responsible for Pakistan and parts ofCentral Asia and chair of the TripartiteCommission. There will be a change in boththe military command (Barno is scheduled tobe replaced by Lieutenant General KarlEikenberry in May 2005) and diplomatic lead-ership (U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad isleaving Afghanistan to become U.S. ambassa-dor to Iraq), which may alter the geo-strategicsituation profoundly.2

Afghanistan still faces major challenges,and there remain long-term concerns in theregion about its prospects for stability, whichis essential if it is to be the hub of regionaltrade and not of regional unrest. These chal-lenges are interlinked and include the persist-ence of an anti-government, anti-Westerninsurgency (which continues to enjoy ongo-ing popular support in Pakistan); the contin-uing presence of warlord-led militias and therole they might play in complicated parlia-mentary elections scheduled for September2005; and the disturbing boom of the nar-cotics economy. Significant ethnic (Pushtun,Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek), linguistic (Dari,Pushtun), sectarian (Sunni, Shi’a), andregional divisions (most of the aforemen-tioned groups overlap into neighboring coun-tries, and have been clients of those states inthe past) persist and may resurface in the par-liamentary electoral process. The ethnic

breakdown of the October 2004 presidentialelection results suggests that ethnicity andallegiance to local warlords may be importantfactors in the September 2005 parliamentaryelections. Afghanistan’s one major product,opium, is now an important if illegal pillar ofits economy, making Afghanistan the hub of aregional and global heroin network that pro-vides almost 90% of the world’s heroin sup-ply. Deep rural poverty in Afghanistan com-bines with corruption among the police, cus-toms officials, and soldiers in all the regionalcountries to undercut significant officialefforts to crack down on this trade. The out-come of this struggle is still up in the air, asare the efforts of the Afghan government torevive the Trans-Afghan Pipeline (TAP) proj-ect to run an 850-kilometer pipeline from thegas fields of Turkmenistan through westernAfghanistan to Pakistan, and eventuallyonwards to the burgeoning consumer marketin India. Still, whether through licit or illicittrade, Afghanistan’s long-term economichopes are pinned firmly on the revival of itsstatus as the crossroads of Asia.

Thus, the major geo-strategic considera-tion for all the countries in the region, butespecially Afghanistan, concerns the length ofthe U.S. commitment there. There is acuterecognition that American disengagement inthe 1990s led to the destruction ofAfghanistan through the competitive med-dling of its neighbors, and many fear that aresumption of such meddling is likely in theabsence of a robust American engagement.The U.S. must help rebuild necessary infra-structure for Afghanistan to regain its cross-roads status and to continue to stifle the inter-ventionist impulses of its neighbors.Washington’s willingness to remain engagedin the region speeds the rebirth ofAfghanistan, strengthens Pakistan’s effort toavoid state failure, and may eventually pavethe way for renewed relations with Iran. IfWashington loses interest again, however,Afghanistan may become a crossroads ofnarco-terrorism and regional instability. Thegeo-strategic interests for the U.S. in theTroubled Triangle remain vital.

2. Many knowledgeable observersconsider the most powerful man in Afghanistan to be outgoingAmerican Ambassador ZalmayKhalilzad, with his deep and (afterNovember 2003) generous pock-ets, while the American command-er for the past two years inAfghanistan, Lt. Gen. David Barno,is, in a country full of warlords, the biggest warlord on the block.While Barno’s replacement,Eikenberry, is on the way, a newU.S. ambassador has not yet beennamed. Khalilzad’s unusual accessto the White House (he is also aPresidential Envoy who is close toPresident Bush) and to the Afghanleadership (he is Afghan-Americanand knows much of the currentAfghan leadership from his child-hood days) make him unique anddifficult to replace.


