a society organized for war, medieval spain (lourie, elena)

7/28/2019 A Society Organized for War, Medieval Spain (LOURIE, ELENA)

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The Past and Present Society

A Society Organized for War: Medieval SpainAuthor(s): Elena LourieSource: Past & Present, No. 35 (Dec., 1966), pp. 54-76Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society

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A SOCIETY ORGANIZED FOR WAR:MEDIEVAL SPAIN*

THE MOSLEMSINVADED SPAIN IN 711 AND CONQUERED T IN SEVENyears. "What was lost in seven years, it took seven hundred toregain".1 Thus from the start, the Christians in the survivingfragments of the unitary Visigothic state, were organizedfor war ina particularly purposeful sense: a war of religion and a war of re-conquest.At first the task must have seemed insuperableand probablywasscarcelyconceivedof except in termsof immediate self-defence. Thetiny Asturian State, first nucleus of resistance, protected by theCantabrianmountains and by a vast no-man's-landstretchingto theriver Duero, was peopled only by a handful of refugee magnatesandchurchmenwith their followers,and the permanentinhabitantsof anarea which had always been backward,rebellious and remote fromthe centre of power.2 With such meagre resources, in the face ofwhat, for long, was an incomparablysuperior civilization, not eventhe extra incentive of a religiouswar could makethe early-expressedclaim to be the heirs of the Visigoths3- their government-in-exile,as it were - less than ridiculous.Yet quite apartfrom the built-in weaknessesof the Moslem state,4even in the great days of the Caliphate of Cordoba, the Moslemconquest had not been all loss to the hard-pressedChristianrulers,huddled in their northern mountains. The powerful aristocracyofthe Visigothic kingdom had been ruined. The need for a united

* This article makes use of material published by Spanish and Hispanistscholars whose work is not readily available in English. I would like to thankProfessor Lionel Butler of St. Andrews University for his helpful criticism.1J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469-1716 (London, 1963), p. 14.2 C. Sanchez-Albornoz, Espaia, Un Enigma Hist6rico (Buenos Aires, I956),ii, pp. I6-33. L. Barrau-Dihigo, Recherchessur l'Histoire Politique du RoyaumeAsturien 718-910 (New York, Paris, 1921), pp. III-4.3 R. Menendez Pidal, El Imperio Hispdnicoy los Cinco Reinos (Madrid, 1950),pp. 21-4. L. G. de Valdeavellano, Historia de Espana, 3rd edn. (Madrid, I963),i, Pt. i, p. 435. Barrau-Dihigo, op. cit., pp. 213-4.4 For the divisions between Arabs, Berbers and Slavs within the Moslemstate at all periods until its collapse in Io3I see E. L6vi-Provencal, L'EspagneMusulmane au Xe Siecle: Institutions et Vie Sociale (Paris, 1932), pp. I ff.,I30-I, I35-6. Idem, Histoire de l'Espagne Musulmane (Paris, I950-3), i, pp. 88-9; ii, p. 274; iii, pp. 74-5. C. Sanchez-Albornoz, En Torno a los Origines delFeudalismo (Mendoza, 1942), iii, pp. 235-6.


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A SOCIETY ORGANIZEDFOR WAR: MEDIEVALSPAINcommand strengthened the ruler's authority and the very smallgeographicalextent of the kingdom during the first two centuries ofits existence helped him maintain close control over his officials.The king thus startedwith an advantageand a new aristocracyaroseunder the shadow of the monarchy.5The king's advantage was increased by the progress of the Re-conquest, since the Roman Law maximthat all lordless land belongedto the fisc was firmly maintained, modified less by large-scaleusurpations than by frequent grants by the ruler himself of land infull ownership. Indeed it was preciselythe availabilityof largetractsof land as the Reconquest progressedwhich made it unnecessarytoresort to the benefice - the conditionalgrant of land - as the soleor even chief means of rewardingor creatinga mounted force.6Yet the need for a cavalryforce grew as the Christiansdescendedfrom the mountains into the plains north of the Duero and theEbro. In Leon and Castile this took place at the end of the ninth,and in Aragon in the later eleventh, century. Lacking a powerfularistocracy with numerous serfs and slaves to settle in greatestates, these northernplains, particularlyn Castile,wereverylargelycolonized by free small-holders,attractedby the grant of easy termsfrom the king or those magnates, lay and ecclesiastical, who hadreceived a royal commission to settle newly recovered areas. It wasfrom amongthese non-noble freemen that one of the most importantmilitaryclasses in medieval Spainwas recruited:a class that emergedin the struggles between Castile and Le6n in the tenth century andwas a factorin the civil andinter-Christianwarsin the fourteenthandfifteenth centuries,but whose formation was chiefly due to its role inthe Reconquest from the capture of Toledo in io85 to the fall ofSeville in I248.7 This was the class of the commoner-knights,thecaballerosvillanos, whose numbers greatly increased as numeroustowns arose between the Duero and the Tagus to hold the new frontier

5Sanchez-Albornoz, Espaia, Un Enigma, ii, p. 59. Barrau-Dihigo, op.cit., p. 222. L. G. de Valdeavellano, "Les Liens de Vassalit6 et les Immunitesen Espagne", Recueils de la Societe Jean Bodin, i (I958), pp. 223 ff. For theking's legal authority to exile a vassal or subject arbitrarily by virtue of the iraregis, see Valdeavellano, "Las Instituciones Feudales en Espafia", appendix tothe Spanish transl. of F. Ganshof, El Feudalismo (Barcelona, 1963), pp. 253-8.E. de Hinojosa, "El Derecho en el Poema del Cid", in Estudios sobre la Historiadel Derecho Espaiol (Madrid, 1915), p. 88, n. 2.6 Sanchez-Albornoz, Espaia, Un Enigma, ch. xii.Sanchez-Albornoz, op. cit., ii, p. 476. On Aragon see J. M. Ramos yLoscertales, "La Observancia 31 'De Generalibus Privilegiis' del Libro VI",Homenaje a Menendez Pidal (Madrid, 1925), iii, pp. 228-9.

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PAST AND PRESENTin the late eleventh and twelfth centuries.8 Many of the small menwho cameto settle the new lands, althoughlackingsufficientresourcesto carve out great estates for themselves, were neverthelessvery wellable to afford a horse. Thus with the descent from the mountainsthe demandfor a cavalryforce and the meansof supplyingit appearedsimultaneously. Indeed, as settlement became more systematicallyorganized,newly conqueredtowns would be divided into caballeria(cavalryportions) and peonias (infantryportions) to be allotted tonewcomerswho acceptedthe relevantobligations.9Already by the late eleventh century,underthe Almoravidethreat,king or senormight give both horse and armourto freemen in returnfor cavalryservice. The grantwas called a benefice- or rathertheusual term in Le6n and Castile was prestimonio but it was nota noble benefice nor was it accompaniedby any ceremonyor ritual.1At first such grants had to be returned to the donor on the death ofthe beneficiary,but by the second decade of the twelfth century ithad become common, as an inducement to the growth of this classof soldier, formallyto grant a man hereditaryrights to the horse andarmoureven if his heir were a minor. An interestingtransitionstageappears n a privilegegranted n Le6n wherebythe horse and arms hadto be returned if the caballerodied at home, but not if he died inaction.11Since land was not in short supply, to encouragethe growth of thisessential arm in the military organizationof the state, it was onlynecessaryto grant them privileges. At first they appear,in contrastto the nobles, the caballeroshidalgos,almost completely submerged

8C. Pescador, "La Caballeria Popular en Le6n y Castilla", Cuadernos deHistoria de Espaia (hereafter CHE.), xxxiii-iv (I96I), pp. IOI-238; XXXV-V(I962), pp. 56-201; xxxvii-viii (I963), pp. 88-198; xxxix-xl (I964), pp. 169-260.For the towns see J. M. Lacarra, "Les Villes-Fontieres dans l'Espagne des XIeet XIIe Siecles", Moyen Age, lxix (I963), pp. 205-22.9 Pescador in CHE., xxxix-xl (1964), pp. 177-8. For a similar division ofland in twelfth-century Saragossa see J. M. Lacarra, "Documentos para laReconquista del Valle del Ebro", Estudios de Edad Media de la Corona deArag6n (hereafter EEMCA.), ii (I946), pp. 543-4. Caballeria could also meana knight's fee or money fief held by a noble; cf. loc. cit. below, note 35.10Prestimonio was a term applied to all conditional grants whether for life,a term of years, or ad nutum and included benefices to noble vassals in return forhomage and military service as well as holdings granted to agricultural tenants:see Valdeavellano, "El Prestimonio. Contribuci6n al Estudio de lasManifestaciones del Feudalismo en los Reinos de Le6n y Castilla durante la EdadMedia", Anuario de Historia del DerechoEspaiol (hereafter AHDE.), xxv (I955),pp. 5-122; H. Grassotti, "Apostillas a 'El Prestimonio' de Valdeavellano",CHE., xxix-xxx (I959), pp. 167-217.11T. Mufioz y Romero, Colecci6n de Fueros M/lunicipales Cartas Pueblas delos Reinos de Castilla, Le6n, Corona de Aragon y Navarra (Madrid, I847), i,pp. 97-8. Pescador in CHE., xxxiii-iv (1961), pp. I34-7.

