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Soviet ‘Refuseniks’ turn to orthodox JudaismK. Joseph Lourie aa Morris Ginsburg Fellow and Guest Lecturer, Department of Sociology and SocialAnthropology, Hebrew University of Jerusalem,

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To cite this article: K. Joseph Lourie (1992): Soviet ‘Refuseniks’ turn to orthodox Judaism, East European Jewish Affairs,22:1, 51-62

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K. JOSEPH LOURIE

Soviet 'Refuseniks' Turn to OrthodoxJudaism

Introductionlln the 1970s and 1980s thousands of formerly secular Soviet Jews madeteshuva. They 'repented', 'became religious', many of them ultra-Ortho-dox.1 While this phenomenon provokes questions about the religious'rcfusenik' networks, the relationship between religious revival and theJewish emigration movement, and the larger issue of the contemporaryrise of ultra-Orthodoxy in Israel, few scholars have addressed these mat-ters.2 Drawing on interviews "with Jewish teachers and students from Mos-cow and Leningrad underground religious circles, this paper describes theemergence of specific Orthodox groups among Soviet 'refuseniks' and dis-cusses the relationship between them and the major trends in the Israelisetting.3

1 In addition to the author's data, published interviews with religious 'refusenik' leaders(cf. Z. Wagner (ed.), Vosemnadtsat (The Eighteen) (Jerusalem: Shamir, 1989), and D.Prital, In Search of Self: The Soviet Jewish Intelligentsia and the Exodus (Jerusalem:Mount Scopus Publications 1983)), demographic research (cf. Mordechai Altshuler,'Who are the "refuseniks"? A statistical and demographic analysis', SOVIET JEWISH A F -FAIRS, vol. 18, no. 1, 1988, 3-15), and investigative reports (cf. Isi Leibler, Turning Pointfor Soviet Jewry? A Contemporary Challenge for World Jewry. Report on a Mission toMoscow. Executive Council of Australian Jewry, 1988) show that by the late 1980s therewere at least 500 baaley teshuva active in Moscow, and somewhat fewer in Leningrad.Official Soviet estimates suggest that there were in 1976 50, 000-60,000 observant Jews inthe Soviet Union and Benjamin Pinkus,The hazara bi-teshuva phenomenon amongRussian Jews in the post-Stalin era' in Jews and Jewish Topics in the Soviet Union andEastern Europe, 2(15), 1991, 15-30, estimates that 'at the end of the 1970s, 5-7% of adultSoviet Jews were observant' (p. 16).

2 Even the few who have recognized the novelty of the teshuva phenomenon among So-viet Jews, and the 'housing complexes, industrial and service enterprises'- (Y. M. Rabkin,'Cultures in transition' in T. R. Horowitz (ed.), The Soviet Man in an Open Society(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), 256) which they have built in Israel,have not extensively analysed the process of teshuva or the implications of the teshuva-aliya relationship.

3 The author conducted in-depth interviews with thirty-six male and sixteen female reli-gious Soviet Jewish immigrants living in the Jerusalem area. The interviews were con-ducted between September 1988 and July 1989 with the assistance of Maria Marinov andMichele Miller. The project was funded in part by the Institute for International Studies,Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island.

EAST EUROPEAN JEWISH AFFAIRS, vol. 22, no. 1, 1992/0038-5454 X/51-62

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52 Soviet 'Refuseniks' Turn to Orthodoxjudaism

Teshuva as a social phenomenonTeshuva is here explained as a social phenomenon in which haaleyteshuva—those who repent—are seen as actors who transform the specificsocial and historical boundaries of their existence. By analysing teshuvawithin the context of the movement of aliya (emigration to Israel) and thespecific events which governed 'refuseniks' options and choices—in fact,seeing the phenomenon of 'coming to religion' as the result of a dialecticbetween teshuva and aliya—the relationship between Haredi* trends andfactions in Israeli and Soviet settings is explained. Hence teshuva can beseen as part of an 'aliya strategy'. In the process of observing, of practisingthe Judaic codes made available via interactions between Soviet Jews andvisitors from Israel and the West, religious 'refuseniks' built their own un-derground groups (which in turn intensified such interactions). Thesegroups also laid the foundation for three new 'Russian' yeshivot (rabbini-cal seminaries) and kolelims in Jerusalem.