8

Since the 1990s, there has been much discus-sion about the uneasy relations betweenPakistan and Iran, and the equally difficult todefine relations between Pakistan andAfghanistan. In fact, the phrase TroubledTriangle suggests the presence of a geo-politi-cally unstable “critical core,” the security ofwhich might have regional and extra-regionalgeo-strategic implications. The independentsets of bilateral relations between the threecountries have not expanded into a trilateralframework in which any of the three countriescould smoothly manage relations amongst theothers. The inability to undertake a paradigmshift relates to the geo-strategic developmentin the region after the 1980s. Contrary to theview that the bilateral relations are “troubled,”my perception is that bilateral relations aretense due to divergent policies. However, theshared and divergent interests would not allowrelations between the three neighbors to dete-riorate to a point of hostility. There are sharedvalues and common interests that would allowthese countries to contribute positivelytowards each other’s security.

The existing analysis tends to see Pakistan-Iran relations largely in the context of thedevelopments in Afghanistan. The Pakistan-Iran confrontation over the political future ofAfghanistan, especially during the 1990s afterthe withdrawal of Soviet troops from Kabuland the end of the Cold War, has been the cen-terpiece of analysis. However, Pakistan’s rela-tions with Iran and Afghanistan need to beanalyzed in a historic framework rather thanin a post-December 1979 context.Furthermore, while India plays an importantrole, the changes in Pakistan’s Iran andAfghanistan policies were driven by otherobjectives as well. Islamabad’s desire for aleadership role in the region, especially in thecontext of the Muslim world and the evolu-

tion of its foreign and security policies fromdependence to independence, is a helpfulcontext in which to analyze these bilateralrelations. Finally, the two sets of relationsought to be analyzed in a three-dimensionalcontext including: (a) the progression ofPakistan’s security and foreign policies; (b) ahexagonal framework; and (c) the issue of reli-gious identity.

Pakistan’s Security and Foreign PoliciesOne of the key arguments of this paper is thatPakistan’s relations with Iran and Afghanistango beyond the linear Pakistan-India frame-work. Surely, this is a significant parameter.Traditionally, India enjoyed good ties withIran and Afghanistan. The relations betweenKabul and New Delhi date back to 1947 andbefore. Kabul was always considered hostile toPakistan, and this is what Islamabad sought tochange through its two decades of involve-ment in Afghanistan. Driven by its militaryobjectives, Pakistan’s main concern after thedeparture of Soviet forces and American assis-tance was to structure Afghanistan’s politics insuch a manner that it would cease to be athreat to or have the ability to collaborateagainst Pakistan. The support provided to thevarious warlords, and later the Taliban, estab-lished Pakistan’s stakes in Kabul. While 9/11changed the strategic environment, it did notdiminish Islamabad’s interests or capacity toaffect Afghanistan’s internal politics.Pakistan’s influence would certainly be diffi-cult to counter, even with India’s growingrelations with Kabul. Although Islamabad isdeeply upset about India’s bid to re-establishitself in Pakistan’s west—the apprehension isthat this would be used to destabilizePakistan—there are limits to New Delhi’sinfluence in Kabul. This factor needs to betaken into consideration.

Pakistan-Iran-Afghanistan Relations: Looking Beyond the Troubled Triangle By Ayesha Siddiqa, Pakistan Scholar, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars;Visiting Fellow, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Islamabad; Correspondent, Jane’s Defence Weekly

Ayesha Siddiqa

9

Similarly, there is concern regarding Iran-India relations. The development of the sea-port in Chahbahar, Iran with New Delhi’sassistance is seen as challenging Pakistan’s geo-strategic interests and Islamabad’s own devel-opment of the port at Gwadar. The relationsbetween the three countries at a bilateral levelmust be seen in the broader perspective of theevolution of Pakistan’s security and foreignpolicies moving from dependence to inde-pendence or from infancy to adolescence.

Pakistan-Iran relations can be divided intotwo phases: 1954–78 and 1978–2001 andbeyond. The joint membership of the U.S.-sponsored CENTO (Central TreatyOrganization), creation of the regional net-work (RCD), and military cooperationbetween the two countries was the hallmarkof the first period. Iran came to Pakistan’s helpduring the 1965 war and provided gunshiphelicopters that were used against Baluchinsurgents in the mid-1970s. This was theheyday of the friendly bilateral links betweenthe two neighbors.

