3-paratax syntax and case

Chapter 3Chapter 3

Paratax, Syntax and CaseParatax, Syntax and CaseDavid Dwyer, Michigan State University

February 3, 2011

Abstract

The idea for this paper came from the disconnect between linguists who say that ape language is not syntax (Terrace 1979) and researchers working with signing apes who say that apes sign grammatically (Savage-Rumbaugh 1994. I use semiological framework, following the work of Saussure 1916), as opposed to a rule-based framework, to analyze the formal properties of the grammars of adult humans (syntax) and the two-word grammars of young humans, which I call paratax, and signing apes. This analysis shows that the grammars of syntax and paratax are formally distinct. The sentences of signing apes are then analyzed using the formal distinction between paratax and syntax, and found to be paratactic, that is identical to the grammar of young humans. Case roles are of special interest in this investigation, because they are found in both syntax and paratax, even though they are used differently in each grammar. Given that case roles are found in both syntactic and paratactic grammars, they cannot be syntax specific. And given that case roles are found in the grammars of apes and humans, then they are not human universals and may be related to cognitive universals. The distinction between paratax and syntax raises the question of what is involved in making the transition from paratax to syntax, in humans and evolutionarily. Two possible avenues are suggested for this transition, one for modern humans learning language and one for the evolution of language.

Atax, paratax and syntax

As humans acquire grammar, they go through three distinct stages, the one-word, the two-word, and syntax. The first two stages, which I call atax and paratax, are seen by some as incipient forms of syntax and described accordingly Braine (1963) and Bickerton (1990). Despite having common properties, like using referential signs and case roles, each stage has distinct formal properties. The table to the right contrasts these three tactic types using six defining properties which are explained below.

Sentence Structure and length

The sentence begins with an intention on the part of the speaker “to say something about something to someone” Ricoeur (1978). However, the speaker has to convey this message using one or more sentences. These sentences will vary in complexity, depending on the grammar. The task of the grammatical analysis is to describe the internal organization of these sentences and show the formal properties of the grammar that produced them. Briefly, an atactic sentence

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This paper is a working draft. Comments are welcome. Do not quote without permission.

Tactic Type NA = Not Applicable

One-Word(Atax)

Two-Word(Paratax)

Syntax

Phrase Structure Words per sentence

Significant word orderGrammatical symbols

Case rolesAssigned Case Roles

SW1

NoS and W

NANA

SW:W2

NoS and W

YesNo

SNP+VP, etc.InfiniteFixedManyYesYes

DefinitionsS= SentenceW=WordNP=Noun Phrase

VP = Verb PhraseDet = Determiner

David Dwyer

consists of a single word. A paratactic sentence has two words. And in a syntax sentence, the number of words is potentially infinite. The phrase structure1 rule for atax is S W (each sentence has only one word). The phrase structure rule for paratax is SW: W (each sentence consists of only two words). Syntax, of course, has a number of phrase structure rules including: S NP + VP; VPV + (NP); and NP Det + N.

Word order

Word order is only significant in syntax where the position of the syntactic sign is crucial to determining the meaning of the sentence. This is not the case in paratax, where word order cannot influence meaning. This is why the concatenation for paratax is marked with a colon (:) instead of a plus (+).

Parts of speech

Part of the reason that word order is not significant in parataxis is because parataxis has no parts of speech, as I show below, following Bowerman (1973).

Case roles

Fillmore (1968) introduced the term case to help to explain how syntax assigns meaning. He said that the constituents of a syntactic construction have a specific case role in the sentence. Because a common list of these case roles has yet to emerge, let me suggest at least the following roles: agent, action, object, recipient, modifier and head. While others use the terms semantic relationship (Brown 1973) and functional notion (Chomsky 1965), I prefer Fillmore’s term, case, because it carries a purely grammatical sense, in contrast to an analogous terms like cognitive role or semantic relationship. A major conclusion of this paper is that these case roles are not only found in syntax, but are part of the paratactic grammars of chimpanzees, bonobos2 and young humans. Importantly, this means that while case roles are universal, they are not unique to human language, and thus not a (human) linguistic universal.

In syntax, unlike paratax, a specific case role is assigned to each syntactic structure. This means that in syntax the case role is clear, even in two word sentences like those shown in the sidebar.

Atactic and paratactic sentences in human children

Before children construct syntactic grammars, they go through an atactic (one word) and a paratactic stage.

Atax in children

This stage has also been characterized as “holophrastic,” meaning that the whole sentence consists of one word. However, I prefer the term atactic for two reasons. First, the use of the same root, tactic, in atactic, paratactic and syntactic, emphasizes the fact that all three types of grammars have a common property - that of producing sentences. In addition, the root tactic permits the use of the prefix, a-, to emphasize that the grammar has no internal structure. The root can also be modified with the prefix para-, meaning ‘beside,’ and syn- meaning ‘together.’ This permits the characterization of human language tactic ontogeny from atax to paratax to syntax. Second, this distinction also allows us to discuss three levels of grammar, the tactical level, the lexical level (words), and the representational level (phonology).1 Phrase structure is discussed in greater depth in the section on syntax.2 Bonobos (pan paniscus), were once considered a subspecies of chimpanzee (pan troglodytes).

2

I see.See FredLook hereMy book

3. Paratax, syntax and case

Somewhere between the ages of one and two, children produce atactic sentences. As such, atactic sentences have one constituent, the word, which is a lexical sign. In the example below, Brenda is communicating with the researcher Scollon using atactic sentences. Because of the context, Brenda is able to use a number of atactic sentences to get across a message which when rendered syntactically, would say “hearing that car, no - not a bus, reminds me of the car ride that we had yesterday.” The intended case role of speakers of atactic sentences is inferred by the listener through the use of several communicative strategies including common background knowledge (the ride Brenda took, the sound heard outside), context (the previous sentences in the conversation) feedback (the use of what and no in clarifying) and iteration, the use of more than one sentence in a statement, for emphasis.

Paratax in children

The paratactic stage follows atax somewhere around the second year of life. Sentences at this stage consist of paired lexical signs. In the example to the right, I have analyzed all of Brenda’s sentences as paratactic. I take sentence a) Tape corder to be a paratactic sentence and not a single atactic word in which the case role of the constituents is modifier-head. This is because the word corder is used in sentence f) as an independent word. Even though these sentences are paratactic, it is clear from the context that Brenda is conveying a message something like “Give me the tape recorder so I can use it to talk into.”

This brief example reveals four of the five formal properties of paratax discussed above: 1) two words per sentence; 2) insignificant word order; 3) case roles; and 4) case roles are implicit but unassigned.

The formal properties of paratax

The paratax has been described as pivot-open by Braine (1963)

Two words per sentence

The most salient aspect of the paratactic stage is that sentences consist of only two words. The overwhelming evidence from children at this stage Braine (1963), Brown (1973), and others is of sentences of two words. Many of the data sources also list three word sentences. Some of these three-word sentences mark the transition to syntax, but a good number are not. Some three word sentences are better analyzed as two sentences, one paratactic and one atactic, as children still produce atactic sentences at this stage. In other three-word sentences what appears to be a two-word sequence is better analyzed as a single word, because neither of the components appears outside this sequence. The word allgone appears in many

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Atax (Moscowitz 1978:124)Brenda: Car [pronounced /ka/. Car. Car. Car.Scollon: What?Brenda: Go. Go.Scollon: [Undecipherable.]Brenda: Bus [pronounced `baish’]. Bus. Bus. Bus.

