6.4 strategic environment and implications of climate change james.pdf · 310 climate and energy...

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Let me begin my pointing out that U.S. Africa Command(USAFRICOM) has been in discussions with the Office of theSecretaryofDefense;OfficeoftheUnderSecretaryofDefenseforAcquisition, Technology and Logistics; and the Defense ScienceBoardtoestablishataskforcefocusedonclimatechangeinAfricaand its implications for U.S. national security. That task forcehopefullywillgetunderwaywithinthenextcoupleofmonthsandaddress theissuesofclimatechangeandhowtheUnitedStates,DepartmentofDefense(DoD),andthemilitarycanbepreparedtorespond.

Iwillstart thispresentationbyofferinga fewmapsofAfricaforyourreview(Figures1and2). It isalwaysgoodtohavepic-turesandmapsinapresentation.Iparticularlylikemapsbecausetheybothtellastoryandprovideaframeofreferenceregardinglocations. Over the past 20 years, many African countries havemovedtowarddemocratizationprocesses,goodgovernance,andruleoflaw.

Colonel James G. Welton is the Deputy Director for Programs in the Strategy, Plans, and Programs Directorate, Headquarters (HQ) U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), Stuttgart, Germany. He is respon-sible to the Director for Strategy, Plans, and Programs for coordinating staff actions assigned to the directorate pertaining to political–military issues, military-to-military engagements, and Department of Defense (DoD) theater security cooperation programs, activities, and events in support of U.S. foreign policy in the command’s 53-country area of responsibility (AOR). He oversees the staff actions of five divisions involving bilateral relations with African partner nations, other U.S. Unified Commands, allied military, international military, and regional organizations. Colonel Welton received his commission from Officer Training School, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas, in 1981.

6.4 StRAtEGIC ENVIRoNMENt AND IMPLICAtIoNS oF CLIMAtE ChANGE

Colonel James G. Welton

308 Climate and Energy Proceedings 2010

InJanuaryof2009,justoverayearago,Ghanaianvoterscon-ductedtheirfourthfreeandfairelectionin15years.Forthesecondtime,theoppositionreplacedarulingpartypeacefully.Forthosewhodonotknow,GhanaislocatedinWestAfrica;itisaboutthesizeofOregonandishometo23millionpeople.

InOctober2009,Botswana,which isacountry in southernAfrica, where the Kalahari Desert is located, successfully heldits 10thdemocratic presidential elections since independence in1966—themostofanypostcolonialSub-SaharanAfricancountry.Botswanahasroughly2millionpeopleinanareathesizeofTexas.Africaasacontinent is the least responsible forgreenhousegas

Figure 1. Population Density in Africa

309Chapter 6 Future Naval Operations in Europe and Africa

emissions.IfyoulookatAfricaatnightfromspace,youdonotseemanylightsinthecenterofthecontinent.

However, Africa is almost universally seen as the continentmost at risk for climate-induced conflict. It is a function of reli-ance on climate-dependent sectors such as rain-fed agricultureand a history of resource-related, ethnic, and political conflict.Often livingonmarginal landanddisaster-proneareasandwith

Figure 2. Natural Vegetation in Africa


fewgovernmentsabletoadequatelyrespondtodisasters,Africanpopulationsareparticularlyvulnerabletoclimatechange.

The map in Figure 1 depicts population density per squaremile.Nigeria,atmorethan149millionpeople,isthemostpopu-lous country on the continent. It is twice the size of California,whichhasjust37millionpeople.Soifyoudoubledthepopula-tionofCaliforniato74millionandthatamountoflandspace,thatis abouthowcrowdedNigeria is. InNigeria, themedianage is19years.Forcomparison,themedianageintheUnitedStatesis37,andit is44inGermanyandWesternEurope.SotherearealotofyoungpeopleinNigeriawithoutjobs,withoutsecurity,andwithouthope;thiswillprobablybecomeaproblematsomepointinthefuture.

In terms of area, Sudan is the largest country on the conti-nent. Sudan’s area is slightly more than a quarter of that of thecontinentalUnitedStates.Sudan’spopulationis41millionpeople.ThemedianageintheSudanisalso19years.ThroughoutAfrica,thereisayouthbulgewithalackofadultsupervisionfromthosewhohavelivedlongenoughtobeabletoprovideguidanceandsagecounsel.

