a brief and incomplete history

7/27/2019 A Brief and Incomplete History

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A Brief and Incomplete

History of thePhilosophy of Science

Based largely on John Losee (1993)A Historical Introduction tothe Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford UP.


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Plato (427 - 347 BCE)

Platos epistemology denigrated scientificknowledge (knowledge of natural andmaterial regularities)such knowledgewas not of the true reality, but merely ofshadows in the cave

Most important for Plato was knowledgeof the Forms, the abstract entities whichdefine the moral and metaphysicalstructure of the universe

Knowledge of the Forms was to begained not via observation andinference, but through pure reason andphilosophical discourse


3/41

Inductive-Deductive Model:

From observations one proceeds by inductive inference (1) toGeneral Principles which explain the observations in virtue ofthe fact that those same observations can be deduced (2)from the principles

Aristotle (384-322 BCE)

(1) Induction Deduction (2)

General Principles

Observed Phenomena


4/41

Aristotles I-D Model

Induction: enumeration, direct intuition Deduction: categorical logic

Aristotle required that the General Principles beat least as evident as the observations

ultimately, they should be self-evident ornecessary truths

The motivation here is to avoid arriving at claims whichdescribe only accidental regularities

Rather GPs should be self-evident necessary truthsreflecting the essences of objects and relations in nature

This is related to the issue of the nature oflaws

The problem is that it is hard to see how we can get tonecessary truths via induction

This can be seen as an outcropping of theproblem ofinduction


5/41

Aristotles Four Causes

Material Cause: substance which undergoes a process Formal Cause: general conditions required for, and

pattern or form of, process

Efficient Cause: immediate conditions which precipitatethe process or bring the object into being

Final Cause: the purpose or end for which the processoccursxoccurs in order that this sort of explanation iscalled teleological

To fully explain a phenomena, each of its four causes must beexplained

Whereas now we focus primarily on a combination of the firstthree and often try to eliminate teleological explanation,Aristotle saw the final cause/teleological explanation as mostimportant to understanding the nature of things

this raises the issue of the nature of laws and causation
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Pythagoreanism

Pythagoreans revered numbers and mathematicalrelations to the point of mysticism

The real is the mathematical patterns and harmoniesdiscoverable in nature

Describe the mathematical structure of a phenomena andyou have knowledge of its essence

This contrasts with Aristotelianism in that it focuses on theformal cause to the exclusion of the others, it especiallyneglects final causes

Our current mathematical physics is, indeed, quitePythagorean

Pythagoreanism resembles Platonism in that it gives prideof place to abstract entities (numbers) and their relations,

but it does not have much to say about moral Forms


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PythagoreanismProblems Given their knowledge of the Pythagorean Theorem, and

the fact that they conceived of all numbers as ratios,certain quantities were thought to be mysterious andincommensurable (immeasurable or unable to be comparedwith known quantities, what we would call the irrationalnumbers), e.g.,

Of course, any good mysticism has to have mysteries

A further problem is that the same phenomena can be

described by various different, but observationallyequivalent, mathematical models

This is the issue ofunderdetermination of theory by evidence

This puts in question the ideal that mathematicaldescription gets at the true nature of things


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Pythagoreanism and SavingAppearances

The tension between Pythagoreanism and thepossibility of observationally equivalentmathematical descriptions was especially acute inastronomy

It was well knowne.g., by Ptolemy

(100-178)that motion of the planetscould be equally well accounted for byvarious mathematical models

The question then becomes whetherto view mathematical description as

revealing underlying nature or asmerely providing a convenient description of theobservable phenomena (saving the appearances)

This leads to the issue of the observation/theorydistinction andrealism/anti-realism
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E

E E

Three Models of Planetary Motion

Planet P revolves aroundpoint c, while c revolvesaround Earth, E

When P passes through aand b, P will appear tomove backwards againstthe night sky seen from E(retrograde motion of P)

