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The Journal of PsychologyInterdisciplinary and Applied

ISSN: 0022-3980 (Print) 1940-1019 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/vjrl20

A Protection Motivation Theory of Fear Appealsand Attitude Change1

Ronald W. Rogers

To cite this article: Ronald W. Rogers (1975) A Protection Motivation Theory ofFear Appeals and Attitude Change1, The Journal of Psychology, 91:1, 93-114, DOI:10.1080/00223980.1975.9915803

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00223980.1975.9915803

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Published as a separate and in The Journal of Psychology, 1975, 91, 93-114.

A PROTECTION MOTIVATION THEORY OF FEARAPPEALS AND ATTITUDE CHANGE*l

University of South Carolina

RONALD W. ROGERS2

SUMMARY

A protection motivation theory is proposed that postulates the threecrucial components of a fear appeal to be (a) the magnitude of noxiousnessof a depicted event; (b) the probability of that event's occurrence; and (c)the efficacy of a protective response. Each of these communication vari­ables initiates corresponding cognitive appraisal processes that mediateattitude change. The proposed conceptualization is a special case of a morecomprehensive theoretical schema: expectancy-value theories. Severalsuggestions are offered for reinterpreting existing data, designing new typesof empirical research, and making future studies more comparable. Final­ly, the principal advantages of protection motivation theory over the rivalformulations of Janis and Leventhal are discussed.

A. INTRODUCTION

In the research paradigm designed to investigate the effects of fearappeals upon attitude change, an individual typically is exposed to persua­sive communications that depict the noxious consequences accruing to aspecified course of action. Recommendations are presented that can avertthe danger if the individual adopts the appropriate attitudes and acts uponthem. Fear-arousing stimuli seek to eliminate response patterns that mightproduce aversive consequences (e. g., cigarette smoking) or establish re­sponse patterns that might prevent the occurrence of noxious events (e. g.,taking prescribed inoculations).

Fear appeals frequently vary information on one or more of the follow-

... Received in the Editorial Office on June 5, 1975, and published immediately at Prov­incetown, Massachusetts. Copyright by The Journal Press.

I Preparation of this paper was supported in part by Grant MH 22157-01 from theNational Institute of Mental Health. The author would like to express thanks to Donald L.Thistlethwaite for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

Z Requests for reprints should be sent to the 'author at the address shown at the end of thisarticle.

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ing topics: (a) the personally relevant consequences of some noxious event;(b) the likelihood of occurrence of the event; and (c) recommendedprophylactic responses. If fear appeals thus have multiple components, itshould not be surprising that several dependent variables have been foundto covary with the level of fear aroused. Higher levels of fear arousal havebeen demonstrated to be more persuasive than lower levels with respect tomeasures of the interest value of the communication (7, 13, 68); the severityor seriousness of the noxious event (13, 46, 47); perceived vulnerability orsusceptibility to the threat (13, 46, 48); the importance of the avoidanceresponse (13, 46, 47); and concern over the threat (44).

In one of the earliest theoretical analyses of the effects of fear arousalupon persuasion (29), fear appeals were referred to as the contents ofcommunications describing the unfavorable consequences that may resultfrom failure to adopt the communicator's recommendations. It does notseem surprising that such communication content can be conceptualized invarious ways, or that a fear-arousing communication may be a compositepackage of several confounded variables. The experiments cited in theprevious paragraph may be interpreted as suggesting that when the inten­sity of fear was manipulated, other factors (e. g., interest, importance, etc.)were also frequently varied; however, it is difficult to determine whichindependent variable(s) was effective in producing the theoretically rele­vant changes in the dependent variables. This confounding effect is notinherent in any attempt to manipulate fear arousal but may either be theproduct of the unwitting simultaneous manipulation of several factors or bethe result of varying definitions of fear appeals among investigators.

While it is generally recognized that fear appeals are multifaceted stimuli(cf. 26, 43), there has been little progress in formulating theoretical ac­counts that identify relevant stimulus variables, describe associated cogni­tive mediational events, and systematically state effects upon attitudechange. Recent reviews of the literature on fear appeals and persuasionagree that the empirical data are inconsistent and difficult to interpret (26,32, 43, 52). A major factor contributing to the intractable pattern ofconflicting results may be a reluctance to differentiate components of fearappeals, develop a theoretical framework to integrate these variables, andconduct parametric investigations of them. It will be difficult for researchfindings to be amenable to systematic cumulation until these definitionaland conceptual issues are addressed.