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A SOCIETYORGANIZEDFOR WAR: MEDIEVALSPAINin the tax-paying classes and frequently owing semi-servile labourdues.12 But almost from the start they began to accumulatejudicialand fiscal privileges so that by the thirteenth century some werewholly exempt from taxation, either royal or municipal. However,all their privileges were closely linked to their function and theirusefulness. Total tax-exemptionwas rarely given merelyfor a horse,but only for a horse of a certain quality and with elaboratemilitaryequipment and arms. To encourage the commoner caballerostoimprove their arms, the Leonese kings began in the late twelfthcentury to establish a tariff of exemptions from military service, aswell as taxation, which affected the dependants of the caballero.Thus a knight who came with full equipment for himself and hishorse including a tent could exempt eight dependents or fellow-citizens from military service, whereas a knight with merely shield,lanceandhelmet couldexempt only two. In most cases these exemptmen had to be foot-soldiers.13Another privilege and one of great social and political importancewas the reservation,begun tentativelyin the late twelfth century andalmost complete by the end of the fifteenth century, of all municipaloffices to the knights, whethernoble or commoner.14Inducementalonewas not alwaysrelied upon to providenon-noblecavalrymen. Cavalryservice was on occasion made compulsoryforthose who could afford it. In twelfth-century Calatayud on thefrontiers of Aragon and Navarre the municipal authoritieswereempowered to seize and sell a man's goods in order to buy him ahorse, if he could affordit and had failed to buy one himself.15 Inthe fourteenth century the very success of the Reconquest and thefrequent truces with Granadamade Alfonso XI concerned about thestrength of his frontier defences. He therefore obliged those withcertain minimum incomes to maintain a proportionatenumber ofhorses. These men, who now had not only to ride themselves but tomaintainothers who were excluded, it seems, from the privileges of12Pescador in CHE., xxxiii-iv (I96I), pp. 147 ff. Not all Sra. Pescador'searly examples may refer to caballeros villanos; see Sanchez-Albornoz, ibid.,pp. IOI-2; Pescador in CHE., xxxix-xl (I964), p. I73. On exemptions frompersonal services see idem, in CHE., xxxvii-viii (I963), pp. 89 ff.13 Pescador in CHE., xxxiii-iv (I96I), pp. I64-6, 177-80; xxxv-vi (I962),pp. I97-20I; xxxvii-viii (I963), pp. 148-60. A. Palomeque Torres, "Contri-buci6n al Estudio del Ejercito en los Estados de la Reconquista", AHDE., xv(I944), pp. 3IO-I7.14 A. B6 and M. del Carmen Carle, "Cuando Empieza a Reservarse a losCaballeros el Gobierno de las Ciudades Castellanas", CHE., iv (I946), pp. II9-24. Pescador in CHE., xxxix-xl (I964), pp. 200-33.1 Pescador in CHE., xxxiii-iv (I961), pp. I60-I, 182-3. Palomeque, loc.cit., pp. 245-6. Mufioz y Romero, op. cit., p. 460.

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PAST AND PRESENTcommoner-knights,16were the caballeros de cuantia or de alarde(knights of minimum wealth who attended the annual or bi-annualinspections, sanctionedby loss of status and privileges, of horsesandequipment). Their field of actiondwindledfromallthe frontierprov-inces to Murciaand Andaluciaalonein the sixteenthcentury. In 619they were suppressed by royal edict as "unnecessaryto the king'sservice".17 Thus early and late there was real distraint of knight-hood, but with a strictly military purpose. For these caballerosherewas no mystique of knighthood; they were privileged because theywere useful. Entryinto their rankswas solely the result of acquiringa horse, inheriting one or having it thrust upon you. And exit wasjust as casual. The unreplaced loss or sale of one's horse wouldreduce one to the ranksof the tax-payinginfantry.18The non-noble cavalryin the walled towns which protected theirown inhabitants and the scatteredvillages in which the frontiersmensettled, played a dominantrole not only in times of declared war butin that day-to-day atmosphere of insecurity, characteristicof thefrontier, which made it necessary to grant wide privileges andliberties to all settlers, not merely those who could maintain a horseand arms. The constantthreat of Moslem raids as well as the aridityof much of the land made pastoral farming and stock breeding farmore attractivethan agriculture, since the animals could be movedaway when the alarm was given. But for much the same reasoncattle and sheep and horses were particularlyattractive as booty, andcattle-stealing, especially between Moslems and Christians, was afrequentand lucrativeoccupation.19 One of the most importantandminutely detailed duties of the caballeroswas therefore to act asguardsmenof the pastures, as well as, more generally,to patrol thefrontier.20

16Pescador in CHE., xxxiii-iv (I961), p. 209.17 Pescador, loc. cit., pp. 203-Io, 215, 229-38.18 The methods of becoming a caballero villano are listed by Pescador in CHE.,xxxv-vi (1962), pp. 56 ff. For loss of this status see loc. cit., pp. 81-2, 84-9.19For Idrisi's testimony to wealth in cattle see L. Torres Balbas, ResumenHistorico del Urbanismo en Espaia (Madrid, I954), pp. 37-8. For the attractionof cattle and horses as booty see Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris, ed. L. SanchezBelda (Madrid, I950), paras, 36, 38, II9, I3I, I87. On cattle-stealing see theFuero of Calatayud (which mentions Christian culprits), Mufioz y Romero, op.cit., p. 464; Forum Conche, Fuero de Cuenca. The Latin text of the MunicipalCharters and Laws of the City of Cuenca, ed. G. H. Allen in two parts (UniversityStudies, Univ. of Cincinnati, 2nd ser., vi, no. I, 9gIo), cap. xxxI, rubric I2;"Fuero sobre el Fecho de las Cavalgadas", Memoria Historico Espaiol, ii(I85I), tit. XVII, p. 456; Pescador in CHE., xxxv-vi (1962), pp. I86-7.20 Palomeque, loc. cit., pp. 225-8, 342-6. Pescador in CHE., xxxvi-vii (I963),pp. 99-I24. M. Estela Gonzalez, "La Anubda y la Arrobda en Castilla, CHE.,xxxix-xl (1964), pp. 6-42.

