A NEW AFRICA IN THE 21STCENTURY

What Policy Agenda,What Conditions?

Sadig RasheedEconomic Commission for Africa

European Centre for Development Policy Management

1996

About the Author

Sadig Rasheed is a development economist currently serving as Directorof the Public Administration, Human Resources and Social DevelopmentDivision of the UN Economic Commission for Africa. He is alsochairman of the Management Board of the Development PolicyManagement Forum (DPMF). He was formerly Executive Director of theAfrican Centre for Applied Research and Training in Social Developmentand Director of the Development Studies and Research Centre of theUniversity of Khartoum, Sudan. The views expressed in this paper are thoseof the author and should not be attributed to the United Nations or the EconomicCommission for Africa.

About the DPMF

With financial support from the Dutch and German governments, andsubstantial technical support from ECDPM, the Development PolicyManagement Forum was established in Ethiopia in March 1995. It ishoused at the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. TheDPMF (previously the Development Policy Management Network)carries out networking and other activities in the field of developmentpolicy management in Africa.

The overall aim of DPMF is to enhance institutional capacity fordevelopment policy management in sub-Saharan Africa. To this end itaims to establish and maintain effective linkages between researchers andpractitioners involved in this area of activity in African countries and ininstitutions and agencies in other parts of the world.

ISBN: 90-72908-19-8

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Contents

Foreword i

List of Acronyms ii

The Context 1

What Implications and What Agenda? 5Conditions for Successful Change 8

A Joint Responsibility: Enabling Africans to Take Charge 9

African Responsibilities 11v Establishing Enduring Peace, Security and Stability 11v Effective Management of Development 12v Boosting Financial Self-Reliance and Investment Levels 15v Investing in Growth, Human Development and Economic Restructuring 16v Indigenization of Applied Research and Policy Analysis 18v Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Solidarity 19v Rehabilitating and Building the Sound Social and Physical Infrastructure 20v Strengthening Democracy and Civil Society 21

Responsibilities of Africa's Partners 22v Translating Support for the Emerging Consensus into Reality 22v Toward a Coordinated Approach to External Support and Assistance 23v An Enduring Solution to the Debt Crisis 25v Enabling Africa to Take Advantage of Opportunities Offered by Globalisation 28

Conclusion 29

References 31

Tables 341. Human Development Index of African Countries 342. Gross Domestic Savings in Africa 363. Gross Domestic Investment in Africa 384. Africa's 1990-1993 Market Loss Relative to 1970-1973 405. Diversification and Product Concentration Indices for 41

African Countries, 1970-19906. Africa's External Debt and Debt Service, 1991-1994 42

Foreword

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Two statements by Sadig Rasheed in this wide ranging and incisive paperdelineate its main thrust. First, on page 11, he points out that "there is no viablealternative to Africans taking effective charge of their destiny and deliberatelycreating the conditions that are essential for effecting the desirable change intheir fortunes." In the second, he suggests that "the Bretton Woods institutionsmust create space for African countries to realize these goals". With these twostatements, Rasheed identifies two of the main elements of today's capacitydevelopment agenda.

The author looks at the implications of these two statements for Africancountries and for their partners. He identifies the responsibilities each has toassume to make a new partnership work. He does not underestimate thedifficulties to be addressed. Neither does he take an unduly pessimistic view ofthe present situation. What is contained in the paper is a realistic overview of theinstitutional environment both within Africa and among the partners of Africancountries.

Sadiq Rasheed does not claim to have all the answers. He realises that there is nocertainty that the ideas he suggests will actually work. But, in a world wherethere is wide emphasis on the need to give Africa 'ownership' of its owndevelopment, it is important to get a proper perception of what achieving thisinvolves. The views of such an experienced African writer on the complexitiesare thus timely and useful.

As he concludes, "a new ethic in international development cooperation withAfrica must emerge if Africa is to change its fortunes for the better". This paperwill help those most closely concerned to develop this new ethic, to arrive at anadjusted balance in the relationship between the African countries who must takecharge of their own affairs and their non-African partners whose support will beneeded for some considerable time. For this reason, the European Centre forDevelopment Policy Management is pleased to publish it as part of its PolicyManagement Report Series.

We are also very pleased to be able to publish this book with the DevelopmentPolicy Management Forum (DPMF) with whom ECDPM has a long association.

Joan CorkeryProgramme Director, ECDPMList of Acronyms

COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa ACC Administrative Committee on Co-ordination BWI Bretton Woods Institutions CFA Community France AfriqueCSOs Civil Society OrganizationsDPMF Development Policy Management Forum ECOMOG Economic Community Monitoring GroupECOSOC Economic and Social Council (UN)FDI Foreign Direct InvestmentGDI Gross Domestic Investment GDS Gross Domestic SavingsHDI Human Development Index IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmentIATF Inter-Agency Task Forces LDCs Least Developed CountriesMFN Most-Favoured-NationNSRT North-South Round Table OAU Organisation of African UnitR&D research and developmentSILIC Severely Indebted Low Income CountriesSPA Special Programme for AfricaUEMOA Union Economique et Monétaire de L'Afrique de L'ouest

The Context

The African continent is currently at a critical crossroads in its history.The seemingly unremitting economic and humanitarian crises, coupledwith proliferating situations of political instability, civil strife and armedconflicts - particularly since the beginning of the 1980s - have led manyto view the African situation with great despair and growing scepticism.

Despite a decade and a half of economic reform and adjustmentprogrammes in most countries, ailing African economies have yet to be'turned around'. Economic growth rates averaged a mere 2 per cent duringthe 1980s, translating into per capita income declining at an average rateof 1.1 per cent per annum during this period. Contrary to expectations andthe projections of numerous organizations, economic performance levelsremained depressed through the first half of the 1990s, during which theregional GDP per capita grew at an even lower average rate of 1.4 percent, causing average per capita incomes to fall by 1.6 per cent annually(ECA, 1995c). Incomes per head have fallen so steeply during the pastfifteen years that it would take Africa more than half a century to return tothe levels of the 1970s. African countries classed as Least DevelopedCountries (LDCs) mushroomed from 21 countries in 1980 to 33 in 19951.Botswana is the only country in recent years to 'graduate' from being anLDC to middle income country. The economic situation of this largegroup constituting 66 per cent of all African and 73 per cent ofsub-Saharan countries continued to deteriorate in the 1990s. Between1990 and 1994, the GDP average rate of growth of African LDCs, as agroup, was -0.03 per cent. Against an annual average rate of growth oftheir population at 3.1 per cent, per capita GDP growth rates practicallyfell by the same rate (ECA, 1995a).

Economic regression has been reinforced by a serious deterioration inhuman conditions. UNDP's overall human development index (HDI) listsonly two African countries Mauritius and Seychelles at the bottom of the`high human development' category, includes fourteen countries in themedium category and relegates 36 countries to the 'low human

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1 Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad,Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau,Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, SaoTome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, United Republic ofTanzania, Zaire and Zambia.

development' rank (UNDP, 1995). African countries represent 79% of thetotal count in this latter category, and 84% of the 35 countries with thelowest HDI (see table 1).

More than half of the African people currently live below the povertyline2. Poverty interrelates and interacts closely with unemployment andunderemployment, and these have recorded high levels and are increasingat alarming rates, particularly among women and youth3. These trendshave combined with endemic famine; recurrent drought; deterioratinghealth conditions -- further complicated by the scourge of the AIDspandemic; high infant and maternity mortality rates; and lack of access bythe majority of the people to safe drinking water, sanitation and healthand educational services, to draw the mass of the African people into avicious circle of economic and social deprivation. Rapid populationgrowth - projected to almost triple Africa's current population size to 1.6billion by 2025 - and uncontrolled environmental degradation havefurther complicated the picture and point to the enormity of the plight andthe challenge ahead (Rasheed, 1993b).

Perhaps the greatest damage inflicted on Africa's image has resulted froman increasing number of extremely disturbing humanitarian and politicalsituations. These include: the organized mass genocide in Rwanda; a fearof the recurrence of bloody ethnic conflicts in Burundi and a counterinvasion of Rwanda by elements of the displaced former Hutu-dominatedarmy; a sense of hopelessness as what to do about continuing anarchy andblood-letting in Somalia; the lack of progress on the Western Saharaconflict; the continuing civil wars in Sudan and Sierra Leone; the armedinsurrections in Djibouti, Niger, Mali and Uganda; the political instabilitythat followed elections in countries such as the Congo, Cameroon, Togoand Senegal; social unrest in old trouble spots such as Zaire and showcasecountries such as the Cote d'Ivoire; the rising tide of religious extremismcausing armed civil conflicts in Algeria and attempts at politicaldestabilization in Egypt; the inter-state disputes such as those between

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3 While Africa's population is growing by 3%t per annum, productive employment has beengrowing at a slower average rate of 2.4% in recent years. Open unemployment has risen from7.7% in 1978 to 22.8% in 1990, and is further projected to increase to 30% by the year 2000.Underemployment affects nearly 100 million Africans. (For a recent assessment of theunemployment situation in Africa see ILO, 1993).

2 It is estimated that 54% of the people in sub-Saharan Africa live in absolute poverty. SeeUNDP, 1994, Table 8, Annex, p. 165.

Nigeria and Cameroon over Bakasi island and Egypt and Sudan over theHalaib area; the resurgence of political tension in the Horn of Africa as afall-out of increasingly strained relations between Sudan on the one handand Eritrea, Uganda, Ethiopia and Egypt on the other hand; and the plightand costs of caring for over 7 million refugees and 20 million displacedpersons.

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the government, are disturbing developments leading many to speculatewhether the spectre of military take-overs will once again cause a reversalof the recent surge toward political liberalization so refreshingly evidentsince the beginning of 1989.

These deepening economic, humanitarian and political crises haveengendered embarrassing international media coverage in recent years,caused despair among even Africa's staunchest supporters and led manyto wonder whether the continent will ever have the political stability sovital for development and economic progress and whether the latterprocesses can be jump-started and sustained under the prevailingconditions.