Planet P revolves aroundpoint c, while c revolvesaround Earth, E

When c and P are onopposite sides of Eretrograde motion of Poccurs

c

a b

P

P

Epicycle/Deferent MovingEccentric

P

HeliocentricCircles

S

Planet P and Earth, E, bothrevolve around Sun, S

When E passes Pretrograde motion of Poccurs

These models also account for variations in speed and distance relative to E. Further epicycles, eccentrics,deferents, and equants can be added for greater precision. Of course, none of these is correct

epicycle

deferent

eccentric

c


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Saving Appearances Especially in astronomy, a tradition evolved of

not claiming reality for the mathematicalmodelsthe task for the astronomer is not tohypothesize about the unobservable nature ofthings, but to provide convenient andobservationally adequate models

This is a form ofanti-realism Relates to the observation/theory distinction

This is very similar to naive positivism,operationalism, and current constructiveempiricism

Ptolemy was inconsistent on this issue, usuallystressing Pythagorean realism, but sometimesweakening his claims to saving the appearances(though he never considered heliocentrismplausible)
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Saving Appearancesand Oneself

The famous heliocentrists, Copernicus (1473-1543), Galileo (1564-1642), and Kepler (1571-1630), each had Pythagorean commitments

each held to the reality of his model, and

each was strongly motivated, not just by data andobservation, but also by strong mathematicalaesthetics, a desire to find certain kinds of harmoniesin nature

This raises the issues ofscientific revolutions and therationality of theory change

Yet each of the heliocentrists was advised topresent his work as a mere saving of appearancesto avoid persecution from the Church. Galileo did

not take great pains to hide his commitment to thereality of heliocentrism. As a result, Galileo wasbrought before the Inquisition and forced torecant, spending the his last eight years underhouse arrest.

Again, the issues of rationality, revolutions, and socialforces

Copernicus

Galileo

Kepler
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Atomism

A further metaphysical/explanatory picture that can becontrasted to Pythagoreanism and Aristotelianism isAtomism

Proponents included Leucippus (490-430 BCE) andDemocritus (460-360 BCE)

The general approach was to explain observed qualitativeand quantitative changes by reference to quantitativechanges at a more elementary level of organization

This, too, neglects the Final Cause, and is thoroughlymaterialistic, thus it is antithetical both to Aristotelianismand to Platonism/Pythagoreanism

One difficulty is to avoid simply attributing to the atoms thevery property to be explained at the macro level. Doing sowould create a circular explanation, which is to say, noexplanation at all (e.g., day-old coffee is bitter because ithas acquired large numbers of bitter atoms)

This raises the issue of the nature and quality of scientificexplanationas well as the observation/theory distinction


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Development of the I-D modelin the Middle Ages

The Middle Ages saw a number ofmodifications to and developments ofAristotles basic I-D model


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Robert Grosseteste (c. 1168-1253)

Attempted to systematize choice amongcompeting theories

Use Modus Tollens to eliminate all but one possiblehypothesis

I.e., deduce a consequence, C, from a hypothesis, H,show that not-C, conclude not-H

Modus Tollens:If H, then Cnot-C

not-H

Problem is, this cannot be done;it is not possible to eliminate allbut one hypothesis

underdetermination


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Roger Bacon(1214-92)

Three Prerogatives of Experimental Science:1. From general principles deduce claims about new

phenomena, and put these to experimental test(Aristotle required only that the originalphenomena be deduced)

2. Actively and systematically experiment in order toincrease data and knowledge of phenomena

3. Use this knowledge to develop new techniques forgathering data and testing hypotheses, as well asfor developing practical tools and new crafts; lookto old craft traditions as a source of data andtechnical knowledge

These constitute advances over Aristotles simpleinductive-deductive method, because it stressessystematic gathering of data, the extension of implicationsand tests to new phenomena, and a bridging of the gapbetween intellectual knowledge and craft knowledge


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Scotus and Ockham on Induction

Further forms of induction articulated

These two methods are often called the (first two) ofMills Methods,after J.S. Mill (1806-73), whose arguments in favor of inductivism were

widely influential.

