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Southeast European and Black Sea StudiesVol. 7, No. 4, December 2007, pp. 573–590

ISSN 1468–3857 (print)/ISSN 1743–9639 (online) © 2007 Taylor & FrancisDOI: 10.1080/14683850701726047

A Study in State Socialization: Turkey’s EU Accession and CFSPIpek RuacanTaylor and FrancisFBSS_A_272519.sgm10.1080/14683850701726047Southeast European and Black Sea Studies1468-3857 (print)/1743-9639 (online)Original Article2007Taylor & Francis74000000December 2007IpekRuacaniruacan@yahoo.com

This article reviews the literature on state socialization in the context of Turkey’s EuropeanUnion (EU) accession and the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).Rationalist and constructivist approaches are considered in order to examine Turkey’s pastopposition to norms that characterize the EU’s CFSP, the interest-driven nature of its stra-tegic culture, its foreign policy and the particular challenges of its EU accession process. Inpresenting the arguments that Turkey has been putting forth to avoid full socialization, itis concluded that prospects for Turkey’s socialization are grim due to the regulatory natureof this pillar.

Introduction

According to the rationalist approach to international relations, states are rationalactors that respond to the demands of an international system characterized by anar-chy. Constructivists prefer to consider that the international system is held togetherby the observance of collectively held norms and argue that states are socialized inadhering to these norms.

The state socialization debate between rationalism and constructivism is relevant forthe study of European Union (EU) enlargement. The EU accession process, for themost part, involves the technical adjustment of the acceding or candidate state’sdomestic legislation to the acquis communautaire. This adjustment not only involvesthe formal, tangible elements of the acquis; it also raises expectations regarding thespirit of membership that the candidate countries are expected to fit into. Indeed, it isargued that in policy areas where the acquis is weak, mechanisms of state socializationare set in motion as the EU tries to get candidate countries to adjust to expected formsof behaviour, policies and positions. This article studies the Common Foreign andSecurity Policy (CFSP) of the EU, an area in which the EU acquis is weak, and analyzes

Ipek Ruacan is PhD candidate at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey. Correspondence to: Department of PoliticalScience and International Studies, European Research Institute, The University of Birmingham, Edgbaston,Birmingham B15 2TT, UK. Email: iruacan@yahoo.com. An earlier version of this article was presented at theseminar EU Accession Process at Bilkent University in Ankara in May 2006.

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the prospects for Turkey’s alignment with this policy. Through referring to competingaccounts of state socialization, it puts forward three mixed models of state socializationthat arise in the context of EU enlargement: joint, evolutionary and separate. Construc-tivists and rationalists base their accounts of state socialization on norms and interests,respectively. While constructivists assume that the socialization process is marked by anorm-driven ‘logic of appropriateness’, rationalists assume that it is marked by aninterest-driven or strategically oriented ‘logic of consequences’. These two logics meetin the joint model; the assumption in this case is that observing norms is itself an inter-est-driven act. ‘Normative as strategic action’ is the term coined in the article to referto this joint model. The evolutionary model suggests that state socialization is charac-terized by a shift from the logic of consequences in its initial stages toward the logic ofappropriateness in its later stages. The final model suggests that there are favourableconditions for each logic to prevail separately in the course of the socialization process.All three models are discussed in detail below.

The Union’s CFSP and the dynamics of Turkish foreign policy are examined andcompared in order to argue that Turkey’s socialization into the CFSP can be describedas ‘superficial norm-following’. This results from the loose nature of regulation of theCFSP pillar, the level of Turkey’s prior opposition to CFSP norms due to the country’sdistinct strategic culture and the nature of its foreign policy-making, as well as theparticular challenges that characterize its accession to the EU.

Outcomes in State Behaviour: Which Logic of Action?

Hollis and Smith (1990: 1) have argued that there are two stories to tell in internationalrelations: one from the outside and another from the inside. Socialization literaturefollowed this dichotomous pattern in trying to identify the logic that underlies stateaction at the international level. In more recent work, rationalist ‘outside’ stories andconstructivist ‘inside’ stories of state socialization have been brought together by whatcan be described as the ‘in-between’ story that combines the strengths of the two. Thissection reviews the rationalist and constructivist approaches to state socialization andhow they have been ‘mixed’.

From the rationalists’ perspective, socialization, or the ‘process that is directed towarda state’s internalization of the constitutive beliefs and practices institutionalized in its inter-national environment’ (Schimmelfennig 2000, pp. 111–112; original emphasis), isinduced from the outside by the imperatives of the anarchical international system.Kenneth Waltz has recommended that: ‘Students of international politics will do wellto concentrate on separate theories of internal and external politics until someone findsa way to unite them’ (1986a: 340). The ‘external’, in the sense Waltz (1986a and 1986b)uses it, is a rigid and conflictual system that restricts states to certain types of security-seeking behaviour the guiding principle of which is the consequences of particularactions—hence the term ‘logic of consequences’ as a shortcut to the rationalist theory.State behaviour is assumed to be an exercise in instrumental and strategic reasoning(Sending 2002: 457) and the system is the socializing agent that spontaneously operatedto push states into becoming units with an overwhelming interest in security.

