1NC

The 1st Off is Effects T A. Interpretation: ‘reduce’ refers to a process, not an outcome --- the plan itself must decrease its restrictions on legal immigration --- it cannot simply lead to it

Public Law 87-253 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, 97th US Congress, Sept 8, 1982, Lexis)

E) Prior to approving any application for a refund, the Secretary shall require evidence that such reduction in market- ings has taken place and

that such reduction is a net decrease in marketings of milk and has not been offset by expansion of production in other production facilities in which the person has an interest or by transfer of partial interest in the produc- tion facility or by the taking of any other action. which is a scheme or device to qualify for payment.

B. Violation: the plan does not directly decrease restrictions on legal immigration.

C. Standards

1. Limits- the aff completely explodes the limits of the resolution because they could take any number of steps to eventually get access to topical action.

2. Aff burden- It mixes burdens – to determine topicality through effect, you have to look to solvency, which is crossing the stock issues and is theoretically illegitimate.

3. Vacuum test- the only way to determine whether a plan is topical or not is to directly view the plan text through a vacuum. If the plan is proven not topical then the aff is not topical.

D. Voters

1. A Priori

2. Fairness

3. Education

Next Off is a Restrictions T

Interpretation

Restrictions means a (plural) collection of restrictions

Wordhippo 3/7/2019 https://www.wordhippo.com/what-is/the-plural-of/restriction.html

However, in more specific contexts, the plural form can also be   restrictions  e.g. in reference to various types of restrictions or a collection of   restrictions .

Violation:

The affirmative team is not reducing a collection of restrictions, only reducing one or none

Standards:

A. Bright Line: Definition is better because it draws a clear distinction between what is topical and what is not whereas aff definition is vague.

B. Grammatical Context: Definition is better because it fits into the resolution and still works.

Voters:

A. Debatability: We can prepare for only those cases that fall under the resolution and should not be voted against because we could not debate a nontopical case.

B. Jurisdiction: It is not within your jurisdiction as judge to vote for a nontopical case.

Next Off is the Temporary Counter-Plan

The United States federal government should create a substantially expanded temporary residency program for [insert group]. The United States federal government should renew temporary residency after five years for [ insert group ] on a year by year basis. Temporary immigration programs solve nativist fears, avoids political backlash to permanent residency, and brain drain

Faizer, 17 [M. Akram Faizer, Professor of Law at Lincoln Memorial University, “America First: Improving a Recalcitrant Immigration and Refugee Policy,” 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 933] -- ef

At the turn of the last century, my grandfather, Dr. Mohamed Casim Mohamed Kaleel, traveled from his native Colombo, Ceylon, to the United Kingdom to study medicine at the venerable Edinburgh University. Upon graduation, he started practicing medicine in Dublin, Ireland, a city he truly loved. Notwithstanding the fact that the United Kingdom was the center of a clearly racist Empire where white Britons had superior rights to their colonial subordinates, the Empire afforded Dr. Kaleel freedom of movement and residency. It was the fear of a Japanese invasion of Ceylon and a concomitant need [*935] for doctors that prompted British authorities to ask him to return to Ceylon. Dr. Kaleel did so, met the woman who became his wife, subsequently advocated for Ceylon's independence from the U.K., and then served in Ceylon's first post-independence government as Health Minister. He eventually had ten children, many of whom, including my mother, migrated to first-world English-speaking democracies. Paradoxically, nearly a full century later, while racial discrimination is illegal in all first-world nations, n4 the

citizens of these nations are increasingly unaccepting of global migrants. This is evidenced by President Trump's advocacy of a 2,000 mile border wall with Mexico n5 and the rise of anti-immigration populist parties throughout the developed world. n6 The tragic plight of Syrian, Eritrean, and other refugees n7 and the rich-world's reluctance to accept them demonstrates how migration from the developing world to mature democracies is unwelcome . Myanmar's genocide of its Rohingya Muslim minority and the refusal of other South and Southeast Asian nations to welcome them n9 demonstrates that persecution of migrants is not relegated to the global north. The dynamics behind the migratory surge, including war, collapsing state [*936] structures, economic dislocation, climate change, and an anticipated population explosion in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa, will not abate. Nor will the

causes of rich-world recalcitrance, including Islamophobia, xenophobic authoritarianism, socio-economic and intergenerational immobility, income and wealth inequality and, most importantly, unconsented-to migration-based political and cultural changes. n10 I. AN ARGUMENT FOR CHANGING THE CURRENT RECALCITRANT IMMIGRATION POLICY TO PROVIDE TEMPORARY RESIDENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL MIGRANTS In view of global demand, rich countries, including the U.S., have a humanitarian obligation to substantially increase the admission of international economic migrants and refugees (collectively "migrants"). This

must be done in a manner that avoids a political backlash or causes an uptick in social dislocation and nativism . This will be exceedingly difficult and will require rethinking how rich-world nations approach the issue of global migration . As long as rich-countries continue to treat asylum and migration as a form of immigration, popular pressure will deprive

policymakers of the ability to accommodate migrants at the needed level. My proposal is to recognize the humanitarian imperative of welcoming migrants and to foster support for such a disposition by untethering migration from permanent residency and eventual naturalization by means of a substantially expanded temporary residency program . Rich-world governments will have political support to welcome far more migrants than is currently the case because the policy addresses the concerns of conservatives and nationalists who bemoan the cultural and political consequences of permanent international migration and strengthens the position of liberals and moderates who argue for humanitarian admission. The policy will improve overall global well-being because it will lead to the admission of far more temporary residents and will protect the sending states of the developing world by protecting them against an irrevocable loss of their most capable citizens . Although admitting far greater numbers of temporary residents risks undermining social cohesion and creating a problematic tiered-system [*937] of residency by depriving migrants' U.S. born children of citizenship, it is a necessary requirement for a bipartisan immigration compromise . Much of the nativist opposition to immigration is caused by economic insecurity , income inequality, and socio-economic immobility within rich-world countries . n11 Therefore, advocates for migrant rights will also have to push for domestic political reforms in rich-world countries to encourage socio-economic and intergenerational mobility. These include labor market reforms, greater progressivity in the tax code, and ensuring access to high-quality public schooling, health care, and higher education as a citizenship right. The need for these reforms is beyond the scope of this paper and is addressed in my previous piece published in the Pennsylvania State Law Review. n12 President Trump's election was facilitated by the U.S. electorate's backlash over the fact that the nation's demographics have changed dramatically due to the country's failure to address the permanent residency of illegal migrants, many of whose children have become citizens based on the country's provision of birthright

citizenship. n13 President Trump could address his supporters' concerns and provide for a far better alternative to the status quo by adopting policies

designed to encourage greater acceptance of migrants in conjunction with stricter border and immigration enforcement. This is a needed change in view of the rise of right-wing populism as manifest by Trump's election , the United Kingdom's Brexit vote to leave the

European Union, Marine Le Pen's reaching the second round of the French Presidential election, the success of the far right AFD Party in Germany, and the growth of far-right political parties in other mature democracies. n14 It is, moreover, a necessary policy change should rich countries seek to fulfill their humanitarian obligation to accommodate the current international migratory surge and avoid becoming [*938] unwelcoming hostages to a fortress-like mentality that demeans the Enlightenment and the idea of global human rights. n15

Next Off is the Brain Drain DA – the net benefit

A. Uniqueness and link – US immigration restrictions cause displaced workers to move to China – the aff reverses that

Chen 17 – (Qian Chen, 3/27/17, “As US weighs tightening visa program, Asia stands to benefit,” CNBC, Accessed 6/21/18, https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/27/h-1b-visas-as-us-weighs-tightening-visa-program-asia-stands-to-benefit.html) //ak

A returning trend In addition to professionals like Deng, who are relocated back to Asia due to H-1B rejections, many high-skilled personnel with overseas education backgrounds are returning for the rising opportunities in the region. A report released by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences showed that only 30 percent of Chinese students studying abroad between 1978 and 2006 chose to return to China after graduation. "It's easier to become a middle-class person in the U.S., but regarding greater opportunities, the U.S. market is becoming less appealing for Chinese students." -Shun Hou, HR manager at staffing and recruiting firm Wyser That figure has jumped nearly a decade later: According to data provided by China's Ministry of Education, more than 500,000 Chinese students went overseas for education in 2015, and another 400,000

returned home. "In recent years, the connection between China's domestic job market and global talent market has established and strengthened, " said Shun Hou, HR manager at Wyser, a staffing and recruiting company. "It's easier to

become a middle-class person in the U.S., but regarding greater opportunities, the U.S. market is becoming less appealing for Chinese students." And China appears to be growing more attractive. A Chinese government survey conducted in 2016 found that nearly half of survey participants wanted to work in China's leading cities — Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen. This survey

result is in line with Hou's observation. "For positions at big companies, the salary gap between China and the U.S. is narrowing while career paths in China are more attractive," Hou told CNBC in a phone interview. "China's multinational companies are craving bilingual talents and Chinese students abroad see this trend."

Opportunity cost is getting higher Low odds of winning the H-1B lottery and fears of tightening immigration policies under the Trump administration are both helping China lure more top talents back home, according to Hou. U.S. immigration authorities said the Premium Processing Service of H-1B visas, which allowed petitioners to pay extra $1,225 to request faster approval, will be not available this year. And to some, those extra few months could make a big difference. "It's a one-time shot: Win the lottery this year, or get out of here." -Hongli Lan, a quantitative investment analyst and H-1B lottery hopeful "Many students will return to China immediately after graduation without even trying to find jobs in the U.S. because they don't want to miss out on the summer

recruitment season back home," Hou explained. "The opportunity cost is getting higher to stay in the U.S . — you spend one year to find a job, and wait another half year to find yourself fail the lottery." But for Lan, waiting is the only option for now. "It's a one-time shot: Win the lottery this year, or get out of here," he said.

B. High-skilled workers are key to China’s economy – aging crisis and pension ILO 17 – (International Labour Office, 2017, “Attracting skilled international migrants to China: A review and comparison of policies and practices,” Centre for China and Globalization (CCG), Accessed 6/21/18,

https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/attracting_skilled_en_0.pdf) //ak

2.1.1 Demographic imperatives After rising rapidly during the post-World War II baby boom, fertility rates began falling steeply across all OECD countries in 1970s. By the end of that decade, the average OECD-wide fertility rate had dipped below the natural replacement rate of 2.1 and continued plunging through the middle of 1980s. Fertility rates did rebound somewhat in a few places, notably in the United States and, to some extent, Scandinavia, during the 1990s (Sleebos, 2003). But the overall fertility rate among OECD countries remains below the replacement

rate needed to sustain populations. The average fertility rate among this group of States stood at 1.70 in 2011 (OECD, 2014a). This demographic crunch extends beyond developed countries to middle-income emerging economies, particularly China, whose fertility rate has been falling for decades, putting it in the same league as low- birth OECD countries. One of the possible reasons behind low fertility rates might be the social/financial pressure that young couples

receive as a result of rapid economic development. According to a news article published in Nature, constraints on housing and education, as well as a strong focus on career have all led to a low average fertility rate in China (Schiermeier, 2015). It is notable that relaxations of China’s “One-Child” family planning regime – the Government enacted the Selective Two-Child Policy ( 单独二孩政策 ) in 2013, allowing families to have two children if one of the parents is an only child (National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2013) – have failed to raise birth rates (Guo et al., 2014). Adverse demography will significantly lower the share of individuals of working age in the overall population. It is estimated that the total working age population among OECD countries will only grow

by 4 per cent from 2000 to 2050, after a rapid increase of 76 per cent from 1950 to 2000 (Sleebos, 2003). As noted above, given China’s low fertility rate, it is very possible that China will face a decrease in its working age population in the near future (F. Wang, 2010). In the absence of intensified efforts to boost domestic education levels, these trends will more than likely exacerbate the overall shortage of high-quality talent . Such shortages in human capital will become especially acute if, as widely predicted, the importance of knowledge-based economic activities continues to rise. In any case, the slowdown in the numbers of working age adults is expected to influence economic growth rates among advanced economies . A 2001 study predicted that the European economic growth rate is expected to fall from the 2001 annual rate of 2.3 per cent to 0.5 per cent by 2050, while the American

economy might decrease from a growth rate of 2.5 per cent in 2001 to 1.4 per cent by 2050. As the ratio of working age population to retirees falls, public pension schemes in these countries, which are in large part financed by the contributions of working adults, will face increasing pressure, and therefore, exacerbate governmental primary fiscal deficits (Dang, Antolin, and Oxley, 2001). Such influence might trigger a greater economic impact in China than in other countries, since China is still standing at the crossroads of economic restructuring. For instance, besides the universal demand for a stable social welfare system, the Chinese Government also tends to use its pension funds as a strategic tool for stimulating domestic consumption among the elderly and among working adults (A. Wang and Qing, 2012). In short, it is clear that with the emerging ageing issue, pension schemes in both developed and developing economies are facing the potential threat of undertaking too many unfunded

liabilities. Higher levels of immigration , particularly of high-skilled migrants, can help provide a quick fix to these problems . However, it bears emphasizing, this solution is at best a temporary and partial palliative to the ageing population problems that highly developed countries and emerging economies are now experiencing. Lutz and Skirbekk (2005) have noted that even with a steep increase in annual immigration inflow (say, 1.2 million people migrating into the European Union per year), the dependency ratio (population above 65 years old divided by the population between 15 to 64 years old) will almost double by 2050 (Lutz and Skirbekk, 2005). Furthermore, since immigrants are getting older each year, slowing down the age of the population will require constant fresh waves of immigrants. However, as the backlash against immigration emerges in numerous developed economies, politicians are likely going to constrain future increases in the number of foreigners living in these countries.

C. Chinese economic collapse leads to nuclear warCarpenter 15 (Ted Galen, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at The National Interest, “Could China's Economic Troubles Spark a War?, The National Interest, 9/6/15” http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-chinas-economic-troubles-spark-war-13784?page=2//ER)

Global attention has focused on the plunge in the Shanghai stock market and mounting evidence that China’s economic growth is slowing dramatically. Moreover, the contagion appears to be spreading, characterized by extreme volatility and alarming declines in America’s own equity markets. Those worries are compounded because there always have been doubts about the accuracy of Beijing’s official economic statistics. Even before the current downturn, some outside experts believed that Chinese officials padded the results, making the country’s performance appear stronger than it actually was. If China is now teetering on the brink of recession, the political incentives for officials to conceal the extent of the damage would be quite powerful. The focus on the possible wider economic

consequences of a severe Chinese economic slowdown is understandable, since the ramifications could be extremely unpleasant for the U.S. and global economies. But we should also be vigilant about how such economic stress might affect Beijing’s

diplomatic and military behavior. It is not unprecedented for a government that feels besieged to attempt to distract a discontented public by fomenting a foreign policy crisis. In Henry IV, Shakespeare pithily described that process as the temptation to “busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels.”

China’s leaders likely feel increasingly uncomfortable. The implicit bargain that has been in place since the onset of market-oriented reforms in the late 1970s has been that if the public does not challenge the Communist Party’s dominant political position, the Party will deliver an ever-rising standard of living for the people. The bloody Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 was a graphic reminder of what happens if the Party’s position is challenged. However, until now, the economic portion of the bargain seemed secure, characterized by breathtaking, often double digit, rates of growth. It is uncertain what happens if the Party can no longer maintain its part of the implicit bargain, but it is likely that a dangerous degree of public discontent will surface. Beijing might refrain from deliberately provoking a major foreign policy crisis, since the Chinese economy depends heavily on export

markets, and access to those markets would be jeopardized by war. However, the need to preserve and strengthen national unity

and distract the public from mounting economic troubles is likely to impel Chinese leaders to adopt very hardline policies in at least three areas. And all of those situations entail the danger of miscalculations that could lead to war. One issue is the South China Sea. Beijing has made extraordinarily broad territorial claims that encompass some 90 percent of that body of water. China is pressing its claims with air and naval patrols and the building of artificial islands. Those policies have brought Beijing into acrimonious disputes with neighbors such as Vietnam and the Philippines, which have rival territorial claims, and with the world’s leading maritime power, the United States, which resists any manifestation of Chinese control over the South China Sea and the crucial

commercial lanes that pass through it. The conditions are in place for a nasty confrontation. Chinese leaders have already stressed the country’s alleged historical claims to the area, and made it clear that it will not tolerate being subjected to humiliation by outside powers. Such arguments are designed to gain domestic support by reminding the Chinese people of the country’s long period of weakness and humiliation in the 1800s and early 1900s. A second issue is Taiwan. Beijing has long argued that Taiwan is rightfully part of China and was stolen from the country in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Although Chinese leaders have exhibited patience regarding the issue of reunification, relying in large measure on growing cross-strait economic ties to entice Taiwan to eventually accept that outcome, Beijing has also reacted very sharply whenever Taiwanese officials have pushed an agenda of independence, as during the administration of Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008. The danger or renewed confrontation is rising, since public opinion polls indicate that the nominee of Chen’s old party, the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, will be Taiwan’s next leader. A new crisis in the Taiwan Strait would be extremely serious, since the United States has obligated itself to consider any Chinese efforts at coercion as a “grave breach of the peace” of East Asia. Yet there is little doubt that there would be widespread domestic support on the mainland for a stern response by the Beijing government to a Taiwanese attempt to enhance its de-facto independence. Indeed, there might be more political danger to the regime if it did not take a strong stance on that issue. The third possible arena for crisis is the East China Sea. China is increasingly adamant about its claims to the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, which are under Japanese control. From China’s perspective, those islands were stolen by Imperial Japan at the same time that Tokyo took possession of Taiwan following the 1895 war. And ginning up public anger against Japan is never difficult. China just finished celebrating the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, which is touted in China as “the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.” Recalling Japan’s invasion of China, and the resulting atrocities, was a prominent theme of the various commemorative events. But the animosity is not based solely on historical grievances. Anger at Japan over the ongoing East China Sea dispute and other matters has already produced anti-Japanese riots in

Chinese cities, characterized by attacks on Japanese businesses and automobiles. There is a powerful incentive for Chinese leaders to take an uncompromising stance on the Diaoyu/Senkaku feud, confident that the Chinese people will back such a stance. All of this suggests that the United States and its allies need to proceed cautiously about dealing with China, especially on these three

issues. Now is not the time to press a Chinese leadership that likely feels beleaguered by the country’s economic woes. The last thing we should do is give those leaders further temptation to distract the Chinese people with a foreign policy confrontation. Such a strategy entails the grave risk of miscalculation and escalation, and that would be a tragedy for all concerned.

Next Off is the Balkanization DA

A: Uniqueness - President Trump is striving to increase restrictions on immigration.

Hauslohner and Tran ’18 (Abigail, Andrew, “Trump is making inroads in reducing legal immigration”, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-legal-migration-steep-decrease-20180702-story.html)

As the national immigration debate swirls around the effort to discourage illegal immigration by separating families at the border, the Trump administration is making inroads into another longtime priority: reducing legal immigration. The number of people receiving visas to move permanently to the United States is on pace to drop 12 percent in President Donald Trump's first two years in office, according to a Washington Post analysis of State

Department data…. Trump has said he wants additional limits on immigration in part because he believes new arrivals create undue competition for American workers.

B: Link - Immigration increasing leads to further balkanization.Qiu ’18 (Linda, “Border Crossings Have Been Declining for Years, Despite Claims of a ‘Crisis of Illegal Immigration’”,

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/us/politics/fact-check-trump-border-crossings-declining-.html) Nowrasteh ’16 (Alex, “Balkanization and Immigration in America”, https://www.cato.org/blog/balkanization-immigration-america)

IT CERTAINLY looked like a “Trump effect.” Within weeks of Donald Trump’s arrival at the White House in January 2017, the number of people caught crossing America’s southern border illegally fell to a 17-year low of 11,127. John Kelly, then secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), attributed the drop to Mr Trump’s executive orders on immigration. Elaine Duke, the department’s deputy secretary, gave credit to better enforcement of immigration laws. Mr Trump hailed it as “a historic and unprecedented achievement”. If such an effect did exist, it appears to have

been short-lived. On April 5th, the DHS announced that Border Patrol agents apprehended 37,393 people in March, an increase of more than 200% on the previous year. The number of unaccompanied children caught entering illegally jumped by 300%, and the number of families detained while attempting the journey surged by nearly 700%. Permanently reducing such flows will require more than Mr Trump’s tough talk. The president’s vow to end what he calls “catch and release”—the practice of apprehending undocumented immigrants, and then releasing them while their court cases are being resolved—will be particularly difficult to implement. The DHS currently has the capacity to detain a maximum of 39,000 immigrants facing deportation; Mr Trump wants that figure raised to 48,000. Under a decades-old federal court ruling, immigration authorities can detain unaccompanied children for only 20 days before releasing them to family members or other sponsors living in the country. By law asylum-seekers with a “credible fear” of returning home must be released if they do not present a security risk. Despite these constraints, Mr Trump appears determined to proceed with his immigration crackdown. On April 4th he announced plans to deploy 2,000 to 4,000 National Guard troops to the Mexican border to support federal law enforcement. He has continued to tout his achievements. “We’re toughening up at the border” he told a crowd in West Virginia on April 5th. “We’re throwing them out by the hundreds.” Mr Trump may be disappointed to learn that the DHS deported 226,000

individuals in 2017, 14,000 fewer than the previous year. One common critique of immigration and multiculturalism is it will cause Balkanization in the United States.

