Humanitarian Agility in Action

UNICEF’s Response to the Yemen Crisis

A document prepared by the INSEAD Humanitarian Research Group for UNICEF

January 2017 – Abridged version

About INSEAD

INSEAD is one of the world’s leading graduate business schools, with campuses in France, Singapore

and Abu Dhabi. As a global educational institution, INSEAD’s mission is to create a learning

environment that brings together people, ideas and cultures from around the world, in order to

transform organisations and individuals through business education.

Besides education, INSEAD also conducts research through its research centres. Since 2001, the

Humanitarian Research Group (HRG) has been working to develop the science of humanitarian

logistics. HRG strives to increase the capacity of humanitarian actors to respond effectively to the

growing number of major disasters impacting the world today by finding solutions to management

challenges affecting humanitarian organisations.

About the authors

• Othman Boufaied, Research Associate, INSEAD Humanitarian Research Group

• Charles Delagarde, Research Associate, INSEAD Humanitarian Research Group

• Joachim Mikalsen, Research Associate, INSEAD Humanitarian Research Group

• Luk Van Wassenhove, The Henry Ford Chaired Professor of Manufacturing, Professor of

Technology and Operations Management, Director INSEAD Humanitarian Research Group

• Elin Williams, Writer, Editor, Consultant

Contacts

Luk Van Wassenhove

INSEAD Humanitarian Research Group

Bd de Constance - 77305 Fontainebleau - France

Email: luk.van-wassenhove@insead.edu

Web: http://centres.insead.edu/humanitarian-research-group/

Contents

1 Context of the crisis........................................................................................................................ 1

2 Impact on UNICEF operations ....................................................................................................... 1

3 UNICEF’s initial response ............................................................................................................. 2

4 The creation of the Djibouti hub .................................................................................................... 3

5 On the ground in Yemen ................................................................................................................ 5

6 Analysis: UNICEF’s strategically agile response .......................................................................... 6

6.1 Resource Fluidity .................................................................................................................... 7

6.2 Collective Commitment .......................................................................................................... 8

6.3 Strategic Sensitivity ................................................................................................................ 9

7 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................... 9

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1 Context of the crisis

The Arab spring of 2011 brought hope to Yemen – and then chaos.

Amid the turmoil of the 2011 Yemeni Revolution, President Ali Abdullah Saleh stepped down and

his former vice-president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, was elected unopposed.1 However, the

Houthis, a Zaidi-Shia movement from the northern tribes of the country and long-standing opponents

of Saleh, boycotted the election – and were not invited to join Hadi’s new cabinet in February 2012.

In 2014, following several conflicts with Sunni tribes in northern Yemen, the Houthis began

protesting against the government. The situation escalated and, by January 2015, the Houthis had

seized control of the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, and forced Hadi to step down.

Meanwhile, Hadi escaped to the southern port city of Aden and proclaimed on television that his

overthrow had been illegitimate. Several countries, including Saudi Arabia, condemned the Houthi

victory as a coup d’état or even an act of terrorism.

Houthi leaders countered by condemning continued Saudi recognition of President Hadi as an attempt

to destabilise the country, while Iran praised the Houthi uprising as the next phase in the Iranian

revolution. Yemen’s civil war was drawing ever closer to a “new Syria”2 or “proxy war” between Iran

and Saudi Arabia3 – as some commentators put it.

Matters came to a head on 21 March, when Houthi forces mobilised to defeat Hadi once and for all.

He responded by declaring Aden the country’s temporary capital and fled to Riyadh, requesting

support from Saudi Arabia. By the next day, the Houthis were already in control of key parts of Taiz,

less than 200 km from Aden. They arrived on the outskirts of Aden on 25 March. One of their

commanders claimed that they would not rest until they had reached Riyadh, the Saudi capital.

On 26 March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition of ten Arab States began airstrikes on Sana’a, and imposed

both an aerial and naval blockade on the whole of Yemen, plunging the already ravaged country

into an even deeper conflict.

2 Impact on UNICEF operations

When the bombing started, UNICEF had been present in Yemen for more than a decade, and had put

in place well-functioning supply lines to and within the country. The Yemen Country Office (YCO)

was located in the capital, Sana’a, with five field offices spread across the country (Aden, Hodeidah,

Sa’ada, Taiz, and Sana’a – see Figure 1).