The heyday of Pakistan-Iran relations alsomarked a turning point. Former PrimeMinister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s ambition ofturning Pakistan into the leader of the Muslimworld, and his ability to communicate withKabul, reduced Tehran’s political significancefor Islamabad. Moreover, Bhutto was interest-ed in the leadership role himself. Islamabad wasgradually growing to have a sense of its owngeo-political significance. The first Afghan warof the 1980s bolstered Pakistan’s confidence. Alot of people in responsible positions consid-ered Pakistan’s role as significant in causing the“death” of the Eastern superpower. This per-ception was certainly popular in the armedforces and other strategic organizations.

The 1980s and the 1990s were two decadesin which Islamabad established its interests inAfghanistan and its political system.Afghanistan was far more relevant in terms ofpursuing Islamabad’s goals with West andCentral Asia. The idea of Pakistan leading aMuslim block, which is attributed to GeneralZia-ul-Haq, did not become dormant in theensuing years after his sudden death in 1988.

The Hexagonal FrameworkThe Troubled Triangle can also be analyzed atanother level: in the context of a hexagonal rela-tionship including Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan,U.S., India, and Russia. Pakistan-Iran orPakistan-Afghanistan relations were never inde-pendent of the impact of the policies of theseother players. These states have stakes in theregion and their physical presence or expressionof interest in the region tends to impact rela-tions within the Troubled Triangle.

This is truly a multi-layered relationshipbetween the three neighbors, each affected bythe other states’ bilateral links with other coun-tries. The U.S. is an active player in the region.Washington’s tensions with Tehran and its phys-ical presence in Afghanistan have bearings onPakistan’s relations with its neighbors, especiallywhen Islamabad is viewed as a proponent ofAmerican policies encouraging Washington toprolong its stay in the region. American forces,indeed, are external to the region, and their pres-ence causes geo-political instability at a certainlevel. However, Islamabad is keen to have theU.S. prolong its stay in Afghanistan. Pakistan’srelations with the U.S. are central to the presentdebate. There is inherent tension in Iran-Pakistan ties due to Islamabad’s relations withthe U.S. While Islamabad sees some strategicdividends in its relations with the U.S., it alsodepends on conflict in the wider Asian region tokeep Washington engaged. Having been “letdown” by the U.S., at least five times, as somePakistani analysts suggest, Islamabad is not keenfor a repetition of this experience.

The Troubled Triangle can also be analyzed at another level: in the context of a hexagonal

relationship including Iran,Pakistan, Afghanistan, U.S.,

India, and Russia.


10

Similarly, American presence and policiesimpact Pakistan-Afghanistan relations. TheU.S. policy during the 1980s opened upAfghanistan for Pakistan. The almost client-patron relationship that had emerged betweenIslamabad and Kabul during the 1990s was amanifestation of the American policy of the1980s and then of the 1990s when the U.S. leftKabul in the hands of regional actors.Replacing a communist-socialist-nationalistleadership with a rabidly religious force waspart of the policy to deepen Islamabad’s controlover Afghanistan and the adjoining CentralAsia. It was truly a military approach to solvingthe problem of the lack of stability and centralauthority in Afghanistan. In some respects, thestrategy was colonial in nature. It was hopedthat a centrally controlled and more unifiedAfghanistan could pave the way for Islamabadto explore or exploit the resources of centralAsia. Peace in Afghanistan was essential forexploiting a resource-rich region.

Post-9/11 Afghanistan is less easy tomaneuver. Moreover, there is American pres-ence that matters a lot in terms of providingstability to Afghanistan and the region.Stability in Afghanistan is a long-term game,and it is worth assessing how long the U.S.will sustain its interest in the country. Wouldthis interest be long enough to stabilizeAfghanistan to a degree that its neighborscould use it as a source of energy supply? Itappears that Afghanistan is favored by theU.S. as an option; U.S. Secretary of StateCondoleezza Rice recently warned India andPakistan against a gas pipeline project with

Iran. It goes without saying the Iran-Pakistan-Afghanistan pipeline would strengthen tiesbetween the three regional countries, as wellas contribute tremendously towards improv-ing India-Pakistan relations. While Indiaremains keen to pursue the project,Islamabad, it is feared, might not withstandWashington’s pressure.

