A LONG-LASTING FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS: TURKEY'S

MILITARY INTERVENTION TO CYPRUS IN ITS 40TH

ANNIVERSARY**

FUAT AKSU

**

SULEYMAN GUDER***

Abstract July 2014 is the 40th anniversary of Turkey’s military intervention in Cyprus. It is one

of the most striking incidents of the near past, whose impacts continue to occupy a significant

place in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies. The conflict is already a bargaining issue in

local political rivalries and Turkey’s relations with the EU. International actors have long

been in quest for a permanent solution for Cyprus, which is being perceived as the second

most significant dispute in the Middle East-East Mediterranean axis after the chronic Arab-

Israeli conflict. The aim of this paper is to shed a light on the long-lasting Cyprus dispute,

claiming that it is one of the interesting examples of the foreign policy crises that Brecher and

Wilkenfeld classified successfully (2003). It aims to discuss turning of this dispute first into a

conflict and then into a long-term foreign policy crisis between Turkey and Greece.

Introduction

In this paper, “dispute” refers to verbal disagreement between two or more parties on

any issue. Conflict on the other hand is employed to describe the escalated level of dispute at

which the verbal disagreement is brought to the state of action by one of the parties.

It is possible to study crises at different levels as employed by Charles Hermann and

Michael Brecher. With a classification on the basis of actors, the foreign policy crises and

international crises are separated. In general, in cases of mismanaging the situations of dispute

and conflict, when one or all of the parties include the options involving military violence

among literal or operational conducts and challenge the opponents may create a perceptional

crisis situation. Hence, crisis is understood/employed as a situation between two parties and

carrying the risk of militarization and putting the decision maker to a choice among limited

options.

In this view, the development triggering the crisis situation;

Occurs on any issue prepossessing the diplomatic concerns/agenda of the decision

maker

Might emerge suddenly as well as developing in a certain period of time

Enforces the decision maker to make a change in her perception or reality, in her

values and priorities

This situation is perceived as risk, danger or threat by the decision maker

The decision maker has to make a choice among limited options and take a

decision due to this perceptional situation

Though a possibility of military conflict or war with the opponent actor/s because

of her decisions exists, this does not happen all the time.

* This paper is supported by Yıldız Technical University Scientific Research Projects Coordination Department

YTU Project 2014-02-03-DOP03 and TÜBİTAK 1001 Project – Project Number: 112K172.

** Assoc. Prof. PhD; Yıldız Technical University, Department of Political Science and International Relations,

faksu@yildiz.edu.tr

*** PhD. Student; Yıldız Technical University, Department of Political Science and International Relations,

suleymanguder@gmail.com

It is possible to undertake the crisis analysis at two different levels; it is possible to put

the crises into two categories based on the parties. The first is the foreign policy crises based

on actors and occur between the states. The second is system based and they are called

international crises. In the foreign policy crises at least one of the parties is a state. In the

international crises, despite the fact that one of the parties of the crisis is a state, the crisis is

pertained to several states and organizations directly or indirectly and forces to take a decision

and it is more sophisticated. Moreover, it is always possible –though rare- for a foreign policy

crisis to turn into an international crisis. Both foreign policy and international crises may

occur suddenly, they can diminish or re-escalate with a provoking word or deed. Therefore,

crises usually hold the marks of a long-term dispute or conflict. Plus, long term and protracted

crises are likely to strike a military dimension and turn into a war eventually.

Turkish – Greek Foreign Policy Crises in Protracted Conflict (1923-2014)

Source: Created by autors using table in Brecher, International Political Earthquakes…, p. 38.

According to Brecher, the following characteristics are observed in the crises emerged

in long term conflict:1

• The triggering word, deed or situation includes high possibility of violence,

• The possibility of threat to high-priority values is high,

• The possibility of violence in crisis management is high.

The above listed features are low possibility in the crises emerged not within long-

term conflicts. In this regard, between Turkey and Greece the status of minorities since

1 Michael Brecher, International Political Earthquakes, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008,

p.29.

Lausanne Peace Treaty in 1923 has been a matter of dispute-conflict except short intervals

within this period of time. The issue of minorities can be regarded as long-term disputes with

regard to the relationships of two countries. Nonetheless, while the crisis triggering word-

deed involved (non-military) violence during September 6-7 events in 1955 and Western

Thrace events in 1984, the parties did not consider it as a threat to their high priority values

and did not deploy violence/military violence as an option for crisis-management strategy.

Parallel with the evaluations of Brecher, when we look at the crises between Turkey and

Greece, it is understood that both parties consider the crises on the status of minorities as low-

threat. Therefore they preferred to manage these crises by employing political strategies with

low possibility of military violence.

