a comparison of help giving to individuals versus humanitarian organizations

A Comparison of Help Giving to Individuals VersusHumanitarian Organizations1

Daniela Niesta Kayser2

Clinical and Social Sciences in PsychologyUniversity of Rochester

Lisa FarwellSanta Monica College

Tobias GreitemeyerUniversity of Sussex

Brighton, United Kingdom

The theories of social conduct, seriousness of need, and similarity; cost–benefitmodels; and individual differences in ideology are used to predict self-reported helpgiving that is interpersonal or through humanitarian organizations. The resultsindicate that persons tend to be more helpful interpersonally than through organi-zations, are more responsive to characteristics of the needy when helping interper-sonally than through organizations, and have stronger affective responses towardindividuals than toward individuals represented by organizations. For both inter-personal and organization-mediated assistance, perceived benefit to the donorstrongly predicts help giving. Relatively conservative persons report less helpfulness,both interpersonally and through humanitarian organizations. Collectively, thesefindings offer an integrative approach to help giving and have implications forfundraising in the humanitarian sector.

A variety of social psychological theories have been proposed and derivedhypotheses have been tested in an attempt to understand and predict helpingbehavior. Here, we integrate four well-supported theoretical processes—namely, the theory of social conduct, seriousness of need, theory of similar-ity, and cost–benefit models—to evaluate how these theoretical assumptionsdescribe attitudes toward help giving in two contexts: interpersonal assis-tance and assistance via humanitarian organizations. Although the contextsfor helping behavior are numerous, we address these two in particularbecause they are ecologically valid and significant. In the United States, 70%

1This research was supported by a grant from the German American Exchange Service(DAAD). The data were collected when the authors were at the University of California, LosAngeles. Portions of this article were presented at the annual meeting of the Western PsychologyAssociation, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, May 2002. The authors thank GerhardHelleman and Bernard Weiner for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.

2Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Daniela Niesta Kayser,Clinical and Social Sciences in Psychology, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627.E-mail: [email protected]

2990

Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 2008, 38, 12, pp. 2990–3008.© 2008 Copyright the AuthorsJournal compilation © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

mailto:[email protected]

of all households donate money to charity, and nearly 110 million Americansvolunteer in public service (Independent Sector, 2001).

We also investigate how an individual-difference variable, political ideol-ogy, combines with the four theoretical processes to influence attitudestoward help giving. Ideology is known to be predictive of helping in a varietyof contexts, including interpersonal assistance and charitable giving (seeCrandall, 1995; Skitka, 1999, 2002). The relationship between ideology andhelp giving by means of humanitarian organizations is a particularly timelyand important issue. In recent years, American conservatives have argued forand achieved reductions in tax-funded government assistance programs(“Herger rebuts claim welfare cases are rising,” 2003; Welfare Vision, 2004).If these reductions leave individuals in need, citizen philanthropy maybecome even more essential.

Theoretical Processes

The four theoretical processes vary in their emphasis on characteristics ofpotential recipients. These processes were chosen because they are sensitive toeach other, and allow for systematic investigation of the strength of therelationship of each variable with self-predicted donations to persons andorganizations. Here, the first approach is the theory of social conduct(Weiner, 1995), which focuses directly on a single perceived characteristic ofthe recipient; namely, his or her degree of responsibility for the plight.

According to this attribution–affect–action approach to help giving,beliefs about the causes of a recipient’s situation give rise to inferences aboutpersonal responsibility that, in turn, lead to feelings of anger (recipientresponsible) or sympathy (recipient not responsible). These feelings of angerand sympathy are most proximal in directing help giving, with anger leadingto reluctance to help, and sympathy increasing willingness to help. Numerousstudies have affirmed the importance of recipient responsibility in guidinghelp giving (e.g., Greitemeyer & Rudolph, 2003; see review in Rudolph,Roesch, Greitemeyer, & Weiner, 2004), but no other study has combinedthese variables with considerations of need, similarity, and cost–benefitcalculations.

