2

Executive Summary

This report is guided by Mayor Greg Fischer’s charge to the Task Force on Merger 2.0

and focuses on selected aspects of six sectors of Metro government. These are 1) information,

data and surveys 2) budget and personnel 3) the Urban Service District 4) police protection 5)

fire services and 6) road maintenance. Findings are summarized below.

Information furnished to the Task Force was seriously flawed and contained erroneous figures on metro workforce and service efficiencies.

An examination of budget data show a reduction of 242 jobs (3.4 percent of the workforce) between the period of FY 2002-03 (last year before merger) and FY 2011-12 (current year). This reduction was offset by higher personnel costs and by earlier unpublicized, transition costs.

Metro Louisville is now paying more for fewer employees and this may have a bearing on service performance.

Data and surveys suffer from a lack of a timeline, especially as they relate to pre-merger and post-merger performance. This results in a static snapshot of a situation rather than a more accurate and dynamic series of pictures.

Excluding the recent period of national recession when city budgets across the country were reduced, we see no appreciable changes in Louisville’s budget patterns from pre-merger to post-merger periods.

Re the Urban Service District, we find it lacking in an adequate accounting of expenditures and revenues. The shortcoming has engendered negative effects—both tangibly (performance) and attitudinally (distrust).

Re the Urban Service District, out of seven metro areas surveyed only Louisville and much smaller Athens (Georgia) do not publicize expenditures and revenues for provided services.

Re police, the number of sworn police officers has modestly risen since merger while the number of part time employees has declined. At the same time, personnel expenditures for the consolidated department have sharply risen without commensurate improvement in performance.

3

Re police, between the pre-merger year of FY 2002-03 and the current fiscal year, per capita personnel expenditures increased by 43 percent. At the same time the incidence of violent and property crime has remained flat or tilted slightly upward.

Re police, public perceptions of the newly consolidated force leave something to be desired. Barely half the respondents gave Louisville high marks for safety. While a higher proportion of respondents (71 percent) expressed reasonable satisfaction with police performance another 29 percent were less than enthusiastic.

Re fire protection, judging from partial data this more decentralized service appears to be doing well. When matched against fire services elsewhere, those in Metro Louisville compare favorably in terms of lower per capita expenses and better response time.

Re fire protection, the favorable numbers are confirmed by attitudinal data with 90 percent of respondents expressing high levels of satisfaction.

Re roads, the number of employees working on this infrastructure has remained relatively flat. At the same time, personnel expenditures have sharply risen without commensurate improvement in road conditions.

Re roads, between the pre-merger calendar year of 2002 and the post-merger calendar year of 2010 annual payroll increased by 81.6 percent, while per capita personnel costs increased by 70.6 percent. Albeit, the salaries of road workers are still modest.

Re roads, evaluative data reveal that maintenance is largely insufficient; 52 percent of the roads are in poor or mediocre condition, while 48 percent are in fair or good condition.

Re roads, survey data show the public sharing a similarly negative response. Just 37 percent of respondents express reasonable levels of satisfaction, while a quarter of respondents were clearly dissatisfied.

The report concludes with a series of observations about city-county consolidation and recommendations about how to improve performance.

4

Preface: Context of Louisville’s Merger

In opening this report it is useful to describe some aspects of Louisville’s merger,

particularly the promises made and what has come of them. The campaign for merger was

anchored in a set of explicit claims. At the forefront were promises that merger would accelerate

economic development by making Louisville competitive with Nashville and Indianapolis; that it

would attract capital investment and firms; and, that it would bring more jobs to our city.

Another set of promises hinged on greater efficiency by eliminating duplicate services, reducing

unnecessary labor costs and creating a “sleek, modern government”. A third claim rested on

merger producing greater local democracy by creating a single metropolitan-wide executive,

establishing a metro council and stimulating more citizen participation. All this was supposed to

allow Louisville to speak with “one voice” and embrace “one vision”.

More than a decade after merger’s adoption we can take stock of the results. Economic

development has not accelerated but moved downward. The decline is not just a product of the

national recession that began in 2008, but had beset post-merged Louisville while the nation was

in the midst of economic growth. During the best of these years post-merged Louisville

foundered and in some respects its economic performance was less robust than pre-merged

Louisville.1 As the situation was evolving the Brookings Institution became engaged in helping

the city lay out an economic development strategy. Public officials and the local media read its

reports and invoked the Brookings name on behalf of merger.

1 Savitch, H.V., Vogel, R.K, and Ye, L., “Beyond the Rhetoric: A Case Study of Louisville’s Consolidation” American Review of Public Administration”, 2005 40 (1) 3-28

5

This year the Brookings Institution confirmed what most of us had come to realize. The

claims about economic development had fallen apart. A new Brookings study was able to cite

just two policies that yielded benefits for Louisville—airport expansion and the University of

Louisville’s Metropolitan College, both of which were undertaken for UPS in the 1990s well

before merger. Brookings concluded that “merger may have other merits”, or it may not, “but

stimulating economic development does not appear to have been one of them.”2 There is nothing

new in the finding that city-county consolidation does not produce economic benefits. A raft of

literature exists on the subject; one of which compares pre-merged Louisville to merged

Lexington-Fayette and “confirm(s) earlier analyses showing no systematic development

improvements from city-county government.”3

Promises about merger leading to efficiency and democratic accountability have fared no

better. Louisville Metro budget amounts are not significantly different than the combined

budgets of Louisville/Jefferson County, modest reductions in total workforce have been offset by

increased personnel costs and it has been difficult to identify enhanced service performance.