This paper deals with several conceptual issues that need to be clarifiedand extended in order to advance theory relating fear appeals to attitude

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RONALD W. ROGERS 95

change. A protection motivation theory will be described that attempts tospecify a limited set of crucial stimulus variables in a fear appeal and thecognitive processes postulated to mediate acceptance of a communicator'srecommendations. Since research in fear appeals is one part of a largerterrain that includes the closely related topics of stress, anxiety, instrumen­tal avoidance learning, and emotion, it would be fruitful wherever possibleto apply conceptual development in these broader based frames of refer­ence to theory building in attitude change. Furthermore, there are severalmore generic or macrolevel theories that contain propositions that can beapplied to a microlevel theory of fear appeals and persuasion. Subsequentsections will suggest that several variables and empirical findings could beincorporated into the protection motivation theory. Then the proposedtheory will be contrasted to rival formulations. Finally, several limitationsof the theory will be mentioned in hopes that limitations may point todirections for future theoretical development. Before proceeding, however,it may be instructive to consider the nature of fear, selectively focusingupon those aspects of this concept that might facilitate our understandingof the relationship of fear appeals to attitude change.

B. FEAR AS A MOTIVATIONAL INTERVENING VARIABLE

Historically, fear has been conceptualized as an affective state protectingone against danger (22) or a motivational state leading one away fromsomething (10, 73, 79). More recently, fear has been characterized as anintervening variable, inferred from stimulus conditions and response vari­ables, that motivates an organism to escape or avoid a noxious event (el 3,24, 42, 75). A "motivational theory of emotion," especially the emotion offear, is perhaps the most typical conceptualization of the emotions (el 9,31, 42, 53, 55, 56, 71).

Interpretations of instrumental avoidance learning often employ the con­struct of fear to account for the emergence and maintenance of an avoid­ance response. Miller (55), Mowrer (56, 58), and Spence (71) believed thatthe occurrence of a noxious unconditioned stimulus conditioned an emo­tional reaction, fear, to the stimuli associated with it. Two-factor learningtheory (57, 69) states that complex autonomic and skeletal responses areconditioned to a noxious unconditioned stimulus. (Fear is the conditionedform of the pain reaction.) These conditioned intereoceptive responses aresaid to act as a learned drive to evoke the instrumental avoidance be­havior. In the initial theoretical formulation of the effects of fear uponattitude change, Hovland, Janis, and Kelley (29) adopted the fear-as-

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acquired-drive model, specifically citing the work of Miller (55) andMowrer (58).

Fear may also be considered a relational construct, aroused in responseto a situation that is judged as dangerous and toward which protectiveaction is taken. This point of view may be traced to, among others, Freud(22), Tolman (73), and Woodworth (79) who noted that an emotional stateis directly produced by some stimulus in the environment and is directedtowards mobilizing the organism to effect some change in the stimulus.The prototypic emotion in this type of analysis has been fear. As a type ofemotion, fear is closely related not only to stimulus events, but to responseevents as well. The close relationship between emotion and muscularactivity has been postulated in a long and rich tradition (e. g., 10, 15, SO,66). The emotional distrubance of the viscera facilitates the muscularactivity which protects the organism from the dangerous environmentalstimulus: hence the etiology of the word "emotion" itself from the Latinemouere, e meaning out, and movere to move. This transactional relation­ship between environment and organism has been emphasized at recentsymposia on anxiety (72) and stress (1, 51), thus reflecting a conceptualconvergence among these cognate research traditions.

It was previously argued that insufficient attention has been devoted tospecifying the components of a fear appeal and that this may partiallyaccount for the inconsistent empirical findings. Emphasis upon the inter­vening variable, relational nature of fear, reminds us to consider carefullynot only the emotional response but also the stimulus events producing it.

C. A PROTECTION MOTIVATION THEORY

1. Convergent Formulations

The protection motivation theory to be described below is connectedwith a well-established theoretical tradition and may be considered aspecial case of a more general category of theories employing "expectancy"and "value" constructs. Feather (19) identified psychologists in five diverseareas who use concepts similar to expectancy and value to explain behaviorin a choice situation: Atkinson's (5) conceptualization of achievement moti­vation, Edwards' (18) decision making theory, Lewin's (49) decision mak­ing and field theory, Tolman's (74) purposive behaviorism, and Rotter's(64) social learning theory. For all of these researchers, the tendency to actin a particular fashion is said to be a function of the expectancy that thegiven act will be followed by some consequence and the value of the

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consequence. The expectancy-value formulations (also referred to asmeans-ends and instrumentality theories) have been applied to severalother social psychological phenomena: the structure of attitudes (63, 67,81); the prediction of behavior from self-report measures (21); and persua­sion in the social health field (27). Thus, the formulation to be proposed isnot a radical departure from current conceptualizations, but is in thetradition of a number of psychological theories. Hopefully, linking smallscale theories with more comprehensive schemes will yield a fuller under­standing of psychological phenomena by reaching a higher-order explana­tion.