C: Internal Link - Balkanization has already began, further immigration will worsen thisWoodridge ’18 (Frosty Woodridge, “Immigration Altering The Political DNA Of America”, https://theroperreportsite.wordpress.com/2017/04/15/the-balkanization-of-the-u-s-has-begun/)

In 2017, powerful interests push for blanket amnesty of 12 million and as high as 20 million illegal aliens. The journalist Ann Coulter, in her book Adios America,

counted 31 million illegal aliens residing within America by researching U.S. Census Bureau records. Since 1965, via legal immigration, birth rates and chain-migrated relatives, the United States added 100,000,000 (million) people from 196 countries around the world. If that trend continues on the same path, America expects to add 100,000,000 (million) more people from around the world by 2050. Not mentioned by politicians, those 100 million people from 196 different countries represent 190 different

worldviews, religions, language and cultures. America faces a complete altering of its political and cultural DNA toward millions of immigrants pulling in their own directions, rather than for the American way of life. Foremost among incompatible immigrants, Muslims number 3.3 million today within the United States, but they expect to reach as high as 20 million or more by 2050 at current immigration rates, birth rates and chain migration. A recent Fox News survey recorded that 51 percent of Muslim-Americans demand Sharia Law. As their numbers grow, so does their power to vote Sharia Law into their communities. They create parallel societies within our country, but in defiance of our country. “Islam isn’t in America to be equal to any faith, but to become dominant. The Qur’an should be the highest authority in America, and Islam the only accepted religion on Earth.” Omar Ahmed, director of Council on American Islamic Relations. If Congress allows an illegal alien worker amnesty, America shall suffer 20 million illegal aliens becoming U.S. citizens. That will change the DNA of America to resemble Mexico’s failed society. It will become our first step down toward becoming a Third World country. Mexicans will be able to ‘chain migrate’ entire villages into our country from the poorest, most uneducated peasants that can be exported to

America. They do not speak, act nor are they invested as American citizens. They represent the beachhead of an invading army of foreigners colonizing America. They’re commandeering our school systems across America. Sharon Barrett of Fort Collins, Colorado said, “We left California

because you can’t drive safely without danger of being hit by a Mexican. Our kids couldn’t learn anything in school because of so much language chaos and functional illiteracy. We were vulnerable to home break-ins seven days a week. They steal everything that’s not tied down. They’re bringing the lawlessness from Mexico into the United States. We had to get out.” Samuel Huntington, author of Clash of Civilizations, said, “It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.” What it means if the senate passes a mass amnesty—our country morphs into something other than the United States of America. It will become a ‘Fractured Colony of Mexico…or a Caliphate of the Middle East.” English cannot survive endless immigration. We will no longer remain a lawful sovereign nation. We will most certainly suffer the loss of law and order. Our citizenship will be degraded to the level of foreign people with no identification with our country. For example, Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti, an American politician works for Mexican interests and sanctuary city immunity for illegal aliens. The same continues in Chicago, Detroit, New York City and Denver. Do we want our country to turn into another third world? How about another China like what happened to Vancouver, British Columbia in Canada? Any American excited about the prospects of another Paris, France here in the USA? How about another Sydney, Australia? Or, will we keep degrading ourselves into slum conditions like Bombay, India? How about immigrating ourselves toward a billion people so we can catch up to China’s insane population of 1.35 billion? How many of us want America turned into 100 different languages and still pretend it’s America? Anyone thrilled about more gridlock auto congestion in our cities? How about more acid rain, air pollution and water shortages by adding millions of immigrants? How about higher prices for everything until we’re all reduced to the lower class? “Immigrants devoted to their own cultures and religions are not influenced by the secular politically correct façade that dominates academia, news-media, entertainment, education, religious and political thinking today,” said James Walsh,

former Associate General Counsel of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service. “They claim the right not to assimilate, and the day is coming when the question will be how can the United States regulate the defiantly unassimilated cultures, religions and mores of foreign lands? Such immigrants say their traditions trump the U.S. legal system. Balkanization of the United States has begun.”

D: Impact - Balkanization is a leading cause of division of countries, even striking violenceBriney ’18 (Amanda, “What is Balkanization?” https://www.thoughtco.com/what-is-balkanization-1435451)

In the 1950s and 1960s, balkanization began occurring outside of the Balkans and Europe when several British and French colonial empires

began fragmenting and breaking up in Africa. Balkanization was at its height in the early 1990s however when the Soviet Union collapsed and the former Yugoslavia disintegrated. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries of Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,

Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania (and many others) were created. In the creation of

some of these countries, there was often extreme violence and hostility. For example, Armenia and Azerbaijan do experience periodic war over their borders and ethnic enclaves. In addition to violence in some, all of these newly created countries have experienced difficult periods of transition in their governments, economies, and societies. Yugoslavia was created out of a combination of over 20 different ethnic groups at the end of World War I. As a result of differences between these groups, there were friction and violence in the country. Following World War II, Yugoslavia began to gain more stability but by 1980 the different factions within the country began fighting for more independence. In the early 1990s, Yugoslavia finally disintegrated after around 250,000 people were killed by war. The countries eventually created out of the former Yugoslavia were Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Slovenia, Macedonia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Kosovo did not declare its independence until 2008 and it is still not recognized as fully independent by the entire world. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia are some of the most successful but also the most violent attempts at balkanization that have taken

place. There have also been attempts to balkanize in Kashmir, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, Kurdistan, and Iraq. In each of these areas, there are cultural and/or ethnic differences that have caused different factions to want to break away from the main country. In Kashmir, Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir are trying to break away from India, while in Sri Lanka the Tamil Tigers (a separatist organization for the Tamil people) want to break away from that country. People in the southeastern part of Nigeria declared themselves to be the state of Biafra and in Iraq, Sunni and Shiite Muslims fight to break away from Iraq. In addition, Kurdish people in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran have fought to create the State of Kurdistan. Kurdistan is currently not an independent state but it is rather a region with a mostly Kurdish population…In these instances, it describes potential divisions based political, economic and social differences. Some political commentators in the United States, for example, claim that balkanized or fragmented because it is special interests with elections in specific areas than with governing the entire country (West, 2012). Because of these differences, there have also been some discussions and separatist movements at the national and local levels.

Next to On-Case-Plan - Procedural

Read 1 – Not Both

1. Plan Does Not Specify 2. First Our Interpretation: implementation specification is crucial to affirmative

solvency; they don’t specify so this turns the case.

Janda, Berry, and Goldman 1999 NorthwesternThe Challenge of Democracy Sixth Edition, 1999 p. 434

The development of Policy in Washington is the end of one phase of the policy-making cycle and the beginning of another. After policies have been developed, they must be implemented. Implementation is the process of putting specifics into operation. Ultimately, bureaucrats must convert policies on paper into action. It is important to study implementation, because policies do not always do what they are designed to do. Implementation may be difficult because the details of the policy meant to be carried out have not been clearly stated.

3. Violation: The Affirmative has neglected to specify how the plan will be implemented. 4. As a Standard – This makes the Aff a Moving Target – By not specifying the

implementation the affirmative becomes a moving target because they can change and edit the way their plan is implemented due to neg attacks.

5. This makes this argument specifically a voter and turns solvency – Without specifying implementation then the affirmative cannot prove that the plan can or will be able to achieve its objectives

1. Plan Over Specifies 2. Our Interpretation: The affirmative must defend all 3 branches of the United States

Federal Government. We have definitional support – ‘the’ is a mass noun.American Heritage Dictionary 2000

3. The Violation: The affirmative specifies an agent. 4. Reasons to Prefer our argument is because of ground – specifying allows them to

choose tiny, unpredictable agents that we won’t be prepared to debate and they can strategically change. This allows them to spike out of generic da’s and cp’s because they aren’t even using the federal government anymore.

5. And this argument is a voter for fairness and competitive equity.

Next to Advantage 1Read 1 Card against their advantage 1 – should be able to find this in the case negative file

Next to Advantage 2Read 1 Card against their advantage 2 – should be able to find this in the case negative file

Next to SolvencyRead 1 Card against their solvency – should be able to find this in the case negative file

2NC

My partner and I will be splitting the negative block

I will be taking the Auctions CP, Wages DA, and Case. My partner will take the Effects T, Restrictions T and the Balkanization DA.

First Off is the Counter Plan

Answer the Aff arguments against the CP first1. They said _______, but this is wrong because of ________2. They said _______, but this is wrong because of ________3. They said _______, but this is wrong because of ________

Extend our Plan Text

Extend the CP plan text from the 1NC – The affirmative never addresses directly the plan text of the CP – This means they agree with our plan text and the solvency deficit it creates for the affirmative.

Extend Our Solvency

The counterplan is necessary – it legitimizes immigration and reduces the pressure for unauthorized immigration – results in a reduction of populism while building U.S. leadership

Faizer, 17 [M. Akram Faizer, Professor of Law at Lincoln Memorial University, “America First: Improving a Recalcitrant Immigration and Refugee Policy,” 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 933] -- ef

The U.S. has benefited from immigration in that its population is 72 million higher than it would be but for the enactment of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. n46 The increased population has corresponded with increased racial and ethnic diversity. To illustrate, the proportion of non-Hispanic whites dropped from 84% in 1965 to 62% and, as of 2015, continues to fall,

largely because the Hispanic and Asian populations have grown during this time frame from 4% and 1% to 15% and 6%, respectively. n47 Because of lower fertility in the native-born population, a full 88% of future U.S. population growth will be attributable to immigration and the descendants of these immigrants. n48 This, however, places pressure on a country's absorptive capacity to integrate newcomers, especially when the majority of the population is relatively stagnant with respect to both population and economic productivity and fears cultural and economic displacement. n49 For example, enactment of the 1986 Simpson-Mazzoli Immigration Reform and Control Act, n50 which regularized the status of previously illegal migrants, was facilitated by U.S. economic and population growth, which was 3.5% and 1.7% respectively, under the Reagan Presidency when Islamic fundamentalism and geopolitical [*944] instability were unheard-of problems to most western citizens. n51 The success of President Trump's populist xenophobia is, in turn, attributable to the fact that economic and population growth in post-financial-crisis America are 1.5% and .75%, respectively, in a period of geopolitical instability and fear of political Islam. n52 Furthermore, compared to other developed nations, the U.S. has very high levels of income inequality as measured by a GINI index of 45.0, n53 and socio-economic intergenerational immobility as evidenced by the fact that between 50% and 60% of Americans' relative income is explained by that of their parents. n54 These are far higher measures of inequality than in the U.S's northern neighbor, Canada, which has been lauded for an altogether more welcoming approach to migrants. n55 That said, unlike Canada, which is surrounded by the U.S. and three major oceans, the U.S. is the destination

point of a major migratory route from Central America and Mexico, which explains the unauthorized immigration problem. n56 The 11 million unauthorized immigrants, in conjunction with the fear of Islamic extremism and domestic economic insecurity, are the obvious explanations for domestic disquiet over the issue. Less discussed is how the substantial in-migration of developing-world residents has changed the nation's political culture in a manner that arguably explains much of the backlash that resulted in President Trump's election . This is due to both the [*945] Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 n57 and the insufficiently-acknowledged migration incentives that have resulted in development of the above-referenced migration route. The former effectively ended preference for European immigrants and led to a marked uptick in racial minority immigration. n58 The latter is attributable to relatively strong economic performance in the U.S. compared to the economic and political crises that developed in Mexico and Central American in the 1980s. n59 To illustrate the political consequences, if the same proportion of white voters as compared to racial minority voters that voted for Jimmy Carter in his landslide loss to Ronald Reagan in 1980, voted for Barack Obama in 2012, the popular vote tally in the 2012 election would have been in Mitt Romney's favor. n60 Obama won reelection because the white vote fell from nearly 90% of the electorate in 1980 to approximately 73% in 2012 and continues to fall. n61 A full 73% of Asian Americans and 71% of Hispanics, who comprise 4.5% and 10% of the U.S. voting populations respectively, voted for President Obama in the

2012 presidential election. n62 This, in conjunction with the fact that African Americans overwhelmingly vote for the Democratic Party candidate, meant that President Obama was able to win a decisive electoral college victory and earn more than 51% [*946] of the popular vote while winning only 39% of the white vote. n63 This is a disquieting phenomenon for nativists and conservatives. n64 Indeed, although much of President Trump's support is explained by his demotic characterization of unauthorized immigrants, it would be wrong to conclude that this fully explains his decisive electoral college win. n65 His base expressed understandable disquiet over the previous failure of both major political parties to either enhance border security to prevent continued unauthorized immigration or repatriate the undocumented migrants living in the country. n66 Mass migration has had serious political repercussions. A Pew Research Center study finds that half of Americans want immigration to be reduced and incorrectly blame immigrants for a disproportionate share of the nation's crime and economic problems. n67 This is in spite of the fact non-immigrants have nearly two and three times the incarceration rate of unauthorized

and legal immigrants, respectively. n68 These perceptions vary by immigrants' region of origin, with Americans most likely to hold negative views about immigrants from Latin America and the Middle East . n69 Amid the uproar regarding President [*947] Trump's recent Executive Orders n70 suspending the U.S.'s refugee resettlement program and temporarily banning the entry of individuals from six majority Muslim countries, the political culture has conveniently forgotten how ungenerous the Obama Administration and all rich countries are on this issue. n71 For example, the Obama Administration admitted only 85,000 refugees for the fiscal year ending in September 2016 and planned on admitting only 110,000 for fiscal year 2017, n72 both of which are negligible numbers in view of the scale of the international refugee problem -- e.g. there are an estimated 16 million refugees worldwide n73 and the United States alone is home to approximately 11 million undocumented or illegal economic migrants. n74 The Obama Administration's response to these problems, namely, a refusal to abide by its own "red line" and intervene to stop the Syrian Genocide n75 and a belatedly issued Presidential Executive Order to designate a large subset of undocumented residents as non-deportable, n76 has proven to be both unworkable and counterproductive. The

refugee surge that is affecting Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and the European Union n77 is most likely caused by the effects of global climate change in conjunction with the political consequences

brought about by the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Obama Administration's decision to subsequently disengage from the Middle [*948] East. n78 With respect to unauthorized migration to the U.S., the Obama Administration's failure to obtain a bipartisan immigration compromise was largely attributable to the Democratic Party's failure to disentangle the demand for economic migration from the current immigration and naturalization paradigm as well as the Republican Party's reflexive nativism. This resulted in the issuance of an ineffective Executive Order on the issue, which was enjoined by the federal

courts n79 and still had the parlous consequence of inciting a backlash on the right that facilitated Trump's election as President. How might the federal government have better anticipated and addressed the demand for unauthorized migrants? My argument is

that it could have forthrightly been addressed by a proactive temporary residency and worker program , used in conjunction with development

assistance provision to the sending states of Mexico and Central America. This would have minimized the incentives for unauthorized migration , protected guest workers from the perils of undocumented status and ensured the public that migration-based demographic changes are legitimate . The fact that neither political party pushed for such a program, all the while refusing to provide for either greater border enforcement or stepped-up deportation, facilitated the current populist backlash . Although the U.S. resettles more refugees than any other developed country n80 and has resettled more than 3 million persons since 1975, n81 its expected refugee resettlement number of 50,000 n82 this year is relatively minuscule and inadequate in view of the total number of refugees and displaced persons worldwide. The fact that a non-existent threat from Syrian refugees was seized upon by the President to temporarily suspend the U.S. Refugee Assistance Program n83 evidences that the disquiet felt about Islam and unauthorized migration has superimposed itself onto the refugee [*949] crisis and

demands a response. The response, however, should recognize that concerns about migration's consequences are legitimate while allowing for expanded migration so that the U.S. can maintain its moral authority as the world's leading nation and fulfill its obligation to help with the problems confronting international migrants .

Next Off is the Net Benefit – our Brain Drain DA

Answer the Aff arguments against the Wages DA first

1. They said _______, they are wrong because _________2. They said_______, they are wrong because _________3. They said_______, they are wrong because _________

China is attracting talent now- status quo trending toward reverse brain drainCCG in 2017Centre for China and Globalization (CCG), Attracting skilled international migrants to China： A review and comparison of policies and practices, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---ilo-beijing/documents/publication/wcms_565474.pdf

Up until recently, developing countries like China and India had mainly served as sources of highly qualified talent, especially in the science and engineering fields. Young people from these developing economies would receive engineering and science degrees in North America, Europe, or Australia and then remain in those regions for their future career. This one-way flow of talent from emerging to

developed economies became known as the “brain drain”. This century, as the governments of countries like China and India began to initiate major programmes for attracting their best and brightest talent back home , a general trend of “reverse brain drain” has started to emerge. For instance, India aims at attracting its large pool of overseas diaspora talent through measures like the Overseas Citizenship of India card (OCI card), which grants Indian returnees numerous rights and privileges that are equivalent to citizens. As of March 2009, the Indian Government had handed out approximately 400,000 OCI cards, with nearly half (43 per cent) of them being distributed through Indian consulates in the United States (Wogart and Schüller, 2011). Growth in distribution has accelerated since then, and in 2012 alone, 1,029,131 OCI cards were issued by the

Indian Government (Lum, 2015). China has been energetically courting overseas Chinese talent with national initiatives, such as the “Thousand Talents Programme” as well as numerous provincial and local-level talent attraction plans, which will be discussed in detail in sections 3.2.2and 3.2.3 below. Bolstered by rapid economic growth rates, these initiatives have attracted large numbers of overseas Chinese back to mainland China (H. Wang and Bao, 2015).

Temporary resident status mitigates the effects of brain drain globally Faizer, 17 [M. Akram Faizer, Professor of Law at Lincoln Memorial University, “America First: Improving a Recalcitrant Immigration and Refugee Policy,” 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 933] -- ef

Another benefit of granting migrants temporary status as opposed to permanent residency is that it would mitigate the baneful consequences of "brain drain" from the developing world. n174 An everincreasing [*967] number of persons with post-secondary education from developing nations now live permanently in rich-world countries. n175 To illustrate, African countries lose 20,000 skilled personnel to the developed world each year. n176 That means that Africa is continuously losing people who might improve public health and foster economic development, democratization, and government

accountability. Although the solution to the brain-drain phenomenon is not simple and does not lie in closing off access to rich-world labor markets, it requires taking steps to ensure migrants remain

invested in their countries of origin by providing them only temporary residency in developed nations as much as feasible. To conjecture, Mexico's economy and democracy would be better placed today if the Mexicans who migrated to the U.S. in previous generations had remained invested in Mexico's development. T he same could be said of North and West Africans in France and South Asians in the U.K. By limiting migrants to temporary visas, rich world governments can help foster democratization and economic development in the Global South that, in view of the population disparities between the Global North and South, would be an obvious improvement in global well-being.

Now to our Impact Cal: (weigh the impact of this DA against the impacts of the aff)

1. Probability - 2. Time Frame - 3. Magnitude -

Next to Case

On the Plan Text - ProceduralRead one of the procedurals from the 1NC on the plan text only if your partner was

unable to get to it.

On Advantage 1:Make analytical arguments against advantage 1 here.Read 3 Cards against their advantage 1 – should be able to find this in the case negative file

On Advantage 2:Make analytical arguments against advantage 2 here.Read 3 Cards against their advantage 2 – should be able to find this in the case negative file

On Solvency:Use the remainder of your time to read as many cards against solvency as possible. Should be able to find this in the case negative file

1NR

My partner and I will be splitting the negative block

I will be taking the Effects T, Restrictions T and the Balkanization DA.

First Off if Effects T

1. Answer the arguments the affirmative said on the interpretation. (If affirmative never addressed Effects T say – “At the moment the affirmative drops topicality, you must sign your ballot for the negative – Topicality is an A-priority issue. Vote negative.”)

2. Extend our Interpretation that’s the Public Law 87-253 card that states reduction is a net decrease not offset by expansion .

3. Answer the arguments the affirmative said on the violation. 4. Extend our Violation: the plan does not directly decrease restrictions on legal

immigration.5. Answer the arguments the affirmative said on the violation. 6. Extend our standards of Limits, Aff burden and Vacuum Test. –Plan has been proven

non-topical because the plan is effects T thus the plan is untopical and must be voted against.

7. Extend our voters of A Priori, Fairness, and Education

Next off is the Restrictions T

1. Answer the arguments the affirmative said on the interpretation. (If affirmative never addressed Restrictions T say – “At the moment the affirmative drops topicality, you must sign your ballot for the negative – Topicality is an A-priority issue. Vote negative.”)

2. Extend our Interpretation - Restrictions means a (plural) collection of restrictions – that’s our Wordhippo 19 card – which states it means “a collection of restrictions – a plural form of restriction. ”

3. Answer the arguments the affirmative made on our violation. 4. Extend our violation - The affirmative team is not reducing a collection of

restrictions, only reducing one or none5. Answer the arguments the affirmative made on our violation. 6. Extend our standards of Bright Line and Grammatical Context – we must draw a clear

distinction between what is topical and what is not.

7. Extend our voters of Debatability ansd Jurisdiction

Next Off is the Balkanization DA

Answer the Aff arguments against the Balkanization DA first

1. They said _______, they are wrong because _________2. They said_______, they are wrong because _________3. They said_______, they are wrong because _________

Extend our 1NC evidence of the Balkanization DA that was never adequately answered by the affirmative. Please extend our Hauslohner and Tran ’18, Qui 18, Woodridge ’18, Briney ’18 evidence. This DA is saying that the affirmative plan will cause Balkanization in the United States. America is currently facing a complete altering of its political and cultural DNA toward millions of immigrants pulling things in their own directions, rather than promoting the American way of life. As a result of the affirmative plan, the division of America is imminent which will cause extreme violence and hostility

Latino and African American conflicts are proof of small scale balkanization, leading to go onto a larger scale. Immigrant minority groups, particularly between hispanic and african-americans sparks balknaization and conflict among the two. Boyle Heights

shows. Mather, ‘17 https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-ramona-hate-crime-20160707-snap-story.html

Seven Latino immigrants have been charged with firebombing the homes of black families living in a Boyle Heights

housing project, an attack that federal prosecutors allege was designed to drive African Americans out of the

neighborhood. A federal indictment unsealed Thursday describes how the the suspects allegedly planned and

carried out the May 12, 2014, attack, which came at time when black families were increasingly moving

back into the Ramona Gardens public housing complex after previous violence that prompted most African

Americans to flee.