Some of the findings on municipal services are elaborated in this report and also published

elsewhere.4 Last on the list of promises, the notion of merger leading to increased democracy is

difficult to measure, but there are some basic indicators. On the one hand voting rates have gone

up in Metro Louisville, but these may be a product of national or state politics. On the other

hand, local campaign financing (especially for mayor) has substantially risen. Involvement by

minority communities has not improved and the recent survey by IQS shows seriously discrepant

2 Atkins, P et. al. “Responding to Manufacturing Jobs: What Can Economic Development Policy Do?” Metropolitan Policy Program, Brookings Institution, June 2011.3 See Carr, J, Bae, S, and Lu, W. “City-County Government and Promises of Economic Development: A Tale of Two Cities, State and Local Government Review, 38:3 (2006).4 See Savitch, H.V., Vogel, R.K and Ye, L. “Louisville Transformed but Hardly Changed: A Survey of a City Before and After Merger” in Phares, D. (ed) Who Will Govern Metropolitan Regions in the 21st Century, M.E. Sharpe, 2009.

6

attitudes between white and African-American residents. Again, the findings on Louisville’s

merger are neither novel nor new. Studies of other city-county consolidations confirm that city-

county consolidation neither enhances efficiency nor does it lead to greater democratic

accountability.5 We trust we can learn from scientific findings in the field and from our own

independently derived results.

5 ? See Altshuler, Morrill, A. Wolman, H and Mitchell F. eds. 1999. Governance and Opportunity in Metropolitan America. Washington D.C. National Academy Press. For a recent synopsis see Martin, L and Schiff, J "City-County Consolidations” State and Local Government Review 43(2):167-177 (2011). Also see, Seamon, F and Feiock, R. “Political Participation and City/County Consolidation: Jacksonville-Duval County” International Journal of Public Administration, 18(11) 1741-1752 (1995)

7

An Opportunity Gone but Not Yet Lost

The call to examine Louisville’s merger presents us with an opportunity to find out what

is right or wrong with local government. Mayor Greg Fischer’s charge to the Task Force on

Merger 2.0 was limited but quite clear and achievable. Basically it called for “examining the

delivery of government services” with regard to “Fire/EMS, “Public Safety”,

“Transportation/Infrastructure” and “Solid Waste/Recycling”. Among other things, the charge

also called for the Task Force to analyze how Metro government can collaborate with “other

taxing districts, municipalities and agencies to achieve efficiencies and overall better services”.

The charge was issued within the context of Louisville-Jefferson County’s consolidation

(merger), voted into law in November of 2000 and put into operation by January of 2003. In a

press release Mayor Fischer summarized the Task Force’s goals by stating, “It’s time we take a

fresh look at merger, what went well, what hasn’t and what can be improved upon to make sure

all citizens are getting the services and response they deserve from city government.”6

To do this several fundamental and simple steps needed to be taken. First and foremost a

full and candid evaluation needed to be made of specific services. Where possible this should

include costs for service relative to its effectiveness. The obvious reason for drawing this linkage

is that it is one matter to slash budgets and quite another to do so without compromising service.

The connection between costs and effectiveness allows us to ascertain whether savings have

truly been exacted without creating shortcomings elsewhere. Second, such an evaluation made

sense if the Task Force could compare those services before and after merger. Only then might

we know if merger had brought positive results and, if necessary, explore ways to attain

6 "Mayor Fischer Takes Action to Review and Improve Government Merger", January 6, 2011. Available at http://www.louisvilleky.gov/Mayor/News/2011/01-06-11-merger.htm .

8

promised levels of performance. Third, the Urban Service District (USD) created within the

boundaries of pre-merged Louisville would be integral to anything derived from Merger 2.0.

This involved an evaluation of the costs and benefits of services within the USD that could be

compared with the service package offered in the rest of Metro Louisville. Once achieved, the

Task Force could determine if merger had yielded its promised benefits to the “old city” and

whether it was worthwhile to extend those benefits to other areas. Besides this, the familiar

question about whether the USD is over-paying or underpaying for its services has been a

continued source of contention. In a vacuum of information individuals may imagine or distort

facts, and this has been a growing concern within the Metro Council. Here, the Task Force had

an opportunity to clear the fog of misinformation and allay any source of disquiet. Last, a study

involving dozens of individuals and enduring over a period of eight months should produce

viable and substantial recommendations—not simply logical suggestions squeezed out of routine

management but transformative prescriptions. This report focuses on selective aspects of the

Task Force’s agenda, namely 1) information, data and surveys 2) budgets and personnel 3) the

Urban Service District 4) police protection 5) fire services and 6) road maintenance. The criteria

for evaluating these activities are summarized as:

Full and accurate data on services to be evaluated (costs plus effectiveness)

Analyses based on pre-merger and post-merger performance

Sufficient attention paid to the costs and benefits of services within the Urban Service District (USD)

An end set of recommendations that are transformative.

9

Information, Data and Surveys

An earlier memo dealt with efforts to acquire information.7 The Task Force began its

deliberations by seeking basic data, including censuses on the changing demography of the area

and studies of service performance. A good deal of census material was furnished by individuals

working in the field. By standards of full and accurate information the information was reliable,

though it was broadly aimed at background and context rather than anything that could lead to

specific policy changes.

Other information provided to the Task Force was more problematic. A report authored

by graduate students and a professor at the Indiana University–Bloomington left a good deal to

be desired.8 Among other questionable assertions, the report claimed that merger eliminated

nearly 700 positions, mostly through attrition and vacancies.9 Exactly how this count was derived

is not mentioned, though it is misleading (see figures below). Other claims about increased

“efficiency” “effective policing” “cost savings” and better relationships for Louisville’s

consolidated police department lacked evidence or credible example.10 One searches in vain for

metrics that might justify the report’s conclusions. Granted, the Task Force cannot be weighed

down with reams of studies, but there is an abundance of material on this subject, including

articles on Louisville. Certainly, a few solid, peer reviewed articles would have gone long way

toward properly informing the Task Force about what we might expect from city-county

consolidation.

7 See Position Paper: Merger 2.0, April, 2011. 8 See Louisville Merger Report, Indiana University–Bloomington, School of Public and Environmental Affairs, April 27, 2007.9 Ibid. p. 12.10 Ibid. p. 13 and 19.