2. Components and Mediating Processes

There is frequently an intimate relationship between taxonomy on theone hand and theory on the other. Ambiguity in the former may facilitate acorresponding vagueness in the latter. Since it has been argued that fearappeals are composite packages of confounding variables, it would beadvantageous to limit the relevant stimulus variables subsumed under thelabel "fear appeal." Hovland et al. 's (29) analysis and expectancy-valuetheories suggest there are three crucial stimulus variables in a fear appeal:(a) the magnitude of noxiousness of a depicted event; (b) the conditionalprobability that the event will occur provided that no adaptive behavior isperformed or there is no modification of an existing behavioral disposition;and (c) the availability and effectiveness of a coping response that mightreduce or eliminate the noxious stimulus.

It is apparent that with no more than these three components of a fearappeal, there are seven possible combinations or different ways to define afear appeal operationally. (A fear appeal could present information on anyone of the three components, each of the three pairs of components, or thecombination of all components.) Any effect of a combination of compo­nents could be caused by anyone or more of the components. Thus, fearhas been manipulated in some studies by varying information on theseriousness of a depicted harm and the likelihood of exposure (e. g., 11, 30,33) and in other studies by varying only the former type of information(e. g., 28, 44). It is a small wonder that it is frequently difficult to interpret andcompare empirical findings, much less specify important functional relation­ships. One goal of formalization is to render a precise meaning to the theoreti­cally relevant variables. Specification of the crucial stimulus components of afear appeal previously has been passed over too lightly.

It is important to note that recognition of these communication content

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variables is not unique to protection motivation theory. Several inves­tigators have recognized similar variables, among a host of others, but thereare a number of important conceptual differences beween previousanalyses and the proposed formulation that will be examined after theprotection motivation theory has been fully characterized. Doubtless, theprotection motivation theory is a simplified schema. It lacks a noveltheoretical approach, daring and startling speculations, counterintuitivehypotheses, and similar properties that endear new conceptualizations tosocial psychologists. However, there are a number of complementarystrategies for advancing the theoretical understanding of fear appeals andattitude change. When we refer to the cumulative nature of science, we arereferring typically to the slow, systematic accumulation of empirical datathat builds upon previous findings. Theory construction needs to becumulative in the same sense, especially if confusion over the data ispartially attributable to disparities in operationally defining fear appeals.

It is further assumed that each of the three components of a fear appealinitiates a cognitive mediational process. A schema of the communicationcomponents and mediating processes of the protection motivation theory isshown in Figure 1. Each of these processes appraises communicationinformation about noxiousness, probability, or efficacy by placing eachstimulus on dimensions of appraised severity of the depicted event, expec­tancy of exposure to the event, or belief in efficacy of the recommendedcoping response, respectively. It will be taken as a working hypothesisthat these cognitive processes are independent. Each of these appraisalprocesses will be roughly proportional to the strength of the associatedenvironmental variable. The representation will not be exact, since indi­viduals have different styles of appraising threatening events (cf 40). Thus,these processes are centrally mediated representations of external and in­ternal events and are linked to observable stimulus events and measurableresponses. Of course, cognitive appraisal of a fear appeal presupposes thatthe environmental input has been attended to and comprehended. One isnot affected by even the direst events when they are not perceived orunderstood.

It is also assumed that these three cognitive processes mediate the effectsof the components of fear appeals upon attitudes by arousing what will betermed "protection motivation." The intent to adopt the communicator'srecommendation is mediated by the amount of protection motivationaroused. Protection motivation is an intervening variable that has thetypical characteristics of a motive: it arouses, sustains, and directs activity.

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COMPONENTS OFA

FEAR APPEAL

RONALD W. ROGERS

COGNITIVE MEDIATING PROCESSES ATnTUOE CHANGE

99

MAGNITUDEOF NOXIOOSNESS

PROBABILITY

OF OCCURRENCE

EFFICACY OF

t£aMo1ENllEDRESPONSE

r----IPROTECTION

I MOTIVATION IL J

r------ --I BELIEF IN EFFICACY I

OF COPING RESPONSE II1-- ..J

INTENT TO ADOPT

REl:OMMENlED RESPONSE

FIGURE 1SCHEMA OF THE PROTECTION MOTIVATION THEORY

Therefore, a basic postulate is that protection motivation arises from thecognitive appraisal of a depicted event as noxious and likely to occur, alongwith the belief that a recommended coping response Can effectively pre­vent the occurrence of the aversive event. If an event is not appraised assevere, as likely to occur, or if nothing can be done about the event, thenno protection motivation would be aroused, and hence there would be nochange in behavioral intentions. Protection motivation (and hence attitudechange) is postulated to be a multiplicative function of the three media­tional processes for two reasons: (a) no motivation would be aroused if anyof these values equalled zero; and (b) a multiplicative relationship is pos­tulated in the expectancy-value theories of Atkinson, Edwards, Feather,Fishbein, and Rosenberg. Thus, this formulation predicts not only sig­nificant main effects for each variable but also second- and third-orderinteraction effects. Only the form of the third-order interaction will bedescribed, since it incorporates the other hypothesized effects. For eachlevel of a magnitude of noxiousness manipulation, high probability ofoccurrence and high efficacy of coping response should each producegreater acceptance of the communicator's recommendation than low levels of