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A SOCIETY ORGANIZEDFOR WAR: MEDIEVALSPAINThe same sense of insecurity, of a society on the alert for danger,appears in the regulations relating to the gathering of the harvest.Exactlythe sameprecautionsagainsta surpriseattackon the denudedcity were taken then, as when the organizedhost left to campaigninenemy territory.21 Even the fire-drill of the town reflected theattitude of a society conditioned by danger and war. When a firebreaks out in the town, the citizens are straitlyorderednot to rush tothe fire but to the city-gates in order to secure them; and only thenmay they put out the fire; for, the statutesexplain,wilful incendiarismis a well-tried rusedeguerremuch used by fifth-columnistsanxioustolet in the enemy. And the statutesof Plasencia earnedlyadd: "Thuswas Troy destroyed".22In such a society cowardice was dangerous and co-operation anecessity. Hence a number of frontier towns condemned to deathanyone who either ran away from battle, or hid in order to avoidhaving to fight, or failed to help anyone in dangeronce he had beenseen to be in danger.23But though grimly conscious of their exposed position and givento war as a way of life, these frontier towns did not sacrifice theindividual to the group in any Spartan fashion. Their laws wereneitherinhumanenor mean. In some cases the caballerowas exemptfrom military duty duringthe firstyearof his marriage. He was alsoexempt if his wife was in labour or his parents dying or he himselfhad been recentlywidowed. Old age, too, excused him from service

without loss of status. Moreover, his widow often continued toenjoy his privileges though she lost them if she marriedan infantry-man.24Some control over individual freedom was necessary. Butrestrictions on leave of absence derived as much from the economicneeds as from the militaryduties of the frontier. One could not goawayfor long without losing the privilegesof a citizen as such, muchless of a caballero, ince permanentdomicile was usuallythe essentialcondition for each. However, individual freedom and militarydiscipline were usually reconciled in a compromisewhich permittedthe caballero o be away during the winter months as long as he waspresentfrom ist May to October,that is for the campaigningseason.2521 Palomeque, loc. cit., pp. 24I-4.22

Idem, ibid., p. 242. The edition by J. Benavides Checa (Rome, I896)was unavailable to me.23 Palomeque, loc. cit., p. 290.24 Idem, ibid., pp. 233, 309, n. 303. Pescador in CHE., xxxv-vi (I962), p. 89.Sixty was the normal retiring age.25 Idem, ibid., pp. IOI-2; xxxix-xl (I964), pp. I83-5.

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PAST AND PRESENTThe non-noble knights were not, of course, the only cavalryforceat the king's disposal. There was also the dubbed knight, thenobleman. The nobles of Castile and, with slight variations interminology, of Aragon, were divided into two classes: the greater

called ricos hombres nd the lesser, the infanzonesor hidalgos,often,especially in Aragon, simply called caballeros. The generic namehidalgoswas often used forboth greaterandlessernobles, andnobilityas such was hidalguia.26 Alreadyin I093 the caballerohidalgowasdefinedin terms of blood and lineage,ratherthan economicpower, orfunction.27Originallythey owed the king military service simply as subjects,for the Visigothic principle that all subjects had a duty to serve theking in peace and war never died.28 But from an early date, owingto the circumstancesthat attended the birth of Castile in the tenth

century, the Castilian nobility achieved the privilege, besides thatof tax-exemption, of freedom from military service except in returnfor a benefice in land or money;29cash paymentsindeed were greatlyfacilitated in the eleventh century when the successor-statesto theCaliphatebegan paying the Christianrulers heavy annual tribute.30This privilege seems to have spreadto Le6n by the twelfth century,but in Aragon, at least in theory, an unbeneficed noble had to givethree days' serviceat his own expense, whereasa beneficedone had toserve for two or three months.31But the grant of a benefice in land or cash was not necessarilyaccompaniedby the act of homage. Nor was the beneficiaryalwaysbound by a special tie over and above the allegiance owed by allsubjects to the king. Indeed the general oath of allegiance neverdisappearedas it did in France between the eleventh and thirteenth

26 Vidal de Canellas, Vidal Mayor. Traducci6n Aragonesa de "In Excelsis DeiThesauris", ed. G. Tilander (Leges Hispanicae Medii Aevi, v, Lund, I956),ii, p. 453. M. del Carmen Carle, "Infanzones e Hidalgos", CHE., xxxiii-iv(I962), pp. 58-o00. L. G. de Valdeavellano, Historia de Espaia, i, Pt. ii,pp. 64-5, 472.27 E. de Hinojosa, Documentospara la Historia de las Instituciones de Leon yCastilla. Siglos X-XIII, (Madrid, I919), pp. 40-I.28 Palomeque, loc. cit., p. 213.29 Sanchez-Albornoz, En Torno a los Origines del Feudalismo, i, p. I8I; iii,pp. 277-9. Pescador in CHE., xxxiii-iv (I96I), pp. I43-4. The Fuero ofCastrojeriz (974) which equated the caballeros villanos with the nobles on thisscore too is in Mufioz y Romero, op. cit., p. 38.

30 H. Grassotti, "Para la Historia del Botin y las Parias en Le6n y Castilla",CHE., xxxix-xl (I964), pp. 52-62.31 Ramos y Loscertales, "La Observancia 31 'De Generalibus Privilegiis' ",Homenajea Menendez Pidal, ii, pp. 228,229-30,232-3. Idem, "Recopilaci6ndelos Fueros y Usos de los Infanzones y Barones de Arag6n liecha en II34",ibid., p. 237. Vidal de Canellas, Vidal Mayor, ed. G. Tilander, ii, p. 435.

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A SOCIETYORGANIZEDFOR WAR: MEDIEVALSPAINcenturies. The king in fact could get military service without abenefice and fealty without vassalage. All the ingredients offeudalismwere there: immunity,32vassalage,benefice; but they nevercongealedinto the mould characteristicof north Europeanfeudalism.The beneficeandvassalageneverjoinedto createa fief in the acceptedsense. For even where they were joined, the grant never becamehereditary,not even in the area which was most remote from, andleast affectedby, the Moslem invasion- the far northwestcornerofGalicia.33 By the time that the extent of the kingdom called forconsiderabledelegation of authority,and when civil wars, minoritiesand the influenceof France might have led to a retardedimitationofthe French model,34 he opportunity had gone - for the rise of thetowns, common to the whole of Europe, created an inhospitableatmospherefor the developmentof a feudal society. Thus in Castileand Aragon35t is possible to speakof a feudal ambiance,of a societevassalatique,but not of feudalism, except of course in Catalonia,which was conceived in the Carolingianwomb and early displayeda classic feudal hierarchy.36Furthermore, public office was never feudalized. Althoughadministrativeposts were grantedas benefices from the late eleventhcentury presumablyas a result of French influence, the grants neverbecame hereditary. Even as benefices they were scarcely feudal.AlfonsoX insisted that such grants- or honores did not necessitatefeudal homage, since the bestowal of royal authorityimplied in itself

32 Sanchez-Albornoz, "La Potestad Real y los Sefiorios en Asturias, Le6n yCastilla, Siglos VIII-XIII", Revista de Archivos Bibliotecas y Museos, xxxi(1914), pp. 263-90. J. Guallart, "Algunos Documentos de Inmunidad deTierra de Le6n", CHE., iii (1945), pp. I68-85. Valdeavellano, "Las Insti-tuciones Feudales", appendix to Ganshof, El Feudalismo, pp. 240-5, 280-I.33 Valdeavellano, "El Prestimonio .. .", AHDE., xxv (I955), p. 72. Only twohereditary fiefs have been found in Castile: Sanchez-Albornoz, "Un FeudoCastellano del Siglo XIII", AHDE., i (I924), pp. 387-90; R. Paz, "Un NuevoFeudo Castellano", AHDE., v (1928), pp. 445-8.34M. Defourneaux, Les Franfais en Espagne aux XIe et XIIe Siecles(Toulouse, I949).35 Even in Aragon the descent of knights' fees to the direct heir-male was notautomatic in the fourteenth century: see Actos de Cortes del Reyno de Aragon(Saragossa, I664), fos. iv.2 (I366).36 On the peculiarities of feudalism in Castile, Aragon and Navarre seeValdeavellano, "Las Instituciones Feudales", app. to Ganshof, El Feudalismo,pp. 229-86. For Catalonia see ibid., pp. 286-300. There is a useful biblio-graphy on pp. 301-5. For a different emphasis see Salvador de Mox6'sreview article of Valdeavellano: "Feudalismo Europeo y Feudalismo Espaiiol",Hispania, xxiv (I964), pp. 123-33. A good short survey is Valdeavellano, "LesLiens de Vassalite et les Immunites en Espagne", Recueils de la Soc. Jean Bodin,i (1958), pp. 223-55.