As 'refuseniks' were exposed to the doctrine and resources of themajor trends of Israeli Orthodoxjudaism, they underwent an ideologicaland political shift in their orientation towards modern Israel. The movetowards ultra-Orthodoxy meant that religious 'refuseniks' perspectiveschanged from at first idealistically viewing modern Israel through thesymbols of the Bible, to rejecting secular Israeli society and culture. Butthis did not discourage them from coming to Israel; rather, they madeprior arrangements to join ultra-Orthodox sectors of Israeli society. As aresult of this reciprocal relationship between the two settings, by the endof the 1980s each Haredi trend among 'refuseniks' was directly or indi-rectly governed by the legitimacy and organizational base of its counter-part in Israel.

Because 'refuseniks' suffered from lack of resources foreign philan-thropic religious groups offered a reliable alternative for meeting basicneeds, both of survival in the Soviet Union and anticipated settlement inIsrael. Also, religious study and prayer groups (both in the USSR and Is-rael) could offer a sense of identity and community, demarcating Ortho-dox Jews from other Jewish and non-Jewish groups. Finally, religious'refuseniks' learned that by adopting 'the religiosity of an elite',* they

4 The word Haredi, used synonymously with ultra-Orthodox, connotes 'God-fearing'.This term, as distinct from 'neo-Orthodox' or 'modern-Orthodox', refers to religiousJews who have 'rejected secular culture and tried to shut it out, intellectually and socio-logically* (J. Aviad, Return to Judaism: Religious Renewal in Israel (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1983), 57). The Haredim are identified by their black dress and clois-tered neighbourhoods (in both Israel and the West) and are devoted to piety and themaintenance of an uncompromising Jewish lifestyle according to Halakha.

5 Kolel (pl. kolelim)—literary comprehensive. While yeshivot are for unmarried students,the kolel is a college for advanced Talmudic studies for married men.

6 M. Friedman, 'Haredim confront the modern city' in P. Medding (ed.), Studies in Con-temporary Jewry, vol. 2. (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1986), 75.

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K.J. LOURIE 53

could negotiate, and even circumvent, the dominant authority structuresof the Soviet and Israeli systems.

These three premises form the basis of a sociological explanation fortesbtiva, but they must be taken together. Their independence as descrip-tive variables is called into question upon analysis of any one specific as-pect of teshuva (i.e., 'refusenik' groups have material, social and politicalcomponents which, in fact, are inseparable). Thus here we find a morepragmatic perspective emphasizing the situation, the intrinsic theologicalsystem, and the state as reference? As such, broad issues like 'Orthodoxy'and 'Zionism' may be discussed on the three levels of the individual,group and state, rather than according to a single deterministic variable.

We know that the process of teshuva began with an identity crisis,which led to the search for a people, a homeland and a new belief system.A Mitnagdim* leader from Leningrad recalls:

He forgets that he is a Jew and suddenly he has a turn, and he thinks 'whoam I?'. And then he discovers that he is Jewish, but why doesn't he know any-thing about his people, his language, his history? So slowly he begins to come toreligion.

Identity crisisApproaching the teshuva phenomenon from a situational perspective elu-cidates this leap from an 'identity crisis' to 'becoming religious': teshuvaamong 'refuseniks' was a natural answer to Jews' alienation from Sovietsociety and culture, antisemitism and disillusionment with Communistideology: 'They don't believe [in Communism] any more so they look forsomething else to fill their lives with meaning.'

Informants recall that their university studies and careers appearedto be progressing 'as normal' when an identity crisis occurred. The as-sumption that 'everything was OK' was suddenly broken down by 'someinternal conflict'. In the words of one Mitnaged woman, 'It was felt thatsome inner need was discovered, a lack of something, a spiritual defect.'Others call it a time of self-examination: 'When you ask yourself "Whatare you living for?".' 'It was a search for self: I was seeking something for

7 This three-part paradigm is in part borrowed from S. N. Eisenstadt's analysis of the re-construction of traditions, though our definitions and applications differ (S. N.Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change, Modernity (New York: Wiley-Interscience Publications,1973)).

8 Mitnaged (pl. Mitnagdim)—literally opponent. Originally opponents of Hasidism,which emphasizes the emotional aspect of belief, worship and the religious way of life(cf. G. Scholem, The Messianic Idea of Judaism (New York: Schocken, 1971)). TheMhnagdim represented a tendency of thought and expression and a way of life especiallycharacteristic of Lithuanian Jewry (Litvaks), except for the Lithuanian Hasidim. TheMhnagdim lay greater stress on the study of the Talmud. While the Hasidim adopted theprayer book of the ARI-Isaac Luria (which largely follows the Sephardi custom) theMitnagdim retained the Polish form of the Ashkenazi custom in their prayers.