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these variables. Within a low-noxiousness condition, the superiority of a highover a low efficacy variable should be more pronounced in a high-probabilitycondition than in a low-probability condition. Within a high-noxiousnesscondition, the same ordering of means should obtain, but the differencesshould be more pronounced. Rather than assert that anyone of the threevariables is more important than another, it will be assumed that they areequally potent in changing attitudes. Thus, in brief, according to the protec­tion motivation theory, people appraise the severity and likelihood of beingexposed to a depicted noxious event, evaluate their ability to cope with theevent, and alter their attitudes accordingly.

The proposed formulation asserts that attitude change is not mediated byor a result of an emotional state of fear, but rather is a function of theamount of protective motivation aroused by the cognitive appraisal pro­cesses. The emphasis is thus upon cognitive processes and protection moti­vation, rather than fear as an emotion. Although a currently acceptablecomposite definition of fear might define it to be an emotion complex withphysiological, cognitive, and overt motor subsystems (e. g., 37, 39, 41, 72),the concept of fear has a tradition of being associated almost exclusivelywith autonomic activity (e. g., 57, 78). Cognitive components have beenfrequently regarded as ancillary, not integral components of fear. Leeperlamented "the almost universal conceptualization of emotional processes aslower-level processes" (42, p. 69). Lazarus et at. noted that "It has longbeen traditional to associate emotions with the viscera ..." (41, p. 213).Although visceral and skeletal activity may be cognitively appraised, theproposed formulation asserts that it is the central events that mediateprotective, adaptive activity. Therefore, the emphasis on "protection moti­vation" rather than "fear" is designed to emphasize the importance ofcognitive processes to the relative exclusion of visceral ones.

There are numerous advantages to the emphasis on cognitive constructs.With respect to investigations of animal instrumental avoidance learning(an area where peripheral explanations might be expected to be preferredto cognitive ones), Rescorla and Solomon concluded from their review ofthe literature that "we have not yet identified any peripheral CRs whichare necessary to mediate avoidance behavior" (60, p. 169). They furthersuggest that physiological activity is merely an index of a central state thatmediates the avoidance behavior. Even critics of two-process theory havestressed the information signalling function of noxious stimuli (e. g., 8, 14,25). Thus, if psychologists studying avoidance behavior in animals are nowwilling to de-emphasize the mediational role of peripheral phenomena

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relative to central representations, then perhaps social and personalitytheorists should consider emulating them again. Indeed, Janis' (32) conceptof reflective fear and Leventhal's (43) danger control process are steps inthis direction. Thus, the de-emphasis of visceral processes is consistentwith empirical data and emerging conceptualizations.

The protection motivation theory also stresses the organization andintegration of cognitive plans (cf. 54). Protection from noxious eventsfrequently requires long-sustained processes, like cognitive representations,rather than reflexive responsivity to visceral events. The significance of thedeparture from prevailing S-R models of the last several decades has beentermed revolutionary by Dember, who observed that "Psychology has gonecognitive, and so has motivation" (16, p. 161). Recent symposia on emotion(4), anxiety (72), and stress (1, 51) reflect this convergence upon the role ofcognition. One wonders if psychology has indeed "gone" anywhere orsimply recycled to St. Thomas Aquinas' (2) view that emotional states arereactions to intellective apprehension. There has been progress of sorts, foralthough we may have lost our Thomistic souls in the recycling, we surelyhave found our empirical data.

Not only is the concept of fear too frequently associated with peripheral,visceral activity, but this association readily lends itself to an emphasisupon reduction of an emotional state rather than upon avoidance of theenvironmental danger. Thus, according to a fear-reduction conceptualiza­tion, a protective response is viewed as only an epiphenomenon of theeffort to escape the state of fear (e. g., 59, 65). The protection motivationtheory makes it clear that one is coping with and avoiding a noxious eventrather than escaping from an unpleasant emotional state of fear. Oneadvantage of this distinction is that it directs our attention back to en­vironmental stimulation (i. e., the components of a fear appeal) where it isso sorely needed. Another advantage of this distinction is that protectionmotivation theory can be applied to automatized forms of coping, such ascrossing a street, in which no emotional state of fear is aroused, yet oneengages in protective activity. Rather than being outside the scope of thepresent analysis, protection motivation should be aroused in these types ofsituations, since each of the three stimulus variables would be present.

