a reassessment of regional politics and international relations in the south caucasus

A Reassessment of Regional Politics and International Relations in the South CaucasusAuthor(s): Gerard LibaridianSource: Iran & the Caucasus, Vol. 6, No. 1/2 (2002), pp. 237-247Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4030723 .

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A REASSESSMENT OF REGIONAL POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE SOUTH

CAUCASUS*

GERARD LIBARIDIAN

(University ofBoston)

One way to begin a reassessment of the situation in the Caucasus and Central Asia following the September I 1, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and WVashington, D.C., is to ask the question: What has changed or will change in the way international relations are conducted as a result of September 11? Will that horrendous act cause a radical change, will it merely accelerate existing trends, or will things in essence continue as they were?

The short answer is that September 11 has accelerated and facilitated existing trends and processes. There is no doubt of the depth of the horror, the sense of solidarity with the US and American people as a victim immediately following the attacks, and the desire to transcend differences felt around the world. But these were soon subverted by governments and non-state actors who used their collaboration with the US or the new environment to the benefit of their own causes,' assisted by a sense that the US as well was using September 11 to pursue domestic and foreign policy agendas long in place. Rather than the horrendous nature of the crime imposing a new sense of international community, it is already altered agendas and strategies that are defining the nature-and utility-of the crime. September 11 has both justified and facilitated trends in American strategic thinking and the relation of American power to the rest of the world that predated the attacks. The radical change and predisposition to act differently were introduced with the coming of the new Bush administration inJanuary 2001.

A longer answer requires a closer look at September 11. September 11 has highlighted the particular characteristics in the Western perceptions of Central Asia and the Caucasus. The response is more likely to bring to the surface the weaknesses of these perceptions and the fault-lines of the region.

This commentarv is based on a paper originallv delit ered at the 95h International Seminar on Central Asia and the Caucasus organized bv IPIS in Tehran, December 22-23, 2001.

? Brill, Leiden, 2002 Iran and the Caucasus, 6.1-2



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We are dealing with a multidimensional problem, the understanding of which is essential if the response is to be constructive as well as effective in the long run. For discussion purposes, September 11 can be analyzed on four levels.

At the most immediate and obvious level, we are dealing with pathology, when a group of people can imagine, plan and commit acts of such horror and horrendous enormity, regardless of any given or underlying causes. It takes a particular kind of person and persons to undertake such operations.

The second level is made up of the political causes that are articulated in the discourse of the first group, as well as those who may condemn acts of terrorism but see some legitimate or quasi- legitimate motivations. The presence of US troop in Saudi Arabia, the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and even Kashmir are the most clearly articulated though not the only ones.

The third is the historical level: Here we are dealing with a vaguer but wider grievance that subsumes the political issues but intexprets them as part of a process that has a history and a historical logic. Political issues are interpreted as a manifestation and seen from the prism of Western, and in recent decades specifically US, strategic goals that are pursued at the expense of vulnerable peoples and countries whose interests and future are made subservient to neo-imperialistic designs.

To the extent that economic factors (hydrocarbon resources, expansion of markets, in today's terms-globalization) play a significant role in motivatng such historical processes, and given the challenge which Western penetraton tends to present to traditional societies and dislodge systems, September 11 involves also a fourth level of conflict where the US and its interests are seen as part of an aggressive culture characterized by crassness, materialism, exploitation, and a sense of superiority. It has thus been possible to move the discourse toward a clash of social values couched in terms of religious/cultural/civilization confrontation. Aggrieved groups have determined that a deeper form of racism is at work, this time with religious undertones.

These different levels interact with and feed on each other. The multiplicity of dimensions and their interaction explain the spectrum of reactions from the Arab/Muslim/non-Western/non- US quarters and the difficulties in distinguishing between cause and excuse, rhetoric and real grievance.



REGIONAL POUTICS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS 239

The purpose of these comments is to indicate how difficult it may be, without a recognition of all levels of this conflict, to even address the audiences on the other side or sides, let alone to allay their fears, make them accept US/Western assurances, and eventually find a better framework for the new world order promised since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The US/Western reaction to the tragedy dealt and is still largely dealing with the first level, the personal and group pathology: the elimination of the person and the group thought responsible for the horror and their supporters.