10

By the terms of the mayor’s charge the Task Force also commissioned a survey of Metro

residents. The survey was conducted by phone and administered to 1,092 households within the

metro area over a period of seven days.11 Given the narrow parameters of the Task Force the

survey was done with reasonable competence. However, we might note that some essential

questions were not asked. These questions relate to our third criterion based on an analysis of

pre-merger and post-merger service performance. Very little, if anything, was asked about the

relative effects of merger on the services in question. We cannot comment on whether this

omission was intentional or not, but it is difficult to imagine a valid survey without tapping into

citizens perceptions of pre and post-merger conditions. One would think that the Task Force

would need to know how perceptions change over a critical period of time or whether services

have improved or deteriorated as a result of merger. Instead of a moving picture over time, the

survey produced a static snapshot. Because of this lapse, the reader is left in the dark about the

efficiency and effectiveness over time relative to police, fire, EMS, transport, or waste

management. These questions might have revealed how merger affected services or answered

questions about the relative advantages and disadvantages to the public. The closest reference to

pre and post-merger perceptions was a vaguely worded statement that some respondents felt “the

police situation had worsened after the merger”.12

There are considerable flaws in information provided to the Task Force on other

essentials. A document entitled “Merger by Numbers” indicated 9,130 “positions approved” in

FY 2002-03 for pre-merged Louisville/Jefferson County and 7,406 in 2010-11 for post-merged

Louisville/Jefferson County. These figures lead the Task Force to believe that metro government

reduced personnel by 1,724. By contrast, official budget figures for the pre-merged year of FY

11 IQS Research, “Louisville Metro Government Merger 2.0 Study” August, 2011, Louisville, KY, p. 10.12 Ibid. p.19.

11

2002-03 show the number of personnel to be 7,057 and for FY 2011-2012 the official budget

shows the total number of personnel to be 6,815. This amounts to a much smaller reduction.

What accounts for this difference? Upon further examination we find the number of

positions listed in “Merger by the Numbers” consists of a category called “other employees”.

These “other employees” are seasonal and temporary workers; they are not sworn, not regular

full-time and are not entitled to pension or other benefits. The greatest numbers were hired by

parks/recreation, the Louisville Zoo and were most likely teenagers who staffed pools, golf

courses, ticket booths and the like. At the very least, if those who constructed “Merger by the

Numbers” wanted to go “off-budget”, they might have specified a common measure such as “full

time equivalent” positions. Besides this, important and essential items are missing from this

document, such as the total budget numbers, trend lines, inflation adjustments and cost per

employee. The numbers provided herein are readily available and it is unclear why the Task

Force was deprived of full and accurate information.

Budgets and Personnel

We should recognize that budgets were an important component of the Task Force’s

inquiry. Throughout the course of that inquiry, members often asked about whether Metro

government had exacted savings relative to pre-merger and post-merger performance. Figures 1,

2 and 3 provide some answers to these questions.13 Figure 1 below displays basic information on

13 For the pre-merged period both Louisville and Jefferson County are included while the post-merged period takes both entities into account by using Metro figures.

12

total budgets, in nominal amounts (actual budget dollars) as well as inflation adjusted amounts

(cost of living).14

Figure 1

Louisville/Jefferson County Budgets: Fiscal Years 1999-00 to 2011-12

Source: Louisville/ Jefferson County and Metro Executive Budgets, FY 1999-00 to FY 2011-12

14 The inflation adjusted amounts are based on the Constant Price Index or CPI and measures the average change in the prices of consumer items, the goods and services that people buy for daily living. See Bureau of Labor Statistics at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. Note there are various ways to account for inflation with each having its own advantages and disadvantages.

Nominal Amounts (in millions) Inflation Adjusted Amounts (2011 in millions)

13

As we see from Figure 1 both nominal and adjusted amounts snake up and down. Soon

after merger in FY 2003-04 nominal budgets climbed while the inflation adjusted amounts

stayed relatively flat. By FY 2006-07 both nominal and inflation adjusted budgets rose.15 These

might be considered prosperous years or even “normal years” for Metro Louisville and they were

reflected in its budgets. By FY 2009-10 the impact of a national recession began and by FY

2010-11 the budget was in a full downward trajectory. The national trend affected almost all

cities. Across the country local governments cut their budgets regardless of whether they were

consolidated or not.16 A recent study showed that in 2010 local budget expenditures declined by -

4.4 percent and will continue to decline in 2011.17

Whatever might be said about Metro Louisville’s performance, it would be difficult to

claim that merger saved the new government any money. Taking the last pre-merger year we see

that both the nominal ($712 million) and inflation adjusted budgets ($896.6 million) showed a

normal trajectory. By comparison, the post-merger budgets, just before the national recession,

were higher for nominal amounts ($848.8 million) and about the same for inflation adjusted

amounts ($896.3 million). Louisville’s budget did not change because of the nature of its

government, but because of the nature of the times.

While budgets are not always subject to local conditions, public employment is more

pliable. The obvious reason is that cities have a greater ability to engage in hiring, firing and

workforce attrition than an ability to raise revenue or control long term expenditures. We can

learn a great deal from understanding trends in Metro’s workforce. Figures 2 and 3 tell us

15 There was however a dip in inflation adjusted amounts in 2007-08. 16 See Hoene, C.W. and Pagano, M.A. City Fiscal Conditions in 2011, National League of Cities (NLC), September, 2011, Washington D.C.17 By comparison with cities in the NLC survey Louisville’s nominal reduction was less at -2.5 percent while its inflation adjusted reduction was similar to other cities at -4.1 percent. Ibid. p. 3.

14

something about numbers of employees and costs per employee. The line graphs run from pre-

merged Louisville to Metro government and cover total employment (Figure 2) as well as

expenditures per employee (Figure 3).