Bus. Bus. Bus. Bus. Bus.Scollon: What? Oh, bicycle? Is that what you said?Brenda: Not (`na’].Scollon: No?Brenda: Not. Scollon: No. I got it wrong.

Paratax (Moscowitz 1978:124)Brenda: a) Tape corder.

b) Use it.c) Use it.

Scollon: d) Use it for what?Brenda: e) Brenda talk.

f) Corder talk.

Modifier –headAction-objectAction-object

Agent-actionObject-action

a) Hamburger : allgoneb) Tape : corder. Use : it.c) Brenda : talk. Corder : talk.

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paratactic grammars, including my daughter’s sentence Hamburger allgone.’ Similarly our son used holdyou as a single word when he wanted to be held. Brenda’s sentences b) and c) are examples of iterations, two sentences one after the other. These iterations account for the all of utterances longer than two words.

Free word order

In Brenda’s paratactic sentence, the action (use) in is in the first position in sentences b), c) and d), while the action (talk) is in the second position in sentences e) and f).

Case roles

More strikingly, however, is that Brenda’s sentences show the same range of case roles that have been reported in other studies, cf. Brown (1973) and Braine (1963). The specific case roles in Brenda’s sentences, above are: modifier-head (a); action-object in; (b, c and f) and object-action in (e).

Slobin (1979) examined the two word sentences of children brought up in different language backgrounds. Slobin found that the paratactic grammars of these children were remarkably similar to each other and remarkably different from the grammars of the adult language spoken about them. He found in each paratactic grammar, that the same set of case roles appears. His research also showed that case roles were implied but not assigned to constituents, and that word order that was not significant.

Case role English Russian Finish Luo Samoanmodifier/head3

My shoemama dress

mami chaska[mama cup]

täti auto[aunt car]

kom baba[chair father]

lole a’u[candy my]

modifier/Head

pretty dress Papa bol’shoy rikki auto[broken car]

piypiy kech[pepper hot]

fa’ala’i pepe[stubborn baby

head/ location(question)

there book

where ball

Tosya tam[Tosya there]gde papa[where papa]

vettä siinä[water there]missä pallo[where ball]

ma wendo[this visitor]

Keith lea[Keith there]fea Punafu[where Punafu

action/object(beneficiary)

give ball anna Rina[give Rina]

miya tamtam[give-me candy]

mai pepe[give doll]

action/agent block fallmail come

mama prua[mama walk]

Seppo putoo[Seppo fall]

odhi skul[he-went school]

pa’u pepe[doll fall]

negative no washno wet

vody net[water no]

ei susi[not wolf]

beda onge[my-sister absent]

le ‘ai[not eat]

No parts of speech and free case roles

Initially, paratax was understood as a limited form of syntax consisting of two words. Braine (1963) proposed a grammar with two parts of speech, a pivot and an open. Pivot words were verb like and open words were noun like. In the above example, “use” and “talk” would be 3 Slobin, (1979 treated the role “possession” as distinct from modifier-head. I see no reason to do so.

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Paratactic Sentence Case relationMommy : come. Daddy : sit. Drive : car. Eat : grape.Mommy : sock. Baby : book. Go : park. Sit : chair.Cup : table. Toy : floor.My : teddy. Mommy : dress.Box : shiny. Crayon : big. Dat : money. Dis : telephone.

agent : actionaction : objectagent : objecthead : modifier (location)head : modifier (location)modifier : head (possession) modifier : head (attribute)modifier : head (demonstrative)

Based on Brown (1973: 193-197)

Pivot/Open GrammarFormula: S P+O; O+P; O:O; and O (no P : P or P reported)P=Pivot; O=OpenBased on Brame (1963)


pivot (verb-like) words and “it,” “Brenda” and “corder” would be open (noun-like) words. Brenda’s sentence (a) would be analyzed as an Open-Open sentence. Braine reported that all sequences but Pivot:Pivot and that unlike Open, Pivot does not occur in one word (atactic) utterances.

However, Bowerman (1973) critiqued by pointing out that Pivot Pivot sequences do occur and Pivot words do appear in atactic sentences. She concluded that Braine’s grammar could be more simply stated as S W: W, a grammar in which parts of speech play no role.

Bloom (1971, 1973) critiqued Braine’s pivot/open grammar, and consequently Bowerman’s grammar by noting that it was inadequate because it failed to distinguish between two meanings in a sentence like mommy : sock, for it could be a possessive ‘Mommy’s sock’ and an agent : object constructing meaning something like ‘Mommy is wearing a sock. For this reason, Bloom argued that a grammar needs to contain syntactic information in order to disambiguate such sentences.

The semantics of the grammatical meaning in early sentences were later described by Melissa Bowerman in terms of Fillmore’s case grammar categories of agent, action and patient. She suggested (…) that the evidence from early sentences supported attributing semantic but not syntactic knowledge to the young child. In contrast, I had proposed originally (…) that children learn syntax and semantics together. Once verbs are productive in word combinations, the constituent structure of children’s sentence has a semantic-syntactic basis. The assumption that children’s early sentences are syntactically motivated is now consistent with virtually all contemporary acquisition theories and has since been embraced by Bowerman as well (Bloom 1993:16).

Bloom argues that if the child makes a statement like mommy: sock and intends only one of the possible meanings, the child has a grammar that distinguishes the two meanings.4 This reasoning is only possible if one considers grammar to be a form of mental representation of thought. If we distinguish between a mental representation (Burling 2005:178) and a syntactic representation we can allow for the fact that an individual may have an understanding which can not be unambiguously translated into a tactic representation. Thus while it is possible to have thoughts like Mommy’s sock and Mommy is wearing a sock, the paratactic grammar is not capable of distinguishing them.

Extending this argument to atax, we would not want to attribute parts of speech to Brenda’s atactic sequence (Car. Go. Bus.) Brenda is actually using iteration, a sequence in which one sentence (Car.) provides the context for the next sentence (Go.). Likewise, Brenda’s atactic sentences (Car. Go.) provide the context for the third sentence (Bus.). Note that Car and Go can not be interpreted as a paratactic sentence because they do not stand in a case relationship to each other.

For these reasons, I argue that ambiguous paratactic sentences, like Mommy sock, occur because a paratactic grammar cannot assign case roles. The determination of the intended case roles of a paratactic sentence is the task of the interpreter using the context of the utterance, background

4 This is also true of sentences like “Nim eat,” where Nim could be the agent or object of the action.

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knowledge and knowledge of the speaker, even though the interpreter’s reading may not be correct.

This limitation is captured by the rule, SW: W, which does not involve parts of speech. I argue below that parts of speech, and other grammatical signs, are what makes syntax work and that the key to humans acquiring syntax is acquiring the concept of parts of speech.