Similar to the theory of social conduct, the seriousness of need approach(Shotland & Huston, 1979; Taormina & Messick, 1983; Ting, 1992) focuseson a characteristic of the recipient; namely, the severity of the individual’splight. Need is perceived to be great when it is life-threatening (Greitemeyer,Rudolph, & Weiner, 2003) or when an imminent deterioration of the person’ssituation is likely. For example, when a hypothetical, developing country wasperceived as more poor, it was also perceived as more worthy of support

COMPARISON OF HELP GIVING 2991

(Taormina & Messick, 1983). Likewise, the more serious the described con-dition of an individual recipient, the greater the donations received (Ting,1992).

According to the theory of similarity, the donor’s perception of the“match” between his or her characteristics and those of the recipient influ-ences helping behavior (Dovidio, 1984; Rushton, Russel, & Wells, 1984).Perceived similarity may increase tendencies to help strangers (Batson,Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981) and even family members (Leek& Smith, 1991). Helping-relevant characteristics can include the donor’s ownexperience with the problem at hand. For example, a donor who has beenpersonally affected by a disease or disability may be more willing to helpothers who are similarly afflicted (Macaulay, 1975). The importance of simi-larity to helping also finds support in evolutionary theory. By helping peoplelike ourselves, we act to preserve the genes that we have in common (Rushtonet al., 1984); the closer the genetic relationship, the greater the “payoff” fromhelping.

In contrast to the preceding approaches, the cost–benefit model of helpingfocuses more directly on the needs of potential helpers, taking an economicperspective toward human behavior. The cost–benefit model assumes thatpeople are motivated to maximize rewards and minimize costs (Dovidio,Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder, & Clark, 1991). Helping is expected to occur ifit is perceived as more profitable, relative to withholding help. In this calcu-lus, rewards include social recognition, enhanced self-esteem, self-efficacy,and material benefits. Costs of helping include monetary, moral, andemotional costs, such as feelings of annoyance about the recipient’s plight(Greitemeyer, Fischer, Kastenmüller, & Frey, 2006).

Such economic concerns may be particularly relevant to long-termhelping behavior, as opposed to more immediate assistance (see Fiske, 2004).To illustrate, Clary and Snyder (1991; see also Omoto, Snyder, & Berghuis,1993) identified six benefits influencing volunteer behavior; namely,knowledge/skill enhancement, career/job enhancement, group belonging/approval, escape from guilt/personal problems, self-esteem enhancement,and value expression. Also rewarding are the practical consequences ofhelping; that is, the benefit to the recipient of the aid: the greater the perceivedbenefit, the greater the help giving (Smith, Keating, & Stotland, 1989; Warren& Walker, 1991). In contrast, it is both costly and not rewarding to giveassistance that is ineffectual (Skitka, 1999).

In addition to these four models, we also examined how individual dif-ferences in political ideology affect help giving. Skitka (1999; see also Farwell& Weiner, 2000) found that conservatives were less generous than wereliberals toward victims of a natural disaster, holding them more responsiblefor not taking damage-minimizing precautions. These findings are in line

2992 NIESTA KAYSER ET AL.

with the punitiveness hypothesis, which states that conservatives are moremotivated than are liberals to punish violators of traditional values andnorms. For example, Skitka and Tetlock (1992) found that conservatives hadstronger negative emotional reactions to targets, made stronger attributionsof personal responsibility, and withheld more aid from personally responsibleclaimants, in contrast to liberals who were more sympathetic to these respon-sible claimants.

It is important to note that when victims are unambiguously not respon-sible, conservatives may be just as helpful as liberals (Farwell & Weiner, 2000;Farwell, Weiner, Stevens, & Martin, 2008). For example, in a recent study ofassistance to the obviously blameless 9/11 victims, the Independent Sector(2001) reported that 43% of sampled donors self-identified as liberal (tovarying degrees), and 54% self-identified as conservative (to varying degrees).Here, we extend this line of research in an integrative fashion to investigatehow ideology affects perceptions of responsibility, need, similarity to self,and beliefs about recipients’ likely benefit from assistance to influence cost–benefit assessments and predictions of own help-giving behavior in an indi-vidual and organizational context.

The Present Research

The present study extends previous theories of help giving and developstwo models, thereby distinguishing between two contexts: interpersonalhelping and helping by means of intermediary, humanitarian organizations.Evidence has suggested (McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1997) that judg-ments can vary as a function of whether the target is an individual or a group.The present research explores the hypothesis that the salience of an individualversus an organizational identity is important in accounting for differences inthe way people process information, form appraisals, and make decisionsto help.