Bleak as the overall picture is, it is important to recognize that positive -and at times even remarkable - change has been taking place on numerousfronts in Africa.

v Not all African countries have suffered to the same degree. In spite ofthe generally gloomy record of economic growth, nearly a dozencountries have managed to register positive per capita rates of growthat one time or another during the past fifteen years4.

v Regardless of the controversy over the efficiency, impact and costs ofadjustment and economic reform measures, most African countries arenow willing to undertake economic reforms, exercise a greater degree

it and

Incidents such as the recent coup d'état in Africa's oldest and most stabledemocracy, the Gambia; the 1992 coup d'état and October 1995 attemptedcounter coup in Sierra Leone; August 1995 success fulthough containedattempt by the army to overthrow the first democratically electedgovernment of Sao Tome and Principe; 1989, 1992 and September 1995mercenary-supported coup attempts in the Comoros; the intransigence ofthe military rulers in Nigeria and their refusal to return democracy to thecountry even in the face of intense internal and external pressures; themutiny of the army in Lesotho and the continuing tension between

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4 In 1994, it is estimated that 11 countries experienced growth rates between 3 to 6%; 5countries had growth rates between 6-8%; and growth rates exceeded 8% in 3 countries. Thesix countries with the highest growth rates in 1994 were Morocco (10.5%), Namibia (8.7%),Ghana (8%), Uganda (7%), Mauritius (6.8%) and Zimbabwe (6%). (See ECA, 1995c, page28)

of financial and budgetary discipline, exhibit greater accountabilityand transparency, manage the economy more effectively, andgenuinely encourage entrepreneurship and private initiatives. Basicmacro-economic fundamentals have also been corrected to asubstantial degree in the adjusting/reforming countries.

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v Africa's political landscape has been transformed dramatically since1989. An unprecedented era of political liberalization and reform hasunfolded in most African countries. While the quality of that changemay leave much to be desired, it has, nevertheless, ushered in a criticalmomentum on which a further consolidation of political reforms anddemocratization can be attempted (see Rasheed, 1995a).

v An increasingly resilient and emboldened civil society and civilsociety organizations (CSOs) have recently emerged across Africa,exhibiting a capacity on the part of Africa's people not only to surviveand experiment with economic ventures under extremely tryingconditions, but also to challenge the state and demand moremeaningful involvement in political life and economic policy-makingprocesses.

v The end of the bitter civil wars in Uganda, Ethiopia, Angola andMozambique and the ongoing processes in these countries aimed atcreating political stability and establishing more pluralistic structuresof governance offer opportunities to redirect scarce resources andefforts to the tasks of national reconciliation, economic reconstructionand development.

v While the human development situation in Africa is certainly alarmingand disappointing and while social gains are being threatened or lost insome areas, undeniable achievements have been made over the years.These include the success of 18 African countries in reducing childmortality rates by 50% between 1960-1992; the ability of overtwo-thirds of the population in at least 23 countries to have access tobasic health services; and the rise in gross primary school enrolmentrates from 30% in 1960 to nearly 70% at present (see ECA, 1995b).

v The demise of apartheid rule and the orderly transition to democraticgovernance in South Africa are dramatic achievements - unthinkableonly a few years back - which are not only likely to improve theeconomic and social situation for the majority of the population in thatcountry but could also create opportunities for improved economicprospects in the Southern African sub-region and perhaps - in thelong-run- for greater economic dynamism in Africa as a whole.

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What Implications and What Agenda?

This mixed picture of despair and hope has generally polarized views - asregards the economic, social and political prospects of Africa - into twoextreme positions.

At one end, there are those, mainly among outside observers and donors,who see the positive signs as mere aberrations in generally negativetrends and doubt the possibility of a fundamental change occurring in theAfrican situation. At the other end, there are those who are convinced thatstructural adjustment and economic reform have succeeded in 'turningaround' the economies of the 'strong adjusters' and that more adjustment,aided by better governance, is essentially and ultimately the answer tosustained improvements in economic performance and even povertyreduction (see for example, World Bank, 1994a; Hadjimichel, et al,1995). A few consider the on-going processes of political reforms andliberalization as irreversible.

One is, however, convinced that the issue is much more complex than isportrayed by either side. With regard to the latter viewpoint, the resultsachieved by adjustment are modest, are very much induced by exogenousfactors, and the sustainability of even those modest results is ratherdoubtful (see Rasheed, 1994). Furthermore, the social costs ofadjustments have also been high. While adjustment is an inevitableprocess which African countries must undergo with flexibility anddifferentiation in response to changing domestic and internationalcircumstances - so as to create macroeconomic conditions and anenvironment conducive to growth - a respectable body of evidence hasclearly demonstrated that SAPs by themselves cannot generateaccelerated growth on a sustained basis. The serious diversification ofboth the production base and structures of the economies and deliberatepolicies aimed at raising investment to substantial levels and ensuring thatit is channelled to enhance productive-capacity and productivity - toindigenize and generate sufficient impulses of growth - are rather thebasis through which such buoyancy and sustainability of growth ratesmay be achieved. 13 Secondly, there is no objective of developmentpolicy more overriding in Africa at present than eliminating poverty andimproving human conditions in a significant manner.

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This objective is unlikely to be achieved through adjustment policies.Furthermore, adjustment-induced growth will not be sufficient for anytangible reduction in poverty5. It is through purposeful human-centredstrategies - involving deliberate policy shifts and augmentation,re-ordering and targeting of resource allocations - that any appreciableprogress toward the realization of this goal can realistically beapproached.

As to the pessimistic view, given the richness of Africa's natural resourceendowment, existing and latent opportunities for their exploitation, andthe fact that promising opportunities for economic and political progressexist in a number of countries, there is no objective reason to doubt thehuge potential for investment, growth and improvement of humanconditions that can be tapped once there is the political will to spur andsustain that process through appropriate and deliberate policies.

There are compelling arguments and evidence underscoring that unlessconditions to transform economic structures and achieve human-centreddevelopment are deliberately created, growth cannot be accelerated on asustained basis and human conditions cannot be improved in anappreciable manner even in those countries presently labelled as starperformers6. With the projected doubling of the size of the Africanpopulation to 1.6 billion by 2025, further pressure on education, healthand sanitation services, the demand for food, housing, employmentrequirements and the negative impact on poverty levels would bephenomenal if current trends remain unaltered in a fundamental manner.Even for 'core adjusters' and other African countries presently growing ata relatively high speed, it will take them about 70 years to double theirper capita income levels from $1 to $2 per day, which is not a spectacularoutcome (Husain, et al, 1993). Without the massive infusion of ODA

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6 A study of the World Bank concluded: "The strong acceleration in GDP per capita growthbetween 1981-86 and 1987-91 for African countries with improving macro-economic policiescompared favorably with that in other regions. . . . These outcomes, while encouraging are notas positive as they might be. Current growth rates among the best African performers are stilltoo low to reduce poverty much in the next two or three decades. So far, the rebounds havemerely brought countries back to their historical trend of low growth, and it is not yet clearwhether they are shifting onto a higher growth path" (World Bank, 1994a: page 132).

5 The third meeting of the SPA Working Group on Poverty and Social Policy, held during 19-22September 1995 in Addis Ababa, concluded that while the analysis underlines the point thathigh growth rates (more than 5%) are needed to stem a rise in the number of poor in SSA,poverty reducing policies should focus not only on high growth, but also on pro-poor patternsof growth across sectors and regions (SPA, 1995: page 3).

flows to the 'best performers', even these results would not have beenattainable and will certainly be unattainable in future. Savings andinvestment have remained depressed and have even deteriorated inadjusting countries, including 'high intensity reformers' (GCA, 1993).

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For the average African country, the economic prospects are muchbleaker. Projections by the World Bank and IMF predict that sub-SaharanAfrica is not likely to grow by more than 3.4% (World Bank, 1992: page32) and 3.5% (IMF, 1992: page 10) per annum, respectively, during theperiod 1990-2000. The number of poor in sub-Saharan Africa, estimatedat 184 million in 1985, is projected to increase to 304 million by the year2000 (World Bank, 1992: page 30) and there are indications that thismight turn out to be a rather conservative estimate. In only a very fewcountries is it likely that the poverty situation will remain unchanged orslightly improve. The slow growth syndrome and susceptibility of African economies torecurrent crises are essentially due to structural deficiencies and factors,which have been further exacerbated by an unfavourable externalenvironment. Without dealing successfully with the root causes of thiseconomic malaise and unless the structures of production and of theeconomies are purposefully transformed, African economies will continueto succumb to perpetual crises. African countries will have to face thechallenge of adopting and implementing imaginative strategies to attainthe interlinked objectives of fundamentally diversifying productionstructures and achieving human-centred development. In this frame,adjustment would form a part of the developmental context, rather than asubstitute for it.

Thus, the bleakness of the current economic situation; the unacceptableprospects of further intensification of poverty and deterioration of humanconditions -- even in countries which are considered to be economicallybetter performers; as well as the opportunities for change that are at hand,make it imperative that internal and external efforts must converge, at thisparticular juncture, to reverse the negative trends, accentuate and broadenthe emerging fragile positive economic, social and political gains, and toexploit looming opportunities.

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Conditions for Successful Change

Although sharp controversies have raged and views have differed widelywithin and outside Africa over the years as to the exact nature of themeasures needed to deal with the African crises, a growing broadconsensus in policy analysis - among development institutions andresearchers alike - has started to emerge in recent years. This recognizesthat long-term development in Africa requires comprehensive approachesand policies that go beyond adjustment. This broad consensus has beenreflected in major institutional and intergovernmental policy documentssuch as the United Nations Programme of Action for African EconomicRecovery and Development 1986-1990; the United Nations New Agendafor Development in Africa; the World Bank's report on Sub-SaharanAfrica: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth; and World DevelopmentReports; ECA's African Alternative Framework to Structural AdjustmentProgrammes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation;UNICEF's Adjustment with a Human Face; and UNDP's HumanDevelopment Reports.