A definition of a paratactic grammar

A paratactic sentence consists of two words, each of which has an implicit case role (e.g., action, agent, object, head and modifier) even though the specific role is not assigned to a constituent. The specific case roles intended by the speaker have to be inferred by the listener using the context in which the sentence is uttered. While the user may prefer some word combinations and word orders, it is the user, not the paratactic grammar, that determines these preferences.

Chimpanzees and paratax

The sentences produced by signing chimpanzees conform to the properties of paratax, as formulated in the preceding section. The data used in this section comes largely from Nim, a chimpanzee taught by Terrace (1979) to use the signs of American Sign Language. I use this data because it presents the most complete published listing of sentences used by a chimpanzee. Other examples, though not as complete, but often showing the contexts in which the sentences can be found in Fouts (1997), Gardner, Gardner and Cantfort (1989) and Savage-Rumbaugh (1994). This section demonstrates that the grammars of Nim and other chimpanzees are paratactic, by examining their sentences in terms of length, case roles and word order.

Sentence Length

Consistent with paratax, the vast majority of Nim’s sentences consist of two word utterances, a fact consistent with a paratactic grammar (S W: W). Nim was reported to have produced longer sentences, but as I demonstrate below, that these longer examples consist of a sequence of two or more paratactic sentences.

Case Roles

The sentences produced by Nim show the same case roles found in the paratactic grammars of humans. The table to the left, slightly revised from Terrace (1979), shows examples of agent-action, object action, object–modifier and others. What is so remarkable about these case roles is that they are identical to those found in adult human and child human grammars.

Implicit case roles

The sentences Eat Nim (action-agent) and Eat grape (action-object) make it clear that the specific case roles while present are not assigned to constituents as they are in syntax.

Word Order

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Paratactic GrammarFormula: S --> W:W S=Sentence; W=WordEach word has a case role, though the particular role is not specified...

Nim’s two word combinations based on Terrace 1979Example # Example #Play me. Me Nim.Tickle me.Eat Nim.More eat.

375328316302287

Me eat.Nim eat.Finish hug.Drink Nim.More tickle.

237209187143136

Nim’s examples of case roles based on Terrace 1979Example Case RoleEat NimNim outEat grapeOut shoeOut pantsFood NimFood thereApple more

action-agent agent-actionaction-objectlocation-objectaction-objecthead-beneficiaryhead-locationhead-modifier


Consistent with a paratactic grammar, Nim’s sentences have no fixed word order. Changing the word order does not change the range of possible meanings of the sentence. And while Nim and other apes have preferred orders, this word order is not absolute.

In conclusion, we see that with respect to word properties, case roles and word order, the sentences of Nim, and other chimpanzees (Washoe, Lucy, Loulis, Sherman and Austin), Bonobos (Kanzi), and gorillas (Koko, Patterson and Linden 1981) are consistent with those found in human children at the paratactic level.

Syntax

A major stumbling block in the study of the understanding ape language and the evolution of language has been the failure to contrast syntax with paratax. This failure can be traced to three sources: 1) the assumption that paratax is a primitive form of syntax, as opposed to a distinct tactic form; 2) the tendency to ignore case roles in both syntax and paratax; and 3) the failure to understand syntax as a sign system. By reestablishing the semiological sign as the foundation of syntax, we can better formalize the properties of syntax and thus show how it differs from paratax.

How syntax assigns case roles

In contrast to paratax, syntax has four interrelated and unique characteristics: 1) fixed word order; 2) assigned case roles; 3) grammatical signs; and 4) phrase structure. Grammatical signs, which include parts of speech, are the key to understanding phrase structure. Each part of speech connects with a word.

In the example to the right, ‘the’ is a determiner, ‘boy’ and ‘dog’ are nouns, and ‘see’ is a verb. Some parts of speech are universal, that is, nouns and verbs occur in all languages. Others, like adjective and adverb, are found in many languages but not all.

We commonly understand that a noun is the name of a person place or thing. As such, the noun appears to be a natural category rather than a syntactic one. Yet on closer examination we see that the natural definition fails us. Is “nowhere” a place? Is “nothing” a thing? Is “stop” as in “coming to a stop” a thing as opposed to an activity? And while we can fiddle with the definition of the noun, it is far simpler to define the noun as a syntactic unit, or in the words of Jackendoff (1994:55), “We conclude that the parts of speech, the basic building blocks of syntactic structure, are not definable in terms of meaning.”

A sequence of one or more grammatical signs can define another grammatical sign. The sequence Det + N defines a Noun Phrase (NP and the sequence of V + NP defines a verb phrase. This process produces a phrase structure or tree diagram.5 These grammatical signs are abstract:

5 Linguists have developed different ways to represent phrase-structure diagrams. Most are more complex and abstract than the one used here.

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Nim’s examples of alternate word order based on Terrace 1979Example # Example #More appleMore bananaGive appleGive gumBrush meBrush Nim

1262 9 43513

Apple moreBanana moreApple giveGum giveMe brushNim brush

5 5 3 3 9 4

The boy sees the dog.Det Noun Verb Det Noun(Det = Déterminer)

David Dwyer

they are never seen, but are inferred by the user in the process of understanding and producing sentences.

A rule-based analysis recognizes the structure of a syntactic sentence as a phrase structure dominated at the top by a grammatical unit called sentence (S), and including other grammatical units called Verb Phrase (VP) and Noun Phrase (NP) and ending in the terminal units called parts of speech.

Case roles

Although these tree diagrams are useful in representing the structure of a sentence, they alone do not tell us how case roles are assigned to the constituents of the sentence.6 For example, in our sentence, “The boy sees the dog” we know that the boy is involved, the dog is involved, and seeing is involved, but from the phrase structure alone we do not know who is being seen and who is doing the seeing. Chomsky (1965), who identified these case roles as “functional notions,” pointed out that for all languages, the constituent NP of S is the agent, that the constituent VP of the S is the action and the constituent NP of the VP is the object. Because this is a linguistic universal, it is a property of the metagrammar7 and does not need to be repeated in individual grammars. Thus, unlike paratax, syntax assigns a specific case role to each constituent of the sentence.

Semiological signs

A semiological perspective helps us understand why fixed word order and syntactic signs are essential to the assignment of case roles in a sentence. Semiology, a term coined by Saussure (1916), is the study of sign systems. Although Saussure did not present syntax as a semiological system, I have shown (Dwyer 1986) that such an interpretation is consistent with his view that any semiological sign systems consists of 1) a closed, or finite set of 2) signs.