The greatest population densities as shown on the map inFigure1arealong thewatersources, inWestAfrica,and in theGreat Lakes region where Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, EasternCongo, and Kenya are located. The continent has more than987millionpeople today,a thirdofwhichlive indrought-proneareas.Africa’spopulationisprojectedtodoublebytheyear2050.

Theoil-richNigerDeltaishometo20millionpeople.InWestAfrica40%liveincoastalareasthatarepronetoflooding.Africahasabout800ethnicgroupsacrossborders.Approximately1000languagesanddialectsarespokenthere,althoughEnglish,French,Arabic, andPortugueseare themost common international lan-guagesandserveasofficiallanguagesinmostnations.

The map in Figure 2 shows natural vegetation across theAfricancontinent.TheSaharaDesertislargerinsquaremilesthanthe entire continental United States. Natural disasters over thepast50yearshavehaddevastatingimpactstopopulationsacross


thecontinent.Intheyear2000,thereweretwocyclonesthathitMozambique, which is located in the southwest Pacific Oceanin the Mozambique Channel, which displaced nearly 500,000peopleandleftnearly1milliondependentonhumanitarianassis-tance for survival. Put in terms that we understand, those wereHurricaneKatrinaproportions.YetMozambiqueisabouttwicethesizeofCaliforniawith21millionpeople.AnditdoesnothavetheresourcesoftheU.S.governmenttorespondtonaturaldisastersofthistype.

Ithasalsobeenreportedthat,overthe30yearsbetween1960and1990,morethan500,000peoplediedofdroughtsintheSahelregionintheWesternSahara.Climatechangeinthenorthcoulddecreaseyieldsofrain-fedandsemiaridcoastalareas.Previouslymalaria-freehighlandareasinEthiopia,Kenya,Rwanda,Burundi,andSouthernAfricacouldalsoexperiencerisesinmalariatrans-missionsduetoclimatechange.

InWestAfrica,changestocoastalenvironmentswouldhavenegative impacts on the mangroves, fisheries, and agriculturalcropsduetoflooding.Foodsecurity,whichisalreadyahumanitar-iancrisisinmanyareasofAfrica,islikelytobefurtheraggravatedandexacerbatedbyclimatechange.

TheestablishmentofU.S.AfricaCommandwasessentiallyaninternalreorganizationoftheDoDcommandstructure.ItisnotaplotbytheDepartmentofDefensetotakeoverrolesandmissionsof the Department of State or the U.S. Agency for InternationalDevelopment (USAID)or itsotheragency, theOfficeofForeignDisasterAssistance.DoDdoesnotwanttogetintothoseroles.ThepurposeofAfricaCommandistosupportU.S.governmentefforts,support theDepartmentofStateforeignpolicy,supportUSAID’sdevelopment inareasofAfrica,andwhen requestedbeable torespondtotheOfficeofForeignDisasterAssistance.

Africa Command is now the sixth geographic combatantcommand. The other five commands include the U.S. CentralCommand, European Command, Northern Command, PacificCommand, andSouthernCommand (Figure3). SoAfrica is ourcommand’sfocusandistheDoD’ssinglefocusonAfrica.


PresidentObama,inhisaddressinAccra,Ghana,inJuly2009,reaffirmedAfrica’sstrategicimportancetotheUnitedStates.Africais a continent of vast resources, strategic minerals, and energysources.ItisindeedintheU.S.nationalinteresttoensureaccessto markets of all the global commodities that are necessary intoday’sworldtosupportourstandardofliving.Thesecommoditiesincludemineralores,suchascobaltandcoltan,whichisusedtomakecapacitors,cellphonecircuitboards,othertechnologyprod-uctsneededbytheU.S.military,aswellasothertechnologiesthatwenowtakeforgranted.

ThebottomlineisthatAfricaCommandhasthesamerespon-sibilitiesasall theothergeographicunifiedcommands,butwithadifference:ThereisnonationinAfricathatweviewasastatethreat to our security. But it is the conditions on the continentthatchallengeandthreatenoursecurity.AsasinglefocusforallDoD activities in Africa, we concentrate our efforts on helpingourAfricanpartnersbuildcapableandprofessionalmilitariesthataresubordinate tocivilianauthorities, respecthumanrights,andadheretotheruleoflaw.