Prosecutors allege that the men broke the apartment windows before hurling Molotov cocktails inside – a move designed

to "maximize damage" – and struck homes where families, including children, were inside. Three of the four

apartments were occupied by black families.

Balkanization resulted in New York due to large influxes of Irish and Italian immigrants.Moses 15 https://www.newsday.com/opinion/oped/a-migration-marred-by-tension-rivalry-1.10580274

The Irish and Italian immigrants to New York had much in common despite differences in language and

custom. They were people of the periphery who suffered from poverty and exploitive governance. They shared a religion in Catholicism, and work experience

that consisted mostly of the heavy lifting needed for farm labor. Yet they clashed in New York. Construction sites, parish

churches, union halls, the police station, the waterfront: All became arenas for Irish-Italian conflict in

the late 19th century and well into the 20th century.

When the Italians arrived in large numbers in New York starting around 1880, the Irish were established. A sign of

that success was the election of William R. Grace as the city's first Irish-Catholic mayor in 1880. But many of the Irish remained

impoverished and tempers flared when Italians competed for jobs as laborers, willing to work longer days for less

money. The workers' fights became so common that the Brooklyn Eagle editorialized, "Can't they be

separated?" With that rivalry in the background, even the church became an arena for conflict. Rather than try to unify the

congregations, Irish-American pastors found it better to make the Italians worship in the church basement,

stirring resentment and even some pointed words from the Vatican.

Prosecutors allege that the men broke the apartment windows before hurling Molotov cocktails inside – a move designed

to "maximize damage" – and struck homes where families, including children, were inside. Three of the four

apartments were occupied by black families.

Balkanization kills disaster infrastructure- magnifies natural disastersToor ’13 (Toor joined The Verge in April 2012. He has also worked as a consultant at the OECD in Paris and at Miramax in Santa Monica. **Cites Sascha Meinrath, the director of the New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute, and Allan Friedman, the Director of Cybersecurity Initiatives at National Telecommunications and Information Administration in the US Department of Commerce. “Will the global NSA backlash break the internet?” http://www.theverge.com/2013/11/8/5080554/nsa-backlash-brazil-germany-raises-fears-of-internet-balkanization)

"The network experience is key," says Leslie Daigle, chief technology officer at the Internet Society. "Increased Balkanization is typically correlated with less diversity of offerings, less diversity of support infrastructure, and fewer interconnects with other parts of the [internet]." Such interconnectedness, she adds, has proven particularly valuable in times of crisis. "When we've seen natural disasters hit countries, it's diversity of infrastructure that has meant those countries were not entirely wiped off the internet map , " Daigle says in an email to The Verge. "When there was an earthquake and tsunami in Japan, there was network damage but that meant slower connections, not complete lack of connection."

The biggest thing is to answer the affirmative arguments – extend evidence already read and provide an impact calculus.

Next to Impact Calculus - (Explain how the impacts of this Disadvantage outweigh the affirmative’s disadvantages) Prefer the negative impacts of the Balkinzation DA to the negative impacts. Our impacts outweigh the affirmative’s on: Probability – (explain in your own words), Time-Frame – (explain in your own words), Magnitude – (explain in your own words).

2NR

Note – Go for whatever you’re winning – But, typically here – you should go for

Temporary CP, Brain Drain DA and then two major on-case category like

Advantages or Solvency. Just make sure you tell the judge how you’re winning and

what arguments you’re winning. You shouldn’t be reading a lot of evidence

here. Just going back over and summarizing the arguments you’re

winning.

Ext Effects T – If going for Effects T - Make sure you are extending the interpretation – violation – standards – voters and explain how you’re winning in your own words.

Ext Restrictions T – If going for Restrictions T - Make sure you are extending the interpretation – violation – standards – voters and explain how you’re winning in your own words.

Ext Counter PlanThe biggest thing to consider here is to answer the affirmative arguments and to extend arguments already made. Please extend the CP by saying in your own words how the CP captures the affirmative advantages before.

SOLVENCY

2nc – at: lpr key – top level*this answers both the circumvention (Abrego & Lakhani) and the uncertainty deficits

None of their evidence assumes the counterplan – creates a new temporary residency status with the same benefits and protections as the plan – only difference is permanence – BUT recent studies prove even lesser forms are still sufficient to solve – despite the uncertainty of renewal and attempts to circumventMenjívar 17 (Cecilia Menjívar, Ph.D., Department of Sociology, University of Kansas, “Temporary Protected Status in The United States: The Experiences of Honduran and Salvadoran Immigrants,” Center for Migration Research, University of Kansas, May 2017, https://www.wola.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/TPS_REPORT_FINAL.pdf DOA 7-27-2018)KMM

Executive Summary This report presents findings from a nationwide survey of immigrants holding Temporary Protected Status ( TPS ) . In

collaboration with CARECEN-Los Angeles, NDLON and other organizations, the Center for Migration Research (CMR) at the University of Kansas designed and administered a randomized telephone survey and in-person survey of 2,098 respondents (Men 53.7%, Women 46.3%) from El Salvador (92.3%), Honduras (7.5%), and Nicaragua (0.2%). The survey was conducted in Spanish during the period April, 2016 to

August, 2016 in the six cities with the largest populations of Central Americans: Los Angeles (34.1%), Houston (28.7%), Washington (21.0%), San Francisco (9.4%), New York (4.9%), and New Jersey (1.9%). Survey results indicate that generally, TPS has contributed positively to the socioeconomic integration of these immigrants and therefore this legal status has benefitted these immigrants , their families and society in general . Key findings include: TPS holders have significantly high levels of labor force participation: 94.0% of men and 82.1% are working, with 83.2% of men and 54.9% of women working more than 40 hours per week, and 7.6% of men and 10.0% of women working more than one job. About one tenth of survey respondents were self-employed (men 13.4%, women 7.8%). Men work in construction/painting (18.9%), driving (9.3%), cleaning (6.3%), cooking (3.2%), gardening (2.8%), while women concentrate in cleaning buildings (16.5%) or houses (12.2%), childcare (7.6%), cooking (6.0%), or in clothing manufacture (5.8%). The average monthly income of the survey respondents is $2,909.87 (men=$3,597.64; women=$2,054.31) 33.6% of men and 29.94% of women in the survey live in owner-occupied homes in the United States. The average educational level of the survey respondents at the time they arrived in the United States was 7.64 years; however, 49.2% of them have furthered their education in the United States, enrolling in at least one educational program, such as English language courses (36.4%), high school diploma or GED (9.6%), vocational certificate (4.9%), college courses (1.6%), and university (1.0%) 29.7% of the survey respondents volunteered in civic organizations, committees, or community groups in the 12 months prior to the survey, showing high levels of social integration. In addition, 20.2% engaged in activities to benefit to their community including donating blood, cleaning streets, etc. 80.3% of survey respondents pay income taxes, including 79.3% of those who are self-employed. They have contributed to social security for an avg. of 15.4 years and 90% file taxes every year. [TABLE OF CONTENTS OMITTED] What is Temporary Protected Status? According to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (2017) a country may be designated for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) when conditions in that country temporarily prevent the country’s nationals from returning safely, or under certain circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the return of its nationals adequately. The Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS) may designate a country for TPS if there is ongoing armed conflict in that country, if an environmental disaster or an epidemic has occurred there, or for other extraordinary and temporary conditions. During the designated period, TPS beneficiaries are not removable from the United States, can obtain employment authorization (EAD), and in principle may be granted travel authorization, though this is very rarely used. Unlike undocumented immigrants, TPS beneficiaries cannot be detained by DHS on the basis of their legal status. However, unlike other forms of permanent legal residence, TPS is a temporary benefit that does not lead to lawful permanent residence status or any other immigration status (United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 2017). Importantly, TPS is only granted if it is consistent with U.S. national interests (Segerblom 2007; Seghetti, Ester, and Wasem 2015) and, contrary to refugee or asylum status, TPS is granted based on country conditions, not on individual situations (Bergeron 2014). In practice, as Fitzpatrick (2000:280) observes, TPS “expands the protection of forced migrants who cannot satisfy the criteria [of refugee or asylum status]…it promises group-based protection when the determination of an individual’s status proves impossible… TP[S] serves as a short-term strategy to secure the immediate physical safety of refugees and a way station to more durable protection.” As such, TPS allows for the creation of international ties, solidarity, and political treaties between nations. And according to refugee law under the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHRC), temporary protection helps countries fulfill remedial obligations to other states that have provoked human rights violations and victims of flight (Fitzpatrick 2000; Golay 2001). Countries of Western Europe, Australia and others have created temporary protection statuses at different times for various groups as a result of: (1) armed conflicts, (2) internal strife, (3) systematic human rights violations, or (4) natural disaster (United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 2014). However, the mechanisms that make TPS possible and its requirements make it difficult for beneficiaries to incorporate in the host countries, an aspect that highlights the temporariness of this designation. Research has found that the in-between legality of immigrants in temporary statuses (e.g., not undocumented but not permanent legal residence either) and the embedded ambiguity inherent in these statuses is reflected in the experiences of immigrants who hold them ( Abrego and Lakhani 2015 ; Gonzales 2016; Menjívar 2006). Although research has found that these immigrants share uncertainties and face barriers similar to those that undocumented immigrants also encounter, TPS holders’ experiences can differ from those of undocumented immigrants as well as from those of permanent residents (Bergeron 2014; Cebulko 2014; Menjívar 2006). A temporary status affects immigrants’ sense of belonging in society and process of socioeconomic integration. TPS holders are able to access economic opportunities they would otherwise be ineligible for, but the temporariness of the status can hinder other forms of more stable integration . That is, “TPS confers partial inclusion while simultaneously affirming that this status is temporary and partial” (Waters and Gernstein Pineau 2016:140). Temporary Protected Status in the United States [TBALE 1 OMITTED] Salvadorans and Hondurans on TPS: A Background The Immigration Act of 1990 authorized the creation of TPS. The U.S. Congress designated El Salvador as the first country whose nationals could apply for TPS (Chishti and Yale-Loehr 2016), a decision based on the civil war raging in that country at the time. This new status included important limitations: individuals applying for TPS had to already be in the United States; they could not apply for this benefit overseas. An applicant also had to meet the following requirements: continued residence in the United States, no felony convictions, not more than two misdemeanors committed in the United States, not pose a national security threat, and the person registered and reapplied for continuous status during a stipulated timeframe (Chishti and Yale-Loehr 2016). Since 1990, the requirements to apply, process, and maintain TPS have remained the same. According to estimates by the Migration Policy Institute (2016) there are approximately 323,000 immigrants on TPS at the moment; they make up approximately 4% of the U.S. foreignborn population (Passel and Cohn 2016a). The overwhelming majority of those on TPS are nationals of El Salvador (204,000) and Honduras (61,000). Other designated countries at the moment include Haiti (50,000), Syria (10,000), Liberia (4,000), and Nicaragua (2,800). Smaller numbers of recipients come from Nepal, Yemen, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Guinea are also included (Argueta and Wasem 2016; Chishti and Yale-Loehr 2016; Seghetti et al. 2015). TPS is temporary, granted for a designated time period usually lasting between 6 to 18 months and can be extended if country conditions do not change (Bergeron 2014; Seghetti et al. 2015). And TPS does not lead to permanent residency or citizenship. Thus, unlike family reunification visas, TPS holders are unable to sponsor family members, and in contrast to refugees or those granted asylum, TPS beneficiaries do not receive settlement aid nor qualify for public assistance benefits (Kerwin 2014). However, they are eligible for emergency Medicaid, public health programs (e.g. immunizations), disaster relief, reduced lunch programs, and public K-12 education (Kerwin 2014). The only way that TPS holders can be adjusted to legal permanent residency is through an affirmative supermajority vote in the Senate (involving 3/5ths of all Senators), given an Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provision for TPS (Kerwin 2014; Seghetti et al. 2015). The first TPS designation for Salvadorans expired in 1992, but after the 12-year civil war ended country conditions did not change and a weakened economy did not recover. TPS holders, therefore, were granted another form of temporary relief, “deferred enforcement departure” (DED), which lasted until 1995. In January 2001 El Salvador suffered two deadly earthquakes, which prompted the U.S. government to once again designate El Salvador for TPS. An estimated 290,000 Salvadorans already present in the United States at the time were granted TPS, but according to estimates this number has declined to approximately 204,000 by 2015 (Orrenius and Zavodny 2015). Salvadoran TPS holders have had continuous presence in the country since March, 2001 and TPS has been expanded for them nine times. Hondurans on TPS have been on this status consecutively longer than any other designated group. In October 1998, Hurricane Mitch left extensive devastation in Honduras, including an estimated 1.5 million homeless (out of approximately 6 million people at the time), entire villages destroyed, and billions of dollars in damages. The U.S. Congress designated Hondurans for TPS and according to estimates initially approximately 105,000 Hondurans benefited but the number has declined to approximately 61,000 today (Magaña-Salgado 2016). TPS has been renewed 10 times for Hondurans. As is the case for Salvadorans, Hondurans have had continuous presence in the United States, since January 1999. Who are the TPS holders? Even though Salvadorans and Hondurans have held TPS status for a decade and a half, little is known about their experiences. This is in part due to the lack of publically available data on this population. However, some extant research points to the benefits of this status, in particular protection from deportation. Research has shown that the threat of deportation has significant consequences to immigrants and their families, ranging from alterations in everyday routines, low wages and work exploitation, economic instability, mental and physical health downturns, decreases in educational attainment and cognitive development for children, and indefinite family separations (Aranda, Menjívar, and Donato 2014; Brabeck and Xu 2010; Dreby 2015; Gonzalez and Chaves 2012; Hagan, Castro, and Rodriguez 2010; Hasselberg 2016). Furthermore, TPS gives immigrants access to a social security number and a work permit, which allows immigrants to obtain driver’s licenses and other state-regulated licenses, leading to access to jobs with certain degree of mobility and to participate in society’s institutions and civic organizations. Undoubtedly, TPS has provided immigrants with certain opportunities to expand their economic and social contributions to society that undocumented immigrants do not have. Salvadoran and Honduran TPS holders comprise over 80% of the TPS population; they also make up 16 % of the Salvadoran population and 11.5% of the Honduran population in the United States today. These two groups are also the national-origin groups with the longest TPS tenure—17 years for Hondurans and 16 years for Salvadorans. Noteworthy, they have lived in the United States for much longer, for an average of 20 years, since TPS registration required that applicants already reside in the United States at the time of application. And the TPS program does not allow new entrants; thus, everyone on TPS today registered during a specified time period when the countries were designated. With a median age for TPS holders of 42 years, the average TPS holder has spent one third of their lives on TPS. This long-term settlement has allowed these TPS holders to become dynamic members of their communities and active contributors to the nation’s coffers. Based on a national-level telephone survey of 2,098 respondents in the five U.S. regions with the largest concentration of Salvadoran and Honduran immigrants, this report presents their demographic profile, educational background, economic activities and contributions, community involvement, and some of the effects and benefits of having TPS in the United States. Data Collection We determined the population of Central Americans to survey for this study using the U.S. Census. With data from the U.S. Census we identified the largest concentrations of Salvadorans and Hondurans in the country, assuming that TPS holders would live in the same geographic areas. Thus, we selected the top six metropolitan areas with the largest populations of Salvadorans and Hondurans: Los Angeles, San Francisco, Houston, Washington D.C., New York and New Jersey. We did not select the Miami area because although it has a high concentration of Hondurans it has far fewer Salvadorans and TPS holders are not as represented in Miami as they are in the other regions of the survey. Without a sampling frame from which to select a sample of TPS holders to survey in those regions, we turned to community organizations that work with Central American communities to enlist their assistance in this effort. They were critical in two ways: They provided lists of TPS holders from which we selected survey participants. Equally important, they also enrolled volunteers to conduct the survey. These organizations include the Central American Resource Center (CARECEN), Red Nacional de Salvadoreños en el Exterior (RENASE), and Wind of the Spirit. We also obtained assistance from Salvadoran consulates. Some of these organizations, like CARECEN, provide legal services and assist individuals with TPS renewals every 18 months, maintaining lists of the people they serve. However, we also obtained assistance from community organizations that do not provide direct legal