Saussure defined a sign as consisting of a signifier (representation) and a signified (concept). Saussure emphasized that both the signifiers were idealizations and not things. For example, a word like cat is a sign that consists of a signifier, the sound cat (or the letter sequence c-a-t) and a signified, the concept of cat. The concept cat is not a specific cat. And the sound cat is not a specific instance of someone saying cat but an idealized version of the sequence of sounds /k--t/. In a sentence like, "Look at the cat,” we are asked to conger up the concept of a cat and look for referent, that is, an instance of a real cat. Words, also called lexical signs, have the special property of a referent. The fact that the sequence of letters c-a-t, or the sequence of sounds /k--t/, spells out the signifier is the reason that the ordering of these letters, or sounds, is crucial to the identifying of a given sign. A different order identifies a different word. For example, the sequence a-c-t (/kt/) identifies the word ‘act’, and the sequence t-a-c-k (/tk/) identifies the word ‘tack.’ Some sequences (e.g., c-t-a, or t-c-a) do not identify a sign, at least not in English

Syntactic signs

The preceding examples illustrate a type of sign, commonly known as a word. Syntactic signs also consist of signifiers and signifieds, but of a different type. The signifier of a syntactic sign

6 A constituent is either a grammatical sign or a word.7 For the purposes of this discussion, the metagrammar is where universal properties of language are stated.

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consists of a string of grammatical signs and the signified states what case roles are involved and to which constituent each is assigned.

For example, the NP is a sign in which the signifier consists of a string of parts of speech (Det + N in this example).8 That is, the string of Det + N spells out the signifier. The signified consists of a statement that the Det is the modifier and that the N is the head, the thing being modified.

In a like way, the sequence V + NP spells out the signifier of the sign called VP and the signifier identifies the verb as the action and the NP as the object. Also, the sequence NP + VP spells out the signifier of the sentence. The signified of the sentence states that the NP has the case role of agent and the VP has the case role of action.

The spelling out of syntactic signifiers with syntactic signs is analogous to spelling out lexical signifiers using a sequence of letters or phonemes. In both cases a different sequence will identify a unique sign or none at all. For example, the sequence Det + Noun signifies an NP, but the sequence Noun + Det does not occur in English). Thus the spelling out of signifiers permits the unique identification of a syntactic sign and in turn allows the signifier to assign case roles to its constituents. Second, the spelling out of signifiers with syntactic sign also explains why syntax has a fixed word order.

A semiological approach explains why syntactic signs are thus crucial to the working of syntax. It shows how case roles are assigned to constituents, and why a fixed word order exists. Syntactic signs are also abstract and do not have a real world referent as do lexical signs. We pointed out that words are classified as nouns or verbs, not because their referent is a thing or an action, because of how they participate in a grammar. The learning of a syntactic sign is not done by learning to associate a sound with a referent but by learning to recognize that this group of words, be they nouns or verbs function in a like way in the sentence.

Not all modern languages have the same word order. For example, English has the case role sequence of subject + action + object. The standard convention in linguistics is to call this sequence Subject Verb Object or SVO for short.9 In other languages, such as Japanese, Mende (Sierra Leone) and Zuñi, the order is SOV, and for still other languages are VSO (Arabic and Hawaiian.10

What is a verb phrase?

From a semiological perspective, a VP is a syntactic sign whose signifier is the sequence V + NP. The VP is also a constituent of the S along with the NP. The signified of the VP assigns the case role of action to the verb and object to the NP. Parts of speech differ from S, NP and VP. While the parts of speech connect with words, S, NP and VP only connect with other

8 Other NPs are sequences of Adjective + N and Possessive Pronoun + N.9 The usage of SVO instead of subject + action + object is somewhat confusing because it mixes case roles (subject and object) and grammatical signs (verb).10 While SVO, SOV and VSO are the most common orders, the other possible combinations also occur.

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grammatical signs. For this reason, they are called non terminal grammatical signs. Nonterminal signs enable nesting.

Simple nesting

Nesting occurs when a given sign participates as a signifier for another sign. For example, the sequence Det + N identifies the sign NP. Next, the sign NP can participate as a part of the signifier of another sign (either NP + VP or V+NP). This interlocking process is what produces the phrase structure described above. I call this simple nesting because these processes result in the production of the simple sentence

Sentence nesting

Complex sentences can be produced by treating a sentence as a noun phrase which allows one sentence to be nested inside another. For example the sentence: “He knows you like money.” In this example, the sentence (You like money.) is the object of the (VP). Thus the full sentence actually consists of two sentences. This process can go on indefinitely as in the following sentence involving two groups of spies: “We know that you know that we know that you know … the secret.”

Modern syntax uses two types of nesting additional sentences, or parts of them, within a sentence. One is through the use of conjunctions:

o Mary likes chocolate and Bill likes mints. (conjoined sentences)

o I came into the house and turned on the light. (conjoined verb phrases

o You and I are going to the store. (conjoined noun phrases)

Relative clauses provide another nesting mechanism involving the use of a sentence used to modify a noun phrase.

o The man who runs the bakery is my cousin.o This is the cat that ate the rat that lives in the house that Jack built.

With the exception of the negative (see below), the mechanism of nesting in paratax is not a useful strategy because there is no formal way to parse (analyze) the embedded sentence sign for more information. For example, in a hypothetical nested sentence like “Nim eat orange,” the nested sentence is ambiguous, for it could be either Nim eat or eat orange, but the grammar provides no way to determine this. Consequently, neither of the parsings given in the sidebar provides any help toward the understanding of the sequence. This is why users of paratactic grammars avoid the nesting strategy so common to syntax and why they favor iterations.

A definition of syntax

Syntax is a semiological system consisting of a finite set of syntactic signs. A string of syntactic signs spell out the signifiers of a syntactic sign. The signified of a syntactic sign specifies the case roles and the constituents to which they are assigned. Syntactic signs are either nonterminal (S, NP, and VP) or terminal (parts of speech). Each part of speech is a word class and is

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identified in a sentence by a word that represents that class. For example the sequence of words, the dog represents a string of parts of speech Determiner-Noun which is the signifier for the sign called Noun Phrase or NP for short. The signified of the NP assigns the case role of modifier to the determiner and head to the noun. The NP can participate in spelling out other signifiers. The sequence Noun Phrase + Verb Phrase (VP) spells out the signifier of the sign called the Sentence (S). The signified of the (S) assigns the case role of agent to the NP and action to the VP is the action. In human syntax, the sign “Sentence” can be embedded in other sentences and this enables human syntax with the potential to produce sentences of infinite length.

Rules versus signs

Modern linguistics prefers to look at linguistics in terms of rules as opposed to signs. In fact, some linguists go to the extreme of claiming that lexical signs, the most quintessential of semiological signs, are not signs at all, but rather rules: “A lexical rule pairs a meaning with a pronunciation” (Langacker 1972:3). Unfortunately this approach has led to an underplaying of the importance of case roles. This helps to explain why they are rarely mentioned in the definitions given for syntax. This also helps to explain the inability to distinguish syntax from paratax. Chomsky and others have stated that nested sentences are the essence of human language. While nested sentences are only useful in syntax, the observation overlooks the important role that syntactic signs and case roles play in making nesting possible.

What can syntax do that paratax can’t?