On the other hand, their sense of threat is high regarding the crisis-triggering words,

deeds and situations on Cyprus or Aegean Sea disputes. In some of these crises, it can be seen

that Turkey gives way to the strategies of using and/or threat of using military force (coercive

diplomacy) among crisis management strategies in line with its high threat perception.2 We

see the exception of that in continental shelf crisis in Aegean Sea as it designed by creating a

de facto situation in Aegean Sea since 1973-74. In this crisis, Turkey employed its actions to

make Greece accept its right in delimitation of continental shelf through peaceful-political

means (such as sending exploration ships to contested areas or issuing license for them). Since

the aim was to force the opposing party to accept the dispute and to initiate the negotiations

she applied a defensive strategy not an aggressive one. Therefore she acted on legitimate

ground of international law. As a matter of fact, when Greece lodged a complaint against

Turkey in UN Security Council during 1976 crisis and asked for provisional injunction, in the

2 For details about the strategies of coercive diplomacy see; Alexander L. George, “Coercive Diplomacy:

Definition and Characteristics”, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, Alexander L. George and William E.

Simons (eds.), Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, p. 7. Alexander L.. George, Forceful Persuation: Coercive

Diplomacy as an Alternative to War. Washington: United States Instute of Peace, 1997. The implementation

of Turkish Foreign Policy see; Fuat Aksu, Türk Dış Politikasında Zorlayıcı Diplomasi, İstanbul: Bağlam

Yay., 2008.

resolution of Security Council dated August 24, 1976 the Council decided that the scientific

activities executed by Turkey would not constitute a threat against the rights and interests of

the both countries and invited the parties to direct negotiations.

TABLE 1 – TURKISH – GREEK FOREIGN POLICY CRISES (1923-2014)

CRISIS

PARTIES

PARTIES TRIGGERED THE

CRISIS

1955, September 6-7 Crisis Turkey - Greece Turkey

February 11, 1959 (Treaty of Zurich), 19 February

1959 (London Convention)

August 16, 1960 (The Establishment of The Republic

of Cyprus)

1963-1964 Cyprus Crisis I

(December 21, 1963 to 10 August 1964) Turkey - Republic of Cyprus Republic of Cyprus

1967 Cyprus Crisis II

(November 15, 1967 - December 1, 1967)

Turkey - Cyprus (Greek Cypriot

Administration) / Greece

Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration) /

Greece

Dated November 1, 1973 and numbered 14699 the

Official Gazette / TPAO Continental Shelf License

1974 Cyprus Crisis III

(July 15, 1974 to 16 August 1974)

Turkey - Cyprus (Greek Cypriot

Administration) / Greece

Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration) /

Greece

1974 -1980 NOTAM Crisis / August 6th, 1974

proclamation of NOTAMs No. 714 Turkey - Greece Turkey

1974-1976 Aegean Crisis I / November 11, 1976

Bern Declaration Turkey - Greece Turkey

Removal of Turkish NOTAM numbered 714 /

Removal of Greek NOTAM numbered 1157

1981 (Militarization of) Limnos Crisis / October

20, 1980 Greece's return to NATO with Rogers Plan Turkey - Greece Greece

1984 (Minority of ) Western Thrace Crisis Turkey - Greece Greece

1987 Aegean Crisis II Turkey - Greece Greece

1994-1995 Aegean Sea casus belli Crisis / UNCLOS

III- Statements of Parliaments Turkey - Greece Greece

1996 Kardak / Imia Islets Crisis Turkey - Greece Greece

1997 S-300 Missile Crisis* Turkey - Cyprus (Greek Cypriot

Administration) / Greece

Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration) /

Greece

1998 Syria –Ocalan Crisis** Turkey - Greece Turkey

2003- Maritime Jurisdiction Crisis in Eastern

Mediterranean Sea ***

Turkey - Cyprus (Greek Cypriot

Administration) / Greece

Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration) /

Greece

* In Cyprus crises (1964, 1967, 1974) Greece has a guarantor state status. 1997 S-300 Missile Crisis has experienced between Turkey and

Cyprus (Greek Cypriot Administration) but signed Joint Defense Doctrine and the Greece’s guarantor state status has become Greece to indirect parties in crisis.

** The target country in Syria- Ocalan crisis (1998) is Syria, however Turkey has led to Greece indirect target due to the Greece's protection and support of Ocalan. Turkey stated that she may use the legal rights of self-defense.

*** In the crisis of maritime jurisdictions over Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey has witnessed the emerging crisis period, which is about over

maritime borders in both of Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.

Considering the relations between Turkey and Greece, two crises should be considered

as indirect crises. Despite the fact that S-300 missile crisis in 1997 occurred between Turkey

and Greek Cypriot Administration, Greece also involved in the issue. This issue was a result

of the common defense alliance of Greece with GCA within the framework of common

defense doctrine. During the crisis, Turkey’s statement to destroy the missiles in case of their

deployment in the Island is a high risky ultimatum to be tested. Greece and GCA agreed to

store the missiles in Crete instead of delivering to the island and Turkey’s demand has been

met. Turkey’s considering the missiles as a threat and to declare that it would use military

force in case of need, made a deterrent effect. Besides, it is necessary to consider this crisis as

a crisis within a long term conflict as defined by Brecher because it is a part of larger Cyprus

issue.