Figure 2

Louisville/Jefferson County Personnel; Fiscal Years 1999-00 to 2011-12

Source: Louisville/ Jefferson County and Metro Executive Budgets

15

Figure 3

Louisville/Jefferson County Expenditures per Employee: Fiscal Years 1999-00 to 2011-12

Source: Louisville/ Jefferson County and Metro Executive Budgets

By FY 1999-2000 Louisville/Jefferson County employed a workforce of 7,177 while in

the last fiscal year before merger that number fell to 7,057 (a reduction of 120 individuals or 1.6

percent). By comparison Metro Louisville began FY 2003-04 with 7,045 employees and by the

current FY 2011-12 Metro employed 6,815 individuals. Whatever other figures may be bandied

16

about and counted in various ways, these numbers are gleaned from official budgets. Without

knowing the unpublicized and offsetting costs of the merger transition, we can report a modest

reduction of 242 individuals or 3.4 percent of the workforce from the last year of pre-merged

Louisville (FY 2002-03) to the current year.18

There is another side to this picture and that concerns the actual expenditures per

employee. Obviously, numbers of employees are one factor and the costs of those employees are

quite another. As Figure 3 shows, the last pre-merger fiscal year showed nominal costs per

employee at $50,838 while the inflation adjusted amount came to $64,177 per worker. By

comparison the pre recession fiscal year of 2009-10 showed Metro’s nominal costs per worker at

$68,265 and inflation adjusted amounts at $72,195 per worker. We can conclude that before

large recessionary cuts occurred the costs per employee were higher for Metro government than

for pre-merged government. Once the national recession set in cities throughout the nation

reduced costs and Louisville was no exception. The current budget shows both nominal costs and

inflation adjusted at $63,246.

What might explain the reasons behind the rise in the costs of existing personnel during

many of the merger years? One possible explanation is that merger required salary adjustments

across jurisdictions, so that compensation for all employees is equal—referred to as “ratcheting

salaries upward”. Another may be that as government grows larger and bureaucracy becomes

“taller”, more supervisory staff is needed. Workforce costs then increase at selective services and

levels. The results show that merged Louisville found itself with fewer employees while also

18 Transition costs can be substantial. The cost of merging much larger Toronto amounted to $240 million. Se Toronto City Council, “The Toronto Amalgamation: Looking Back, Moving Ahead”, Toronto, Canada, September, 14, 2000.

17

paying more for each worker. Whether this affected the quality and performance of services is

the subject of the sections below.

The Urban Service District (USD)

As we look at performance the Urban Service District or USD is critical. For one it

constitutes the densest area within Metro Louisville and as such receives the bulk of typical

municipal services. For another, its combination of multiple services can be a useful barometer

for determining service efficiencies. This enables us to determine whether those services warrant

amalgamation of adjoining areas into the USD or whether other service districts might be used in

creative ways (additional service districts, merged service districts or constricted service

districts). If we are to extrapolate useful lessons about USD performance, clarity is important.

Yet, during its eight years of operation Metro government had not made the necessary

information available, much less put it in a systematic form. A special request by Commissioner

Owens in April 2011 to the Legislative Reference Committee (LRC) did turn up some partial

figures. The LRC was able to track three services—fire, solid waste and street lights. The figures

for FY 2010-11 showed costs for these services at $66,159,300 while revenue was put at

$66,165,000. By these rough and partial numbers the difference in overpayment for the USD was

just $5,700.19

The available data for even these limited services are incomplete. Some services provided

by the USD to suburban localities are not tracked and not reimbursed. For the Louisville Fire

Department these include occasional fire protection outside the city and arson investigations. The 19 Undated sheets of revenues and expenditures for the USD did turn up later. For FY 2009-10 the expenditures came to 63,669,000 while revenues were put at $63,680,000. For these rough numbers the excess of revenues over expenditures came to $11,000. See “Urban Services District (USD) Board Approved Budget FY 2009-10”.

18

USD also occasionally provides some suburbs with waste pickups, debris collection and

recycling. There are also instances where the USD provided of street lighting to suburbs, which

have not been reimbursed.20

Even the limited scope of LRC’s inquiry is insufficient because it does not include road

maintenance, parks and recreation and other municipal activities. Ideally and for the sake of

accurate analyses, it would be useful to count expenditures/revenues for all USD services and

compare those to the rest of Metro Louisville. While we understand the political and other

impediments to conducting this kind of examination, we should not be precluded from doing our

very best with available data. Louisville’s USD remains an exception in scarcity of available

public data. Table 1 displays information about USDs located elsewhere in the nation. Listed in

the table are basic categories related to the presence of an urban service district, tax rates and the

availability of budgets and expenditures.

20 Legislative Research Commission, “Memorandum: Louisville Urban Service District”, April 20, 2011.

19

Table 1: Urban Service Districts (USDs) in Seven Metro Areas

City Urban Services District

Tax rates USD information available

Louisville Metro Yes Different No

Lexington Yes Different Urban Services District Fund in city budget

Nashville Yes Different Urban Services District Fund in city budget

Jacksonville 5 districts Same in USD1 (old city) and county; different tax rates in 4 independent cities

No (not necessary); independent cities have their own budgets

Indianapolis, IN 61 taxing districts Different Information provided in “Non-Binding Review Documents”

Charlotte, NC Yes Different Separate budgets for city, county and independent towns

Athens, GA No Same No

As can be seen only Louisville and much smaller Athens do not publicize information

about their USDs. In Athens/Clark the consolidated area holds just 115,000 residents and

differences are not particularly significant. Louisville is entirely different with considerable

variation between urbanized, suburban and rural areas. If only by the criterion of equity, citizens

in these different areas deserve an accounting of services received and paid for.

There are still other reasons why Metro Louisville should be more transparent on this

issue. One of the best variables in accounting for service performance lies in the distinction

between different environments and population densities. For example, some municipal services

are more efficiently delivered in denser neighborhoods than in sprawled areas. This is

20

particularly true of fire, police and trash pickup. The questions beg for answers namely, at what

break points do efficiencies turn into inefficiencies? And, where can a partial mix of services

best be employed? Without accurate and full data and without a comparison of information on

pre-merger and post-merger performance, it is not possible to make any headway on the costs

and effectiveness of the urban service district.

Police Protection

In examining police services we focus again on costs and effectiveness. The costs for

delivering a particular service are designated as budget amounts while effectiveness relates to

outcomes related to that service. We begin with numbers of personnel and costs as displayed in

Table 2 below.