Modern syntax has three important advantages over paratax. First, while both syntax and paratax have case roles, only syntax can specifically assign the specific case relation to the lexical word. Second, syntax allows more than two words per sentences thus permitting multiple words to be related at the same times as in “You give Nim (me) the orange to eat.” This allows for a specificity and clarity not possible in paratax. Third, as Chomsky has pointed out, modern syntax allows for the embedding of one sentence within another, making possible the expression of even more complex relationships.11

The Question of syntax in chimpanzees

As mentioned above, there are four key properties that distinguish human syntax from paratax: fixed word order, parts of speech, fixed case role and nesting, which leads to the potential of infinite sentence length. In the section on paratax, I presented data that demonstrated that the sentences of Nim and other signing apes have no fixed word order, no assigned case roles and no parts of speech and thus that the grammars of signing apes are paratactic. However, Nim has produced some sentences that potentially challenge this conclusion. First, some of Nim’s sentences appear to be longer than two words. Second, Savage-Rumbaugh et al (n.d.) claim that Kanzi has a fixed word order.

Syntax and sentence length

Because of the potential for nesting of syntactic signs (both parts of speech and nonterminal signs), syntactic sentences are not limited to two words as in the case of paratax, syntactic sentences have the potential to be infinite. Thus, once a user acquires syntax, sentence length increases dramatically. One statistic associated with sentence length is called “mean length of utterance” or MLU for short. MLU is calculated by averaging the number of words in sentences

11 I show in another paper in progress, Syntax and the evolution of institutional culture, that syntax is a key factor in the development of modern human institutional culture.

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David Dwyer

recorded over a period of time. As humans go through the tactic stages of atax, paratax, and syntax, their MLU will increase. And once syntax is acquired, the MLU will rise above 2 words per sentence.

The adjacent graph, from Terrace (1979) shows the MLUs of Nim (purple line) and several children, some hearing (black lines) and some deaf (red lines). The MLUs for each individual were sampled every two months starting at 18 months. The graph shows that hearing children had a MLU greater than two by the age of 2½, and 3 by three years of age. Deaf children, while a bit slower reached an MLU of 2 by 40 months and 3 by their fourth year. The delay of the onset in deaf children is attributed to the fact that many are not exposed to sign language until a later age meaning that their linguistic input is limited by their difficulty in hearing. During this same period, Nim’s MLU fluctuated between one and two, and unlike the humans, Nim shows no indication of a steady upward climb.

Nim’s longer sentences

However, Nim did produce a number of three-word sentences, which might indicate the presence of syntax. However, most of these three-word sequences contain a repetition mainly involving me and Nim. Because of this, sentences (1-7) cannot be analyzed as syntactic. They are better analyzed as a sequence of an atactic and a paratactic sentence.

With a two word limit, additional sentences are required to elaborate the message. I interpret the repetition in (1-7) as a mechanism for emphasis, a mechanism found in human paratax, cf. Brenda’s Tape corder. Use it. Use it.

The last three word combinations (8-10) have three distinct words suggesting the possibility of syntax. Note that (8 and 9) have the sequence Object-Verb-Agent suggesting a fixed word order as in syntax. However, these sentences can not be syntactic because sentence (10) has the order of Object-Agent-Action. Were these sentences examples of syntax the word order would be the same in all three sentences. This is why these sentences are also better analyzed as a sequence of a paratactic and atactic sentence. Given the limitation of two words per sentence, new information can only be added with a new sentence. Nyota (Savage-Rumbaugh et al n.d.) was reported to point to Kanzi and sign a paratactic sentence Blueberries yesterday, meaning that Kanzi had eaten blueberries yesterday. I interpret this to be a sequence of an atactic sentence (pointing to Kanzi) and a paratactic sentence (blueberries yesterday).

Nim’s four word utterances more clearly reflect the paratactic iteration strategies shown in three-word combinations, either that of iteration for emphasis (examples 1-6) or adding new information (examples 7-

12

Nim’s three word combinations based on Terrace 1979Example # Example #

1. Play me. Nim.

2. Eat me. Nim. 3. Tickle me. Nim. 4. Hug me. Nim. 5. Me. Nim eat.

8148442021

6. Eat me. Eat. 7. Eat Nim. Eat. 8. Banana Eat. Nim. 9. Grape eat. Nim.10. Yogurt. Nim eat.

22463337 20

Nim’s four word combinations based on Terrace 1979

Examples #

1. Eat : drink. Eat : drink. 2. Eat : Nim. Eat : Nim. 3. Banana : Nim. : Banana Nim. 4. Drink : Nim. Drink : Nim. 5. Nim : eat. Nim : eat. 6. Play : me. Play : me. 7. Banana : me. Nim me. 8. Banana : eat. Me : Nim. 9. Grape : eat. Nim : eat. 10. Banana : me. Eat : banana.

15 7 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4


10). The first sentence of (7) suggests an object-recipient case role, while second sentence illustrates this emphasis strategy. The last four examples (8-10) suggest a new strategy of introducing new information in the second sentence. In example 8, sentence 1 shows an object action case role, while sentence 2 indicates the agent. In example 9, I see Nim expressing two case roles: the first, object-action; the second, agent action. When combined this produces the meaning represented syntactically as “Nim eat grape.” Brenda’s 4 word sequence (Brenda talk. Corder talk) are consistent with Nim’s sentences 7-9. The first sentence of example 10 shows the same object-recipient role as example (7) while the second sentence shows an agent-action role. Note that the patterns in examples (7-10) are not consistent, as one would expect in syntax. The first sentence of (9) also expresses the object-action relation with the second sentence expressing the agent.

Both types of iteration represent strategies for enriching paratactic statements. Were a syntactic grammar available, these strategies would be abandoned in favor of the richer syntactic statement, for example, the paratactic message “Grape eat. Nim eat.” can be replaced by the syntactic statement “I (Nim) eat a grape.”

The number of two-word (paratactic) sentence sequences produced by Nim is far less than the number of single paratactic sentence statements. Likewise, longer sentences are quite rare. However, Terrace did report one sixteen word sequence that he considered gibberish.

This analysis also allows us to interpret a sixteen word sequence produced by Nim, not as a good example of gibberish, as suggested by Terrace, but as an eight-sentence sequence of paratactic sentences:

Give Nim eat orange me you Nim eat you give eat orange Nim eat eat orange.

Furthermore, each sentence has a case role. For example, the first sentence, Give Nim shows the action-recipient role of the first action give. The other case roles are shown in the table to the right.

Had Nim had a syntactic capacity he could have rendered the information as "You give me (Nim) the orange to eat." However, without this benefit, Nim had to resort to iteration to get across the full set of case roles and to provide emphasis by repeating Eat orange twice and Nim eat once.

Nim’s sixteen word sentence represents a strategy found in the paratactic grammar also found in human children. For example, Brenda (next section) also used this paratactic strategy in the sentence “Tape corder. Use it. Use it.” However, unlike chimpanzees, children soon learn to use syntax to encode these more complex thoughts. Chimpanzees, on the other hand, continue to rely on iterated paratax, owing to their inability to master the workings of syntax. From this analysis it is clear that Nim has produced an intelligible paragraph of eight iterated paratactic sentences.