Religious IdentityFinally, relations between the three countriesmust be seen in another context: their diver-gent and shared domestic political and socialidentities. What does one make of the Sunni-Shiite divide? Or the political divide betweenthe Pushtuns and Hazaras or other ethnicgroups? Indubitably, the sectarian divide hasbeen extremely bothersome. Since the early1980s violence in Pakistan has cost the lives ofhundreds of Sunnis and Shiites. In fact, a fewIranian diplomats were also targeted. This,according to some senior Pakistani officials,was the ramification of the Iran-Iraq War hav-ing been fought on Pakistan’s territory. Theincreasing influence of Saudi-sponsoredWahabi Islam plays a significant role in thisviolence. Such financial and ideologicalinvestment over the past 10–15 years has cer-tainly created tension between the Sunnimajority and Shiite minority populations.The limited numbers of Shiites could bemaneuvered to impact Pakistan’s domesticpolitics. However, it is also a fact that thisdivide has not stopped these people fromcooperating during a war in Afghanistan.Militants from both sides of the sectariandivide fought their battles together. Moreover,it is difficult to ignore the fact that PakistaniShiites are an influential group in the countrywhose members are part of the decision-mak-ing nexus.

The bilateral relations are indeed sour onthis account, but relations transcend acrosssectarian or nation-state identity issues as well.My proposition is that while Iran-Pakistanrelations have been tense, and national inter-ests have made the countries pursue differingobjectives, the larger Muslim identity still hassome relevance. So, while the Pakistanis would

Replacing a communist-socialist-nationalist leadership with a rab-

idly religious force was part of thepolicy to deepen Islamabad’s control over Afghanistan and

the adjoining Central Asia.

11

get upset about the Iranian government disclos-ing the links between Pakistani scientists andIran’s nuclear program, there might not necessar-ily be a fear of an immediate threat from Tehran.Afghanistan surely is a problem area, but thisremains a manageable issue. A nuclear Iran mightnot necessarily pose as a matter of concern inIslamabad. However, there is a counter argumentas well. A number of Pakistani analysts havelooked at the issue of Islamabad’s possible nuclearproliferation links with Iran and castigated thepossibility as shortsightedness and contrary tothe Westphalian nation-state and national inter-est paradigm. The argument is that Islamabadcannot really afford to have another nuclear statein its immediate neighborhood. However, suchan argument needs to be unpacked and analyzedmore carefully in the context of a larger identityof the three as neighboring Muslim states.

How bilateral relations between Pakistan andIran and Pakistan and Afghanistan develop

depends on a number of issues highlighted earli-er. The relations should be seen in a broader con-text rather than a narrow trilateral paradigm.The three neighbors remain highly relevant foreach other’s security despite the fact that they arewilling to pursue independent political andsocioeconomic development trajectories.Afghanistan’s stability is of interest to Pakistanand other actors as well. However, the regionlacks the potential to guarantee stability inAfghanistan. The international force, hence, is agood short-to-medium-term alternative thatwould limit Islamabad’s immediate concernsregarding its own security and the geo-strategicbalance on its western border. However, thisapproach is less comfortable in the context ofIran because it is really the U.S. presence thatmakes Afghanistan strategically significant forTehran. Ultimately, it is the tension with theU.S. that is likely to determine the course ofrelations between Pakistan and Iran.


Over the course of the past four years, Iran’sstrategic perspective on its eastern frontier hasundergone significant change. As the GlobalWar on Terrorism has altered the political land-scape of both Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iranfaces new strategic realities that present bothopportunities and challenges.