More recently, this broad consensus received renewed attention and moreforceful articulation in the main document prepared by the GlobalCoalition for Africa (GCA, 1995) for its Second Maastricht Plenary; theWorld Bank's A Continent in Transition: Sub-Saharan Africa in theMid-1990's (World Bank, 1995); the African Common Position onHuman and Social Development; ECA's Human Development Report inAfrica, 1995; and the OAU's Relaunching Africa's Economic and SocialDevelopment: Cairo Agenda for Action; and the 'Declaration and 'Plan ofAction' of the World Summit for Social Development. This consensuswas also, more or less, reflected during the debate at the July 1995ECOSOC High-Level Segment on Africa.

This broad consensus also recognizes that only Africans can reverse thecontinent's socio-economic retrogression and that economic and politicalchange requires enhanced and sustained levels as well as betterco-ordinated patterns of external support. Yet, on all these counts thepractice has not reinforced this consensus. The nagging questions thusremain:

v Why aren't African countries creating the conditions necessary for

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sustained socio-economic development?v Why hasn't external support reinforced a coherent agenda for

long-term development? andv What does it take to achieve progress in these two directions?

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A Joint Responsibility:Enabling Africans to Take Charge

It cannot be stressed too often that African countries must assume primaryresponsibility for and take charge of their developmental destiny. Africa'sbilateral and multilateral partners have often proclaimed the desirabilitythat African countries take ownership of reform programmes, mobilizedomestic resources and establish sectoral investment priorities. While allof these are laudable goals, the issue is broader and much more complexthan it appears on the surface. Two aspects which need to be carefullyanalyzed in this regard are: first, the overall context and objectives of thedesired development initiative, and second, whether African countries areactually able to take the initiative in charting their own developmentpaths.

Despite endless pronouncements and commitments by African leadersand senior policy-makers extolling the virtues and desirability ofsustained human-centred development, national development policies andpractices have, to the contrary, been conditioned largely by therequirements of the very narrowly-focused objectives of macroeconomicstabilization and adjustment.

At the same time, while the international partners have similarlycontributed to declarations and compacts in line with the emergingconsensus on long-term development objectives in Africa, conditionalitieshave largely been framed around economic reform programmes.

As a result, African governments have become adept at agreeing toeconomic reform priorities and modalities guaranteeing the flow of thebadly needed financial resources and debt relief. They have also becomeso engrossed in attempting to meet and report favourably on theimplementation of performance criteria set by international partners, thatany desire or will to confront the requirements of long-term growth anddevelopment have essentially been stifled.

The behaviour and action patterns of African governments have basicallybeen conditioned by a dependency/follower - rather than initiator/leader -mentality. This reality, together with the fact that not many policy makersare genuine believers in adjustment policies, has generated a lack ofcommitment, and a sense of non-accountability on their part.

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This situation can successfully change to the extent that there is mutualinterest on the part of the Africans and their partners to think and actstrategically -- to first give effect to the emerging consensus ondevelopment objectives in Africa, and to enable Africans to gain theinitiative in this regard. Africa's partners must be genuinely willing toalter their current approaches in support of African development. Whilethat is a major hurdle, African countries must press vigorously for theattainment of these objectives and must demonstrate a capacity and willto lead and discharge their developmental responsibilities in an effectivemanner.

Questions of conditionality and accountability are relevant in the contextof this discussion. Extensive conditionalities have systematically beenused to ensure adherence to the requirements of reform programmes; asan instrument to reward good performers and as a way to ensureaccountability to the donors in respect of programme implementation andutilization of funds. Without digressing into the merits and demerits ofconditionalities, it must be said that one-way conditionalities smack ofpaternalism, are hardly defensible and do raise awkward questions andformidable ethical complications.

A development cooperation model built around agreements between eachcountry and a consortium of donors, and based on mutually bindingundertakings to implement national programmes deriving from therequirements of the emerging consensus, can both advance theimplementation of the consensus and allow for two-way accountability byeach side .

A complication arises where the absence of a state structure or where thenature of political governance does not permit or encourage the forging ofsuch mutually-binding agreements. These situations have often been citedto buttress and justify the arguments for 'selectivity' in extending externalsupport.

The views advanced at the beginning of this paper have underscored notonly the need to reward better performers and build on the positive signs,but also to reverse the negative trends and deteriorating conditions.Countries with which it becomes impossible or undesirable to work inpartnership with or through governments ought not to be abandoned or

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forsaken on the strength of the argument of 'selectivity', as currentlypractised. Means must be found - through UN agencies or international,regional, sub-regional and national NGOs - to extend external support tohelp eradicate poverty, improve human conditions, empower peopleeconomically, build-up human and institutional capacities of educationaland research institutions, empower women, support private initiatives andstrengthen the institutions and organizations of civil society.

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African Responsibilities

There is no viable alternative to Africans taking effective charge of theirdestiny and deliberately creating the conditions that are essential foreffecting the desirable change in their fortunes. In doing so, they need topay attention to the following:

Establishing Enduring Peace, Security and Stability

It has become a tautology to reiterate that peace and stability are the veryfoundation of social and economic progress in Africa. Yet, this simpletruth cannot be over-stressed. It is when the many direct and indirectways in which the lack of peace and stability wipes out gains and threatenprospective rewards from development are perceived, that the futility -and sometimes even the impossibility - of attempting to develop undersuch conditions can be truly appreciated. When the impact of the spillover of armed conflicts and political instability on neighbouring countriesand communities is factored in, the enormity of the costs involvedbecome much more pronounced.

Without the removal of the underlying causes for such conflicts andinstability, basic conditions for economic renewal will be glaringlyabsent. Whether African countries will succeed or fail in establishingpeace and stability on a lasting basis depends on the extent to which theyare able to achieve genuine democratization of polity and society; removeeconomic, political and social injustices; and resolve their conflictspeacefully. Recent developments reveal a mixed picture of hope andset-backs.

While it is difficult to predict future trends, mainly intra- but alsointer-state conflicts are likely to occur in future in Africa. The lessons ofpast experience underscore the necessity of adopting a comprehensiveapproach to conflict prevention, management and resolution. Closecooperation between the national level, sub-regional and regionalorganizations, the UN and non-governmental organizations is essential.The lessons of Somalia and Rwanda in particular, have repeatedlyconfirmed the absolute necessity of concentrating efforts to preventconflicts during their formative stages. The energies and resources of all

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need to converge to deliberately create or strengthen the conditions,forces and processes making for peace, cohesion, reconciliation andstability at the national level. At the same time, regional and sub-regionalprocesses such as the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,Management and Resolution deserve to be fully supported andstrengthened.While the inability of the OAU to take decisive action in relation to therecent coup d'etat in the Comoros has left many to wonder about theeffectiveness of the OAU's 'mechanism', it has nevertheless been able toscore some modest successes and does show future promise. Alsosignificant are the few interventions which groups of countries have beenable to undertake at the sub-regional level to contain conflicts.ECOMOG's initiative in Liberia and the successful mediation by severalSouthern African countries to contain the political crisis in Lesotho aremodels that ought to be emulated in similar situations.

Effective Management of Development

Since independence, the State in Africa has assumed a dominant andvisibly overbearing role in development. Regardless of the underlyingreasons, the limitations and costs of such an approach have becomeclearly evident. This has prompted a backlash where, under adjustment,both the economic role of the state and the size of the civil service havebeen severely curtailed.

We are now beginning to also see the limitations and cost of thisexcessive curtailment of the role of state; and we are also learning that theprocesses of economic reform and development require deliberatespurring and support by the state.

A new more responsive and proactive state must emerge as anothercondition and fundamental prerequisite for economic renewal andtransformation in Africa. Its main role is to create an enablingenvironment that permits and facilitates the effective participation andcontribution of all agents of change to the development process. It should,through imaginative and pragmatic policy interventions, strengthen andwork through market forces; foster entrepreneurship; encourage theprivate sector and establish mutually reinforcing relationships andpartnerships with civil society and the private sector. It should also

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economically empower the people, invest in them, devolve political andadministrative power, and channel resources to them so a that they caneffectively participate in increasing production and productivity andultimately benefit from the development process. These strategies willalso assist in enlarging markets.

Market forces by themselves cannot promote growth, let alone humandevelopment and structural transformation in Africa. Fifteen years ofeconomic reforms have proved that unrestricted 'open door' policies canlead to the demise of local industries and discourage expansion indomestic food production, thus harming two crucial aspects of thedevelopment of stronger economies. This experience of African countries,and indeed the experience of other regions, underscores the importance ofthe state playing a more proactive and pragmatic role in support of highgrowth and development. Policy frameworks need to respond to thisrequirement rather than blindly following the liberalization dictat.

Recent literature appraising the East Asian 'miracle' has underscored thebenefits of selective government interventions. One such report by theWorld Bank states:

Fundamental policies do not tell the entire story. In each of theseeconomies the government also intervened to foster development,often systematically and through multiple channels. Policy inter-ventions took many forms: targeted and subsidized credit toselected industries, low deposit rates and ceilings on borrowingrates to increase profits and retained earnings, protection ofdomestic import substitutes, subsidies to declining industries, theestablishment and financial support of government banks, publicinvestments in applied research, firm- and industry-specificexport targets, development of export marketing institutions, andwide sharing of information between public and private sectors.At least some of these interventions violate the dictum of estab-lishing for the private sector a level playing field, a neutralincentives regime. Yet these strategies of selective promotionwere closely associated with high rates of accumulation, gener-ally efficient allocation and, in the fastest-growing economies,high rates of productivity growth (World Bank, 1993: page 6).

