LESSON 21CRISIS DECISION MAKINGUSS Vincennes Case Study

USS Vincennes Case StudyHistorical BackgroundTHE LINGERING THREAT IN THE MIDDLE EAST SHAH OVERTHROWN - 62 AMERICANS TAKEN HOSTAGE (1979)IRAN/IRAQ WAR COMMENCES (SEP 1980)BEIRUT EMBASSY BOMBING (1983)TANKER WAR ESCALATES (1984) USS STARK INCIDENT (MAY 87)IRAQI F-1 LAUNCHES (2) EXOCET MISSILES (Pilot Error)37 DEATHS, 21 INJURED, CO RELIEVED FOR CAUSEU.S. REFLAGS KUWAITI TANKERS (1987)OPERATION: EARNEST WILL - U.S. REFLAGS 11 TANKERS (JUL)M/V BRIDGETON STRIKES A MINE (as did two other vessels)IRAN AJR CAUGHT LAYING MINES (SEP 87)USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS STRIKES MINE (APR 88)OPERATION: PRAYING MANTIS - Response against the Iranian Navy

USS Vincennes IncidentSeven Minutes that Stunned the Navy

USS Stark IncidentHistorical Background (Review)

USS Vincennes (CG-49)Combat Information Center

Commander, Joint Task Force, Middle East Chain of CommandCombatant Commander (COCOM) ****Component Commander (OPCON) *Warfare Commanders (TACON) O-6

USS Vincennes Case StudyAir Warfare PID CriteriaKinematics (course, speed, altitude , CPA)Point of originComposition (Quantity)ESMIFFPosition relative to COMAIR routesPublished AOG Flight SchedulesIntel Reports (Indications and Warnings)Voice comms (Queries and Warnings)

USS Vincennes Case StudyPeacetime Rules of Engagement (ROE)INHERENT RIGHT OF SELF DEFENSE - permits the use of force in self-defense against armed attack or threat of imminent armed attack subject to the following:

NECESSITY - use of force must be IRT a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.PROPORTIONALITY - use of force must be limited in intensity, duration, and scope.

HOSTILE ACT - deliberate attacks by opposing forces. Examples: actual attacks, laying mines in international waters, etc.

HOSTILE INTENT - the threat of imminent use of force by opposing forces.Examples: training weapons systems, energizing fire control radars, maneuvering to launch position.

USS Vincennes Case StudySequence of Events 03 Jul 88Surface EngagementVINCENNES IN GULF ENROUTE PVST BAHRAIN0711 MON hears reports of 5-7 explosions near a Liberian tanker MON directed by GS to proceed away from the tanker VIN directed to vector SH-60B to investigate 0742 OL25 observers gunboats circling a German cargo ship0915 OL25 reports being fired upon by IRG gunboats0939 VIN requests permission to engage gunboats0941 GS gave permission to engage boghammers with guns0942 Iranian gunboats turn inbound toward VIN0943 VIN/MON commenced fire with 5in/54 guns 0945:30 IA655 launches from Bandar Abbas1003 VIN/MON ceased fire (119 rounds expended)UNCLASSIFIED

USS Vincennes Case StudySequence of Events 03 Jul 88Air Engagement0945:30 IA655 launches from Bandar Abbas0947 VIN gains radar contact (SPY-1A) (47 nm)0949 VIN issues initial warning over MAD to TN 4131 (40 nm) Ten warnings given in next five minutes (3 IAD / 7 MAD)0950 VIN reports inbound F-14 to GB (32 nm)0951 VIN states that intentions are to engage contact at 20 nm if the contact does not turn away (now 30 nm)0951 VIN forward 5in gun jams (MT51) - ship turns violently0952 VIN issues several warnings to TN 4131 (25nm)0952 VIN requests and receives permission to illuminate (20 nm)0953 TN 4131 was at 16nm SPD 371 kts, ALT 11,230 ft0954:05 VIN engages TN 4131 at 10 nm (salvo size two)UNCLASSIFIED

USS Vincennes Case StudyArtershocksFormal Board of Inquiry was convened by RADM Fogerty 13 Jul 88.Official parties to the inquiry:RADM Less (principal)CAPT Rodgers (principal)LCDR Scott Lustig (Air TAO)LCDR Vic Guillory (TAO)Findings: during the formal portion of the inquiry, the board found no grounds for disciplinary or punitive action.

USS Vincennes Case StudyInvestigation - Synopsis of FactsIRAN AIR ACTUAL FLIGHT PROFILEAlways ascendingOnly mode III IFF squawkWithin airway Amber 59Maximum air speed of 385 knots

AEGIS WEAPON SYSTEM PERFORMANCENo Aegis weapon system equipment deficiencies existed during the engagement. Link-11 was down for 28 seconds.

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCEWith little time and under combat stress during the surface engagement, watchstanders misinterpreted some tactical information.UNCLASSIFIED

USS Vincennes Case StudyFundamental Considerations that the Vincennes Could Not ControlISSUES FACED BY CAPTAIN RODGERS:Ongoing surface engagement.The unidentified assumed hostile contact had taken off from a civilian-military airfield.Heading directly toward Vincennes, relentlessly closing. No definitive radar emissions.Unanswered warnings.Short decision window.No proof that the contact was not related to the ongoing surface fight.UNCLASSIFIED

CRISIS LEADERSHIPKey LessonsMAINTAIN FLEXIBILITYbe willing to show flexibility; do not be tied to inflexible policies of the past that may not apply to the fast-moving situations of the present.be open to suggestions on how to solve crisesAVOID TASK FIXATIONsomeone needs to be looking at the big pictureAVOID SCENARIO FULFILLMENT BIASESdont neglect to search for disconfirmatory information.KEEP THINGS SIMPLEask people to do things that they are already trained to do.

USS Vincennes Case StudyEpilogueCAPT RodgersCompleted remainder of scheduled deployment, returning to San Diego in 24 Oct 88.July 1989 assumed command of TACTRAGRUPACRetired Aug 1991 and is now a consultantRADM LessSubsequently promoted to VADM and appointed COMNAVAIRPAC.LCDR Vic Guillory and LCDR Scott Lustig Both promoted to CDR and completed successful XO tours aboard new-construction Aegis Cruisers.