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Constructivist theory of state socialization challenges these premises. In theconstructivist viewpoint, the anarchical international system does not necessarilydirect state interests exclusively towards security. In fact, anarchy is a manageablecondition containing possibilities for cooperation. A state can operate with an identityother than that which is predetermined on its behalf by the international system(Wendt 1992). State action, within this framework, ceases to be instrumental or strate-gic action directed from the outside. It becomes moral, or normative, action stemmingfrom the inside and within the requirements of identity. March and Olsen (1995: 38)more specifically define state action as the administration of identity roles in given situ-ations. The pressure of adopting appropriate behaviour within the bounds of a specificidentity guides state behaviour—hence the constructivist’s ‘logic of appropriateness’ asopposed to the rationalist’s ‘logic of consequences’.

In order to remain within the limits of appropriateness, states consult with the reser-voir of collectively held norms in the international society and match them againstparticular actions (Sending 2002: 450). Thus, norms are the link between identity andaction in constructivism and the socializing agent is norm diffusion that operatesthrough a three-stage process as identified by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998: 895):norm emergence, norm acceptance and norm internalization.1

Socialization, in the sense of norm diffusion, can take place on many sites wherethere exists a capacity for interaction between socializing agents and the recipients ofsocialization. International organizations, for instance, can help diffuse norms byexerting peer pressure on member states for conformity; or indeed may even requireapplicant states to conform to commonly held norms before they can be admitted(Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, pp. 902–903). Norm entrepreneurs use persuasion tacticsto secure acceptance for specific norms by a crucial number of states (ibid.: 895), orsometimes it is individual states themselves who try to get fellow states to follow certainnorms. Civil-society actors and transnational networks can also affect the processthrough lobbying activities and by shaming states that refuse to socialize in particularpolicy areas. Habermas’ (1981) theory of communicative action offers another meansto norm creation, and this will be taken up below in the context of international rela-tions.

The end of a successful process of socialization is marked by norm internalizationwhereby the particular norm acquires ‘a quality of oughtness’ (Ikenberry & Kupchan1990: 290) in the targets. Once a norm is internalized, it will then be incorporated intothe domestic institutional framework of the recipient state through new laws, bureau-cratic procedures, the practice of individuals with political powers (Alderson 2001,pp. 419–420) and public expectations. Norm internalization does not automaticallypreclude deviations from norms, but makes sure that domestic sanctioning mecha-nisms function when they occur.

Rationalist and constructivist theories of state socialization have clearly differentdeparture points regarding the nature of the international system, the disposition ofstates and the framework of action that dominates their external behaviour. Both theo-ries have strengths and weaknesses, maintains Sterling-Folker (2000), and the two posi-tions end up needing each other to check their excesses. For a satisfactory description

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of state socialization, critics insist, it is necessary to end the isolation between the twotheories as strategic action associated with rationalism and normative action associatedwith constructivism interact in the actual practice of international politics (seeFinnemore & Sikkink 1998; Schimmelfennig 2000; Diez 2000; Alderson 2001).

The case for the administration of a joint rationalist/constructivist model of social-ization applies particularly well to the EU enlargement context. In its narrowest sense,enlargement is alignment with EU acquis on the part of aspiring members. EU enlarge-ment is also an instance of state socialization beyond the acquis; there exists a specificinternational system with its constitutive beliefs and practices (the EU) and a process(accession) for targets (candidate states) to adapt to the system. It is within this broadersense of EU enlargement that the present article will address the joint, evolutionary andseparate operation of the diverging logics of state action: normative as strategic action,whereby the constructivist and rationalist accounts of state socialization meet strategicaction; evolving into normative action, whereby the rationalist logic of consequencesshifts toward the constructivist logic of appropriateness in the course of the accessionprocess; and finally, the separate operation of normative action and strategic action atdifferent times during accession talks when the conditions favourable to each presentthemselves

Rationalism is an ‘underinstitutionalized’ theory, while constructivism is an ‘over-socialized’ one. The mode of socialization that applies to the European Union (andother institutions on the continent) is too institutionalized to fit the former, yetneither does it lend itself to the type of underrating of strategic action as in the latter(Schimmelfennig 2000: 135). Clearly, candidate states are not simply seeking partici-pation in the European ideal when they knock on the door but are pursuing nationalself-interests in accessing common EU resources. However, the EU is not a resource-dispensing charity, and the candidate countries are reminded that they have todemonstrate conformity with the shared norms of the community before they can beadmitted into the ranks.

Normative as strategic action, whereby the constructivist and the rationalist logics ofaction meet, comes into play at this juncture as candidate countries become norm-followers out of self-interest (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998). This is a point at which‘appropriateness’ is the rational choice for candidate states. They observe the constitu-tive beliefs and practices of the EU without judging them as right or wrong in order toadvance the political objective of membership (Schimmelfennig 2000, pp. 116–117).Normative as strategic action need not be an instance of norm internalization, but cancome in the form of what Diez (2000) calls ‘superficial norm-following’ by candidatecountries.2 Superficial norm-followers try to reduce the costs of socialization and arelikely to disregard the constitutive beliefs of the EU when it is in their interests to do so,even at the expense of their credibility if the perceived benefits from norm-breaking arereally high (Schimmelfennig 2000, pp. 118–119).