When considering donating to individuals, persons may be influencedmore directly by recipient characteristics. Conversely, when persons con-sider donating through intermediaries, aspects of the organization itself maycontribute more strongly to cost–benefit assessments. In everyday life, suchorganizations play an extremely important role in philanthropy. In provid-ing relief to victims of disease and catastrophe and in promoting peace andsupporting community-based projects, humanitarian organizations power-fully improve quality of life for the needy. In 1994, the nonprofit sector’sshare of the national income was 6.3% (or $354 billion), as compared tothe for-profit’s 78% and the U.S. government’s 15% (Fishman & Schwarz,2000).


As reported in Giving USA (American Association of Fund RaisingCounsel, 2002), approximately 84% of all charitable donations come fromliving individuals, with the remainder from bequests and foundations.Clearly, the success of nonprofit charities depends on help giving by thepublic. In light of their importance, the present study investigates not onlyhelp giving to individuals in need—which has been the main focus of previousresearch—but also how help giving is affected when intermediary, humani-tarian organizations are made salient.

In a between-subjects design, we varied target of aid (individual vs. inter-mediate organization) and cause of need (12 different needs). Investigatingdonating in the context of varying targets and varying needs provides theopportunity to explore a number of questions neglected in the social psycho-logical literature. For instance, do people differ in responsiveness to group-level requests versus individual-level requests for aid? Regardless of theirideological positions, we expect that people tend to be more motivated todonate money to an individual in need than to an organization, a differencethat may be partly a result of diffusion of responsibility effects (Darley &Latané, 1968). If the presence of the intermediary organization makes salientthe existence of other possible donors, generosity would likely decline (seeFiske, 2004). Moreover, turning away from an individual in need may bemore difficult than failing to help an organization.

Are people less responsive to the characteristics of recipients when theydonate to nonprofit organizations, relative to when they donate to individuals?For example, we expect that the effect of perceived similarity to the recipientshould be more pronounced for individuals, because in order for similarity toelicit more helping, a sense of group identity or “we-ness” seems necessary (seeFiske, 2004). Intermediary, humanitarian organizations are likely to decreasein-group identification with the needy. Furthermore, we hypothesize that inthe individual case, persons perceived to be similar will be rated as lessresponsible for their plights (Dovidio, 1984) and will be given more help.

Do persons’ affective responses differ as a function of the target of aid? Weexpect relatively weak affective responses on the organizational versus indi-vidual level. It has been shown that help giving by means of governmentalprograms is less strongly influenced by affective responses than are moreinterpersonal forms of assistance (Skitka, 1999; Skitka & Tetlock, 1993;Zucker & Weiner, 1993). Here, we expect anger and sympathy to contributemore strongly to willingness to donate to individuals, relative to organizations.

Does the social conduct framework as postulated by the attribution–affect–action sequence account any better for help giving to individuals thanto organizations? We expect that it will, insofar as characteristics of therecipients should become less salient when persons donate via intermediaryorganizations. Nevertheless, consistent with previous findings (see Weiner,


1995), less perceived responsibility for a need is expected to be associatedwith greater sympathy, less anger, and larger self-predicted donations toindividuals and to organizations. Likewise, greater perceived seriousness ofneed should be associated with greater sympathy and larger self-predicteddonations (Betancourt, 1990; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988).

To what extent do ideological differences emerge across targets of aid thatvary in terms of the causes of their needs? To the extent that ideologicaldifferences reflect baseline propensities to ascribe responsibility to the needy,liberals and conservatives should have different affective reactions towardclaimants and should vary in their willingness to provide assistance (Skitka &Tetlock, 1992, 1993; Zucker & Weiner, 1993). We expect that ideology will bepredictive of donations such that more conservative persons will hold recipi-ents more responsible (Skitka, 1999) and, as a consequence, will be willing todonate less to individuals and to humanitarian organizations. Furthermore,given conservatives’ stronger ascriptions of responsibility, negative affectiveresponses (e.g., anger, distress) are likely to be more influential for conser-vatives than for liberals when they decide to withhold assistance.