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Case roles Example1. Action 1 – Recipient2. Action 2 – Object 3. Recipient – Agent4. Action 2 – Action 25. Agent – Action 2

Give NimEat orangeMe youNim eatYou give

David Dwyer

Kanzi and syntax

Greenfield and Savage-Rumbaugh (1990) make the claim that Kanzi and other apes with whom they worked showed the beginnings of syntax, because they “shared norms for combining symbols that were shared by either the two co-reared apes, all three language competent apes or one of the apes and the researchers.” They justify this view by noting that “all three apes and the human researchers were more likely to order an action before an agent [object?], rather than an agent before an action (‘open cooler’ rather than ‘cooler open’).”

However, preferred patterns are not the same as a fixed word order. Being “likely to order an action before an agent” is not the same as ordering an action before an agent. In fact they note that “these shared norms were statistical, not absolute, which is true of human children as well (e.g., Bowerman, 1973; Goldin-Meadow, and Mylander, 1984), thus making it clear that these sentences are clearly paratactic and not syntactic.

Ape tactic comprehension

There is some evidence that bonobos can understand syntax, even if they cannot produce it. Savage-Rumbaugh (1994) report that a bonobo named Kanzi was able to comprehend the difference between sentence pairs independent of contextual clues like: Pour coke in the lemonade and Pour lemonade in the coke. Kanzi is reported to have responded correctly to such sentences about 80% of the time, even though Kanzi could not produce such sentences. This is a remarkable finding and strongly hints of syntactic capability in a species other than human. In addition, if we accept the principle that comprehension precedes production in language acquisition in humans (Dwyer 1999) and in apes (Savage-Rumbaugh 1994),12 a development like this is a logical first step toward developing a syntactic grammar. However, in light of the fact that Kanzi’s accuracy was only 80% in contrast with children who can distinguish between such sentences pairs by their third year of life with 100% accuracy, we can at best see this as a step toward the development of syntax.

Anderson (2004:292) reviewed Savage-Rumbaugh data on Kanzi's syntactic ability and data and concluded that Kanzi had developed a “word-chain model which has regularities for what follows what (for instance, agents precede actions and objects follow them.” Anderson further notes that “Kanzi’s performance is quite poor” when interpretation depends on “grammatical” words, such as prepositions or conjunctions.”13 He does not distinguish between putting “something in, on, or next to, something else.”

Case and cognitive roles

With respect to word structure, sentence structure, case roles, and word order, Nim’s paratactic sentences are identical to those of human children. This observation immediately raises the important question as to why. Modern linguistics generally considers these case roles to be a linguistic universal and as such they are hard wired into the human brain as part of the faculty of

12 From an evolutionary perspective, it has been argued (e.g., Savage-Rumbaugh 1986) that comprehension would have to precede production. Furthermore, these two separate abilities are associated with two separate areas of the brain: comprehension is associated with Wernicke’s area and that production is associated with Broca’s area. The two areas, found in both humans and apes are connected by a nerve bundle called the arcuate fasciculus. This view would argue that as comprehension abilities increased the capacity of this nerve bundle, which is larger in humans, and so would Broca’s area as well, which is also larger in humans.13 The evolution of grammatical particles such as these marks a later stage of syntax than the syntactic stages that I describe below in the section entitled “From paratax to syntax. “

14


language. It would thus follow that, if chimpanzees exhibit the same roles, these roles are not human but homonoid universals or even mammalian. Furthermore, if these case roles are not uniquely human and not uniquely syntactic, what are they? Let me suggest a parallel concept, that of cognitive relationships. I understand cognitive relationships to be the mechanism through which we understand the events in the world around us. We understand events in the world in terms of agents, actions, objects, modifiers and heads.

Case relationships appear in a paratactic grammar because the speaker is expressing its cognitive understanding of an event but can only do so two words at a time. Since this understanding is in terms of cognitive relationships, it follows that they would delimit the range of meaning of the paratactic sentence. Similarly, listeners interpret the message with the same cognitive relationships. At this point, cognitive relationships and case relationships are identical. I will show later that once syntax has developed, that case relationships can begin to deviate from cognitive relationships.

The idea of imposing cognitive relationships onto a paratactic grammar explains why when children the world over construct paratactic grammars, they do so using the same case roles, regardless of the form of their adult grammar, which may vary in word order and constituent structure.14

This view also provides an insight into language learning as well. Part of what the child is learning to do in the process of constructing a grammar (atax, paratax or syntax) involves mapping these cognitive roles onto linguistic statements. In this vein, the atactic stage involves learning to express words. The paratactic stage involves assigning a role between the two words of the sentence. And the syntactic stage involves the assigning of a unique case role to the constituents of a sentence. At the beginning of this paper I suggested a difference between case and cognitive role. At the atactic and paratactic levels case and cognitive roles are identical.15 However, at the syntactic level, they diverge, for in syntax, it is possible for case roles to grammaticalize so that they no longer represent the same case roles of their cognitive counterparts. For example, the ablative case in Latin has no cognitive counterpart. Also syntactic case markers can also be used for entirely different syntactic purposes. In German, some prepositions require a noun complement in the genitive case and others which require one in the accusative.

From paratax to syntax

The fact that all children develop a paratactic grammar before they develop a syntactic one raises the question of why should this be. If we assume that the capacity for syntax is innate than why don’t children simply develop a syntactic grammar without developing an intermediate grammar first? One answer to this question is that human children actually have two innate grammars, one paratactic and one syntactic. This line of reasoning would lead us to conclude that the other apes have an innate paratactic grammar. Alternatively I argue that what both apes and humans

14 On the distinction between cognitive roles and case roles, Jackendoff (2002:239) puts it this way. “But if apes can think, why can’t they talk? The answer is that they don’t have the capacity to acquire phonological and syntactic structures that map thought into linguist expression. That’s exactly what it means to say language is a cognitive specialization, separate from thought.”15 The question of whether to refer to case or cognitive role in reference to atactic and paratactic constructions is problematic. I could have argued that only cognitive roles are involved in paratactic constructions because they are not formally assigned to constituents. I have decided not to because I want to suggest that once thought is objectivated through grammar, be it atactic, paratactic, and syntactic, that case as a grammatical entity has emerged.

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David Dwyer

have in common is an innate capacity for case relationships and have the ability to impose them on paratactic sentences. Secondly, the fact, as argued above, that only humans learn syntax raises the question of what capacity they have in this regard that apes do not.

It is not enough to say that humans have a genetic predisposition for learning syntax, because this declaration is simply stating the obvious and does not explain what it is that they do learn. I argue that syntactic signs, including the parts of speech, hold the key to learning syntax. Syntactic signs are abstract categories and unlike lexical signs do not have a real world reference. We learn that a given word is a noun or a verb because it functions that way in a sentence, not because of any semantic properties it holds. Thus when we learn syntax, we are learning to see a word sequence, not simply as a string of lexical items, but as a string of parts of speech. To this, we need to focus on its grammatical class.

I also argue that a genetic disposition for a given behavior, like learning syntax, is a response to an adaptive behavior and not the cause of a behavior. Thus I suggest the following:

First, the genetic capacity to learn word classes was part of the gene pool of a few individuals in the population but not selected for during the paratactic stage. Greenfield (1991), Ambrose (2001) and others have noted that the fine muscle control needed to manufacture tools is located in Broca’s area. Broca’s area is better known as one of the two major modules of the brain most closely connected with language, Wernicke’s area being the other. Specifically, Broca’s is associated with the articulation of words and the production of syntax. Thus the increased use and manufacture of tools could have placed increased pressure on the development of Broca’s area a development that could well have been an exaptation not only for the development of the vocal apparatus but subsequently syntax.