Habermas’ theory of communicative action is worth revisiting under the normativeas strategic action category against the background of Risse’s (2000) contribution. Rissehas reached a new logic of action that applies to international politics, the ‘logic ofarguing’, by taking Habermas’ idea of a communicative process of consensus-seeking

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among actors whereby each one of them is willing to submit to the ‘better argument’.The logic of arguing is located within the constructivist logic of appropriateness andhelps determine which norm applies to a particular situation in international affairs asthis is not instantly obvious at all times (Risse 2000, pp. 6–7).3

A pertinent question to consider is whether candidate countries can convince the EUthat theirs is the better argument through the logic of arguing? In principle, the answerto this question is a qualified ‘yes’, since communicative action is not entirely transfer-able to the EU domain given that Habermas’ original formulation entails the ideal ofpower-free communication (Brown 1992). However, the ‘structural asymmetry’between the EU and candidate countries, which Schimmelfennig (2000: 117) charac-terizes as a prerequisite for any successful socialization process, is far from a power-freesetting. Moreover, candidate countries are not so much interested in presenting a betterargument to the EU as they are in achieving membership. Nevertheless, there is roomfor the logic of arguing in the EU domain when it is construed as a discursive form ofnormative as strategic action, as opposed to Habermas-style communicative action.

As Diez (2000) mentions, structural asymmetry need not mean that accession statesare the mere subjects of EU enlargement policy. They can also have their own agendasthat may contradict the EU agenda and interaction; in short, it is not necessarily theimposition of norms by the strong on the weak, but a two-way process. Of course, thealready existing constitutive beliefs and practices of the EU enjoy the highest degree oflegitimacy among the members (Schimmelfennig 2000: 129), and as such there is notmuch ground for the candidate countries to claim that they have a better argument.Even so, there are two discursive methods through which candidate countries can usethe logic of arguing to establish which particular norms should apply in their individualmembership processes: norm manipulation and norm contestation. It is the purpose-ful nature of the two methods that transforms the logic of arguing into a discursiveversion of normative as strategic action in EU affairs; candidate countries undertakepurposeful speech-acts in pursuit of membership that try to manipulate or contestcommunity norms in order to gain a comparative advantage over other candidates inthe accession process, or to accelerate and facilitate the process of their own accession.

Four distinct strategies of norm manipulation have been identified by Schimmelfen-nig (2000, pp. 129–132) as being used by states seeking entry into European institutions,two of which are highly relevant for the purposes of this article. In the strategy of ‘shiftingthe burden’, candidate countries argue that membership would accelerate the norminternalization process and, therefore, ask for certain conditions to be met followingmembership (ibid.: 130). In the second strategy of ‘manipulation of European identity’,candidate countries advertize their ‘traditional affiliation with Europe’ and argue thatthey should somehow be treated more favourably than others in the crowd of candidatecountries (ibid.: 131).4 Special circumstances strategy can be added to Schimmelfennig’sstrategies, whereby the candidate country advances arguments for leaving the standardnorm aside for a tailor-made one applicable for its case.

Norm contestation involves ‘discursive interventions’ aimed at reconstructing themeaning of norms. Meaning, particularly against the backdrop of different culturesor vague legal texts, can always be contested in principle (Wiener 2004) without any

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deliberate intent on the part of expected norm-followers. In the specific context of EUenlargement, community norms can have different meanings for candidate countrieswho are asked to adopt them but who have not been involved in their emergence (ibid.:204). Two counter-arguments can be advanced against the possibility of diverginginterpretations of meaning. The first, raised by Müller (2004: 420) with reference toHedley Bull’s (1977) discussion of the role of the diplomatic profession in internationalsociety, is that the common language of diplomacy cancels the impact of cultural differ-ences that may lead to different interpretations of norms; the second is that there islittle room for diverging interpretations in homogenous political communities in thefirst place (Sending 2002: 451), and this would be valid for candidate countries ingeneral whose cultural backgrounds are not widely incompatible in relation to thealready existing members of the EU. Both counter-arguments are indeed convincing;however, neither holds when one remembers the purposefulness of norm contestation.When necessary, candidate countries may contest meaning deliberately to suit theirown needs.

The two logics of action, which at times coincide in the particular moves of candi-date countries, can just as well run in sequence as strategic action evolves into norma-tive action in the course of encounters with the socializing agents. As encountersbetween the parties intensify, the logic of appropriateness comes to dominate theprocess (March & Olsen 1998). From this perspective, EU accession starts as an unam-biguous strategic action setting. The EU as a socializing agent uses access to member-ship, and candidates operate according to the logic of consequences in order to achievemembership. As accession talks progress, candidate countries’ actions are increasinglydriven by the logic of appropriateness. According to Meyer ‘This is not only due to theconformity pressures newcomers experience; it is also due to the deepening of social-ization effects associated with the intensification of interaction with the socializingagent’ (Meyer 2005, pp. 536–537).

Alternatively, each logic of action can come into play at a different stage of the longprocess of EU accession. Normative and strategic action, accordingly, can prevail atseparate points in negotiations. Each form of action is likely to prevail under certainconditions depending on, among others, the nature of regulation in the policy areaunder discussion and the domestic structure of the target of socialization.