To summarize, we expect that persons will tend to be more motivated todonate money to an individual in need than to an organization. In addition,they are expected to be more responsive to the characteristics of the recipientswhen they donate to individuals. For example, there should be stronger angerresponses toward individuals than toward individuals represented by orga-nizations. Furthermore, relatively conservative persons will donate less toindividuals and to humanitarian organizations. Collectively, perceptions oflower responsibility, greater seriousness of need, and greater perceivedbenefit to the recipient are expected to contribute to larger donations.

Method

Participants and Design

Study participants were 255 persons (126 female, 123 male, 6 individualsdid not indicate their gender) who were recruited on the campus of theUniversity of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and at Los Angeles Interna-tional Airport (LAX).3 Participants ranged in age from 18 to 69 years; and185 were native English speakers, while 64 were non-native speakers (6participants did not indicate their mother tongue). With regard to ethnicity,61% identified themselves as Caucasian, 20% as Asian, 5% as Latino(a), 4%

3The UCLA sample contributed 67.8% of the cases (N = 173), while the LAX samplecontributed 32.2% of the cases (N = 82).


as African American, 2% as Native American, and 8% as “other.” Order ofquestionnaire items, sex, age, and ethnicity had no effect on the dependentvariables, nor were there any significant interactions. Thus, these variablesare not considered further.

Procedure

Participants read scenarios that describe hypothetical persons who are inneed as a result of 1 of 12 conditions: AIDS, alcoholism, blindness, disad-vantaged Native American, disadvantaged youth, drug addiction, homeless-ness, a hurricane, lung cancer, health-compromising obesity, unemployment,and abuse by a male partner (female victim only). These need situations werechosen because they are ecologically valid, and also because they appear tovary in terms of severity and recipients’ degree of responsibility for the plight.

Participants in this between-subjects design read about a single person/situation, and were asked about their willingness to donate either to a needyindividual or to a relevant organization. For example, when asked to predicttheir donations to either an individual with AIDS or to a humanitarianorganization that serves persons with AIDS, the described uses of the funds(e.g., medicine and a healthcare program) were the same for both individualand organization recipients. That is, the scenario describing the single personin need reads “A person has been infected by AIDS. You learn that theperson needs money to pay for the necessary medicine and a healthcareprogram. You are asked to make a donation.” The scenario describing thehumanitarian organization reads as follows:

A humanitarian nonprofit organization targets people infectedwith AIDS. You learn that this charity provides the necessarymedicine and a healthcare program for AIDS patients. You areasked to donate money that would be used to finance the orga-nization’s program.

Using a 7-point scale, participants reported their perceptions of the recipi-ent’s responsibility for the condition (e.g., “Do you think that the actualcondition is the person’s fault?”), the seriousness of the recipient’s situation(e.g., “How serious is the plight of the person?”), how much sympathy theyfelt for the recipient (e.g., “How compassionate do you feel for the person?”),how much anger they felt toward the recipient (e.g., “How annoyed do youfeel toward the person when thinking about this condition?”), how likely theythought it was that their donations would improve the condition of therecipient (e.g., “How likely is it that the person can effectively be helped by


your donation?”), how much they thought they personally would benefitfrom their donations (e.g., “How much joy would you feel if you help theperson with your donation?”), and the extent to which they felt personallysimilar to the recipient (e.g., “To what extent do you think the person is likeyou?”). In the case of organizations, the wording in each condition referred tothe individuals targeted by the respective organization (e.g., “To what extentdo you think the persons helped by the organization are like you?”). Each ofthe seven preceding variables was measured using three items.

Willingness to donate was measured by three 7-point scales asking howmuch one would give considering his or her income, how likely one would beto donate to the person/nonprofit organization, and how willing one wouldbe to donate to the person/nonprofit organization. The alpha coefficient forall the aforementioned variables was greater or equal to .72.

Ideology was measured using a single 9-point scale ranging from 1(extremely liberal) to 9 (extremely conservative). This single measure was notassumed to provide a complete portrait of ideological orientation, yet suchsingle-item measures have been shown to correlate with more comprehensivemeasures (Jost & Major, 2001).

There were two orders of the questionnaire. The first version began withitems measuring willingness to donate, followed by feelings of sympathy andanger, donor’s likelihood of benefiting, recipient’s likelihood of benefiting,ratings of the recipient’s responsibility, perceived seriousness of need, andperceived similarity to the recipient. The second order was a mirror version ofthe first. On both versions of the questionnaire, demographic questions,including the question regarding ideology, were asked at the conclusion.