The next crisis is the Ocalan-Syria crisis between Turkey and Syria in 1998. Turkey’s

coercive diplomacy strategy involving threat for the use of force stemming from self-defense,

ended up with the predicted effect on Syria and it deported Ocalan and PKK elements in its

territories. Ocalan’s seeking protection and asylum in Greece after Syria brought Turkey and

Greece into confrontation. Turkey’s stating that in case of Greece’s granting asylum to

Ocalan, the same measures with Syria would be taken for Greece and considers Greece as a

country supporting terrorism displayed the escalation of the crisis. Greece focused on not to

enter into a military conflict or war with Turkey while giving effort for unburdening itself

from Ocalan residing in its territory. When it is understood that Ocalan is kept in Greece’s

embassy in Kenya, the US stepped in and Ocalan is delivered to Turkey with an operation.

Thereby a possible crisis between Turkey and Greece has been resolved through US

mediation. During that crisis a hot debate went on between the government and

opposition/bureaucracy and Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis dismantled some politicians

and bureaucrats with the claim that they put Greece into a conflict with Turkey. Following the

crisis, fixing the relations is provided through the letter-diplomacy between the ministers of

foreign affairs.3 When we look at from the crisis analysis perspective, Ocalan-Syria crisis is a

“reflection-crisis” for Turkey-Greece relations. In the post-1980 period, explicit-implicit

support for anti-Turkish terror groups had been the part of the Turkish policy of Greece.

Although Turkey put the concrete evidences of this support to terrorist organizations by

Greece, Greece preferred to deny this support every time. Ironically, this support has also

been revealed by the statements of Ocalan during his trial.4

Cyprus dispute in Turkey-Greece Relations

In the general course of relations between Greece and Turkey the 1919-23 period

carries the traces of war period. The 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty is a founding text/act which

establishes a balance between the parties. In the era from 1923 to 1950 a relative friendship

and cooperation is observed. In Turkey-Greece relations, Cyprus and Aegean disputes have an

old past too. This stems from the fact that a mutually agreed status regarding Cyprus dispute

have been demanded to be changed unilaterally in time.5 Therefore it is a challenge against

status quo at the same time. After the First World War the basic text determining the national

boundaries of modern Turkey and resolving the territorial issues of Ottoman lands is the

Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923. The Lausanne Treaty not only resolved the boundary issues

3 See for details: İsmail Cem, Türkiye Avrupa Avrasya, Cilt I, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniv. Yay, 2004.

4 See for details: Atilla, Uğur, Abdullah Öcalan'ı Nasıl Sorguladım:İşte Gerçekler, İstanbul: Kaynak

Yayınları, 2011. Savas Kalenderidis, Öcalan’ın Teslimi, İstanbul: Pencere Yay., 2011.

5 For details visit;

http://tdpkrizleri.org/index.php?option=com_seoglossary&view=glossary&catid=1&id=138&Itemid=188&lan

g=tr

with Greece but also with Italy and the UK. While Dodecanese is left for Italy the British

mandate in Cyprus have been recognized by the signatories.

The mutual recognition of the boundaries of sovereignty among the states signing the

Treaty had created equilibrium and until post-WW II era this balance has been protected. In

this period, unilateral challenge to the balance has been observed in the case of Cyprus as

well. In 1931, the rebel against the British mandate in Cyprus and demand for enosis (union

with Greece) has been suppressed by the harsh methods of British administration. Though the

demand of enosis declined after harsh suppress of the rebellion, it re-emerged in the 1950s.

After WW II the cession of the Dodecanese islands to Greece from Italy increased the

expectation for enosis regarding Cyprus. Cyprus’ becoming a concern of Turkey-Greece

relations had also occurred in the same period. In the early 1950s the rising enosis (union with

Greece) propaganda in the Island has been considered as an internal affair of Great Britain at

first and Turkey remained relatively silent. In a period from which Greece had recently

survived from a civil war and maintaining recovery, Turkey did not want to create a new field

of conflict with Britain support of whom she was asking for. After Greece’s

“internationalization” the demands on Cyprus with the pressure and propaganda of the Greek

Orthodox Church of Cyprus and enosis supporters, Turkey also got involved in the issue. In

this involvement Turkish Cypriots living in Turkey and the national press played an important

role.

At the beginning, since the mandate of Britain is recognized in Cyprus, Turkey did not

claim any right on Cyprus. In this phase, Cyprus is not a dispute to be negotiated between

Turkey and Greece either. In the meantime, Turkish side who observed the possible

worsening of relations between two countries warned the Greek side on the matter. The

Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu warned his Greek counterpart and

stated that the enosis policy with Cyprus would negatively affected Turkey-Greece relations.