Although the report cautioned that "separating the relative impact of

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fundamentals and interventions is virtually impossible", it neverthelessconcluded:

Our judgment is that in a few economies, mainly in NortheastAsia, government interventions appear in some instances to haveresulted in higher and more equal growth than otherwise wouldhave occurred (World Bank, 1993: page 6)

Several other studies have supported the thesis that selective and prudentintervention by the state is a crucial element in accelerating growth anddevelopment and have concentrated on analysing the factors andmechanisms needed for successful intervention (see Huff, 1995;Bhagwati, 1987; Wade, 1990).

The implications of these experiences need to be carefully weighed ifAfrica is to benefit from them. For the African state to play a proactivedevelopmental role, its institutions and systems will need to be revamped,rehabilitated, reoriented and streamlined. In many countries, civil serviceinstitutions are in a state of serious collapse and civil service performancestandards are completely inadequate.

Recognizing the extent and implications of the crisis in the African civilservices, African countries, with the support of multilateral institutions,bilateral partners and the UN have instituted a variety of civil servicereform schemes during the past 15 years. These, however, have generallycentred around aspects of the cost and size of the civil service, conceivedmainly within the framework of structural adjustment programmes. Notonly have these civil service reforms been limited in objective, but manyassessments - including those by the World Bank - concede that thereforms have failed to achieve their limited objectives (see Rasheed andLuke, 1995; Dia, 1993). This experience was summed up by a recentWorld Bank study as follows:

a review of past World Bank support to civil service reform confirms thatthe cost containment approach achieved neither fiscal stabilization norefficiency objectives despite heavy political and social costs (Dia, 1993:page viii).

As a result of these limitations, many practitioners and organizations(Rasheed and Balugun, 1995; Dia, 1993; ECA, 1993; ECA, 1994) have

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argued that the objectives and scope of civil service reforms need to aimat enabling the services to be a more effective instrument for the deliveryof high quality services and development in general. These objectives callcivil services which are effective, efficient, responsive, productive,transparent, ethical, corruption-free and accountable. A comprehensivepackage of measures, aimed at facilitating and removing constraints tosuch reform efforts, would need to be adopted, taking into account thespecificities of each country. One component of these measures - whichhas been ignored and is yet central to the process and realization of theobjectives of civil service reforms - is the remuneration of civil servants.Practical modalities need to be found urgently to rationalize the pay andremuneration systems of African civil servants. A recent joint UNICEFand UNDP study has made bold recommendations in this direction(Adedeji, Green, and Janha, 1995).

Important as this comprehensive approach to civil service reform is, oneis of the opinion that it is not sufficient to ensure a reorientation of therole of the state as suggested earlier. Comprehensive public sectorreforms are the means for reshaping the civil service to help the state playits revamped role. That role must, however, be fashioned at the level ofthe determinant macroeconomic policies, policy measures andinstruments, and resource allocation patterns.

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Boosting Financial Self-Reliance and Investment Levels

Sustainability of high growth rates and indigenization of growth impulsescan hardly ensue under the currently depressed levels of domestic savingsand investment.

Saving and investment rates have actually been falling, rather thanincreasing, during the past two decades. Whereas Gross DomesticSavings (GDS) and Gross Domestic Investment (GDI) represented 23.4%and 24.2% respectively of the GDP in sub-Saharan Africa during1974-1980, they amounted to 17.6% and 17.4% respectively of the GDPduring 1988-93 (see tables 2 and 3). Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) hasbeen negligible as a proportion of total resource flows in spite of atremendous surge in FDI flows globally. While the average value of netFDI in developing countries increased dramatically from $13.1 billion in1983-1989 to $34.2 billion per year in 1990-1993, FDI inflows to Africaaveraged only $1.4 billion and $1.8 billion for the same periods (ECA,1995c: page 37). Indeed, Africa is the only region which has not beenable to benefit from this positive phenomenon. These realities haveprecipitated unhealthy overdependence on foreign aid. African economiesmust be 'weaned' off this dependence through purposeful long-termaction. The poor prospects for any sustained increases in ODA to Africalend urgency to this task.

Raising and maintaining growth rates at 6% per annum would require thatGross Domestic Investment rates must increase to over 35% of GDP(ECA, 1993b). The implications for the efforts that have to be made toincrease the rates of domestic savings to that level are self evident.

Adjustment policies have failed to raise savings and investment levels, even inthe strongly-adjusting countries where indeed, there is evidence that savings andinvestment rates have fallen (see Rasheed, 1994a: pages 23-24; GCA, 1993; ElBadawi. Ghura and Uwujaren, 1992: page 5; World Bank, 1988: table 1.1;World Bank, 1989: page 27). Lessons from this experience need to be heeded inorder to design flexible and imaginative policies and measures to spur domesticsavings and investment.

This requires dedicated actions to encourage private savings andinvestment through appropriate macroeconomic policies, reformingfinancial systems and institutions, deepening formal and informal

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financial intermediation, stemming capital flight and encouragingremittances from abroad. A wide latitude exists for enhancing publicsector savings through the reduction of military expenditure, curtailmentof unnecessary subsidies, unproductive expenditure, fraud and waste, andenhancing the efficiency of taxation systems. Similar measures will haveto be adopted to boost private and public investment and attract FDI.Experience has demonstrated that economic liberalization measures havelimits and can also be distorting. For example, market-determined highnominal interest rates could divert funds away from productiveinvestment. Uniform high interest rates could also discourage borrowingfor the purposes of productive investment and encourage borrowing forspeculative purposes, as the rates of return from the latter would still befinancially rewarding. These lessons demonstrate the need for flexibilityand pragmatism in economic policy and the implementation of policyinstruments to encourage productive investment, to diversify production,and to broaden the export base. They also highlight the necessity for thestate to go beyond the creation of a conducive policy environment and toremove structural impediments, and to build institutions (see UNCTAD,1991; Gibson and Tsakalotos, 1994). The state needs to invest in schemesto attract investment and encourage entrepreneurship such as provision ofinfrastructural facilities, investment support centres, training facilities andprogrammes, support for research and development (R&D), and financialincentives such as low targeted interest rates and tax holidays (see ECA,1992).

Whether, in the final analysis, such an approach will succeed is a matterto be seen. Obviously, the wide-spread poverty and low levels of incomewould set an upper ceiling on the magnitude by which domestic savingsand investment could be boosted, which points to the need to acknowledea dynamic relationship between accelerated growth and high savings ratesin the design of development policies. Furthermore, political stability andeconomic policy predictability, consistency and durability - and notmerely the orientation of economic policy - are determining factors forraising the levels of domestic savings and investment and attracting FDI.

Investing in Growth, Human Development and EconomicRestructuring

Macro-economic policies need to be flexibly and deliberately fashioned

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to be growth-oriented and to foster human development and economicrestructuring. This must also be coupled with purposeful efforts to targetpublic expenditure and encourage investment into these avenues.Removing distortions and expecting growth to accelerate merely throughmarket operations is a passive approach, which has clearly shown itslimitations and even negative implications.

Given the overdependence of African countries on primary commodities,the continuing deterioration in Africa's terms of trade and the strongexpectations that primary products will face long-term declining pricetrends and substitution possibilities by synthetic products, it has becomeevident that in no way can sustained growth be based on primarycommodities.The structure of exports has remained virtually unaltered for over twodecades. In 1993, 86% of Africa's foreign exchange earnings weregenerated from primary products. In 9 countries, the share of non-oilprimary commodities accounted for more than 90% of exchange earningsand is over 70% in another 18 countries. In 35 other countries, non-oilprimary commodities accounted for over 50% of export values.Particularly disturbing is the fact that Africa's share in global trade hasdeclined steadily from 5% in 1980 to about 2% in 1993. As is evidentfrom table 4, significant losses in market shares have been sustained byAfrica in respect of major primary commodities.

Regrettably, few African countries have succeeded in diversifying thestructures of their production and exports in any meaningful way. Amongthe countries that have made the most progress in this direction areMauritius, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya,Tanzania and Zimbabwe. While other countries have increased thenumber of exportables, this has not led to any significant impact on thestructure of exports. Table 5 gives the diversification and productconcentration indices in the exports of selected African countries.

Conscious efforts will need to be made to encourage horizontal andvertical diversification, create dynamic export possibilities and removethe obstacles that hinder progress in this direction. Of crucial importancein this context is the role of industrialization, a dimension which has notreceived the attention it deserves in adjustment programmes or even inthe debate on Africa's long-term development (ECA, 1995c: pages26-27). Without tapping the great potential that exists for agro-industries

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and diversifying into industrial production and exports, both growth anddiversification efforts will remain stultified.

Policies and resources will need to be targeted to generate progressivelygreater diversification of the structures of the economies, broaden theexport base and to strengthen forces leading to greater individual andcollective self-reliance, indigenization of enhanced growth impulses andself-sustainment of the development process. Such reorientation mustbuild upon and bolster indigenous capacities and capabilities, instill andnurture self-confidence and empower people to become energizedarchitects and agents of change and transformation.

To accord priority to human development requires that macro-economicpolicies should be deliberately shifted in support of this overarchingobjective and also that substantial investment, at sustained levels, bemade to purposefully alleviate poverty, generate incomes and productiveemployment, improve living standards and build human capital andcapacities. Budgetary allocations for human development have beeninadequate, and per capita real expenditure on health and education haveactually declined in recent years.

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Policies and measures to alleviate poverty and enhance opportunities forproductive employment and income generation should be mutuallyreinforcing. Success in poverty alleviation requires a comprehensiveapproach to attack the causes of pervasive poverty at the source. Stop-gapinterventions and indirect impact policies will not work. Direct measuresaimed at triggering a substantial increase in the productive capacity andproductivity of the labour force in the agricultural and informal sectors -where the majority of people subsist, work and earn their incomes - needto be effectively implemented. Central to such measures and policies isthe need to create opportunities for the poor to engage in productiveemployment and generate incomes for themselves. Particularly crucial inthis regard is the need to increase the access of the poor to assets, finance,credit and social services, and the creation of an enabling environmentthat would unleash the creativity, latent entrepreneurial talents,enthusiasm and productive capacities of the people.