3. Incorporation of Descriptive Variables

One purpose of any theory is to bring order out of seemingly chaotic,inconsistent findings. This paper has strongly argued that one of the mostimportant sources of inconsistency in the data relating fear to attitude

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change is the nature of a fear appeal itself. The properties of fear appealsthat produce attitude change have not been firmly established, and atpresent there is no formulation that can do so. Unfortunately, empiricalconsistency cannot be imposed post hoc if fear appeals have been opera­tionally defined in a variety of ways. Thus, rather than offer a reinterpreta­tion of the existing literature, protection motivation theory offers aframework for making comparisons among future studies morestraightforward and interpretable.

Although there have been no empirical tests of protection motivationtheory, several studies have manipulated one or two independent variablessimilar to noxiousness, probability, or efficacy. It will be shown brieflythat, in principle, protection motivation theory can account for these data.In general, the higher the level of fear aroused, the more attitude changeproduced (cf 26). The magnitude of noxiousness of a depicted threat (thefirst communication variable specified by protection motivation theory) isperhaps the most common component of a fear appeal and may thus beinferred to be an important communication variable. More specifically,several studies (13, 47) have found that manipulations of fear affectedperceived seriousness of a threat and thus facilitated attitude change. Withrespect to the probability of occurrence, the second component of a fearappeal specified by protection motivation theory, several experiments havefound that compared to a low-fear appeal, a high-fear appeal increasedfeelings of susceptibility to a threat and thus facilitated attitude change (13,48). Although Watts (76) found that a vulnerability communication plus afear-film was not superior to a control condition, compared to the controlgroup, the vulnerability communication increased attitude change. Lev­enthal and Watts (45) blocked cigarette smokers on their feelings ofsusceptibility to disease and reported internal analyses showing a maineffect of susceptibility upon behavioral intentions. Perhaps the importanceof the probability of occurrence variable is most clearly shown in role­playing studies. Janis and Mann (36) reported that compared to a controlgroup, role players expressed greater expectations that harm would come tothem if they continued to smoke and developed stronger antismokingattitudes. These authors attributed the effectiveness of the role-playingtechnique to making smokers aware of their personal vulnerability. Theevidence on the importance of the third component, the efficacy of therecommended response, is rather consistent. Although Dabbs and Leven­thal (13) found no effect of an efficacy manipulation, Chu (11), Rogers andDeckner (61), and Rogers and Thistlethwaite (62) reported that increments

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RONALD W. ROGERS 103

in efficacy of a coping response increased compliance with the com­municator's recommendations. Therefore, there is evidence that the threecomponents of a fear appeal specified by protection motivation theory areimportant determinants of attitude change.

With respect to interaction effects, Leventhal and Watts (45) and Snider(68) attempted to examine a Fear x Probability interaction, but neitherfound the type of interaction predicted by protection motivation theory.However, the manipulations were not completely successful in eitherstudy, Leventhal and Watts reported that more fear was experienced in ahigh-susceptible condition than in a low-susceptible condition. Snider com­bined fear-arousing information and statements of likelihood of occurrencein a high-threat condition, but omitted the latter type of information in alow-threat condition. Thus, the combination of the independent variablesin these two studies makes any unequivocal conclusions impossible.

Three studies have attempted to examine the interaction effect of fearand efficacy. Although Dabbs and Leventhal (13) found no interactioneffect, the low-fear condition described a case history of recovery followingmedication while the high-fear condition described a case history of deathdespite medication, thereby combining the magnitude of danger and prob­ability of occurrence variables. Chu (11) found an interaction that reachedthe .07 level of significance. However, his high-fear communication arguedthat the depicted threat was highly noxious and highly likely to occur, andhis low-fear communication argued that the threat was not noxious and notlikely to occur. Therefore, it is impossible to determine the separate effectsof these combined variables. Rogers and Thistlethwaite (62) successfullymanipulated fear and efficacy and obtained a significant interaction on ameasure of attitudes toward cigarette smoking.

No experiments have been reported that attempted to investigate theother interaction effects predicted by protection motivation theory. Thescant data that do bear upon the protection motivation formulation (noneof which were designed to test this theory) provide some support. How­ever, the utility of the proposed theory clearly requires further empiricalinvestigation.