UNICEF’s Supply Division (SD) in Copenhagen handled all logistics activities related to delivering

humanitarian supplies to Yemen, while the YCO organised the in-country transportation. The Middle

East and North African Regional Office (MENARO) in Amman also played a support role, with their

own logistics service providers and two regional warehouses located in Amman (Jordan) and Mersin

(Turkey). Only a limited range of goods were available locally in Yemen, so most of the supplies had

to be shipped into the country.

1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yemeni_Crisis_(2011%E2%80%93present) 2 http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/06/is-yemen-becoming-the-next-syria/ 3 http://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-presses-sunni-security-force-as-bulwark-against-iran-1427415577

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Before the bombing, UNICEF was operating two separate supply chains: one for vaccines, and one

for dry goods. Vaccine shipments were sent by air to Sana’a, while dry goods were shipped to the port

cities of Aden and Hodeidah by sea. From these entry points, goods were transported to warehouses

for temporary storage or shipped directly to partners. All of these logistics activities were outsourced

to service providers via long-term agreements.

This well-oiled operation ground to a sudden halt when the Saudi-led coalition bombed port and

airport infrastructures, and imposed a blockade on Yemen. UNICEF’s immediate problem was how to

get relief shipments into Yemen, as it was not clear who could give them permission to enter the

country, or how long the current situation would last. The YCO staff initially thought that Hodeidah

Port and Sana’a Airport would remain open – or at least reopen after a short time. “We didn’t expect

the entire delivery system to collapse,” says Yasser Al-Azazi, a logistics officer in the YCO.

Following the announcement of the blockade, the United Nations Department of Safety and Security

(UNDSS) took the difficult decision to evacuate all international staff from Yemen. The UN received

permission to land and depart from Sana’a Airport on 4 and 5 April, at which point all 25 of

UNICEF’s international personnel were relocated to the Regional Office in Jordan.

With every passing day, the situation in Yemen was growing in complexity. By April 2015, ever more

citizens, especially children, were in need of humanitarian assistance. Civilian casualties were on the

increase – not only as a direct result of bombing or gunfire but because humanitarian support had been

cut off. In addition, essential commodities were beginning to run low.

3 UNICEF’s initial response

When the bombing started on 26 March, UNICEF’s Yemen Country Representative, Julien Harneis,

happened to be in Cairo, where he had stopped on his way to Amman. The next day, on arrival in

Jordan, he went straight to the MENARO and prepared for the likely evacuation from Yemen. By the

time the international YCO staff arrived on 4 and 5 April, all the facilities they needed were in place.

The person initially in charge of coordinating the Yemen response was Paul Molinaro, Regional Chief

of Supply and Logistics, based in the MENARO. On 27 March, the day after the initial airstrikes, he

requested that the Supply Division identify all ships with UNICEF cargo on board that had Hodeidah

as destination. UNICEF containers at sea needed to be rerouted, while for vessels at berth, loading had

to stop. Molinaro also explored the possibility of chartering a flight to Sana’a to deliver urgently

needed aid cargo – and instructed the YCO to make a funding requisition accordingly.

Through Ibrahim El-Ziq, who worked at UNICEF’s Gulf Area Office in Riyadh, Molinaro learned

that the Coalition had introduced a process to grant selected flights approval to land in Sana’a. By

using El-Ziq’s contacts in the Saudi government, a flight permit was applied for and an aircraft was

loaded with emergency aid from UNICEF’s Supply Division on 2 April. However, the process of

delivering these supplies to Yemen proved to be a major challenge. After withdrawals of fly-over and

landing permissions from several countries’ civil aviation authorities, a stop-over in Djibouti

including a change of planes, and five permit applications to the Coalition, the cargo was finally

unloaded in Sana’a on 10 April. One simple delivery had taken eight days of intense work and

frustrated hopes. On the positive side, UNICEF was the first humanitarian organisation, together with

the International Committee of the Red Cross, to land a plane with aid cargo in Yemen.