services to TPS holders; in these cases, they worked in collaboration with local Salvadoran consulates to select potential survey participants from list of registrants that the consulates maintain. The table below shows what organization participated in each city, indicating whether they are a direct service organization, the total number of volunteers in each city, and the total number of surveys collected there. [TABLE 2 OMITTED] Each list of TPS holders was randomized and the selection proceeded with an interval=5, that is, every fifth name was selected, determined as an optimal N to be secured based on the total number of names on each list1, a compromise on the selection procedure that can still allow us to conduct statistical analysis. The selected names were then placed on a calling list for the telephone survey. Volunteers, TPS holders themselves, who were trained in administering the survey as well as in human subjects protocols and the ethics of conducting research,2 then called each person on the selected list and recorded whether the person participated, declined to participate, if a voicemail was left, or if that person was unreachable. Potential participants who were marked as unreachable were tried again up to total of 3 attempts. If by the 3rd attempt the potential participant was still unreachable, they were taken off the calling list. Some potential participants doubted the legitimacy of the survey and visited the organization in person to verify that the request for participation was not a scam. These few individuals completed the survey in person. Furthermore, some organizations came across some obstacles to complete the survey over the phone and thus opted for interviewing individuals as they came to the organization to obtain assistance to renew their TPS. For those who agreed to participate, a letter of consent describing their rights and including contact information for Dr. Cecilia Menjívar was read to them before beginning with the survey. Once the surveys were completed, they were mailed to the coordinator at CARECEN-Los Angeles to review for completeness. Once reviewed, the surveys were mailed to the University of Kansas for data entering and management. 1. Demographic Profile Given that the goal of the survey was to capture the largest TPS population, 92.3% of the survey participants originated in El Salvador and 7.5% in Honduras. As indicated earlier, the survey was conducted in five regions with large concentrations of these immigrants: Houston, Los Angeles, New York/New Jersey region, San Francisco, and the Washington D.C. region However, the majority of the survey participants lived either in Houston (28.7%) or Los Angeles (34.1%), which conforms with settlement patterns of Salvadorans in the United States (Lopez 2015), who make up the majority of TPS holders. Of the 2,098 survey participants, the majority (53.7%) were men. The median age of TPS holders in the study was 43 years (42 for men, 43 for women), a group older than both the undocumented population and the immigrant population with permanent legal status (both have a median age of 36.1 years) (Taylor, Lopez, and Motel 2011), and older than the U.S. population in general, with a median age of 37 years (Lopez 2015). 3 [TABLE 3 OMITTED] The majority of TPS holders were married (40.7% total), a rate lower than among the general U.S. population (48.2%) (U.S. Census Bureau 2015a). Among TPS holders, more men (44.2%) than women (36.6%) were married; the marriage rate for women among TPS holders is lower than that of women in the general U.S. population (46.5%) (U.S. Census Bureau 2015a). Overall, 36% of TPS holders were single, but this rate was higher among women (42%) than among men (30%). This is comparable to the general U.S. population, among whom 30% live in single-person households, but higher than legal immigrants (17%) and undocumented immigrants (13%) who live in single-person households (Immigration Council 2014; Passel and Cohn 2009). Thus, TPS holders have lower rates of marriage than the U.S-born population, and also have higher rates of singlehood than the U.S.-born population, authorized immigrants, and undocumented immigrants. 4 About 13% of TPS holders were cohabiting, a pattern that was more common among men (16%) than among women (10%). These cohabiting patterns mirror those in the countries of origin as well as among Latinos in the United States. With respect to family composition, most TPS survey participants (86.3%) had at least one child, but on average they had between two and three children. This rate is higher than among unauthorized immigrants (46%), authorized adult immigrant (38%), or among the U.S.- born population (29%) (Taylor et al. 2011), which may be related to TPS holders being older than any of the other comparison groups. TPS Holders’ Families Sixty-one percent of TPS respondents had all of their children living in the United States; however, women were slightly more likely to have all of their children living in the United States than were men. On the other hand, 24% of TPS holders had either some or all of their children living outside of the United States. Specifically, 9.5% of men and 6.9% of women had all of their children abroad, while 14.9% of men and 18.4% of women had at least one child living in a different country. Although the majority of participants’ children living abroad were older than 21 years of age, we must take into account that the TPS holders’ average time spent living in the United States is over a decade and a half. Therefore, the majority of TPS holders who have children living abroad most likely left their children while they were young. These parents have been separated from their children for a significant part of the children’s lives. The long-term separations in these families and the uncertainty of not knowing when they will see each other again, has created conditions for TPS holders to create new families in the United States (Menjívar 2006). Many TPS holders live in mixed-status families, with 61% having at least one child born in the U.S. (among those with children). The length of time spent living in the U.S. (16 years among Hondurans and 15 years for Salvadorans) and the formation of these new families, with almost two thirds having a U.S-born child, means that TPS holders are rooted and settled in the United States and socially integrated in their communities across the country. 2. Education [TABLE 5 OMITTED] The average level of education TPS holders obtained in their country of origin before migration is between 7th and 8th grade, a reflection of the constraints to accessing education that prevail in the origin countries. However, about half of TPS holders continued some form of education after arriving in the United States. For instance, about 36.4% enrolled in English courses, 9.6% finished high school or obtained a GED, 4.9% obtained a certificate, and about 2.6% enrolled in some college or obtained a college degree. Whereas there are small differences between women and men’s educational attainment, this gender variation is important to note because it may impact the jobs that TPS holders can obtain. Thus, women showed higher involvement in higher education, English classes or certificates than men, while slightly more men finished high school or their GED. The lower educational levels of TPS holders are comparable to those of Salvadorans living in the U.S., who tend to have lower education levels than other Latinos and other groups in the United States (Lopez 2015). The general educational levels for TPS holders are also similar to those of undocumented immigrants; in 2009, 47% of undocumented immigrant adults ages 25-64 had less than a high school education, compared to 8% of U.S.-born residents of the same age (Passel and Cohn 2009). 3. Economic Activities [TABLE 6 OMITTED] economy (see Orrenius and Zavodny 2015). The overall labor force participation rate of TPS holders is 88.5%, much higher than the 62.9 % in the U.S. population (Buerau of Labor Statistics 2017). With regard to labor force participation by gender, the overwhelming majority of men TPS holders, 93.9%, are currently working. This rate is higher than any of the other comparison groups. For instance, 91% of undocumented immigrant men, 79% of U.S.-born men, and 84% of lawful immigrants of similar age were in the labor force in 2014 (Passel and Cohn 2016). Women TPS holders have similarly high levels of labor force participation; 82.1% of them are currently working, a rate also higher than among other comparison groups. For instance, 61% of undocumented immigrant women, 72% of U.S.-born women, and 67% of lawful immigrant women were in the labor force in 2014 (Passel and Cohn 2016). Thus, overall, TPS holders’ labor force participation rate is significantly higher than that of the general U.S. population and higher than among other immigrant groups, both authorized and undocumented. Reflecting their active labor force participation both women and men TPS holders have had between 4 and 5 jobs since they arrived to the United States. The majority of TPS holders only have one job at present; 85% of men and 71.1% of women had one job at the time of the survey. However, among those who had more than one job, there is a gender difference: More women (8.6% of women) than men (6.6%) had two jobs. This difference could be due to the fact that women have a higher rate of part-time work and thus they often stitch together various jobs in order to earn what full-time work would generate, a situation observed in other immigrant-receiving contexts (see Menjívar 2000). Men TPS holders make approximately $3,597.64 a month while women make $2,054, a monthly income that is slightly higher than that of other Hispanics (Lopez 2015), but considerably less than median U.S. earnings. According to the ACS, the median annual household income is $53,889, which works out to approximately $4,500 a month (U.S. Census Bureau 2015c). And although TPS holders work in a variety of sectors and occupations, there are concentrations by gender. For instance, 23% men concentrate in construction; almost 14% work in driving and delivery, and approximately 8% work as dishwashers or cleaning offices or buildings. However, approximately 25.7% of men reported an “other” occupation, which comprises factory work. Among women, almost 17% work cleaning offices or buildings, approximately 18% work in childcare or cleaning houses, and close to 23% reported “other” occupations. TPS holders are likely to put in long hours at work. While the majority work between 40-45 hours per week, women are more likely to work part-time; 24.7% of women worked 39 hours or less compared to only 8% of men. And men are more likely than women to work overtime (we define overtime as 46 hours of work per week). Thus, 52.75% of men reported working between 40 and 45 hours a week and 43.42% of women reported working those hours. In comparison, in the U.S. population in general, in 2015 the average number of hours men worked was 41 hours whereas women worked 36.2 hours per week (Pew Research Center 2016). TPS holders remit regularly, contributing to their families and to maintain their countries’ economies afloat. Approximately 77% of all TPS holders send remittances to their home country. Men send on average $303 per month and women send on average $226 per month. The lower remitted amount by women likely reflects their lower earnings. However, while men send approximately 8% of their monthly wages, women remit about 11% of their monthly earnings. [TABLE 7 OMITTED] One of the most significant benefits of having TPS is obtaining a work permit. As Orrenius and Zavodny (2015) found, having TPS had a significant impact on Salvadorans’ labor force participation. Looking at pre- and post-TPS Salvadorans, the authors examined whether obtaining TPS aids Salvadorans in obtaining better wages or having better jobs compared to other Salvadorans who are not eligible for TPS and are undocumented. Orrenius and Zavodny’s (2015) findings show that TPS leads to higher earnings for men and higher employment for women. Specifically, employed Salvadoran men with TPS are likely to earn about 13% more than those who do not have TPS. Furthermore, TPS holders are able to be more selective in the kinds of jobs they secure. Women who are employed and have TPS are also likely to work more than women who do not have TPS. Thus, as Orrenius and Zavodny found, even having a temporary permit increases the likelihood of better wages and employment. The findings we report here are consistent with this earlier conclusion. [TABLE 8 OMITTED] Thus, although TPS has had positive effects, particularly on its beneficiaries’ ability to secure employment and better paying jobs, it should be noted that TPS holders remain susceptible to worker exploitation. Temporary statuses are sometimes little understood, in government offices as well as in the workplace; often employers mistakenly understand TPS to be undocumented status because beneficiaries cannot show a green card. As such, some employers assume that it is a status incompatible with workers’ rights even though all workers have rights. Thus, misunderstandings about a temporary legal status may leave TPS workers vulnerable to mistreatment in the workplace. In this survey, about 7% of TPS holders mentioned that their boss did not pay them on time in the 12 months prior to the survey, and almost 11% indicated that their boss paid them less than what they were supposed to be paid. About 6.4% described having an injury at work, and fewer than 3% described having to leave their job due to an injury in the 12 months prior to the survey. Finally about 2.8% of the respondents described that their boss owed them wages. Workplace violations that we identified among TPS respondents are similar those that undocumented immigrants have been found to experience (see Hall and Greenman 2015). For instance, in a national study of workplace violations in several occupations and economic sectors, Bernhardt et al. (2009) found that foreign-born Latino workers had the highest minimum wage violation rates of any racial or ethnic group. 4. Taxes & Contributions [TABLE 9 OMITTED] The overwhelming majority of TPS holders, 80.3%, pay income taxes, including 79.3% of those who are self-employed. And TPS holders have contributed to social security for an average of 15.4 years, making contributions since they obtained TPS status. And 90% of TPS holders reported having filed income taxes every year in the three years prior to the survey. The ability to pay taxes and make more contributions to the nation’s coffers that a more stable legal status affords translates into contributions to the economy. It also represents a social investment that TPS holders are able to make as they become more socioeconomically integrated in society. 5. Health Insurance TPS also allows access to medical health insurance. In our survey 76.5% of TPS holders had some form of medical insurance. The majority (38.3%) obtained insurance through their job, others acquired coverage through their partners (5%) or through their parents (.2%), the Affordable Care Act (7.7%), or other sources (24.7%). The percentage of uninsured TPS holders (22.3%) is more than double that of the uninsured in the general population ages 18-64 in the U.S. (12.8%) (Center for Disease Control and Prevention 2016). According to the ACS, 81.9% of adults between 18 and 64 are insured (85.7% men and 88.3% women) (U.S. Census Bureau 2015b). Importantly, the proportion of uninsured TPS holders (22.3%) in our survey is similar to the proportion of uninsured lawful permanent residents (23%) in 2014 (post-ACA), lower than among the undocumented (40%) (as the undocumented are ineligible to purchase coverage through the ACA or other forms of medical insurance), but higher than among U.S. citizens (10%) (Artiga et al. 2016). Therefore, reflecting their ‘inbetween’ status, rates of insured TPS holders fall between those of the undocumented and the general U.S. population. Access to health care is another area where TPS provides a benefit to the individuals and alleviates pressure on the health care system. By allowing TPS holders access to the opportunity to purchase health coverage they become insured. Thus, access to health insurance serves as a preventive measure. For instance, only 15% of TPS holders in this study had been in the emergency room in the 12 months prior to the survey interview. This rate varies by gender, as more women (20%) than men (10.7%) had been to the emergency room in the last 12 months prior to the interview. [TABLE 10 OMITTED] 6. Community Settlement and Involvement An important indicator of immigrant settlement in the country is homeownership. Homeownership is a marker of economic mobility and incorporation; it also signals social embeddedness, membership, and a commitment to the neighborhood, city and country, as homeowners are considered to be connected members of their communities (Castillo 2014). Homeownership conveys the will to create a permanent group and stable social relations (Bourdieu 2005). And as Castillo (2014) observes, homeownership is deeply rooted in American culture, and for immigrants it may create better opportunities for themselves and their families. For TPS holders then homeownership is an economic indicator but also a sign of belonging and membership. Almost 32% of TPS holders in our survey own their home, which is half of the proportion of homeowners in the general U.S. population (64%) and slightly less than Hispanic homeowners (38%) (Lopez 2015). Furthermore, research has shown that undocumented immigrants are less likely to own a home (McConnell 2015) than documented immigrants (Hall and Greenman 2013). Given that TPS is a temporary status, therefore, the fact that one third of TPS holders own a home means that this group seeks to be part of U.S. society and to be active members of their communities. [TABLE 11 OMITTED] They also pay property taxes and contribute in other ways that come with owning a home. Thus, it is not a coincidence that about 30% of TPS holders are actively involved in their communities, through neighborhood organizations (3.7%), their children’s schools (9.8%), church (17.4%), work organizations or events (2.6%), sports teams (3.5%), or other activities (2.4%). Community involvement is more common among women (32.3%) than among men (27.4%), especially in children’s schools or church. Indeed, the community involvement of TPS holders as a whole is slightly higher than that of the general U.S. population. According to a 2016 Bureau of Labor Statistics report, 24.9% of the U.S. population reported volunteering for an organization, and U.S. women volunteer at a higher rate than men, with 27.8% of women stating that they volunteer compared with 21.8% among men (U.S. Department of Labor 2016). About 20% of TPS holders participate in community service, such as volunteering in nonprofit organizations or in other service activities

like children’s hospitals. Their community involvement also includes activities that support immigrants’ rights, such as rallies, informative forums, or petitions (26%). Yet, this form of participation is slightly more common among men (27.4%) than among women (24.2%). [TABLE 12 OMITTED] 7. Effects of TPS In general, TPS has brought significant benefits to the TPS holders. Compared to the undocumented population, TPS has meant an increase in quality of life , higher incomes , better jobs , and higher rates of homeownership, among other indicators of integration and well-being. This has translated into benefits for families and communities and society as a whole; as it has allowed TPS holders to actively contribute to society economically, socially, and culturally . It also allows TPS holders to pay for their own medical insurance and to increase

their tax contributions through homeownership, formal employment, and entrepreneurial activities. Thus, one of the most significant benefits of TPS is

obtaining a work permit albeit for 18 months at a time. Therefore, benefits go beyond the economic gains of better employment and higher pay. TPS allows its beneficiaries to progress toward worker rights and protections , an important benefit that impacts all workers who labor alongside TPS holders, regardless of legal status or citizenship status. For instance, after obtaining TPS, 56.7% of survey participants were able

to get a new job, and over half of those job changes involved getting a better job. And approximately 78% of TPS holders described better job opportunities as a direct benefit of TPS, with more men (81.6%) than women (73.8%) stating that their job opportunities improved after obtaining TPS. And about 12% of TPS holders were able to start their own business , with men reporting a higher rate of business ownership (14.2%) than women (9.6%). [TABLE 13 OMITTED] Another critical benefit of TPS is relief from deportation , which translates into lower levels of anxiety and fear deportation . Research has shown that this fear can affect individuals and their families in multiple ways, including their physical and mental health (Aranda et al. 2014; Brabeck et al. 2015; Capps et al. 2015; De Genova 2002; Dreby 2015; Gonzales and Chavez 2012; Menjívar and Abrego 2012; Yoshikawa, Suárez-Orozco, and Gonzales 2016). As such, our survey participants noted that TPS has helped decrease their fears and worries related to deportation for themselves (46.9%) and their family members (35.6%), which leads to a sense of certain stability in these families, in spite of the insecurity that comes from the renewals required to maintain this status . And approximately 67 .5 % of TPS holders stated that TPS has provided them with security for themselves or their families (37.6%). Finally, survey participants noted that TPS has allowed them to obtain driver’s licenses, which translates into a benefit for themselves, their families, and society in general. For instance, they are able to purchase car insurance, to drive without fear and safely, to have more freedom of movement to get to jobs that pay better or to attend their children’s school or extracurricular activities, and to drive for a living as many TPS holders do on a daily basis. Final Considerations and Recommendations TPS has been critical and significantly beneficial for those who hold this status. As this report has shown, this legal status has elevated the quality of life of its recipients, and through these improvements, TPS also has had positive effects on these immigrants’ family members, coworkers, neighbors, and coreligionists. In this report we have demonstrated, through contrasts with comparable groups such as undocumented immigrants, authorized residents, and the general U.S. population, the benefits that accrue to this legal status. The comparisons we have made to immigrants in other legal statuses as well as to the U.S. population as a whole also highlight two fundamental aspects of his status: in-between and temporary. Thus, TPS holders’ in-between legal status is reflected in their in-between conditions, as they generally do better than undocumented immigrants on the various indicators discussed in this report but not as well as those immigrants who are authorized or naturalized, or the U.S. population in general. As such, TPS represents a step in the right direction. It positions its beneficiaries in a favorable starting position in the process of integration, but this process is truncated as these immigrants quickly encounter a legal ceiling that precludes them from advancing further. For instance, in further analyses conducted based on data collected for this survey, a critical bifurcation was identified: TPS holders with higher levels of education do not earn commensurate earnings to their educational level; their earnings are similar to those of TPS holders with lower levels of education, other things being equal. In spite of this mismatch between education and earnings, TPS holders participate actively in civic society, which increases with time in the United States (Oh, Menjívar, Alvord and Agadjanian n.d.). Thus, TPS holders are de facto citizens and active members of their communities but lack full de jure recognition. This legal ambiguity has repercussions for the individuals with TPS but also for their families and communities. Although TPS has allowed individual holders to acquire a measure of economic advancement and to gain partial formal integration, it does not allow for the integration of their families as TPS holders are prohibited from petitioning for family members. And although TPS has lessened the constant fear of deportation for its beneficiaries, this fear has not fully disappeared. Indeed, it has resurfaced with force in recent weeks with news reports of an expansion of detention and deportation of immigrants holding temporary statutes, such as DACA, and thus thought to have more secure statuses. TPS also brings a measure of equity as individuals on this status are closer to feeling more equal to others—in owning a home or renting, when getting paid on time for a day of work, when seeking employment, when driving their kids to school—in general, when doing the routine activities of others who know their rights. Thus, the benefits go beyond the individual. TPS holders have already fulfilled many of the requirements for legal permanent residence—the overwhelming majority holds at

least one job; they pay taxes and purchase their own insurance; they have clean criminal records (these checks are required with every renewal); and have demonstrated that they have the will to belong and become full members of society through homeownership and raising children in the United States. Many also have continued to advance educationally. Thus, whereas TPS grants temporary relief, it is not ideal to live in uncertain legality for 15 years (but often longer), especially when those in this status are already de facto members of society. This report has demonstrated the benefits that can ensue from legality, even temporary; it also has shown that moving these immigrants to permanent legal residence would be even more beneficial for the immigrants, their families, and for U.S. society in general.

2nc – at: lpr key – mirrors plan*this also answers economic deficits

The details matter – the fact that the provisions of the counterplan mirror the plan erases any deficit and denies the relevance of the programs their evidence is indictingClemens, et al 18 (Michael Clemens, Co-Director of Migration, Displacement, and Humanitarian Policy and Senior Fellow, Center for Global Development, Ph.D. economics, Harvard University; Cindy Huang, Co-Director of Migration, Displacement, and Humanitarian Policy and Senior Policy Fellow, CGD, Ph.D. cultural anthropology, University of California, Berkeley; Jimmy Graham, Research Assistant, CGD, M.A. Global Human Development, Georgetown University; and Kate Gough, Research Assistant, CGD, B.A. political science, Southern Methodist University; “Migration Is What You Make It: Seven Policy Decisions that Turned Challenges into Opportunities,” 5-30-2018, https://www.cgdev.org/publication/migration-what-you-make-it-seven-policy-decisions-turned-challenges-opportunities DOA 7-24-2018)KMM2. Well-designed temporary migration programs fill critical labor needs, while also minimizing the risk of overstays Temporary migration programs face suspicion on a range of issues. Common arguments against them are that their tracking measures to ensure

“temporariness” are ineffective, with the result that immigrants overstay their visas and thereafter compete with natives for jobs; they deny migrants access to standard workers’ rights and protections enjoyed by citizens; and their recruitment processes are opaque and cannot be regulated by the destination country.[4]

However , although each of these negative aspects has characterized some programs, a number of temporary migration programs have successfully kept visa overstay to a minimum while also bringing in migrants to fill labor shortages , offering migrant protections , and creating large economic benefits for hosts and migrants alike (Newland et al. 2008). Whether temporary migration programs create these benefits or generate negative effects depend s on whether the right policies are in place . In New Zealand , design features for a temporary migration scheme reduced overstays and created large economic benefits by introducing incentives to both employers and migrants to avoid overstays. A program in the UK, on the other hand, was unintentionally designed to encourage migrants not to return to their origin countries. New Zealand’s seasonal migration program, the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme, reaps benefits not just for New Zealand and its employers, but for migrants and their origin countries. The program allows workers from Pacific Island states that have been granted low-skilled work permits to work for specific employers on a seasonal basis, most permitted to stay no longer than seven months within the 11-month seasonal period. Thanks to innovation in governance and partnerships, the program has defied the common refrain that there is no such thing as temporary migration: for the first six years of the program, it had an average overstay rate of less than 1 percent. The program is designed to allow migrants to consistently return, such that employers in New Zealand have a reliable, familiar, and competent workforce. Term-

limited seasonal work may also create a complementary effect (as described in the previous section) that boosts production and incomes for natives . The benefits for the migrants and their origin countries were significant: the workers’ household income rose by an average of about 35 percent per capita (Gibson and McKenzie 2014). Regarded by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as an example of best practice , the scheme also includes a wide range of provisions to ensure workers receive adequate protections and are informed about them (MBIE 2015; ILO 2015). To achieve these outcomes, the RSE scheme introduced a number of innovative design features and incentives for migrant workers and employers. Notably, while a migrant worker’s stay in one season is limited, it is possible for that worker to return in subsequent years to work for the same or a different employer. This sense of job security gives workers an incentive not to overstay their visas, while also creating relative consistency and predictability within the circular design. Another part of circularity’s success appears to come from some onus being put on the employers, who are fined for migrant workers who overstay their visa (Gibson and McKenzie 2014). These fines, coupled with employers paying for half the flight and provision of housing, may incentivize employers to track their employees more closely along the circular timeline. When employers absorb some of the travel costs on behalf of migrant workers, a tendency to overstay the visa may be lessened because migrants are less likely to delay departure due to financial barriers—meaning they don’t have to wait to save enough money for the flight home (Basok 2002). The program also introduced quotas that change in response to demand, thus ensuring that employers are meeting their needs without admitting so many workers that they compete with natives (Nunns et al. 2010). Finally, the strong bilateral partnerships between New Zealand and the origin countries lay the foundation for opportunities for greater mutual benefits, including policies and programs designed to support the development of origin countries. New Zealand has in particular highlighted the benefits of remittances, and supported programs to increase migrants’ financial inclusion and financial literacy. The RSE scheme shows that temporary migration programs can be an effective means for origin and destination countries to reap the rewards of migration without significant risk of overstay. Other programs , such as Canada’s Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP) and Spain’s Unió de Pagesos program, have had similar success (Newland et al. 2008). Nevertheless, there is still room for improvement. For example, the RSE scheme could have included a Global Skill Partnership element (discussed in detail in the section on brain drain) wherein migrants are trained in the origin country, rendering mutual benefits through technology and skills transfer that can help drive development gains in the origin country. Other initiatives have failed to build in the design features that allowed for successful circularity seen in RSE and similar programs . For example, the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) in the UK has had overstay rates as high as 10 percent. The program, which started in 1945 and was discontinued in 2013, targeted eastern European agricultural/farming students to fill low-skilled temporary labor market needs for terms lasting up to six months. One problem with the SAWS program was that although employers paid for accommodation, workers had to pay travel costs. As evidence from other examples illustrates, some workers may have had difficulty affording the return ticket at the end of the season. Second, because the program was available only for full-time students, the workers had no prospects for returning to the UK following graduation and were thus prone to overstay once they completed school. Finally, because the program targeted students, many were overqualified and thus able to find other work opportunities outside of agriculture. These job opportunities created an additional pull factor for staying (Consterdine and Samuk 2015; World Bank 2006a). Experience in New Zealand belies the notion that low-skilled temporary migrants are bound to overstay their work authorization at high rates. Low rates of overstay are the result of pragmatic policy design and implementation that create sufficient legal migration channels to fill labor market needs; provide opportunities to migrants; and align incentives among migrants, employers, and host and origin countries. These outcomes were achieved while providing workers with adequate protections. Meanwhile, policy choices in the UK program had the effect of encouraging large numbers of workers to not return home.

Temporary migration programs can generate substantial economic benefits. Whether they do so with or without large overstay rates depends on the incentives that policies create .

