essays in radical empiricism, by william james.pdf

8/6/2019 Essays in Radical Empiricism, by William James.pdf

1/69

Find Authentic Happiness Formula, and more free booklets on www.AmAreWay.org - Subjectie well-being blog

!ssays in "adical !mpiricism#sychologist $and philosopher% William &ames wrote influential books on the youngscience of psychology, educational psychology, psychology of religious e'perience and

mysticism, and on the philosophy of pragmatism.

James interacted with a wide array of writers and scholars throughout his life, including his

godfather Ralph Waldo Emerson, his godson William James Sidis, as well as Charles Sanders

Peirce, Bertrand Russell, Josiah Royce, Ernst Mach, John Dewey, Walter ippmann, Mar!

"wain, #oratio $lger, Jr%, #enri Bergson and Sigmund &reud%

#ere, courtesy of the Pro'ect (uten)erg, Brian &oley, and Christine D% you find his in eBoo!

format% En'oy*

We would lo+e to hear your feed)ac! suggestions a)out new topics- .deas a)out

impro+ements- i!e to share your e/perience and ma!e it an eBoo!, White Paper, chec!0list-

Please let us !now through http11www%amareway%org1 "here, you can also read more on

related topics% "han!s*

EDITORS PREFACE

e present +olume is an attempt to carry out a plan which William James is !nown to ha+e formed se+eral years )efore

death% .n 2345 he collected reprints in an en+elope which he inscri)ed with the title 6Essays in Radical Empiricism78d he also had duplicate sets of these reprints )ound, under the same title, and deposited for the use of students in the

neral #ar+ard i)rary, and in the Philosophical i)rary in Emerson #all%

o years later Professor James pu)lished The Meaning of TruthandA Pluralistic Universe, and inserted in these +olumes

eral of the articles which he had intended to use in the 6Essays in Radical Empiricism%7 Whether he would ne+ertheless

e carried out his original plan, had he li+ed, cannot )e certainly !nown% Se+eral facts, howe+er, stand out +ery clearly%

the first place, the articles included in the original plan )ut omitted from his later +olumes are indispensa)le to the

derstanding9Pg i+: of his other writings% "o these articles he repeatedly alludes% "hus, in The Meaning of Truth;p% 2"his statement is pro)a)ly e/cessi+ely o)scure to any one who has not read my two articles 6Does Consciousness

st-7 and 6$ World of Pure E/perience%7? @ther allusions ha+e )een indicated in the present te/t% .n the second place, the

cles originally )rought together as 6Essays in Radical Empiricism7 form a connected whole% Aot only were most ofm written consecuti+ely within a period of two years, )ut they contain numerous cross0references% .n the third place,

fessor James regarded 6radical empiricism7 as an independentdoctrine% "his he asserted e/pressly >et me say that

re is no logical conne/ion )etween pragmatism, as . understand it, and a doctrine which . ha+e recently set forth as

dical empiricism%7 "he latter stands on its own feet% @ne may entirely re'ect it and still )e a pragmatist%? ;Pragmatism,

45, Preface, p% i/%= &inally, Professor James came toward the end of his life to regard 6radical empiricism7 as more 9Pg

undamental and more important than 6pragmatism%7 .n the Preface to The Meaning of Truth;2343=, the author gi+es the

owing e/planation of his desire to continue, and if possi)le conclude, the contro+ersy o+er pragmatism >. am interested

another doctrine in philosophy to which . gi+e the name of radical empiricism, and it seems to me that the esta)lishment

he pragmatist theory of truth is a step of first0rate importance in ma!ing radical empiricism pre+ail? ;p% /ii=%

preparing the present +olume, the editor has therefore )een go+erned )y two moti+es% @n the one hand, he has sought to

ser+e and ma!e accessi)le certain important articles not to )e found in Professor James7s other )oo!s% "his is true of

aysi,ii,i+, +,+iii, i/, /, /i, and /ii% @n the other hand, he has sought to )ring together in one +olume a set of essays

ating systematically of one independent, coherent, and fundamental doctrine% "o this end it has seemed )est to include

ee essays ;iii, +i, and +ii=, which, although included in the original plan, were afterwards reprinted elsewhere8 9Pg +i:and

$m$re Way li+ing 'oyfully 0 www%$m$reWay%org
http://www.amareway.org/http://www.iswb.org/http://www.amareway.org/%20http://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#Ihttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#Ihttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#IIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#IIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#IIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#IVhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#Vhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#Vhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#VIIIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#IXhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#Xhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#XIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#XIIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#IIIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#VIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#VIIhttp://www.amareway.org/http://www.amareway.org/http://www.amareway.org/http://www.iswb.org/http://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#Ihttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#IIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#IVhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#Vhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#VIIIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#IXhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#Xhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#XIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#XIIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#IIIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#VIhttp://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#VIIhttp://www.amareway.org/%20


2/69


essay,/ii,not included in the original plan% Essays iii, +i,and +iiare indispensa)le to the consecuti+eness of the series,

d are so interwo+en with the rest that it is necessary that the student should ha+e them at hand for ready consultation%

ay /iithrows an important light on the author7s general 6empiricism,7 and forms an important lin! )etween 6radical

piricism7 and the author7s other doctrines%

short, the present +olume is designed not as a collection )ut rather as a treatise% .t is intended that another +olume shall

issued which shall contain papers ha+ing )iographical or historical importance which ha+e not yet )een reprinted in

o! form% "he present +olume is intended not only for students of Professor James7s philosophy, )ut for students of

taphysics and the theory of !nowledge% .t sets forth systematically and within )rief compass the doctrine of 6radical

piricism%7

word more may )e in order concerning the general meaning of this doctrine% .n the Preface to the Will to Believe;23=,

fessor 9Pg +ii:James gi+es the name >radical empiricism? to his >philosophic attitude,? and adds the following

lanation >. say 6empiricism,7 )ecause it is contented to regard its most assured conclusions concerning matters of fact

hypotheses lia)le to modification in the course of future e/perience8 and . say 6radical,7 )ecause it treats the doctrine of

nism itself as an hypothesis, and, unli!e so much of the halfway empiricism that is current under the name of positi+ism

agnosticism or scientific naturalism, it does not dogmatically affirm monism as something with which all e/perience has

to suare? ;pp% +ii0+iii=% $n 6empiricism7 of this description is a >philosophic attitude? or temper of mind rather than a

trine, and characteries all of Professor James7s writings% .t is set forth in Essay /iiof the present +olume%

a narrower sense, 6empiricism7 is the method of resorting toparticular experiencesfor the solution of philosophical

)lems% Rationalists are the men of principles, empiricists the men of facts% ; Some Problems of Philosophy, 9Pg +iii:p%

cf% also, ibid., p% GG8 andPragmatism, pp% 3, F2%= @r, >since principles are uni+ersals, and facts are particulars, perhaps

)est way of characteriing the two tendencies is to say that rationalist thin!ing proceeds most willingly )y going from

oles to parts, while empiricist thin!ing proceeds )y going from parts to wholes%? ; Some Problems of Philosophy, p% F8

also ibid., p% 38 andA Pluralistic Universe, p% 5%= $gain, empiricism >remands us to sensation%? ;p. cit., p% the meaning of any proposition can always )e )rought down to some 9Pg /:particular

nseuence in our future practical e/perience, %%% the point lying in the fact that the e/perience must )e particular rather

n in the fact that it must )e acti+e? ;Meaning of Truth, p%


3/69


ape the +icious dis'unctions that ha+e thus far )affled philosophy such dis'unctions as those )etween consciousness and

ysical nature, )etween thought and its o)'ect, )etween one mind and another, and )etween one 6thing7 and another%

ese dis'unctions need not )e 6o+ercome7 )y calling in any >e/traneous trans0empirical connecti+e support? ;Meaning of

th, Preface, p% /iii=8 they may now )e avoided)y regarding the dualities in uestion as only differences of empirical

ationship among common empirical terms% "he pragmatistic account of 6meaning7 and 6truth,7 shows only how a +icious

unction )etween 6idea7 and 6o)'ect7 may thus )e a+oided% "he present +olume not only presents pragmatism in this

ht8 )ut adds similar accounts of the other dualities mentioned a)o+e%

us while pragmatism and radical empiricism 9Pg /ii:do not differ essentially when regarded as methods, they are

ependent when regarded as doctrines% &or it would )e possi)le to hold the pragmatistic theory of 6meaning7 and 6truth,7

hout )asing it on any fundamental theory of relations, and without e/tending such a theory of relations to residual

losophical pro)lems8 without, in short, holding either to the a)o+e 6statement of fact,7 or to the following 6generalied

nclusion%7

>"he generalied conclusion is that therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that

themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs% in short% no extraneous trans'empirical

nective support% but possesses in its o!n right a concatenated or continuous structure%? When thus generalied, 6radical

piricism7 is not only a theory of !nowledge comprising pragmatism as a special chapter, )ut a metaphysic as well% .t

ludes >the hypothesis of trans0empirical reality? ;Cf% )elow, p% 23F=% .t is the author7s most rigorous statement of his

ory that reality is an >e/perience0continuum%? 9Pg /iii:;Meaning of Truth, p% 2Fet empiricism once )ecome associated with

gion, as hitherto, through some strange misunderstanding, it has )een associated with irreligion, and . )elie+e that a new