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54 Soviet 'Refuseniks' Turn to Orthodox Judaism

a long time and came to Orthodox Judaism.'In each case, Judaism is said to have made complete an incomplete

personal situation, to have filled a gap:

In the development of my Jewish identity, an important point was mysearch for my place in this world. Judaism gives this sense to a man, that is, that hehas a task which he has to fulfill: he has to pray and live according to the Torah. Sothe question of man's place in the world is solved. [Mitnaged from Moscow]

It seemed that it was just some addition, a piece that I needed to make mylife more full. But then it was not just a 'piece' and occupied all the rest of thespace—a whole which gradually pushed aside what was before. [Habad' womanfrom Leningrad]

Once equipped with an answer which transcends the material andpsychological suffering of alienation ('not belonging', 'not feeling athome') in the Soviet Union, a negative Jewish identity was replaced by apositive identity and a sense of one's place in Jewish history (as opposedto Russian and Soviet history).

According to the situational explanation, there is a stimulus, a cer-tain predicament, which acts as a catalyst for the turn to religion. The cor-relation between suffering under the oppressive conditions of 'refusal' andthe turn to religion is well documented by informants' descriptions of thecircumstances of their first prayers and feelings of religious conviction. Inthe words of one Habadnik who was nine years 'in refusal', 'They say thatGod reveals himself to man in moments of grievance. The same thing hap-pened to me. Religion helped me find a sense of equilibrium.' A youngHabad woman's explanation of her father's teshuva in prison is similar:'Of course it helps. He asks himself, "Why did I start this problem?" Andreligion gives him hope.' Another became religious while on a hungerstrike, after tearing up his Soviet passpor t : ' . . . for fifteen days I read whatI had at hand, [Christian] religious literature in Russian.' One of the fore-most Habad leaders from Leningrad also concludes: 'We were justrefuseniks that understood . . . that it's impossible to withstand the time ofrefusal without spiritual renewal.'

In most cases, teshuva unexpectedly occurred during the process of'waiting', sometimes in isolation but most often in the context of under-ground lecture and study groups. Such was the case 'in our circle in Mos-cow, where many began with Zionism . . . and it turned out that the next

9 Habad—acronym of hokhma (Wisdom), bina (Understanding), daat (Knowledge). Atrend in the Hasidic movement founded by Shneur Zalman of Lyady (1745-1813), theauthor of Likkutey Amorim (Selection of Teachings) known as the Tanya and ancestorof the Lubavicher Rebbes' dynasty. Shneur Zalman's works represent a unique combina-tion of mysticism and common sense, and Habad insisted on the scholarly and intellec-tual element in a religious Jewish way of life.

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K.J. LOURIE 55

stage in this phase was faith.' It was a similar process among the'refuseniks' of Leningrad, as described by a Mitnaged leaden

In 1979 we arranged lectures once a week on Sunday and we gathered atsomebody's apartment. And once a month there was a lecture on a religious topic,which brought as many as 100 people together at a time. And later it grew into thenucleus of the community of baaley teshuva.

Through such seminars and groups a degree of Judaic and Israelistudies found its way into the 'refusenik' waiting experience. (Indeed, asdiscussed elsewhere,10 the pragmatic structure of 'refusenik' networks wasitself critical to the outcome of teshuva.)

'Becoming religious' in the USSRTesbitva may also be seen in relation to the intrinsic religious system—theparticular trends of Judaism through which 'refuseniks' became religious(no matter how loosely they adhered to its formal rules before coming toIsrael). The turn to religion was experienced by individuals as a newsource of faith, powerful belief in God, something which 'just suddenlyhappened'. At the same time, however, we see that experience within the'refusenik' network was the pragmatic basis of teshuva: 'These groupshelped us to find ourselves, to understand ourselves.' In systemic terms,teshuva meant the discovery of the universal Judaic code according to alocal interpretation of this code. This necessarily occurred through theframework of a particular shita (Hebrew for 'system' or 'approach').