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There was also an urgent need for funding to finance the initial operations. The YCO staff in Amman

therefore prepared a proposal for UNICEF’s Emergency Programme Fund (EPF), requesting

resources to handle the immediate response. They received US$ 3 million. In the meantime, as

UNICEF’s Country Representative in Yemen, Julien Harneis had the authority to reallocate funds

from different projects in the country to address the emergency. In addition, as the Regional Chief of

Supply and Logistics, Paul Molinaro, was able to “lend” the YCO water, sanitation and hygiene

supplies worth US$ 900,000. To finance the operations to come, a “flash appeal” for the first three

months of the Yemeni response was put out on 17 April via the UN Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

4 The creation of the Djibouti hub

With airports and major seaports closing, and difficulties in flying goods into Yemen, it was clear that

UNICEF needed to reengineer its supply chain into the country. Soon after the onset of the crisis, the

idea of a “forwarding hub” close to Yemen emerged (Figure 1).

The proximity to Yemen was especially important in light of the Coalition’s rules for flight permits.

Once a permit was obtained, the plane would need to enter Yemeni airspace, unload the goods and

exit the airspace, all within a four-hour time window. Moreover, flight permits were usually obtained

only the night before departure, which made close proximity to Yemen even more critical. Short

distances also equated to lower lead times for the much slower deliveries by sea.

Joselito Nuguid (Deputy Director of the Supply Division) and Peta Barns (Logistics Specialist in the

Supply Division) held a meeting with Paul Molinaro to discuss possible locations for the hub. The

options they considered were: Amman (Jordan); Aqaba (Jordan); Dubai (UAE); Salalah (Oman);

Saudi Arabia; and Djibouti.

Following further discussions with freight forwarders, Djibouti was selected for a variety of reasons,

including: UNICEF’s presence there; flexible logistics facilities; and relatively light government

regulation. In fact, the logistical infrastructure at Djibouti was excellent. It was one of the region’s

major seaports – with a tax-free zone for the import, storage and export of goods. In addition, Scan

Global Logistics, UNICEF’s principal freight forwarder in the region already had subcontractors in

Djibouti. Other humanitarian organisations were successfully using Djibouti as a transport hub for

Africa, which suggested that it could work for Yemen too. Most important of all, however, was

Djibouti’s proximity to Yemen – just 242 km to Aden, 394 km to Hodeidah (by sea) and 453 km to

Sana’a (by air).

Stéphane Arnaud, from the SD, arrived in Djibouti on 9 April to assess the suitability of the city as a

forwarding hub. The starting point for his assessment was to establish contact with two local service

providers in Djibouti through two of UNICEF’s international freight forwarders, Scan Global

Logistics and Kuehne + Nagel. In addition, some Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) staff in Djibouti

put Arnaud in touch with two further transport companies, one which owned a fleet of dhows

(motorised wooden vessels, typically used to transport dates, timber, and fish in the region).

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Figure 1: Key UNICEF locations in Yemen (with changes during the crisis marked in red)

Country Office

Field Office

Warehouse

Airport

Port

Legend Mukallah

Aden

Hodeidah

Sana’a

Taiz

Mocha

Djibouti

Sa’ada

Yemen

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MSF told Arnaud that they had already successfully used dhows to send medical aid from Djibouti to

Yemen. Through discussions with various transport companies, he also obtained information about

clearance, warehousing and transport. Arnaud introduced the service providers to each other and,

working with them, figured out how to organise shipments from Djibouti to Yemen.

After Arnaud had met with Paul Molinaro (MENARO) and Joselito Nuguid (SD) in Djibouti and

presented his suggestions, a plan for staffing and managing the hub was drafted. Collaboration with

Djibouti Country Office (DCO) staff, who agreed to lend some of their office space to support the

hub, was essential in getting the operation started. Following discussions with the DCO, who agreed

to continue providing necessary support, Molinaro and Nuguid flew straight back to Amman to get

the plan signed off by the YCO and MENARO. The task was made easier by the fact that both teams

were located in the same building.

The contract for managing the hub was awarded to Scan Global Logistics, which in turn was

responsible for subcontracting further service providers to carry out day-to-day operations.