Duns Scotus(1265-1308)

Method of Agreement

Case Circumstances Effect Conclusion

1 ABCD e

A can be the cause of e

2 ACE e

3 ABEF e

4 ACD e

William ofOckham

(1280-1349)

Method of Difference


1 ABC eA can be the cause of e

2 BC -


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Ockhams Razor

William of OckhamOckhams Razor A demand for simplicity, stated in various forms:

Assume nature takes the simplest path available

assume the minimum number of (types of) objects necessary to thetheory/explanation

do not unnecessarily complicate theory

eliminate superfluous concepts. Ockham would not like the first formulation because it makes a

metaphysical claim about nature (that it pursues the simplestpath), and, Ockham would say, we cannot know how God hasdesigned natureGod could complicate nature unnecessarily if heso chose

Instead, Ockham cast his injunction so as to apply to our theoriesrather than to nature itselfkeep the theories as simple aspossible

while in principle God could complicate things, we should not pretendto knowledge of Gods design

we should make our theories as simple and tractable as possible,

given the evidence


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Necessary Truth of First Principles

Note that Ockhams caution in stating his razor, as well as the cautious form of theconclusions in the two inductive methods above, point out a growing recognition ofthe fallibility of inductive inference, as well as a reconsideration of Aristotlesrequirement that the First (General) Principles be self-evident. For some thinkersself-evidence may still have been a goal, but many began to recognize (in theory ifnot in practice) that one had to be more cautious about the strength of onesinductively generated conclusions.

Duns Scotus believed that sense experience allowed us to recognize necessarytruths, but that such truths were true in virtue of the meanings of the terms, and itwas understanding of these meanings, not sense experience, which justifies ourbelief in them (see Herschel); such truths are necessary, as their denials are self-contradictory

An early version ofanalyticity

Aristotle, Scotus, and others had assumed that certain first principles of the specialsciences could be known to be necessary, hence what counted as self-contradictory

extended beyond just what could be reduced to a logical contradiction

Nicolas of Autrecourt (c. 1300-1350+) had a much stricter notion of necessary truth,restricting it to claims whose denials are logical contradictions

Much like David Hume (1711-1776) four centuries later, Nicolas concluded that we can haveno certain knowledge of causal relations (Hume also draws stronger conclusions)

Much unlike Hume, Nicolas used his critique to encourage faith in a Christian God

The issue oflaws and causation
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Galileo and Francis Bacon Galileo (1564-1642) stresses the role of

abstraction and idealization in the inductive stage Takes to heart and implements R. Bacons

injunction to test hypotheses against newphenomena

Is a master of qualitative observation andexperimental design

And, of course, one of the first the use thetelescope to make astronomical observations

Francis Bacon (1561-1626) tries to develop a moresystematic and more careful version of AristotlesI-D model

Eliminate all prejudices and assumptions

Gather a huge amount of data and generalizecautiously

Build up to ultimate generalities through a hierarchyof intermediate steps (restricted generalities)

Science should be an organized community endeavor

Science should have practical results, eventually manshould regain his dominion over nature


20/41

Ren Descartes(1596-1650)

Rejects Aristotelian I-D Model, and inverts F. Baconsascent to generality

Rather than inductively building fromobservations to successively more general andmore fundamental truths (as F. Bacon),Descartes proposed to start with the most

general and most certain truths and derive morespecific knowledge and observations from those

Clarity and distinctness a guide to a prioriknowledge of concepts, their implications, andtheir application

E.g., Descartes thought he could derive, a priori,

laws of physical matter from metaphysical truthsabout extension and motion of bodies, and generaltruths about the relation between mind and bodyfrom truths about the different substances

Observation has a role in determining underwhich circumstances regularities occur, but

observation cannot support general laws


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22/41

David Hume (1711-76) Broad empiricist attack on metaphysics and causal

knowledge Criterion of meaningfulness

A thought is genuinely meaningful only if it can betraced back its constituent sensory impressions