The religious models used by 'refuseniks' were based on a combina-tion of what individuals could learn from the Torah (often in Russiantranslation) and, more so, on what was picked up through contact withrepresentatives of Orthodox trends in Israel and the West, whose re-sources, political ties and theological systems 'refuseniks' used to buildsmall prayer and study circles. Each trend brought its own texts, dressstyles, rabbis and ideology. Most important, each possessed its own inter-pretation of Halakha (Jewish law) and a code for its application to dailylife.

'Becoming religious' therefore emerged from practice within a spe-cific shita—interaction with visiting and local Haredi leaders, access to thespecific Jewish sources emphasized by each trend, learning to pray accord-ing to the Sephardi, Ashkenazi or ARI nusah (prayer rite) and participat-ing in rituals (e.g., clandestine marriages, circumcisions, barmitzvas).

10 In Lourie, 'Religious refusenik networks in Moscow and Leningrad: The view from an-thropology' in Jews and Jewish Topics in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 2(15),1991, 31-47, experience within religious 'refusenik' networks is analysed through thepragmatics of source (exposure to religious texts), contact (interaction with other Jews)and domain (the realm of the synagogue).

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56 Soviet 'Refuseniks' Turn to Orthodox Judaism

Moreover, the definition of leaders and followers in accordance with thetraditions of each shita provided a structure for new study and prayergroups and the division of roles within such groups. As a leader of ShevutAmi, one of the three 'Russian' yeshivot in Jerusalem, recalls, 'To empha-size your own separation was very important . . . and the leaders advo-cated this: the Habadniks and Litvaks and Mizrahis" and everyone thatwas there.'

The place of IsraelThe major Israeli Orthodox trends are also intimately tied to the Israelipolitical infrastructure, bringing us to discussion of the state as a frame ofreference. Firstly, international politics in the 1970s and 1980s influencedthe outcome of the teshuva and aliya movements in the USSR (just as theywould later influence the assimilation strategies of newcomers in Israel).The Soviet regime was (and remains) to a certain extent dependent on theJewish national movement for legitimacy in the eyes of the United States(for example, the Soviet effort to gain the 'most favoured nation status').As Western pressure on Soviet authorities to release both religious andsecular 'refuseniks' mounted, they exhibited greater leniency towards theobservant and moved to reform prohibitions on their unofficial activitiesand interactions with tourists.

The efforts of both secular and religious Jews in Israel played a cen-tral role in the development of Jewish nationalist movements in the SovietUnion, particularly following the 1967 war. And the baaley teshuva of the1970s and 1980s began as Zionists, for whom to be religious meant to be a'religious Zionist'12 and, for most, to emigrate meant aliya. Since the originof this movement, Israel has had a referential value based on the possibil-ity for aliya. In the words of one Habadnik from Moscow, 'According tosimple logic . . . Where is my.place? Where do the Jews live?'

Although Zionist ideology may have been a prerequisite for reli-gious identity, this liaison soon took on a paradoxical aspect. In the mindsof the newly religious, whose preconceptions were formed in isolation andunder duress, modern Israel represented a historic people and a homelandaccording to the Torah. As reports about secular Israeli society and cul-ture became juxtaposed with the Orthodox models to which they were

11 Mizrahi—religious trend in the World Zionist Organization which acquired an organiza-tional identity in 1902. Its main political expression in Israel is the National ReligiousParty (Mafdal—acronym of Miflaga Datit Leumit).

12 C. S. Liebman's operational definition for religious Zionism is useful: 'Does Israel consti-tute a successor or potential successor, from a Divine point of view, to the two previouscommonwealths? Is Israel the fulfilment (or at least the first step in the fulfilment) ofGod's promises to the Jews, or is it a political entity that happens to exercise hegemonyover the territory of Zion and includes within its borders sizable numbers of Jews?' Anti-Zionists, it follows, reject the view that modern Israel is in any way a fulfilment of Judaicprophecy. C. S. Liebman, 'Religion and political integration in Israel' in Jewish Journal ofSociology, 1975, 21.

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K.J. LOURIE 57

attracted in the mid-1980s, hundreds of Soviet baaley teshuva shifted to-wards the Hasidic and Lithuanian traditions of Israeli Haredi Judaism.

Israel became for these people not simply 'a place to go to' but gov-erned what may be termed the structure of legitimacy of each of the Or-thodox trends on the Moscow and Leningrad scenes, while the perceivedand real authority of rival groups influenced 'refuseniks' decisions on howto observe (for example, to read Habad's Tanya or the works of the Gaonof Vilna or with which Haredi representatives to interact). Furthermore,while the success of each Orthodox shita among 'refuseniks' was to a greatextent determined by events in Israel (and the flow of material resourcesfrom Israel), the most important roles in the competition between groupswas the allocution of resources and the objects essential for performingdaily nnd holiday rituals, and the building of social ties and new commu-nities.