Results

Target of Donations

A 2 (Target) ¥ 12 (Cause of Need) between-subjects ANOVA yielded asignificant main effect of type of target, F(1, 253) = 3.74, p = .05, h2 = .02,with participants reporting greater willingness to donate to individuals(M = 4.14), relative to organizations (M = 3.79).4 This finding confirms ourassumption that regardless of any other considerations, persons would bemore helpful toward individuals than toward organizations. In addition, wefound a main effect of cause of need, confirming that the different scenarioselicited a range of responses with respect to size of donations, F(11,

4Sample source (UCLA vs. LAX) did not interact with target or cause of need, nor was thethree-way interaction significant (all Fs < 2.29). In addition, the main effect of sample source wasalso not significant (F < 2.26).


231) = 2.78, p < .01, h2 = .11. These main effects were qualified by a signifi-cant interaction, F(11, 231) = 1.81, p = .05, h2 = .08. Means, standard devia-tions, and mean differences for the different causes in the two targetconditions are presented in Table 1.

Although willingness to donate was greater toward individuals thantoward organizations in 8 of 12 scenarios, the differences were significantonly when the recipients’ needs were caused by a hurricane, t(20) = 3.49,p < .01; and unemployment, t(19) = 2.53, p < .05. Of the 12 causes, these twoappear to be most “unstable” (see Weiner, 1995). Victims of hurricanes andunemployment may simply require help “getting back on their feet,” whereasothers (e.g., the blind), may have needs that are less time limited.

To examine the effects of target (individuals vs. organizations) and causeof need, the eight measures—namely, perceived responsibility, seriousness,similarity, sympathy, anger, benefit to donor, benefit to recipient, andideology—were used as dependent variables. Effect sizes and F values arereported in Table 2. The multivariate effects of target and cause of need were

Table 1

Means of Donations for Target and Cause of Need

Cause of need

IndividualsIntermediateorganization

M SD N M SD N

AIDS 5.00a 1.20 12 4.05a 1.15 9Abused women 3.57a 1.40 11 4.50a 1.22 10Alcoholism 4.40a 1.30 10 3.95a 1.21 12Blindness 4.33a 0.83 9 4.41a 1.16 10Disadvantaged youth 3.62a 1.59 12 3.91a 1.68 12Disadvantaged native 3.45a 1.33 11 3.15a 1.68 10Drug addiction 3.00a 1.73 10 3.75a 1.48 12Homelessness 4.65a 1.88 10 4.48a 1.63 10Hurricane victims 5.31a 1.05 11 3.54b 1.31 11Lung cancer 4.44a 0.99 12 3.83a 1.71 9Obesity 3.12a 1.56 12 2.77a 1.60 9Unemployment 4.72a 1.22 9 3.08b 1.62 12

Note. Means with different subscripts differ significantly between the two targets atp < .05.


significant (at the .01 level), whereas the multivariate interaction betweentarget and cause of need was not significant (F < 1). Most importantly, in twoof eight variables, univariate F tests show the hypothesized differences on theindividual and organization-mediated level. In the case of anger, participantsresponded more strongly toward individuals (M = 2.57), relative to individu-als as represented by organizations (M = 2.01). Furthermore, seriousnessof need was judged to be greater for individuals (M = 5.24), relative toindividuals helped by organizations (M = 4.86). These findings will be furtherilluminated by the following results.

Responsibility, Seriousness, and Similarity Relative to Target of Aid

The substantial effects of cause of need on perceptions of responsibilityare consistent with the findings of previous research (e.g., Weiner et al.,1988). Systematic Tukey’s pairwise comparisons indicate that regardless ofthe target (i.e., whether they were individuals or individuals as representedby organizations), those suffering from substance use and overuse—namely, drug addiction, alcoholism, and obesity (Ms = 4.93, 4.28 and 4.07,

Table 2

Univariate and Multivariate Effect Sizes and F Statistics Associated WithCause of Need, Target, and Interaction on Study Variables