The use of dhows for sea transport from Djibouti to Yemen proved beneficial, and gave UNICEF a

great deal of speed and flexibility. As ports in Yemen had been bombed, container vessels often had

to wait weeks before being handled, as there were only a limited number of functional unloading

cranes available – and waiting times to enter large ports had risen significantly. The much smaller

dhows, on the other hand, could be loaded and unloaded manually, almost immediately. These

wooden vessels could also deliver goods to smaller Yemeni ports. As a result, on a number of

occasions UNICEF was able to land goods in Yemen much closer to where they were actually needed.

5 On the ground in Yemen

When the fighting had escalated in late March, all non-life-saving programmes in Yemen had been

stopped. The focus had shifted to delivering emergency supplies to assist a population in peril.

Although shipments to Yemen were vastly improved by the creation of the forwarding hub in

Djibouti, the situation within the country remained complicated.

The YCO was forced to suspend its long-term agreements with transport companies in Yemen for two

reasons. First, fuel became difficult – and expensive – to obtain. Second, the security landscape

shifted considerably. Service providers were unable to reach some destinations, while for others the

prices rose sharply. The charge for a delivery from Sana’a to Taiz, for example, was five times the

pre-crisis rate. The decision was taken to source service providers case by case for each delivery,

instead of using the established long-term agreements.

On the other hand, the customs process at Yemeni entry ports became more efficient. In April 2015,

UNICEF reached an agreement with the customs authorities to speed up the process, obtaining a so-

called “direct release” of goods. This meant that shipments could leave the port as soon as the

approval from the Ministry of Health came through, whereas they had previously needed approval

from four or five ministries. Customs clearance (or exemption) was handled afterwards. The time

taken to release supplies after arrival at the port fell from 3–4 weeks to 2–3 days. Thus UNICEF’s

lead times for shipments into Yemen became even shorter than before the blockade, despite the fact

that deliveries now had to be routed via the Djibouti hub.

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Another problem faced by the YCO was electrical cuts due to bombing of power plants. Even before

the conflict escalated, electricity supplies had been unreliable, which meant that many Yemenis relied

on generators. However, with fuel either unavailable or unaffordable due to the blockade, this was no

longer an option. Yasser Al-Azazi, who was the only UNICEF logistics person left in Yemen, took

the initiative to buy solar panels, which compensated for the unreliable electricity supply and greatly

enhanced communications with his colleagues outside the country.

In May 2015, Al-Azazi’s international teammates returned from Jordan, but the Yemen crisis endures

to this day (December 2016). Despite sporadic peace talks and ceasefires, airstrikes and fighting have

become regular occurrences and essential commodities are still hard to come by. What was already

the poorest country on the Arabian Peninsula has been further ravaged by war, disease and

malnutrition.

Meanwhile, amidst the most arduous working conditions, UNICEF has continued to deliver unbroken

emergency aid. Its support is essential for a population in which 3.2 of the 27 million inhabitants are

internally displaced, and a staggering 82% are in need of humanitarian assistance, including 1.5

million acutely malnourished children. More than 6,400 metric tonnes of emergency supplies have so

far been sent into the country via the Djibouti hub. Initially planned to operate for 3-6 months, the hub

is still very much needed – and looks as if it will remain open for quite some time.

6 Analysis: UNICEF’s strategically agile response

When the Yemeni crisis escalated with the start of the Coalition airstrikes, UNICEF’s supply chain

broke down completely, making shipments to and within the country quasi-impossible. An agile

response by UNICEF led to the development of a new, flexible supply chain, which enabled the

organisation to act effectively in this new context.

Clearly, a large organisation like UNICEF cannot react in this way by accident or sheer luck. Over the

years, UNICEF has developed a number of supply chain and broader organisational competences,

which – perhaps due to the particular circumstances and people involved – were effectively and

successfully combined in the Yemen crisis.

The question then becomes: How can an organisation successfully and systematically develop these

skills, and combine them into a competitive advantage? We will attempt to answer this question by

viewing UNICEF’s response through the prism of a framework called Strategic Agility.4

In the current “VUCA” world of Volatility, Uncertainty, Complexity, and Ambiguity, it is becoming

exponentially more difficult to foresee and plan for the future. Our management models cannot cope

with the shocking problems we face and the fast-changing environment around us. A different – more

strategic and agile – model is needed for organisations to thrive on change.