In 1955 the London Conference initiated as a solution seeking effort for the dispute

have been a process led the parties to embody their arguments and expectations as well as

sharpening the sides of a long-term conflict.6 Therefore Cyprus dispute has 64 years old past

in Turkey-Greece relations. With the conclusion of the negotiations started in 1955 in 1960, a

state has been established based on the political equality of the two societies living in the

island and the parties renounced their claims by guaranteeing the status of the new

independent state. The new state has been a part of international system as a member of the

UN. However, this structure based on the political equality of the communities in the island

could not have been sustained. In 1963, the unilateral intervention of Makarios to change the

Cyprus constitution and the beginning attacks against Turkish Cypriot community brought the

dispute to a different level. This time the addressee of Turkey not only was Greece but also

Republic of Cyprus. Remarkably, the representatives of Turkish Cypriots under Republic of

Cyprus had become unable to use their constitutional rights and authority. In other words,

despite the fact that Republic of Cyprus had been founded as a partnership regime in the crisis

situation one of the partners could not be represented at all. This situation rapidly led the

6 1950-1960 was the period during which both Greek and Turkish communities living in the Island had

organized for armed resistance. In the early 1950s, against the attacks of EOKA Ethniki Organosis Kyprion

Agoniston/National Struggle Organization of Cypriots founded under the leadership of George Grivas, Turkish

community displayed a loose defense at the beginning; however, in 1957 Turkish Resistance Corps were

founded. For the details about the foundation of both organizations see; Ulvi Keser, Kıbrıs’ta Yer altı

faaliyetleri ve Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, (Underground Activities in Cyprus and Turkish Resistance Corps)

İstanbul: IQ Yay., 2007; Makarios Druşotis, Karanlık Yön: EOKA (The Dark Side: EOKA) , Lefkoşa:

Galeri Kültür Yay., 2007.

dispute to evolve into a political conflict among the communities and the guarantor states and

it turned into a serious crisis in a short period of time.

If we start the period of crises in Turkish-Greek relations with the “Bloody

Christmas” of 1963, it is possible to treat the progress of crises of Cyprus dispute within a 50

year period. From 1950 to today, 14 diplomatic crises emerged between Turkey and Greece. 5

of them are directly related with Cyprus issue. However, from the Cyprus crises 1963-64,

1967 and 1974 as Cold War crises and 1997 S-300 missiles and 2003 Eastern Mediterranean

Maritime Jurisdiction Areas (EEZ) crises have different characteristics. Besides, in the post-

1990 crises we observe efforts to create de facto situation and to enforce a new status. From a

different perspective Cyprus crises can be considered as “long-term and protracted crises” in

Turkey-Greece relations. As a matter of fact, this dispute emerged in the early 1950s and

while the 1960s witnessed conflicting relations, between 1960 and 1974 three crises with

almost the same characteristics appeared. Despite the fact that conflict had been re-appealed

after each crisis period, these appeals have been high-tension status quo ante since the

founding texts of the parties granted no such status. Moreover, conflict resolution -

management processes/ initiatives following these three crises did not remove the

disagreements between the parties.

On the other hand, in the post-1990 crisis period the discursive/operational behaviors

triggering the crisis are evidences for crisis-management strategies of Greek Cypriot

Administration. In the S-300 missile crisis between 1997 and 1999, the strategy of creating a

de facto situation (fait accompli) in a period when the Cyprus issue had been put into

mothballs have been consciously designed as it is explained by Glafkos Klerides. With

Turkey’s reaction to missile order and statement that missiles would be destroyed in case of

delivery to the island suddenly provoked the international/regional agenda and organizations

like UN, NATO and the EU got involved into the issue. Turkey managed to prevent the

delivery of missiles into the island with the threat of coercion but could not prevent the rise of

Cyprus issue in the agenda of international society. While the missiles stored in Crete Island,

after a while, with the call of UN Secretary General to restart the negotiations between the

parties the Cyprus issue entered into a new phase. Following these negotiations the Annan

Plan emerged as it is subjected to referendum in 2004. In this period, sometimes negotiations

were interrupted but dialogue has been sustained with new offers.

In the progress of Cyprus issue from 1950 to today, doubtlessly, Annan Plan-

Comprehensive Peace Plan for Cyprus- put to the people of Cyprus in a referendum in 2004

has been a turning point. The peace plan prepared with the mediation of UN Secretary

General as an output of the negotiations of the parties have been put to the people for

referendum for the first time in the long history of dispute. Even the founding texts of Cyprus

Republic were not the text put in front of the public opinion in the history of long dispute-

crisis. Annan Plan has been prepared after long and harsh negotiations and put into

referendum on April 24, 2004 on both sides of the island and while Turkish Cypriots said

YES with 64,91 percent vote, Greek Cypriots voted NO with 75,38 %. Therefore the plan has

been rejected and Cyprus dispute could not been resolved.

The direct results of the failure of Annan Plan are noteworthy. While the resolution of

Cyprus dispute was put as a pre-condition for the EU membership of Turkey, the Greek

Cypriot Administration has been accepted as a full-member to the union representing the

whole Island. By approving the EU membership created a paradoxical situation with its own

expansion principles and accepted GCA before it resolved its boundary disputes. Turkish

Cypriots on the other hand, could not escape the isolation and preventions even though they

supported the plan. Moreover, the membership of GCA to the EU also brought a new

conditionality in Turkey-EU relations. Including GCA to the Customs Union created new

problems in the execution of the full membership framework document and put the accession

monitoring program into difficulty.