of religion as well as of philosophy will )e ready to )egin%? ; p. cit., p% 2G8 cf% ibid., ect% +iii,passim8 and The

rieties of #eligious $xperience, pp% F2F0F


4/69


% .s Radical Empiricism Solipsistic-


5/69


the thin!ers . call neo0Kantian, the word consciousness to0day does no more than signalie the fact that e/perience is

efeasi)ly dualistic in structure% .t means that not su)'ect, not o)'ect, )ut o)'ect0plus0su)'ect is the minimum that can

ually )e% "he su)'ect0o)'ect distinction meanwhile is entirely different from that )etween mind and matter, from that

ween )ody and soul% Souls were detacha)le, had separate destinies8 things could happen to them% "o consciousness as

h nothing can happen, for, timeless itself, it is only a witness of happenings in time, in which it plays no part% .t is, in a

rd, )ut the logical correlati+e of 6content7 in an E/perience of which the9Pg H: peculiarity is that fact comes to lightin it,

t a!areness of contentta!es place% Consciousness as such is entirely impersonalI6self7 and its acti+ities )elong to the

ntent% "o say that . am self0conscious, or conscious of putting forth +olition, means only that certain contents, for which

f7 and 6effort of will7 are the names, are not without witness as they occur%

us, for these )elated drin!ers at the Kantian spring, we should ha+e to admit consciousness as an 6epistemological7

essity, e+en if we had no direct e+idence of its )eing there%

t in addition to this, we are supposed )y almost e+ery one to ha+e an immediate consciousness of consciousness itself%

hen the world of outer fact ceases to )e materially present, and we merely recall it in memory, or fancy it, the

nsciousness is )elie+ed to stand out and to )e felt as a !ind of impalpa)le inner flowing, which, once !nown in this sort

e/perience, may eually )e detected in presentations of the outer world% >"he moment we try to fi/ our attention upon

nsciousness and to see !hat, distinctly, it is,? says a recent writer,9Pg 5: >it seems to +anish% .t seems as if we had )efore

a mere emptiness% When we try to introspect the sensation of )lue, all we can see is the )lue8 the other element is as if it

re diaphanous% Net it can)e distinguished, if we loo! attenti+ely enough, and !now that there is something to loo!

?9H: >Consciousness? ;Bewusstheit=, says another philosopher, >is ine/plica)le and hardly descri)a)le, yet all

nscious e/periences ha+e this in common that what we call their content has this peculiar reference to a centre for which

lf7 is the name, in +irtue of which reference alone the content is su)'ecti+ely gi+en, or appears %%% While in this way

nsciousness, or reference to a self, is the only thing which distinguishes a conscious content from any sort of )eing that

ght )e there with no one conscious of it, yet this only ground of the distinction defies all closer e/planations% "he

stence of consciousness, although it is the fundamental fact of psychology, can indeed )e laid down as certain, can )e

ught out )y analysis, )ut can neither )e defined nor deduced from anything )ut itself%?95::

an )e )rought out )y analysis,7 this author says% "his supposes that the consciousness is one element, moment, factorI

l it what you li!eIof an e/perience of essentially dualistic inner constitution, from which, if you a)stract the content,

consciousness will remain re+ealed to its own eye% E/perience, at this rate, would )e much li!e a paint of which the

rld pictures were made% Paint has a dual constitution, in+ol+ing, as it does, a menstruum9:;oil, sie or what not= and a

ss of content in the form of pigment suspended therein% We can get the pure menstruum )y letting the pigment settle,

d the pure pigment )y pouring off the sie or oil% We operate here )y physical su)traction8 and the usual +iew is, that )y

ntal su)traction we can separate the two factors of e/perience in an analogous wayInot isolating them entirely, )ut

tinguishing them enough to !now that they are two%9Pg 3:

w my contention is e/actly the re+erse of this%$xperience% * believe% has no such inner duplicity+ and the separation of

nto consciousness and content comes% not by !ay of subtraction% but by !ay of additionIthe addition, to a gi+en

ncrete piece of it, of other sets of e/periences, in connection with which se+erally its use or function may )e of two

ferent !inds% "he paint will also ser+e here as an illustration% .n a pot in a paint0shop, along with other paints, it ser+es in

entirety as so much salea)le matter% Spread on a can+as, with other paints around it, it represents, on the contrary, a

ture in a picture and performs a spiritual function% Just so, . maintain, does a gi+en undi+ided portion of e/perience,

en in one conte/t of associates, play the part of a !nower, of a state of mind, of 6consciousness78 while in a different

nte/t the same undi+ided )it of e/perience plays the part of a thing !nown, of9Pg 24: an o)'ecti+e 6content%7 .n a word,

one group it figures as a thought, in another group as a thing% $nd, since it can figure in )oth groups simultaneously we

+e e+ery right to spea! of it as su)'ecti+e and o)'ecti+e )oth at once% "he dualism connoted )y such dou)le0)arrelled

ms as 6e/perience,7 6phenomenon,7 6datum,7 6"orfindung7Iterms which, in philosophy at any rate, tend more and more

replace the single0)arrelled terms of 6thought7 and 6thing7Ithat dualism, . say, is still preser+ed in this account, )ut

http://www.amareway.org/http://www.iswb.org/http://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#Footnote_6_6http://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#Footnote_7_7http://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#Footnote_8_8http://www.amareway.org/http://www.amareway.org/http://www.amareway.org/http://www.iswb.org/http://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#Footnote_6_6http://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#Footnote_7_7http://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#Footnote_8_8


6/69


nterpreted, so that, instead of )eing mysterious and elusi+e, it )ecomes +erifia)le and concrete% .t is an affair of relations,

alls outside, not inside, the single e/perience considered, and can always )e particularied and defined%

e entering wedge for this more concrete way of understanding the dualism was fashioned )y oc!e when he made the

rd 6idea7 stand indifferently for thing and thought, and )y Ber!eley when he said that what common sense means )ylities is e/actly what the philosopher means )y ideas% Aeither oc!e9Pg 22: nor Ber!eley thought his truth out into

fect clearness, )ut it seems to me that the conception . am defending does little more than consistently carry out the

agmatic7 method which they were the first to use%

he reader will ta!e his own e/periences, he will see what . mean% et him )egin with a perceptual e/perience, the

esentation,7 so called, of a physical o)'ect, his actual field of +ision, the room he sits in, with the )oo! he is reading as

centre8 and let him for the present treat this comple/ o)'ect in the common0sense way as )eing 6really7 what it seems to

namely, a collection of physical things cut out from an en+ironing world of other physical things with which these

ysical things ha+e actual or potential relations% Aow at the same time it is 'ust those self'same thingswhich his mind, as

say, percei+es8 and the whole philosophy of perception from Democritus7s time downwards has )een 'ust one long

angle o+er the parado/ that what is e+idently one reality should )e in two places at once, )oth in outer space and in a

son7s mind% 6Representati+e79Pg 2


7/69


erience, and, as such, are single thatswhich act in one conte/t as o)'ects, and in another conte/t figure as mental states%

ta!ing them in their first intention, . mean ignoring their relation to possi)le perceptual e/periences with which they

y )e connected, which they may lead to and terminate in, and which then they may )e supposed to9Pg 2H: 6represent%7

!ing them in this way first, we confine the pro)lem to a world merely 6thought0of7 and not directly felt or seen% 924:"his

rld, 'ust li!e the world of percepts, comes to us at first as a chaos of e/periences, )ut lines of order soon get traced% We

d that any )it of it which we may cut out as an e/ample is connected with distinct groups of associates, 'ust as our

ceptual e/periences are, that these associates lin! themsel+es with it )y different relations,922:and that one forms the

er history of a person, while the other acts as an impersonal 6o)'ecti+e7 world, either spatial and temporal, or else

rely logical or mathematical, or otherwise 6ideal%7

25:

e first o)stacle on the part of the reader to seeing that these non0perceptual e/periences ha+e o)'ecti+ity as well as

'ecti+ity will pro)a)ly )e due to the intrusion into his mind of percepts, that third group of associates with which the

n0perceptual e/periences ha+e relations, and which, as a whole, they 6represent,7 standing to them as thoughts to things%

s important function of the non0perceptual e/periences complicates the uestion and confuses it8 for, so used are we to

at percepts as the sole genuine realities that, unless we !eep them out of the discussion, we tend altogether to o+erloo!

o)'ecti+ity that lies in non0perceptual e/periences )y themsel+es% We treat them, 6!nowing7 percepts as they do, as

ough and through su)'ecti+e, and say that they are wholly constituted of the stuff called consciousness, using this term

w for a !ind of entity, after the fashion which . am see!ing to refute% 92


8/69


mplete reality in our )elief% "his actually happens in our dreams, and in our day0dreams so long as percepts do not

errupt them%

d yet, 'ust as the seen room ;to go )ac! to our late e/ample= is alsoa field of consciousness, so the concei+ed or

ollected room is alsoa state of mind8 and the dou)ling0up of the e/perience has in )oth cases similar grounds%e room thought0of, namely, has many thought0of couplings with many thought0of things% Some of these couplings are

onstant, others are sta)le% .n the reader7s personal history the room occupies a single dateIhe saw it only once perhaps,

ear ago% @f the house7s history, on the other hand, it forms a permanent ingredient% Some couplings ha+e the curious