The Legacy of the 1990sAfter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in1980, Iran became host to some two millionAfghan refugees—one of the largest refugeepopulations at the time. Many of the refugeesbecame integrated into the Iranian labor mar-ket, and others were cared for by Iran withoutsupport from the international community.The refugee issue—and especially the fact thatthe refugees included Persian speaking andShi’a Afghans—created vested interest in theresolution of the Afghan war in Tehran. Thatinterest became more pronounced with the riseof the anti-Shi’a and anti-Iranian Taliban,whose massacre of Shi’as in Mazar-i Sharif andBamiyan in 1997–98 and the execution ofIranian journalists and diplomats in 1997 ledto the mobilization of some 200,000 Iraniantroops on the Afghan border. Throughout theAfghan war, Iran had supported variousAfghan factions, including the Shi’a Hazaraparty Hezb-i Wahdat and Isma’il Khan ofHerat’s militia. After the rise of the Taliban,Iran more forcefully threw its weight behindthe Northern Alliance.

In the 1980s, Iran’s revolutionary leaderslooked to Pakistan’s Shi’a population—whichconstitutes 15–25% of the population—as atarget for exporting their ideology and revolu-tion. The prospects of greater Shi’a activism inPakistan provoked a response from Iraq andSaudi Arabia. As a result, Shi’a-Sunni rivalry inPakistan—the former supported by Iran andthe latter by Saudi Arabia and Iraq—quicklybecame an extension of the Iran-Iraq War and

the Saudi-Iranian rivalry for control of thePersian Gulf. The Pakistani government, waryof Iranian interference and Shi’a restlessness,and the country’s strong Sunni Islamic forcestook the side of Saudi Arabia and endorsed itscontainment strategy. What emerged was astrong strategic tie between Riyadh andIslamabad, which would then extend to Kabulafter the rise of the Taliban. This alliance wasstrongly anti-Shi’a and anti-Iranian. SaudiArabia’s aim here was to create a “Sunni wall”from Pakistan north through Afghanistan andinto Central Asia.

As a result, for much of the decade preced-ing September 11, 2001, Iran’s strategic per-spective regarding Afghanistan and Pakistanwas determined by its reaction to the Saudi-Pakistani-Taliban condominium. The successof Saudi Arabia in creating and managing the“Sunni wall” accounts for Iran’s tilt towardIndia in the 1990s and its strong backing of theNorthern Alliance in Afghanistan.

Iran’s Strategic Perspective After September 11 Events of September 11, 2001 brought theanti-Iran Sunni alliance into America’scrosshairs. The alliance that had receivedWashington’s tacit support to contain Iran wasnow viewed as the source of the greatest terror-ist challenge to the U.S. With the fall of theTaliban in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s shift to sup-port the Global War on Terrorism, and ten-sions in relations between the U.S. and SaudiArabia, Iran found new opportunities on itseastern frontier. With the “Sunni wall” gone,Iran found new room to maneuver.

Iran’s initial reaction was to support the fallof the Taliban. Tehran’s objective here was firstto roll-back the Sunni militancy that had lim-ited Iran’s influence in Afghanistan. Second,Iran’s leaders hoped that the vacuum left inAfghanistan after the fall of Taliban would12

Iran’s Strategic Perspective on Afghanistan and PakistanVali Nasr, Associate Chair of Research and Professor, Department of National Security Affairs,Naval Post-Graduate School

Robert Hathaway, Director of the Asia Program at the WilsonCenter; Vali Nasr

allow Iran to expand its sphere of influence inwestern Afghanistan. Third, Iran hoped thatAfghanistan would serve as the context for arapprochement with Washington.