Another dispute-crisis spiral for Turkey related with Cyprus is the determination of

Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Jurisdiction Areas. GCA’s concluding agreements with the

countries in the Eastern Mediterranean regulating (exclusive economic zones/EEZ)

boundaries of the region, issuing international licenses and to allocate tenders in declared

continental shelf regions confronted Turkey and GCA directly and Greece indirectly. GCA’s

initiatives for maritime jurisdiction areas and strategies are similar to Turkey’s strategies

followed for the dispute in determining continental shelves in Aegean Sea in 1974 to 1976.

Turkey followed the strategy of creating de facto situations to claim her rights in Aegean Sea

against Greece’s claims of continental shelf in that period. As a part of this strategy, in the

disputed areas of Aegean Sea, except territorial waters, in the areas claimed as Turkey’s

continental shelf, Turkey issued license for Turkish Petroleum Company-TPAO to conduct

seismic research in the region. Upon the reaction of Greece, she stated that maritime

boundaries had not been determined by an agreement and was ready for negotiation on the

issue. In this way the dispute on maritime jurisdiction came into the scene. However, basic

policy of Turkey in this dispute-conflict-crisis process is defensive and its main target has

been to enforce Greece to accept the rights of coastal countries on Aegean Sea.

Similarly, in the first half of 2000s, we see that GCA’s attempts are for creating de

facto situation. While GCA was joining international negotiations for a permanent peace for

Cyprus dispute, on the other hand she signed EEZ agreements with Egypt on February 17,

2003, with Lebanon on January 2007 and with Israel on December 17, 2010 and invited

tenders for license. 7

However, this is controversial in many dimensions. The natural resources

and their use are under the authority of central/federal state as determined by 1960 Nicosia

Agreement and 2004 Annan Plan.8 Until reaching a permanent resolution for Cyprus dispute,

the view that any action to escalate tension between the parties should be denied had been

delivered by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus-TRNC and negotiators to Greek side

but it was not possible to prevent such developments.9 GCA’s signing agreements before

ending the negotiations and issuing licenses to international companies created new fields of

discussion in the negotiations on the one hand and led Turkey and TRNC to develop opposing

strategies on the other. In the agreements between Turkey and TRNC, TRNC also issued

license for Turkish Petroleum Company-TPAO in both northern and southern region of the

island and continued its claim on the disputed regions.

From the crisis-management perspective, the policy executed by GCA is quite risky

both economically and politically and involves sensitive issues. This de facto situation created

7 See the regulations about maritime jurisdiction rights in Eastern Mediterranean Sea; Sertaç Hami Başeren (Y.

Haz.), Doğu Akdeniz'de Hukuk ve Siyaset, Ankara: A.Ü. SBF Yay., 2013.

8 See for the relevant provision of Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (1960); Article 25/3,

http://www.presidency.gov.cy/presidency/presidency.nsf/all/1003AEDD83EED9C7C225756F0023C6AD/$fil

e/CY_Constitution.pdf?openelement

See for the relevant provision of Annan Plan; “Part IV: The Federal Government And the Constituent States,

Article 14 Competences and functions of the federal government”, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/un-comprehensive-

settlement-plan-of-the-cyprus-question.en.mfa

9 “KKTC de Petrol ve Doğalgaz Arayacak”, http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25242258/ ; “Türkiye ve KKTC’den

Önemli Adım!”, http://www.gazetevatan.com/turkiye-ve-kktc-den-onemli-adim--401041-gundem/

a new field of dispute-crisis between Turkey and GCA and the relations are driven to tension.

Upon the reaction of Turkey GCA declared that she is ready for discussing the controversial

areas but this carries the dispute to another realm. Since Turkey did not recognized GCA, it

asked for the participation of TRNC as a party to the negotiations. And this created a paradox

because GCA did not want to consider TRNC as a partner. In a context where parties do not

recognize each other as addressees, creating a de facto situation on the one hand and

retaliation strategies of Turkey on the other have been executed. Considering the negotiations

to resolve the Cyprus dispute, such developments are negatively affecting the process. As a

matter of fact, the debates over the energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean are turned

into mutual showdown and the peace negotiations are interrupted.10

Crisis Name Discourse and/or Actions

Triggered the Crisis

The Nature of Events

Triggered the Crisis

The Category of Events

Triggered the Crisis

1955 6-7 September Crisis

Non-military violent and

attacks against the Greek

minorities

Violation of treaty Political- Humanitarian

1963-1964 Cyprus Crisis I

Military-paramilitary

violent and attacks against

the Turkish Cypriots

Violation of status Political- Humanitarian-

Juristical

1967 Cyprus Crisis II

Military-paramilitary

violent and attacks against

the Turkish Cypriots

Violation of status Political- Humanitarian-

Juristical

1974 Cyprus Crisis III Coup d’Etat / Enosis Violation of status Political- Juristical - Military-

Humanitarian-

1974 -1980 NOTAM-FIR

Crisis Military security measures Security dilemma Military- Political- Juristical