Other measures include initiating and strengthening programmes for theeradication of illiteracy; re-orienting education and training to make themmore responsive to the requirements of economic and technologicaltransformation; removing the bias against institutions of higher learning;stemming the brain drain; pursuing pricing policies and othermacroeconomic measures for the benefit of the poor; creating anenvironment conducive to enhancing the effectiveness of the informalsector and strengthening production inter-linkages and marketingnetworks between the formal and informal sectors; removing institutionaland policy biases against women and introducing special measures toempower and support them with a view to enlisting their full participationand involvement in productive and income-generating activities; andtargeting resources and social services to improve the conditions of thepoor, marginalized and vulnerable. Poverty, population and environmentare closely interlinked. Active policies to discourage high rates ofpopulation growth and protect the environment must be both linked toand part of the comprehensive approach to the alleviation of poverty7.

Indigenization of Applied Research and Policy Analysis

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7 ECA, the UN and a few authors have drawn attention to the importance of industrialization indiversification and economic transformation efforts. See ECA, 1989; Adedeji, Teriba, andBugembe, 1991; Rasheed, 1993a; Stewart, Lall and Wangwe, 1992; Lallis, 1993;Mkandawire, 1988; Pack, 1993; Stein, 1992.

Sustainability of growth and development, competitiveness andinvestment in self-reliance requires a strengthened capacity forindigenous applied research and policy analysis as well as the effectiveutilization of such capacities. Regrettably, Africa has, to a large degree,lost both the initiative and ability to think for itself. African governmentshave virtually abdicated their responsibility and even lost control over theprocess of policy-making for the purposes of economic reform anddevelopment in general. Few indigenous capacities currently exist forpolicy-oriented research and policy analysis both within governmentaland educational/research institutions. Those that exist have beenunderutilized, bypassed, allowed to rot, and sometimes even dismantled.Furthermore, a state of sterile interface between policy-makers and theresearch community has been the norm, rather than the exception(Rasheed, 1994a).

Very little scientific and technological research of an applied nature andinterlinkages between research centres and industry are taking place.Agricultural extension services and the application of agriculturalresearch to enhance the production and productivity of agriculture leavemuch to be desired.

The seriousness of these negative trends and their long-term damagingimplications ought to encourage serious efforts to reverse them.Researchers and research institutions should not shun policy-orientedresearch and should play a more proactive role in initiating policyresearch. Indigenous policy research and technological R&D institutionsand think-tanks need to be adequately funded, and they themselves needto strengthen their income-generating capacities and reach out to providesupport and extension services to the private sector. Governments need tostrengthen their own policy analysis units as well as to support andeffectively utilize indigenous structures and capacities for policy researchin educational and research institutions. Governments and the privatesector also need to forge imaginative collaboration modalities to establishand support applied R&D institutions to provide the technological supportand back-up so vital for vigorous industrial growth and competitivenessin international markets.

Capacities for strategic thinking and planning need to be urgently builtup, both within governmental structures and research institutions. Crisis

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management, excessive preoccupation with economic reform programmesand dependence on externally prepared policy framework papers havevirtually destroyed indigenous capacities for strategic planning in generaland policy analysis and technological R&D in particular.

Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Solidarity

Greater and more effective economic cooperation and integration amongAfrican countries at the sub-regional and regional levels are as crucial inachieving sustained development and economic transformation as aredeeper economic diversification and internalization of the forces andimpulses of growth at the national level. Enlarged regional markets andco-ordinated and rationalized production structures are indispensablemeans for achieving food security and self-sufficiency at the regionallevel; creating capacities for world class competitive manufacturedproducts; effectively exploiting the vast endowment of the naturalresources of the continent; and the development of core industries andfactor inputs. This imperative is made more urgent by the fact that tradingand economic blocs are being erected and fortified around the globe.

A continental framework - the Abuja Treaty establishing the AfricanEconomic Community - and literally dozens of sub-regional organizationshave been established in an effort to foster collective economiccooperation and integration. So far, the results have been modest due to ahost of economic and political factors such as the dominant outward linksof the African economies, the similarity of economic and productionstructures, the unwillingness to relinquish national sovereignty andcontrol over economic and social matters, the strong sense of affiliation todifferent monetary zones and the animosity or lack of political rapportbetween some leaders.

It remains to be seen whether progress toward closer economiccooperation among African countries will be achieved in coming years.One element is certain -- that African countries are still experimentingwith sub-regional cooperation modalities. Two recent examples are theUnion Economique et Monétaire de L'Afrique de L'ouest (UEMOA),established in January 1995 to promote the free movement of capital,goods and people and ultimately the establishment of a common marketbetween Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal and

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Togo, and the birth of the Common Market for Eastern and SouthernAfrica (COMESA).

These, and other examples demonstrate that closer economic andmonetary cooperation is on the horizon. However, an urgent challenge ishow to rationalize the many and overlapping organizations dealing withsub-regional economic cooperation and integration. Although the needhas been recognized by African countries, implementation has beenstalled by political manoeuvring.

African countries need to maintain great solidarity vis-a-vis therequirements of a more responsive external environment, and Africa'sregional institutions have a major responsibility in supporting Africancountries and strengthening their capacities to undergo the desiredeconomic and political transformation.

Rehabilitating and Building the Social and Physical Infrastructure

The financial austerity engendered by the economic crisis and adjustmentand reform programmes have precipitated serious neglect anddeterioration of the social and physical infrastructure in the majority ofAfrican countries. In spite of the tremendous expansion in the provisionof infrastructural facilities in the post-independence years, water,sanitation, transport, power, irrigation and communications systems aregrossly inadequate in relation to human development needs andrequirements for sustained growth. Furthermore, serious deterioration ininfrastructure has occurred as a result of poor maintenance.

The inadequacy of infrastructure is now so critical that it poses seriouslimitations to efforts aimed at improving living standards and achievingaccelerated and sustained growth. Regrettably, this reality, and thecontribution of infrastructure to growth and development is not beingsufficiently appreciated (Rasheed, 1994b). In coming years, imaginativeapproaches must be found to rehabilitate, expand and manageinfrastructural facilities.

Given the enormous cost implications of such a drive8, and the limited

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8 ECA estimates that $49 billion will be needed over the next 10 years to rehabilitate 100% of

financial resources available for this purpose, African governments needto build effective partnerships with the private sector, local communitiesand donors to cover the necessary investment outlays as well as toeffectively utilize and manage infrastructure services.

Strengthening Democracy and Civil Society

The deepening of ongoing political liberalization processes and thestrengthening of the role of civil society and its organizations are essentialconditions for the sustainability of democracy in Africa. They are neededto ensure effective popular participation in development, to make the statemore accountable to the people, as well as to enhance the capacity of thelatter to demand accountability of the state. Of particular significance inthis context is the favourable role which democratization and politicalliberalization can play in advancing the agenda of sustainable humandevelopment and structural transformation. Without pressure from civilsociety, progress in this direction is not likely to be accelerated.

Given the lack of entrenched democratic traditions, culture andinstitutions and an African state which is still overly patrimonial, the onusfor strengthening democracy and better governance will have to fall oncivil society. It will have to be more vigilant and more vigorous indemanding genuine participation in political, economic and socialprocesses. In essence, this is an historical process whose unfolding will belengthy and whose final outcome may still be uncertain in spite of thecurrent encouraging overall trends.

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the paved, 70% of graded and 50% of rural roads; and that $7.8 billion would also be requiredfor routine maintenance. See ECA, 1994a: page 4.

References

Responsibilities of Africa's Partners

Though, understandably, the Africans themselves must take the lead inand assume the ultimate responsibility for their own development, thatprocess can be facilitated or hindered depending on the nature and qualityof external support. Both because the African economic crisis has beenexacerbated by exogenous factors and also because external actors doexercise considerable influence over the orientation of economic policiesand reforms, one may conveniently refer here to the responsibility ofAfrica's partners toward African development, rather than their support toit.

Translating Support for the Emerging Consensus into Reality

The World Bank and the IMF have been the main motivators, drivingforce, core financiers and enforcers of adjustment policies. Their successin mobilizing bilateral resources and encouraging Africa's creditors togrant debt relief in support of adjustment and also in further channellingfinancial resources and debt relief exclusively to the adjusters, haveguaranteed that African countries are 'hooked' on reform programmes.Given the critical economic situation which most African countries face,any call on them to adopt a more embracing approach to development orto exercise leadership in fashioning such an approach would, under thesecircumstances, constitute an unreasonable demand and ultimately anunfulfillable expectation.

A corollary of this argument suggests that the Bretton Woods institutionsmust create space for African countries to realize these goals. The crucialquestion remains, is such a fundamental change of attitude on the part orthese two leading institutions likely to occur in the foreseeable future?

While there has been a refreshing evolution in thinking by a small, yetincreasing, number of practitioners within the Bank in the direction of theemerging consensus, this has not been embraced by the rest of theestablishment nor has it permeated to the operational side of the Bank inany significant degree. Thus, major policy documents of the Bank - suchas Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead, whichessentially call for more adjustment - and others - such as Sub-Saharan

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Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth and the more recent documentA Continent in Transition: Sub-Saharan Africa in the Mid-1990s whichemphasize long-term considerations and sustainable poverty reductionhave co-existed side by side. This has sent conflicting and confusingmessages from the Bank. In addition, the Bank's practical developmentapproaches in Africa have remained largely reform-driven rather thanguided by the spirit of the emerging consensus. While the importance ofthe social dimension and the need for broader developmental policies tocomplement 'bold' adjustment policies have been recognized by the IMF,it is the latter consideration which continues to shape its operations inAfrican countries

It remains to be seen how the different approaches to Africandevelopment within the Bank will be ultimately resolved, the extent towhich the position of the IMF will shift, how the emerging consensus willbe translated into concrete policy actions and how much say Africancountries will eventually have in the formulation of reform programmesand development policies.

The differentiated socio-political and economic conditions of Africancountries require that external support must be sensitive and responsive tosuch differentiation. Development priorities and agendas in countriesexperiencing conflicts, in those emerging from protracted conflicts, and incountries with a fairly stable economic, social and political environmentcannot be similar.