Table 2

Budgets Louisville Police Department: FY 2001-02, FY 2002-03 and FY 2011-12

CategoryFY 2001-02

(Pre-Merger)

FY 2002-03

(Pre-Merger)

FY 2011-12

(Current)

Sworn Offices 1,243 1,243 1287

Full-Time 402 362 226

Permanent Part-Time 153 137 71

Personnel Services $ 97,443,740 $ 105,519,000 $ 137,069,900

Personnel Costs Per Capita $ 54,195 $ 60,573 $ 86, 534

Source: Louisville/ Jefferson County and Metro Executive Budgets

21

Note the number of sworn officers has increased over the years while other employees

(full and part time) have decreased. In principle this should bolster police protection, assuming

more personnel are now on patrol. At the same time we also see a significant rise in police

expenditures over the years. These increases are consistent with our previous findings on the

higher costs of Metro government.21 Thus, in the pre-merger year of FY 2001-02 costs were

relatively low at $97.4 million and by the current year show a rise of 41 percent. During the last

year before merger personnel expenditures for police came to $105.5 million and by the current

period costs had risen 30 percent. The increase is reflected in per capita expenditures which rose

from $54,165 in FY 2001-02 to the current year by 60 percent. The increase continued from the

pre-merger year of FY 2002-03 onward with a rise of 43 percent. Even after accounting for

inflation this is a very substantial increase.22

Did this change result in greater effectiveness? The linkage between performance and

outcome is imperfect, but some measures are worth considering—among these are crime and

clearance rates. Figures 4, 5 and 6 display the incidence and clearance rates for property and

violent crime.23

21 As is the practice throughout this report pre-merger years include the city of Louisville and Jefferson County.22 For the inflation adjusted amount the per capita personnel costs for FY 2001-02 come to $65,700 for a 32.3 percent increase. The inflation adjusted amount for FY 2002-03 comes to $71, 800 for a 21.1 percent increase. The inflation adjustments are based on the Constant Price Index or CPI See Bureau of Labor Statistics at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl. 23 The FBI reports that an offense is cleared by arrest when all of the following conditions have been met for at least one person: arrested, charged with the commission of the offense, or turned over to the court for prosecution. In certain situations, elements beyond law enforcement's control prevent the agency from arresting and formally charging the offender. These offenses can be cleared by “exceptional means”. United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation. 2006. Crime in the United States at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/offenses/clearances/index.html.

22

Figure 4

Incidence of Property and Violent Crime (Per 1000,000 Population)

in Louisville/Jefferson County: 1997-2009

Source: Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR), Federal Bureau of Investigation; http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm#cius

23

Figure 5

Clearance Rates for Property Crime in Louisville/Jefferson County: 2000-2005

Source: Crime Analysis Unit/CompStat, Louisville Metro Police Department, Louisville, Kentucky

24

Figure 6

Clearance Rates for Violent Crime in Louisville/Jefferson County: 2000-2005

Source: Crime Analysis Unit/CompStat, Louisville Metro Police Department, Louisville, Kentucky

As the figures show outcomes are mixed. The incidence of both property and violent

crime had risen in the 2000, dipping slightly in 2009 and trending upward again in 2010. At the

25

same time clearance rates have improved.24 Clearance on all categories of property crime has

increased by approximately 10 percent since merger. While this is an improvement, the clearance

rates remain at between 20 and 30 percent. Clearance rates on violent crime have markedly

improved with the sharpest rise for rape. As can be seen, the pattern of clearance on violent

crime jumps up and down, though we do see a ratcheting upward. In sum, we can say that while

clearance has improved the incidence of crime has worsened.

The rise in criminal incidence is confirmed by public perceptions. Some critical questions

on the IQS survey furnish ready examples. When asked whether Metro Louisville “was a safe

place to live” 22.9 percent of respondents could “strongly agree” while 34 percent fell into the

next category of agreement. This added up to a bare majority of 56.9 percent of respondents

feeling Louisville was safe. As for police performance, 41.4 percent of respondents were

strongly satisfied with police performance, while another 29.3 fell into the next category of

agreement.25 This produced 70.7 percent of respondents who felt reasonably satisfied with police.

Results for African-American attitudes on the safety of Louisville were roughly comparable with

59.6 percent feeling safe, though the combined categories of satisfaction with police services was

lower at just 62.9. 26

Again, since the IQS survey did not inquire about pre-merger and post-merger

performance we are unable to make a comparative assessment. We can however, glean shreds of

information from an earlier survey conducted during the mid 1990s. At that time between 70 and

80 percent of pre-merger respondents agreed that Louisville was a safe city. In a follow up 24 The causes of crime are multifaceted and may not necessarily be attributed to poor police performance. By comparison clearance rates touch directly on the police performance because they deal with the apprehension of suspects.25 The combined totals are very modest and we might ask why 43 percent of residents do not feel entirely safe in Louisville. Similarly we can ask why 29 percent of residents are not entirely satisfied with police performance. See IQS Research, “Louisville Metro Government Merger 2.0 Study” August, 2011, Louisville, KY pp. 107-108. 26 See IQS Research, “Louisville Metro Government Merger 2.0 Study” August, 2011, Louisville, KY pp. 68-69.

26

question on police performance the earlier survey indicated that 82 percent of pre-merger

residents expressed high levels of satisfaction with the police.27

The conclusion to be drawn from this imperfect data is that the added expenditures in

public safety have not done anything to prevent crime, but Metro has made progress in punishing

offenders. Criminal incidence has continued to rise, though clearance rates have improved.