Iran was able to achieve its first two objec-tives. Operation Enduring Freedom complete-ly destroyed the Taliban. It also created a vac-uum in which Iran’s economic ties with Heratwere strengthened. Freed from the menace ofthe Taliban, Isma’il Khan returned from exileto form the government in Herat, which wasclosely aligned with Iran and quickly gainedpower. More important, the city’s economywas more tightly integrated into that of Iran’sKhorasan province. Herat’s bazaars were filledwith Iranian goods that came to the city onIranian trucks and on roads build by Iran—which were far better developed than thoseconnecting the city to the rest of Afghanistan.The road development was financed byIranian foundations, notably the Foundationof the Shrine of Imam Reza in Mashad, and itspace and scope far exceeded international eco-nomic reconstruction projects in Afghanistanat the time. Those goods were bought by laborremittances from Afghans working in Iran.Iran had lost Herat in the 19th century. InOctober 2001, Herat was far more tightly con-nected to Iran’s road network and economicinfrastructure than it was to the rest ofAfghanistan. The collapse of the Taliban for allpractical purposes extended Iran’s cultural andeconomic, if not political, boundaries intowestern Afghanistan. Economic ties betweenHerat and Khorasan, more than governmentstrategy, has driven Iran’s Afghan policy.Moreover, the case of Herat introduced a newapproach to regional exercise of power toIranian foreign policy: economic influence inlieu of political expansionism.

Iran’s third objective never materialized.Iranians found the U.S. to be in no mood tomend fences with Iran; in fact, the U.S. wasbuoyed by its victory in Afghanistan andbecame keen to challenge Tehran’s policies.This realization changed Iran’s strategic objec-tives in Afghanistan. Iran began to view long-term U.S. presence in Afghanistan, a pro-American government in Kabul, and more

generally a centralized Afghan state as strategicthreats. These fears became only more intenseafter Isma’il Khan was removed from power in2004 and reports surfaced that the U.S. mayuse an airbase in western Afghanistan for oper-ations against Iran. Since 2001, Tehran hasvested its interests in local power brokers andwarlords, and has remained distant from thegovernment in Kabul.

However, Iran has also been wary of insta-bility in Afghanistan. The Iranian population isconcerned with the flow of refugees fromAfghanistan and the impact of chaos on Iran’sinterests. Local merchants in eastern Iran havebenefited from the trade that stability in Herat

and Kabul has brought about, and hence theyare eager to maintain order. The heroin tradehas been a source of great concern for Iran.Heroin is transported though Iran both fromthe north, through Turkmenistan, and thesouth, through Pakistan’s Baluchistan province,before it finds its way onto ferries in the PersianGulf. The trade has produced a drug economyin Iran, increased drug addiction within Iran,and also impacted law and order along Iran’sborders. Collapse of order in Afghanistan islikely to increase the scope of the traffic in nar-cotics. As a result, stability is at the heart ofIran’s strategic interests in Afghanistan. Iranwould like order in Afghanistan, but not anAmerican order.

Pakistan presents Iran with a different set ofinterests and challenges. Since the 1990s, Iranhas ceased to look at Pakistan as a strategicpartner. Iran’s economic and regional interests 13

Iranians found the U.S. to be inno mood to mend fences with

Iran; in fact, the U.S. was buoyedby its victory in Afghanistan and

became keen to challengeTehran’s policies.


now lie with India, and Iran for some time nowhas denied support to Pakistan on the Kashmirissue. Iran has also welcomed the weakening ofSunni militancy and Saudi influence inPakistan. However, Iran is keen that Pakistandoes not become too closely tied with the U.S.As a result, Iran has viewed the regime ofPresident Pervez Musharraf as a strategic threat.Tehran’s desire to dampen U.S. enthusiasm forMusharraf was reflected in Tehran’s claim in2002–03 that most of the Al-Qa’ida activistsarrested in Iran were dumped on the border byPakistani intelligence, and at times wereaccompanied by their handlers. More recently,Pakistanis have accused Iran of being unneces-sarily cooperative with the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the tiesbetween its nuclear energy program and theA.Q. Khan network.