In the first two cases, external assistance is crucial in supporting effortsaimed to consolidate peace, national reconciliation, relief, reconstruction,rehabilitation, and development. These countries cannot be written off as"lost to the development process". African countries currentlyexperiencing armed conflicts and political and social unrest account fornearly 50% of Africa's population, and there is no guarantee that theseemingly stable countries will not experience a reversal of this situation!

Furthermore, in all cases, support to consolidate democracy, effectiveeconomic, social and political participation and better governance is ofcrucial importance.

Toward a Coordinated Approach to External Support and Assistance

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Frustrations with the poor results of decades of technical assistance andcooperation in Africa9, repeated calls for closer and more effectivecooperation and coordination of activities of the agencies andorganizations of the UN system in Africa; and growing scepticism amongbilateral donors about the efficacy of the narrowly conceived adjustmentmeasures ought to add more pressure for reforming technical assistanceand cooperation in general and for movement toward the consensus inparticular.

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9 See for example UNDP, 1993; Jaycox, 1993; UN-IATF, 1989; UNDP, 1989; UNDP, 1988;Jolly, .

A number of interesting though limited in scope experiments arecurrently being tried by bilateral and multilateral partners of Africa.Among them, are UN Secretary-General's Special Initiative on Africa.which emphasizes system-wide synergistic implementation oftheme-oriented long-term development priorities, and the coordinatedapproach to the implementation of the outcomes of global conferences.

Against a background of increased apprehensions about the social andeconomic conditions in Africa and recognizing that Africa represents theforemost challenge of global development, the UN Secretary-Generallaunched his Special Initiative following 1994 discussions of the UNAdministrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) on Africa. The broadaims of the Special Initiative are to "... identify and develop practicalproposals to maximize the support provided by the UN system to Africandevelopment and to raise the priority given to Africa in the internationalagenda". A report containing concrete proposals within this frame wastabled for action by the ACC at its October 1995 meeting (UN, 1995b).

The Special Initiative is limited in its objectives. It seeks to "... identifythe best supportive actions congruent with Africa's priorities, which canbe taken to help stimulate an added push for development in Africa ...",emphasizing system-wide joint development and implementation oftheme-oriented long-term development priorities. It also seeks to "...mobilize the political support needed to ensure that timely action is takento remove some of the obstacles to Africa's development ..." through a "...political mobilization component ...".

The Report proposes the following priorities: strengthening OAUcapacity for peace-building; debt relief; harnessing informationtechnology for development; basic education for all African children;health sector reform; capacity building for governance; strengtheningcivil society for development and peace-building; assuring sustainableand equitable fresh water supplies; partnership innovations for effectivedevelopment cooperation through goal-oriented regional fora and countryprogrammes; and broadening participation efforts.

This 'Initiative' is an innovation in UN-led endeavours. Unlike the UNSystem-Wide Plan of Action for African Recovery and Developmentwhich is essentially an aggregation of on-going activities of variousorganizations of the system in Africa -- the Initiative aims to bring a

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consortia of UN organizations together to provide core resources,mobilize additional resources and work with national governments toimplement specific goals judged as being of critical importance toAfrica's long term development.

Conscious of the need to increase the effectiveness of donor support; tofoster government leadership in defining development priorities; toencourage African governments and their partners to agree on modalitiesfor implementing and monitoring the priorities of the Initiative; and toenhance opportunities for mobilizing resources for the agreed priorities,the 'Initiative' is proposing the creation of regional fora around specificobjectives or sectors; the preparation of national investment programmesfor specific objectives; and broadening Consultative Group and RoundTable discussions through the addition of representatives of the privatesector and NGOs.

In response to a call by the World Summit for Social Development, theUN is also proposing an "Integrated UN-Wide Approach to ProvidingDevelopment Assistance to the Follow-up to Major UN Conferences", theobjective of which is to "bring the UN family together as a unified forceto provide co-ordinated technical and other assistance to programmecountries in support of priority objectives established at recent UNconferences". Through this, it is hoped that the existing visible overlapbetween the agendas and programmes of action of internationalconferences such as UNCED, Cairo Conference on Population andDevelopment, World Summit for Social Development, and BeijingConference on Women and Development will be avoided and follow-upmechanisms for the delivery of assistance at the country and regionallevels will be rationalized and strengthened. Inter-agency task forces(IATFs) would be established to provide UN country teams and ResidentCo-ordinators with coordinated substantive support and to facilitate theircontributions to the implementation of the recommendations of variousinternational conferences.

These are important new directions, which need to be strengthened andconsolidated. Yet they can only have real impact and significance if theyare implemented within a comprehensive framework of technicalassistance and cooperation from all sources, and if they could dovetailwith and form parts of the larger mosaic of the emerging consensus.

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An Enduring Solution to the Debt Crisis

Notwithstanding the need for African countries to substantially enhancethe levels of domestic resource mobilization, external resource flows willcontinue to exert considerable influence over the pace of economicgrowth in the continent and will need to be augmented to accelerategrowth. Based on current trends, both ODA and private investment flowsto Africa are likely to remain depressed in the foreseable future.

Africa's huge external debt has acted as a major constraint to developmentefforts by syphoning off substantial financial resources for debtrepayment and denying their use for development finance. Both thecontinent's total debt and debt servicing burdens have clearly become notonly unsustainable but also morally unjustifiable, though apparently notyet to a degree sufficiently embarrassing to Africa's creditors.

At the end of 1994, Africa's total stock of debt stood at $312 billion,equivalent to 231% of the exports of goods and services and 72% of theGDP. Sub-Saharan Africa's debt (excluding South Africa) was $177billion for the same year, constituting 334% of exports, and 126% of theGDP (see table 6).

These and other indicators testify to the enormity of Africa's debt burdenand also to the fact that this burden is higher than any other region. Theaverage ratios of the value of debt to export income of Africa andsub-Saharan Africa at 231% and 334% respectively are much higher thanthe World Bank's indicator of debt sustainability of 200%. Africa's percapita external debt and the arrears on debt are also higher than those inother regions. 80% of the 32 countries defined by the World Bank as'severely indebted low income countries' (SILICs) are in sub-SaharanAfrica, and the number is increasing. It is also important to note that theincrease in the external debt of sub-Saharan African countries is due tothe accumulating interest arrears and not a result of increases in long-termborrowing.

Important shifts have taken place with regard to the structure of debt.Multilateral debt obligations have increased in proportion from 8% in1980 to about 41% in 1994. Debt owed to commercial creditors declinedin proportion from 78% in 1980 to 35% in 1994, while the share of

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bilateral debt increased from 20% in 1980 to 24% in 1994.45 The factthat IMF net resource transfers to Africa have now become negative forthe past several years is a further indication of the seriousness of themultilateral debt problem. The magnitude of these net negative transferswere as follows: $-374 million (1969); $-455 (1990); $-261 (1991), $-189(1992); $-305 (1993) (GCA, 1995B).

In spite of repeated calls for creditors to adopt a more comprehensiveapproach to solving Africa's debt crisis, measures hitherto adopted withinthe Paris Club and by the multilateral institutions have remained partialand inadequate10. Indeed, UNDP estimates that if all the currentlyavailable debt reduction mechanisms were fully applied, only foursub-Saharan debt distressed countries would pass the threshold of theso-called sustainable debt servicing level, while multilateral debt willcontinue to constitute an increasing percentage of the total debt.

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10 In the Latest of these initiatives, the UN Secretary-General called, in his report to July 1995High Level Segment Meeting of ECOSOC for consideration of ways to promote amulti-pronged debt reduction strategy and new initiatives with regard to the external debt ofAfrican countries, including proposals for consideration by bilateral, multilateral or privatecreditors.

Actions to ease the burden of multilateral debt have not progressed farbeyond the World Bank's use of the 'IDA Debt Reduction Facility' toretire commercial debt and to replace some IBRD debt with IDA debt andthe IMF's establishment of ESAF. In all cases the results thus farachieved, in terms of reduction of the debt burden, have been extremelymodest. Of concern should also be two categories of debt which are notreceiving sufficient attention, namely: the debt owed by the Africancountries to the African Development Bank and that owed to the formerSoviet Union.

Clearly there is a compelling case to solve Africa's debt problem once andfor all because of the extremely precarious socio-economic conditionsprevailing in Africa and the illogicality of demanding debt repayment anddiversion of financial resources away from improving these conditions.That case is additionally compelling because the structure of Africa's debtand the cost to both the bilateral and multilateral creditors is relativelysmall.

The salient questions that thus remain are:

v Why have Africa's bilateral and multilateral partners been reluctant toadopt a comprehensive approach to the solution of the continent's debtproblem in light of such a compelling case and also at a time whendebt forgiveness has actually been selectively granted to a fewcountries?; and

v Is it likely that such an approach would finally be adopted?

The 'moral hazard' argument, in the case of all categories of debt, and thefear of harming the credit ratings of multilateral institutions have oftenbeen cited as the reasons for reluctance to go for more radical solutions tothe problem of debt. But linking debt forgiveness to investment in humancapital and to development in general and tightening the criteria for freshborrowing should take care of this argument. Furthermore, as many haveargued, there is no real danger that the credit rating of the Bretton WoodsInstitutions (BWIs) would suffer as a result of the cancellation of Africandebt (see George, 1988). These considerations have led some to surmisethat the real reason behind the reluctance to solve the debt problem is theleverage creditors would have in shaping economic policy and the contentof reform programmes in African countries.