(similar to 20th c. positivism)

Knowledge divided into Relations of ideas

Their denials are logically contradictory, so theyare necessary truths, known with certainty

Subject matter restricted to logic, math, geometryno question of existence or causation is a relation of

ideas (see analyticity)

Matters of Fact

Neither a MOF nor its denial is logically contradictory,so each is possible

Based in knowledge of cause and effect, which is notcertain In fact,


23/41

David Hume (1711-76) Induction, Causation, Matters of Fact

Knowledge of MOF based in knowledge of cause andeffect

Knowledge of cause and effect based on experience

All knowledge based on experience presupposes the

fundamental inductive principle that the future will belike the past

But this principle is not a relation of ideas, so it must bea MOF

But then the fundamental principle of induction cannot

be justifiedany attempt to do so would requirepresupposing that very principle

This is Humes version ofthe problem ofinduction
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David Hume (1711-76) Hume concludes that our judgments concerning matters of fact

(including causal relations) are notrationally grounded at all Rather there are (stronger or weaker) habits of expectation which

evolve in us as a result of (i) our natural propensities and(ii) observation of constant conjunctions of events (fire then heat,fire then heat)

This skeptical solution is a form of psychological naturalismdescription of what we do, how we cannot avoid it

He is rejecting inductive justification (though not inductivepractice), as well as intuition of necessary truth

Indeed, we cannot know the hidden springs and principlesunderlying the world we observe, all we ever know of is the

constant conjunctions of kinds of eventslaws and causation

Except, perhaps, for Nicolas of Autrecourt, Hume is the first wevelooked at to completely reject the ideal of somehow arriving atsecure generalizations or certain First Principles of some sort

Hume, unlike Nicolas, used these skeptical results to argue

against metaphysics and religion


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Immanuel Kant(1724-1804) Kant responds to Hume by distinguishing the form

from the content of knowledge Form is not given in experience; rather the raw

data of experience is structured in various waysby the rational human mind

Space and Time are the Forms of Sensory Intuition,all perception is structured by these forms

Perceptions so structured are further organized andsynthesized according to 12 Categories ofUnderstanding (e.g., Unity, Substance, Causality, Contingency, etc.)

Judgments are made and organized via the Regulative Principles ofReason

Since the structures/forms Kant posits are inherent in the human

rational mind, they are open to philosophical investigation, theycan be known via pure reason

Since any knowledge (esp., empirical/scientific) presupposes theForms, Categories, and Principles, we can (contra Hume) haveknowledge of the general features of any possible scientifictheory, including fundamental and general truths about causation,

matter, motion, etc.


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Immanuel Kant Transcendental Idealism

from a point of view which attempts to transcend our forms ofcognition, we recognize how much our mind and its structurecontributes to our knowledge of the world

Empirical Realismfrom a point of view which does not attempt the impossibletranscendence, the structures imparted by the Forms, Categories,

and Principles are fully real, and necessary truths regarding suchthings as causal relations and matter can be known

Some problems with this ingenious and seductive picture:

What justifies saying this is what any theory or cognition mustpresuppose? How can we be sure weve correctly identified the most

basic forms, categories, and principles? Must they be unique? Kantthought he had identified unique basic forms, but some of what hetook as basic to science has since been changed and rejected byscience

How can one coherently speak of the transcendental unreality of formsand categories, while maintaining that transcendence is impossible,and that the transcendental (noumenal) world is unknowable?