Figure 3. Combatant Commands in Africa


U.S. foreign policy objectives are to build the capacities ofAfricanmilitaries so thatAfricannationscanbetter service theirpopulationsbyprovidingasecureandstableenvironmentthatwillalloweachnation topromotedemocracy,expanddevelopment,andprovide for its commondefense (Figure4).By fulfilling thismission,U.S.AfricaCommandsupportsthenationalsecurityinter-estsoftheUnitedStatesbyassistingAfricannationsencounteringtransnationalthreatsfromviolent,extremistorganizationsandillicittraffickinginhumans,narcotics,andweapons.

BystrengtheningAfricansecurity,wehelptodeteranddimin-ishboththepotential forandtheconsequencesofhumanitariandisasters,whetherman-madeornatural,thatcauselossoflifeandthedestructivemovementofdisplacedpeoplesorthreatenglobalaccesstonaturalresourcesandcommoditiesthattheworldreliesontoadvancestandardsofliving.

Ashasbeenmentionedseveraltimesbefore,AfricaisalargeanddiversecontinentwithalandmassthatisthreeandahalftimesthatofthecontinentalUnitedStates(Figure5).Therearevastdis-tancestoovercome.ThedistancesbetweenthenorthernmosttiptothesouthernmosttipisequaltoaflightfromNewYorktoMoscow.TheflighttimefromFrankfurt,Germany,toJohannesburg,South

Figure 4. Mission Statement for U.S. Africa Command


Africa, is 11 hours, roughly the same time as Frankfurt to LosAngeles. The east–west distance acrossAfrica exceeds that of aflightfromChicagotoHonolulu.

These distances are exacerbated by Africa’s lack of internalinfrastructure.Inmanycases,travelingfromonecountrytoanotherrequiresflyingthroughEuropetomaketheconnection.Therearefewroadsthatconnectcountriestogethertopromotetrade.Alloftheroadsandrailroadsthatwerebuiltincolonialdaysweretheretoextractresources,nottopromotedevelopmentorprosperityoftheAfricanpeoples.

Africa’s challenges require a holistic view of security thatincludesdefense,lawenforcement,andcustomsandbordersecu-rity.Africaisdealingwiththeeffectsofwidespreadconflictaftertheindependencemovementsofthelasthalfofthe20thcentury.Somearestillongoingtoday.

ThemapshowninFigure6isbasedonanarticleinForeign Policy magazine, “Failed State Index of 2009.” [1] Of note, no

Figure 5. Understanding Africa’s Landmass


Africancountrieswerejudgedtobe“stable”or“moststable.”OurchallengeistofacilitateAfricansolutionstoAfricanproblemsbyidentifying rootcausesand findingways toenableAfrican solu-tions.Manyfactorsaffecttheprobabilityofarmedconflict,suchaspovertylevel,naturalresources,populationcharacteristics,andethnicity.Remember,therearemorethan800ethnicgroupsthatcross borders. The comparatively low educational levels of thepopulationareyetanotherfactordrivingdisagreements.

So it is these nonclimatic factors that will largely determinewhetherandhowclimatechangemovesfrombeingachallengetopresentingdevelopmentopportunities topresentingasecuritythreattothecontinentandwritlargetotherestoftheworld,includ-ingtheUnitedStates.Thethinlinesbetweensecurityandinsecu-rityandstabilityandinstabilitywillbeaffectedbyclimatechangeandtheabilityofAfricanpopulationsandgovernmentstoadapt.

Figure7includestwomaps.Theoneontheleftshowsgrossdomesticproduct(GDP)growthof2008.ItreflectsapositiveGDP

Figure 6. Foreign Policy Concerns in Africa


growthoverthepast5–10years.AsinthecaseofAngola,muchofthisgrowthisdrivenbynaturalresources.ThechallengetoAfricannations is todevelopdiversifiedeconomieswithwealthderivedfromtheseenergyresources.