Furthermore, the protection motivation theory may be able to integratemany variables lacking a clear connection with substantive theory into acoherent theoretical framework. As previously noted, fear appeals havebeen found to differ in their interest value, seriousness, importance, andamount of concern elicited. Variations in these dependent measures may beplausibly interpreted as depending upon variations in magnitude of nox-

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iousness, probability of occurrence, and/or efficacy of coping response. Forexample, an event may be appraised as more serious and arouse greaterconcern as it is appraised as more severe, more likely to occur, and lessamenable to any protective action. Additionally, there are a number ofterms that have been used to describe fear appeals (e. g., "realism,""losses," "breaking through invulnerability defenses," "familiarity") thatcan be interpreted in terms of manipulations of the components of theprotection motivation theory. To consider one example, it has been pro­posed that familiarity with the topics of a fear appeal may affect attitudechange (26, 35). Familiarity with a topic may be interpreted as the more orless correct appraisal of how severe and/or likely an event is to occur.Thus, treated more analytically, the effects of "familiarity" on attitudechange may be mediated by the theoretical constructs of appraised severityand expectancy of exposure. Finally, Higbee (26) has suggested that incon­sistent findings in the fear appeal area may be partially due to differencesbetween experiments in the topics of communications and the objects offear. However, the types of differences that are crucial have not yet beenspecified. The proposed theory does specify some of the important differ­ences. The frequently investigated topics of tooth decay and lung cancerobviously differ widely on the dimensions of magnitude of noxiousness andprobability of occurrence. If noxious stimuli were to be located on thedimensions specified in protection motivation theory, comparisons amongstudies employing different topics might be more straightforward, andotherwise inconsistent results might be more readily interpretable.

D. Contrasts with Rival Theories

1. Janis' Curvilinear Formulation of Reflective Fear

Our understanding of fear appeals and persuasion has been greatlyadvanced by Irving Janis and his colleagues, who not only performed thefirst empirical investigations but have sustained an extensive interest inemotional phenomena. While there are numerous differences betweenJanis' formulation and the protection motivation theory, only three of themost salient ones will be discussed: (a) the conceptualization of a fearappeal; (b) the types of mediational processes proposed; and (c) the natureof the function relating fear to attitude change. [For a thoroughgoingcritique of Janis' model, the interested reader is referred to Leventhal (43).]

In operationalizing fear appeals, Janis and Feshbach combined informa­tion about the extent of bodily injury (which is similar to a magnitude of

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RONALD W. ROGERS 105

noxiousness variable) and personalized references (which is similar to aprobability of occurrence variable), such as "this can happen to you" (33,p. 79). Thus, they manipulated both factors conjointly, as Chu (11) andSnider (68) subsequently did, which produced a strong-fear or high-threatcondition in which the depicted event was described as highly noxious andlikely to occur, and a low-fear or low-threat condition in which the eventwas described as less noxious and less likely to occur. More recently, indiagramming the manipulatable stimulus events that comprise differentlevels of intensity of threat, Janis (32, p. 173) combined likelihood, impor­tance, and resources for coping. Although there is nothing logically incor­rect about his conceptualization of fear appeals, the rival protection moti­vation theory argues that much may be gained by treating fear appealsmore analytically. Hence, as has been shown, numerous measures covarywith the level of fear aroused, and it is difficult to identify importantfunctional relationships. These components must be differentiated andinvestigated independently.

A second major contrast is the relative emphasis placed upon cognitiveprocesses. In 1967 as in 1953, Janis cited the position of the reinforcementlearning theorists (e. g., 58) that whenever fear is aroused, one will bemotivated to ward off the painful emotional state and will persist until thishas been accomplished in some way. Although Janis has not been disposedexplicitly to adopt all of the reinforcement learning theory position, it isclear that fear retains the functional properties of an acquired drive andthat the effects of fear upon attitude change depend upon the amount ofdrive reduction (or reduction of emotional tension) contiguous with rehears­al of the communicator's recommendations. However, there has been agrowing disenchantment with drive constructs expressed in recent texts onmotivation (6, 8, 12), and several tests of fear-reduction reinforcing attitudechange clearly have not supported that hypothesis (20, 44). Although Janismight not insist upon retaining these drive and drive-reduction concepts,he has not explicitly rejected them. Even though he refers to fear asreflective and anticipatory, involving higher mental processes, the termfear will continue to connote visceral, lower-level processes to many. Ashas been shown, this association of an emotional state of fear with lower­level processes is not consistent with many emerging theories of emotion,anxiety, and stress.

For Janis, higher mental processes simply mediate between the emo­tional state and attitude change, whereas the cognitive processes are thecritical mediational events in protection motivation theory. This differen-

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tial emphasis has important consequences for the type of independentvariables that are manipulated and the dependent variables that are mea­sured. Janis' interpretation thus focuses upon alleviation of an unpleasantemotional state (resulting in the neglect of the components of a fear appealthat was previously mentioned), whereas the proposed theory focuses moreexplicitly upon protection from the external danger (resulting in a moreexact specification of the parameters of that danger). Another handicap indealing with an emotional state of reflective fear is that it must be presentto motivate the acquisition of new responses. Janis (32) asserted that fearappeals will fail unless they evoke emotional arousal. However, animalstudies (e. g., 70, 80) and human studies (e. g., 39) have shown thatavoidance responses and fear responses can be dissociated. Additionally,there are the automatized forms of coping (e. g., crossing a street) whereprotection motivation is aroused and protective behavior is performed, butno emotional state of fear is aroused. Although one of Janis' most fre­quently cited contributions has been his analysis of techniques of defensiveavoidance to reduce unpleasant emotional tension, an equally plausibleinterpretation of the lack of covariation between emotional arousal andattitude change is that they are independent processes and that the cogni­tive processes specified in protection motivation theory mediate attitudechange and emotional arousal.