2nc – at: lpr key – indefinitely renewable

Making the permits indefinitely renewable makes the counterplan functionally equivalent to permanent residency, even if legally distinctKrikorian 4 (Mark Krikorian, Executive Director of the Center for Immigration Studies, M.A. Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, B.A. Georgetown University, “Immigration, Saudi Style,” National Review, 1-13-2004, https://www.nationalreview.com/2004/01/immigration-saudi-style-mark-krikorian/ DOA 7-24-2018)KMMThe president assured the nation that the legal status accorded to foreign workers under his proposal “will have an end,” and that he “expects that most temporary workers will eventually return permanently to their home countries.” And one of the principles the president espoused for his

proposal was that “new laws should provide incentives for temporary , foreign workers to return permanently to their home countries after their

period of work in the United States has expired,” incentives such as tax-free savings accounts that guestworkers could only access after they return. But anyone familiar with the working of our immigration system–or anyone else’s– knows the bulk of these workers would be permanent . (See this overview of past guestworker failures.) The White House sees the three-year visas that workers would come in on (and that illegals would use to launder their status) as renewable for however many times Congress sees fit. The relevant parallel in current law is the H-1b visa, which is for foreigners in “specialty occupations,” and which lasts three years, renewable once. However, since the six years weren’t enough for many H-1b visa holders to work their way to the head of the line for green cards, Congress in 2000 made the visa indefinitely renewable for one year at a time for people on a green card waiting list. Assuming that Congress didn’t design the new guestworker program to be like this from the start, this kind of permanent status almost certainly would be granted eventually to everyone waiting in the queue for green cards. And the time such workers would spend in “temporary” status would not be appreciably shortened by the White House plan’s call for a “reasonable” increase in the number of green cards. The total annual number of green cards would have to be tripled or quadrupled beyond today’s total level of one million-plus in order to make any dent in the existing backlogs and to satisfy the huge demand that would be unleashed by the guestworker program. And such huge increases in permanent immigration are politically impossible, unlike the soothing fairy tales of “temporary” worker programs. The result would be big increases in waiting lists for immigration, but the ability to live and work here until your number comes up, meaning that the “temporary” status would in actuality be permanent .

2nc – at: lpr key – soft left

It resolves, NOT sustains structures of anti-immigrant violence – BUT even if, they don’t solve that either AND the net benefit turns it – counterplan’s net better for more migrantsFaizer 17 (M. Akram Faizer, Professor of Law at Lincoln Memorial University's Duncan School of Law, J.D. University of Notre Dame Law School, B.A. International Relations, B.S. Physiology, McGill University, “America First: Improving a Recalcitrant Immigration and Refugee Policy,” Tennessee Law Review, Summer, 2017, 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 933, l/n)KMM

An obvious objection to this proposal is that it treats these individuals unequally compared to citizens and permanent residents. It also will require receiving states to devote more resources to deport unwilling migrants than is currently the case. However, all new policies meant to address a

particular set of problems create new ones. Here, the problems engendered by the policy, though real, are altogether more defensible than the status quo. As we have seen, assuring migrants de jure equality has had the perverse consequence of preventing them from accessing developed countries and improving their living standards . Although repatriation is harsh, it does not violate the Refugee Convention's prohibition

against refoulement because the Convention specifically authorizes repatriation to [*963] countries of origin when conditions are safe to do so. 154 The current paradigm of asylum-granting followed by permanent residency encourages states to disregard the Refugee Convention's purpose and spend great resources to prevent the entry of would-be refugee claimants . Examples of this include not only President Trump's temporary suspension of the U.S. Refugee Assistance Program, but Australia's decision to process and house refugees in the Micronesian state of Nauru to prevent refugees from effectuating asylum claims on Australian territory 155 and France's creating of an artificial international zone within Paris's De Gaulle Airport to prevent asylum seekers from making claims on French soil. 156 A similar pattern is at play with respect to economic migrants. The U.S.'s abject failure to address the issues of economic inequality and insecurity has led to the rise of populist, anti-immigration sentiment. 157 Britain's failure to address the issue since the 1990s led to the Brexit vote to withdraw from the E.U. 158 and France's political polarization on the issue led to the evisceration of both major political parties and led Marine Le Pen succeeding to a run-off in the 2017 French Presidential election. 159 The rich-world is disregarding the obvious demand for migration and is harming global well-being by resorting to a fortress approach to avoid migration's demographic consequences. The current cumbersome and outdated immigration laws have the effect of incentivizing the uncertainty, exploitation , resentment , and backlash against immigrants because it forces most of the world's unskilled migrants and refugees into an unauthorized immigration paradigm. This leaves them vulnerable to criminal and economic exploitation by unscrupulous employers and traffickers . 160 [*964] Offering an expanded temporary residency program would provide substantial benefits for migrants, the receiving states, the sending states and overall global well-being. B. Changing Birthright Citizenship Laws Birthright citizenship in the U.S. stems from the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, which provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside." 161 This provision was ratified in 1868 and effectively reversed Dred Scott v. Sandford, 162 which concluded that African Americans born in the U.S., unless naturalized, cannot be U.S. citizens and therefore lack the right to sue for their freedom in federal court on diversity of citizenship grounds. 163 Although some argue that the "under the jurisdiction thereof" language might exempt the children of illegal migrants from birthright citizenship, 164 this is a minority position and is not the position adopted by the U.S. government, which currently grants U.S. citizenship to all those born in the U.S. except the children of foreign diplomats. 165 In Canada, birthright citizenship stems from the Citizenship Act, 166 which provides that all persons, with the exception of the children of diplomatic personnel or foreign government employees, are entitled to Canadian citizenship by law. 167 Other developed nations such as Australia, New Zealand, France, the [*965] United Kingdom and Ireland abandoned birthright citizenship. 168 With respect to the U.S. and Canada, though, birthright citizenship will have to be revisited with respect to migrants, be they illegal, temporary or refugees. For Canada, this will require nothing more than for the Parliament of Canada to enact an amendment to the Citizenship Act. 169 For the U.S., although purists may argue that this would require a constitutional amendment, the actual contours of the limitations on natural born citizenship and the "under the jurisdiction thereof" language have never been spelled out. 170 My proposal would be to have international migrants, prior to entry, permanently renounce the citizenship rights of any of their children born in the territorial U.S., on the ground that such births would not be under the U.S.'s jurisdiction for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. It would be, in effect, akin to the birth of a diplomat's child on U.S. territory, i.e. the child is not entitled to U.S. citizenship on the grounds his parents are not "subject to the jurisdiction" of the U.S. government. Although this would be a reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, I see nothing problematic with this approach because it would not be an improper denial of citizenship rights as was the case in Dred Scott, but a means of facilitating humanitarian migration. C. Preventing and Addressing State Failure and International Crises A more generous approach to migrants, in conjunction with a plan for repatriation, will encourage developed nations to spend greater resources addressing problems related to the Global Commons such as climate change, state failure and political instability in the developing world. This is because rich nations seeking to safely repatriate migrants will be encouraged to devote necessary resources to address these problems. Although superficially problematic, the repatriation requirement is a key component here because the current paradigm of limited asylum and permanent residency deters rich countries from the required international engagement level. For example, the U.S. and its European allies might have spent additional [*966] resources to address state failure in Libya and Syria if it did not fear the moral requirement to provide asylum with further involvement. The same applies with respect to economic migrants because the U.S. and other developed states would be forced to encourage economic development in sending-regions such as Central America and Mexico. Should rich countries collectively agree to adopt a dramatically increased temporary residency program, they will, in effect, be forced to devote additional resources to democratization and economic development in the developing world. For receiving states in Europe, Canada, and Australia, it will mean devotion of resources that are currently not spent. 171 For the U.S., it will most likely mean reallocation of resources from Israel and Turkey 172 to more vulnerable states with an emphasis on human development and job creation as opposed to military spending. It will also require states to take a more proactive approach to climate change and its concomitants, including political instability and state failure. Rich nations, including the U.S., however, have a moral obligation to take in a greater number of global migrants in view of the migratory surge and coming population bulge in the developing world. 173 This will only be forthcoming with a repatriation requirement that will force rich countries to strategically prevent and address international crises. D. Mitigating a Brain Drain from the Developing World Another benefit of granting migrants temporary status as opposed to permanent residency is that it would mitigate the baneful consequences of "brain drain" from the developing world. 174 An ever-increasing [*967] number of persons with post-secondary education from developing nations now live permanently in rich-world countries. 175 To illustrate, African countries lose 20,000 skilled personnel to the developed world each year. 176 That means that Africa is continuously losing people who might improve public health and foster economic development, democratization, and government accountability. Although the solution to the brain-drain phenomenon is not simple and does not lie in closing off access to rich-world labor markets, it requires taking steps to ensure migrants remain invested in their countries of origin by providing them only temporary residency in developed nations as much as feasible. To conjecture, Mexico's economy and democracy would be better placed today if the Mexicans who migrated to the U.S. in previous generations had remained invested in Mexico's development. The same could be said of North and West Africans in France and South Asians in the U.K. By limiting migrants to temporary visas, rich world governments can help foster democratization and economic development in the Global South that, in view of the population disparities between the Global North and South, would be an obvious improvement in global well-being. CONCLUSION If immigration and asylum laws were amended to allow for a large increase in temporary residence permits to facilitate ingress and egress across international frontiers, migrants would not become illegal immigrants, but would instead be legal temporary residents with the ability to live, work, and pay taxes in destination countries . Because the policy will require eventual repatriation and would deny migrant children birthright citizenship, bipartisan support for accepting more migrants will likely be forthcoming. Continuing to incentivize repatriation to countries of origin by means of providing only temporary residence and work authorization without opportunity for permanent residency will

definitely be problematic in that it will create an unequal residency paradigm that is anathema to liberal internationalists. That said, the current focus on equal permanent residency for all is causing more harm than good by effectively depriving the vast majority of migrants the physical security and economic opportunity that only rich-world nations can [*968] currently provide. It also disincentivizes rich countries from working within an international community to prevent and address international crises and undermines third-world democratization and economic growth by permanently depriving developing nations of crucial human capital. My proposal will strike some as both naïve and harsh. Naïve because it perhaps understates rich world countries' opposition to migrants, and harsh in that it contemplates and indeed advocates repatriating these migrants to their countries of origin and denies them the opportunity for either permanent residency or citizenship. Recognizing there are problems related to migrant repatriation, my proposal at least considers all relevant interests in seeking to advance global well-being. These interests are those of receiving states, which fear the demographic and backlash consequences of permanent migration, the sending states, who consistently lose human capital to the developed world, and most importantly, the migrants themselves, who are effectively disallowed access to developed countries under the current paradigm. Obviously, my proposal does not directly address the issues of economic insecurity and socio-economic immobility, which are the other obvious causes for nativism and hostility to migrants in much of the developed world. These problems should be addressed as a moral imperative regardless of how they affect attitudes to migrants. However, taking steps toward remediating inequality and providing for socio-economic and intergenerational mobility is a necessary but altogether insufficient basis for changing attitudes to migrants . Recognizing my proposal is a mere starting point , my hope is that it will stimulate a needed conversation about changing the current approach, which inadvertently and unfortunately treats migrants as toxins pervading an interconnected world and denies the reality of global migration and how this phenomenon will grow with time, based on state failure, climate change, and uneven population and economic growth further. By expanding access to migration on the condition that it be for no more than for a definite duration , developed countries can engender sufficient political support to greatly expand the number of migrant visas issued each year, address their citizens' legitimate concerns about migration's consequences and proactively deal with the problems that engender problematic levels of global migration. At the start of the previous century, my grandfather traveled from what was then Ceylon to the U.K. as an Imperial subject. Recognizing the benighted views of many Imperial administrators, including incorrect suppositions as to racial hierarchy, they saw individual [*969] British subjects as assets entitled to freedom of movement and residency. Although today's world has laudably rejected the legitimacy of both empire and ethnic superiority, my grandfather's descendants who hold Sri Lankan passports lack the same freedom of movement he took for granted. This is because first-world destination countries largely refuse to admit Sri Lankans because they fear that admission will irrevocably lead to illegal and unwelcome permanent residency. My hope is that changing our approach to global migration will encourage rich world citizens to welcome global migrants, facilitate migrants' ability to improve their lives and, in the end, improve global well-being. President Trump, who has unequivocally opposed his country's current approach to both immigrants and refugees, might consider this proposal as a means to address his supporters' concerns and facilitate U.S. leadership on the issue.

2nc – at: lpr key – international law

Doesn’t violate i-law – spurs broader complianceFaizer 17 (M. Akram Faizer, Professor of Law at Lincoln Memorial University's Duncan School of Law, J.D. University of Notre Dame Law School, B.A. International Relations, B.S. Physiology, McGill University, “America First: Improving a Recalcitrant Immigration and Refugee Policy,” Tennessee Law Review, Summer, 2017, 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 933, l/n)KMM

Even though i nternational law presently requires no more than the provision of rights-regarding temporary protection , Northern states , in law or in practice, have historically afforded refugees permanent status . As the interest-convergence between refugees and

developed countries has disappeared, Northern states have sought to avoid the arrival of refugees by adopting policies of external deterrence . Because developed states have the logistical capacity to prevent the arrival of many, and sometimes most, refugees, they have been able to implement non-entrée practices that prevent refugees from even reaching their frontiers. Since legal duties arise only once refugees successfully access a state's jurisdiction, non-entrée practices are a relatively invisible, and hence politically expedient, means to ensure that refugees are never in a position to assert their legal right to protection . 138 Developed countries effectively prevent refugees from being able to file refugee claims. Hathaway and Neve write as follows: Specifically, most Northern states impose a visa requirement on the nationals of refugee-producing states, and penalize airlines and other transportation companies for bringing unauthorized refugees into their territories. By refusing to grant visas for the purpose of making a claim to asylum, Northern countries have been able to insulate themselves from many potential claimants of refugee status. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has expressed concern that visas are a serious obstacle to the admission to protection of refugees, and may in some instances [*959] put refugees at serious risk of refoluement, that is, of return to the country in which they assert they will be at risk of grave harm. 139 Resistance to honoring duties owed to refugees follows from a growing concern about migration-based demographic changes. 140 Hathaway and Neve explain that "the legal right of refugees to [evade typical] immigration control rules means that persons not of a state's choosing [can] effectively be entitled to [permanently] join its community" and effectuate permanent demographic changes. 141 This, in societies like the U.S. that have "a tradition of equating refugee status with the right to remain permanently . . . ," leads to fear of widespread and undesired social change. 142 Moreover, "even in those Northern states that have a long tradition of receiving immigrants, there is concern about the non-selective nature of the duty to admit refugees." 143 This is a problem not limited to the rich countries of the global north. 144 Many East Asian states, "including Brunei, China, Japan, and Malaysia, are preoccupied with avoiding the arrival of refugees of distinct cultural or ethnic backgrounds." 145 This presents refugee advocates with the reality that refugee admission consistent with the Refugee Convention's purposes and global refugee needs, requires eventual repatriation to address the legitimate concerns about unconsented to cultural change in receiving states. 146 Hathaway and Neve write: [i]t is presently politically unwise to insist that states permanently enfranchise all refugees. Such a stance holds refugees hostage to a major project of social transformation. We need instead to accommodate the need of refugees to flee with the prevalence of often narrow understandings of community inspired by the rise of ethnic nationalism and the demise of the Cold War interest-convergence. This accommodation will clearly not amount to a complete recognition of the right of the present inhabitants of states to exclude all outsiders. Yet the terms upon which refugees enter [*960] a foreign state could be qualified to prevent refugees from becoming pawns in the internal struggles of asylum states over the meaning of community. In particular, a solid and dependable system of refugee protection need not have any enduring impact on the receiving state's communal self-definition. It could instead be oriented to ensuring that , at least in most cases, refugees ultimately repatriate to their own country when conditions permit. 147 This is not to heartlessly violate the international law against refoulement . Rather : temporary protection can be structured in a way that recognizes and protects core human rights, encourages self-reliance, and preserves the social, political,

and cultural identity of the refugee community. If return is made practicable by an empowering system of repatriation aid and development assistance, the solution-oriented protection system we propose has the potential to renew asylum capacity regularly. As a reasonable and principled compromise between the needs of refugees and the migration control objectives of host governments, temporary protection will encourage states to live up to their international protection responsibilities, rather than avoid them .

PERMS/THEORY

2nc – at: perm – do both

Including a path to LPR wrecks effective global responses to migration – 2 reasons – first, states fear commitment, deterring proactive crisis intervention – second, legitimizes nativist burden-claiming, empowering spoilers – that’s Faizer

Counterplan alone’s key to an effective global modelFaizer 17 (M. Akram Faizer, Professor of Law at Lincoln Memorial University's Duncan School of Law, J.D. University of Notre Dame Law School, B.A. International Relations, B.S. Physiology, McGill University, “America First: Improving a Recalcitrant Immigration and Refugee Policy,” Tennessee Law Review, Summer, 2017, 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 933, l/n)KMM [*961] V. PROPOSAL FOR GREATER PROVISION OF TEMPORARY RESIDENCE PERMITS TO ADDRESS MIGRANT NEEDS The best approach to dealing with the immigration and refugee crisis would be for developed countries to take a more proactive approach to dealing with issues related

to the Global Commons 149 such as climate change, state failure, and international crises. It will also require them to relieve the burden on developing nations and resettle a far greater number of refugees and displaced persons within their nations. These are not likely to be forthcoming responses from developed nations such as the U.S. if refugee and displaced person resettlement requires permanent residency provision. This is because active involvement to address global problems will be deterred should rich nations feel obliged to permanently resettle conflict victims. Similarly, with respect to resettlement in rich countries, the current provision of asylum status followed by permanent residency leads those countries to not only avoid the issue, but , as is their response to Haitian refugees, who sought asylum to the U.S. after the 1991 coup against former President Jean Bertrand Aristide and the January 12, 2010 magnitude

seven earthquake that decimated the country, 150 actually devote hard and soft resources to effectively prevent asylum claims from being effectuated. 151 Although requiring the eventual repatriation will be difficult to administer, it will, if effectively and humanely done, provide political support to political moderates seeking international engagement and humanitarian resettlement. It will ideally stem the backlash against migrants that is evidenced by President Trump's suspension of the U.S. Refugee Assistance [*962] Program and his

Administration's repeated and ill-advised attempts to ban travelers from seven majority-Muslim countries. 152 A. Temporary Residence Permits

The current paradigm of granting permanent residency to migrants has the effect of encouraging developed democracies to prevent the entry of those most in need . This is because nativist opposition to migrants, which is legitimized by the political and cultural consequences of unauthorized migration and naturalization, is forcefully being effectuated to create a fortress-like approach to national sovereignty. By stepping-up assistance to all migrants, the U.S. can once again lead the community of nations on an issue of compelling importance to global well-being. This will only be forthcoming if its citizens can be assured that allowing for greater migration will not distort the political culture based on migrant permanent residency . Migrants are to be issued five-year temporary residency permits that will allow them to live, work, and travel as is the case with refugees resettled in the U.S. under the Refugee Admissions Program. 153 The temporary residency permits are to be renewed for one-year periods only if the migrant can show good cause or a significant hardship if repatriated. An obvious objection to this proposal is that it treats these individuals unequally compared to citizens and permanent residents. It also will require receiving states to devote more resources to deport unwilling migrants than is currently the case. However, all new policies meant to address a particular set of problems create new ones. Here, the problems engendered by the policy, though real, are altogether more defensible than the status quo. As we have seen, assuring migrants de jure equality has had the perverse consequence of preventing them from accessing developed countries and improving their living standards. Although repatriation is harsh, it does not violate the Refugee Convention's prohibition against refoulement because the Convention specifically authorizes repatriation to [*963] countries of origin when conditions are safe to do so. 154 The current paradigm of asylum-granting followed by permanent residency encourages states to disregard the Refugee Convention's purpose and spend great resources to prevent the entry of would-be refugee claimants. Examples of this include not only President Trump's temporary suspension of the U.S. Refugee Assistance Program, but Australia's decision to process and house refugees in the Micronesian state of Nauru to prevent refugees from effectuating asylum claims on Australian territory 155 and France's creating of an artificial international zone within Paris's De Gaulle Airport to prevent asylum seekers from making claims on French soil. 156 A similar pattern is at play with respect to economic migrants. The U.S.'s abject failure to address the issues of economic inequality and insecurity has led to the rise of populist, anti-immigration sentiment. 157 Britain's failure to address the issue since the 1990s led to the Brexit vote to withdraw from the E.U. 158 and France's political polarization on the issue led to the evisceration of both major political parties and led Marine Le Pen succeeding to a run-off in the 2017 French Presidential election. 159 The rich-world is disregarding the obvious demand for migration and is harming global well-being by resorting to a fortress approach to avoid migration's demographic consequences. The current cumbersome and outdated immigration laws have the effect of incentivizing the uncertainty, exploitation, resentment, and backlash against immigrants because it forces most of the world's unskilled migrants and refugees into an unauthorized immigration paradigm. This leaves them vulnerable to criminal and economic exploitation by unscrupulous employers and traffickers. 160 [*964] Offering an expanded temporary residency program would provide substantial benefits for migrants, the receiving states, the sending states and overall global well-being. B. Changing Birthright Citizenship Laws Birthright citizenship in the U.S. stems from the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, which provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside." 161 This provision was ratified in 1868 and effectively reversed Dred Scott v. Sandford, 162 which concluded that African Americans born in the U.S., unless naturalized, cannot be U.S. citizens and therefore lack the right to sue for their freedom in federal court on diversity of citizenship grounds. 163 Although some argue that the "under the jurisdiction thereof" language might exempt the children of illegal migrants from birthright citizenship, 164 this is a minority position and is not the position adopted by the U.S. government, which currently grants U.S. citizenship to all those born in the U.S. except the children of foreign diplomats. 165 In Canada, birthright citizenship stems from the Citizenship Act, 166 which provides that all persons, with the exception of the children of diplomatic personnel or foreign government employees, are entitled to Canadian citizenship by law. 167 Other developed nations such as Australia, New Zealand, France, the [*965] United Kingdom and Ireland abandoned birthright citizenship. 168 With respect to the U.S. and Canada, though, birthright citizenship will have to be revisited with respect to migrants, be they illegal, temporary or refugees. For Canada, this will require nothing more than for the Parliament of Canada to enact an amendment to the Citizenship Act. 169 For the U.S., although purists may argue that this would require a constitutional amendment, the actual contours of the limitations on natural born citizenship and the "under the jurisdiction thereof" language have never been spelled out. 170 My proposal would be to have international migrants, prior to entry, permanently renounce the citizenship rights of any of their children born in the territorial U.S., on the ground that such births would not be under the U.S.'s jurisdiction for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. It would be, in effect, akin to the birth of a diplomat's child on U.S. territory, i.e. the child is not entitled to U.S. citizenship on the grounds his parents are not "subject to the jurisdiction" of the U.S. government. Although this would be a reinterpretation of

the Fourteenth Amendment, I see nothing problematic with this approach because it would not be an improper denial of citizenship rights as was the case in Dred Scott, but a means of facilitating humanitarian migration. C. Preventing and Addressing State Failure and International Crises A more generous approach to migrants, in conjunction with a plan for repatriation, will encourage developed nations to spend greater resources addressing problems related to the Global Commons such as climate change , state failure and political instability in the developing world. This is because rich nations seeking to safely repatriate migrants will be encouraged to devote necessary resources to address these problems. Although superficially problematic, the repatriation requirement is a key component here because the current paradigm of limited asylum and permanent residency deters rich countries from the required international engagement level . For example, the U.S. and its European allies might have spent additional [*966] resources to address state failure in Libya and Syria if it did not fear the moral requirement to provide asylum with further involvement. The same applies with respect to economic migrants because the U.S. and other

developed states would be forced to encourage economic development in sending-regions such as Central America and Mexico. Should rich countries collectively agree to adopt a dramatically increased temporary residency program, they will, in effect, be forced to devote additional resources to democratization and economic development in the developing world. For receiving states in Europe, Canada, and Australia, it will mean devotion of resources that are currently not spent. 171 For the U.S., it will most likely mean reallocation of resources from Israel and Turkey 172 to more vulnerable states with an emphasis on human development and job creation as opposed to military spending. It will also require states to take a more proactive approach to climate change and its concomitants, including political instability and state failure. Rich nations , including the U.S. , however, have a moral obligation to take in a greater number of global migrants in view of the migratory surge and coming population bulge in the developing world . 173 This will only be forthcoming with a repatriation requirement that will force rich countries to strategically prevent and address international crises .