))ornness, to )orrow Royce7s term, of fact8 others show the fluidity of fancyIwe let them come and go as we please%

ouped with9Pg


9/69


st of all, this will )e as!ed >.f e/perience has not 6conscious7 e/istence, if it )e not partly made of 6consciousness,7 of

at then is it made- Matter we !now, and thought we !now, and conscious content we !now, )ut neutral and simple 6pure

erience7 is something we !now not at all% Say !hat it consists ofIfor it must consist of somethingIor )e willing toe it up*?

this challenge the reply is easy% $lthough for fluency7s sa!e . myself spo!e early in this article of a stuff of pure

erience, . ha+e now to say that there is nogeneralstuff of which e/perience at large is made% "here are as many stuffs

here are 6natures7 in the things e/perienced% .f you as! what any one )it of pure e/perience is made of, the answer is

ays the9Pg .t is made of that, of 'ust what appears, of space, of intensity, of flatness, )rownness, hea+iness,

what not%? Shadworth #odgson7s analysis here lea+es nothing to )e desired%923:E/perience is only a collecti+e name

all these sensi)le natures, and sa+e for time and space ;and, if you li!e, for 6)eing7= there appears no uni+ersal element

which all things are made%

e ne/t o)'ection is more formida)le, in fact it sounds uite crushing when one hears it first%9Pg how comes it that its attri)utes should differ so fundamentally in the two ta!ings% $s thing, the

erience is e/tended8 as thought, it occupies no space or place% $s thing, it is red, hard, hea+y8 )ut who e+er heard of a

, hard or hea+y thought- Net e+en now you said that an e/perience is made of 'ust what appears, and what appears is

t such ad'ecti+es% #ow can the one e/perience in its thing0function )e made of them, consist of them, carry them as its

n attri)utes, while in its thought0function it disowns them and attri)utes them elsewhere% "here is a self0contradiction

e from which the radical dualism of thought and thing is the only truth that can sa+e us% @nly if the thought is one !ind

)eing can the ad'ecti+es e/ist in it 6intentionally7 ;to use the scholastic term=8 only if the thing is another !ind, can they

st in it constituti+ely and energetically% Ao simple su)'ect can ta!e the same ad'ecti+es and at one time )e ualified )y

and at another time )e merely 6of7 it, as of something only meant or !nown%?

e solution insisted on )y this o)'ector, li!e many other common0sense solutions, grows the less satisfactory the more one

ns it in one7s mind% "o )egin with, arethought and thing as heterogeneous as is commonly said-9Pg


10/69


m this that inner e/perience is a)solutely ine/tensi+e seems to me little short of a)surd% "he two worlds differ, not )y

presence or a)sence of e/tension, )ut )y the relations of the e/tensions which in )oth worlds e/ist%

es not this case of e/tension now put us on the trac! of truth in the case of other ualities- .t does8 and . am surprised

t the facts should not ha+e )een noticed long ago% Why, for e/ample, do we call a fire hot, and water wet, and yet refuseay that our mental state, when it is 6of7 these o)'ects, is either wet or hot- 6.ntentionally,7 at any rate, and 9Pg


11/69


ught, flowing as a life within us, in a)solute contrast with the o)'ects which it so unremittingly escorts% We can not )e

hless to this immediate intuition% "he dualism is a fundamental datum et no man 'oin what (od has put asunder%?

reply to this is my last word, and . greatly grie+e that to many it will sound materialistic% . can not help that, howe+er,

., too, ha+e my intuitions and . must o)ey them% et the case )e what it may in others, . am as confident as . am ofything that, in9Pg 5: myself, the stream of thin!ing ;which . recognie emphatically as a phenomenon= is only a

eless name for what, when scrutinied, re+eals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my )reathing% "he 6. thin!7

ich Kant said must )e a)le to accompany all my o)'ects, is the 6. )reathe7 which actually does accompany them% "here

other internal facts )esides )reathing ;intracephalic muscular ad'ustments, etc%, of which . ha+e said a word in my

ger Psychology=, and these increase the assets of 6consciousness,7 so far as the latter is su)'ect to immediate perception8

:)ut )reath, which was e+er the original of 6spirit,7 )reath mo+ing outwards, )etween the glottis and the nostrils, is, .

persuaded, the essence out of which philosophers ha+e constructed the entity !nown to them as consciousness% That

ity is fictitious% !hile thoughts in the concrete are fully real. But thoughts in the concrete are made of the same stuff as

ngs are.9Pg :

ish . might )elie+e myself to ha+e made that plausi)le in this article% .n another article . shall try to ma!e the general

ion of a world composed of pure e/periences still more clear%

(()*()!S+

9Reprinted from the3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific Methods, +ol% i, Ao% 2, Septem)er 2, 234G% &or

relation )etween this essay and those which follow, cf% )elow, pp%F0FG% Ed%:

$rticles )y Baldwin, Ward, Bawden, King, $le/ander and others% Dr% Perry is fran!ly o+er the )order%

9Similarly, there is no >acti+ity of 6consciousness7 as such%? See )elow, pp% 254 ff%, note% Ed%:

.n my Psychology . ha+e tried to show that we need no !nower other than the 6passing thought%7 9Principles of

ychology, +ol% i, pp% ff%:

(% E% MooreMind, +ol% /ii, A% S%, 9234:, p% GF4%

Paul Aatorp$inleitung in die Psychologie, 2, pp% 2G, 22&igurati+ely spea!ing, consciousness may )e said to )e the one uni+ersal sol+ent, or menstruum, in which the different

ncrete !inds of psychic acts and facts are contained, whether in concealed or in o)+ious form%? (% "% add Psychology%

scriptive and $xplanatory, 23G, p% 4%

9&or a parallel statement of this +iew, cf% the author7sMeaning of Truth, p% G3, note% Cf% also )elow, pp% 23H0235% Ed%:

:9&or the author7s recognition of >concepts as a co0ordinate realm? of reality, cf% his Meaning of Truth, pp% Gmay )e regarded as somewhat eccentric inattempt to com)ine logical realism with an otherwise empiricist mode of thought? ; Some Problems of Philosophy, p%

H=% Ed%:

:#ere as elsewhere the relations are of course experiencedrelations, mem)ers of the same originally chaotic manifold

non0perceptual e/perience of which the related terms themsel+es are parts% 9Cf% )elow, p% G


12/69


:Aote the am)iguity of this term, which is ta!en sometimes o)'ecti+ely and sometimes su)'ecti+ely%

:.n thePsychological #evie!for July 9234G:, Dr% R% B% Perry has pu)lished a +iew of Consciousness which comes

rer to mine than any other with which . am acuainted% $t present, Dr% Perry thin!s, e+ery field of e/perience is so

ch 6fact%7 .t )ecomes 6opinion7 or 6thought7 only in retrospection, when a fresh e/perience, thin!ing the same o)'ect,ers and corrects it% But the correcti+e e/perience )ecomes itself in turn corrected, and thus e/perience as a whole is a

cess in which what is o)'ecti+e originally fore+er turns su)'ecti+e, turns into our apprehension of the o)'ect% . strongly

ommend Dr% Perry7s admira)le article to my readers%

:. ha+e gi+en a partial account of the matter in Mind, +ol% /, p%


13/69


else, if )etter luc! )efall it, uietly su)side to the profundities, and ser+e as a possi)le ferment of new growths or a

leus of new crystalliation%

"adical !mpiricism

i+e the name of 6radical empiricism7 to my Weltanschauung% Empiricism is !nown as the opposite of rationalism%

ionalism tends to emphasie uni+ersals and to ma!e wholes prior to parts in the order of logic as well as in that of

ng% Empiricism, on the contrary, lays the e/planatory stress upon the part, the element, the indi+idual, and treats the

ole as a collection and the uni+ersal as an a)straction% My description of things, accordingly, starts with the parts and

!es of the whole9Pg G


14/69


ferent sel+es together%Prima facie, if you should li!en the uni+erse of a)solute idealism to an auarium, a crystal glo)e

which goldfish are swimming, you would ha+e to compare the empiricist uni+erse to something more li!e one of those

ed human heads with which the Dya!s of Borneo dec! their lodges% "he s!ull forms a solid nucleus8 )ut innumera)le

thers, lea+es, strings, )eads, and loose appendices of e+ery description float and dangle from it, and, sa+e that they

minate in it, seem to ha+e nothing to do with one another% E+en so my e/periences and yours float and dangle,9Pg G5:

minating, it is true, in a nucleus of common perception, )ut for the most part out of sight and irrele+ant and

magina)le to one another% "his imperfect intimacy, this )are relation of !ithness)etween some parts of the sum total of

erience and other parts, is the fact that ordinary empiricism o+er0emphasies against rationalism, the latter always

ding to ignore it unduly% Radical empiricism, on the contrary, is fair to )oth the unity and the disconnection% .t finds no

son for treating either as illusory% .t allots to each its definite sphere of description, and agrees that there appear to )e

ual forces at wor! which tend, as time goes on, to ma!e the unity greater%

e con'uncti+e relation that has gi+en most trou)le to philosophy is the co'conscious transition, so to call it, )y which one

erience passes into another when )oth )elong to the same self% $)out the facts there is no uestion% My e/periences and

ur e/periences are 6with7 each other in +arious e/ternal ways, )ut mine pass into mine, and yours pass into yours in a

y in which yours and mine ne+er pass9Pg G: into one another% Within each of our personal histories, su)'ect, o)'ect,erest and purpose are continuous or may be continuous%9