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It is evident that African countries need to minimize external borrowingand restrict it to concessional financing; and ensure that if necessary itshould be used for productive activities and to better manage their currentdebt portfolios. They also need to maintain solidarity in pressing for alasting solution to their debt problem. Whether the mounting pressurefrom this quarter and other sources will finally change the attitude of thecreditors remains to be seen. Recently a paper circulated unofficially bythe Bank has proposed that an $11 billion multilateral debt facility becreated to permit the 40 poorest countries to repay about $30 billion oftheir $160 billion debt to multilateral agencies while undergoingeconomic reforms. The proposal is currently being further scrutinized bystaff of the Bank and the Fund, and is not expected to be put before theboards of the two institutions before the spring of 1996. If adopted in1996, this might signal an important shift away from the BWIs oppositionto writing off multilateral debt and strengthen the argument to move awayfrom the current fragmented approach to the problem of Africa's debt. Weare, however, still far from the end of that road.

Enabling Africa to Take Advantage of Opportunities Offered byGlobalisation

Donors, multilateral institutions and the UN have been urging Africancountries to be competitive and to take full advantage of the opportunitiesoffered by globalisation and the Uruguay Round. African countries oughtto heed this advice seriously, particularly since they have been losingmarket shares of even primary exports in which they had enjoyedtraditional dominance (see table 4). But the Uruguay Round has its short-to medium-term costs and Africa is likely to be the only net loser as aresult of this Agreement. It is estimated that these losses could reach $2.6billion per annum during the initial years of the Agreement. Furthermore,Africa and African exports are also facing a world which is fortressingitself behind economic groupings and blocs.

Objectivity and fairness dictate that Africa's partners should create theconditions that would enable Africa to successfully pursue theaforementioned objectives. Support to mitigate the adverse impact of theUruguay Round and relaxation of trade barriers faced by African exportsare among the important measures that need to be instituted. The UN has

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specifically proposed to defer the removal of trade preferences enjoyed byAfrican countries; to implement in advance, and without staging, agreedmost-favoured-nation (MFN) tariff reductions on products of exportinterest to African countries that do not enjoy preferential treatment; toprovide financial support to assist African countries in dealing withbalance of payments pressures and transitional strains consequent onpolicy reforms; and to assist African countries in their efforts to achievediversification and ultimately to enhance their competitiveness in worldtrade (UN, 1995a).

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Conclusion

A decade and a half experimenting with economic reform programmes inAfrica underscore the virtue of humility and the need for depth inattempting to better perceive and analyze the causes of the continent'sserious socio-economic conditions as well as devising policies to achieveaccelerated and sustained growth and development. Excessive pessimismas regards prospects for achieving this objective is unwarranted, butequally so is excessive optimism about the same prospects. Adjustmentalone cannot generate and sustain high growth, eradicate poverty, orpromote human development.

The requirements of such fundamental change, the complexities of theeconomic, social and political realities and the fragility of the results sofar achieved through adjustment and reform programmes in Africa, arenow generating a growing consensus on the broad elements of the agendafor long-term development. Yet, economic reform and developmentprogrammes on the ground are not moving in that direction to anysatisfactory degree.

This paper has reflected on why African countries are not creatingconditions sufficient for sustained socio-economic development, and whyexternal support has not reinforced a coherent agenda for long-termdevelopment. It has also attempted to sketch the agenda and conditionsnecessary to make progress in these two directions. Whether or notAfrican countries are ultimately capable of making determined progresstoward achieving robust sustained growth and development depend on theextent to which the conditions outlined in earlier sections of this papercan be created and fulfilled.

One crucial aspect is that African countries must take charge of their owndestinies. Recently, many partners of Africa and the Africans themselveshave proclaimed the desirability of this seemingly obvious objective. Thetricky issue is whether Africans are, in reality, able to take this initiative.This can happen if there is mutual interest and genuine desire by bothAfrican governments and their partners to achieve this goal. While theAfricans must be aggressive in their approach to this issue, success willbe a shared responsibility of the Africans and their partners. A new ethicin international development cooperation with Africa must emerge if

42

Africa is to change its fortunes for the better.

Another aspect which merits emphasis is the interplay between thepolitical and economic factors. Less than three years after the Gambia andNigeria were proclaimed as two of the six countries with the "largestimprovement in GDP per capita growth" due to "large improvement inmacro economic policies", political instability is now threatening growthprospects in these countries. Political instability in Burundi - a country inthe next World Bank group of nine adjusters - has similarly affectedgrowth adversely. As a result of political instability and other factors,growth rates have slowed down in recent years in all three countries. RealGDP growth rates in Nigeria were estimated at 5.1% in 1992 and 4.1% in1993, below an average rate of 5.3% in 1988-93. In the Gambia, growthrates stood at 1.4% (1992) and 1.5% (1993) compared to an average of3.4% in 1988-93. If this trend continues, the number of the so-called 'starperformers' would, then, be reduced by one third, from 6 to 4 countries. InBurundi, growth rates were 2.7% (1992), and -1.2% (1993), compared to3.0% during 1988-93. The socio-political realities are such that very fewcountries are immune to political destabilization and social unrest.

These realities and the lesson that showcase countries such as Coted'Ivoire and Kenya where growth averaged over 8% up to 1980 and hassince then tumbled down to - 0.3% in Cote d'Ivoire and 3% in Kenya11 -should inject more realism in appreciating the totality of the factorsmaking for sustainability of growth and development in Africa.

An unprecedented opportunity has presented itself, in that more than everbefore, there is now greater understanding that development policies inAfrica need to move beyond adjustment, that economic and financialliberalization policies have serious limitations and also adverse effects;and that the state must play an enabling as well as a proactive role tocorrect for market failures and provide targeted support to spur andsustain growth and development.

The question is, however, whether this emerging consensus will betranslated into operational strategies, policies and approaches. There is an

43

11 Average growth rates were: Côte d'Ivoire: 9.7% (1965-73); 6.8% (1974-80); -1.1% (1988-93);-0.7% (1992); 1.0% (1993). Kenya: 8.3% (1965-73); 3.4% (1981-87); 2.7% (1988-93); 0.7%(1992); -1.0% (1993). (See GCA, 1995b: page 36).

urgent need for African countries to move with determination in thatdirection. Africa's partners must 'create space' for the Africans to takeeffective leadership in development efforts and they must form effectivepartnerships with African countries to support, in a coordinated andsynergistic manner, the agenda of sustained human-centred developmentand structural transformation. Organizations of the UN system, Africa'sregional organizations and other Africa-related fora, such as the GCA andthe North-South Round Table (NSRT), have a major responsibility topush for and advance progress in that direction. Ultimately, however, it isthe pressure of the African civil society and its organizations; theseriousness of African governments; and the realization by Africa'spartners that the cost of development failure in Africa is not morally andfinancially sustainable that are likely to make change possible.

44

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Mkandawire, T. 1988. The road to crisis,adjustment and de-industrialization: theAfrican case. Africa Development, 8(1):5-31.Pack, H. 1993. Productivity and industrialdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa.World Development, 21(1): 1-16.

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Change, 26(2): 333-354.

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47

Tables

Table 1: Human Development Index of African Countries (1992)

-122,3905060560,5127Cameroun

71,700707457,50,52124Swaziland

41,750596664,70,54123CapeVerde

-212,870567151,30,54122Congo

01,970708353,70,54121Zimbabwe

-263,3704340,663,30,55117Morocco-363,913475953,50,58114Gabon

-314,020814058,80,61108Namibia

-233,5406749,163,60,61107Egypt

-153,799768162,90,7195SouthAfrica

-154,8706657,467,10,7385Algeria

-95,1606462,867,80,7675Tunisia

-75,12071 6764,90,7674Botswana

-385,2576673,463,10,7773Libya

Medium Human Development (0,500 to 0.799)

-55,6196177710,81062Seychelles

-2811,700598170,20,8260Mauritius

High Human Development (0,800 and above)

Real GDPper capita

(PPS$)rank minusHDI rank*

Real GDPper capita (PPP$)

Combined1st, 2nd, 3rdlevel grossenrolmentratio(%)

Adultliteracyrate(%)

Lifeexpectancy at birth(years)

Humandevelopment

index

Humandevelop-ment rank

48

Table 1 (continued)

-18820141246,50,21174Niger-208802829390,22173Sierra Leone-15501527460,22172Mali3330143347,50,23171Ethiopia

-10810191747,40,23169Burk. Faso2592223344,50,24168Guinea6380253746,40,25167Mozambique

-141,001727470,25166Somalia-1720313350,20,29165Burundi-3751334346,50,29164Angola-8820285243,50,29163Guin.-Bissau-2760284547,50,3162Chad-221,2603336450,3161Gambia-91,045173555,40,33159Liberia-4860375944,90,33158Uganda-2820465445,60,33157Malawi9710395747,30,33156Rwanda

-221,630343347,60,33155Benin-181,5471843,248,30,34154Djibouti-251,750313149,30,34152Senegal-181,650323651,50,36150Mauritania

-21,130375449,40,36149Central Afri.Republic

21620346452,10,36147Tanzania-151,7103937510,37145Cote d'Ivoire-101,6203142,753,00,38144Sudan295233974520,38143Zaire257006075480,4142Eq. Guinea-61,560515350,40,41141Nigeria41,2206048550,41140Togo-11,3503756560,42139Comoros61,230497548,90,43136Zambia30710358156,50,43135Madagascar

366004860670,45133Sao Tomé &Principe

171,060576960,50,47 131Lesotho71,400577555,70,48130Kenya

-102,1104561560,48129Ghana

Low Human Development (below 0,500)

Real GDPper capita

(PPS$) rankminus HDI

rank*

Real GDPper capita (PPP$)

Combined1st, 2nd, 3rdlevel grossenrolmentratio(%)

Adultliteracy rate(%)

Lifeexpectancy

at birth(years)

Humandevelopment

index

Humandevelopment

rank

Source: UNDP, 1995: pages 155-157.