The final distinction to be mentioned is Janis' assertion that persuasion isan inverted If-shaped function of the level of fear aroused. Janis (32)postulated a family of curves in a three-dimensional space. The level offear arousal is plotted on the X axis, probability of acceptance of arecommendation is represented on the Y axis, and the Z axis represents anyvariable that might interact with fear arousal in affecting acceptance (e. g.,source credibility, personality variables, etc.). Thus, one limitation is im­mediately apparent. The model can study fear arousal and only one otherindependent variable at a time, unless an investigator is willing to considercurves in four or more dimensions. Leventhal (43) has criticized tren­chantly Janis' procedures for fitting data to a curvilinear function anddemonstrated that equally plausible procedures would yield entirely differentfunctions. Since Leventhal's criticism was very incisive, only one addi­tional example will be given. Janis plotted acceptance as a function ofemotional arousal for two experiments which investigated dispositionalvariables. When the Janis and Feshbach (34) study of anxiety was plottedusing the obtained emotional arousal scores, the inverted V-shaped func­tion emerged. However, the curvilinear function was derived by plottingGoldstein's (23) data solely on the basis of the scores obtained on the

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personality measure of coping versus avoiding (thus ignoring the obtainedemotional arousal scores), so Janis did that.

Leventhal also demonstrated that Janis' family of curves could be usedin a post hoc manner to explain a host of main effects and a variety ofinteraction effects simply by shifting the position of the experimental cellson the emotional arousal dimension. However, as Janis has acknowledged,it is extremely hazardous to compare fear-arousal scores among experi­ments in the absence of a reliable and valid method of scaling fear re­sponses (especially if they employ different dependent measures and differ­ent topics). In the absence of such a scaling technique, it is difficult toimagine any set of empirical findings that could falsify Janis' formulation.Janis' (32) suggestion that a proper use of the curvilinear model is to helpus reinterpret experiments previously conducted should be rejected. De­spite the plausibility and ubiquity of a curvilinear function, which is therelationship found between intensity of many motivational variables andperformance (cf 17, 53), Janis' model is not even descriptively adequate.Janis has acknowledged the difficulty of falsifying such a flexible formula­tion and suggested that the model's value should also lie in its ability togenerate new hypotheses. However, it seems appropriate to question theutility of generating new hypotheses if it is impossible to disconfirm them.

It is difficult to specify differential empirical consequences of the Janisand protection motivation theories because the family of inverted U'-shapedcurves formulation may not be falsifiable and because Janis' conceptualiza­tion of a fear appeal confounds the three independent components of theprotection motivation formulation. Nevertheless, Janis' formulation didhave the salutary effect of refining the types of research questions that wereposed. He taught us to cease asking the simplistic question of whether fearfacilitated or inhibited attitude change, but rather to seek interactingvariables that might facilitate persuasion. The protection motivation con­ceptualization offers, in a coherent theoretical framework, three such in­teracting variables that have been demonstrated to have empirical utility.Thus, the major advantages of protection motivation theory are (a) a moreanalytic conception of the constituent components of a fear appeal; (b) anemphasis upon cognitive, rather than emotional, mediational processes;and (c) a set of hypotheses that are falsifiable.

2. Leventhal's Parallel Response Model

The most prolific empirical investigator of fear appeals has been HowardLeventhal, who is responsible for approximately 50% of the studies pub­lished in the last decade. His extensive research program led him to reject

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the hypothesis that fear-as-acquired-drive produces attitude change. Lev­enthal (43) postulated instead two independent processes he labeleddanger control and fear control, which process information about theenvironment and internal cues, respectively. A cognitive encoder initiatesboth instrumental adaptive behavior and the emotional reaction. Theemotional response of fear is not necessary to mediate adaptive behavior.The same causal sequence has been derived from expectancy-value theoryby Atkinson (6). This position is similar to Rescorla and Solomon's (60)aforementioned suggestion that avoidance behavior and peripheral CRslabeled fear may both be mediated by a common central state, and it isconsistent with Lacey's (38) and Lang's (39) position that differentmechanisms may mediate physiological, cognitive, and behavioral activity.