'Refuscniks'perceptions of the authority of the major Israeli trendswere largely formed in reference to events within the Israeli context—what Goldstein calls 'the revival of cultural forms in a national frame-work.'13 For example, the authority of the Habad Lubavicher Rebbe,though unrecognized by many Israeli Haredim, was reinforced when heinfluenced the outcome of the 1988 national elections by commanding theblock vote of all Habad and many other Hasidim for Agudat Israel (andthen, in 1990, forbade his followers to enter into a coalition with the La-bour Party). Israel is also dependent on the Litvak (Lithuanian) yeshivotfor the training of Orthodox rabbis and the printing of religious materials.On die other hand, because the most revered Haredi rabbinical councilsare either Lithuanian or Hasidic, even before emigrating most baaleyteshuva came to see the Mizrahi (national-religious) trend, the Rabbinate,and the National Religious Party as lacking legitimacy and powerless incomparison to the dominant Haredi factions.

The dominant modelsThe teshuva phenomenon should also be related to a particular aliya.strategy and an example of a larger dynamic, which may be called the .'ne-gotiation of Orthodoxy'.14 Although, as part of the shift toward ultra-Or-thodoxy, Soviet baaley teshuva adopted a notion of the secular Israelistate as a desecration of the true Zion, they also simultaneously learnedthat, as opposed to the costs of marginalization as observant 'refuseniks' in

13 J. L. Goldstein, 'Iranian ethnicity in Israel: The performance of identity' in A. Weingrod(ed.). Studies in Israeli Ethnicity: After the Ingathering (New York: Gordon and Breach,

14 In the simplest terms, the negotiation of Orthodoxy may be conceptualized as a strategyfor reconciling the religious ideal and the social real within given historical conditions.Through negotiation, the religious attempt to reconcile their needs with the demands ofmembers of the family, their own community, other, often rival, Orthodox communities,and the larger secular society and state.

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58 Soviet 'Refuseniks' Turn to Orthodoxjudaism

the Soviet Union, membership among the Haredi elite in Jerusalem guar-anteed certain rights and privileges.

Initial expectations among religious 'refuseniks' that life in modernIsrael would resemble a 'Torah State', wherein all Jews observed themitsvot (Commandments), became, of course, impossible to fulfill. Yetthis ideological conflict was not to mean that a number of alternativemodels could not be forged. On the contrary, the general shift from anational-religious to an Orthodox ideology among religious 'refuseniks'signified the acceptability of fundamentalist Judaism 'in a national frame-work' for their needs. It resulted from an evaluation of relevant trends andthe best alternatives in Israel for building 'refusenik' networks in the So-viet Union and for preparing for life in Jerusalem.

As shown in Table 1, the three dominant religious 'refusenik' mod-els correspond to the Hasidic, Mitnaged, and Mizrahi trends in Israeli Or-thodoxjudaism. The dominant Israeli Haredi and religious 'refusenik' do-mains are represented by the three 'Russian' yeshivot in Jerusalem, estab-lished by 'refusenik' leaders who arrived in Israel in the 1970s and 1980s—the Habad Hasidic 'Shamir' yeshiva; 'Shevut Ami', belonging to theschool of Mitnagdim; and the religious-Zionist Mahanaim yeshiva (alsooperated by Russian Haredim). Tightly-knit social circles were builtaround these trends in both Moscow and Leningrad, some of which werelater transplanted to the neighbourhoods of the three Jerusalem 'Russian'yeshivot (e.g., in Ramot).

Table 1

Major Israeli Orthodox Trends and Their Russian Counterpartsin the USSR and Jerusalem

Israeliorthodoxtrend

Mizrahi(ReligiousZionist)

HabadHasidic

'Mitnaged'(Litvak)

Oriental(Sephardim)

'Refusenik'model

ReligiousZionist

Habad

Litvak('Black')

. JerusalemRussianyeshiva

Mahanaim

Shamir

Shevut Ami

IsraelipoliticalParty

Mafdal (NRP)

Agudat Israel

DegelHa-torah

Shas

IsraeliRabbinicCouncil

ChiefRabbinate

Council ofTorah SagesI*

Council ofTorah SagesII*

Council ofSephardicRabbis

' Since 1991 there has been a common Council of Torah Sages.