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J.S. Mill (1806-73)

Laws, General Principles, and theoreticalclaims are justified by inferences fromexperience which satisfy inductive schemasor formsthis is known as Inductivism

Much like the I-D model, but little importallowed to the D side, and Mill had veryspecific inductive methods in mind

Mill a bit unrealistic about how wellinductive schemas can justify theoretical claims

Deduction from hypotheses of successful prediction arequirement, but not a justifying factor unless all otherpossible hypotheses are eliminated

Again, justification of theoretical claims is gained only byconformity of the data to inductive schemas supporting thetheoretical claims


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Mills Methods

Method of Agreement* Method of Difference*Method of Concomitant Variation


1 An BC an b (occurrence of a is varying proportionally

to occurrence of A)So either A causes a, or A and a have a

common third cause

2 A0 BC a0 b

3 A1/n BC a1/n b

Method of Residues


1 ABC abc

A is the cause of a2 B b

3 C c

*See Scotus and Ockham on Induction


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Hypothetico-Deductivism

William Whewell (1794-1866) andW.S. Jevons (1832-82) rejected Inductivism

Rather than justified on the basis ofinductions, a hypothesis is justified when it

Is consistent with other established

hypotheses, and The consequences deducible from the

hypothesis agree with observations

With its strong emphasis on predictive test,this is in the spirit of Aristotle, R. Bacon,

Galileo, and Newton, but the view givesmore priority to predictive test than theseothers (by giving much less importance toinduction)

Whewell

Jevons


30/41

Herschel on Discovery and Justification

John Herschel (1792-1871)

Herschel distinguished the issue of how atheory was arrived at (context of discovery)from the issue of its acceptability orjustification (context of justification)

He claimed that context of discovery is

strictly irrelevant to context of justification Discovery

Use of inductive schemas Abstraction and imaginative hypothesis F. Bacon-like hierarchy of generalizations

Justification Success of deduced predictions (thus a form of hypothetico-

deductivism), especially Extension of predictions to extreme cases Deduction of unexpected predictions and their successful testing Use of crucial experiments to decide between competing

theories/hypotheses


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Problem(s) of Induction Two Issues:

The Descriptive Issue: we arrive at beliefs regarding unobservedmatters of fact (future particulars, eternal generalizations)How dowe do that?

The Normative Issue: do we arrive at such beliefs the way in whichwe oughtto arrive at them? I.e., are we justified in our practice? If notis there any practice we could adopt which is justified?

Problems Regarding the Normative Issue: Uncertainty/Underdetermination : Inductive inference is

underdetermined, hence not truth-preserving, hence some amount ofuncertainty is involved, even when starting from certain premises

Lack of Rational Ground: The basic principle(s) of induction are notlogical truths, nor self-evident, so what justifies those principles? As

Hume points out, we cannot appeal to experience, because any suchappeal presupposes the very inductive principles in questionthis isthe problem

A useful online discussion: The Problem of Induction
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Underdetermination

The Underdetermination of Theory by Evidence

Given any amount of observational evidence, there will be morethan one (indeed infinitely many) theories compatible with thatevidence

A unique theory is never dictated by the evidence, not even if wehad all possible evidence

This raises the question of how and if we can rationally decidebetween theories

WRONG and often WRONGLY ATTRIBUTED TO W.V. Quineversion: a theory can be preserved in the face of any contraryevidence (what Quine says, in case youre interested, is that a

hypothesis or statementcan be preserved as long as others aregiven up, but this is a CHANGEIN THEORY, some hypotheses arepreserved, others not)

This correct understanding of Quine implies that

There are no crucial experiments to rule out a hypothesis

There are (near) crucial experiments to rule out whole theories


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Observation/TheoryDistinction

Intuitively, there seems to be a distinction between that which wecan observethe observational; and that which we cannotobservethe theoretical Observable: people, stars, trees, rocks, grains of sand, a patch of

red

Theoretical: electrons, quarks, viruses, dark matter, the big bang,trees, people

The theoretical ispositedor inferredto help predict and explainthe observable

Problems abound for this distinction: Does the distinction concern observable vs. theoretical

Objects?

Words and Sentences involved in scientific claims?

Sense Data vs. Things in the World? How sharp is the distinction?

Does something projected onto the retina through a microscope or telescopecount as observable?

What about artificially colored images produced on a screen by an electronmicroscope or an infrared sensitive telescope?

What about observations made by a prosthetically enhanced human?


34/41

Revolutions and Rationality

Given the problems ofInduction andUnderdetermination, is theory acceptance(change) at all rational?