Strategic Agility is the capacity of organisations to proactively identify and respond to emerging

strategic challenges so as to avoid unnecessary crises and carry out strategic and structural changes in

an orderly and timely manner.

Strategic Agility consists of three major building blocks: resource fluidity, collective

commitment, and strategic sensitivity.

4 Y. Doz and M. Kosonen, “Embedding Strategic Agility”, Long Range Planning Vol. 43, pp. 370-382, 2010

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1. Resource fluidity: Fluidity in fast mobilisation and (re)deployment of strategic resources or

funds, people and competences, providing the operational underpinning for Strategic Agility.

2. Collective commitment: The ability to make and implement decisions that mobilise multiple

subunits to sustain and integrate collaborative action.

3. Strategic sensitivity: The early awareness and acute perception of incipient trends,

converging forces, risks of discontinuities, and the real-time sense-making of strategic

situations as they develop and evolve.

Building Strategic Agility is a second-order change to mastering a permanently available

capability to face challenges and complex problems as they arise. That is, the change is in how

we do things, not what we do.

As the organisation gains agility, resources are allocated with greater fluency. Strategic foresight and

insight frame and guide actions, and a “whole-organisation” commitment integrates policies and

actions across the usual bureaucratic silos. The spectrum of actions available to the organisation is

renewed, or at least enhanced, to better address complex, interdependent issues.

Several elements of UNICEF’s response can be analysed in terms of the three building blocks of

Strategic Agility, as follows.5

6.1 Resource Fluidity

People fluidity

The Supply Division was able to move personnel fast. Stéphane Arnaud, Senior Emergency Supply

Manager, SD Copenhagen, was deployed within 48 hours of the decision to use Djibouti as a hub.

Moreover, the Deputy Director of SD, Joselito Nuguid, and the Regional Chief of Supply and

Logistics, Paul Molinaro, both travelled to Djibouti shortly after the onset of the crisis. In addition, the

coincidental co-location of the MENARO and the temporary YCO, and the fact that all these people

knew each other well (Paul Molinaro, who had worked in Copenhagen for a long time, the staff in the

Copenhagen SD, the Yemen country representative Julien Harneis, etc.), certainly facilitated the quick

decision-making process. Experienced people with mutual respect and trust do not need a lot of words

to create a joint understanding, agree on an action plan and quickly move forward.

Funding fluidity

While a flash appeal was issued to OCHA, the immediate funding need was met in a fluid fashion

from several sources. The first was a quick application to the UNICEF Emergency Programme Fund.

Permission was also granted to reallocate some Yemen programme funds to the emergency in order to

act quickly. In addition, Paul Molinaro granted the Yemen Country Office supplies valued at US$

900,000. It is clear that this fluid funding reallocation allowed for quick and independent action – and

prevented the delays that are typical of many bureaucratic organisations with slow funding processes.

Indeed, funding fluidity is essential in emergencies, where time lags between pledges and actual

availability of funds can be substantial and seriously hamper operations.

5 A more comprehensive analysis is available in the extended version of the report.

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Transport fluidity

The SD has created an effective global ecosystem of partners through Global Freight Agreements

(GFAs) with four freight forwarders that have excellent capabilities. Indeed, the Supply Division is

similar to the head of an octopus in that it has freight forwarder tentacles all over the globe, which can

be flexibly repositioned in case of a transport blockade like in Yemen. The SD can tap into the supply

chain and partnering network capabilities of the freight forwarders, and benefit from their one-stop-

shop services and excellent IT tracking systems.

The global supply chain strategies and the outsourcing of transport through GFAs allowed the

organisation to focus on a solution, i.e. establishing a hub in Djibouti, rather than on the details of

execution, since UNICEF could count on its partners to swiftly reallocate, reroute and execute

shipments. It also allowed UNICEF to select Djibouti and the dhow solution to flexibly serve small

ports based on the changing security situation, thereby reducing distances for difficult inland

transport.