Second, after some individuals, who had this predisposition, developed syntax and began to use parts of speech. Once syntax developed, it improved the survivability of its users the genetic predisposition for syntax became more wide-spread in the population to the point where it is now part of the genetic make up of all humans.

As stated above, the crucial step then is how humans developed an ability to use parts of speech. Burling (2005) suggests that this may have come about through the development of function words like of (showing possession) and with (showing instrumentality). This line of reasoning fails to explain why these function words do not show up in the initial stages of syntactic grammar. And from an evolutionary perspective, function words can not be part of a primitive syntax because they arise through a process of grammaticalization (Heine et al 1991) which can only take place after syntax has been established.

Returning to parts of speech, Burling also suggests that they may have arisen through the natural semantics of words (actions represent verbs, things represent nouns and qualities represent adjectives). This argument has some promise. Greenfield and Savage-Rumbaugh (1990) report that Kanzi developed a favored word order, such as agent + action and action + object. This preferred word order imitates the syntactic word order of English, the language of the syntax-using adult humans in their environment. However, these preferred orders are statistical rather than absolute, as it would be the case in syntax. Nevertheless, preferred word orders begin to suggest the emergence of grammatical signs, specifically an agentive sign and an objective sign and parts of speech. In the agentive sign, for example, the signifier is the

16


sequence N+V and the signified is the assigned case roles of agent to the noun and action to the verb.

Suppose that in humans these tendencies did become absolute, as they did in the case of Genie16 (Curtiss et al 1974). Once this happens, these two sentences become syntactic for three reasons. First, the grammar that produced these sentences recognizes two parts of speech (N and V). Second, the sentences have a fixed word order. Third, the sentences have assigned case roles, even though each sequence consists of two words. Let us call this stage I syntax. This stage of syntax, however, does lack several properties that we associate with modern syntax, namely an agent, action and object in the same sentence and abstract grammatical signs, it nevertheless represents the first stage of syntax. The next stage involves the development of the verb phrase.

The transition to the next stage (stage II syntax) involves the incorporation of an agent, action and object in the sentence, through the emergence of the verb phrase as a syntactic sign.

This takes place by expanding the agentive sign to allow not only sequences of N + V, but N + Objective sign. This is consistent with Genie’s development in which her first three-word sentences combined a noun with a previously used objective sentence.

When the objective sign becomes embedded in this way, it is formally equivalent to a verb phrase. Thus, the transition to stage II, although it is a huge intellectual accomplishment, can be understood as a logical development once the fixed word order and parts of speech of stage I have taken place. Importantly, the development of VP in stage II is the first non terminal syntactic sign to emerge. Once the grammatical concepts of stage II have developed, the stage is set for the further development of syntax. Here, I have in mind developments like the expansion of the noun phrase, the nesting of sentences within sentences and the grammaticalization of words and the development of affixes. Nevertheless, once stage I has been achieved, these other syntactic developments take place rather quickly.

With the addition of stage I and stage II syntax to atax and paratax, we can now see a developmental sequence in which the transitions from one stage to the next is understandable.

Tactic Type NA = Not Applicable

One-Word(Atax)

Two-Word(Paratax)

Stage ISyntax

Stage IISyntax

TrueSyntax

Phrase Structure

Words per sentence Significant word orderGrammatical symbols

Case rolesAssigned Case Roles

SW

1No

S and WNANA

SW:W

2No

S and WYesNo

S N+VSV+N

2Yes

S, N and VYesYes

SN+VPVV+N

3Yes

S, N, V and VPYesYes

SNP+VP, etc.

InfiniteFixedManyYesYes

Protolanguage, paratax and protosyntax16 Genie, the pseudonym of a child isolated from language and human interaction until the age of 13 years. She had no language abilities and was undernourished. Under the supervision of the authors, Genie developed the ability to sign, and as I point out, stage I syntax.

17

Genie’s Stage II Sentences Based on Curtiss et al (1974)Earlier Stage 1 sentence Stage 2 sentenceLove Curtiss.More soupMark mouth

Genie love Curtiss.Want more soup.Mark mouth hurt.

David Dwyer

Bickerton (1990: 122-6) has proposed a presyntactic stage of language evolution, which he calls protolanguage, a term first used in this context by Halliday (1975). He claims that this protolanguage is found in the two-word stage of young children, socialized apes, Genie and pidgin languages and was at one time spoken by our presyntactic ancestors.17

From this characterization, Bickerton’s protolanguage would appear to be simply another term for paratax, however, Bickerton characterizes his protolanguage from a syntactic vantage point. He presents a list of properties that syntax has and protolanguage lacks including 1) significant word order; 2) null elements; 3) verb subcategorization; 4) mechanisms for the expansion of utterances (which I call nesting); and 5) syntactic items including inflectional affixes. Interestingly, Bickerton does not include the condition of two words per sentence. Without going into the details of these somewhat technical categories, it should be clear that Bickerton’s characterizes protolanguage negatively. A proper formalization of this stage should describe the properties which it possesses.

Furthermore, Bickerton’s proto language includes the grammar of Genie, which as I have shown above developed stage I and stage II syntax. Therefore, Genie needs to be removed from Bickerton’s list of protolanguage users.

Secondly Bickerton considers the grammars of pidgin languages (such as Hawaiian Pidgin English), as opposed to creoles, to be protolanguage. Drawing on sentences from three Hawaiian immigrants (1880-1930), whose first languages were Japanese, Korean and Filipino, Bickerton (120) notes that:

The utterances cited, typical of pidgin speech, consist of short strings of no more than four words each. Each of these strings is, except for the one conditional, an utterance complete in itself and separate from all the others. The order within the strings is quite variable: objects may precede verbs (mani no kaen hapai, haus mani pei), verbs may precede subjects (hapai awl, hemo awl), or verbs may be missing altogether (aetna tu macha churen).

Although this statement deserves a more complete critique, note that Bickerton has admitted that these sentences have more than two words and that they have parts of speech.18 This alone excludes this version of Hawaiian Pidgin English as paratactic. If Bickerton’s protolanguage includes the grammars of Genie and pidgin languages, then it is clear that his protolanguage is different from what I call paratax.

Role of negatives in the evolution of syntax

The above developmental scheme for the emerging parts of speech depends on the preexistence of an adult syntactic model in which the paratactic learners favor the word order of the syntactic model of their human companions. This raises the question of how parts of speech develop in the absence of the syntactic model. Is it possible that preferred words automatically emerge, even without a syntactic model, or was there some other mechanism by which humans acquired the concept of syntactic signs.

17 Nonetheless, I agree with Bickerton that paratax was a stage of language evolution, which I associate with the lower Paleolithic, a period in which the vocal tract and the brain evolved into its modern form and that syntax developed much later in the upper Paleolithic when we see an expansion of cultural variation. The development of this scenario, however, is a topic for another paper.18 For a more complete critique of Bickerton’s hypothesis see Goodman (1985).