To simplify Müller’s (2004: 412) sophisticated model based on Deitelhoff’s work,states are expected to embark on normative action when norms and institutions regu-lating the policy area are strong. Conversely, when both norms and institutions in aparticular policy are weak, strategic action will suffice up until the point when prob-lems emerge. Strong norms and weak institutions favour normative action, while weaknorms and strong institutions favour strategic action, again until problems emerge.Finally, a global case for strategic action exists when the perceived benefits frombreaching norms appear so high as to offset all other costs (ibid.: 408).

If the domestic structure of the candidate state already contains liberal Westernvalues, both at the governmental and societal levels at the same time, then normativeaction should follow as a natural outcome (Schimmelfennig 2000: 134). Such a conver-gence of values will mean there will be no prior inconsistency between the values of the

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socializing agent and those of the target of socialization (Checkel 2001: 563), renderingstrategic action more or less unnecessary. Even if liberal values are already widespreadin society, however, normative action may still not come so easily when the domesticstructure of the target country contains the legacy of a former empire, for instance. Theexperience of the United Kingdom shows that countries with an imperial past find itmore difficult to share sovereign rights with the EU (Grabbe 2004: 6).

CFSP and Turkey: Prospects for Socialization

So far, the article has discussed state socialization at the theoretical level without refer-ence to a particular policy area or a particular target country. In this section, the articledeals specifically with the prospects for the successful socialization of Turkey in theEU’s CFSP. This includes an overview of the CFSP and proceeds with an attempt todetermine the current space existing between Turkey and the EU in this area. Finally,at the intersection of theory and practice, this section examines the various logics ofaction that are likely to come into play as the EU and Turkey tackle this particular chap-ter of the acquis communautaire.

CFSP has been established as the second pillar of the EU with the Treaty of EuropeanUnion (1993); its five fundamental objectives, as later identified in the AmsterdamTreaty (1999), are:

● to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrityof the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;

● to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;● to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the prin-

ciples of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki FinalAct and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;

● to promote international cooperation;● to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human

rights and fundamental freedoms. (European Commission 2007)

For now, CFSP remains an intergovernmental policy area that lacks legal instru-ments such as regulations or directives, relying instead on a pool of common declara-tions, joint actions, statements and positions by the EU. Alignment with the CFSP assuch does not require major changes in domestic law, but candidate countries are stillexpected to unconditionally support the implementation of common community poli-cies in a ‘spirit of solidarity’ with the Union (European Union 2004). CFSP does notprescribe specific policies. It does, however, identify certain fundamental norms onforeign policy issues and on the use of force, which candidate countries eventually needto follow. Some of these fundamental norms are stated explicitly in the articles of theAmsterdam Treaty and other documents. Others have developed in practice, and thesewill be examined below for the EU and for Turkey separately.

Diez (2000) identifies the two central norms of European foreign policy as coordi-nation and de-securitization. Coordination is sustained through a ‘we feeling’ amongEuropean diplomats and pressures to conform to the acquis politique, a term Diez

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finds in Ginsberg (1999) and others denoting the pool of common positions thatorders the CFSP. Unilateralism on the part of EU members is in principle regarded asinappropriate given the norm of coordination. Securitization refers to the discursiveact of ‘lifting issues to an urgency and necessity above normal politics’ (Wæver 1998:80; original emphasis ). De-securitization, conversely, is the ‘progressive marginaliza-tion of mutual security concerns in favor of other issues’ or their return to the realm ofnormal politics (ibid.: 69). It developed into a norm relevant in European foreignpolicy following the disappearance of the Soviet threat, given that an urgency abovenormal politics was no longer considered to be necessary. Europe’s aim, in the wordsof former President of the EU Commission, Romano Prodi, was to ‘become a civilpower at the service of sustainable global development’ as the only way of ensuringstrategic security (quoted in Manners 2002: 8). There are of course important excep-tions to both norms of European foreign policy, however, these demonstrate thelooser governance structure of the CFSP, rather than invalidating coordination andde-securitization (Diez 2000).

The question examined in this context is: how much convergence is there betweenthe European foreign policy norms of coordination/de-securitization and Turkishforeign policy? Much points in the direction of low convergence, as appears to besuggested by annual EU reports on Turkey’s progress toward accession and by thegeneral mindset that conditions Turkish foreign policy behaviour.

The conclusions of the 2004 EU progress report on Turkey are telling of the norm ofcoordination and, therefore, deserve lengthy quoting:

With respect to the CFSP, despite its overall satisfactory record, Turkey aligns itself withsignificantly fewer EU declarations than the other candidate countries. This was particu-larly the case with declarations on issues related to Turkey’s neighborhood (Georgia,Azerbaijan, Iraq, Ukraine), to certain Muslim countries and on human rights and democ-racy. Turkey is sometimes hesitant to align itself to EU positions on issues touching its vitalforeign and security interests.This is in marked difference to the conduct of all other candi-date, associated and SAP [Stabilization and Association Process] countries.