Measure

Target Cause of need Need ¥ Target

F h2 F h2 F h2

Responsibility 0.31 .002 8.62** .298 1.43 .066Seriousness 3.24* .026 2.95** .127 0.43 .021Similarity 2.24 .010 2.74** .119 0.30 .015Sympathy 0.69 .003 3.47** .146 1.85* .083Anger 7.76** .035 3.25** .138 2.70** .117Benefit to donor 0.16 .001 2.66** .116 0.60 .029Benefit to recipient 0.68 .003 2.71** .118 0.36 .018Ideology 0.27 .001 0.33 .055 1.18 .057Multivariate (Pillai’s

trace)2.42** .085 2.48** .113 0.87 .043

*p < .05. **p < .01.


respectively)—were seen as the most responsible for their plight, relative toother needy persons. As expected, for both individual and organization-mediated donations, seriousness of need was rated highest for life-threatening and long-term disabilities; that is, AIDS (M = 6.60), lung cancer(M = 5.60), and blindness (M = 5.51). Perceived similarity to the person inneed was not related to whether the target was an individual or an organi-zation. Overall, participants reported feeling most similar to people sufferingfrom blindness (M = 3.73), lung cancer (M = 3.65), and AIDS (M = 3.33);and least similar to homeless people (M = 2.27), drug-addicted people(M = 2.14), and abused women (M = 1.90).

Affective Responses Toward the Target of Aid

A main effect of target was observed such that participants reportedthat they would feel more anger toward individuals (M = 2.57), relativeto individuals as represented by humanitarian organizations (M = 2.01),F(1, 252) = 12.06, p < .001, h2 = .05. This main effect is qualified by an inter-action between target and cause of need, F(11, 243) = 2.73, p < .01, h2 = .12,with participants rating their feelings of anger most highly toward individualswith AIDS, drug addiction, and obesity. Overall then, negative affect (i.e.,anger) is more strongly associated with individuals than with organizationsif, as is the case with drug addiction, HIV, and obesity, we tend to blamevictims of such misfortunes for their plights (Furnham, 1995; Skitka, 1999).For persons with such “controllable” problems, being represented by anorganization mitigated negative affect toward them. It is interesting thatdespite reporting more anger toward the aforementioned individuals, partici-pants did not report that they would be less generous toward persons withHIV, drug addiction, or obesity than toward their representative groups (seeTable 1). This finding is consistent with recent evidence indicating thathelping behavior is influenced less strongly by anger than it is by sympathy(Rudolph et al., 2004).

There was a significant main effect of cause of need on sympathy (seeTable 2). This main effect was qualified by an interaction between target andcause of need, such that greater sympathy was shown to individuals relativeto organizations if the need was caused by a hurricane (Ms = 5.63 vs. 4.51),homelessness (Ms = 5.26 vs. 4.20), or unemployment (Ms = 4.25 vs. 4.00; allps < .05). Moreover, in contrast to the data with respect to anger, here we seepatterns in which greater sympathy toward individuals, relative to individu-als represented by organizations, is also accompanied by greater generosity(see Table 1), though the difference is not significant in the case of homeless-ness. Again, these data are consistent with previous findings that sympathy,


not anger, is most predictive of help giving. Furthermore, we should reiteratethat of the 12 causes, hurricanes and unemployment in particular appear tobe most time limited (in attributional terms, most unstable; see Weiner, 1995)requiring only brief, interpersonal assistance.

Determinants of Willingness to Donate

Previously, the five theoretically derived variables were found to predicthelp giving. To explore these relationships further, correlational analyses andmultiple regressions were carried out separately for help giving toward indi-viduals and by means of intermediate organizations. The majority of thevariables correlated significantly with willingness to donate both to individu-als (see Table 3, above the diagonal) and to intermediate organizations (seeTable 3, below the diagonal). But in every case, the variables correlated morestrongly with donations to individuals than donations to organizations. Mostimportantly, in particular those variables that pertain to characteristics of therecipients (e.g., responsibility for the plight, similarity to the donor) andaffective responses toward recipients were more strongly correlated withdonations to individuals than to individuals represented by organizations.But note that personal benefit to the donor (feeling “good,” “joyful,” “relief”from donating) and likely benefit to the recipient (“improvement,” “aid,” and“effectiveness” from the donation) correlated substantially with donations toindividuals and to organizations. As predicted, the presence of an interme-diary organization reduced the psychological impact of recipient character-istics such as perceived responsibility and similarity. Yet, cost–benefitconcerns (i.e., benefit to self and benefit to the recipient) remain important.