TheNigeriaandGulfofGuineaarea isa largesourceofoilfortheUnitedStates.AsIrecall,oneofourearlierspeakerssaidthat the United Stares receives 13%–15% of its oil from Africa.Almost all of that oil comes from the Gulf of Guinea region. Itis light, sweetcrudeand it isperfect forU.S. refineries.Aswasshownearlier,itisjustadirecttransitacrosstheAtlantictogettotheUnitedStates.ButtheareaaroundtheGulfofGuineaisbesetbyalotofproblems,especiallyregardingNigeria.Justrecently,oilwasdiscoveredoffthecoastofGhana.So,theyaresettohaveanoilboom.TheprincipalchallengethatGhanawillfacewillbetodeterminehowtocaptureaportionofthatwealthandputitbackintotheireconomyfordevelopmentandgrowth.

Figure 7. GDP Growth in Africa


The map on the right of Figures 7 and 8 shows the UnitedNationsHumanDevelopmentIndex(HDI).Itismeasuredasbasi-cally one-third GDP per capita, one-third life expectancy, andone-third literacy. The HDI rank orders countries from all overtheworld.NoAfricanstaterankedabove50.Thehighest-rankingAfricanstatewas theSeychelles,out in the IndianOcean.Whatcauses thediscrepancy?Corruptionandweakgovernment insti-tutionsareonecause.Lackof securityandstability toallow forgrowthanddevelopmentandprosperityof itspeople isanothercause.Whydowe show this figure?Africa’sgreatest challengesrevolvearoundeconomicdevelopment;combatingpoverty;bat-tlingdiseasesuchasmalaria,HIV/AIDS,andothers;andprovidingbasic education. These complex challenges require a whole-of-governmentapproach.DoDreallyhasonlyalimitedroletoplay.As General Wald discussed, there are other U.S. governmentdepartmentsandagenciesthatcanandshouldprovideeffortstobuildinstitutionsandagencieswithinthosegovernments.

Figure 8. Human Development in Africa


DoD’sposition is that, fordevelopment to takehold,agov-ernmentneeds security and stability inorder tohave economicgrowth.Thus,DoD’sroleistopartnerwithotherU.S.governmentsandagenciestohelpbuildsecuritycapacityincountrieswhereweareputtingmoneyfordevelopment,toallowthatdevelopmenttotakeholdandprovidehopeandpromiseforabettertomorrowforthepeopleinthatcountryundertheruleoflaw.

The left side of Figure 8 shows Transparency International’s2009CorruptionPerceptionIndex.[2]Theonecountrythatstandsout is Botswana, located just above South Africa at the bottomof the continent. Botswana is the one African country that hasbeen effective at fighting corruption. That fact was highlightedinPresidentObama’sspeechinJuly2009whenhesaidthatthedemocratization and good governments evident in Ghana andBotswanaareexamplesthatotherAfricancountriesshouldstrivetoemulate.

So thechallengesassociatedwith theAfricanCommandaregreat.Thereisalotofcorruptionandplentyofweakgovernmentinstitutionsthatundermineeffortstopromotegrowthandprosper-ity.Fromamilitaryperspective,manycountriesfacethechallengeofpayingtheirowntroopssothattheydonotpreyonthelocalpopulation.DoD’sroleistosupportdefensesectorreforminitia-tivesinthelargerareaofsecuritysectorreformtobuildeffectivegovernmentinstitutions.

TheVenndiagraminFigure9helpsustosummarizethestra-tegic environmentofour53-nationareaof responsibility. It alsoallows us to distance ourselves from simplistic political rheto-ric,whichoftenattemptstoplacestatesonalinearslidingscalebetweenliberaldemocraciesononehandandtyranniesanddic-tatorshipsontheother.

Discussingthetypeofregimewithoutdiscussingthestrengthoftheregimeisafool’serrand,especiallyinAfrica.Contemporarily,wecouldattempttoidentifythetransitionalfederalgovernmentinSomaliaasaparliamentarydemocracyoradictatorship.ButtheidentificationhardlymatterswhenoneconsidersthattheSomaliaregimehasabsolutelynopower toenforce itsmandateover the


Somaliapopulationwithin thebordersof that country, let alonewithinthesquaremileofMogadishu.