15/69


n+erse act% We ought to in+o!e higher principles of disunion, also, to ma!e our merely e/perienced dis'unctions more

y real% &ailing thus, we ought to let the originally gi+en continuities stand on their own )ottom% We ha+e no right to )e

sided or to )low capriciously hot and cold%9Pg F


16/69


succession, or )y 6withness7 alone% Knowledge of sensi)le realities thus comes to life inside the tissue of e/perience% .t

made8 and made )y relations that unroll themsel+es in time% Whene+er certain intermediaries are gi+en, such that, as they

elop towards their terminus, there is e/perience from point to point of one direction followed, and finally of one process

filled, the result is that their starting'point thereby becomes a (no!er and their terminus an ob&ect meant or (no!n % "hat

ll that !nowing ;in the simple case considered= can )e !nown0as, that is the whole of its nature, put into e/periential

ms% Whene+er such is the seuence of our e/periences we may freely say that we had the terminal o)'ect 6in mind7 from

outset, e+en although atthe outset nothing was there in us )ut a flat piece of su)stanti+e e/perience li!e any other, with

self0transcendency a)out it, and no mystery sa+e the mystery of coming into e/istence and of )eing gradually followed

other pieces of su)stanti+e e/perience, with9Pg F: con'uncti+ely transitional e/periences )etween% "hat is what we

anhere )y the o)'ect7s )eing 6in mind%7 @f any deeper more real way of )eing in mind we ha+e no positi+e conception,

d we ha+e no right to discredit our actual e/perience )y tal!ing of such a way at all%

now that many a reader will re)el at this% >Mere intermediaries,? he will say, >e+en though they )e feelings of

ntinuously growing fulfilment, onlyseparatethe !nower from the !nown, whereas what we ha+e in !nowledge is a !ind

mmediate touch of the one )y the other, an 6apprehension7 in the etymological sense of the word, a leaping of the chasm

)y lightning, an act )y which two terms are smitten into one, o+er the head of their distinctness% $ll these deadermediaries of yours are out of each other, and outside of their termini still%?

t do not such dialectic difficulties remind us of the dog dropping his )one and snapping at its image in the water- .f we

ew any more real !ind of union aliunde, we might )e entitled9Pg F3: to )rand all our empirical unions as a sham% But

ons )y continuous transition are the only ones we !now of, whether in this matter of a !nowledge0a)out that terminates

an acuaintance, whether in personal identity, in logical predication through the copula 6is,7 or elsewhere% .f anywhere

re were more a)solute unions realied, they could only re+eal themsel+es to us )y 'ust such con'uncti+e results% "hese

what the unions are !orth, these are all that !e can ever practically mean)y union, )y continuity% .s it not time to

eat what ote said of su)stances, that to act li(eone is to beone-9:Should we not say here that to )e e/perienced as

ntinuous is to )e really continuous, in a world where e/perience and reality come to the same thing- .n a picture gallery

ainted hoo! will ser+e to hang a painted chain )y, a painted ca)le will hold a painted ship% .n a world where )oth thems and their distinctions are affairs of e/perience, con'unctions that are e/perienced must )e at least as real as anything

e% "hey will )e 6a)solutely7 real con'unctions, if we ha+e no transphenomenal $)solute ready, to derealie the whole

erienced world )y, at a stro!e% .f, on the other hand, we had such an $)solute, not one of our opponents7 theories of

owledge could remain standing any )etter than ours could8 for the distinctions as well as the con'unctions of e/perience

uld impartially fall its prey% "he whole uestion of how 6one7 thing can !now 6another7 would cease to )e a real one at

in a world where otherness itself was an illusion%9G:9Pg H4:

much for the essentials of the cogniti+e relation, where the !nowledge is conceptual in type, or forms !nowledge

out7 an o)'ect% .t consists in intermediary e/periences ;possi)le, if not actual= of continuously de+eloping progress, and,

ally, of fulfilment, when the sensi)le percept, which is the o)'ect, is reached% "he percept here not only verifies the

ncept, pro+es its function of !nowing that percept to )e true, )ut the percept7s e/istence as the terminus of the chain of

ermediaries createsthe function% Whate+er terminates that chain was, )ecause it now pro+es itself to )e, what the

ncept 6had in mind%7

H2:

e towering importance for human life of this !ind of !nowing lies in the fact that an e/perience that !nows another can

ure as its representative, not in any uasi0miraculous 6epistemological7 sense, )ut in the definite practical sense of )eing

substitutein +arious operations, sometimes physical and sometimes mental, which lead us to its associates and results%

e/perimenting on our ideas of reality, we may sa+e oursel+es the trou)le of e/perimenting on the real e/periences

ich they se+erally mean% "he ideas form related systems, corresponding point for point to the systems which the realities

m8 and )y letting an ideal term call up its associates systematically, we may )e led to a terminus which the

responding real term would ha+e led to in case we had operated on the real world% $nd this )rings us to the general

stion of su)stitution%9Pg H


17/69


Substitution

"aine7s )rilliant )oo! on 6.ntelligence,7 su)stitution was for the first time named as a cardinal logical function, though of

urse the facts had always )een familiar enough% What, e/actly, in a system of e/periences, does the 6su)stitution7 of one

hem for another mean-cording to my +iew, e/perience as a whole is a process in time, where)y innumera)le particular terms lapse and are

erseded )y others that follow upon them )y transitions which, whether dis'uncti+e or con'uncti+e in content, are

msel+es e/periences, and must in general )e accounted at least as real as the terms which they relate% What the nature of

e+ent called 6superseding7 signifies, depends altogether on the !ind of transition that o)tains% Some e/periences simply

lish their predecessors without continuing them in any way% @thers are felt to increase or to enlarge their meaning, to

ry out their purpose, or to )ring us nearer to their goal% "hey9Pg H: 6represent7 them, and may fulfil their function )etter

n they fulfilled it themsel+es% But to 6fulfil a function7 in a world of pure e/perience can )e concei+ed and defined in

y one possi)le way% .n such a world transitions and arri+als ;or terminations= are the only e+ents that happen, though

y happen )y so many sorts of path% "he only function that one e/perience can perform is to lead into another e/perience8

d the only fulfilment we can spea! of is the reaching of a certain e/perienced end% When one e/perience leads to ;or can

d to= the same end as another, they agree in function% But the whole system of e/periences as they are immediately

en presents itself as a uasi0chaos through which one can pass out of an initial term in many directions and yet end in

same terminus, mo+ing from ne/t to ne/t )y a great many possi)le paths%

her one of these paths might )e a functional su)stitute for another, and to follow one rather than another might on

asion )e an ad+antageous thing to do% $s a matter of9Pg HG: fact, and in a general way, the paths that run through

nceptual e/periences, that is, through 6thoughts7 or 6ideas7 that 6!now7 the things in which they terminate, are highly

+antageous paths to follow% Aot only do they yield inconcei+a)ly rapid transitions8 )ut, owing to the 6uni+ersal7

racter9F:which they freuently possess, and to their capacity for association with one another in great systems, they

strip the tardy consecutions of the things themsel+es, and sweep us on towards our ultimate termini in a far more la)or0

ing way than the following of trains of sensi)le perception e+er could% Wonderful are the new cuts and the short0circuits

ich the thought0paths ma!e% Most thought0paths, it is true, are su)stitutes for nothing actual8 they end outside the realrld altogether, in wayward fancies, utopias, fictions or mista!es% But where they do re0enter reality and terminate

rein, we su)stitute them always8 and with these su)stitutes we pass the greater num)er of our hours%9Pg HF:

s is why . called our e/periences, ta!en all together, a uasi0chaos% "here is +astly more discontinuity in the sum total of

eriences than we commonly suppose% "he o)'ecti+e nucleus of e+ery man7s e/perience, his own )ody, is, it is true, a

ntinuous percept8 and eually continuous as a percept ;though we may )e inattenti+e to it= is the material en+ironment of

t )ody, changing )y gradual transition when the )ody mo+es% But the distant parts of the physical world are at all times

ent from us, and form conceptual o)'ects merely, into the perceptual reality of which our life inserts itself at points

crete and relati+ely rare% Round their se+eral o)'ecti+e nuclei, partly shared and common and partly discrete, of the real

ysical world, innumera)le thin!ers, pursuing their se+eral lines of physically true cogitation, trace paths that intersect

e another only at discontinuous perceptual points, and the rest of the time are uite incongruent8 and around all thelei9Pg HH: of shared 6reality,7 as around the Dya!7s head of my late metaphor, floats the +ast cloud of e/periences that

wholly su)'ecti+e, that are non0su)stitutional, that find not e+en an e+entual ending for themsel+es in the perceptual

rldIthe mere day0dreams and 'oys and sufferings and wishes of the indi+idual minds% "hese e/ist !ithone another,

eed, and with the o)'ecti+e nuclei, )ut out of them it is pro)a)le that to all eternity no interrelated system of any !ind

l e+er )e made%

s notion of the purely su)stitutional or conceptual physical world )rings us to the most critical of all the steps in the

+elopment of a philosophy of pure e/perience% "he parado/ of self0transcendency in !nowledge comes )ac! upon us

e, )ut . thin! that our notions of pure e/perience and of su)stitution, and our radically empirical +iew of con'uncti+e

nsitions, are4en(mittelthat will carry us safely through the pass%9Pg H5:

What (bjectie "eference s.

hosoe+er feels his e/perience to )e something su)stitutional e+en while he has it, may )e said to ha+e an e/perience that

ches )eyond itself% &rom inside of its own entity it says 6more,7 and postulates reality e/isting elsewhere% &or the

nscendentalist, who holds !nowing to consist in asalto mortaleacross an 6epistemological chasm,7 such an idea presents

http://www.amareway.org/http://www.iswb.org/http://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#Footnote_35_35http://www.amareway.org/http://www.amareway.org/http://www.amareway.org/http://www.iswb.org/http://www.gutenberg.org/files/32547/32547-h/32547-h.htm#Footnote_35_35


18/69


difficulty8 )ut it seems at first sight as if it might )e inconsistent with an empiricism li!e our own% #a+e we not

lained that conceptual !nowledge is made such wholly )y the e/istence of things that fall outside of the !nowing

erience itselfI)y intermediary e/periences and )y a terminus that fulfils- Can the !nowledge )e there )efore these

ments that constitute its )eing ha+e come- $nd, if !nowledge )e not there, how can o)'ecti+e reference occur-

e !ey to this difficulty lies in the distinction )etween !nowing as +erified and completed, and the same !nowing as in

nsit9Pg H: and on its way% "o recur to the Memorial #all e/ample lately used, it is only when our idea of the #all has

ually terminated in the percept that we !now 6for certain7 that from the )eginning it was truly cogniti+e of that% Qntil

a)lished )y the end of the process, its uality of !nowing that, or indeed of !nowing anything, could still )e dou)ted8

d yet the !nowing really was there, as the result now shows% We were virtual!nowers of the #all long )efore we were

tified to ha+e )een its actual !nowers, )y the percept7s retroacti+e +alidating power% Just so we are 6mortal7 all the time,

reason of the +irtuality of the ine+ita)le e+ent which will ma!e us so when it shall ha+e come%

w the immensely greater part of all our !nowing ne+er gets )eyond this +irtual stage% .t ne+er is completed or nailed

wn% . spea! not merely of our ideas of impercepti)les li!e ether0wa+es or dissociated 6ions,7 or of 6e'ects7 li!e the

ntents of our neigh)ors7 minds8 . spea! also of ideas which we might +erify if we would ta!e the trou)le, )ut which we

d for9Pg H3: true although unterminated perceptually, )ecause nothing says 6no7 to us, and there is no contradicting truth

ight% To continue thin(ing unchallenged is% ninety'nine times out of a hundred% our practical substitute for (no!ing in

completed sense.$s each e/perience runs )y cogniti+e transition into the ne/t one, and we nowhere feel a collision

h what we elsewhere count as truth or fact, we commit oursel+es to the current as if the port were sure% We li+e, as it

re, upon the front edge of an ad+ancing wa+e0crest, and our sense of a determinate direction in falling forward is all we

er of the future of our path% .t is as if a differential uotient should )e conscious and treat itself as an adeuate su)stitute

a traced0out cur+e% @ur e/perience, inter alia, is of +ariations of rate and of direction, and li+es in these transitions more

n in the 'ourney7s end% "he e/periences of tendency are sufficient to act uponIwhat more could we ha+e doneat those

ments e+en if the later +erification comes complete-

s is what, as a radical empiricist, . say to9Pg 54: the charge that the o)'ecti+e reference which is so flagrant a character

our e/periences in+ol+es a chasm and a mortal leap% $ positi+ely con'uncti+e transition in+ol+es neither chasm nor leap%ng the +ery original of what we mean )y continuity, it ma!es a continuum where+er it appears% . !now full well that

h )rief words as these will lea+e the hardened transcendentalist unsha!en% Con'uncti+e e/periences separatetheir terms,

will still say they are third things interposed, that ha+e themsel+es to )e con'oined )y new lin!s, and to in+o!e them

!es our trou)le infinitely worse% "o 6feel7 our motion forward is impossi)le% Motion implies terminus8 and how can

minus )e felt )efore we ha+e arri+ed- "he )arest start and sally forwards, the )arest tendency to lea+e the instant,

ol+es the chasm and the leap% Con'uncti+e transitions are the most superficial of appearances, illusions of our sensi)ility

ich philosophical reflection pul+eries at a touch% Conception is our only trustworthy instrument, conception and the

solute wor!ing hand in hand% Conception9Pg 52: disintegrates e/perience utterly, )ut its dis'unctions are easily

rcome again when the $)solute ta!es up the tas!%

ch transcendentalists . must lea+e, pro+isionally at least, in full possession of their creed% 9H: . ha+e no space foremics in this article, so . shall simply formulate the empiricist doctrine as my hypothesis, lea+ing it to wor! or not wor!

t may%

'ecti+e reference, . say then, is an incident of the fact that so much of our e/perience comes as an insufficient and

nsists of process and transition% @ur fields of e/perience ha+e no more definite )oundaries than ha+e our fields of +iew%

th are fringed fore+er )y a morethat continuously de+elops, and that continuously supersedes them as life proceeds% "he

ations, generally spea!ing, are as real here as the terms are, and the only complaint of the transcendentalist7s with which

ould at all sympathie would )e his charge that, )y first ma!ing !nowledge to consist in e/ternal relations as . ha+e

ne, and )y then confessing that nine0tenths of the time these are not actually )ut only +irtually there, . ha+e !noc!ed the

id )ottom out of the whole )usiness, and palmed off a su)stitute of !nowledge for the genuine thing% @nly the

mission, such a critic might say, that our ideas are self0transcendent and 6true7 already, in ad+ance of the e/periences that

to terminate them, can )ring solidity )ac! to !nowledge in a world li!e this, in which transitions and terminations are

y )y e/ception fulfilled%9Pg 5


19/69


ught of, the dispute is a uarrel o+er words% What then would the self0transcendency affirmed to e/ist in ad+ance of all

eriential mediation or termination, )e (no!n'as- What would it practically result in for us, were it true-

ould only result in our orientation, in the turning of our e/pectations and practical9Pg 5: tendencies into the right path8

d the right path here, so long as we and the o)'ect are not yet face to face ;or can ne+er get face to face, as in the case ofcts=, would )e the path that led us into the o)'ect7s nearest neigh)orhood% Where direct acuaintance is lac!ing,

owledge a)out7 is the ne/t )est thing, and an acuaintance with what actually lies a)out the o)'ect, and is most closely

ated to it, puts such !nowledge within our grasp% Ether0wa+es and your anger, for e/ample, are things in which my

ughts will ne+erperceptuallyterminate, )ut my concepts of them lead me to their +ery )rin!, to the chromatic fringes

d to the hurtful words and deeds which are their really ne/t effects%

en if our ideas did in themsel+es carry the postulated self0transcendency, it would still remain true that their putting us

o possession of such effects !ould be the sole cash'value of the self'transcendency for us % $nd this cash0+alue, it is

dless to say, is verbatim et literatimwhat our empiricist account pays in% @n pragmatist principles therefore, a

pute9Pg 5G: o+er self0transcendency is a pure logomachy% Call our concepts of e'ecti+e things self0transcendent or the

erse, it ma!es no difference, so long as we don7t differ a)out the nature of that e/alted +irtue7s fruitsIfruits for us, of

urse, humanistic fruits% .f an $)solute were pro+ed to e/ist for other reasons, it might well appear that his!nowledge is

minated in innumera)le cases where ours is still incomplete% "hat, howe+er, would )e a fact indifferent to our

owledge% "he latter would grow neither worse nor )etter, whether we ac!nowledged such an $)solute or left him out%

the notion of a !nowledge still in transituand on its way 'oins hands here with that notion of a 6pure e/perience7 which

ied to e/plain in my 9essay: entitled 6Does Consciousness E/ist-7 "he instant field of the present is always e/perience in

6pure7 state, plain unualified actuality, a simple that, as yet undifferentiated into thing and thought, and only +irtually

ssifia)le as o)'ecti+e fact or as some one7s opinion a)out fact% "his is as true9Pg 5F: when the field is conceptual as

en it is perceptual% 6Memorial #all7 is 6there7 in my idea as much as when . stand )efore it% . proceed to act on its

ount in either case% @nly in the later e/perience that supersedes the present one is this na/f immediacy retrospecti+ely

t into two parts, a 6consciousness7 and its 6content,7 and the content corrected or confirmed% While still pure, or present,

y e/perienceImine, for e/ample, of what . write a)out in these +ery linesIpasses for 6truth%7 "he morrow may reduceo 6opinion%7 "he transcendentalist in all his particular !nowledges is as lia)le to this reduction as . am his $)solute does

sa+e him% Why, then, need he uarrel with an account of !nowing that merely lea+es it lia)le to this ine+ita)le

ndition- Why insist that !nowing is a static relation out of time when it practically seems so much a function of our

+e life- &or a thing to )e +alid, says ote, is the same as to ma!e itself +alid% When the whole uni+erse seems only to

ma!ing itself +alid and to )e still incomplete ;else why its ceaseless changing-= why, of9Pg 5H: all things, should

owing )e e/empt- Why should it not )e ma!ing itself +alid li!e e+erything else- "hat some parts of it may )e already

id or +erified )eyond dispute, the empirical philosopher, of course, li!e any one else, may always hope%