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the presenceof a high degree of fealty.37 The only two counts who,governing exposed and distant marches, gained independence fromthe king were the count of Castile in the tenth, and the count ofPortugal in the twelfth century. But neither had been given theirposts as hereditary fiefs, although Alfonso Henriques had theadvantageover the Castiliancount in that Portugalhad been given tohis father as a hereditary grant in full ownership.38 Both howeverachieved theiraimsby successfulrebellion. The Castilianusurpationwas particularlynoticeable in that the comital title which, unlike theBurgundianHenry's, was of Spanish origin, became hereditaryuntilthe creationof a kingdomin I035. The retardednature of Castilianfeudalismis illustratedby the antiquesignificanceretainedby the titleof count. Both in the Astur-Leonesekingdomand afterwards n thatof Le6n-Castile, a comes or conde still kept the associations of thecomitivaor board-companionsof a great lord or king. It was not anadministrativeoffice, and an administrativearea was called a countyonly as long as a count held it and ceased so to be calledas soon as hewas transferred elsewhere. It was above all a personal dignity, anhonorifictitle acquiredfor life and the highest in the social hierarchy.This extraordinarily rchaicsignificancestill endured in the fourteenthcentury when Alfonso XI made Alvar Nufiez a count. The kingseated him on a dais and broughthim a cup of wine and three dishes,of which the main ingredient was bread. The king said: "Eat,count", and the count said: "Eat, king". They said this to eachother three times and then they ate together from the same dish.There was, however, much that was self-consciously archaicin thisceremony since we are told that "because for a long time there hadbeen no count in the kingdom of Castile and Le6n there was somedoubt how to go about it".39 And the peculiarities which had

37Valdeavellano, "El Prestimonio...", AHDE., xxv (I955), pp. 39, 58-9.Grassotti, "Apostillas.. .", CHE., xxix-xxx (1959), pp. 191-2. N. Guglielmi,"El 'Dominus Villae' en Castilla y Le6n", CHE., xix (I953), p. 72. E. CoronaBaratech, "Las Tenencias en Arag6n desde 1035 a II34", EEMCA., vi (I946),pp. 379-96. Alfonso X, Las Siete Partidas, edn. Real Academia de la Historia(Madrid, I807), Pt. ii, tit. xxv, ley ii.38P. Merea, "A Concessao da Terra Potugalense a D. Henrique perantea Hist6ria Juridica", AHDE., ii (1925), pp. 169-78. P. David, "Le PacteSuccessoral entre Raymond de Galice et Henri de Portugal", Bulletin Hispanique,1 (I948), pp. 289-90. Sanchez-Albornoz, Espaia, Un Enigma, ii, pp. 425 ff.For the rise of Castile see Valdeavellano, Historia de Espaia, i, Pt. ii, p. I33.39Cr6nica del Rey D. Alfonso el Onceno (Biblioteca de Autores Espafioles,lxvi, Madrid, I875), cap LXI,pp. 210-I. Sanchez-Albornoz remarked that thetitle of count disappeared in the thirteenth century. In fact Sancho IV madeLope de Haro a count on i Jan. 1287. Since Lope asked specially that his sonshould inherit the title, it was clearly still non-hereditary. Sanchez-Albornoz,En Torno a los Origenes del Feudalismo, i, p. 127. Cr6nica de Sancho IV(Bibl. Aut. Esp., lxvi, I875), p. 74. M. Gaibrois, Historia del Reinado de

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markedthe title in Spain disappeared n the fourteenthcenturyand itbecame an hereditarydistinction as elsewhere. But, though publicofficebecame hereditary n the later middle ages and eventuallycameto be concentrated n the handsof the titled nobility, the feudalizationof public office was by then impossible. For althoughin some casestreated as such, the offices so controlled could never, given theinfluence of Roman Law in the later middle ages, be regarded asprivate property, as anything but offshoots of the centralauthority,nor could their holders fail to be seen formally as royal servants,however feeble the king.40Finally, although the civil wars following the assassination ofPedro I witnessed an enormous increasein the alienation of jurisdic-tion into private hands, this was a seigneurial rather than a feudalphenomenon. For the holders of immune sehorioswere not neces-sarily vassals and the duties of the latter remained essentially andarchaicly personal.41 There was no concept of multiple lordship orliege homage. As late as the mid-fourteenthcenturythe punishment

for a vassalwho took beneficesfrom two senoreswas death.42The caballerovillano could be the vassal of an hidalgo,and indeedsome urbanstatutes are carefulto providerulings for a possible clashof loyalties, stipulating that, should the senorattack the town, theloyalties of the vassal must lie with his fellow citizens. He can onlyhelp his lord to the extent of giving him a mount should he beunhorsed. Some went further and stipulated that no caballervillano might take as senor the lord of the town.43 In Portugal,although the king agreed to count those vassals of the ricoshombreamong the urban knights as part of the former's cavalrycontingent,it was clear that the caballerosvillanos in question nevertheless did

40 L. Suarez, Nobleza y Monarquia (Estudios y Documentos. Cuadernos deHistoria Medievalia, xv, Facultad de Filosofia y Letras de la Univ. de Valladolid,I959), PP. 18-27, 63, 102-3.41 Sanchez-Albornoz, Espaia, Un Enigma, ii, p. 71. Most of the largecompact senorios were incorporated into the royal estates at the end of theMiddle Ages. The usual chequer-board type helped maintain the supremacy ofroyal jurisdiction and confine seigneurial autonomy to local administration: seeSalvador de Mox6, "Los Seiiorios. En Torno a una Problematica para elEstudio del Regimen Sefiorial", Hispania, xxiv (1964), pp. 188-9.42 Ordinance of Alcala de Henares (I348), cap. lxxii. Cortes de los AntiguosReinos de Le6n y Castilla (R. Acad. de la Hist., Madrid, i86i), i, p. 550. Thebenefice was in cash. Money-benifices, quite normal in the eleventh andtwelfth centuries, became the rule in Castile in the thirteenth: Valdeavellano,"Las Instituciones Feudales", in Ganshof, El Feudalismo, pp. 275-7.43 Pescador, in CHE., xxxiii-iv (1961), pp. 128-34. For a ruling in Palencia(1181) which distinguished between a knight in his lord's company and one inthe city at the time of the attack see ibid., pp. I72-3.

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PAST AND PRESENTservicewith the rest of the urbanmilitia. The urbanframeworkwasproof against a semi-feudal tie.44The caballerovillano in turn could be a sehor,and like the nobles bea partnerin a relationshipwith non-noble freemenwhich was uniqueto Castile, Le6n and Portugal - but particularly,because of thecircumstancesofreconquest andsettlement,to Castile. The majorityof the earlysettlers wereindependentsmallfreemen. Butastime wenton, becauseof a naturaltendency towardsthe polarizationof societyand becausethe growthof largeestates wasabettedby usurpationsandroyal grantsof immunity, these small men began to feel the need forprotection. At first it took the form of a very free commendation toa powerful man which made one his hono de benefactoria r as it wascalledin Romance,behetria. Originallyone could choose and changeone's lord freely and when, in the thirteenth century, this freedombecamerare,it was given a name: the behetriademar a mar.45In the twelfth century Castile and Le6n were torn by prolongedcivil wars,repeatedminorities and revolts. It was probablythen thatthe greatest number of freemen entered the behetriarelationship inCastile- which suffered most. At the same time conditionsbecamegraduallyharsher. The most glaring change was the restriction inthe choice of lord to the members of a single family. This resultedin a further burden on the behetria-man ince all the relations of hislord wantedto capitalizetheir possible candidacyand began insistingon paymentsover andabove those owed to the actualsenor n return orhis protection. Furthermore, he chaoticstate in which Castilefounditself during long stretches of the twelfth century permitted othersbeside the seigneurialfamily to demand a cut from the behetria-menand so addto the number of sharesor divisaspaid by the latter. Thisis the only way to explain the appearanceof the all-powerful Larafamily as diviseros n scores of Castilianvillages. For even the mostprolific breeding would hardly account for the sudden irruption oftheir claims. What is particularlyworthy of note is that the changetakesplace not in the extremenorth- old Castile andthe Cantabrianarea- but in the plains, where the fighting was done. It was here

44 Sanchez-Albornoz, "Las Behetrias: La Encomendaci6n en Asturias, Le6ny Castilla", AHDE., i (1924), p. 239, n. 104. Sepuilveda permitted the knightto serve with his sehor. Ucles qualified this with the obligation to pay the townpart of his booty. R. Gibert et al., Los Fueros de Sepzlveda (Publicacioneshist6ricas de la Exma. Diput. Prov. de Segovia, i, 1953), p. 460.45 Sanchez-Albornoz, loc. cit., pp. I98-243, 285-6. C. M. Benedito, "NuevasBehetrias de Le6n y Galicia y Textos para el Estudio de la Curia Regia",AHDE., vi (1929), pp. 408-28.