1974-76 Aegean Sea

(Continental Shelf) Crisis-I

License declaration and

seismic research

Creation of de facto

situation Political-Juristical-Economics

1981 (Militarization of)

Limnos Crisis Militarization of Islands Violation of status Military- Political- Juristical

1984 (Minority of) Western

Thrace Crisis

Non-military violent and

attacks against the Turkish

minority in Western Thrace

Violation of Status and

Treaty

Humanitarian- Political-

Juristical

1987 Aegean Sea

(Continental Shelf) Crisis-II

Declaration of invalidity of

agreement and statements

of oil exploration activities

Agreement -Violation

of status Juristical- Political

1994-1995 Aegean Sea casus

belli Crisis

Declaration of Greek

Parliament Declaration of will Political

1996 Kardak/Imia Islets

Crisis

Landing troops on Kardak

Islets and warning to fire in

case of draw near to islets

Use of military force Military- Political

1997 S-300 Missile Crisis*

The signing of the missile

purchase agreement with

Russia

Violation of status / fait

accompli Military- Political

1998 Syria –Ocalan Crisis**

Turkey’s demand from

Syria to fulfill according to

upon its request

Political pressure Political- Military

2003 Maritime Jurisdiction

Crisis in Eastern

Mediterranean Sea***

Greek Cypriot

Administration’s bilateral

EEZ agreements with

neighbors and license

declaration

Unilateral fait accompli Political- Juristical

In this process of fifty years, the events that triggered Cyprus crises took place with

the intention of realizing the enosis which was dream shared by Greek Cypriot Community

10

“MEB’imiz İhlal Edilirse Görüşmelerden Çekiliriz!”, http://www.yeniduzen.com/Haberler/guney/meb-imiz-

ihlal-edilirse-muzakerelerden-cekiliriz/35546

and Greece. Actually, even the establishment of Cyprus Republic through the treaties in 1960

was a step in line with this purpose11

. In years of 1963-1964, 1967 and 1974, three crises took

place that needed Turkey’s intervention in its capacity as guarantor in the island as a result of

the attacks that were increased by the directions of the decision makers from Cyprus Greek

Community and Greece. Whereas England was seen as the main obstacle in the way to enosis

between 1950 and 1960, Turkish Cypriot Community and Turkey were started to be seen as

the main obstacle starting from 1960. On the other hand, the main purposes and the priorities

of Turkey during the crises were to prevent the assaults against the existence of Turkish

Cypriots living in the island and to protect the rights and the status provided constituent

treaties. During the first two attacks (1963-1964 and 1967), Turkey used the international

legitimacy provided by its status as the guarantor state in order to prevent the assaults and

solved the crisis through coercive diplomacy strategies12

. However, the solutions that were

agreed on could not settle the disputes in negotiations between communities held after these

crises. With the coup d’état against President Makarios and the proclamation of The Hellenic

Republic of Cyprus, Turkey’s right as a guarantor came up again. That the group that staged

the military coup in the island was supported by the military junta in Greece pointed Greece

as the real responsible for the coup. Turkey consulted England for it was the other guarantor

state, but it could not convince England for a joint intervention. Ultimately, Turkey decided to

intervene by itself. Turkey carried out a military intervention in Cyprus in 20 July 1974.

The common point of all these three crises was that the events that turned the conflicts

into crises were enosis-based. Besides, during each of these crises, the paramilitary group

named EOKA / EOKA-B played an essential role13

. At this point, it is not possible to

differentiate state and non-state actors as the triggering actors of the crises. Because, when it

was discussed who were responsible for these events later on, leaders of Greek Cypriot

Community blamed EOKA and General George Grivas and tried to avoid the political

responsibilities. Even though Turkish Cypriots were the ones targeted in the armed assaults

during the first two crises, a military coup was held against President Makarios in 1974 crisis,

though the legitimacy of his position can be questioned. After the coup, another conflict broke

up in the island within Greek Cyprot Community itself and pro-enosis coupists and the ones

having problems with the junta in Greece though they support the enosis started to struggle

against each other. According to “Akritas Plan” that were created in the beginning of 1960s

by decision makers from Cyprus and Greece that acted together to realize enosis, it was aimed

to intimidate and exterminate Turkish Cypriots unless they were assimilated. Pro-enosis

groups that acted together during the crises of 1964 and 1967 drifted into disagreements

between themselves between 1964 and 1967, and President Makarios became an obstacle for

the military junta in Greece. That Makarios was more popular and respected in the island

compared to the leaders of the junta in Greece caused coupists to attempt both getting rid of

Makarios and realize the enosis in the same time. Though the military coup held in 15 July

against Makarios created an internal conflict within Greek Cypriot Community, coupists did

11

See Druşotis, Karanlık Yön[ Dark Side]… for the difference of opinions and discussions between politicians

from EOKA, Greece and Cyprus about the acceptance of solutions provided by Zurich and London Treaties.

12 See Fuat Aksu, Türk Dış Politikasında Zorlayıcı Diplomasi (Coercive Diplomacy in Turkish Foreign

Policy), Istanbul: Baglam Publishing House, 2008.