* A positive figure shows that the HDI rank is better than the real GDP per capita (PPP$) rank, a

49

negative the opposite

50

Table 2: Gross Domestic Savings in Africa (as percentage of GDP)

2.202.903.10-4.20-1.500.5031 Burkina Faso*+..4.603.709.9013.2017.5020 Tanzania*

3.203.903.901.200.503.2029 Benin*+....4.504.908.7011.4028 Sudan

1.903.504.902.402.704.4027 Madagascar*5.704.805.00-2.10-1.908.2026 Mali*+-1.201.805.105.808.2010.5025 Ghana*5.101.806.3013.3016.405.3024 Malawi*

..2.506.706.202.900.7023 The Gambia*1.301.807.106.3010.103.5022 Niger+7.407.207.200.408.008.6021 Senegal*+

..1.507.7011.00....20 Namibia5.1010.508.307.604.0011.5019 Sierra Leone*

13.009.3011.104.303.8028.0018 Mauritania*....11.8010.4012.4011.4017 Zaire

1.6010.9012.2010.5025.7026.0016 Swaziland9.809.5012.6029.2016.7012.9015 Cameroun*+4.0012.0012.7017.9029.6024.0014 Togo*+9.5010.8013.1014.6027.0042.0013 Zambia9.6010.2013.2016.20....12 Guinea

16.3016.4014.9020.9026.9012.9011 Côte d'Invoire*+7.6011.8017.8033.9017.506.5010 Congo+

21.1017.6019.1020.5020.5020.10 9 Kenya*21.3013.4021.0018.4019.9022.30 8 Zimbabwe

..22.7022.4013.9026.9012.60 7 Nigeria19.4019.0023.1028.4032.4026.90 6 South Africa8.7014.2023.5021.8031.000.00 5 Seychelles

....23.8020.80.... 4 Angola24.2025.0024.1020.6021.6013.50 3 Mauritius34.9035.4037.3046.8060.9039.80 2 Gabon+35.0038.6039.1029.7020.303.10 1 Botswana

9.69.5011.4 12.8 15.7015.40Excluding South Africa and Nigeria

..11.9013.8013.2020.3014.70Excluding South Africa

..14.8017.6017.7023.4018.40Sub-Saharan Africa

'93'92'88-'93'81-'87'74-'80'65-'73

51

1.50-0.100.802.40..13.2034 Uganda*..-1.102.806.107.002.8033 Rwanda*

1.60-0.503.003.306.1011.8032 Ethiopia*

Table 2 (continued)

12.813.6011.608.006.007.80South Asia (excl. India)

41.5041.4041.5029.8024.9018.70East Asia (excl. China,Indonesia)

33.1037.3035.7030.0029.3013.30Indonesia24.3023.4023.5020.4020.0015.80India

............China

..17.6019.9021.7025.9019.30All Africa

......31.5031.7021.90North Africa0.00....14.7029.8038.4047 Liberia

-42.10-44.80-47.50-79.30-66.80-35.1046 Lesotho-11.00-24.00-20.80-17.102.5017.4045 Sao Tomé and Principe-9.90-13.60-13.70-12.904.807.4044 Chad*+

-11.00-13.40-13.10-5.50....43 Mozambique*-2.50-22.00-11.30-3.90-7.90-5.3042 Guinea Bissau*

-14.10-10.70-9.80-2.80....41 Djibouti7.502.80-8.30-9.605.7021.0040 Equatorial Guinea*+

....-4.30-7.00-4.505.2039 Somalia-18.10-2.90-3.404.403.403.7038 Burundi*0.400.60-2.90-3.70....37 Comoros*+

..-3.00-2.50-4.90-28.00..36 Cape Verde

1.503.300.60-2.10-0.905.5035 Central Afican Republic*+

'93'92'88-'93'81-'87'74-'80'65-'73

.. Not available;* SPA countries+ CFA countries

Source: GCA, 1995b, page 37.

52

Table 3: Gross Domestic Investment in Africa (Percentage of GDP)

n/an/a13,814,3171234 Sudan2,318,614,317,310,76,333 Burundi*n/an/a14,511,215,114,432 Zairen/a15,614,515,6148,531 Rwanda*

14,812,614,67,391230 Ghana*10,811,114,626,219,914,929 Cameroun*+n/a18,215,31524,816,128 Nigerian/a1115,818,2n/an/a27 Namibia

12,815,716,121,4n/an/a26 Djibouti16,416,916,414,8n/an/a25 Guinea*14,216,816,536,631,52824 Congo+15,115,1182428,526,523 South Africa15,420,218,230,7n/an/a22 Comoros*+12,918,818,317,329,31921 Malawi*n/a19,619,418,518,28,220 The Gambia

22,121,421,419,822,613,219 Burkina Faso*+16,117,521,523,323,32118 Kenya*20,225,321,726,730,721,217 Swaziland11,721,921,924,833,616,916 Togo*+21,921,921,917,91617,715 Mali*+24,822,52231,532,120,314 Mauritania*22,524,322,319,319,220,913 Zimbabwe2318,52324,738,7n/a12 Seychellesn/an/a23,227,427,812,311 Somalia

25,124,226,413,414,618,210 Equatoraial Guinea*+21,621,427,335,548,837,4 9 Gabon+2426,528,928,220,225,3 8 Guinea-Bissau*

29,428,529,6222815 7 Mauritius38,335,630,230,338,833,4 6 Botswanan/a36,632,651,841,6n/a 5 Cape Verde

41,538,437,718n/an/a 4 Mozambique*n/a41,938,42023,819,2 3 Tanzania*

72,25748,934,724,917 2 Sao Tomé and Principe*75,769,66744,128,612,9 1 Lesotho16,616,517,21820,916,7Excluding Africa and Nigerian/a16,716,816,922,616,6Excluding South African/a1617,41924,219,6Sub-Saharan Africa

'93'92'88-'93'81-'87'74-'80'65-'73

53

Table 3 (continued)

19,518,418,118,514,913,3South Asia (excl. India)

39,941,740,330,228,221,6East Asia (excl. China,Indonesia)

30,634,633,928,523,615,7Indonesia24,52525,323,121,117,1India

1920,522,826,619,8All Africa25,224,925,830,232,420,3North African/an/an/a11,829,318,947 Liberia9,48,58,76,620,414,346 Chad*+5,75,410,113,421,29,345 Niger*+9,310,910,416,425,614,944 Côte d'Ivoire*+9,211,711,41313,813,543 Sierra Leone*

8,611,811,511,211,419,942 Central AfricanRepublic*+

11,711,312,59,210,59,441 Madagascar*168,712,812,99,312,940 Ehtiopia*n/an/a12,818,1n/an/a39 Angola

14,113,41311,417,31438 Senegal*+10,714,113,116,727,930,437 Zambia*14,514,413,37,9n/a12,336 Uganda*15,213,813,715,517,511,435 Benin*+

'93'92'88-'93'81-'87'74-'80'65-'73

* SPA countries;+ CFA countries;

Source: GCA, 1995b, page 38.

54

Table 4: Africa's 1990-1993 Market Loss Relative to 1970-1973

27.041.748.528.655.948.3

60.716.113.611.55.63.1

83.127.626.416.112.76.0

CocoaCoffeeCopperCottonIron oreTimber

1990-931970-73

Loss in market shares in1990-1993 relative to

1970-1973

Market ShareCommodity

Sources: ECA (1995c); UNCTAD Commodity Year Books (various issues); UN MonthlyBulletin of Statistics (various issues).

55

Table 5: Diversification and Product Concentration Indices for

African Countries, 1970-1990

0,70,60,950,922628Uganda0,260,260,830,857449Tanzania0,310,50,810,9212317Kenya0,690,470,930,912923Malawi0,380,750,910,945624Ghana0,70,60,930,662933Ethiopia

0,170,290,760,8215584Morocco0,33-0,78-165-Zimbabwe0,310,420,860,8613081Côte d'Ivoire0,280,310,860,799282Senegal0,20,260,670,7517470Tunisia

0,340,930,710,97101 9Mauritius0,820,950,930,964522Zambia

Non-oil Exporters

0,440,440,70,7815487Egypt0,270,370,780,8311661Cameroon0,710,490,890,92618Congo0,950,580,920,8811783Nigeria0,770,50,910,883921Gabon0,550,650,880,838576Algeria0,8410,890,953731Libya

Countries/Groups

199019701990197019901970

ConcentrationIndex

DiversificationIndex

Number ofcommodities

exportedOil exporters

Sources: ECA, 1995c, page 30.; UNCTAD, Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics 1984, 1991; ECA Secretariat calculations.

56

Table 6: Africa's External Debt and Debt Service, 1991-1994

19.531.112.015.55.8

21.429.715.514.815.9

21.1.28.815.916.514.7

22.129.417.319.413.3

Total AfricaNorth AfricaSub-Saharan AfricabSub-Saharan (excluding South Africa) South Africa

Debt service to goods and services exports

231.3223.6236.2334.255.3

228.0215.1237.2338.751.3

216.7210.7220.8312.756.3

223.3222.1224.1310.561.3

Total AfricaNorth AfricaSub-Saharan AfricabSub-Saharan (excluding South Africa) South Africa

Debt to goods and services exports

71.665.476.0

126.014.5

66.162.868.5

107.913.2

65.667.964.298.914.3

67.166.867.3

102.115.8

Total Africa North Africa Sub-Saharan AfricabSub-Saharan (excluding South Africa) South Africa

Debt to GDP Ratios (%)

n/an/an/a

39.818.521.3

39.818.421.4

44.123.121.0

Total AfricaNorth AfricaSub-Saharan Africa

Debt Service due (Billions of dollars)

26.316.58.21.6

28.316.37.44.6

29.016.18.64.3

29.715.810.23.7

Total AfricaNorth AfricaSub-Saharan (excluding South Africa) South Africa

Debt service paid (Billions of dollars)

312.2118.5177.116.6

301.7117.9169.014.8

297.3118.0162.916.4

299.9119.5163.317.1

Total Africa North Africaa

Sub-Saharan (excluding South Africa) South Africa

Total external debt (Billions of dollars)

1994*199319921991

Sources: ECA secretariat calculations from World Debt Tables, 1994-1995 and varioussources; ECA, 1995c, page 38.

57

* Preliminary estimates; a including the Sudan; b including South Africa

58