Turkey’s 2003 voting patterns in the United Nations, of which it is a founding member,leads to a similar conclusion. Turkey has voted in line with EU positions to a large extent.Divergences mainly related to human rights issues and the Middle East. (EuropeanCommission 2004: 154–155)

In 2005, the EU writes that Turkey’s alignment with the CFSP ‘has been somewhatselective from a geographical point of view with delays and lacunae observed as regardsthe Balkans, Asia (Burma) and Africa (Darfur)’ (European Commission 2005: 127). Ineffect, the geographical point of view is indeed as central to Turkey’s foreign policy asis the historical. It is the sense of living in a historically troubled neighbourhood thatdominates Turkish strategic thinking (Jung & Piccoli 2000), which fınds expression inthe remarks of Ya[scedil] ar Büyükanıt, the current commander of Turkish armed forces:

It is known to all that our country is located in one of the most volatile regions of the world.This is why I would like to stress how important it is for us to constantly consider prospec-tive developments in our geography; since history in this geography is filled with events thatwere not foreseeable yet brought pain and misfortune onto the peoples it sheltered. ... Our

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geography necessitates the existence of strong guards for the well-being of the Republic ofTurkey. These strong guards are not just the military or police forces of the nation and thestate but include all institutions. (Büyükanıt 2006)

Under the impact of these particular interpretations of geography and history,foreign policy amounts to a continuing struggle for the very survival of Turkey.This, beyond being a securitized foreign policy, is a significantly securitized self-construction (Diez 2000).

Thus, the two European foreign policy norms of coordination and de-securitiza-tion are difficult to observe in the case of Turkey. What must now be considered isEuropean norms pertaining to the use of force in order to identify how Turkey relatesto them. Attitudes toward the use of force are largely a function of a country’s strate-gic culture. This strategic culture is ‘the socially transmitted, identity-derived norms,ideas and patterns of behaviour’ that shape preferences in the pursuit of defense goalsin a security community (Meyer 2005: 528; original emphasis). Studies in strategicculture benefit from the insights of cultural studies to demonstrate how societalforces shape decision-making in security matters (Heiselberg 2003: 4). Strategicculture is very deeply rooted within national experiences, and it is difficult to identifya single European strategic culture (Heiselberg 2003; Meyer 2005). There is, forinstance, the more proactive strategic culture of countries like France and the UnitedKingdom, and the more pacific ones like those of Sweden and Germany (Heiselberg2003, pp. 12–13), among others.

Nevertheless, given the socializing function of international organizations, there areforces pushing individual EU strategic cultures more and more towards each other, asMeyer (2005) asserts; and it is possible to identify some fundamental European normsthat apply to the use of force as those that apply to European foreign policy. Theseinclude the following: legitimacy accorded to the use of force for humanitarian inter-ventions abroad; preference for non-military means in dealing with regimes thatviolate human rights; preference for an EU-based mechanism to pursue security anddefence goals amid increasing estrangement from the United States; and finally, pref-erence for a multilateral framework for the use of force authorized under internationallaw (Meyer 2005, pp. 543–545).

With the exception of the legitimacy accorded to humanitarian interventionsabroad, Turkish strategic culture strikingly differs from that of nine EU members (andfrom the United States), according to a separate chapter that merited the title ‘TurkishExceptionalism?’ in the German Marshall Fund’s Transatlantic Trends survey in 2004.The Turkish approval rate for the use of military means to deal with regimes thatviolate human rights, or to stop civil wars, significantly exceeds the EU average. This isalso the case for the value attached to military strength as the key to security (asopposed to, for instance, sustainable global development). As for the preferred mech-anism for the pursuit of defence goals, Turks are just as estranged from the UnitedStates as are Europeans, but they prefer self-reliance to an EU-based system. Moreover,it is highly justifiable for Turks to bypass international law and multilateral frameworkswhen vital national interests are at stake (German Marshall Fund 2004, pp. 21–23).Turkey’s record in violating United Nations Security Council resolutions is indeed

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illustrative of this propensity. Turkey was the second (after Israel) most frequent viola-tor of the resolutions endorsed between 1968 and 2002; violating 24, all of which arerelated to the Cyprus conflict (Zunes 2003). This negative record turns all the moreproblematic in view of the fact that the EU has officially bound itself to act in accor-dance with the principles of the United Nations Charter in the Amsterdam Treaty.

Earlier surveys conducted by the European Commission’s official public opinionanalysis sector, the Eurobarometer, in candidate countries had also illustrated howTurkish strategic culture diverged from most other would-be members. Some strikingfindings reveal that the Turks, despite being quite supportive of EU membership ingeneral, are very wary of an EU-based defence system and joint decision-making at theEU level in defence- and security-related matters. In 2003, Turks measured the lowestrate of support for joint decision-making in defence policy among all the candidatecountries, with only 27 per cent favourable to the idea (Eurobarometer 2003: 127).From 2003 to 2004, Turkey was the only accession/candidate country to register a sharpdecline in support for the EU’s foreign policy initiatives, and even a sharper decline inrelation to defence initiatives (Eurobarometer 2004, pp. 13–14). Overall, these indica-tors suggest that there are indeed qualities to Turkey’s strategic culture that are discern-ibly different from the rest.