These findings replicate and extend those reported by Zucker and Weiner(1993; see also Weiner, 2006). The results of Zucker and Weiner’s studyindicated that affective responses, particularly anger, play a stronger directrole in interpersonal helping than in helping by means of welfare (i.e.,through an organization). The present study extends these findings byaddressing perceptions of recipient responsibility (similar to those measuredby Zucker & Weiner), and also the likely benefits to self and others. Ourresults are consistent with Zucker and Weiner’s assertion that feelings aremore directly influential for interpersonal helping, whereas cognitions aremore directly influential for impersonal forms of helping.

With respect to participant ideology and responses toward individuals,ideology negatively correlates with donations and with sympathy; and itpositively correlates with anger. This finding is consistent with previousresearch on ideological differences in response to victims. That is, conserva-tives, as opposed to liberals, feel more anger and less sympathy toward the


Tab

le3

Inte

rcor

rela

tion

sB

etw

een

Sub

scal

esfo

rIn

divi

dual

san

dN

onpr

ofit

Org

aniz

atio

nsC

olla

psed

Acr

oss

Nee

dS

cena

rios

Subs

cale

12

34

56

78

9

1.D

onat

e—

.466

**-.

302*

*.4

50**

.366

**-.

293*

*.2

81**

.257

**-.

249*

*2.

Sym

path

y.1

83**

—-.

223*

.337

**.3

30**

-.23

8**

.384

**.2

12*

-.29

1**

3.A

nger

-.13

1-.

293*

*—

-.19

5*-.

133

.465

**-.

110

-.17

8*.3

76**

4.B

enefi

tto

dono

r.4

05**

.413

**-.

251*

*—

.391

**-.

214*

.250

**.1

67-.

089

5.B

enefi

tto

reci

pien

t.2

59**

.246

**-.

136

.417

**—

-.11

4.0

49.1

19-.

054

6.P

erce

ived

resp

onsi

bilit

y-.

193*

-.28

1**

.426

**-.

148

-.17

6—

-.01

8-.

253*

*.1

71

7.Se

riou

snes

sof

need

.163

.477

**-.

291*

*.2

77**

.119

-.21

0*—

.038

-.14

58.

Sim

ilari

ty.0

41.0

55-.

009

.089

.111

-.02

5.1

49—

-.05

29.

Ideo

logy

-.16

7-.

180

-.04

8.0

09-.

100

.097

-.19

1*-.

030

—

Not

e.V

alue

sab

ove

the

diag

onal

indi

cate

indi

vidu

als

(N=

129)

,whi

leva

lues

belo

wth

edi

agon

alin

dica

teno

npro

fitor

gani

zati

ons

(N=

126)

.*C

orre

lati

onis

sign

ifica

ntat

.05.

**C

orre

lati

onis

sign

ifica

ntat

.01.


disadvantaged and, as a consequence, react less generously. In contrast,liberals see the poor as victims of unjust social practices and structures(Furnham, 1995) and are more positively disposed toward them. It must behighlighted here that these response differences are mitigated if the disadvan-taged are represented by an organization. When participants predicted theirresponses toward intermediary organizations, the correlations between ide-ology and affective and helping responses declined, with only perceptions ofseriousness of need significantly related to ideology.

Using the eight factors of responsibility, seriousness, similarity, sympa-thy, anger, benefit to donor, benefit to recipient, and ideology as predictorvariables for donation, multiple regressions reveal that more variance wasexplained for individuals (R2 = .39), F(8, 115) = 9.27, p < .001; than for orga-nizations as target (R2 = .27), F(8, 106) = 4.81, p < .001. Whereas benefit todonor and benefit to recipient were the two significant predictors for willing-ness to donate to individuals, willingness to donate to organizations wassignificantly predicted by benefit to donor and ideology.5

Discussion

This study explored similarities and differences in decision-making pro-cesses that underlie donations to individuals versus donations by means oforganizations. Taken together, these processes paint a coherent picture ofhow responsibility, seriousness of need, similarity, affective responses, cost–benefit concerns, and ideology contribute to different forms of helping. Thus,we have addressed the fundamental question: To what extent are decisions todonate to humanitarian organizations different or similar to decisions todonate to individuals?