2nc – at: perm – do counterplan

Perm severs “immigration” – AND the entire plan, including the particular status they reduced restrictions on – testing the necessity of permanent residency is particularly key to fair ground, topic education, comparative analytical skills, and to check ideological extremismKeeley 9 (Brian Keeley, writer/editor, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “International Migration: The human face of globalization,” September 2009, https://www.docme.ru/doc/1204887/583.oecd-insights--international-mi---brian-keeley DOA 7-26-2018)KMMAs we’ve seen, migration doesn’t affect only immigrants and the countries they come to live in. It can also have a big impact on the families, communities and countries they leave behind, especially in the developing world. The impact can be beneficial, through remittances, but also detrimental, such as when a brain drain of trained staff

causes shortages in crucial areas like healthcare and education. There is a responsibility on governments both in developed and developing countries to find ways to maximise these benefits and minimise the drawbacks . A better debate Complex, contentious, controversial – international migration can

sometimes be seen as the third rail of political life, a spot that offers only risks and no rewards to policy makers as they try to balance the positives with the negatives. Too often

also, public debate on the issue is hijacked by hysteria, with reality obscured by myths, and complexity by generalisations . “To be prepared for the future, governments need to act now to put proper policies in place to help satisfy labour needs partly through migration and to enable the integration of migrants. Every OECD country should make this a priority. It is socially, politically, ethically, and morally correct, but it is also an act of sheer economic rationality.” Angel Gurría, OECD Secretary-General (speech in Paris, February 2008) We owe it to ourselves and to the people who come to live amongst us to have a more reasoned migration

debate – a better debate , one informed by facts , not fancy. Without such a debate, we risk missing out on the many benefits of immigration, and repeating the errors

of yesterday. Without such a debate, we will fail to design the policies needed for the migration of tomorrow – not just in how we manage migration, but in how we configure our societies, our schools, our workplaces to ensure that those who travel and those who stay home reap the full benefits of our continuing human journey. Some statistics One of OECD’s major contributions to understanding migration is the work it does on gathering and compiling international data on migration flows as well as on the size of migrant populations and their characteristics, such as age, gender, educational qualification and occupations. This data allows international comparisons to be made regarding the state of migration in various OECD countries. It also helps policy makers and planners to better understand the challenges and opportunities arising from international migration. This book has already made extensive use of this data, albeit in a somewhat simplified form. This final section offers a more detailed introduction to OECD’s work on the measurement of international migration, and explains some of the challenges facing statisticians in gathering this data. Definitions for internationally comparable data Compiling internationally comparable data on migration is a challenge for many reasons, not the least of which is that governments don’t always compile comprehensive and specific data both on migration flows – movements in and out of the country – and on the size of foreign-born populations. It’s true that some countries do assemble data in some of these areas, but for others the numbers must sometimes be inferred from data sources such as population registers or from registration and work permits. However, the rules governing such

registration and permit systems vary greatly, making international comparisons difficult . For example, in some countries people staying for just three months are required to register themselves; in others, they can stay for up to 12 months without registering. So, statisticians who want to measure differences in migration between countries need to take account of such variations. But there are challenges for statisticians even when they’re working with specific data on migrants. Countries often use different statistical definitions to compile such numbers; for example, some count seasonal workers as immigrants, others do not . While standardised international data on migration flows would be a benefit for planners and international agencies, countries are naturally free to make their own decisions on how much data to collect and how to do so. Data collection can be an expensive business, and it can touch on other issues, too, such as people’s right to privacy. Nevertheless, over the years some attempts have been made, most notably by the United Nations, to improve the comparability of international data by developing a coherent framework for international migration statistics. In simple terms, the UN speaks of a long-term migrant as someone who moves from their “country of usual residence” for more than a year, and a short-term migrant as someone who moves for more than three but fewer than twelve months. There are a number of international initiatives going on to encourage countries to adopt and use these definitions, but progress has been slow. As a result, it’s currently very difficult to compile internationally comparable data based on these definitions, although that may well change in the years to come. In the interim, OECD has adopted its own definitions, which echo those of the UN by emphasising the distinction between short and long-term, or temporary and permanent, immigration. An immigrant is thus defined as “a person of foreign nationality who enters the permanently resident population either from outside the country or by changing from a temporary to a permanent status in the country ”.

2nc – at: no advocate

Topic-specific mechanism advocates should suffice – plan-specificity and all planks in one card are impossible burdens given the enormity of the immigration topic – Faizer explicitly advocates everything including renewal, even if not explicitly indefinite, he doesn’t preclude it either[FOR REFERENCE:]

Faizer 17 (M. Akram Faizer, Professor of Law at Lincoln Memorial University's Duncan School of Law, J.D. University of Notre Dame Law School, B.A. International Relations, B.S. Physiology, McGill University, “America First: Improving a Recalcitrant Immigration and Refugee Policy,” Tennessee Law Review, Summer, 2017, 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 933, l/n)KMMThe Trump Administration could take the lead in global migration issues by changing the U.S.'s current immigration and refugee resettlement program by substantially expanding access to temporary residency in lieu of immigration and permanent residency. …I would advocate expanding the current number of 600,000 annual temporary work visas to 2-3 million per year and account for this by reducing the number of permanent residency green cards from the current one million per year to a negligible number.…If immigration and asylum laws were amended to allow for a large increase in temporary residence permits to facilitate ingress and egress across international frontiers, migrants would not become illegal immigrants, but would instead be legal temporary residents with the ability to live, work, and pay taxes in destination countries…The visas, which are to be first offered to economic migrants currently working and living illegally in the U.S., are to be issued with strict conditions that visa holders are expected to repatriate at the end of the visa term unless good cause can be shown for one-year extensions.…The temporary residency permits are to be renewed for one-year periods only if the migrant can show good cause or a significant hardship if repatriated…If return is made practicable by an empowering system of repatriation aid and development assistance, the solution-oriented protection system we propose has the potential to renew asylum capacity regularly.

Here’s an advocate for indefinite renewal, reducing restrictions other than LPR, and banning a path to LPRChang 16 (Howard F. Chang, University of Pennsylvania, “Walls or Welcome Mats? Immigration and the Public Treasury,” Issue Brief, 4(5), May 2016, https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1038&context=pennwhartonppi DOA 7-26-2018)KMM

Finally, the bill would create new nonimmigrant visa programs for less skilled workers: one program for agricultural visas and another for other workers.

These W visas would allow workers to enter for a 3-year period and would be renewable. These visas would also allow workers within each category to leave one employer to work for another employer registered with the program, unlike past programs which tied each guest worker to a specific employer . Freedom to leave an employer and to take employment elsewhere would give workers greater power to assert their rights against employers and thereby prevent abuses, without destroying the economic gains that natives enjoy in the labor market from employing these workers. These visas would give less skilled workers a legal alternative to illegal entry and life as an unauthorized immigrant. From the perspective of the economic interests of natives, these guest-worker programs may also be an effective response to concerns regarding the impact of relatively unskilled alien workers on the public treasury. Through such programs, natives enjoy the benefits of these workers in the labor market but do not bear the fiscal burden of providing the full set of public benefits that these workers would receive if they had ready access to permanent residence and, ultimately, citizenship. Although immigrants can gain full access to public benefits upon naturalization, only aliens “admitted for permanent residents” may naturalize as U.S. citizens.13 Alien

workers admitted on nonimmigrant visas only are not admitted as permanent residents and are thus not eligible for most public entitlements and are not eligible to naturalize. Our laws generally exclude not only unauthorized immigrants but also nonimmigrants, including temporary workers, from a broad range of public benefits. With only narrow exceptions, these aliens are ineligible for “any Federal public benefit.”14 Because guest-worker programs can give relatively unskilled aliens access to

our labor markets without necessarily providing full access to the benefits provided to citizens, these programs may allow the most liberal admissions policies possible for these aliens without imposing a fiscal burden on natives. I have suggested that such a program could even accommodate the desire of some guest workers to remain by allow ing guest workers to renew their visas for an indefinite number of multiple periods .15 As long as the U.S. restricts their access to public benefits, they seem unlikely to impose a net fiscal burden on the public treasury.

NBs

NB—GLOBAL MIGRATION

2nc – env refugee a/o

Massive waves of environmental refugees are imminent – failure to generate effective global responses ensures resource conflicts go nuclearWennersten & Robbins 17 (John R. Wennersten, senior fellow, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, emeritus professor of environmental history, University of Maryland; Denise Robbins, communications director at Chesapeake Climate Action Network, graduate of Cornell University; “Introduction,” and “1 Seeking Shelter from the Storm,” Rising Tides: Climate Refugees in the Twenty-First Century, Indiana University Press, 2017, ISBN 9780253025920, p.9-24)KMMAt this writing, Europe is under siege by Syrian war refugees who represent one of the largest war-induced migrations in history . The war has dragged on for

over four years now, taking more than two hundred thousand lives and causing untold destruction to the Syrian environment. Well over a million refugees have entered Europe, adding a complex religious and

cultural mix to the already complicated issue of climate refugees. These streams of migrants may literally change the face of the continent in a generation. Optimists hope that through resettlement and education the issues can be resolved. Others believe that this might be the time when things begin to fall apart in our global system . At present, while a dangerous situation unfolds, many world leaders have chosen paralysis and mutual recrimination. At this juncture members of the EU nations of Europe

are discussing ways to keep further immigration limited to “documented” refugees. In 2009 only 30 percent of Americans believed that the world climate was changing. By 2012, surveys revealed that 70 percent of the American people had come to believe that greenhouse gases had altered the planet. Anew age of environmental change—and subsequently refugees—had dawned.23 Environmental refugees in an age of sectarian violence, civil war, and economic recession are not a flashy public policy project.

Most policy makers wish the subject would go away. But in an age when the world is being forced to bear witness to the fact that millions are fleeing their homes owing to sea rise, desertification, drought , unprecedented hurricanes, tsunamis, and war , the topic is stubbornly resistant to the kinds of public amnesia so often in effect in the world

theater of nations. We do not know how soon reality will trump ideology. At present there are lots of back-and-forth discussions between national and international leaders that have not been very productive. What is certain, however, is that climate change is not just changing the planet; it is changing human lives. In a 2007 essay for the Financial Times, David Cameron points out that “as early as 1971, Richard Falk [a professor of international law at Princeton University,] argued that environmental change was a security issue and outlined what he called his ‘first law of ecological politics’: the faster the rate of change, the less time

to adapt, the more dangerous the impact will be.”24 We are now living in an age of resource shocks. Unbridled world consumption of food and water and other resources combined with the advent of climate change may produce a global explosion , writes Michael Klare in his book The Race for Whats Left.

Different nations are coming up with different strategies on migration . Ultimately, climate refugees present us with a troublesome issue of human rights in an age of climate change, violence,

and technological transformation.25 THE BIG PUSH Extreme weather events in North Africa and elsewhere may become the norm rather than the exception. Certainly

desertification has put large populations on the move in search of water, livelihood, and security. A rise in sea level will create serious situations considering that a quarter of the world’s population lives on or near coasts and that the majority of our own

megacities are situated in coastal areas. A Pentagon memo notes: “Picture Japan’s coastal cities flooded, with their freshwater supplies contaminated. Envision Pakistan , India , and China —all nuclear powers —skirmishing at their borders over access to shared rivers and arable land with older coastal areas now submerged under rising seas.”26 It is often difficult to differentiate between those refugees driven by environmental factors and those driven by other factors. Economics, politics, culture, and climate intertwine like some

sociological double helix. What refugees have in common, however, is that they are suffering, and often they are impoverished by the environmental degradation of their homeland, affected by tsunamis, desertification, water scarcity, and disease. There is considerable uncertainty as to where these streams of global environmental refugees will flow. But it is a safe bet that they will lap up on the shores of prosperous developed Western nations , which are already becoming increasingly xenophobic . The Office of

the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), with a lean staff of ten thousand seven hundred workers, is already stressed by refugee crises of some twenty-one and one-third million.27 Add millions of people displaced by climate change, and you have a crisis of governance and management that will sorely tax the wisest solons at the UN and other governmental agencies. It is not rocket science to conclude that as the century progresses there will be a glaring need for more farms and

farmers to feed the planets burgeoning population. Meanwhile, major countries like China are buying farmland in whatever country they can find it, and food stocks on Wall Street such as ConAgra and General Mills are soaring. Access to supplies like water and grain will become major concerns to countries with diminished rainfall. By 2020 , warns Chatham House in its Resources Futures

report, “yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by 50 percent” in some countries. The highest rates of loss are expected to be in Africa, where reliance on rain-fed farming is greatest, but

agriculture in China, India, Pakistan, and Central Asia is also likely to be severely affected.28 Heatwaves will diminish the flow of rivers, which will mean diminishing supplies of water for irrigation and hydroelectric power . Long range, in addition to setting waves of population migration in motion, a changed environment in the future will transform infrastructures of government out of recognition from their older patterns. Presently, in the safe, affluent confines of our homes, we watch on our television or read in our newspapers or on the Internet of the relentless march of hundreds of thousands of refugees out of Africa and the Middle East bound for the sanctuary and prosperity of England and Western Europe. They are people who cannot hold on to a livelihood in their forsaken homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, floods, and war. They are desperate people who are willing to risk the violence of nativist Europeans or drowning in a tempest of the Mediterranean Sea. Unlike other refugees of yesteryear, these people have abandoned their homeland with little hope of a

foreseeable return. Environmental refugees are a problem of development policy beyond the scope of a single country or agency. The problems are fraught with emotion, human agency, and political controversy . How will people be relocated and settled? Is it possible to offer environmental refugees temporary or permanent asylum ? Will these refugees have any collective rights in the new areas they inhabit? And who will pay the costs of all the affected countries during the process of resettlement? Developed Western nations like the United

States also have begun to feel the shock of environmental stresses and catastrophes. A decade ago Hurricane Katrina put the proud Southern city of New Orleans underwater, and more recently Hurricane Sandy decimated the Middle Atlantic coast and flooded New York City. Today the Southwest languishes in one of the worst droughts in recent memory while environmental historians point out similarities with the Dust Bowl of winds that roared across the drought-ridden plains of Kansas, Texas, and Oklahoma in the 1930s and covered distant cities like Washington and Philadelphia in a choking mantle of dust and dirt. California worries about its San Andreas Fault, and seismologists of the Pacific Northwest fear the coming of what they call “The Big One”—sliding tectonic plates of the “Cascadian subduction zone” resulting in a major earthquake followed by tsunamis whose impact will cover some 140,000 square miles, render seven million people homeless, and destroy and flood Seattle, Tacoma, Eugene, and Salem, the capital of Oregon. Comprehending the scale of our looming climate crisis is difficult. And absorbing climate refugees or their war-torn brethren is burdensome and fraught with controversy. It is easy to welcome them at the airport but more complex to provide them with sustenance and jobs. Thus, when we contemplate the subject of refugees and the future, we might do well to look in a mirror and recognize that every one of us is or could be a migrant. [NOTES OMITTED] 1 Seeking Shelter from the Storm The costs and consequences of climate change on our world will define the twenty-first century. Michael Werz and Laura Conley, Center for American Progress In its 2007 report, the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate

Change (IPCC) warned that warming of the global climate system from fossil fuel emissions is unequivocal , as is now evident from observations of increases in global average and ocean temperatures, with widespread melting of snow and ice and a rising average global sea level. Given rising temperatures and increases in precipitation, the availability of freshwater will shift. Some areas of the planet will be much

wetter, some much drier. Both drought and flooding will increase. Water stored in glacier snowpack will decline, reducing water supplies to more than a billion people. Global changes in land use patterns and the overexploitation of resources will set populations in motion. The conclusion today is inescapable: humans have emerged as a major force in nature and are altering the structure of the planet. We are now witnessing the human devastation of the earth.1 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, declared climate change to be “the defining challenge of our times ”2 Today there is a new awareness that environmental factors— worsened in an atmosphere heated up by massive worldwide carbon dioxide emissions—can be triggers for major population movements. As the planet continues to warm, it will foster extreme weather events like tropical cyclones, and floods will increase in intensity due to warmer [FIGURE 1.1 OMITTED] sea surface and atmospheric temperatures. Rising sea levels in the South Pacific and elsewhere will destroy small island states. In other areas, glacier retreat will lessen available supplies of freshwater. Areas vulnerable to water stress and drought will be at high risk. No one can wait to act until 100 percent scientific proof that humancaused climate change is in place, especially when the lives and livelihoods of considerable numbers of people are at risk,3 but for all intents and purposes we are already there. Scientists have concluded that fossil fuels are driving global warming with 95 percent certainty—the same degree of scientific certainty as the consensus that cigarettes can kill and that HIV causes AIDS (see

figure 1.1).4 Though many predictions about future impacts of climate changes come in ranges, there is “little doubt” that parts of the

earth are becoming less habitable due to factors related to climate change , argues the International Organization for Migration5 Already, warmer surface temperatures have brought

changes to the global climate at rates unseen over previous millennia. With global temperature predicted to rise two to five degrees centigrade by century’s end, migrations will become larger and more problematic .6 Thus, climate or environmental refugees could become one of the foremost human crises of our times . As UN Undersecretary-General Achim Steiner has

argued, “The question we must continually ask ourselves in the face of scientific complexity and uncertainty, but also with growing evidence of climate change, is at what point precaution, common sense, or prudent risk management demands action?”7 SEA LEVEL RISE AND MIGRATION Lester Brown, in his book World on the Edge, writes that “over the longer term, rising-sea refugees will likely dominate the flow of environmental refugees.”8 How far might sea levels rise? The most conservative projections estimate between one and three feet. The ever-practical and forward-looking Dutch, for planning purposes, are assuming a two-anda-half-foot rise by 2050.9 Maybe the Dutch can withstand two and a half feet, but this is enough to obliterate large portions of island nations like the Maldives. Yet scientists now think we are locked in to a sea level rise of at least three feet, and that is only with aggressive worldwide reduction of fossil fuels. Without climate action, sea levels could rise six feet by the end of 2100 and

as much as ten feet within two centuries, creating a huge threat to coastal communities around the globe.10 Ten percent of the world’s population currently lives in low-lying coastal zones, and this population sector is growing rapidly . Sustained global warming of about three degrees centigrade, experts agree , will result in sea level rise of one-quarter meter by 2040 that will damage coastal wetlands, impair fisheries, and disrupt fresh groundwater supplies, with saltwater intrusion ruining farmlands and affecting drinking water supplies . Large urban centers such as Shanghai, Manila, Bangkok, Dhaka, and Jakarta, are already vulnerable to subsidence. Rising tides and storm surges are already putting areas of land underwater—places as diverse as neighborhoods in Norfolk, Virginia; major parts of