13 It can be seen that EOKA and General George Grivas played important roles during the events that triggered

each of the crises. After years from these events, Greek leaders confirmed this situation through their

statements admitting that they had difficulty in controlling the activities of EOKA/EOKA-B paramilitary

organization and Grivas during the crises. It can be seen that Greece increased its activities in the island

through EOKA, National Guard Army and military officers from Greek Troops in the island led by Grivas and

tried to neutralize Makarios’ impact in the island. In this process, along with the assaults against Turkish

community in the island, Greeks that were not pleased by the activities of EOKA were targeted as well.

not want to move provoke Turkey by attacking Turkish Cypriot Community. However,

Turkish Cypriots were anxious in the face of events. The community that experienced 1964

and 1967 events was worried that they were going to be harmed during the crises and tried to

provide security from Turkey. That Turkey only condemned the coup and did not take any

action until July 20 encouraged the coupists but their expectations failed. Turkey’s military

intervention in Cyprus on 20 July 1974 caused long term effects and a new period was started

in Cyprus.

Cyprus Crises and Turkey’s Crisis Management Strategies

With 1960 Treaties, related parties agreed on the establishment of a certain status

(quo). Instead of charging Greece or Turkey with the management of the island or dividing it

between two states, a new state was established that is based on the political equality of both

communities. England, Greece and Turkey recognized this state and guaranteed the territorial

integrity of it. At this point, the decision makers in Turkey had the opinion that the

establishment of Cyprus Republic was a good solution to strengthen the relationships between

Turkey and Greece and even that it could generate a Turkish-Greek federation. However, the

solution that was agreed on by all parties was not a long lasting one. Makarios tried to change

the Constitution of Cyprus and excluded Turkish Cypriots from the administration in due

course, and that increased the tension again.

When the assaults against Turkish community in the island broke out, Turkey tried to

settle the disagreements both through negotiations between the guarantor states and direct

contact with the President of Cyprus, Makarios. Actually, long before the beginning of the

assaults in the island, Turkey called for a negotiation in order to settle the disagreements

between the community leaders during Makarios’ official visit to Ankara between 22 and 26

November 1962.14

In addition, it expressed clearly that Turkey will not allow unilateral

changes in the status. After the incident of “Bloody Noel” in 1963, the negotiations broke

down and armed conflict began between the communities and that put Turkey in a position to

make a hard decision. Political negotiations were ineffective and no improvement was

achieved; therefore, it was necessary to consider options including military actions in order to

stop the assaults. However, those options had their own difficulties due to the national

conditions of that time.

Though 4th

article of the Treaty of Guarantee provided a legitimate basis for Turkey to

make a military intervention in the island, military readiness and capacity of Turkey in that

time was not in a shape to make such an intervention.15

When the Turkish decision makers the

time evaluated the option of a military intervention, they realized that the intervention of

Armed Forces with its limited recourses to the island would bring many problems with itself.

Moreover, even though the military intervention option was supported by the national

community, it is not possible to claim that it was supported by international actors, especially

by the leaders of Western bloc. US President Lyndon Johnson’s letter to Turkish Prime

Minister İsmet İnönü reminded this harsh truth to Turkey. Until August, 1964, Turkey’s only

military intervention to ongoing clashes in the island was to let the air forces fly on the island

in low-altitude; however, when the assaults restarted in the beginning of August, they bombed

Greek military targets directly. That Turkey used its exemplary force entry treat helped

Turkey to terminate the crisis and reduced the violence against Turkish community creating a

deterrent impact.

14

See for Makarios’ visit to Turkey and the details of the negotiations: Turgut Tulumen, Hayat Boyu Kıbrıs

(Lifelong Cyprus), Istanbul: Bogazici Publishing House, 1998, p. 49-57.

15 See for the discussions on Turkey’s decision to make military interventions to the island during Cyprus crises

in 1963-1964 and 1967; Fuat Aksu, Türk Dış Politikasında Zorlayıcı Diplomasi (Coercive Diplomacy in

Turkish Foreign Policy), Istanbul: Baglam Publishing House, 2008.

During 1963-1964 crisis was actually an example where both parties were actually

testing each other and they learned the crisis management. When the conflict between two

parties restarted in 1967, decision makers in Turkey faced the decision to make a military

intervention to the island again. During this crisis, it was revealed once more that the

necessary military capacity and preparations of Turkey were not sufficient for such an option.

Turkish decision makers considered using coercive diplomacy strategies to manage the crisis

and they achieved that by instead of using the power, using its threat. In that crisis,

conciliation by USA contributed a lot to the process. Thanks to the shuttle diplomacy carried

out by US diplomat Cyrus Vance, Turkey obtained its demands and assaults against Turkish

community were stopped. Moreover, 20,000 Greek soldiers and heavy weapons sent to the

island from Greece upon the agreement between Greece and Makarios during 1960 incidents

were removed from the island at the insistent requests of Turkey.16

After the crises in 1963-1964 and 1967, Turkish decision makers realized that they had

limited options in the case of protracted Cyprus crises and they focused on necessary

preparations for a military intervention to the island. Until 1974, the Turkish Armed Forces

almost completed the necessary military training and readiness needed for a successful

amphibian operation. And these preparations facilitated Turkey’s military intervention to

Cyprus on 20 July 1974 and when the intervention was concluded, the casualties were much

less compared to previous crises17

.