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that the proliferation of Lara claims appeared and the behetriasdelinaje, or lineage, were concentrated.46But behetriaswhether individual or corporate,where whole villagescommended themselves to a lord, were not found south of the Duero.For there the walled towns - Madrid, Avila, Salamanca,Segovia,Toledo, Sep/ulveda,etc. - afforded sufficient protection.47 Evennorth of the Duero, concern for urban liberties made some townsinsist that the villagerswithin the areaof the town's jurisdictionwereonly to become the hombres e behetriaof the chief citizens, that is, ofthe caballerosvillanos.48The caballeros illanoswere by now the most importantclass in thetowns of central Spain. Together with the resident hidalgos,wherethe latter were not excluded from municipal office,49 hey formed anurban patriciate of a military nature sharply contrasting with themercantilearistocraciesof the great cities of Europe from Lombardyto Flanders. Probablythe closest parallelwould be the ruling classin the less developed states of south and central Italy. But theimportant point is that these towns did not set the tone of Italiansociety, whereas the militarized patriciates of Castile-Le6n andAragonwerethe most characteristicof Spain.50 So much so, indeed,that even in Andaluciawhose cities had always been the richest andmost populous in Spain,andamong her chief mercantilecentres,eventhere where the Castilian kings were concerned to encourage the

46Sanchez-Albornoz, oc. cit., pp. 244-312. Idem, "Muchas Paginas Massobre las Behetrias", AHDE., iv (1927), p. 85. Garcia Gallo "Textos delDerecho Territorial Castellano", AHDE., xiii (1936-41), pp. 317-32.47 Sanchez-Albornoz,"Las Behetrias", AHDE., i (1924), pp. 258-9. Forthe only known behetria on the south bank of the Duero, see R. GarciaOrmachea, "Una Behetria de 'allende' el Duero", AHDE., vi (I929), pp. 437-40.48Sanchez-Albornoz, "Muchas Paginas Mas", AHDE., iv (I927), pp. 30,90-3.49M. del Carmen Carle, "Infanzones e Hidalgos", CHE., xxxiii-iv (I96I),p. 98.60 Sanchez-Albornoz,"Espafia y Francia en la Edad Media. Causas de suDiferenciaci6n Politica" in Espana y el Islam (Buenos Aires, I943), p. 179.Only those towns which developed along the pilgrim routes to Compostelasharedthe generalcharacteristics f urbandevelopment o be found in the restof westernEurope. Valdeavellano,SobreBurgosy los Burguesesde la EspaiaMedieval (Madrid, I960), pp. I56-7. On these north Spanish towns seeL. Vazquezde Parga,J. M. Lacarra,J. Uria, Las Peregrinaciones Santiago(Madrid, 1949), ii. For the comparative insignificance of the non-nobleknights outside Spain see Pescador in CHE., xxxiii-iv (I96I), pp. o08-14.Fora similardevelopmentn the earlystages onlybutthereafteroneso divergentas to be almost the reverseof the Spanish experiencesee W. F. Butler, TheLombard Communes (London, 1906), pp. 48, 81-3, I80 ff. On central andsouth Italy see D. Waley, ThePapal State in the ThirteenthCentury London,1961), pp. 82, 83-4, 87-8, 288.

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PAST AND PRESENTmercantilecommunity, it was specificallythe status of caballeros hatwas given to the merchants who settled in the most importantof all,Seville.51

However, the extraordinaryeap forwardin the thirteenthcentury,when both Castile and Aragon greatly increased their area, theinitially far greater size of Castile and her policy of expelling largenumbers of the Moslem cultivators,meant that, even with the vastjurisdictionalareas allotted to the cities, her kings could not hope toorganizeand settle the new conquest on their own.52 The result wasthe grant of huge lordships, often in free gift or with immunities,though carryingthe duty of military service,53and the consequentfoundationof the greataristocratichouses of Spain with their under-populatedand under-exploitedlatifundia which exist to this day.Just as small men got grants directly from the king of holdings infull ownership or on lenient tenancy-rates, on condition that theymaintained residence, so the lay magnates, churches and greatmilitaryorders received vast grantson condition that they undertookcolonization. The military orders had appeared in Spain in thetwelfth century. They were not especially active as colonizers buttheir militaryrole was immediately apparent.54 So apparent,indeed,that Alfonso I of Aragon,the conquerorof Zaragoza,dying childlessshortly afterhis defeat in battle againstthe Moslems, bequeathedhiskingdomto the three orders of St. John of Jerusalem,the Temple and

51Pescador in CHE., xxxiii-iv (I96I), p. I86. R. Carande, "Sevilla, Fortalezay Mercado", AHDE., ii (1925), pp. 276 n. 82,286-7. N. Tenorio, "Las Miliciasde Sevilla" Rev. Arch. Bib. Mus., xvii (1907), p. 225.52Castile's territory grew by nearly 50%, her population by barely Io0;Aragon grew in area by 40% and in population by 300%. S. Sobreques, "LaEpoca del Patriciado Urbano" in Historia de Espaia y America, ed. J. VicensVives (Barcelona, I96I), ii, pp. o0, 11-2, 46, 47. For the encouragement ofearly marriage and large families by Alfonso X see Las Siete Partidas, Pt. ii,tit. xx, leyes i-iii.53H. Grassotti, "Apostillas a 'el Prestimonio' de Valdeavellano", CHE.,xxix-xxx (1959), pp. 183 n. 52, pp. 210-2. Idem, "Pro bono et Fideli Servitio",CHE., xxxiii-iv (I96I), p. 46. J. M. Font y Rius, "La Comarca de Tortosa aRaiz de la Reconquista Cristiana (1148)", CHE., xix (1953), P. 115.64Elliott, op. cit., pp. 14-15. Vicens Vives, Historia Economica de Espana(Barcelona, I959), pp. 148-50, 151, 152. Sobreques, loc. cit., pp. 12-21, 44.On the relative importance of the various orders in the different Spanish king-doms see D. Lomax, La Orden de Santiago II70-1275 (Madrid, 1965), pp. 49-50.For the colonizing activity of the order of Santiago see ibid., pp. II9-28; idem,"El arzobispo D. Rodrigo de Rada y la Orden de Santiago", Hispania, xviii(I958), pp. 3-37. The military role of the Hospitallers is deprecated byS. A. Garcia Llaraguete, El Gran Priorado de la Orden de San Juan deJersualen,Siglos XII-XIII (Pamplona, 1957), i, pp. 39-4I. But see J. Goiii Gaztambide'sreview in Hispania Sacra, ix (I956), pp. 461-4; M. Ledesma, "Notas sobre laActividad Militar de los Hospitalarios", Principe de Viana, xcix-v (I964),pp. 5I-6.

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A SOCIETY ORGANIZEDFOR WAR: MEDIEVALSPAINthe Holy Sepulchre. Not even the beneficiaries expected thisextraordinarywill to be implemented and contented themselves withvery lucrative compensation for its non-fulfilment. The Aragonesenobles, having to rush through a solution in face of the far fromtentative designs of the king of Le6n-Castile, seized on Alfonso'sonly brother, Ramiro, monk and bishop-elect, secularized him,marriedhim, waited for him to father a child, betrothed her, for itwas a daughter, to the adult count of Barcelonaand returnedhim tohis monastery,all in the space of three years.55But popular and powerful though the Templars and Hospitallerswere, their thunder was stolen by the native Spanishorders. Indeedthe most importantof these, Calatrava,was founded as a result of theTemplars falling down on the job. They announcedthat Calatravacould not be held against the Almohades and handed it back to theking. Two Cistercian monks from a monastery on the Navarro-Castilian frontier led a group of their fellow-religious to this nowisolated and exposed fort and so, although Citeaux was far frompleased, founded a new military order. The peculiar form of thisfoundation, whereby monks became soldiers, is of more thantransitoryinterest. For it underlines the strong resemblance borneby all the Spanish orders to the Moslem ribat. The ribats werefortified monasterieswhich from the eighth century arose along thefrontiers of the Moslem empire to protect them and also to act asheadquarters or maraudingraidsinto enemy, infidelterritory. Bothattack and defence were consideredpart of the duty ofJihad or holywar.These ribatswere unlike monasteriesin so far as entry into themdid not necessarily represent a permanent vocation. One neededmerely to do a stint of days or months or years there to pile uptreasure in heaven. In between the bouts of military activity, theinmates engaged in ascetic religious exercises. Women were notadmitted. But, as a Hadit quoted by Averroes made clear, a manwho lived on the frontier was not therebya murabit;only one who lefthis home to go to a placeof danger. It was necessaryto have a horse,and one achievedextra merit by buying one's own; but a horse wouldbe supplied if one came without. The foundationwas supported byendowments, alms and booty. The ribatswere also different from

55F. Balaguer, "La Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris y la Elevaci6n de RamiroII al trono Aragon6s", EEMCA., vi (I956), pp. 7-40. A. Ubieto Arteta,"Navarra-Arag6n y la Idea Imperial de Alfonso VII de Castilla", ibid., pp. 41-82. P. E. Schramm, "Ramon Berenguer IV" in Els Primers Comtes-Reis(Biografies Catalanes, iv, Barcelona, 1960), pp. 9-I8.