)he onterminousness of ifferent :inds4;


20/69


uated as my own is, )y an inner life li!e mine% "his argument from analogy is my9Pg 5: reason, whether an instincti+e

ief runs )efore it or not% But what is 6your )ody7 here )ut a percept in myfield- .t is only as animating thato)'ect, my

ect, that . ha+e any occasion to thin! of you at all% .f the )ody that you actuate )e not the +ery )ody that . see there, )ut

me duplicate )ody of your own with which that has nothing to do, we )elong to different uni+erses, you and ., and for

to spea! of you is folly% Myriads of such uni+erses e+en now may coe/ist, irrele+ant to one another8 my concern is

ely with the uni+erse with which my own life is connected%

that perceptual part of my uni+erse which . call your )ody, your mind and my mind meet and may )e called

nterminous% Nour mind actuates that )ody and mine sees it8 my thoughts pass into it as into their harmonious cogniti+e

filment8 your emotions and +olitions pass into it as causes into their effects%

t that percept hangs together with all our other physical percepts% "hey are of one stuff with it8 and if it )e our common

session, they must )e so li!ewise% &or instance, your9Pg 53: hand lays hold of one end of a rope and my hand lays hold

he other end% We pull against each other% Can our two hands )e mutual o)'ects in this e/perience, and the rope not )e

tual also- What is true of the rope is true of any other percept% Nour o)'ects are o+er and o+er again the same as mine% .f

s! you !heresome o)'ect of yours is, our old Memorial #all, for e/ample, you point to myMemorial #all withyour

nd which*see% .f you alter an o)'ect in your world, put out a candle, for e/ample, when . am present, mycandle ipso

togoes out% .t is only as altering my o)'ects that . guess you to e/ist% .f your o)'ects do not coalesce with my o)'ects, if

y )e not identically where mine are, they must )e pro+ed to )e positi+ely somewhere else% But no other location can )e

igned for them, so their place must )e what it seems to )e, the same% 9:

4:

ctically, then, our minds meet in a world of o)'ects which they share in common, which would still )e there, if one or

eral of the minds were destroyed% . can see no formal o)'ection to this supposition7s )eing literally true% @n the

nciples which . am defending, a 6mind7 or 6personal consciousness7 is the name for a series of e/periences run together

certain definite transitions, and an o)'ecti+e reality is a series of similar e/periences !nit )y different transitions% .f one

d the same e/perience can figure twice, once in a mental and once in a physical conte/t ;as . ha+e tried, in my article ononsciousness,7 to show that it can=, one does not see why it might not figure thrice, or four times, or any num)er of

es, )y running into as many different mental conte/ts, 'ust as the same point, lying at their intersection, can )e

ntinued into many different lines% $)olishing any num)er of conte/ts would not destroy the e/perience itself or its other

nte/ts, any more than a)olishing some of the point7s linear continuations would destroy the others, or destroy the point

lf%

ell !now the su)tle dialectic which insists9Pg 2: that a term ta!en in another relation must needs )e an intrinsically

ferent term% "he cru/ is always the old (ree! one, that the same man can7t )e tall in relation to one neigh)or, and short

elation to another, for that would ma!e him tall and short at once% .n this essay . can not stop to refute this dialectic, so .

s on, lea+ing my flan! for the time e/posed%93:But if my reader will only allow that the same 6no!7 )oth ends his past

d )egins his future8 or that, when he )uys an acre of land from his neigh)or, it is the same acre that successi+ely figures

he two estates8 or that when . pay him a dollar, the same dollar goes into his poc!et that came out of mine8 he will alsoconsistency ha+e to allow that the same o)'ect may concei+a)ly play a part in, as )eing related to the rest of, any num)er

otherwise entirely different minds% "his is enough for my present point the common0sense notion of minds sharing the

me o)'ect offers no special logical or epistemological difficulties of its own8 it stands or falls with the general possi)ility

hings )eing in con'uncti+e relation with other things at all%9Pg


21/69


first percept de+elops, the interior of the #all, for instance, or the inner structure of its )ric!s and mortar% .f our minds

re in a literal sense conterminous, neither could get )eyond the percept which they had in common, it would )e an

mate )arrier )etween themIunless indeed they flowed o+er it and )ecame 6co0conscious7 o+er a still larger part of their

ntent, which ;thought0transference apart= is not supposed to )e the case% .n point of fact the ultimate common )arrier can

ays )e pushed, )y )oth minds, farther than any actual percept of either, until at last it resol+es itself into the mere notion

impercepti)les li!e atoms or ether, so that, where we do terminate in percepts, our !nowledge is only speciously

mpleted, )eing, in theoretic strictness, only a +irtual !nowledge of those remoter o)'ects which conception carries out%

natural realism, permissi)le in logic, refuted then )y empirical fact- Do our minds ha+e no o)'ect in common after all-

G:

s, they certainly ha+e Spacein common% @n pragmatic principles we are o)liged to predicate sameness where+er we can

dicate no assigna)le point of difference% .f two named things ha+e e+ery uality and function indiscerni)le, and are at

same time in the same place, they must )e written down as numerically one thing under two different names% But there

no test disco+era)le, so far as . !now, )y which it can )e shown that the place occupied )y your percept of Memorial

ll differs from the place occupied )y mine% "he percepts themsel+es may )e shown to differ8 )ut if each of us )e as!ed

point out where his percept is, we point to an identical spot% $ll the relations, whether geometrical or causal, of the #all

ginate or terminate in that spot wherein our hands meet, and where each of us )egins to wor! if he wishes to ma!e the

ll change )efore the other7s eyes% Just so it is with our )odies% "hat )ody of yours which you actuate and feel from

hin must )e in the same spot as the )ody of yours which . see or touch from without% 6"here7 for me means9Pg F:

ere . place my finger% .f you do not feel my finger7s contact to )e 6there7 in mysense, when . place it on your )ody,

ere then do you feel it- Nour inner actuations of your )ody meet my finger there it is therethat you resist its push, or

in! )ac!, or sweep the finger aside with your hand% Whate+er farther !nowledge either of us may acuire of the real

nstitution of the )ody which we thus feel, you from within and . from without, it is in that same place that the newly

ncei+ed or percei+ed constituents ha+e to )e located, and it is throughthat space that your and my mental intercourse

h each other has always to )e carried on, )y the mediation of impressions which . con+ey thither, and of the reactions

nce which those impressions may pro+o!e from you%general terms, then, whate+er differing contents our minds may e+entually fill a place with, the place itself is a

merically identical content of the two minds, a piece of common property in which, through which, and o+er which they

n% "he receptacle of certain of9Pg H: our e/periences )eing thus common, the e/periences themsel+es might some day

ome common also% .f that day e+er did come, our thoughts would terminate in a complete empirical identity, there

uld )e an end, so far as thosee/periences went, to our discussions a)out truth% Ao points of difference appearing, they

uld ha+e to count as the same%

. onclusion

th this we ha+e the outlines of a philosophy of pure e/perience )efore us% $t the outset of my essay, . called it a mosaic

losophy% .n actual mosaics the pieces are held together )y their )edding, for which )edding the Su)stances,nscendental Egos, or $)solutes of other philosophies may )e ta!en to stand% .n radical empiricism there is no )edding8 it

s if the pieces clung together )y their edges, the transitions e/perienced )etween them forming their cement% @f course

h a metaphor is misleading, for in actual e/perience the more su)stanti+e and the more transiti+e parts run into each

er continuously, there is in general9Pg 5: no separateness needing to )e o+ercome )y an e/ternal cement8 and whate+er

arateness is actually e/perienced is not o+ercome, it stays and counts as separateness to the end% But the metaphor

+es to sym)olie the fact that E/perience itself, ta!en at large, can grow )y its edges% "hat one moment of it proliferates

o the ne/t )y transitions which, whether con'uncti+e or dis'uncti+e, continue the e/periential tissue, can not, . contend,

denied% ife is in the transitions as much as in the terms connected8 often, indeed, it seems to )e there more

phatically, as if our spurts and sallies forward were the real firing0line of the )attle, were li!e the thin line of flame

+ancing across the dry autumnal field which the farmer proceeds to )urn% .n this line we li+e prospecti+ely as well as

ospecti+ely% .t is 6of7 the past, inasmuch as it comes e/pressly as the past7s continuation8 it is 6of7 the future in so far asfuture, when it comes, will ha+e continued it%

ese relations of continuous transition e/perienced are what ma!e our e/periences9Pg : cogniti+e% .n the simplest and

mpletest cases the e/periences are cogniti+e of one another% When one of them terminates a pre+ious series of them with

http://www.amareway.org/http://www.iswb.org/http://www.amareway.org/http://www.amareway.org/http://www.amareway.org/http://www.iswb.org/