southern Louisiana; and island republics like Tuvalu and the Maldives in the Indian and Pacific oceans. In the Western Hemisphere, Americans may find themselves struggling to resettle tens of millions forced to migrate because of rising tides along the Gulf of Mexico, South Florida, and the East Coast , reaching nearly to New England. While scientists cannot predict the details of short-term human history, there is little doubt that changes will be momentous. Renowned climatologist James Hansen argues that China will have great difficulties despite its growing economic power as “hundreds of millions of Chinese are displaced by rising seas. With the submersion of Florida and coastal cities, the United States may be equally stressed.” With global interdependence, he notes, “there may be a threat of collapse of economic and social systems.”11 On the northern Atlantic coast of the United States, sea levels are rising about four times faster than the global average, conservatively predicted to rise six feet by 2100. New York, Norfolk, and Boston arc particularly at risk and already experience damaging floods from even minor storms.12 On a small inlet off the coast of Virginia called Chincoteague, a wildlife haven of wild beaches and feral ponies, beaches are losing about twenty feet of coastline a year. In July 2013 a Rolling Stone article headline blared: “Goodbye, Miami.” Writer Jeff Goodell predicted that due to the rising tides Miami would be uninhabitable by 2030 and completely underwater by the end of the century, when it would essentially transform into a snorkeling spot, “where people could swim with sharks and sea turtles and explore the wreckage of a great American city.”13 Goodell’s article sparked some controversy, but it was not unreasonable. In fact, of all the people in the United States who will be affected by sea level rise, at least 40 percent live in Florida, according to analyses by the news organization Climate Central. And Miami faces a unique risk: its precarious foundation. Miami, and much of South Florida, is built on a foundation of porous limestone. Any levees or seawalls would be ineffective against floods. Ocean water would simply leach through the bedrock instead. The effects of this are already taking place, with seawater seeping onto the streets through the drains, flooding outdated sewage systems. According to the Florida Department of Transportation, the rising seas will flood major coastal highways after 2050 and cause them to deteriorate, saturating and eroding the limestone beneath them. Scientists and experts are already warning the state government of a future mass exodus as people move away from flooded Florida. The latest research shows that it will not be just Floridians who need to flee. Sea level rises could force between four and thirteen million people in coastal American communities from their homes by 2100.14 It is not clear where they will go. The good news is that not all cities are locked into an unlivable sea level scenario. Strong action on climate change would make all the difference for fourteen major US cities, including Jacksonville, Florida, and a handful of cities in Virginia and California.15 FRESHWATER SCARCITY AND CONFLICT As Andrea Appleton notes in the Johns Hopkins Health Review "With climate change comes uncertainty about water resources.” Further, she adds that “a real water scarcity could require a fundamental thinking of how we manage water.”16 We take water for granted now, but that attitude will undergo radical change as the century progresses. A lot of what people believe about water is nonsense. People think there will always be water and when they turn on their taps water will flow. This will not necessarily be true in the future, though there will always be water for the wealthy. The quotidian work of water over the centuries, however, is not the stuff of the popular media. We fill our baths and hot tubs with the expectation that we can discard the wasted water when we are finished. That there will always be water is an idea deeply rooted in our subconscious. It is the major selfish conceit of the affluent West. Awareness of water as an ecological concept is fairly recent, dating for the most part from the mid-twentieth century. The growing desertification of the planet and the disappearance of wetlands of the world have helped to give us a stronger environmental focus. It is only now in the twenty-first century that we are beginning to realize that water is the key component of climate change. For some time, experts have argued about the earth s carrying capacity to support ever-larger populations. For example, will there be enough food and

water on the planet to support a population of eight to ten billion people? Meanwhile, in developing nations, water issues intensify every day between rich residents of overcrowded cities and their poorest neighbors. The World Water Forum, at its third triennial meeting, in Istanbul in 2009, offered a grim assessment in its “Water in a Changing World” report. It was still business as usual for the five billion people, or two-thirds of the planet, who do not have access to safe water, adequate sanitation, or enough food to eat.17 Each year, the World Water Forum reported, the world increases by eighty million people, continually stressing our global freshwater resources. Looking at water through the critical lens of the twenty-first century, we see our rivers drying up. Some of the world’s largest rivers, including the Yellow, the Niger, and the Colorado, are drying up as a result of climate change with potentially disastrous consequences for many of the world’s populous regions and cities of the world.18 Water in the Rio Grande evaporates before reaching the Gulf, the flow of the Nile has choked by a dam, and reservoirs lose millions of gallons of water through

evaporation. In many parts of India, farmers desperate for irrigation water plunder their aquifers faster than rainfall can replenish the withdrawn water. Scientists also predict that those rivers that have seen stable or increased flows, such as the Brahmaputra in South Asia and the Yangtze in China, could wither as inland glaciers melt and rainfall patterns are altered as a

result of climate change.19 More than half the world’s wetlands have disappeared, and climate change around the world has altered weather patterns and led to water shortages.20 Such developments may unleash conflict and major out-migrations in developed countries as well . In the United States hydrologists fear that as water as a commodity becomes increasingly scarcer, conflicts will arise between the United States and Canada over access to the Great Lakes. As the Southwestern states and California swelter under the onslaught of a multiyear drought, governments increasingly turn a hungry eye toward tapping Lake Superior and bringing the “blue gold" to irrigate their parched lands. Consider the Colorado River, a major water source for seven states and parts of northwestern Mexico. Currently the

Colorado River barely meets the needs of the many millions who rely on it. If water levels drop further, Peter Gleick of the Pacific Institute in Oakland, California, said to Newsweek, it could “derail the system altogether."21 Additionally, drought-induced population out-migration may strain state and federal budgets with relocation costs and the attendant problems of community upheaval. When profound water shortages or ravaging floods put populations on the move, they must go somewhere, and this migration can create conflict in the area receiving migrants. The arrival of migrants to areas that already are experiencing water shortages, such as parts of India, can burden the economic and resource base of the receiving area.22 And when these

migrants belong to different ethnic or religious groups, residents may feel threatened and respond aggressively. No matter how peaceful climate refugees may be, in most cases their arrival will generate significant levels of public suspicion and mistrust. As Rafael Reveny notes, sudden drastic environmental changes can push many people to migrate quickly. The arrival of Bangladeshi climate refugees in India led to violence in the 1980s.23 Similarly, the absorption of Dust Bowl migrants in California during the

1930s depression had more than its share of conflict. “Okies’ from the Oklahoma plains faced slurs, discrimination, and beatings. Their shacks were burned, and police manned the California border to block their entry into the state. The main crisis to come, however, will be the water rivalry between India and China, which undoubtedly will produce an anguished flow of climate refugees. China’s unique water power status stems from its control of the headwaters of the Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers that flow into India and other Southeast Asian countries. As both China and India have nuclear weapons, hydrologists worry that water conflicts between India and China may result in nuclear attacks on dams

and other riparian systems. Chinas aggressive dam construction of India’s headwaters in the high Himalayas is a constant irritant to India As the Carnegie Foundation points out in its report, “A Crisis to Come,” China now has hydrohegemony over key headwaters that flow into much of South Asia and more dams “than the rest of the world combined," yet has historically poor environmental practices over these waters, “which has had devastating consequences for the environment”: Headwaters—China is the largest source of transboundary river flows, including many, such as the Brahmaputra River, that flow from the Tibetan plateau to much of South Asia. Dams—No country in history has built more dams than China, which has built more dams than the rest of the world combined. Environmental practices—Chinas use of rivers has been ecologically unsafe, which has had devastating consequences for the environment. 'Ihe Carnegie Foundation offers this perspective: “After many years of denying plans to build a mega-dam on the Brahmaputra River, one of the major rivers of Asia, China recently announced plans to begin construction. This river is one of India’s and Bangladesh’s largest sources of water, and any water diversion could be devastating to both countries.” Water conflict between China and its neighbors has real national security implications, a problem that will only become worse.24 Water issues in this part of the world involve the fate of the Tibetan Himalayan plateau and rivers that flow from there to serve the water needs of a billion people. Currently, glaciers in Tibet are melting as a result of increased temperatures. After an initial burst of too much water, there is going to be a shortage. Climate models suggest “peak meltwater” could be reached by

the 2050s, with major rivers losing up to 20 percent of their flow. China will monopolize what’s left of the water resource, and that will lead to major problems. With China and India attempting to store water for their combined four hundred dams, water shortages will create instability in the region. Clashes along the border between Chinese and Indian troops over the past five decades have resulted in deep mistrust on both sides. Both countries have memories of a short but brutal war between them in 1962.2S AGRICULTURAL CRISES AS MIGRATION DRIVERS Agriculture has become the modern Agasthya, the mythical Indian giant who drank the seas dry.26 Unless careful provisions are made, the expansion of agriculture, with its immense need for irrigation water, may gobble up what is left of the planet’s groundwater in virgin lands and wilderness. To deal with “Agasthaya,” research into new crop yields

that produce seeds tolerant of increasing temperatures and water scarcity is increasingly a part of a survival agenda. One should mention, however, that the tech nological innovations of the Green Revolution have largely run their course, and there is little prospect in agricultural yields increasing at the exponential rate they have in the past as a result of new farming techniques .27 Despite manifold technological innovations, agriculture appears to have plateaued . According to world climate expert Lester Brown, the world agricultural harvest in 1993 was only 4.2 percent higher than that of 1984 while world population increased by 16 percent. During this time, grain output per person declined by

11 percent. The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations reports that about 793 million people were estimated to be chronically undernourished in 2015.28 If projections of world population growing to 9.8 billion by 2050 come true, farms will have to produce three times as many calories as today. Further, there are few new areas remaining that can be opened up for agriculture around the globe. The problems are compounded in a number of countries by inadequate government. As UN observers have said, in certain countries it is not so much faulty as failed governments or no government. Only a few countries in this area seem capable of remaining self-sufficient in food—Kenya, Botswana, and Zimbabwe. At present, droughts top the list of worst global disasters. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, droughts have been responsible for the deaths and uprooting of millions of people—China in 1907, with a toll of twenty-five million; Ukraine in the Volga region of the Soviet Union in 1921-1922, 5 million; and droughts in India in 1965 caused a death toll of 1.5 million. In addition, storm surges in Bangladesh routinely kill thousands. Throughout Africa, desertification has become so pervasive that whole villages and farms are overtaken by sand. The 1982-1984 droughts in Africa, for example, left 184 million people in twenty-four African countries on the brink of starvation. Ten million left their homes in search of food with two million displaced persons winding up in refugee camps in five countries.

Many who waited too long to migrate died. As a result of these disasters owing to climate change, more people are being killed or displaced by landslides, cyclones, and floods than ever before.29 The Stern Review, a British government report on the economics of climate change warned: “As temperatures rise and conditions deteriorate significantly, climate change will test the resilience of many societies around the world. Large numbers of people will be compelled to leave their homes when resources drop below a critical threshold. China, for instance, could see three hundred million of its people suffer from the wholesale reduction in glacial meltwater.”30 Landlessness derives from environmental factors as much as economic ones. Experts point out that this problem is particularly acute in Mexico, Central America, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh. Where people own little or no land in agriculture communities, the productive value of farmland is degraded, as too much pressure is placed on too little to obtain a livelihood. Meanwhile, the United Nations estimates that we will have to feed an extra 1.3 billion people in this decade alone and 4.1 billion by 2050. In Malaysia and other countries, deforestation has resulted in a decline of rainfall, with disastrous impact on local rice production. Recent studies have pointed out that the deforestation of the Himalayan foothills has had a multibillion-dollar negative impact on agricultural systems in

the Ganges Valley of India.31 Whatever the cause of deforestation, it eliminates the homelands and livelihoods of large numbers of people in the developing world.

Desertification is now at work on over one-third of the world’s surface—some forty-five million square kilometers drying out to a state of severely depleted productivity. Desertification is leading to burgeoning catastrophe in sub-Saharan Africa, a region with some of the world s greatest population pressures. As early as the 1980s scientists pointed to the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa, and a dry corridor from Namibia through Botswana and

Zimbabwe to southern Mozambique. By 1987 an estimated ten million people had become environmental or climate refugees in semiarid lands. Today a total of 900 million people are at risk in areas undergoing desertification. At the same time, these areas also have populations growing at rates of over 3 percent a year. Drought in Africa is now different. Areas in the Sahel, Somalia, and elsewhere face untold calamities because

there is less water and more people. Water shortages cause major problems for health, agriculture, and industry. What is especially' relevant is that in 90 percent of the developing world there is a lack of clean water for domestic use, which results in various diseases and maladies like cholera and intestinal parasites .

2nc – at: no war impact

Yes war – escalation in the next 5 years is likely – prefer consensus of the U.S. intelligence community – deterrence and interdependence don’t checkTreverton 17 (Gregory Treverton, Chairman, National Intelligence Council, former Director of the RAND Center for Global Risk and Security, former president of the Pacific Council on International Policy, former senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, former assistant director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London; and NIC’s Strategic Futures Group, directed by Dr. Suzanne Fry, with Rich Engel, Phyllis Berry, Heather Brown, Kenneth Dyer, Daniel Flynn, Geanetta Ford, Steven Grube, Terrence Markin, Nicholas Muto, Robert Odell, Rod Schoonover, and Thomas Stork; “Near Future: Tensions Are Rising,” Global Trends: Paradox of Progress, January 2017, ISBN 978-0-16-093614-2, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nic/GT-Full-Report.pdf DOA 7-25-2018)KMM*edited to mitigate offenseThese global trends, challenging governance and changing the nature of power, will drive major consequences over the next five years. They will raise tensions across all regions and types of governments, both within and between countries. These near-term conditions will contribute to the expanding threat from terrorism and leave the future of international order in the balance. Within countries, tensions are rising because citizens are raising basic questions about what they can expect from their governments in a constantly changing world. Publics are pushing governments to provide peace and prosperity more broadly and reliably at home when what happens abroad is

increasingly shaping those conditions. In turn, these dynamics are increasing tensions between countries— heightening the risk of interstate conflict during the next five years . A hobbled [divided] Europe , uncertainty about America’s role in the world, and weakened norms for conflict-prevention and human rights create openings for China and Russia . The combination will also embolden regional and nonstate aggressors—breathing new life into regional rivalries , such as between Riyadh and Tehran , Islamabad and New Delhi , and on the Korea n Peninsula . Governance shortfalls also will drive threat perceptions and insecurity in countries such as Pakistan and North Korea.

Economic interdependence among major powers remains a check on aggressive behavior but might be insufficient in itself to prevent a future conflict. Major and middle powers alike will search for ways to reduce the types of interdependence that leaves them vulnerable to economic coercion and financial sanctions, potentially providing them more freedom of action to aggressively pursue their interests. Meanwhile, the threat from terrorism is likely to expand as the ability of states, groups, and individuals to impose harm diversifies. The net effect of rising tensions within and between countries—and the growing threat from terrorism—will be greater global disorder and considerable questions about the rules, institutions, and distribution of power in the international system. Europe. Europe’s sharpening tensions and doubts about its future cohesion stem from institutions mismatched to its economic and security challenges. EU institutions set monetary policy for Eurozone states, but state capitals retain fiscal and security responsibilities—leaving poorer members saddled with debt and diminished growth

prospects and each state determining its own approach to security. Public frustration with immigration , slow growth, and unemployment will fuel nativism and a preference for national solutions to continental problems . Outlook: Europe is likely to face additional shocks—banks remain unevenly

capitalized and regulated, migration within and into Europe will continue, and Brexit will encourage regional and separatist movements in other European countries. Europe’s aging population will undermine economic output, shift consumption toward services—like health care—and away from goods and

investment. A shortage of younger workers will reduce tax revenues, fueling debates over immigration to bolster the workforce. The EU’s future will hinge on its ability to reform its institutions, create jobs and growth, restore trust in elites, and address public concerns that immigration will radically alter national cultures . United States. The next five years will test US resilience . As in Europe , tough economic times have brought out societal and class divisions. Stagnant wages and rising income inequality are fueling doubts about global economic integration and the “American Dream” of upward mobility. The share of American men age 25- 54 not seeking work is at the highest level since the Great Depression. Median incomes rose by 5 percent in 2015, however, and there are signs of renewal in some communities where real estate is affordable, returns on foreign and domestic investment are high, leveraging of immigrant talent is the norm, and expectations of federal assistance are low, according to contemporary observers. Outlook: Despite signs of economic improvement, challenges will be significant, with public trust in leaders and institutions sagging, politics highly polarized, and government revenue constrained by modest growth and rising entitlement outlays. Moreover, advances in robotics and artificial intelligence are likely to further disrupt labor markets. Meanwhile, uncertainty is high around the world regarding Washington’s global leadership role. The United States has rebounded from troubled times before, however, such as when the period of angst in the 1970s was followed by a stronger economic recovery and global role in the world. Innovation at the state and local level, flexible financial markets, tolerance for risk-taking, and a demographic profile more balanced than most large countries offer upside potential. Finally, America is distinct because it was founded on an inclusive ideal—the pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness for all, however imperfectly realized—rather than a race or ethnicity. This legacy remains a critical advantage for managing divisions. Central and South America. Although state weakness and drug trafficking have and will continue to beset Central America, South America has been more stable than most regions of the world and has had many democratic advances—including recovery from populist waves from the right and the left. However, government efforts to provide greater economic and social stability are running up against budget and debt constraints. Weakened international demand for commodities has slowed growth. The expectations associated with new entrants to the middle class will strain public coffers, fuel political discontent, and possibly jeopardize the region’s significant progress against poverty and inequality. Activist civil society organizations are likely to fuel social tensions by increasing awareness of elite corruption, inadequate infrastructure, and mismanagement. Some incumbents facing possible rejection by their publics are seeking to protect their power, which could lead to a period of intense political competition and democratic backsliding in some countries. Violence is particularly rampant in northern Central America, as gangs and organized criminal groups have undermined basic governance by regimes that lack capacity to provide many basic public goods and services. Outlook: Central and South America are likely to see more frequent changes in governments that are mismanaging the economy and beleaguered by widespread corruption. Leftist administrations already have lost power in places like Argentina, Guatemala, and Peru and are on the defensive in Venezuela, although new leaders will not have much time to show they can improve conditions. The success or failure of Mexico’s high-profile reforms might affect the willingness of other countries in the region to take similar political risks. The OECD accession process may be an opportunity—and incentive— for some countries to improve economic policies in a region with fairly balanced age demographics, significant energy resources, and well-established economic links to Asia, Europe, and the United States. An Inward West? Among the industrial democracies of North America, Europe, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, leaders will search for ways to restore a sense of middle class wellbeing while some attempt to temper populist and nativist impulses. The result could be a more inwardly focused West than we have experienced in decades, which will seek to avoid costly foreign adventures while experimenting with domestic schemes to address fiscal limits, demographic problems, and wealth concentrations. This inward view will be far more pronounced in the European Union, which is absorbed by questions of EU governance and domestic challenges, than elsewhere. The European Union’s internal divisions, demographic woes, and moribund economic performance threaten its own status as a global player. For the coming five years at least, the need to restructure European relations in light of the UK’s decision to

leave the EU will undermine the region’s international clout and could weaken transatlantic cooperation, while anti-immigration sentiments among the region’s

populations will undermine domestic political support for Europe’s political leaders . Questions about the United States’ role in the world center on what the country can afford and what its public will support in backing allies, managing conflict, and overcoming its own divisions. Foreign publics and governments will be watching Washington for signs of compromise and cooperation , focusing

especially on global trade, tax reform, workforce preparedness for advanced technologies, race relations, and its openness to experimentation at the state and local levels. Lack of domestic progress would signal a shift toward retrenchment, a weaker middle class, and potentially further global drift into disorder and regional spheres of influence. Yet, America’s capital, both human and security, is immense. Much of the world’s best talent seeks to live and work in the United States, and domestic and global hope for a competent and constructive foreign policy remain high.

2nc – at: no model

Our policies are emulated – for better or worse – even if not universally nor immediately, shapes global responses over timeLaFranchi 18 (Howard LaFranchi, staff writer, Christian Science Monitor, internally citing Craig Mokhiber, director of the New York office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and chair of the migration task force within the UN Global Migration Compact negotiations, and Eric Schwartz, president of Refugees International and former assistant secretary of State for population, refugees, and migration, “Refugee crisis: While some follow US as it disengages, others lead,” 6-26-2018, https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2018/0626/Refugee-crisis-While-some-follow-US-as-it-disengages-others-lead DOA 7-25-2018)KMM

For years, the US set an example as the largest resettler of refugees and largest donor of funds to meet the needs of the displaced. Its withdrawal from that humanitarian enterprise has consequences. Around the world, the number of refugees and internally displaced people

continues to rise – now estimated at more than 68 million people, with more than a third of them refugees forced by conflict across international borders. In response, the United Nations’ member states are negotiating a new pact on migration that aims to improve the world’s response to the mounting crisis. All of the UN’s 193 members, that is, save one: the United States. The US under President Trump is sitting out the talks on an area of international policy where it long took the helm: It set an example as the largest resettler of refugees and largest donor of funds to meet the needs of the displaced, and as the world’s most powerful country it cajoled others to follow its lead and adopt its humanitarian values. The Trump administration announced in December that concerns over potential infringements on national sovereignty and border security compelled it to pull out of the negotiations, which are set to deliver a new Global Compact for Migration by the end of the year. The compact – like the Paris climate accord that the US under Mr. Trump withdrew from last year – includes no mandatory measures but seeks to offer guidelines and principles for orderly and safe migration and humane resettlement of refugees. But now the US withdrawal from the global migration talks – especially in the wake of the 2017 numbers released for World Refugee Day

last week showing a worsening crisis – is raising new concerns about the impact of the US turn on migration issues . Are other countries stepping up to fill the void left by the US, or are countries taking a cue from Trump ’s America and stepping back from the world’s

refugees and displaced? International migration experts say they’re seeing some of both – in a country like Canada welcoming more refugees than in past

years, for example, or on the other hand, in a country like Hungary matching Trump’s anti-immigrant posture and imposing harsh new anti-migrant measures. “If you looked at the world’s response to the migration crisis through the lens of the United States’ actions and policy prescriptions, you’d get a pretty

distorted view of the broader context and mobilization,” says Craig Mokhiber, director of the New York office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. As chair of the migration task force within the compact negotiations, Mr. Mokhiber says he’s seeing not just countries but nongovernmental refugee organizations, faith-based groups, the private sector, and municipalities come together to hammer out an accord. “So the US,” he says, “is very much an outlier.” But then he adds a caveat: “On the other hand, it’s true that a few countries have rejected international law and humanitarian norms since the crisis began,” he says. “And that’s where the US response to all of this

becomes very worrying,” he adds, “because when a very powerful country and traditional leader bows in any way to disrespecting human rights, others can be tempted to say, ‘We can follow this powerful leader’s example and do the same .’ ” 'The world does feel very

different' Others, too, say they see both trends happening. But they worry that the sheer weight and influence of the US in an international issue like refugee resettlement and migration policy could have a dire impact over time . “It is difficult to overestimate the impact that the rhetoric and policies of the Trump administration are having on so many levels around the world on efforts of

international organizations and humanitarians to address the challenges of this ongoing crisis,” says Eric Schwartz, president of Refugees International in Washington. The crisis of migration and rising numbers of refugees is not that different from just two years ago, Mr. Schwartz says, when all UN members (including the US) signed a “New York Declaration” on migration launching the current “compact” negotiations. At the time, then-President Barack Obama assembled world leaders to unveil a US pledge to resettle more refugees (110,000 in 2017) and to implore others to follow the American example. Most of the world’s refugees come from the same countries in conflict as a few years ago, with Syria, Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, and Somalia accounting for about two-thirds of refugees in 2017. “But the world does feel very different – and to my mind that

is attributable almost exclusively to the rhetoric and policies coming out of Washington ,” says Schwartz, a former assistant secretary of State for population, refugees, and migration. “American leadership has always been a powerful catalyst on all these issues,” he adds, “and now it’s not there.” There are also signs that the “different feel” extends to publics, including in the US. Polls show a majority of Americans still support receiving refugees and immigration generally, but in falling numbers. And in Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel has seen her support wither as she has championed immigrant assimilation in the wake of the large refugee influx of recent years. If anything, Schwartz says the Trump administration’s rhetoric and actions – from the Muslim travel ban that the Supreme Court upheld Tuesday and a steep reduction in the number of refugees to be resettled in the US to presidential warnings of an “infestation” of immigrants – are enabling the world’s worst actors, from Hungary to Myanmar. “Can you imagine a George W. Bush being complicit in the nationalist, antidemocratic, and anti-migrant rhetoric coming out of Europe right now?” Schwartz says.