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PAST AND PRESENTthe military orders in the type of person who staffed them. Thepermanentnucleus tended to be mystics, scholarsand theologians,inthis way approximatingmore to the civilian monasteriesof the west.The great age for these militarymonasticfoundationsin Spainwasthe eleventh and twelfth centuries,just priorto the foundation of theSpanish military orders. The influence of the ribat on these ordersis apparent n the fact thatexcept, andthen only initially,for Santiago,the Orders of Spain, Calatrava,Alcantara,Montesa and Avis, werenever Hospitallerfoundations,unlike either the Temple or Hospital.From the first they were intended to engage in holy war, on thefrontier and in the most exposed and dangerousareas. At least inthe early centuries they fulfilled these obligations. Thus when OldCalatravaell into the hinterlandwith the progressof the Reconquest,the Order moved its headquartersto New Calatrava, urther south,and againon the frontier.56The military purpose of the ribats was not the only militaryinfluence of the Moslems on the Christians in Spain. The verytactics for which the warrior-monksof the ribatswere famous werecharacteristicof Moslem tactics in general and were copied by theChristians. This was the organized raid: the cabalgada and itsvariantthe algara;ananalogueof the latter,the rebato,proclaimeditsderivationexplicitly.57 Moslem tactics were not only copied by theChristians,so much so that the Reconquestcan even be representedas essentially long centuries of marauding raids; the regulationscovering the organization,command and discipline of the cabalgada

56 J. OliverAsin, "OrigenArabe de 'Rebato','Arrobda'y sus Hom6nimos.Contribuci6nal Estudio de la Historia Medievalde la TacticaMilitary de suLexico Peninsular", Boletin de la Real Academia Espaiola, xv (I928), pp. 347,496-542; on the organization of the ribat see ibid., pp. 358 ff.; the quotation fromAverroes s on p. 362 n. 5; forthe influenceof the ribaton the Spanish militaryorderssee pp. 540-2. For a tentative denial of this influencesee Lomax, LaOrdende Santiago, p. 3; J. O'Callaghan,"The Affiliationof the Order ofCalatrava o the Order of Citeaux", Analecta Sacri OrdinisCisterciensis, v(I959), PP. I76-8. See also F. Gutton, L'Ordre de Calatrave (Paris, I955).On Alcantarasee O'Callaghan,"The Foundation of the Order of AlcantaraI 76-12I8", Catholic Hist. Rev., xlvii (I96I), pp. 471-86. On the order of Evora-Avis see Lomax, "Algunos Estatutos Primitivos de la Orden de Calatrava"Hispania, xxi (I96I), pp. 487 ff. A. Javierre Mur, "La Orden de Calatrava enPortugal",Bol. de la R. Acad. deHist., cxxx (1952), pp. 324-36. On Calatravala Nueva see O'Callaghan,"Sobre los Origines de Calatravala Nueva",Hispania, xciii (I963), pp. 495 ff. For an unflattering description of Calatravala Vieja see L. Torres Balbas,"Ciudades Yermasde la EspafiaMusulmana"Bol. de la R. Acad. de Hist., cxli (I957), pp. 28, 79-II4.57Both cabalgadas and algaras are described in Las Siete Partidas, Pt. ii, tit.xxiii, leyes xxviii, xxix; Palomeque, loc. cit., pp. 222-3. On the general Fuero delas Cabalgadas see Pescador in CHE., xxxiii-iv (1961), pp. 169-72. On rebatosee Oliver Asin, loc. cit., pp. 372 ff.

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A SOCIETYORGANIZEDFOR WAR: MEDIEVALSPAINalsoreceived detailedattentionin the statutesof the frontier owns. Forthese towns were expected to fight not only when formally mobilizedfor large-scale campaigns led by the king but to undertake annualraids on their own initiative. As a result, elaboraterules were drawnup for recruitment,discipline, indemnificationfor losses and woundsreceived, intelligence and counter-intelligence when on the marchand above all - the subject of the most meticulousregulations- thedivision of the spoils.58 For apart from stock-raising, these towns inthe twelfth and thirteenth centuries lived chiefly from booty in theform of cattle, slaves, moveables and even food-stuffs. However,though the Christianswent in for this kind of warfare,the InfanteJuan Manuel in his discussion of comparativetactics written duringthe first half of the fourteenth century recognized that the Moslemswere much better at it, partly if not chiefly because of their superiorpowers of endurance.59The equipment and above all the riding technique which the rapidmanoeuvre of a maraudingband demanded was also copied from theMoslems. This wasthe so-calledstyle a lajinetewhichwasespeciallycharacterizedby short stirrups, a fairly low saddle and a palate-bitwhich enabled the horse to turn far more quickly than by pulling atthe sides of its mouth. Both Moslems and Christiansremarkedonthe fact that the high cantle of the saddle used by the heavily armedknight riding a la brida or with long stirrups made the latter betterable to withstand a powerful lance-thrust in close battle.60 TheChristians,and JuanManuel amongthem, usuallyprided themselveson their greaterskill in pitchedbattlebut a Hispano-Moslemwriterofthe late eleventh century shows that their adversaries knew how toarrange heir battle formationfor such occasions in a mannernormallythought characteristic of western warfareonly after the turn of thefourteenth century.

58For independent annual raids see Chronica Adefonsi Imperatoris, ed.Sanchez Belda, paras. 72, 115. Las Siete Partidas, Pt. ii, tit. xxii-xxx is anelaborate discussion on indemnities, rewards, booty, tactics, terminology,morale, etc., amounting to a treatise on war. For municipal laws on these topicssee Palomeque, loc. cit., pp. 205-351; Pescador in CHE., xxxv-vi (1962),pp. 177-88.59J. M. Castro y Calvo, El Arte de Gobernar el las Obras de D. Juan Manuel(Barcelona, I945), pp. 194, I96-7.60On riding techniques see Oliver Asin, loc. cit., pp. 383-7; L. Mercier, "LesEcoles Espagnoles Dites de la Brida et de la Gineta", Revue de Cavalerie, vii(1927), pp. 301-15; R. B. Cunninghame Graham, The Horses of the Conquest(London, 1930), pp. 8-9, o0-I. Imitation could take place in the otherdirection especially among long-established Andalusian Moslems, but therepeated influx of Berbers from North Africa seems to have overcome andreversed this tendency: see Ldvi-Provencal, L'Espagne Musulmane au XeSiecle, pp. I45-6.