First, our hypothesis was confirmed that people tend to be more moti-vated to donate money to an individual in need than to an organization, adifference that may be related to diffusion of responsibility (Darley & Latané,1968). If the presence of the intermediary organization makes salient theexistence of other possible donors, generosity would likely decline (see Fiske,2004).

Our second main research aim was to examine how four social psycho-logical approaches (theory of social conduct, seriousness of need, theory ofsimilarity, and cost–benefit models) and political ideology are able to explaindonations to individuals and to humanitarian organizations. Collectively,the variables account for more variance in donations to individuals than toorganizations, implying that variables not considered here are important to

5Complete results can be obtained from the first author upon request.


charitable donations. This leads us to speculate that aspects of the organiza-tion itself may contribute more strongly to cost–benefit assessments. Forexample, it may be more rewarding to donate to “trustworthy” organizationsknown to have minimal administrative costs and good records of efficiency.Such perceptions of efficacy may also reflect individuals’ beliefs regarding theextent to which their actions can influence a particular outcome.

In the case of donations to humanitarian organizations, help giving maydepend on individuals’ judgments regarding the extent to which their owncontributions will make a difference in terms of actually influencing the needsituation of the recipient. Conversely, it may feel punishing to have one’sdonations redirected toward maintaining a bureaucracy. We should note thatthe issue of organization effectiveness has recently been the topic of somepublic discussion. Recently, investor Warren Buffet turned over billions ofdollars to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and cited effective use offunds as the deciding factor behind his decision (“The new powers in giving,”2006). We are currently investigating ecologically valid factors that contrib-ute to perceptions of greater organizational effectiveness.

Perceived benefit to the donor significantly predicted willingness todonate both to individuals and to intermediary organizations. Currently, theimportance of self-interest to ostensibly “altruistic” charitable giving has alsobeen the focus of commentary within the popular press (see Huffington,2004). Consistent with this critique, a survey of U.S. corporate executivesrevealed that big donors were more likely to view self-interest as being servedby charitable giving. Furthermore, Frank, Gilovich, and Regan (1993)observed that more extensive training among economics students was nega-tively correlated with their likelihood of donating to charities. Thus, itappears that the salience of cost–benefit calculations can enhance or suppresshelp giving via organizations.

In the present study, donor ideology was found to relate to the size ofdonations both to organizations and to individuals. However, whereas con-servatives experience more anger toward individuals than do liberals—aresponse that was negatively associated with willingness to donate—ideologydid not significantly correlate with anger toward organizations. These resultsare intriguing, insofar as prominent conservatives have argued for adecreased emphasis on government programs and an increased focus oncitizen responsibility toward the less fortunate. For example, in a reportentitled “Principles and Reforms for Citizen Service,” the conservative Heri-tage Foundation (2003) recommended that policymakers “reject the model ofgovernment-centered national service. Volunteer service that is organizedand paid for by government goes against the American character” (p. 1642).If conservatives’ attributions of responsibility and anger inhibit not justinterpersonal assistance, but volunteerism as well, one would expect them to


shoulder less of the burden of reduced social programs. Such a speculationshould be empirically addressed.

In closing, we should acknowledge that by using a scenario-basedmethod, the present study is limited and may speak more clearly to persons’beliefs about their help giving than to the true causes of their behavior. It isimportant to explore how the present findings generalize over differentstudies, such as field studies in which real donations are at stake; and inexperimental studies in which factors such as the salience of other donors aremanipulated. In addition, the reader should be well aware that—because ofpower concerns—we combined our student data with the general adult data.Note that we found no effects of sample source on the main variable “will-ingness to donate” (see Footnote 4). Nevertheless, because our studentsample was much larger than our adult sample, future research focusing onthe responses of community-sample adults would be useful to illuminate thefactors influencing donations to individuals and to organizations.

Despite these limitations, the results of the present study provide consid-erable new insight into help giving toward individuals versus organizations.Previous theories and models used to explain help giving were fairly frag-mented and directed toward interpersonal assistance. Integrating factorsknown to influence helping has the potential to open up a number of newdirections for research on prosocial behavior more generally. The presentresearch is a first step in this direction, combining some of these factors in anincremental manner.

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a comparison of help giving to individuals versus humanitarian organizations

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