Finally, our findings on the missed expectations of Metro’s consolidated police force are

consistent with research on the subject. A highly reputed study of Indianapolis’ consolidated

police force vis-à-vis independent-smaller police departments was quite clear. It concluded that

smaller departments had better response times, better knowledge of the communities they served,

and enjoyed a better rapport with citizens than their larger counterpart.28

Fire Service

Fire service is often a contentious issue because of the neighborhood loyalty firehouses

command. Louisville is no different and its 17 suburban fire districts also evoke strong local

support; at the same time public officials see small fire stations as unnecessary and a rightful

object of cuts during difficult times. With this consideration in mind the Task Force, through the

Mayors Innovation Project, received the assistance of a consulting firm. The upshot arrived in

the form of a Technical Assistance Report, devoted largely to fire protection. While the Report

emphasized the costs of maintaining numerous fire districts, it made no mention of service

27 See University of Louisville, Urban Studies Institute, “Louisville Survey” 13 February, 1996, Louisville, Kentucky. Because the questions are not entirely comparable we cannot draw precise conclusions. However compared to the later survey by IQS, resident perceptions on safety and performance were more favorable in 1996.28 Elinor Ostrom, “The Dangers of Self-Evident Truths” APSANET, http://www.apsanet.org/PS/march00/ostrom.cfm .

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effectiveness.29 This is a serious omission because we are not only dealing with the emotive issue

of firehouses, but life, death and property issues—all of which relate to effectiveness of service.

Another difficulty with the Report was its focus on the single case of Nashville/Davidson

County. Comparisons with other cities can be useful and are widely used in this document, but

the attempt to generalize from a single city does not work well. Metro Louisville and Metro

Nashville also have very different political geographies relative to area, demography, number of

local jurisdictions and patterns of settlement. Moreover, any assessment should account for

variables that affect the propensity for the outbreak of fires. These include the age of buildings,

differences in social class, levels of population density and road access—none of which were

covered in the Technical Assistance Report. Despite the lack of information, the Report went on

to conclude that Louisville spends more on fire protection than Nashville and found “duplication

of services” to be the culprit. In a similarly sweeping manner the Report claimed that

“fragmented services can delay response time.”30 The Report’s remedy for these ostensible ills

lay in the long term goal of consolidating “most or all of the suburban fire districts into the

Louisville Fire Department.”31

The Task Force wisely voted to reject this suggestion, though its rationale for doing so is

not clear. While the issue was rendered moot, we might also see it as an opportunity to learn

larger lessons. Much of the confusion stems from the supposition that smaller, “fragmented”

services are necessarily less efficient. Yet much the opposite is true. Labor intensive, face to face

services like fire, police or trash pickup demonstrate that smaller can be better. Like small-

29 The Report did list numbers of fire and medical runs, vehicle availability, etc. These are hardly outcomes and do not address outcomes or effectiveness. See, Mayors Innovation Project, Technical Assistance Report for Merger 2.0 Task Force, Public Works, LCC, August 26, 2011.30 Ibid. p. 10.31 Ibid, p. 10.

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independent police forces, small-independent fire units may hold more advantages than their

larger counterparts.

We provide a glimpse of Louisville’s own fire fighting capacity and its effectiveness

relative to other cities. Table 3 offers some descriptive data on how eight cities fare relative to

numbers of fire districts, areas served, expenditures and response time.

Table 3

Fire Protection in Eight Cities or Metro Areas

City 2000 Population

Fire Districts

Stations

Area Served (Sq. Miles)

Avg Area / District

Station Area (Sq. Miles)

ExpendituresPer Capita

Response Time (Seconds)

Miami-Dade, FL

2,253,362 63 63 837.58 13.29 13.27 $244 396

Houston, TX

1,953,631 21 110 616.5 29.36 6.54 $151 408

San Francisco, CA

776,733 10 42 43.18 4.32 1.02 $313 327

Louisville Metro, KY

693,604 20 56 392.6 19.63 6.92 $122 283

Charlotte, NC

540,828 7 39 287.39 41.06 8.25 $130 319

Seattle, WA

563,374 32 36 82.55 2.58 2.51 $219 252

Portland, OR

529,121 28 30 154.12 5.5 5.5 $236 297

St Paul, MN

287,151 3 16 64.17 21.39 4.22 $146 291

Source: Katirai, M. “Sprawl, Equity and Fire Department Response Times Across the U.S.” Ph.D. dissertation, Urban & Public Affairs, University of Louisville, 2005

Louisville with its 20 fire districts (at the time) and 56 fire stations does quite well. Our

own seemingly haphazard arrangement outperforms its seven counterparts on both cost and

response time. Other cities of comparable size with fewer fire districts like San Francisco,

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Charlotte, Seattle and Portland spend more and are slower in responding to fire emergencies.

This does tell us that decentralized local services have merit. There are good reasons for this and

they encompass higher flexibility, better accountability, and easy adaptability to circumstance.

While space limitations do not permit a full discussion here, the positives of small independent

units are well documented in the literature.

Finally, these observations on the cost and effectiveness of fire protection are consistent

with the IQS survey of citizens in Louisville. The survey showed that 71.4 percent of

respondents were very satisfied with fire personnel and another 19.2 percent were reasonably

satisfied. The cumulative satisfaction is nearly 91 percent. We might compare these results of

“fragmented” service to Metro’s consolidated police force and think of what they mean in the

larger context of service improvement.

Roads

Road maintenance is a quintessential function of local government. The familiar refrain,

“there is no Democratic or Republican way to build a road or fix a pothole” symbolizes what

localities actually do. Roads are the first things visitors experience as they enter a city and one of

the first facilities residents use in their daily lives. They reflect on every aspect of city life.

Besides their personal utility, roads serve a much larger purpose. Employers, employees,

goods, and customers all use roadways to carry out economic life. Without roads very little

moves, especially in a metropolitan area like Louisville where rail or light rail is either scarce or

absent. High maintenance of roads and other infrastructure is a long term investment in Metro’s

future. Without that investment our city slowly withers and we lose untold opportunities. It is

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important then to briefly examine how much we invest in roads and how many people we hire to

maintain them. At the outset it should be pointed out that collecting consistent and accurate data

on the cost and effectiveness of road maintenance (public works) has been challenging. Part of

the difficulties stem from the transfer of personnel from one department to another. Still other

problems arose because records were inconsistent over pre-merger to post-merger periods and

because of the need to factor out road maintenance from other public works’ functions.

Accordingly, we relied on census data rather than local budgets, though information from local

sources can be found in footnotes. Table 4 provides us with a brief glimpse of personnel and

costs between the pre-merger calendar year of 2002 and the post-merger calendar year of 2010.