Somalia, regardless of its categorization, is a failed state, anungoverned space, which can threaten our homeland and ourinterestsabroad.AfricaCommandhasaveryspecificroletoplayinattempting to fosterstates toward thebottomleftof theVenndiagram;wewanttoreinforcesuccessandhelpthosestatesthatareinthatareafromslippingintoafailed-statestatus.Wearegoingtoworkwithotherstatesinvaryingdegreesoffailed-statestatus.Itreallywillrequireawhole-communityefforttomakeprogress.

Itisalsovaluabletolookatthesubjectofpeacekeepingasitrelatestoourareaofresponsibility(Figure10).Currently,8of17UnitedNationspeacekeepingoperationsareinAfricaandaccountforapproximately75%ofUNmilitary,police,andcivilianpeace-keepers deployed worldwide. Knowing which states are consis-tentlyprovidingpeacekeepersmaybeavaluablepointtoconsiderwhenidentifyingkeypartnershipsfortheUnitedStates.Statesthatprovide peacekeepers may (1) have a degree of self-perceived

Figure 9. Africa’s Political Landscape


stabilitythatallowsthemtoexportsecurityand(2)havedemon-stratedaninterestinfosteringregionalandcontinentalstability.

Ontheothersideofthecoin,statesthatconsistentlyconsumepeacekeepingresourcestendtobesourcesofextremeinstabilityandconflict.Addressingtheirproblemsislikelytorequireasub-stantialinvestmentofbothresourcesandtime.Withoutacongres-sionalmandate,neithertheAfricaCommandnorDoDwillbeabletoundertakethenecessarynation-buildingactivities.

For example, MONUC, the United Nations OrganizationStabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,istheworld’ssinglelargestpeacekeepingmissionwithmorethan18,000uniformedmembers.TherearetwopeacekeepingmissionsintheSudan,UNMISintheSouthernSudanandUNIMED,whichisahybridwiththeAfricaUnion,inDarfur.Together,thesemis-sionsemployapproximately25,000uniformedmembers,themostUNpeacekeepersinanyonecountryintheworld.Itisalsousefulto note that Nigeria provides over 5000 peacekeepers annually.

Figure 10. A Survey of Potential Partners in Peacekeeping


TwocountriesinCentralAfrica,UgandaandRwanda,alsoprovidepeacekeepersinareassuchasSomaliaandDarfur.

Inconclusion,Africaisoneofthemostvulnerablecontinentstoclimatechange.Ihavehighlightedthesituation,whichisaggra-vated by the interaction of themultiple stresses. The scienceofclimatechangeiscomplexanddebatable.Theprojected impactof climate change on African societies is even more uncertain.However, it is fairly evident that climate change represents veryreal challenges to developments in progress for many Africancountries.ProjectedclimatechangesforAfricasuggestafutureofincreasingly scarce water supplies, collapsing agricultural yields,encroachingdesertification,andincreasedfoodsecurity.

The challenges faced by Africa today suggest that climatechangecouldbeatippingfactorthatthreatenstoderaildevelop-mentandtheprogressthathasbeenmade.Climatechangealsohas thepotential tobea threatmultiplier,makingwaterscarcityandfoodinsecurityevengreaterchallengestopeace,security,andstabilitythantheyareatpresent.

ThechallengetoU.S.nationalsecurityinterestsistounderstandtheimplicationsofclimatechangetoAfricanregionalsecurity.Thechallengesaremany.ManyofthoseofparticularconcernfortheNavyarisefromthecontinent’svastsize,whichwillaffectourabil-itytoprovidethecapacityandthecapabilitythatmayberequiredinthefuture.Thankyouforyourtime;Ilookforwardtoanyques-tionsyoumayhaveduringthequestion-and-answersession.

rEFErENCES1. “The2009FailedStatesIndex,”Foreign Policy,Jun2009,http://

www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings.

2. “CorruptionPerceptionsIndex2009,”Transparency International,http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/2009_failed_states_index_interactive_map_and_rankings



http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table

http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2009/cpi_2009_table

6.4 strategic environment and implications of climate change james.pdf · 310 climate and energy...

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