In view of the above, it is argued that two forms of normative as strategic action,superficial norm-following and arguing, are most likely to prevail during the course ofTurkey’s socialization into the foreign and security policies of the EU. This thesis issubstantiated through a negative argument in the section below by attempting to makethe case that strategic action is unlikely to prevail separately even though the CFSP’sloosely regulated nature and Turkey’s prior opposition to CFSP norms would seem toallow it. It will then be argued that the evolutionary triumph of normative action is notunlikely, though it is dependent upon the democratization of Turkey’s foreign policy-making. Finally, it is argued that normative as strategic action is the most likely scenario.

As already posited above, when both the normative and the institutional structureof a policy area are weak, strategic action can suffice up until the point when prob-lems emerge.5 Moreover, normative action is more likely and strategic action isrendered somewhat unnecessary when there is no prior domestic opposition to themessages delivered from the socializing agent. In addition, countries with an imperialpast find it difficult to share sovereignty with the EU, most probably due to the asser-tiveness habitualized in their political cultures. All three conditions for strategicaction, therefore, seem to hold in the case of Turkey and the CFSP; CFSP is a looselyregulated policy area whose fundamental norms are largely inconsistent with pre-existing Turkish norms, and Turkey is a former empire. Strategic action is, however,still unlikely for two main reasons. First, the more costly the accession of a country,the more demanding the EU gets. At times, the EU overlooks poor performance incertain areas when material benefits from the accession of a particular country arehigh; conversely, when accession is costly, the criteria become more stringent and fullinternalization of community norms tends to be sought (Schimmelfennig 2000: 119).Second, given its difficult relations with Greece and Cyprus, two member states thatcan block Turkish membership to the EU, Turkey’s accession process has already

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started from a problematic departure point. It is worth noting especially that Turkeydoes not officially recognize the state of Cyprus, and has therefore been seekingadmission into an organization one of whose members it does not recognize. Itremains to be seen how this complicated issue can be resolved. Yet ultimately, theuniqueness of Turkey’s EU accession does not permit too much strategic action solong as the motivation to achieve membership continues.

An additional condition to consider is when strategic action governs state behaviourglobally as the perceived benefits from breaching norms override all other objectives.Should certain perennial irritants such as a serious threat of secessionism or a deterio-ration of the security situation in its border with Iraq present themselves, Turkey cancertainly be expected to follow this path in quite assertive ways. For instance, in a recentstatement, Turkey’s National Security Council reiterated its resolve to quell separatistterrorism and added that it would continue to take ‘all the measures necessary in thefight against terror no matter what the circumstances are (National Security Council ofTurkey 2007; emphasis added). However, these are also the conditions that take thelogic of action out of the EU context as all other objectives, including membership, willhave been put aside until the irritant is eliminated.

It is interesting to consider here the evolutionary perspective and to enquire as towhether strategic action may evolve into normative action as a result of conformitypressures on newcomers, and of the deepening of socialization effects in the course ofincreasing interaction with the socializing agent? Evolution of the logic of actiontoward the normative is a compelling case. However, it is still unlikely for the timebeing with respect to the CFSP due to the patterns of decision-making in foreign andsecurity matters in Turkey. For socialization of this sort to take effect, the agency thatis participating in the interaction process should be the same agency that formulatesa substantive amount of relevant policy in a given area. This condition is ‘upset’ bythe heavy influence Turkey’s military establishment holds in these matters (throughformal and informal mechanisms) at the expense of the civilian leadership interact-ing with the EU. In its annual progress reports on Turkey, the EU (EuropeanCommission 2004, pp. 22–23; and 2005, pp. 12–15) maintains that formal influenceis exercised through the military members of the regular National Security Councilwhere critical issues like Greece, Iraq and Cyprus are discussed and security policydocuments are drafted. Informal influence is exercised through public statementsfrom individual members of the Council, which sometimes include extensivecomments on EU–Turkey relations. In recent years, civilian control over the militaryhas increased; yet the autonomy of the latter did not fade away. In the formulation ofnational security strategy, the military input is much higher, while the definition ofsecurity in Turkey remains so wide that it can practically reach all areas, insist offi-cials of the European Commission. The political influence of the military is stillsignificant, the 2006 report on Turkey asserts, and only limited progress has beenachieved in terms of aligning civil–military relations with EU standards (EuropeanCommission 2006, pp. 7–8).

It is unlikely that tensions surrounding this issue will fade away soon, as Ya[scedil] arBüyükanıt, the top military leader who assumed office on 30 August 2006, is known to

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have a more assertive style than his predecessor Hilmi Özkök. Büyükanıt has expressedhis support for Turkey’s EU membership publicly many times, while he has beenequally vocal in his criticisms of the EU. For example, in October 2006 he stated that:

EU official Mr. KRETSCHMER mentions about the Turkish Armed Forces, he says: ‘Thearmed forces, by looking at the subject of national security from a very broad perspective,have been issuing statements on almost all aspects of public life, for example religiouseducation, cultural rights, university education and the like, and these statements havebeen having a huge impact on the public; emboldened by the fact that it is the mostrespected, trusted institution by the people, the Armed Forces consider issuing such state-ments to be legitimate’… Statements of this sort are statements that sound nice in termsof democratic discourse. However, I will interpret these statements by translating theminto clear Turkish:

● Religous education;● Cultural rights;● University education.