For the most part the personnel work directly on road maintenance and repair.

Table 4

Employees and Gross Payroll for Louisville’s Streets and Highways: 2002 - 2010

Category2002 Pre-Merger

2010 Post-Merger Percent Increase

Full-time Employees 264 281 6.4%

Annual Payroll $6,715,140 $12,193,116 81.6%

Annual Personnel Costs per Employee $25,436 $43,392 70.6%

Note: Original payroll data of 31-day monthly equivalent values for the month of March was converted to annual figures. This was done to provide clearer comparability with previous assessments.Source: Government Employment & Payroll, 2002 Census of Governments, http://www.census.gov/govs/apes/historical_data_2002.html, last accessed on November 9, 2011; 2010 Annual Survey of Public Employment and Payroll. http://www.census.gov/govs/apes/; last accessed on November 9, 2011.

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The full time workforce increased by just 20 individuals during this interval.32 While the

pay was modest, the percentage increase for annual salaries was large at more than 81 percent

and so too was the annual costs per personnel at more than 70 percent. In proportional terms, it

appears that merger significantly boosted workforce costs. The increases far exceeded the rate of

inflation and the upward trend is similar to that experienced by the police department.33

What then has been the impact of these changes on effectiveness? We can offer some

approximate indicators of Louisville’s road condition. Table 5 provides an evaluative account of

roadways calculated in percentages and classified as “poor” “mediocre,” “fair,” and “good”.

Table 5

Road Maintenance in Louisville-Jefferson County, 2001-2008

Year Poor Mediocre Fair Good

Pre-merger Period2001 16 33 28 22

2002 17 40 17 26

Post-merger Period

2003 12 41 23 24

2004 12 41 25 22

2005 11 40 21 28

2006 14 40 24 22

2007 14 37 21 29

2008 13 39 22 26Source: The Road Information Program (TRIP), Washington, D.C.

With only a few years of pre-merger data to study it is difficult to determine if those two

years are an anomaly or an indication of a trend. In the pre-merger year of 2002 we see that 57

32 Another report poses slightly different figures and arrives at 308 personnel by including administrative workers. See Vogel, et al. Operational Review of Louisville Public Works, July, 2011, Louisville, Kentucky.33 Using the Consumer Price Index an annual salary of $25,436.00 in 2002 would be $30,800 in 2010.

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percent of the road conditions were classified as “poor” or “mediocre”, while 43 percent were

categorized as “fair” or “good”. In the post-merger period 52 percent of the roads were classified

as “poor” or “mediocre”, while 48 percent were categorized as “fair” or “good”. Overall, this is

not a significant difference. Regardless of merger, road conditions have remained much the

same.34

The evaluative data on roads is complemented by recent survey data. The IQS survey

indicates that only 37.9 percent of respondents believed that roads were in “good” condition.35

More than a quarter of respondents felt roads were not “good” and more than a third was

unenthusiastic about road conditions. Neither did other means of transportation register

particularly well. Despite recent efforts to create bicycle lanes, less than half of the respondents

gave high marks for paths accommodating cyclists or pedestrian.36

Clearly, merger has not given Louisville better costs or better effectiveness. Numbers of

personnel doing road work today have remained similar from the last pre-merger year, while

evaluative and attitudinal data do not give road conditions high marks.37 At least by public

perception, thoroughfares for cyclists and pedestrians are also in need of improvement. This

problem may be a matter of integrating Louisville’s transportation network as much as building

or repairing its infrastructure.

34 A broader study of public works focused on job and agency performance. Rather than using public opinion this study asked selective customers and stakeholders (Metro Council, Ford Motor Company, United Parcel Service, etc) to rate the Public Works Department and it received good to decent grades. Op. cit. 201135 See IQS Research, “Louisville Metro Government Merger 2.0 Study” August, 2011, Louisville, KY p. 102 36 Ibid. 10337 The performance study cited above uses a different base year (2006) and perhaps different statistics. It concludes that by 2010 the road workforce had increased by 128 personnel. See Vogel, et al, op. cit. p. 10

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Conclusions and Recommendations

We conclude that seeking improvement from merger may be based on a faulty

assumption. Borne of the 19th century, consolidation was geared toward a different set of

challenges and today lacks the wherewithal to deal with a more complex society. There is little

reason to believe that merger has exacted efficiencies elsewhere and indeed much of the

evidence is to the contrary. There is then no reason to expect that it will do so in Louisville. This

is because city-county consolidation tends toward a top-down, centralized command structure.

The contrast between Louisville’s consolidated police force and its more decentralized fire

fighting capacity can be instructive. What is needed for Louisville’s improvement is not more

but less centralization.

The best of today’s metropolitan governance is based on a bottom-up perspective. Unlike

market driven business which measures its performance through profits and loses, government is

a non market organization where accountability is lodged in citizen-consumers. The finest

arrangements create “feedback loops”, where citizen-consumers are able to communicate with

public officials and service providers. From that point onward smaller jurisdictions coordinate

activities within a lateral framework of cooperation. Central leadership (mayor and metro

council) is best used to steer this dynamic rather than attempt to propel it. Central leadership

should also steer policies that foster lateral cooperation (inter-local agreements to share public

services, contracting out, joint ventures). Accordingly, our approach is to re-balance the

governing system, so that it decentralizes selective aspects of metropolitan governance. A

number of steps toward achieving that end are listed below.

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Urban Service District (USD): Make better use of the USD by converting its current board into a Community Service Board (CSB). The CSB would be a visible organization that would elicit citizen input through hearings and public opinion surveys on select municipal services. These hearings should be used to both monitor local performance and coordinate activities between different agencies. The CSB could issue recommendations to the Mayor and Metro Council relative to revenue raising and expenditure. The composition of the CSB would consist of both appointed members and rotating elected members (from the Metro Council). One of the central objectives here is to convert a little known USD board into an active and vibrant citizen oriented body, working to enhance accountability. Another objective is to create healthy linkages between citizens, service agencies and City Hall.