Privately, Pakistani leaders blame Iran forinciting a Baluch insurgency that has con-founded the military and political establish-ment in Islamabad. The reason for this is thatPakistan believes that Iran is using ethnic ten-sions to prevent the Musharraf regime fromconsolidating power, and hence, from beingable to more completely align itself withWashington. In addition, Tehran shares thesuspicion of Baluch tribesmen that Pakistanhas made an agreement with the U.S. to devel-op a deep water port in Gwadar in southernBaluchistan that could serve as the site for afuture U.S. naval base. Some strategic thinkersin Pakistan have argued that the only way tocompel the U.S. to commit itself to Pakistan is

to establish a U.S. military base in the country.Although the political climate in Pakistan isnot likely to support such a move, constructionwork in Gwadar has still raised the ire of bothBaluch tribesmen and Iranian leaders, wholook unfavorably on a permanent U.S. pres-ence in the region—particularly so close to thenaval base Iran is developing in its Baluchistanprovince at Chahbahar.

Iran is also concerned with the escalation ofsectarian violence since 2003. Iranians believethat the Musharraf government has been farmore vigilant in clamping down on Al-Qa’idaactivists than on violent anti-Shi’a groups suchas Lashkar Jhangvi. In fact, Sipah SahabahPakistan (SSP) is Musharraf ’s only Islamistally — its leader, Azam Tariq, was openly alliedwith Musharraf until his assassination in 2003.More recently, the opposition to Musharrafhas accused Pakistan intelligence of using theShi’a militant organization Sipah Muhammadto instigate sectarian violence in Karachi. Iran’sclients among the Shi’a of Pakistan are worriedabout sectarian violence, and the Iranian gov-ernment views anti-Shi’a activism in Pakistanwith great concern.

The most important issue between Iranand Pakistan, however, involves Iran’s nuclearprogram and Pakistan’s role in proliferation ofnuclear technology. This is an explosive issuethat is closely tied to regime survival in bothcountries. Iran today faces the threat of mili-tary action and regime change if it does notcurb its nuclear program. Pakistan would facestrong international sanctions and domesticupheaval if it is not able to contain the fall-out from the A.Q. Khan issue. Each countrydepends on the discretion of the other toavoid an escalation of its nuclear crisis.

It is a mystery why Pakistan sold Irannuclear technology at a time when the twocountries did not have warm relations andwere in fact growing estranged over theTaliban and Pakistan’s close ties to SaudiArabia. It is not clear exactly what Pakistansold to Iran and when. However, there is nodoubt that Iran’s nuclear technology programwas built on Pakistani technology. As such,Pakistan could fill the missing pieces in by14

Pakistan believes that Iran isusing ethnic tensions to prevent

the Musharraf regime from consol-idating power, and hence, frombeing able to more completely

align itself with Washington.

providing the IAEA with a more completeaccounting of what it sold to Iran, and in par-ticular, with proof that Iran’s program was notmeant for peaceful purposes. Iran in turncould provide proof that sale of nuclear tech-nology was not limited to A.Q. Khan and wassanctioned by the Pakistani military. Giventhe stakes, the strategic relationship betweenthe two countries is pivoted on the criticalissue of managing Iran’s nuclear crisis, whichcould deeply impact both Iranian andPakistani regimes.

The events of September 11th radicallychanged the strategic perspective of Iran withregard to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Theimpregnable “Sunni wall” was replaced withopportunities for expansion of Iran’s influenceinto Afghanistan, but also with concern forthe growing U.S. presence in Afghanistan andPakistan, the specter of renewed instability in

Afghanistan, and tensions born of the nuclearissue. In the past five years, Iran’s perspectivehas been shaped by economic drivers, maxi-mization of Iran’s strategic interests, and themanagement of the perceived threat of anAmerican presence in the region.

The U.S. policy in the region has beendirected at restoring stability to bothAfghanistan and Pakistan — to precludegrowth of terrorism, eliminate narcotics trade,and reduce threats to the U.S. Iran, too, iskeen on stability in the region, but not onethat will exclude Iran’s influence and deny itseconomic and strategic interests. Iran wouldhave no stake in such stability. Moreover, sus-taining a complete exclusion of Iran from theregional order would require the continuedand long-term commitment of the U.S. toAfghanistan and Pakistan, and its physicalpresence in the region.