Leventhal (43) noted that fear communications typically present informa­tion about the causes and consequences of a danger and methods to avoidthe danger, but he did not specifically and systematically relate thesecomponents to his theoretical concepts of fear and danger control. Al­though he repeatedly referred in a general fashion to aspects of the stimulussituation that can facilitate or inhibit the danger and fear control processes,he did not clearly specify what these aspects are or how they affect the twoprocesses. He did identify three important classes of information asemanating from external stimulation, internal stimulation, and instrumen­tal behavior. One gets a bit more guidance in that the danger controlprocess encodes information about a coping response and information fromthe environment. Therefore, a major deficiency of the parallel responsemodel is that it lacks adequate rules of correspondence to link theoreticalconstructs to observable events. The model does not indicate those anteced­ent conditions (especially the components of a fear appeal) that regulateits intervening variables, the danger and fear control processes, much lessindicate the interrelationships among these antecedent conditions. (Protec­tion motivation theory might be viewed as differentiating the danger con­trol process into three cognitive mediational constructs that do have ob­servable stimulus antecedents.)

A second inadequacy of the parallel response model is that the logicalrelationships of the constructs are not sufficiently precise to generate un­equivocal hypotheses. While an assumption of the independence of thedanger and fear control processes may predict an independence of verbal,physiological, and overt behavioral measures, as Leventhal suggests, it isdoubtful that many of the "predictions" are derivable from the model.After stating that the fear and danger control processes are independent

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but may sometimes interact, even competitively, Leventhal asserted that"the parallel response model clearly leads us to expect that for the mostpart there will be positive associations between fear and persuasion" (43, p.127). Although this statement clearly is consistent with the bulk of theempirical data, it is not at all clear that it is derivable from the model'sconstructs and linking statements. It represents more of an empiricalgeneralization than a prediction deduced from the model. The relationsbetween the constructs need to be specified much more carefully.

Leventhal (43) cited the study by Chu (11), which found an effectivenessof response variable to have a positive effect upon acceptance, as beingcompatible with the danger control process of his formulation. This findingis also compatible with Janis' curvilinear model, protection motivationtheory, and, undoubtedly, a number of others. If a major source of infor­mational input into the danger control process concerns protective agents,then the prediction of an effectiveness of response variable facilitatingpersuasion may be plausible. However, since the fear control processsometimes competes with the danger control process, then under someheretofore unspecified conditions this prediction might not be expected. Itis one thing for an empirical finding to be consistent with a model andquite another thing for that model clearly to predict that effect (as Leven­thal would doubtless agree). Protection motivation theory does predict themain effect of the efficacy variable and, in addition, predicts interactionswith each of the two other component variables of a fear appeal. Further­more, these predictions are derived from explicitly stated assumptions.

It should be noted that protection motivation theory is a new formula­tion and thus cannot compare its empirical accomplishments with Janis'and Leventhal's accomplishments. However, Leventhal's query of Janis'model might also be applied to the parallel response model: "We may alsowonder whether it is an explanatory and predictive model or strictly a posthoc descriptive schema" (43, p. 161). However, we should not be overlycritical of the model, since Leventhal has recognized that "It is merely afirst step toward structuring a theory, and it claims to be no more" (p. 181).Since the relationships between the major theoretical constructs have notbeen fully specified, nor have the antecedent controlling variables beendelineated, it must be concluded that, for the present, the parallel responsemodel has not been sufficiently developed to be evaluated. An importantvalue of the model is its rejection of the oversimplification of the constructof an emotional state of fear as the primary process mediating attitudechange. The parallel response model also differentiates processes subsumed

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under more global labels. Hopefully, protection motivation theory is evenmore precise, specific, and testable.

E. LIMITATIONS OF PROTECTION MOTIVATION THEORY

It is recognized, of course, that other environmental and cognitive vari­ables may be important determiners of attitude change. The proposedformulation does not attempt to specify all of the possible factors in a fearappeal that might effect persuasion, but rather attempts a systematicexposition of a limited set of components and cognitive mediational pro­cesses that might account for a large portion of the variance in acceptance of acommunicator's recommendations. A more exhaustive formulation wouldhave to include, for example, the temporal parameters of the duration of thenoxious stimulus and the interval between presentation of information andthe actual onset of the aversive event. Another important variable that mightaffect acceptance of a recommended coping response is a response-cost factor:that is, the painfulness of the amount of work involved in implementmg therecommendation. Dispositional factors have been neglected, and one mightwish to consider a number of personality variables, such as anxiety (34) anddefensive style (77), that have been shown to influence appraisal of noxiousstimuli.

No doubt predictive power could be improved by the process of includ­ing additional variables or finding regression coefficients for the proposedones. Protection motivation theory is circumspect, but intentionally so.Hopefully, the delimitation of the theory will serve to make it amenable toconceptual and empirical investigation. A broader conceptual frameworkcan be achieved through an orderly progression of theory building andempirical research. Hopefully, protection motivation theory can facilitateour understanding of the effects of fear appeals upon attitude change.

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Department of PsychologyUniversity of South CarolinaColumbia, South Carolina 29208

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