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PAST AND PRESENTThe tactics we use [says Abf Bakr at-Turtusii] and which seem the mostefficacious against our enemy are these. The infantry with their antelopeshields, lances and iron-tipped javelins are placed, kneeling, in ranks. Theirlances rest obliquely on their shoulders, the shaft touching the ground behindthem, the point directed towards the enemy. Each one kneels on his leftknee with his shield in the air. Behind the infantry are the picked archerswho, with their arrows, can pierce coats of mail. Behind the archers are thecavalry. When the Christians charge, the infantry remains in position,kneeling as before. As soon as the enemy comes into range, the archers letloose a hail of arrows, while the infantry throw their javelins and receive thecharge on the points of their lances. Then infantry and archers open theirranks to right and left and through the gaps they create, the cavalry rushesthe enemy and inflicts upon him what Allah wills. 6It has been suggested that the Spanish Christians paid littleattentionto the hierarchyof command,and it may be true that theycouldhere have learnedsomethingfromthe Moslems. For accordingto some Moslem writers a strict chain of command,fromcommander-in-chief to section leader, existed not only in the Praetorianguard ofmercenaries urrounding he Caliph,but alsowithinthe territorializedmilitia,the holdersof ikta andthe landownersof the earlyyearsof the

Conquest. It is likely, however, that much of this meticulousMoslem hierarchy existed only in theory,62 and in any case theChristian battle formations advocated by Alfonso X and theexperiencedJuan Manuel, who has indeed been accusedof neglectingthe questionof command,must have meantthat very strict disciplinewas maintainedand hence that some sort of hierarchyof commandexisted. For example, Alfonso X in his great law code the SietePartidas advocatedthe cone whenever the numerical advantagelaywith an enemy drawn up in extended ranks one behind the other.The cone, designed to break up the enemy lines, should be formedwith three horse at the head, then six, then twelve, then twenty-four,etc., or by doubling from one if numbers were very small. If theenemy was numericallyweaker then it was preferableto form ranksoneself in order to use the cavalryto best advantageand to envelopthe opposing side.Alfonso, however, did more than discuss tactics; he also gaveattention to the qualityof command and to the selection and appoint-ment of officers, incidentally revealing the survival of military

61 Ibid., pp. 146-7. His description may be held valid for the tactics ofa century earlier still: see idem, Histoire de L'Espagne Musulmane, iii, p. oo00.62 For charges of inattention to the hierarchy of command see Palomeque, loc.cit., p. 214; D. L. Isola, "Las Instituciones en las Obras de D. Juan Manuel",CHE., xxi-ii (I954), p. II4. For the Moslem chain of command see Levi-Provencal, L'Espagne Musulmane au Xe Siecle, pp. 140-I. On various forms ofpayment for military service in Moslem Spain see ibid., pp. 128 ff. Sanchez-Albornoz, En Torno a los Origines del Feudalismo, iii, pp. I89-214.

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A SOCIETYORGANIZEDFOR WAR: MEDIEVALSPAINceremoniesreminiscentof a distant Germanicpast. At the end of hisdiscussion of types of formation he remarkedthat the officer com-manding the army, the cabdiellomayor, must in each plan of battleappoint subordinate commanders able to direct the necessarymanoeuvres and maintain effective discipline. Perhaps the mostimportantman in the armywas the adalid or guide. Since the armyentering enemy territory depended upon his good judgement he wasgiven wide jurisdictional,administrativeand militarypowers duringthe campaign. A candidatewould only be appointedto the post aftertwelve adalideshad been consulted on his professional qualifications.Once selected, he was given a sword, horse and arms. A ricohombrsenorde caballeroswould then gird him with the swordbut was not togive the accolade for this would make him a knight. A shield wasthen placed on the ground with its inner side topmost. The newadalid had to stand on it, to unsheathe his sword and to suffer thetwelve men who had recommendedhim to raisethe shield "ashigh asthey could". Thus aloft he had to turn to the four points of thecompass,to cut the air in the form of a cross andto cry: "In the nameof God I defy all the enemies of the faith, of my lord the king, and ofthe land". As adalid he had the privilege of messing with knightswhenever the opportunity offered, and the authority to give themmilitary orders.The adalid as superior officerparticipatedin the appointment ofinfantry commanders,the almocadenes,hough again the chief factorwas the professionalrecommendation of the candidateby twelve ofhis future colleagues. Part of the ceremony of appointment was ahoisting of the candidateby his twelve sponsorssimilar to that under-gone by the adalid,althoughthe infantrymanbrandisheda lance, nota sword. More remarkable,perhaps,was the difference in support.The almocaden-electhad to stand on the shafts of two lances; eventhe legislatorhas doubts about this feat and urges the sponsorsto seeto it that neither the lances break nor their new colleague fall.Finally, to drive home the need for competence and orderlypromotion,Alfonso insisted that even thoughamanshould merit selec-tion as adalid,he must rise through the ranks: "A good almocaden smade from a good foot soldier and a good mounted almogdver[anintermediate rank which is otherwisenot described]is made from agood almocaden,and from a good mounted almogdvera good adalid".JuanManuel did not speakof the selection of officersandthe troopformations he advocatedecho the SietePartidas,though not so closelyas to suggest that he was not speaking from personal experience.Indeed, he stressed far more than did Alfonso the importance of

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PAST AND PRESENTconsidering and countering enemy formations. And he implicitlyassumed a high degree of discipline and an adequate command byinsisting that a line-formation of four or five ranks behind oneanothershould move so close together that the heads of each line ofhorse would touch the haunchesof the one in front.63 No doubt theopportunityfor contrast and comparisonwith a society different notonly in its religious and social structure but also in its militaryorganization,explains why thoughtful Spaniards,like Juan Manuel,were stimulated to analyse first principles in warfare in far greaterdetail than their European contemporaries.Juan Manuel had, however, a blind spot: he was neither interestedin nor appreciative of the caballerosvillanos. This was probablybecause he was manic on the subject of genealogy and nobility,particularlyhis own. There was no greaterbelieverin the mystiqueof caballeria,an honourexclusive to hidalgos,a noble order,entry intowhich was only possible by means of a ceremonial and symbolicinitiation- the accolade. Accordingto him and other nobles, onlythe members of this order were the true defenders of the land.6The caballerosvillanos were tacitly ignored. It was partly the resultof the extraordinaryposition achievedby the best equippedcaballerovillanos (a position which in all essentials of privilege approximatethem to the nobles and which led them from the end of the thirteenthcenturyto wantto crossthe finalhurdle andactuallybe calledhidalgosthat the notion of caballeriaand, almost synonymously,of hidalguia,began to hedged with nearly impenetrablegenealogicalcriteria. Ithad from an early date been a matter of blood ratherthan function.In the twelfth century a Portuguese statute distinguished betweena milesper naturamwho did not lose his privilegewith his horse anda miles nonper naturamwho did:65a neat contrastbetween privilegegrantedas a productiveinvestmentand privilegeretained as a luxury.But by the end of the thirteenth century many non-noble knightshad come to enjoy all the concrete privileges of nobility. Theerstwhile close connection between their privilege and their militaryusefulness was slackening partly as a result of the success of theReconquest which led, in the hinterland,to large scale commutationof their services, partly because they had begun to be paid for the

63 Battle formations and the selection of officers are described in Las SietePartidas, Pt. ii, tit. xxiii, ley xvi and tit. xxii, leyes i-vi, respectively. On JuanManuel see Castro y Calvo, op. cit., p. I93.64D. Isola, loc. cit., pp. 114-8. Las Siete Partidas, Pt. ii, tit. xxi, ley ii. ForJuan Manuel's exalted notions of his social status see El Libro de los Castigos oConsejos que Fizo D. Juan Manuel o El Libro Infinido (Bibl. Aut. Esp., xli,I860), caps. v-vi.65 Pescador n CHE., xxxiii-iv (1961), pp. 121-2, 2II.

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A SOCIETY ORGANIZEDFOR WAR: MEDIEVALSPAINlatter in any case.66 Privilege which attached to their blood andnot their function would be a useful acquisition. Furthermore theslowing down of the Reconquest meant that an importantsource ofincome with which they had maintained their status, was on thedecrease. It is precisely when the opportunities for gaining bootywaned that the cloth industry began to rise in the old frontier townsof the Castilian Meseta; just as, at this very point in the thirteenthcentury, the insistent claim began to be heardthat true caballeriawasimpossible for artisans and merchants. Accordingto Alfonso X:

In ancient times, in order to create knights, men chose hunters in themountains who were men of great endurance, and carpenters and smiths andmasons because they were accustomed to giving blows and their hands arestrong. Also butchers, because they were used to killing live things andshedding their blood. Such men are well formed, strong and lithe. TheAncients chose knights in this manner for a very long time. But when theysaw that in many cases their proteges, lacking verguenza [a sense of honour],forgot the reasons for their elevation and instead of defeating their enemieswere defeated themselves, men knowledgeable in these matters looked forknights who, by their nature, possessed verguenza .... For they held a weakman with the will to endure far preferable to a strong one who easily fled.Because of this the authorities saw to it that knights should be men of goodlineage ....The historian-king s prepared o do no morethanrecognizehistoricalfact and write a gratefulepitaph over what he somewhatprematurelydescribed as an anachronism.67The caballeros illanoswerebecomingoutdatedin the sense that asaresult of the Hundred Years'War the importanceof infantrywas in-creasinglyrecognizedin the Peninsula. Even before this the Catalanand Aragonesealmogdveres, red to a life of perpetual plunderon theValencian border before the Castilianoccupation of Murcia in 1264cut them off from direct contact with Moslem areas, had achievedinternational fame as the shock-troops of the Catalan maritimeempire, well able to hold their own, in spite of their light equipment,againstheavily armouredFrench knights.68 Alfonso X himself had