15


Woodrow Wilson International Center for ScholarsLee H. Hamilton, President and Director

Board of TrusteesJoseph B. Gildenhorn, Chair; David A. Metzner, Vice Chair. Public Members: James H. Billington, Librarian of Congress; John W. Carlin, Archivist of the United

States; Bruce Cole, Chair, National Endowment for the Humanities; Margaret Spellings, Secretary, U.S. Department of Education; Condoleezza Rice, Secretary,

U.S. Department of State; Lawrence M. Small, Secretary, Smithsonian Institution; Michael O. Leavitt, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

Private Citizen Members: Joseph A. Cari, Jr., Carol Cartwright, Robin Cook, Donald E. Garcia, Bruce S. Gelb, Charles L. Glazer, Tamala L. Longaberger

Wilson CouncilBruce S. Gelb, President. Diane Aboulafia-D’Jaen, Elias F. Aburdene, Charles S. Ackerman, B.B. Andersen, Cyrus A. Ansary, Lawrence E. Bathgate II, John Beinecke,

Joseph C. Bell, Steven Alan Bennett, Rudy Boschwitz, A. Oakley Brooks, Melva Bucksbaum, Charles W. Burson, Conrad Cafritz, Nicola L. Caiola, Raoul L. Carroll,

Scott Carter, Albert V. Casey, Mark Chandler, Peter B. Clark, Melvin Cohen, William T. Coleman, Jr., Michael D. DiGiacomo, Sheldon Drobny, F. Samuel Eberts

III, J. David Eller, Mark Epstein, Melvyn J. Estrin, Sim Farar, Susan Farber, Joseph H. Flom, John H. Foster, Charles Fox, Barbara Hackman Franklin, Norman

Freidkin, Morton Funger, Gregory M. Gallo, Chris G. Gardiner, Steven J. Gilbert, Alma Gildenhorn, David F. Girard-diCarlo, Michael B. Goldberg, Gretchen M.

Gorog, William E. Grayson, Ronald Greenberg, Raymond A. Guenter, Edward L. Hardin, Jr., Jean L. Hennessey, Eric Hotung, John L. Howard, Darrell E. Issa,

Jerry Jasinowski, Brenda LaGrange Johnson, Shelly Kamins, Edward W. Kelley, Jr., Anastasia D. Kelly, Christopher J. Kennan, Michael V. Kostiw, Steven Kotler,

William H. Kremer, Raymond Learsy, Abbe Lane Leff, Perry Leff, Dennis LeVett, Francine Levinson, Harold O. Levy, David Link, Frederic V. Malek, David S.

Mandel, John P. Manning, Jeffrey A. Marcus, Jay Mazur, Robert McCarthy, Linda McCausland, Stephen G. McConahey, Donald F. McLellan, J. Kenneth Menges,

Jr., Philip Merrill, Kathryn Mosbacher, Jeremiah L. Murphy, Martha T. Muse, Della Newman, John E. Osborn, Paul Hae Park, Gerald L. Parsky, Michael J. Polenske,

Donald Robert Quartel, Jr., J. John L. Richardson, Margaret Milner Richardson, Larry D. Richman, Carlyn Ring, Edwin Robbins, Robert G. Rogers, Otto Ruesch,

B. Francis Saul, III, Alan Schwartz, Timothy R. Scully, J. Michael Shepherd, George P. Shultz, Raja W. Sidawi, Debbie Siebert, Thomas L. Siebert, Kenneth Siegel,

Ron Silver, William A. Slaughter, James H. Small, Thomas F. Stephenson, Norma Kline Tiefel, Mark C. Treanor, Anthony G. Viscogliosi, Christine M. Warnke,

Ruth Westheimer, Pete Wilson, Deborah Wince-Smith, Herbert S. Winokur, Jr., Paul Martin Wolff, Joseph Zappala, Nancy M. Zirkin, Richard S. Ziman

ONE WOODROW WILSON PLAZA, 1300 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, NW, WASHINGTON, DC 20004-3027

SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE $300

a troubled triangle

Documents