US and UK leaders initially also tried to deal with the second level by intensifying efforts at the resolution of some political conflicts. In both major cases, Israel-Palestine and Kashmir, the situation did not improve; in the case of the first, it has become far more dangerous.

However, the US and the West have and will have even more difficulty dealing with the historical and civilization dimensions of the problem.

The US cannot change history, and would have a difficult time changing the others' perception of it. There is scant recognition in US and allied discourse, at least at the public and formal level-of the existence of problems on the third level. There has been rare recognition of the legitimacy of grievances in this respect.

Obviously history-either remembering or forgetting it-is a tricky business. Asking parties to conflicts to forget history has been an integral part of the West's post-Cold War framework for conflict resolution in different parts of the world. The West may be able to afford to forget history and the past. After all, it has made that history and remembering it brings a different kind of responsibility that it is willing to assume at this time. It also dominates the present. The West sees the remembering of the victims of that past as a source of conflict; memory is considered dangerous. It is especially dangerous when it is a source of resistance to worldviews and frameworks that non-Western societies are asked to accept as a basis for the resolution of their conflicts, for their economic development, for their assessment of their environment and the processes they are undergoing, in summary, for their future.

History is an alien category for the most part in US policymaking, especially the history of those regarding whom



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policy is made. This problem was best illustrated in the use of the term "crusade" by President George Bush in the first few days following September 1 1, while providing assurances that the anti- terror war was a not an attack on Muslims.

Furthermore, the formulations of the problem as "good versus evil" and of the response as "with us or against us," while making the first dimension the main determinant of the reaction, tend to reduce the problem to a technical issue. Such formulations also confirm the underlying argument made that the US places a higher human value on the lives of its own victims than on victims of other nations and religions; and, that the US considers it acceptable to create civilian ictims in Iraq and Libya but will not accept the same rules and morality when civilians die on its own territory.

It is difficult to argue that the war against terrorism is for all the good things "we" stand for while having as allies some of those the US considered not so good yesterday. A discourse on the war based on the defense of "civilizaton" and "our way of life" is more likely to strengthen the impression abroad that the US really does not understand others and that in substance the US sees this crisis as a clash of civilizations.

US President Bush and UK Prime Minister Blair have tried to convince Muslims around the world that the US is not against Islam as a religion and that the war on terrorism is not a war against Muslims. That would work if history or collective memory, religion and politics came together in other cultures as it does in American or Western cultures. It is doubtful that Muslims around the world would consider President Bush and Prime Minister Blair as qualified intexpreters of Islam, even when they are saying nice things about it. For most Muslims who have watched Western and NATO responses to crises in the last decade, operations undertaken in defense of Muslim populations in Bosnia and Kosovo pale next to others that have targeted Arab and Muslim countries. In addition, NATO actions in the Balkans are more likely to be seen-by those who do not separate religion as easily from politics as the West does-as operations that were undertaken for geostrategic purposes and aimed at the strategic homogeneity in Europe rather than as a defense of Muslim populations because they were Muslims.

One problem here is the difference in what the US and the West take for granted in their assessment of their own policies, actions and reactions, and what others take for granted in theirs.



REGIONAL POLITICS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS 241

The US and the West take for granted, for example, that foreign aid and dropping food in Afghanistan along with bombs should ingratiate the US to other peoples, cultures, and religions. Sometimes giving tends to reinforce the sense of "not having had", possibly of being exploited by those who have it and are now giving; giving does sometimes create more resentment than gratitude. The US and the West take for granted that globalization in all its manifestations-including the spread of cultural, political, and social values-is a positive phenomenon, for which every society should be grateful. In fact, many societies with different historic experiences and religious bases consider globalization as a basic threat to their way of life and an assault on their value systems.