Each of these crises took place during the rule of different governments. However, the

issue of Cyprus was considered as a “matter of national cause” and especially during and after

1967 crisis, Cyprus policy of the governments was supported widely. When the Turkey’s

crisis management strategies during the crises in question are examined, we see that in the

first two crises, Turkey adopted a coercive diplomacy strategy18

. In the case of 1974 crisis,

Turkey adopted another defense-based crisis management strategy. Bu implementing its

military intervention decision, Turkey applied “strategy of limited escalation”. When Turkey

announced its decision to make a military intervention, it stated that the purpose of the

intervention is to reconstruct the constitutional order in the island as the guarantor state.

Turkey stated that in line with its purpose, it will not open fire unless any fire is opened

against its forces first. The target was the military coup against Makarios staged by EOKA-B

organization. However, Turkey’s military intervention created a conflictive situation in the

island. Whereas the supporters of Makarios supported Turkey’s intervention unwillingly,

supporters of EOKA-B, military officers from Greek Troops, Greek soldiered sneaked into

the island and pro-enosis people struggled against the military intervention of Turkey.

Therefore, the decision to not open fire unless a fire is opened first was not practiced in reality

and Turkish forces had to fight against EOKA-B forces, Greek National Guard Forces and

Greek Troops.

16

Andreas Papandreu explains how the decision to land troops and weapons on the island was made and

implemented after 1960 in his personal writings. See for details: Andreas Papandreu, Namlunun Ucundaki

Demokrasi (Democracy at Gunpoint), Ankara: Bilgi Publishing House, 1988, s. 164.

17 One of the important factors that positively affected the success of Turkey’s military intervention was that

troops and weapons that were sneaked into the island by Greece though it conflicted with the treaties were

removed from the island during 1967 crisis. 20,000 Greek soldiers and heavy weapons were the subject of the

negotiations carried out by the US representative Vance and these forces were removed out of the island in line

with the agreements reached at the end of the negotiations. It can be seen that the resistance would be much

harder during 1974 operations if these troops stayed in the island.

18 See for details of coercive diplomacy and crisis management strategies: Alexander L. George, “Strategies for

Crisis Management”, Alexander L. George (Ed.), Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management, Boulder:

Westview Press, 1991, pp. 377-394.

From the beginning of the clashes in Cyprus, the use of force was limited carefully and

it was not allowed to spread the conflict outside the island along the borders of Greece. In this

respect, strategies carried out by Turkey were accordant with both its obligations and

responsibilities as a guarantor, and the crisis management. Government Spokesman of the

time, Orhan Birgit, explains in his personal writings that in line with the information delivered

to them, they delivered the message that they have no intention for any military attack against

Greece to the military officers who were against the coup, and contributed to the fall of

military junta in Greece in this way.19

Hence, Prime Minister Ecevit showed that he supported

peace and cooperation between the states by congratulating Konstantin Karamanlis who

returned to his country after the fall of the junta and conveying his sincere greetings.20

Conclusion

After 40 years from Turkey’s military intervention to Cyprus, inter-communal

negotiations that have been maintained between the two communities living on the Island are

still continuing. However, we see that the two parties haven’t compromised on a

comprehensive solution yet. Along with this, endeavors that aim to remove the devastating

effects of a long run conflict are also being pursued. The endeavors are going on in the frame

of such parameters that foresee a solution which is centered on the federation and is based

upon the equality of the parties, and also which takes the bicommunal and the bizonal solution

as its core. Although we are not quite hopeful for a solution to come out from the official

negotiations in a short run, it is possible to mention some positive developments on the level

of the communities / peoples of the Island. Especially the facts that access between the South

and the North of the Island is now facilitated, that some positive outcomes were taken from

the attempts to investigate the whereabouts of missing people of both communities in 1963-

1974 and the joint historiography that is purified from the prejudices can be given as

examples of these developments.

For the conflicting communities that have lost their experience of coexistence, getting

rid of the trauma of the past and confronting with them can take a long time. If we view the

1974 intervention from a positive point of view, it in fact gives both of the sides a new

chance. For this time, instead of such purposes of the paramilitary organizations that are quite

extreme and not possible to be realized, a new chance of creating a mutual future supported

by the culture of living together has now arisen. And this is a subject of another particular

discussion that exceeds the limits of this article.

19

See for details: Orhan Birgit, Kalbur Saman İçinde: Olaylar, Anılar, Portreler (Once upon a Time: Events,

Memories, Portraits), Istanbul: Doğan Publishing House., 2012, p. 123-124.

20 See for details: Kamuran Gürün, Bükreş-Paris-Atina Büyükelçilik Hatıraları (Bucharest-Paris-Athens

Ambassadorial Memoirs), Istanbul: Milliyet Publishing House., 1994, p. 330-331.