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K.J. LOURIE 59

The 'refusenik' Orthodox models thus became syncretisms of thetwo worlds of Israeli Haredim and religious-Zionist 'refuseniks'. Ratherthan anti-Zionists, Soviet baaley teshuva can be described as religious'non-Zionists', faithfully committed to living in Israel but in opposition tothe modern society and state. Of course, a handful of Haredi 'refusenik'leaders made no such reconciliation and taught that religious Jews mustremain in the Soviet Union.or go to countries other than Israel.15 But formost religious 'refuseniks', the Shamir-Habad, Shevut Ami-Litvak, andMahanaim-Mizrahi Orthodox models offered an alternative interpretationof Halakha rather than a compromise, through which a reconciliation ofthe Haredi standards of observance and the modern social and politicalscene in Israel could be found.

Affiliation to one specific group became more important among'refuseniks' as the formal and informal differences between trends becameaccentuated, when, according to the wife of one Mahanaim leader in Mos-cow, 'our group name became a kind of flag to wave.' Style of prayer anddress, among other things, came to be dictated by the theological andideological codes of one's shita—for example, the type of kipa (skullcap)worn on the head (black signifying identification with the Haredim, andthe colourful, knitted kipa with Zionist groups); or views on the IsraeliDefence Forces (opposed by Haredim, supported by religious-national-ists). Within the 'refusenik' networks, the symbols of performance were(and continue to be) manipulated to signal group loyalties and to vie forleadership positions."

Rights acquired by affiliationThose groups which performed religious ceremonies and provided ritualobjects and resources often became the most attractive. Yet in so far as allthree groups commanded substantial resources for distribution in the So-viet Union (though Habad more than the others), the choice was mademore on the basis of the projected status of a group in Israel—in whichneighbourhood might one live and at which yeshiva one might study(with a stipend) and/or work. In fact, in many cases these details were atleast tentatively worked out prior to emigration. As depicted in Table 2, ofthe 24 families in the study group who have been at least partly supportedby the 3 'Russian' yeshivot during their first year in Jerusalem, 22 had

15 The Satmar Hasidim, for example, are among the most vehemently anti-Zionist of ultra-Orthodox groups who see modern Israel as a heresy. Originally from Hungary and nowmostly settled in and around New York, they regularly sent representatives to the USSRthroughout the 1980s and won a small following (numbering less than 100).

16 The roles of language, text, discourse and performance in the negotiation strategies ofreligious Soviet Jewish newcomers to Jerusalem are discussed at length in K.J. Lourie,'The Negotiation of Orthodoxy: An Ethnographic Study of the Assimilation Strategiesof Religious Soviet Jewish Immigrants to Israel', Doctoral Dissertation (Brown Univer-sity, 1990).

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60 Soviet 'Refuseniks' Turn to Orthodox Judaism

Table 2

Yeshiva Support by Prior Arrangement

Total families 39

Total families supported by yeshivot 24 22

Males studying and working in yeshivot(teachers/admin.*)

Males only studying in yeshivot

Families living in yeshiva neighbourhoods

* Five of these leaders emigrated in the late 1970s and early 1980s, while others in thesampling emigrated less than one year (28) or less than two years (19) before the study.Source: author's data.

made prior arrangements—for housing (15 of 17), studies (13 of 15) andwork (9 of 9) well before their arrival.

These findings should by no means be construed to emphasize thematerial dependence of Soviet baaley teshuva alone. Rather, the data de-pict their need for elementary religious education and guidance on thepath to 'a Torah way of life'—in short, their need for a total 'system'.Since the beginning of the teshuva process they have required either Rus-sian translations or explanations of texts in Russian, lectures and lessonson the basics of prayer, kashrut, the laws of family purity, and all otherdaily aspects of Halakha. Moreover, like baaley teshuva of all back-grounds, these 'refuseniks'as detached individuals could never fully makethe transition from their secular past to a traditional Jewish lifestyle norgain complete acceptance within dominant Haredi circles.17 Thus in eitherthe USSR or Israel, without their own groups, they would have neitherthe yeshivot nor community support structures and neighbourhoods nec-essary for intensive religious study.