The articulation of political grievances with religion and religious fervor-or any ideologically driven fervor-is problematic in any society. It has a peculiar resonance in some, particularly at this juncture in history. But many in the world see US and Western policies and practices as ideologically driven, in the sense that policies it promotes are not seen as free of historical, cultural, religious and even civilization biases, in addition to the use of power against the weaker in the pursuit of national or alliance interests. That is, it is possible to do to others what would be intolerable if done to "us" or our "kind." US discourse on occasion is as loaded with references to religion and a moral high ground derived from religion as those that Americans loathe in others.

With the assumption of power of the Bush administration, we see the new trends that characterize American attitudes toward the intemational community. First was the sense that overwhelming American military superiority and economic power must be used somehow. The projection of power became a policy goal in itself. Then came the idea that such power could be used to recreate the world in a manner that prolongs American power and neutralizes any challenge or opposition to it in a post-American era. Third, the projection and use of such power can-in the case of some US officials should be-executed unilaterally. The new world order seem to be summarized in the belief within the US administration that it is up to the US to decide what conflicts could be turned into war and by whom. It is no surprise that the US ended up with a confrontation with the UN. After all, international law had invested that power wvith the UN Security Council.

These tenets dominated both the content and style of actions taken prior to September 11. Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol



242 GERARD UBARIDIAN

on global warming, withdrawal of the US signature from the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court, withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, the position on small weapons and ant-personnel mine negotiations were hardly a series of accidental actions. Unilateralism may not only have been necessary but also inevitable, given the goals of foreign policy. If others are not willing to accept the American position, the US has enough power to do it alone, which may be the best way to project power. Finally, all of these can be achieved in the name of national interest and international order, never mind the possible conflict between the two. One might add that approach to international relations was paralleled by a similar radical shift in domestic social, fiscal, political and economic priorities and agendas. While the domestic agenda was quite clear, the international agenda consisted of establishing new rules for the game, whatever the game may be. In some respects, the new US administration appeared as a superpower in search of a grand mission in the world.

The impact of September 11 on countries and peoples will be assessed not so much by the event itself but rather by the actions we take and the reactions we have. Some of the impact is in the short and mid term, and they are easier to think about than the long-term impact.

One general conclusion may be drawn: On the technical level, the eliminaton of Osama Bin Laden and the al-Qaida leadership may be followed by the actions of leftover cells or new groups in a wider area of the world that question the current state of affairs in international relations. Opposition to change and resistance to globalization, accompanied by a sense of powerlessness, and rejection of big power strategic goals, especially when one of them is seen as hegemonic, will assume new forms. Even if terrorism itself is eliminated, we will continue to face new and different manifestations of the discontent that exists. The key to assess the long term impact is not so much the minority involved in terrorism, that can be apprehended and dealt with, but the far larger populations, even governments, who "condemn terrorism but understand it." One does not have to go into the debate on a definition of terrorism to realize the scope of the challenge.

As for the medium term, despite talk of "nothing will be the same," much remains the same. In fact, since September 11 we have witnessed flare-ups in the Kashmir, the Abkhaz-Georgian,



REGIONAL POLITiCS IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS 243

and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. (I will not discuss here what has changed or remains the same in US domestic politics.)

The need for a Grand "Coalition" to fight intenational terrorism led by the US has opened up a bazaar, where countries that associate with the coalition exact a price from the US. That price is not only attempting to define terrorism in a manner that justifies their otherwise unacceptable behavior and ride on the wave, but also to compel the US to adopt their own war against their own terrorists and place it on the US agenda. The atmosphere is one that resembles the post-Kosovo intervention, which affected the discourse of countries, each trying to interpret the action as legitimizing their position and calculations. Except that now more than discourse will be affected.

Furthermore, the association of countries with questionable domestic policies and practices with War on Terrorism will probably diminish the moral-political legitimacy of the US and Western discourse and highlight, from the point of view of many, the underlying hypocrisy of US discourse and policies. The delicate and not so successful balance between US goals to promote democracy and human rights, on the one hand, and strategic interests, on the other, will be further tilted toward the latter. There will be less concern for the first. The need for cooperative governments will be stronger than the demand for respect by governments for human rights and politcal or economic reforms. The US will tend to see other governments as cogs in the machine to defeat terrorism. The legitimacy of regimes-at least to the extent that it depends on govemments' (a) ability to pursue sovereign decision-making based on national interests and (b) focus on domestic reforms-will tend to decrease in the eyes of already suspicious populations.