66 Palomeque, loc. cit., pp. 239, 3I9-42. Pescador in CHE., xxxiii-iv (1961),pp. I85, I87, I9I-2; xxxv-vi (1962), pp. 152-5. Sanchez-Albornoz, En Tornoa los Origines del Feudalismo, i, pp. 164, I84.67Grassotti, "Para la Historia del Botin y de las Parias en Le6n y Castilla",CHE., xxxix-xl (I964), pp. 79. Lacarra, "Les Villes-Frontieres dans l'Espagnedes XIe et XIIe Siecles", Moyen Age, Ixix (I963), pp. 220-I. Sanchez-Albornoz, Espaia, Un Enigma, ii, p. I20. The quotation is in Las SietePartidas, Pt. ii, tit. xxi, ley ii.68 P. E. Russell, English Intervention in Spain and Portugal in the Time ofEdward III and Richard II (Oxford, I955), p. 374. P. de Bofarull y Mascar6,Colecci6n de Documentos Ineditos del Archivo de la Corona de Aragdn (Barcelona,I850), vi, pp. 72-6. F. Soldevila, Els Almogcvers (Collecio Popular Barcino,cxlix, I952), passim. For the use of infantry in the reconquest of Granada andthe subsequent transformation of the Spanish infantry into the most efficienttroops in Europe see Elliott, op. cit., pp. 34, 123-4.

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recognized the occasional extreme usefulness of a "few, but good"infantrytroops as against "many and bad". But his disparagemenof the non-noble knights rather than cavalryforces in generalshowsthat he was prompted by a desire to underlineboth the glamourandthe necessity of a concept - caballeria- which was becomingincreasinglyaristocratic.69The need to rush to the defence of pure hidalguia was indeedaccentuated by Alfonso's own successors. Already in the latethirteenth century lawsuits were brought against those who claimedto be nobles and whose claims were denied by nobles anxious topreserve caste privileges. But in the late fourteenth and fifteenthcenturies the problem becameparticularlyacute; for in the civil warsof this periodthe monarchsbeganto sell patentsof nobilityto anyone,even infantrymen, who would serve them gratis for a fixed periodagainst rebellious nobles. The most vociferous opponents of thispracticewere the city-representativesn the Corteswho expressedtheconcern of the municipal authorities at the diminishing number oftax-payers. This could lead, at least on paper, to the revocationofeven old-established privilege. In the privileges granted by theOrder of Santiagoto Villamayorin 1338 the equivalenceof hidalgosand caballeros illanos in tax-exemptionand "honour"was stated; inI403 it was revokedas "injuriousto our other, taxpaying,subjects".7The attempt to deal with this fiscal problem at the same timerevealedthe prevailingnotions as to what was or was not compatiblewith the "honour" of knighthood. Thus in 1442 in the Cortes ofValladolid, Juan II, answeringyet another petition on the subject,established a three-fold distinction. It ranged from the humblestcaballerovillanowho, if of recent vintage, could no longer expect anyfiscal privilege at all, through a mediate grade whose members hadsome but not spectacular privileges, failing to qualify for the latterbecause they did not live "nobly" since they were not full-timeknights but engaged in trade. The third and highest class were infact to be hidalgospreciselybecausethey were no longercontaminatedwith commoner occupations (ofifios baxos). More than a centuryearlierAlfonso X had given as a reason for stripping a man of hisknighthood:"a personal engagementin commerce or any low manual

69 Las Siete Partidas, Pt. ii, tit. xxii, leyes v, ix. See also Cronica de SanchoIV (Bibl. Aut. Esp. lxvi), p. 71; M. Gaibrois, op. cit., p. 68 n. 4; E. BenitoRuano, "Balduin II de Constantinople y la Orden de Santiago", Hispania, xii(1952), p. 31.70 Pescador in CHE., xxxiii-iv (1961), pp. 213-27. On the various trades inwhich caballeros villanos are found see idem, CHE., xxxix-xl (I964), pp. 239-42.On Villamayor see R. Gibert, Los Fueros de Sepilveda, p. 419.

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A SOCIETYORGANIZEDFOR WAR: MEDIEVALSPAINoccupation to earn money, without being a prisoner of war".I7 InI447 the king gave examples, since confusion had arisen, of what hemeant by base occupations: carpenter, tailor, furrier, stonemason,smith, barber, grocer, cobbler, etc.72 Thus a polarization of thecaballerosvillanos was taking place, or being insisted upon, madeeasierby the fact that, from the twelfth century,privilegewithin theirrankshad been graduatedaccordingto equipmentandhence, usually,to wealth. Now the distinctionsweregeneraland much sharperwiththe lowest level embedded in the tax-paying classes and the highestcreamed off into the nobility. Not that even the I447 rulings wereeasily applicable:there were many complaintsfrom men who claimedthat they had sold their businesses and left their trades in order tomaintainthe habit and "honour"of knighthoodundefiled, to live, asrequired, by "the office of arms", and yet were still being taxed andso threatened with ruin. 7But whether or not the rampartsof blood and caste were raisedaround the notion of Honour, a chain of reasoning had establisheditself, which althoughnot alien to the rest of Europewas particularlymarked in Spain as a result of the long centuriesof frontierexistence.Honour wasthe reward of cavalryservice in a just and preferablyholywar. This service in turn was both the consequenceandthe cause ofwealth, and wealthwas essentially booty in land, cattle andmoveables.The links in this chain became so welded together that it was some-times possible to get confused and to invert the process. Even theknights of St. John of Jerusalem,dedicatedto warfor a noble cause,could suffer from this confusion. After James I of Aragon hadalready conquered Mallorca and divided the land and spoils, theHospitallersarrived,late, on the island. They took Jamesaside andpleaded with him to give them a share: "For", they said, "theHospital would for ever be dishonoured should they have no part inthe taking of Mallorca".

The intimate association of land, wealth and privilege, not onlywith military valour in a holy war but also with guerrillatactics in71Pescador in CHE., xxxiii-iv (1961), p. 217 n. 207 gives the text but,inexplicably, misinterprets it. Las Siete Partidas, Pt. ii, tit. xxi, ley xxv; alsoibid, ley xii. The distinction between knighthood and nobility which, by thelate middle ages, was getting thoroughly blurred, could still be made as late as1786 in a suit which lasted twenty years: A. de Lasala y Perruca, "Las

Ciudadanos Caballeros de la Ciudad de Zaragoza", Hidalguia, xii (I964),pp. 625-38.72 Pescador in CHE., xxxiii-iv (I96I), p. 218 n. 208. Sepilveda had alreadydiscriminated against the suburban knight who was an artisan: R. Gibert, op.cit., p. 4I9.73 Pescador in CHE., xxxiii-iv (1961), pp. 219-20.

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PAST AND PRESENTenemy territory; the optimism which made prophecies of a speedyend to Moslem rule popularin the early days of the Reconquest andlater permitted Castile and Aragon solemnly to partitionthe spheresof future conquest at a time when the Almohade threat was at itsheight andthe results of many painfulcampaignswere being snatchedaway from the Christians;the long training in the belief that wealthlay beyond the horizon: it was this prolongedand complexcondition-ing which made it almost inevitable that, once America had beendiscovered,it should be a handful of Castilianswho would undertakethe conquest of the New World.74Universityof Birmingham Elena Lourie

74Jaume I, Cronica (Collecio Popular Barcino, 1927), cap. 95 (my italics)For the treaties of Tudelen and Cazorla in II5 and II79 respectively seeJ. Miquel Rosell, Liber Feudorum Major (Barcelona, I945), i, pp. 39-42, 49-5I.For a similar treaty in II58 between Le6n and Castile during their final period

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a society organized for war, medieval spain (lourie, elena)

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