As relations between Soviet Jewry and world Jewry became strongera number of 'refuseniks' discovered that Orthodoxy resolved their pre-dicament of alienation and discrimination in the Soviet Union. By offeringan authoritative and legitimate world view, Orthodoxy explained segrega-tion between Jews and non-Jews in such a way that they were proudrather than ashamed:'... something that gave me very positive feelings—I really felt happy that I was a Jew and not a gentile.' After generations ofisolation in a regime which deprived them, in the words of one Mosco-vite Haredi, 'of any real Jewish life . . . or any opportunity to express it

17 J. Aviad, Return to Judaism . . . , 58.

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officially', tesbuva meant the re-discovery of one's history and a tradi-tional way of life.

Religious 'refuseniks' were quick to learn that the relationship be-tween the ultra-Orthodox and the modern Israeli state is one of mutualdependency. The ultra-Orthodox derive their legal power and a good partof their finances from the state while, in turn, the 'Jewish state' derives adegree of its legitimacy and much of its domestic services from the cul-tural and educational institutions maintained by the ultra-Orthodox.Only Orthodox rabbis are legally permitted to administer family law, su-pervise kashrut and conduct official holiday services and it is predomi-nantly the 'black' ultra-Orthodox institutions and councils which trainthis clergy.

ConclusionAnalysis of the situational, systemic and referential dimensions of teshuvaamong religious 'refuseniks' reveals that the conditions of 'refusal' were acatalyst for tesbuva; that religious 'refusenik' models were reconstructedfrom the tools and symbols of Orthodox Judaism outside of the SovietUnion; and that, despite contradictions between the nationalistic convic-tions of 'refuseniks' and the doctrine of Haredi Judaism in Israel, an essen-tial reconciliation between teshuva and aliya could be negotiated.

Representatives of the Haredim appeared powerful as a result oftheir opposition to both Soviet society and the secular Israeli mainstream.Thus becoming religious meant becoming Orthodox or ultra-Orthodox,rather than Reformed or Conservative—denominations which they per-ceived to lack historical authority or legitimacy among contemporary reli-gious leaders in the West and Israel. They also learned that as highly edu-cated Ashkenazim1* who despite their religiosity conform to the dominantcultural model in Israel," their transition from marginality or rejection inthe Soviet Union to being members of elitist though cloistered communi-ties in a state designed, governed and protected by Jews, would bring im-mediate rights and privileges.

As we have seen, religious revival emerged as part-and-parcel of aparticular strategy of aliya, which required a reconciliation of Zionist andfundamentalist doctrine according to the syncretic models of Shamir,Shevut Ami and Mahanaim in Jerusalem. 'Refuseniks' understood thatthese yeshivot were established to cater to the needs of Soviet baaley

18 The interviewees are representative of the larger Ashkenazi Soviet Jewish population inand outside the Soviet Union (middle-aged, highly educated, and predominantly fromMoscow and Leningrad). Each of the forty-six males and females over the age of twenty-five who arrived in Israel already had university degrees, with almost twice as many de-grees in the sciences as in the humanities (the remaining six interviewees are currently inhif.h school or college in Israel).

19 J. L. Goldstein, 'Iranian ethnicity in Israel...' .

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62 Soviet 'Refuseniks' Turn to Orthodoxjudaism

teshuva immigrants and would, on their arrival, support them and guidethem to a righteous way of life.

Finally, it should be emphasized that 'elites', 'privilege', 'rights','power', 'prestige' and 'status' by no means refer to the control of materialresources alone20 but to the demarcation of social and ethnic boundaries,the building of community support networks, the allocation of authority,and the legal definition of a fundamentalist system of belief. For religious'refuseniks', the negotiation of teshuva and aliya has meant a new identityand social role based on one's intrinsic rights as an Israeli citizen, the mostimportant of which was the right and means to observe freely a religiousway of life. In the words of one follower of Habad: 'In other places hisangels are representing him but in Israel he represents himself.'

20 H. Herzog's work on ethnicity also specifically concludes that negotiation 'does not onlyfocus on control of resources or efficient functioning, but deals as well with...gaininglegitimization.' H. Herzog, 'Ethnicity as a negotiated issue in the Israeli political order:The "Ethnic Lists" to the Delegates' Assembly and the Knesset (1920-1977)' in A.Weingrod (ed.), Studies in Israeli Ethnicity . . . , 161. In fact, the competition betweenOrthodox groups in the Soviet Union and Israel may be seen as a 'competition for legiti-macy . . . between groups claiming to possess it', P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory ofPractice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 168.

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