Moreover, the longer the coalition is needed and military operations last, the more occasions will arise where govemments other than the US will try to define what is and is not terrorism. US attempts to walk the tightrope between pursuing its strategy in the war on terrorism and satisfying the odd bedfellows that "their" terrorists-and governments' responses-be measured by the same yardstick as the US does its own is not likely to succeed by embroiling the US in questionable casuistries.

Governments and non-governmental parties to conflicts will try to settle scores while the US is absorbed in this particular war. They are likely to miscalculate one's advantages and the opponent's disadvantages, therefore the consequences of their



244 GERARD LIBARIDLAN

actions, even assuming that the US cannot pay much attention. The equations now as well as the unknowns in the equations are now too many and constantly shifting. The danger of war would increase in places like the Caucasus as in the Indian sub-continent.

During the last decade we have seen governments speak the language of the IMF, WB and even NATO, while their domestic policies have often hidden behind nationalistic and even religious discourses. De-Sovietization and, in general, de-colonization of history has meant, in most cases, nationalization of history, beginning with textbooks used to prepare future citizens. More often than not having radicalized their peoples-in an ethnic or religious sense-governments have blamed the same people for being unable to accept compromises in conflicts with neighbors. The chasm between governments and peoples will widen, as US policies will tend to favor existing regimes to repay for their support of this war. These governments will tend to have less leeway to determine policy as their fear their own peoples, while the political elites lack the courage and/or the ability to have to tackle the difficult question of the relationship between political and economic changes.

The US government's reaction in the long term may still be interpreted as anti-Muslim, not only because there is an effective counter propaganda and because Bush and Blair have not been convincing, but also because the focus on Usama Bin Laden will betray a technical approach to the problem, from the point of view of those most affected in the region.

The difficulties in the Middle East and the Indian sub-continent indicate that we are almost over the immediate/short term reaction. We are now entering the mid term period, which may last a few months to a year or so. There are too many issues, personalities, conflicts and countries to predict the long term.

September 11 and the US reaction have produced an environment which has brought major powers closer, overshadowing rivalries and mutual suspicions, at least for the time being. Should a change occur in the larger picture of geostrategic perceptions, meaning a further qualitative break from remnants of Cold War mentality, there could be a new "division" of the world into zones of influence, albeit qualitatively different from the post World War II division.

Depending on the process and outcome of this war, we may end up with peoples in the Central Asian republics with a stronger




sense of their religious identity. While this does not necessarily mean Muslim fundamentalism, it will signal a change in the domestic politics and options, if that identity becomes an alternative framework within which people situate problems and their solutions.

The three republics in the south Caucasus-Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia-will be affected not only because of changes in the significance of Iran and Russia and the relations of these two countries with the US, but also because they have been weakened seriously in the past 2-3 years.

All three of the south Caucasus republics have formally declared that they are on the side of the coalition against terrorism; decisions facilitated by Russia's support of US actions and the quiet support of Iran.

Georgia and Azerbaijan may try to seek better security guarantees from the US and move closer to the West as a balancing act against a more secure Russia. Yet the two as well as Armenia may feel less important as the US reassesses their relative significance in the context of its new relations with Russia and possibly Iran. Georgia and Azerbaijan may end up seeking even better relations with Russia if the US, in the context of its new priorities, does not respond to their overtures. We are likely to see Russia's increasing leverage and ability to shape the "post-war on terrorism" realities in this region.

In case of a qualitative change in US-Russian relations, the US will be more willing to allow Russia to settle conflicts in the region in a manner that will be closer to a Pax Russica, with due consideration of US and Western economic interests. This may be tolerated, even assisted by the US, as it will seek the resoluton of as many of the conflicts with religious underpinnings resolved as possible.