22/69


ense of fulfilment, it, we say, is what those other e/periences 6had in +iew%7 "he !nowledge, in such a case, is +erified8

truth is 6salted down%7 Mainly, howe+er, we li+e on speculati+e in+estments, or on our prospects only% But li+ing on

ngs in posseis as good as li+ing in the actual, so long as our credit remains good% .t is e+ident that for the most part it is

od, and that the uni+erse seldom protests our drafts%

his sense we at e+ery moment can continue to )elie+e in an e/isting beyond% .t is only in special cases that our confident

h forward gets re)u!ed% "he )eyond must, of course, always in our philosophy )e itself of an e/periential nature% .f not

uture e/perience of our own or a present one of our neigh)or, it must )e a thing in itself in Dr% Prince7s and Professor

ong7s sense of the termIthat is, it must )e an e/perience foritself whose relation to other things we translate into the

on9Pg 3: of molecules, ether0wa+es, or whate+er else the physical sym)ols may )e%9G4:"his opens the chapter of the

ations of radical empiricism to panpsychism, into which . can not enter now%9G2:

e )eyond can in any case e/ist simultaneouslyIfor it can )e e/perienced to have existed simultaneouslyIwith the

erience that practically postulates it )y loo!ing in its direction, or )y turning or changing in the direction of which it is

goal% Pending that actuality of union, in the +irtuality of which the 6truth,7 e+en now, of the postulation consists, the

yond and its !nower are entities split off from each other% "he world is in so far forth a pluralism of which the unity is

fully e/perienced as yet% But, as fast as +erifications come, trains of e/perience, once separate, run into one another8

d that is why . said, earlier in my article, that the unity of the world is on the whole undergoing increase% "he uni+erse

ntinually grows in uantity )y new e/periences that graft themsel+es upon the older mass8 )ut these +ery new

eriences often help the mass to a more consolidated form%

34:

ese are the main features of a philosophy of pure e/perience% .t has innumera)le other aspects and arouses innumera)le

estions, )ut the points . ha+e touched on seem enough to ma!e an entering wedge% .n my own mind such a philosophy

monies )est with a radical pluralism, with no+elty and indeterminism, moralism and theism, and with the 6humanism7

ly sprung upon us )y the @/ford and the Chicago schools%9G


23/69


:9See a)o+e, pp% 302F%:

:9>@n the &unction of Cognition,?Mind, +ol% /, 2F, and >"he Knowing of "hings "ogether,?Psychological #evie!,

% ii, 23F% "hese articles are reprinted, the former in full, the latter in part, in The Meaning of Truth, pp% 20F4% Ed%: "hese

cles and their doctrine, unnoticed apparently )y any one else, ha+e lately gained fa+ora)le comment from Professorong% 9>$ Aaturalistic "heory of the Reference of "hought to Reality,?3ournal of Philosophy% Psychology and Scientific

thods, +ol% i, 234G%: Dr% Dic!inson S% Miller has independently thought out the same results 9>"he Meaning of "ruth and

or,?Philosophical #evie!, +ol% ii, 238 >"he Confusion of &unction and Content in Mental $nalysis,? Psychological

vie!, +ol% ii, 23F:, which Strong accordingly du)s the James0Miller theory of cognition%

:9Cf% #% oteMetaphysi(, 503, 35, 3,


24/69


re e/perience7 is the name which . ga+e to the immediate flu/ of life which furnishes the material to our later reflection

h its conceptual categories% @nly new0)orn )a)es, or men in semi0coma from sleep, drugs, illnesses, or )lows, may )e

umed to ha+e an e/perience pure in the literal sense of a thatwhich is not yet any definite !hat, tho7 ready to )e all sortswhats8 full )oth of oneness9Pg 3G: and of manyness, )ut in respects that don7t appear8 changing throughout, yet so

nfusedly that its phases interpenetrate and no points, either of distinction or of identity, can )e caught% Pure e/perience in

s state is )ut another name for feeling or sensation% But the flu/ of it no sooner comes than it tends to fill itself with

phases, and these salient parts )ecome identified and fi/ed and a)stracted8 so that e/perience now flows as if shot

ough with ad'ecti+es and nouns and prepositions and con'unctions% .ts purity is only a relati+e term, meaning the

portional amount of un+er)alied sensation which it still em)odies%

)ac! as we go, the flu/, )oth as a whole and in its parts, is that of things con'unct and separated% "he great continua of

e, space, and the self en+elope e+erything, )etwi/t them, and flow together without interfering% "he things that they

+elope come as separate in some ways and as continuous in others% Some sensations coalesce with some ideas, and

ers are irreconcila)le% ualities9Pg 3F: compenetrate one space, or e/clude each other from it% "hey cling together

sistently in groups that mo+e as units, or else they separate% "heir changes are a)rupt or discontinuous8 and their !inds

em)le or differ8 and, as they do so, they fall into either e+en or irregular series%

all this the continuities and the discontinuities are a)solutely co0ordinate matters of immediate feeling% "he con'unctions

as primordial elements of 6fact7 as are the distinctions and dis'unctions% .n the same act )y which . feel that this passing

nute is a new pulse of my life, . feel that the old life continues into it, and the feeling of continuance in no wise 'ars upon

simultaneous feeling of a no+elty% "hey, too, compenetrate harmoniously% Prepositions, copulas, and con'unctions, 6is,7

n7t,7 6then,7 6)efore,7 6in,7 6on,7 6)eside,7 6)etween,7 6ne/t,7 6li!e,7 6unli!e,7 6as,7 6)ut,7 flower out of the stream of pure

erience, the stream of concretes or the sensational stream, as naturally as nouns and ad'ecti+es do, and they melt into it

in as fluidly when we apply them to a new portion of the stream%9Pg 3H:

now we as! why we must thus translate e/perience from a more concrete or pure into a more intellectualied form,

ng it with e+er more a)ounding conceptual distinctions, rationalism and naturalism gi+e different replies%

e rationalistic answer is that the theoretic life is a)solute and its interests imperati+e8 that to understand is simply the

y of man8 and that who uestions this need not )e argued with, for )y the fact of arguing he gi+es away his case%

e naturalist answer is that the en+ironment !ills as well as sustains us, and that the tendency of raw e/perience to

inguish the e/perient himself is lessened 'ust in the degree in which the elements in it that ha+e a practical )earing upon

are analyed out of the continuum and +er)ally fi/ed and coupled together, so that we may !now what is in the wind

us and get ready to react in time% #ad pure e/perience, the naturalist says, )een always perfectly healthy, there would

+er9Pg 35: ha+e arisen the necessity of isolating or +er)aliing any of its terms% We should 'ust ha+e e/perienced

rticulately and unintellectually en'oyed% "his leaning on 6reaction7 in the naturalist account implies that, whene+er we

ellectualie a relati+ely pure e/perience, we ought to do so for the sa!e of redescending to the purer or more concrete

el again8 and that if an intellect stays aloft among its a)stract terms and generalied relations, and does not reinsert itself

h its conclusions into some particular point of the immediate stream of life, it fails to finish out its function and lea+es

normal race unrun%

st rationalists nowadays will agree that naturalism gi+es a true enough account of the way in which our intellect arose at

t, )ut they will deny these latter implications% "he case, they will say, resem)les that of se/ual lo+e% @riginating in the

mal need of getting another generation )orn, this passion has de+eloped secondarily such imperious spiritual needs that,

ou as! why another generation ought to )e )orn at all, the answer is 6Chiefly9Pg 3: that lo+e may go on%7 Just so with

intellect it originated as a practical means of ser+ing life8 )ut it has de+eloped incidentally the function of

derstanding a)solute truth8 and life itself now seems to )e gi+en chiefly as a means )y which that function may )esecuted% But truth and the understanding of it lie among the a)stracts and uni+ersals, so the intellect now carries on its

her )usiness wholly in this region, without any need of redescending into pure e/perience again%

http://www.amareway.org/http://www.iswb.org/http://www.amareway.org/http://www.amareway.org/http://www.amareway.org/http://www.iswb.org/


25/69


he contrasted tendencies which . thus designate as naturalistic and rationalistic are not recognied )y the reader, perhaps

e/ample will ma!e them more concrete% Mr% Bradley, for instance, is an ultra0rationalist% #e admits that our intellect is

marily practical, )ut says that, for philosophers, the practical need is simply "ruth% "ruth, moreo+er, must )e assumed

nsistent%7 .mmediate e/perience has to )e )ro!en into su)'ects and ualities, terms and relations, to )e understood as

h at all% Net when so )ro!en it is less consistent than e+er% "a!en raw, it is all9Pg 33: un0distinguished% .ntellectualied,

all distinction without oneness% 6Such an arrangement may !or(, )ut the theoretic pro)lem is not sol+ed%7 "he uestion

ho! the di+ersity can e/ist in harmony with the oneness%7 "o go )ac! to pure e/perience is una+ailing% 6Mere feeling

es no answer to our riddle%7 E+en if your intuition is a fact, it is not an understanding% 6.t is a mere e/perience, and

nishes no consistent +iew%7 "he e/perience offered as facts or truths 6. find that my intellect re'ects )ecause they

ntradict themsel+es% "hey offer a comple/ of di+ersities con'oined in a way which it feels is not its way and which it can

repeat as its own%%%% &or to )e satisfied, my intellect must understand, and it can not understand )y ta!ing a congeries in

lump%79GG:So Mr% Bradley, in the sole interests of 6understanding7 ;as he concei+es that function=, turns his )ac! on

te e/perience fore+er% "ruth must lie in the opposite direction, the direction of the $)solute8 and this !ind of rationalism

d naturalism, or ;as . will now call it= pragmatism, wal! thenceforward upon opposite paths% &or the one, those

ellectual products are most true which, turning their face towards the $)solute, come nearest to sym)oliing its ways ofting the many and the one% &or the other, those are most true which most successfully dip )ac! into the finite stream of

ling and grow most easily confluent with some particular wa+e or wa+elet% Such confluence not only pro+es the

ellectual operation to ha+e )een true ;as an addition may 6pro+e7 that a su)traction is already rightly performed=, )ut it

nstitutes, according to pragmatism, all that we mean )y calling it true% @nly in so far as they lead us, successfully or

uccessfully, )ac! into sensi)le e/perience again, are our a)stracts and uni+ersals true or false at all%9GF:9Pg 244:

Section . of 9the last essay:, . adopted in a general way the common0sense )elief that one and the same world is

gnied )y our different minds8 )ut . left undiscussed the dialectical arguments which maintain that this is logically

urd% "he usual reason gi+en for its )eing a)surd is that it assumes one o)'ect ;to wit, the world= to stand in two relations

once8 to my mind, namely, and again to yours8 whereas a term ta!en in a second relation can not logically )e the samem which it was at first%9Pg 242:

a+e heard this reason urged so often in discussing with a)solutists, and it would destroy my radical empiricism so

erly, if it were +alid, that . am )ound to gi+e it an attenti+e ear, and seriously to search its strength%

instance, let the matter in dispute )e term M, asserted to )e on the one hand related to8, and on the other to98 and let

two cases of relation )e sym)olied )y82MandM29respecti+ely% When, now, . assume that the e/perience may

mediately come and )e gi+en in the shape 82M29, with no trace of dou)ling or internal fission in the9Pg 24


26/69


y% But the starting0point of the reasoning here seems to )e the fact of the two phrases8 and this suggests that the

ument may )e merely +er)al% Can it )e that the whole dialectic consists in attri)uting to the e/perience tal!ed0a)out a

nstitution similar to that of the language in which we descri)e it- Must we assert the o)'ecti+e dou)le0ness of the M

rely )ecause we ha+e to name it twice o+er when we name its two relations-9Pg 24G:

ndidly, . can thin! of no other reason than this for the dialectic conclusion8 9G5:for, if we thin!, not of our words, )ut of

y simple concrete matter which they may )e held to signify, the e/perience itself )elies the parado/ asserted% We use

eed two separate concepts in analying our o)'ect, )ut we !now them all the while to )e )ut su)stitutional, and that the

n82Mand theMinM29 mean;i.e., are capa)le of leading to and terminating in= one self0same piece, M, of sensi)le

erience% "his persistent identity of certain units ;or emphases, or points, or o)'ects, or mem)ersIcall them what you

l= of the e/perience0continuum, is 'ust one of those con'uncti+e9Pg 24F: features of it, on which . am o)liged to insist so

phatically%9G:&or samenesses are parts of e/perience7s indefeasi)le structure% When . hear a )ell0stro!e and, as life

ws on, its after image dies away, . still har! )ac! to it as 6that same )ell0stro!e%7 When . see a thing M, with8to the left

t and9to the right of it, . see it asoneM8 and if you tell me . ha+e had to 6ta!e7 it twice, . reply that if . 6too!7 it a

usand times . should stillseeit as a unit%9G3:.ts unity is a)original, 'ust as the multiplicity of my successi+e ta!ings is

original% .t comes un)ro!en as that M, as a singular which . encounter8 they come )ro!en, as those ta!ings, as myrality of operations% "he unity and the separateness are strictly co0ordinate% . do not easily fathom why my opponents

uld find the separateness so much more easily understanda)le that they must needs infect the whole of finite e/perience

h it, and relegate the unity ;now ta!en as a )are postulate and no longer as a thing positi+ely percei+a)le= to the region

he $)solute7s mysteries% . do not easily fathom this, . say, for the said opponents are a)o+e mere +er)al ui))ling8 yet

that . can catch in their tal! is the su)stitution of what is true of certain words for what is true of what they signify% "hey

y with the words,Inot returning to the stream of life whence all the meaning of them came, and which is always ready

ea)sor) them%

24H:

aught this argument pro+es, then, we may continue to )elie+e that one thing can )e !nown )y many !nowers% But the

nial of one thing in many relations is )ut one application of a still profounder dialectic difficulty% Man can7t )e good,

d the sophists, for man is manandgoodis good8 and #egel9F4:and #er)art in their day, more recently $% Spir,9F2:and

st recently and ela)orately of all, Mr% Bradley, informs us that a term can logically only )e a punctiform unit, and that

one of the con'uncti+e relations )etween things, which e/perience seems to yield, is rationally possi)le%

245:

course, if true, this cuts off radical empiricism without e+en a shilling% Radical empiricism ta!es con'uncti+e relations at

ir face +alue, holding them to )e as real as the terms united )y them% 9F


27/69


s a )urden to the flesh, and an in'ustice )oth to readers and to the pre+ious writers, to repeat good arguments already

nted% So, in noticing Mr% Bradley, . will confine myself to the interests of radical empiricism solely%

e first duty of radical empiricism, ta!ing gi+en con'unctions at their face0+alue, is to class some of them as more

mate and some as more e/ternal% When two terms aresimilar, their +ery natures enter into the relation%9Pg 224: Being

atthey are, no matter where or when, the li!eness ne+er can )e denied, if asserted% .t continues predica)le as long as the

ms continue% @ther relations, the !hereand the !hen, for e/ample, seem ad+entitious% "he sheet of paper may )e 6off7

on7 the ta)le, for e/ample8 and in either case the relation in+ol+es only the outside of its terms% #a+ing an outside, )oth

hem, they contri)ute )y it to the relation% .t is e/ternal the term7s inner nature is irrele+ant to it% $ny )oo!, any ta)le,

y fall into the relation, which is created pro hac vice, not )y their e/istence, )ut )y their casual situation% .t is 'ust

ause so many of the con'unctions of e/perience seem so e/ternal that a philosophy of pure e/perience must tend to

ralism in its ontology% So far as things ha+e space0relations, for e/ample, we are free to imagine them with different

gins e+en% .f they could get to be, and get into space at all, then they may ha+e done so separately% @nce there, howe+er,

y are additivesto one another, and, with no pre'udice to their natures, all sorts of space0relations may super+ene9Pg 222:ween them% "he uestion of how things could come to )e anyhow, is wholly different from the uestion what their

ations, once the )eing accomplished, may consist in%

Bradley now affirms that such e/ternal relations as the space0relations which we here tal! of must hold of entirely

ferent su)'ects from those of which the a)sence of such relations might a moment pre+iously ha+e )een plausi)ly

erted% Aot only is thesituationdifferent when the )oo! is on the ta)le, )ut the boo( itselfis different as a )oo!, from

at it was when it was off the ta)le%9FF:#e admits that >such e/ternal relations seem possi)le and e+en e/isting%%%% "hat

u do not alter what you compare or rearrange in space seems to common sense uite o)+ious, and that on9Pg 22


28/69


ich differs )oth logically and psychologically from the first whole8 and . urge that in contri)uting to the change the

ms so far are altered%?

t merely the relations, then, )ut the terms are altered und !ar6so far%7 But 'ust ho!far is the whole pro)lem8 and

rough0and0through7 would seem ;in spite of Mr% Bradley7s somewhat undecided utterances9F:= to )e the full Bradleyanwer% "he 6whole7 which he here treats as primary and determinati+e of each part7s manner of 6contri)uting,7 simply

st, when it alters, alter in its entirety% "here must)e total conflu/ of its parts, each into and through each other% "he

ust7 appears here as aMachtspruch, as an ipse dixitof Mr% Bradley7s a)solutistically tempered 6understanding,7 for he

didly confesses that how the parts dodiffer as they contri)ute to different wholes, is un!nown to him%9F3:9Pg 22H:

hough . ha+e e+ery wish to comprehend the authority )y which Mr% Bradley7s understanding spea!s, his words lea+e me

olly uncon+erted% 6E/ternal relations7 stand with their withers all unwrung, and remain, for aught he pro+es to the

ntrary, not only practically wor!a)le, )ut also perfectly intelligi)le factors of reality%9Pg 225:

Bradley7s understanding shows the most e/traordinary power of percei+ing separations and the most e/traordinarypotence in comprehending con'unctions% @ne would naturally say 6neither or )oth,7 )ut not so Mr% Bradley% When a

mmon man analyes certain !hatsfrom out the stream of e/perience, he understands their distinctness as thus isolated%

t this does not pre+ent him from eually well understanding their com)ination with each other as originally experienced

he concrete, or their confluence with new sensi)le e/periences in which they recur as 6the same%7 Returning into the

am of sensi)le presentation, nouns and ad'ecti+es, and thatsand a)stract !hats, grow confluent again, and the word 6is7

mes all these e/periences of con'unction% Mr% Bradley understands the isolation of the a)stracts, )ut to understand the

m)ination is to him impossi)le%9H4:>"o under9Pg 22:stand a comple/ AB,? he says, >. must )egin with AorB% $nd

inning, say withA, if . then merely findB, . ha+e either lostA, or . ha+e got )esideA, 9the !ord 0beside1 seems here

al% as meaning a con&unction 0external1 and therefore unintelligible: something else, and in neither case ha+e .

derstood%9H2:&or my intellect can not simply unite a di+ersity, nor has it in itself any form or way of togetherness, and

u gain nothing if, )esideAandB, you offer me their con'unction in fact% &or to my intellect that is no more than anotherer

essays in radical empiricism, by william james.pdf

Documents