If so, there must be some substantialconstraints on theory acceptance beyondmere induction and deduction ofobservable consequences

What are they? How do we know?

next slide


35/41

Revolutions and Rationality

Kuhn claims that scientific revolutions (periods of significantchange in theory and practice) are highly non-rational affairs,highly unconstrained

In part, this is because what makes a revolution revolutionary isthat the normally accepted theories and the methodologicalpractices they ground are in question and changing, hence, it

seems, they cannot constrain their own change in a rational way

But revolutions are lauded as important advances in our thinkingand knowledge, and we think they are good and justified changesin theorybut how could they be if they are not rationally guided?

Moreover, historians of science often recognize that many social

forces can play a role in revolutions and the (non)acceptance oftheorywhat gives?

Finally, the apparent lack of rational constraint and presence ofsocial forces raise the demarcation issuehow, if at all, is sciencedifferent from other organized bodies of beliefs (religion,

metaphysics, political structures, cultural tradition)?


36/41

Social Forces

How and to what extent do religious, cultural,political, gender, racial biases and interests affectscientific theorizing?

Can they be avoided? Ought they to be avoided?

This has implications for the issue of therationality of theory acceptance and change

If theory acceptance and change are not

rationally constrained there seems to be plenty ofroom for non-rational social forces to be in play

Moreover, the apparent lack of rational constraintand the role of social forces raises the

demarcationissue


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Demarcation

How, if at all, is science different from otherorganized bodies of beliefs (religion,metaphysics, political structures, culturaltradition)?

How can a difference be marked out?

Can good science be distinguished from badscience? Is pseudoscience a third thing, or justreally bad bad science?

Does/should science have a privilegedepistemological standing in relation to theseothers?

This all relevant to revolutions and rationality,and social forces


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Realism/Anti-realism

Given the various epistemological difficulties(underdetermination, problem of induction,rationality, social forces), and the lack of aconsensus on these issues, why should we thinkthat our theories are actually describing reality?

The apparently large gap between observationaland theoretical knowledge inspires worry aboutrealism

Metaphysical difficulties come into play here aswellwe do not have good understandings of thenature oflaws and causation, explanation, sohow can we claim that we are discovering the

nature of the universe?
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Laws and Causation

Laws are often thought of as general statements of causallynecessary connection between events, and the statementsof laws themselves are sometimes thought to be necessarytruths

But given the various epistemological problems, especially

the Humean critique, it is unclear whether or not causesand laws can be or be known to be as described above

If laws do not state a necessary connection and are notthemselves necessary truths, then what, if anything,distinguishes them from accidentally true generalizations?

Is there really any such thing as a law of nature?

This all connected to issues ofrealism and explanation


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Explanation

Science is supposed to explain things tous

But what does it mean to have a scientificexplanation?

Does mere derivability of a descriptionfrom more general truths constitute anexplanation?

What sort of explanations can scienceprovide?

How can we tell good from badexplanations?


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Analyticity Statements which are analytic are supposed to be conceptual truthstrue in virtue of

the meanings or concepts involved

Locke: a part of a complex idea is predicated of the whole

Kant: the predicate concept is contained in the subject concept

Carnap: true in virtue of the meanings of the constituent terms

E.g., all bachelors are unmarried

This is contrasted with synthetic statements whose truth (or falsehood) is a matter ofsomething beyond the meanings or concepts involved (the world, matters of fact)

E.g., all faculty are bachelors

Locke and Kant were the first to make use of this distinction, it played a prominentrole for the logical positivists (as well soon see), Quine repudiated it

Analyticity provides a way (though not the only way) of explaining how at least sometruths are

Knowable a prioriwithout appeal to experiencevia linguistic analysis or merelyunderstanding the language

General principles, or frameworks, for theorizing

Necessarily true

A matter of linguistic convention

Accepted or rejected on purely pragmatic considerations and thus lack metaphysical import

a brief and incomplete history

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