* In Georgia we are already witnessing a dangerous revival of the Abkhaz conflict, each side accusing the other of terrorism, including involvement by Chechens and overtones of Bin Laden connections; increasing tensions with Russia; and the government's attempt to receive rewards for its unconditional support for US actions at the same time as it attempts to negotiate a new treaty with Russia. Political realities, both in terms of actual and potential conflict areas and domestic issues, energy dependency, and persistent economic problems do not seem to contribute to the government's efforts to bring a pro-US foreign and security



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strategy to a successful conclusion. The changing US-Russian relations may seem to favor the process, but in fact will probably work against it.

* Although Baku took action against domestic or foreign-bred and Al-Qaida oriented terrorist cells, which placed it on the right side in the new war, Azerbaijan may become problematic with its largely Muslim population. Baku also thinks it deserves more decisive action by Washington regarding the repeal of US sanctions against it mandated by the 1992 Freedom Support Act. Azerbaijan has yet to settle its succession problem, a problem that dominates its domestic agenda and colors its relations with Russia and Iran. Above all, Azerbaijan may find new opportunities to use its good relations with the US and supple diplomacy with Russia to settle the Nagorno Karabagh problem in its favor.

* Armenia could have been a beneficiary of the process but it has little significance in the new war. It is less of a headache given its near immunity to Al-Qaida operations. In the past Chechens associated with Bin Laden had threatened to help Azerbaijan liberate Armenian occupied "Muslim" territories in Azerbaijan. But Armenia today has the kind of relations with Russia that allows Russia to take it for granted and for the US to doubt Armenia's commitment to US strategic interests. Armenia has lost much of its freedom of movement with the non-resolution of the Nagomo Karabagh conflict eroding its essential resources.

The economic downturn, accelerated by the September 11 events, will severely test the assumptions underlying globalization policies that have gone hand in hand with the projection of American power. It is the weaknesses of the system that will be revealed. And these weaknesses will feed into the general discontent in developing countries discussed above. Dealing with that discontent and its articulations will be a far greater challenge than imagined. The longer the military phase lasts and the US increases its security commitments in the region, the more the likelihood of vindicating those wvho believe the US is transforming its war on terrorism into a vehicle to achieve larger geostrategic goals in Central Asia.

Recent discourses and policies thus far do not indicate a fundamental change in the attitudes of the US and the West, on the one hand, and those suspicious of both, on the other. The first continue to believe in the righteousness of the way they have




managed world affairs; the latter continue to suspect the first of pursuing policies that betray a propensity to impose their values and cover up strategic interests at their expense.

This will be a long war, although the military phase against terrorists may be a short one. The tragedy is that we have come to this phase under circumstances that mandated defining it as a "war."3

It does not appear as yet that there is a strategy to move toward a "dialogue" rather than a "clash" of civilizations. The mistakes of the past and inadequate response today on the part of the US and the West, the inability and/or of most governments caught in the middle to reexamine the underpinnings of their own power and legitimacy, and the clever manipulation of tensions in international relations by those who provide a pathological and unacceptable expression to these tensions may lead one to think that the "clash of civilizations" may yet become a self-fulfilling prophecy, with or without Usama Bin Laden.

We are still very far from finding a unifyring model of international relations capable of responding to the complexities and challenges on hand and resolving all conflicts and problems. States, nations and non-state actors have not yet found the ultimate mechanism or agreement on definitions that would allow them to transcend what divides them and the overwhelming pressure to define the world in their own terms.

Postscript

Events since the presentation of this paper in December 2002 have unfolded in a manner that confirms the above by and large. The war that the US and the UK began against Iraq as well as the diplomacy preceding it constitute further evidence of the precepts underlying US policies and their impact on the international community. The US forgets that part of history when it supported Saddam Hussein in the 1980s; it acts, for all practical purposes, in a more unilateral manner than in the war on terrorism, and in doing so has raised the confrontation with the UN into the level of another war; and this has opened a new bazaar for states to get cash and/or reprieve from democratic governance and respect for human rights for their peoples, including in the republics in the South Caucasus that are even less relevant as sovereign and democratic states than before the war on Iraq.



a reassessment of regional politics and international relations in the south caucasus

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