What disturbs this aforementioned EU official on these? What non-democratic discoursedo the Turkish Armed Forces use? Or, is it the case that the Turkish Armed Forces’ discourseis obstructing the goals in the hidden agendas of those who make these comments? We needto know these clearly. (Büyükanıt 2006)

To return to the earlier point on socialization effects, it may be suggested that the casefor the ‘natural selection’ of normative action can be suspended until such time as deci-sion-making in Turkey on foreign and security matters is more democratic.

Normative as strategic action, the most likely form of action in the case of Turkeyand CFSP, is used by countries that try to reduce the costs of socialization into the EUsystem and to alleviate any inconveniences in the course of the socialization process. Itcomes in two main forms: superficial norm-following and argumentation. Superficialnorm-followers easily disregard community norms when it is in their interests to do so.Superficial norm-following also serves as an escape strategy for those who find it diffi-cult to relate to community norms since they may be inconsistent with prior norms.Those who argue manipulate community norms by promising compliance aftermembership, advertizing traditional affiliation with Europe, claiming that there arespecial circumstances that apply to them and contesting the meaning of communitynorms in pursuit of membership (see Schimmelfennig 2000, pp. 130–131 for someexamples of the uses of these strategies by candidate countries from previous enlarge-ment rounds).

Turkey’s interest-driven strategic culture and its largely different foreign policyframework indicate that it can become, at best, a superficial follower of CFSP norms.Strategic culture is deep-rooted, though certainly not immune to change; it canchange through a reassessment of threat perceptions, wars, and of course, institutions(Meyer 2005). Formative moments can also change countries’ strategic cultures(Heiselberg 2003), and it is clear that EU membership would be such a formativemoment for Turkey following its emergence from the Ottoman Empire in the after-math of World War I. What is not so clear is whether EU membership would cause amajor transformation in the highly visible conspiratorial aspect of Turkey’s strategic

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culture that so pervasively feeds back into its securitized self-construction. For a newtype of self-construction to come about, a generational change and some majorhistory education reform would most likely be required, resulting in a less emotionalversion of history being taught.

Unless and until such changes take place, however, Turkey is most likely to keeparguing its way around CFSP norms. Arguing in this fashion is already common prac-tice by Turkey, and what follows are examples of the uses of ‘shifting the burden’,‘claiming traditional affiliation with Europe’, ‘meaning contestation’ and ‘citing specialcircumstances’ strategies by Turkish actors grouped under policy areas.

Turkey’s relations with Greece and Cyprus have been the most popular site for theuse of the first strategy, that of shifting the burden to the EU. The then Commander ofthe Turkish armed forces, Hilmi Özkök, shifts the burden of Turkey’s problems withGreece and Cyprus on the EU in a statement to the Greek newspaper Eleutherotypia inthe following manner: ‘If Turkey’s EU membership proceeds, the Aegean and otherproblems will be resolved within one week’.6 Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo[gbreve] anburdens the EU in similar fashion:

A possible relapse in our European Union accession process will weaken the chances ofresolving our problems with Greece as well. If Turkey becomes a full member, the Aegeanwill cease to become an issue of dispute and acquire the character of becoming a regionuniting Turkey and Greece within the borders of the Union. It is easier to overcome prob-lems in this way. The same applies within the context of the Southern Cyprus GreekAdministration’s membership to the European Union. (Erdo[gbreve] an 2003)

Regarding the second approach, Erdo[gbreve] an has advertized Turkey’s NATO membershipas a way of claiming traditional affiliation with Europe:

My nation, whose sons have fought shoulder to shoulder with their European brothers inwars under the framework of NATO, is expecting today to live together with theirEuropean friends under the same sky for the same ideals of freedom and democracy,(Erdo[gbreve] an 2004)

A Ministry of Foreign Affairs note on Turkey’s goal of achieving EU membershipexpresses the country’s traditional affiliation with Europe in even stronger terms:

Historically, geographically and economically, Turkey is a European country. Therefore, itis only natural for Turkey to become a full member of the European Union within areasonable period of time. So long as Turkey’s membership to the EU is not realized, theEuropean integration project will not be complete (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of theRepublic of Turkey 2006a)

The third strategy, that of claiming the right to special circumstances, has morefrequently been employed in relation to military affairs. For instance, Turkey’s mainopposition leader Deniz Baykal has commented on a European Court of Human Rightsjudgement7 condemning the incarceration of a Turkish conscientious objector.Conscientious objection is a right recognized in all EU countries where conscriptioncontinues, with the exception of Cyprus,8 and is protected by the European Conventionon Human Rights. Baykal justifies this violation by underlining the special circum-stances that apply in the case of Turkey:

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We have not witnessed the emergence of such a need [conscientious objection] as a wide-spread societal demand. However, it is becoming clear that this issue will be graduallybrought before Turkey. Of course, military service is an extraordinarily important issue inTurkey. This is an issue that is at the heart of our understanding of citizenship. It is one ofthe fundamental requirements of co-existence, societal peace and stability. That is why ithas a very special importance and we have a solid, historical experience with this; unfortu-nately, the need to effectively regulate military service continues. Sure, it is a humanitarianmatter that requires attention. On the other hand, I also believe that we have to be verycautious against attempts to exploit the issue. (Baykal 2006)