Community Service Boards (CSBs): Use the newly created CSB for central Louisville as a pilot project for possible extension to other parts of the metropolitan area.38 CSBs should work to energize metro agencies and enhance accountability as well as coordinate activities between municipalities. Depending upon how well the CSB functions, they could be established in other parts of Metro Louisville. CSBs should also make recommendations on revenue raising and cost efficiencies. Should CSBs prove to be successful, their scope of activities could be extended to making recommendations on land use, environmental and other concerns.

Information and Data Collection: Engage the University of Louisville’s Urban & Public Affairs (UPA) to gather data and help determine costs and effectiveness of the current USD. UPA also has the capacity to conduct policy evaluation and help monitor service delivery. UPA is a graduate department granting masters degrees in public administration and urban planning as well as a Ph.D. degree with specialties in public policy and urban planning. UPA also includes a Research and State Data Analysis Center with capable professionals and experienced survey researchers. Its graduate students study methods of policy evaluation, techniques of public management and the substantive aspects of land use planning. Its degrees are accredited by the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration as well as by the Planning Accreditation Board. Internships are required as part of its master curricula and this would be an ideal starting point for university/metro government collaboration.39

38 Subsequent legislation to the original merger law allowed for the creation of “special taxing districts” to other portions of the county, thereby making a possible extension of the CSB logically desirable and feasible.39 The Task Force recommended the University of Louisville’s Department of Political Science for this function. Political Science is a fine department with an excellent faculty. It is mostly an undergraduate department, oriented toward international relations, comparative politics, national government and political theory. For the most part the specialties needed by Metro government are located in Urban and Public Affairs. The Mayor’s Office would do well to consult the Chair of Urban and Public Affairs and the Director of the State Data & Research Center. In the interests of full disclosure this author is a member of UPA and will recues himself from any involvement in such projects.

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Police: Employ current data and take triennial surveys on a neighborhood basis to establish a benchmarking process. The metro police department should establish base lines for pre-merger years and compare its own performance to those baselines. In addition to neighborhood surveys two examples of data are mentioned in this report—incidence of crime and clearance rates. Clearly, the rate at which violent and property crimes are occurring should be curtailed and one of the ways in which to measure progress is to benchmark past and current rates against future goals. Clearance rates for the metro police have gotten better, but they should be continually improved. Compared to other metropolitan areas Louisville’s clearance rate for property crime is higher, while clearance rates for violent crime hover at the national average.40

Police: Consider decentralizing police services into smaller areas or neighborhoods. Decentralization should emphasize place-based policing. This approach focuses on hot spots and develops strategies for engaging the public (residents, landlords, business owners and managers). It is also an effective way to bolster community policing. Further to the point, police deployments are better directed to places where crimes are concentrated as opposed to targeting individual offenders. This approach provides a more stable target for police activities and raises fewer ethical/ legal problems.41 The strategy conforms to geographically based jurisdictions.

Roads: Employ current data bases and a benchmarking process to improve Metro Louisville’s roads. We see no reason for Metro to rank poorly on road conditions. The best way to change this situation is to evaluate road conditions through a series of indicators, establish benchmarked goals and patiently work each year to bring this surface transportation up to respectable levels.

Roads: Accelerate all of the following: the conversion of one way streets into two way streets; the construction or widening of sidewalks; the integration of bicycle paths into the road system; and the implementation of existing planning studies.

Roads: Consider whether workforce increases are necessarily to meet new benchmarked goals for roads and the accelerated pace for re-making streets, sidewalks and bicycle paths.

A Final Word on Tactical Priorities: Focus on select municipal services that have the potential for generating tangible, rapid and achievable results. The list

40 The following are comparisons of Louisville to the national average for metropolitan counties. For crimes against property: Burglary: Louisville 20%/Nat’l avg. 13%: Larceny: Louisville, 30%/Nat’l avg. 20%: Auto Theft: Louisville 20% /Nat’l avg. 15%. For violent crimes: Homicide: Louisville 67%/Nat’l avg. 65%: Rape: Louisville 98%/Nat’l avg. 45%: Robbery: Louisville 32%/Nat’l avg. 31%: and Assault: Louisville 61%/Nat’l avg. 59%. Source: Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR), Federal Bureau of Investigation; http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/ucr.htm#cius.41D. Weisburd, 2008. “Place-Based Policing”, Ideas in American Policing, Number 9, 2008. Police Foundation.

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presented here is by no means exclusive but the most promising candidates appear to be the police, public works (road maintenance) and solid waste disposal. Use base lines and extensive benchmarking to measure performance.

37

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About the Report’s Author

H.V. Savitch, Brown and Williamson Distinguished Research Professor, School of Urban and Public Affairs, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY

Professor Savitch is a former co-editor at the Journal of Urban Affairs and former President of the Urban Section of the American Political Science Association. He has published eleven books or monographs on various aspects of urban development, public policy and regional governance. His co authored volume, Cities in the International Marketplace (Princeton University Press) received the best book award in the urban field by the American Political Science Association and is translated into Spanish as Ciudades en el Mercado Internacional. His most recent work consists of a multi-authored volume, Struggling Giants: City-Region Governance in London, New York, Paris and Tokyo (forthcoming 2012, University of Minnesota Press). His more than 80 articles have appeared in leading journals, collected works and research outlets. Savitch has also published extensively on issues of city-county consolidation and metropolitan reorganization. His articles have appeared in leading, peer reviewed journals as well as book volumes.

Professor Savitch has received numerous awards both in the United States and abroad. He served as a Visiting Scholar at the London School of Economics (United Kingdom) as well as being named a Lady Davis Fellow at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Israel). He has been the recipient of awards which has allowed him to do extensive research in France for more than 20 years. These research assignments in France include an award by the National Center for Scientific Research (Bordeaux, France) and a Fulbright award at the Maison Mediterranean des Sciences de l’Homme (Aix-en-Provence, France). Most recently Savitch was a Fulbright Scholar at the University of Chile, in Santiago.

Savitch has also served as a consultant to former mayor of New York City, David Dinkins, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Mayors’ Urban Summit and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.