6.2 Collective Commitment

Collective commitment across the organisation

UNICEF benefits from a deeply engrained organisational culture and focus on its mission of helping

children. This collective commitment ensures that people are driven by a purpose rather than by the

usual organisational key performance indicators centred on efficiency. When push comes to shove,

the wellbeing of children always takes precedence over the potential hurdles that a necessarily large

and therefore bureaucratic organisation may sometimes impose. This collective commitment pervades

all functions and levels of the organisation, even though it may be experienced more directly and daily

in difficult field conditions like those in Yemen. In short, it allows UNICEF to engage the hearts,

minds and hands of its people.

Collective commitment across the hierarchy and units

There is a clear internal alignment between the SD, the ROs, and the country offices, in this case the

MENARO, YCO and the DCO. The SD and the ROs strongly support the country offices, especially

during emergencies, when support is available 24/7. These people have a collective commitment to

solving problems in order to get the necessary support to children in need. They form a community of

experts with field experience, who are also close to one another in that they have worked together

before and have developed relations of respect and trust, frequently even personal friendships.

This collective commitment within a close-knit community of people facilitates fluid navigation

across hierarchical levels and units, circumventing the usual barriers of large bureaucratic

organisations. It is one of the foundations of a fast and agile reaction, as was clearly exemplified in

the Yemen crisis.

Collective commitment across the country

There was a strong commitment of the Yemen Country Office, and all its expatriate and local

personnel, to UNICEF’s mission and programmes in the country – and this in spite of hard and

frequently dangerous conditions. People were clearly determined to ensure continuity of the

programmes and alleviate the suffering of children. A particularly good example is that of Yasser Al-

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Azazi, YCO logistics officer, and his decision to stay and face the hardship conditions in spite of the

security issues. His work was essential in the response to the crisis, but the commitment of the rest of

the staff in Yemen was equally important, or as Al-Azazi puts it himself: “We managed all together to

make things happen.”

6.3 Strategic Sensitivity

Strategic sensitivity of the Supply Division

The efforts over the years to build a strong SD have clearly led to the development of a set of skills

that increase the strategic sensitivity of the organisation and allow UNICEF to be better prepared in

case of emergencies. The design of the supply chain with global warehouses and strategic pre-

positioning of supplies is an obvious example, since it allows prompt reaction to crises all over the

globe. Similarly, the focus on procurement and outsourcing of transport to well-chosen freight

forwarders is an example of heightened strategic sensitivity.

Strategic sensitivity in the Yemen crisis

A clear sign of strategic sensitivity in the Yemen crisis was the quick recognition that big vessels

would be slow to arrive – and would suffer queuing delays and unloading difficulties. Another

example was the fast realisation that a hub close to Yemen would need to be established swiftly,

which led to the Djibouti solution. The realisation that dhows allowed a flexible shift to different

destinations when security conditions dynamically changed, and that local ports would reduce inland

insecure and fuel-dependent travel to partners also demonstrate strategic sensitivity.

7 Conclusions

After a successful intervention in Yemen, it is clear that UNICEF has the potential to consolidate a

powerful asset: the capacity to be strategically agile in the response to sudden crises. Other

humanitarian organisations can benefit from following UNICEF’s example and utilising the

framework of Strategic Agility. By applying it to their operations, organisations should be able to map

not only their strengths, but also their opportunities to improve.6

Strategic Agility is a fundamental organisational capability that requires time and resources to

develop. It should be considered a “total concept”, encompassing the entire organisation. It also

requires a home in the organisation, i.e. a unit responsible for further development, communication,

and training. By utilising it as a framework for mapping improvement opportunities, organisations can

become more aware of what changes are needed. However, to implement these changes and become

strategically agile, investments in terms of time, resources, and commitment will almost certainly be

needed.

We would like to end with the observation that in our VUCA (volatile, uncertain, complex and

ambiguous) world, crises are bound to occur more frequently and unexpectedly, making Strategic

Agility a new necessity. After all, who anticipated Brexit, the European refugee crisis, or the

presidential election in the USA? And who wants to forecast what will happen next year? Careful

strategic planning is out. Strategic Agility is the way to go. To be able to respond to today’s

challenges and make a difference to the lives of individuals in need throughout the world, Strategic

6 For a description of improvement opportunities in UNICEF’s response to the Yemen crisis, please refer to the extended

version of the report.

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Agility should be considered a key capability for humanitarian organisations. UNICEF is clearly

showing the way, as exemplified by its successful Yemen operation.