Turkey has also contested the meaning of norms to suit its needs in foreign and securitymatters. A relevant example would come from the strictly religious meaning attachedto the term ‘minority’, which is a security (as well as a securitized) matter for Turkey.Its definition works to include non-Muslims only: Greeks, Armenians and Jews, to bespecific. Turkey can subsequently claim that it does respect the rights of minoritiesas required by the EU’s Copenhagen criteria for accession, but that there are no extra-religious minorities in Turkey. Any non-Turkish language spoken other than Greek—Armenian and Hebrew, for instance—is subsumed under the category of ‘differentlanguages and dialects traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives’9 in legis-lation regulating broadcasting permits for radio stations and television channels. Bycontrast, in its evaluation of Turkey’s broadcasting policy, the European Commissiondiscusses the languages affected by this particular piece of legislation such as Kurdish,Bosnian and Arabic as ‘minority languages’ (European Commission 2004: 39). Similarly,the Commission refers to Turkey’s Alevi community, members of a non-Sunni Islamicsect in predominantly Sunni Turkey, as a ‘Muslim minority’ (ibid.: 54). However, bysticking to its own interpretation of the link between religion and minority status, Turkeyhas been able to maintain the thesis that it affords sufficient protection to its minorities.

Likewise, Turkey has differently interpreted the Berlin Plus agreement (2002) regu-lating EU–NATO strategic cooperation in crisis management and has insisted onthe exclusion of Cyprus (and Malta) from the framework. As the EU has reported(European Commission 2005, pp. 127–130), this has had the effect of blocking coop-eration between the two organizations as difficulties remain regarding Turkey’s parti-cipation in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). As far as Turkey isconcerned, ESDP should develop as an extension of EU member states’ committmentto each other’s defence, and not rival NATO or be used against a non-EU NATOmember (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey 2006b).Turkey has also failed to align its position with the common EU position on the Inter-national Criminal Court. On this matter, Turkey expressed its interest in the recon-struction of the text to include terrorism as a crime in the Rome Statute that set up theCourt. Some important steps have been taken by Turkey, including a necessary consti-tutional amendment and a verbal committment from prime minister Erdo an in 2004,to proceed with the process.10 However, the future remains uncertain at this moment,since Turkey’s military establishment is concerned that the Court’s authority stretchestoo far, including cases of ‘prolonged internal conflicts’ (Yinanç 2006). Indeed, theEuropean Commission’s 2006 regular report on Turkey notes that there has been noprogress on the International Criminal Court.

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Conclusion

This article briefly discussed the rationalist and constructivist theories of state social-ization. Referring to both is more appropriate for the special context of EU enlarge-ment. It has been suggested that, of the various ways in which rationalism andconstructivism intersect, two forms of normative as strategic action–superficialnorm-following and argumentation—are the most likely options for Turkey as ittries to socialize into the CFSP. This is the case even though the nature of regulationand prior domestic opposition to community norms in this policy area would seemto favour strategic action. The case for superficial norm-following has been relatedfirst to the uniqueness of Turkey’s accession, its problematic relations with twomember states and the high costs to be incurred by the EU as a whole that will resultfrom its accession. It is argued that these two conditions require at least the appear-ance of norm internalization. Second, the likelihood of superficial norm-followingby Turkey is related to the large distance that exists between European norms andTurkish norms. This gap is unlikely to be bridged in the near future. Lastly, theactual practices of argumentation that have long been coming from Turkey are takento demostrate that it is already following the logic of arguing in foreign- and secu-rity-related matters as a way of avoiding full socialization into CFSP norms. It ishoped that this article will contribute to the debate on the norms upon which theEU’s foreign and security policy is based and their implications for Turkey’s EUaccession process.

Notes1.[1] Finnemore and Sikkink call this three-stage process ‘the norm life cycle’ and identify that

there is a crucial ‘tipping point’ or ‘threshold of normative change’ for a recently emergingnorm to ‘cascade’ through the states in the international community and gain acceptance(Finnemore & Sikking 1998: 895).

2.[2] A pattern of superficial norm-following can be established when the actual conduct of a statecontradicts its prior declarations in support of a particular norm, or when it fails to align itsconduct with the standards demanded by the supported norm.

3.[3] Risse (2000: 6) more specifically asks, ‘how do actors adjudicate which norm applies? Theyargue. I suggest, therefore, that social constructivism encompasses not only the logic of appro-priateness but also what we could a “logic of truth seeking or arguing”’.

4.[4] Schimmelfennig (2000: 129) refers to these attempts to receive preferential treatment sepa-rately as the strategy of ‘swotting’, which he identifies as often being used as a competitivestrategy like the manipulation of European identity. Since Turkish political discourse oftencombines the two strategies (that is, it claims affiliation with Europe to receive preferentialtreatment), they are not treated separately here.

5.[5] Müller identifies some of the problems that can emerge as coordination issues and loss ofcredibility. Too much strategic action by one party can be counterproductive if the otherparties start perceiving this as hindering the desired coordination of policies. Similarly, a partythat seems to hinder progress in the given policy area can start to lose its credibility in the eyesof the others, which is an important element especially if the parties are to meet regularly(Müller 2004), as in EU accession talks.

6.[6] Interview with Hilmi Özkök, 18 October 2003, available at: http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/avrupabirligi/2003/10/20x10x03.htm.

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