18


One promising avenue of development in the transition from paratax to syntax involves the role of the negative. Specifically, I propose that the negative holds the key because it represents a word class with only one member. Negative words do appear in the language of socialized apes and humans, but not in the natural signs of free-ranging apes (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990:226).19 The negative is a social word intended to inform the other not to do something. For example, if two individuals are making an agreement to do something cooperatively, the no, like the yes, is essential for communicating whether one will or will not participate in the agreement. No is also essential for communicating one’s likes and dislikes.

For humans, Klima and Bellugi (1966) posited three stages in the acquisition of negatives. The stage 1 grammar attaches a no or a not to the beginning of an atactic or a paratactic sentence. The stage 2 grammar places a negative word (no, not, can’t, don’t) between the subject and the verb. The stage 3 grammar includes verb agreement and auxiliary verbs. Their analysis considers paratax as an incipient form of syntax with the result that the transition from paratax to syntax is obscured. For example, they use the terms subject and object before there is evidence that they are actually part of the grammar. However, when paratax is understood as distinct from syntax, the transition from the former to the latter becomes clear. To show this, I have reinterpreted the data from Klima and Bellugi (the numbers in parentheses represent Klima and Bellugi’s stages).

Stage 1: Paratactic Negation

Sentences 1-3 are simple paratactic sentences in which the case role of the word no is the modifier. The case role of the other word is that of the head. Word order is not significant, appearing in the first position in sentences 1 and 2, and second position in sentence 2. The other sentences (4-10) are more complex, consisting of a paratactic sentence (S2) nested in a second paratactic sentence (S1) in which the other word is no. Earlier, I had stated that nested paratax was of little use in clarifying the meaning of the sentence and that, for this reason, children and chimpanzees resorted to iteration. However, these sentences are different because they involve the negative no.

No, is an important word because, it represents a word class with one member. Thus, when this word appears in a sentence like this, there can be no question that its case role is modifier and that S2 is the head.

These sentences show the first example of nesting and the emergence of a negative syntactic sign. The signifier is the combination of a negative and a word in either order. The signified is the assignment of modifier to the negative and head to the word. From this analysis, it is clear that Neg is a part of speech, and the first part of speech to emerge. However, at this stage the word order is not fixed, appearing in the first position in sentences 4-8 and second position in sentences 9 and ten.

19 I can find no examples of Nim using a negative word. There are reports that Washoe and Koko, a gorilla, used negatives, but I can not find any examples of sentences in which they were used. Nyota did say “No ice.” When telling Bill that he did not want frozen blueberries.

19

1. No fall. (1) 2. No money.(1) 3. More... no. (1) 4. No wipe finger (1) 5. No sit there. (1) 6. No play that.(1) 7. No singing song. (1) 8. No punch me. (2) 9. Wear mitten no. (1) 10. Book say no. (2)

David Dwyer

Stage 2: Paratactic negation of a phrase

I analyze these examples as a paratactic negation of a phrase, possibly lexicalized, that appears to have syntactic properties though with so little data it is really hard to say. I am inclined to see phrases like: 1) a bad boy and 2) the sun shining as single lexical items, even though the presence of the definite article also suggests syntactic structuring. If they are syntactic, they represent more advanced grammar than those found in Klima and Bellugi’s stages 3 and 4 below. Unfortunately the limited number of examples makes this conclusion tentative. It is not clear to me whether the word not is a synonym for no or a new grammatical development.20

Stage 3: Imbedding of the negative after the subject

These sentences begin with a deictic (this, that or there) followed by a negative paratactic sentence. The deictic may be another early word class. All of these examples show this fixed word order, even though the embedded sentence, S2, like No mommy and No goo., etc. appear paratactic. However, there are no sentences like This good no. Also, the demonstrative pronouns appear to represent a second word class of two members. I analyze this new grammar as a head-modifier construction where the head is the deictic word and the modifier is the remainder of the sentence.

Stage 4: The emergence of a syntactic grammar

In the next set of sentences we see a recognizable subject in the first position followed by a negative, followed by a complement. In some cases the complement appears to be a transitive verb phrase. In no case is there evidence of verb inflection.

The reader may notice that this analysis has placed some of the sentences in a different sequence based on their formal properties and that as such they are out of sequence as reported by Klima and Bellugi. This anachronism should not be seen as too surprising as several researchers (e.g., Irvine 2005) report that these stages of negation do overlap.

Although Klima and Bellugi report several additional stages on the path to adult syntax, I do not show them here, because I believe I have shown how negatives can assist in the ontogeny of syntax in children. I find it reasonable to assume that a similar process may have triggered syntax in the evolution of language. In other words, the word no is an exaptation for syntax. This observation is consistent with the fact that the word no appears only in captive chimpanzees, bonobos and humans. This raises the question of when and why do these beings learn this word as well as the question of how did this concept develop.

Both scenarios that I have suggested involve the emergence of a part of speech as the stepping stone to the development of syntax and the nesting of another grammatical sign. In the first instance, the fixing of word orders allowed for the establishment of the noun and verb as syntactic signs. In the second instance, the negative became a part of speech by virtue of it being a word class with only one member.

20 This set also contains the sentence: No square... is clown. I have removed it from the set because of the pause between the two parts of the sentence and because its meaning is unclear.

20

1. No a bad boy. (1)2. No the sun shining. (1)3. Touch the snow no. (2)4. This a radiator no. (2)5. Not a teddy bear. (2)

1. That no fish school. (2)2. That no Mommy. (2)3. There no squirrels. (2) 4. This not ice-cream. (3d)5. This no good. (3d)6. That not turning. (3d)

1. He not little. He big. (2)2. He no bite you. (2)3. I no want envelope. (2)4. I no taste them. (2)5. I not hurt him. (3b)6. I not crying. (3d)7. He not taking the walls down. (3d)


Recapitulation

In this paper I have used a semiological analysis to show that the grammars found in adult humans (syntax) on one hand and young humans and signing apes on the other (paratax) are formally distinct. This means that linguists are correct when they say that ape grammars are not syntactic and that that researchers studying ape signing are correct when they say it ape signing is grammatical.

I then demonstrated that the case roles of paratactic sentences in apes and young humans are the same as those found in syntax. I then argued that because they are found in apes and human, case roles are a universal, but neither a linguistic universal nor a human universal and that they have their origin in the common cognitive processes found in apes and humans.

I have also proposed two possible scenarios for the evolution of syntax. The first is based on fixing the word order of agent + action and action + object sentence. The second is based on the unique status of negatives enabling the conceptualization of grammatical symbols. Categorical symbols enabled the assignment of case roles to constituents and the nesting of constituents with various case relationships into the sentence. From this development, one can imagine that the earliest form of syntax was the simple sentence, followed both by sentence nesting and affixation. Both of these scenarios suggest that while the distinction between the communicative capacity between paratax and syntax is huge, the grammatical transition from paratax to syntax is less so.

ReferencesSee chapter 10

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3-paratax syntax and case

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