2nc – at: temporary bad

Permanent immigration is historically what causes nativist backlash and threatens the EU – temporary’s keyEichengreen 18 (Barry Eichengreen, Professor of Economics and Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, Ph.D. Yale University, B.A. UC Santa Cruz, “10. Breaking Point,” The Populist Temptation: Economic Grievance and Political Reaction in the Modern Era, Oxford University Press, 2018, ISBN 9780190866303, p.140-144)KMMAll this suggests that the salience of economic grievances was shaped by other factors, namely, identity politics. Radical right parties tend to be skeptical or outright hostile to liberal democracy, pluralism, and minority rights. Opinion polls reveal particular opposition to immigration by people of a different race or ethnicity. They indicate special resistance to immigrants from non-European countries. They show particular hostility to Muslim

people.29 These patterns may reflect the challenge of assimilating immigrants from North Africa and the Middle East and the perceived threat to the dominant culture . Consistent with this view, surveys suggest less concern over time with the impact of immigration on jobs ,

taxes, and public services but more concern with the effect on “cultural life,” as the identity issue is framed by survey takers . One thinks of France, which bars Muslim women in head scarves from working in private day care centers and accompanying school outings, and where Parliament in 2010 passed a law banning women from wearing the burka and other face-covering headgear in public. One can stretch ones imagination and suggest that face coverings hinder the identification of potential terrorists, but it is more plausible that the burka is a visible reminder of the presence of a large religious minority and therefore a challenge to laicite, the notion enshrined in the constitution of France as an indivisible secular republic. In fact, immigration to France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany from Turkey and North Africa has a long history. In the 1950s and 1960s, when labor was scarce, Western Europe actively sought to attract guest workers from these countries. Again this points up the question of why the impact of these immigrants on “cultural life” was now more of an issue. One answer is that the number of Moroccans and Turks in the Netherlands rose tenfold between the early 1970s and 2010, while the number of Turks living in Germany rose fourfold. Another is that the rise of religious fundamentalism made assimilation more difficult. Tradition-minded Muslims (head scarves making

traditional Muslims more visible) challenged Dutch notions of “openmindedness” and French conceptions of Liicite. A third explanation is that the presence of immigrants created security concerns, real or imagined, after 9/11. In addition, there was the shift from temporary migration to permanent residency . In the 1950s and 1960s, guest workers in Germany had typically stayed for a limited period before returning home. They complied with what

German bureaucrats called the Rotationprinzip (rotation principle), which authorized them to work for only a limited time. Returning to one’s country of origin was attractive so long as Europe was booming and there was always the option of moving back.30 But in the 1970s, with growth slowing, the prospects for reentry and reemployment dimmed. And as unemployment rose, Western European governments hardened their barriers to immigration. Temporary migration thus became permanent. Permanent migrants not unreasonably sought to bring their families, as they were permitted to do by their host countries’ reunification laws. Guest workers once had been single men shunted into company housing. Now they took up residence in working-

class neighborhoods. Their children attended school. Their wives did what housewives do. As they became more visible, European societies were forced to grapple with diversity and assimilation.31 This was a clear instance of the interaction of economic factors with identity politics , where slower growth led to the hardening of borders , which in turn caused a change in immigration from temporary to permanent, raising issues of cultural life on which populist parties subsequently pounced. Greece too had its immigrants from Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, and Russia even before the refugee crisis, which Golden Dawn had sought to exploit. By some estimates, as much as 10 percent of the Greek population is foreign born, or at least was before the country’s crisis.32 This was another unintended consequence of the hardening of borders in Northern Europe: immigration was diverted toward Southern Europe, where border enforcement was lax. In Greece, however, the populist shift was to the left, not the right, and the dominant factor was external circumstances, namely, the country’s need for a financial lifeline in order to stay in the euro area and the European Union. The European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, the members of the socalled Troika, demanded harsh austerity as a condition of assistance. So when the mainstream parties were implicated in the crisis and surrendered to the Troika’s terms, the populist backlash turned to the Left as the credible opponent of austerity. The reaction was not so much the people against foreigners, the split that makes for right-wing populism— although the Troika was unmistakably foreign—as much as it was the people against the elites, both the domestic elites blamed for creating the mess and the foreign technocrats seen as aggravating it, the split that makes for left-wing populism. Greece’s history of dictatorship also militated against the authoritarian Right, something that was similarly true in Portugal and Spain. Few disaffected voters wished to return to a brutal authoritarian regime like the military junta of 1967-1974. Syriza thus benefited from having descended from the independent Greek Communist Party with its antifascist, anti-dictatorial roots. Still, the corruption and incompetence of earlier governments, the burden of Troika-imposed austerity, and the suspicion that wealthy individuals with assets abroad were getting off scot-free were more than enough to elicit a populist reaction. In the October 2009 elections Syriza had won barely 5 percent of the vote. In January 2015 it won 36 percent and was asked to form a government. Such is the power of a crisis. Where Greece’s history of military dictatorship limited support for Golden Dawn, Eastern Europe’s history of Soviet domination shaped political reactions differently. In Eastern Europe the “others” opposed to the people were left-wing politicians and parties identified with nowdiscredited socialism. Politicians with leftist leanings were associated with the corrupt Communist elite of the period before 1990 by rightof-center figures seeking to define themselves in opposition. Because the elite was on the Left, politicians seeking to play up the division between the elite and people today arc on the Right. Under Communism these countries felt little pressure to come to terms with historical persecution of minorities, since such behavior could be ascribed to the contradictions of capitalism, following standard Marxist-Leninist logic. Not coming to terms meant that racism and anti-Semitism remained more prevalent, or at least more overtly prevalent, than in Western Europe.

Starting in 2015 these attitudes and prejudices were redirected at refugees and asylum seekers by right-wing politicians seeking to mobilize nationalist support. And the fact that the nation-state had been subsumed by the international socialist order and dominated by the Soviet Union meant that aggressive nationalism could now be portrayed as a reassertion of what was just and right. This historical connection was visible even in Germany. The dangers of nationalism and prejudice featured in public school curricula in the Federal Republic (West Germany) but not in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), where the rise of the Nazis was ascribed not to a heritage of anti-Semitism or to a resurgent nationalism, base instincts now to be avoided, but to the contradictions of the market system.33 Germans educated in the East were not instilled with the same intellectual and emotional aversion to nationalism and antiminority sentiment. Forty-four percent of West Germans polled in 2015 opposed Chancellor Angela Merkels policy of welcoming asylum seekers, while fully 56 percent of Easterners opposed the policy.34 The far-right anti-Muslim movement Pegida (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) was founded, not incidentally, by an advertising executive and professional chef, Lutz Bachmann, born and bred in Dresden.

And it was not just in the United Kingdom that nationalist, antiimmigrant , anti-Muslim sentiment was channeled into EU-skepticism . The Single Market with its four freedoms, including freedom of labor mobility, makes it hard for individual member states to unilaterally secure their borders .35 The EU’s core values of pluralism and tolerance are clear in the acquis communautaire, the body of EU law that member states are required to follow. The acquis includes chapters on justice, freedom, and fundamental human rights. Governments that abridge minority rights or limit freedom of the press can be sanctioned by the European Commission, the EU’s proto-executive branch, and the European Court of Justice, its judicial authority. In 2015 the Commission launched an investigation, cosmetically known as a “dialogue,” of Polish legislation voted through by the right-wing Law and Justice Party that compromised the independence of the Constitutional Tribunal, the country’s supreme court, and that subjected Poland s public broadcasters to state control, limiting freedom of the press and media. At roughly the same time, the commission launched an infringement case against the Hungarian government of Viktor Orban for a restrictive refugee settlement law that conflicted with the Common European Asylum System and for erecting a steel fence along the country’s southern border. Successful prosecution of such cases would require the country to change its national law in order to remain an EU member in good standing or else lose its voting rights in the Council of

Ministers, where decisions on the EU budget and other such matters are taken, and be subject to financial penalties.36 It is thus unsurprising that right-wing, anti-elite, anti-establishment, nativist movements make the EU a target. The EU is an elite project, having been pushed on reluctant publics by intellectuals and high officials since the days of Jean Monnet. It is inadequately democratic, since important decisions are taken by technocrats of the European Commission who arc not directly accountable to national parliaments or the voting public. Staffed by people from twenty-eight member states, it is dominated by foreigners, whatever the country in question. Its Rule of Law Framework, under which the 2015 Polish investigation was launched, is expressly designed to constrain illiberal, nationalist actions. 'There is no consensus on how the EU should address these strains. The elites have responded, predictably, that the best way of containing discontent is by streamlining the Commission and other European institutions to enable them to operate more efficiently.37 The problem is that nationalist critics of the EU are likely to oppose the “efficiently” part insofar as they already oppose the “more.” Europhiles such as the economist Thomas Piketty suggest that the best way of beating back the nationalist threat is by correcting the democratic deficit, strengthening the decision-making powers of the European Parliament, and supplementing it for euro-related matters with a Eurozone Assembly.38 But doing so implies sharing decision-making with foreigners, which is antithetical to those with nationalistic instincts. Still others suggest that faster economic growth is the best way of fostering support for the EU and for the ideas of Piketty et alia.39 No doubt faster growth would help. Too bad that there is no agreement about how to best achieve it.

Attempts to unify Europe around permanent residency already failed – even if it’s worse, even if it’s illegal, solidarity through a race to temporary status is the only way to avoid a race to the true bottomKarageorgiou 16 (Eleni Karageorgiou, Lund University, Sweden, “Downgrading asylum standards to coerce solidarity: Sweden as a case in point,” 5-13-2016, http://eumigrationlawblog.eu/downgrading-asylum-standards-to-coerce-solidarity-sweden-as-a-case-in-point/ DOA 7-29-2018)KMMAsylum in Sweden: a temporary “respite” For at least a decade now, Sweden has been amongst the EU countries with the highest rate of first

time registered asylum applicants compared to their population. Between 2010 and 2014 Sweden received, on average 24.4 applicants per 1,000 inhabitants. According to the

UNHCR Asylum Trends report, the 28 Member States of the European Union registered 570,800 new asylum claims in 2014. Germany and Sweden accounted for 30 (173,100) and 13 (75,100) per cent of all asylum claims in the EU, respectively. In the Nordic Region, Sweden was the main destination country accounting for 70 per cent of all new claims registered. The landscape has changed significantly after June 2015, when Sweden experienced a 197% increase compared to previous months. The number of monthly applications in August 2015 was 11,735, which more than doubled to 24,261 in September 2015, and increased by a further 61% to 39,055 applications in October 2015. Of a total of 163,000 asylum applications received by Sweden in 2015, 114.000 were lodged within the last three months, September – December 2015. To this number, one should add another 1900 refugees who are yearly resettled in Sweden, through the Swedish refugee quota system. The increased arrivals of individuals seeking protection in 2015, particularly after the summer were perceived by the government, political parties and local authorities as stretching the state’s reception capacities to its limits . Municipalities have reported that they can no longer manage reception in a secure manner, while the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency has signaled that important public services cannot cope with the strain. According to the Swedish government “Sweden can no longer guarantee a roof over the head of those who make their way to our country and in the last week people have had to sleep outdoors”. Already in October 2015, the ruling Social Democrat-Green coalition and the four parties in the center-right alliance opposition agreed on a range of measures that would contribute to a more coherent and robust system for the reception and settlement of asylum seekers within Sweden . To that end, asylum seekers were to be distributed across the country so that all municipalities take in a fair share. At the same time, the parties expressed their commitment to promote a “shared responsibility” system between the Member States of the European Union, claiming that “Sweden has taken greater responsibility than any other country in the Western world…but no country can handle this challenge alone”. The following month and while asylum applications were on the rise, Sweden adopted a tougher response aiming at reducing the number of asylum seekers arriving in the country . The government held a press conference on 24 November 2015 where it presented a set of forthcoming amendments to domestic alien’s legislation and provisional measures to control and restrain entry into its territory. In the meantime, the European Commission proposed Sweden to be temporarily suspended of its obligations under the EU relocation mechanism. On 11 Feb 2015, the Swedish Government released the first draft of the legislative “Proposal of a law on limitations of the possibility to receive residence permits in Sweden” which was sent out to competent authorities for consultation. It is worth noting that over 60 institutions around the country commented upon the proposal, with most of them (see for example Amnesty, UNHCR, Uppsala University, Lund University) being particularly critical, pointing out its shortcomings as regards protection considerations and clarity. After the completion of the consultation process, the government slightly revised the

initial draft, insisting though on the proposal’s fundamentals. The new law introducing the proposed amendments is expected to enter into force by 20 July 2016 pending adoption by the Swedish parliament. It will be in force for three years and will be applicable for decisions taken within this period. Briefly, the new law includes the

following exceptions to the provisions of the current Swedish Aliens Act: persons granted international protection will no longer be eligible for permanent residence permits, after a proposed reduction in the duration of the permits to 3 years for refugees and 13 months for subsidiary protection beneficiaries, with the possibility for extension if the protection ground continues to exist ; A restriction of the right to family reunification for refugees is introduced, as they will have the right to be reunited only with nuclear family members, namely spouses, partners or children under the age of 18. Persons eligible for subsidiary protection are in principle deprived from their right to family reunification unless a rejection would be contrary to a Sweden’s obligation under international law; Finally, a permanent residence permit may be granted to applicants whose first temporary residence permit expires upon the condition they can prove sufficient income to support themselves. For those under the age of 25, a permanent permit will only be granted if they have completed upper secondary education, and not solely through employment. Minors may be granted permanent residence permit in limited circumstances in light of their health condition. Two additional limitations introduced with the new law are worth noting. Firstly, Swedish law provides for a third ground of protection encompassing individuals who do not qualify as refugees or beneficiaries for subsidiary protection. This is a domestic provision lacking equivalence in the Qualification Directive and Refugee Convention. Pursuant to Chapter 4 Section 2a of the Aliens Act, Sweden used to grant the right to a residence permit to people “otherwise in need of protection” namely those fleeing severe conflicts, but for whom the threshold of “armed conflict” required for subsidiary protection is not fulfilled. Individuals fleeing environmental disasters in their country of origin were also covered by this provision. This ground of protection is now removed. Secondly, Swedish law provides for a possibility to authorize the residence of aliens in its territory, based on “exceptionally or particularly distressing circumstances”. In particular, pursuant to Chapter 5 Section 6 of the Aliens Act, Sweden may grant a residence permit taking into account the personal circumstances that have to be such that the alien’s situation appears particularly distressing. Factors usually included in the overall assessment of the person’s personal situation are social exclusion, victimization as a result of torture, trafficking or other similar severe experiences in the country of origin. According to the new proposal, there will still be a possibility to a residence permit on such grounds, but only in cases where returning the person back to their country of origin would violate Swedish obligations under international law. This amendment raised much criticism during the consultation process, inter alia by the Swedish Migration Board, which is now required to determine on a case-by-case basis Sweden’s international obligations that may be violated if a decision on return is to be taken. As suggested by the authority “this lack of clarity is problematic and leads to difficulties in the implementation process”. At the same time, in order to control entry to its territory, Sweden has secured a temporary exemption from the EU’s Schengen rules, announcing the reintroduction of border controls to all means of public transportation, through a regulation applicable since 4th of January 2016 valid for 6 months. Such measures are justified as maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. This is actually the first time since the establishment of the Nordic Passport Union in 1957, that people travelling to Sweden from another state by bus, train, or boat are required to show a valid photo identity card with a photo. As regards asylum seekers and refugees, it implies that those with a valid ID may pass, while those without, may not. Such practice was followed by the Danish government who imposed border controls on its southern border with Germany, in an attempt to control the number of people seeking protection arriving in these territories. The above description does no justice to the lengthy process and various amendments in the Swedish legislation, it does provide though the basis on which the objectives of the new measures and questions on solidarity are discussed in the next paragraphs. A nuanced approach to Sweden’s legislative backward stepping will be attempted moving beyond the overstretched-capacities issue. The argument to be made is that precisely as for almost all EU Member States, the asylum situation in Sweden has raised serious concerns, proving the existing system ill-adapted to the new circumstances. Nevertheless, the increased numbers of arrivals is one side of the coin. Strictly politically , the decision for such a policy shift was heavily informed by the general situation in the EU as well as by the stance of other EU Member States and less by the situation in Sweden as such, therefore it should not be reduced to a mere numerical issue. The question to be asked is whether and to what extent an EU Member State may downgrade protection standards and deny entry in its territory to asylum seekers and refugees without

proper identification documents based on the claim that this would evoke more EU solidarity and responsibility . Coercing interstate solidarity by undermining protection The aforementioned legislative proposal aims, according to the official statement, at adjusting “the asylum regulations to the

minimum level in the EU so that more people choose to seek asylum in other EU countries”. This basically means that Sweden no longer wishes to be perceived, as the “soft touch” country with a refugee welcoming policy. To that end, it seeks to convey a twofold message: on the one hand it targets potential protection seekers in an effort to dissolve the illusion of Sweden being the best destination choice by offering exceptional treatment compared to the rest of Europe; on the other hand it seems to signal its unwillingness to continue offering itself as the easy way out for other EU Member States, which deflect their European and international asylum responsibilities. In the absence of a concerted way to handle the current refugee situation in Europe, Sweden appears willing to subscribe to an individualistic approach to asylum, followed lately by many EU Member States, translated into rights-slashing and strict measures of border controls to diminish the number of asylum applicants. Leveling down standards to restrain the number of protection seekers, is certainly not a new trend in European asylum policies. The asylum debate in Europe for the past 15 years has been characterized by a concern about the increasing number of asylum applications and their uneven distribution among countries. There appears to be a widely held belief that the unequal distribution of asylum applications across Europe is due to the relative restrictiveness of states’ asylum policies : the stricter the asylum policies, the lower the number of applications

registered in a county. Although this view has been challenged by scholars, it has informed the EU’s attempts to harmonize national asylum legislation in order to prevent a potential race to the bottom in protection standards and to eliminate policy differences among Member States. The adoption of common norms is suggested to constitute a form of solidarity between Member States who basically commit not to minimize reception and asylum standards

and thereby guarantee refugees a minimum level of protection. This has provided the material basis for solidarity , which since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty has been introduced to primary EU law as a governing principle of EU policies on asylum, immigration and border management (Article 80 TFEU). Despite the fact that solidarity as stipulated in the Treaty is state-oriented (“between the Member States”), it seems that when it comes to legislation designed to promote protection and uphold the right to asylum and the prohibition of non-refoulement, solidarity cannot be divorced from human rights considerations. And this begs the question: does the fact that many EU Member States are not showing a commitment to responsibility sharing, circumventing their European obligations, provide Sweden with a justification or even a right to deny protection to those in need? From a political point of view , such a justification may sound reasonable, even necessary . From a legal perspective though, this is questionable , to say the least. Sweden, by actively sealing its borders for persons with no valid IDs, raises the risk for many people fleeing war and violence to end up in countries where their right to asylum is not guaranteed. History proves that rejection at the frontier is not an uncommon response in cases of “mass influx” of refugees. Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, by which Sweden is bound, provides that no one shall be expelled ‘in any manner whatsoever’ to the frontiers of territories where their lives or freedoms may be in danger. This provision applies to recognized refugees as well as asylum seekers, and there is strong academic consensus that this provision applies to those presenting themselves at the border. Perhaps, a stronger argument can be made that Swedish actions are not in full compliance with EU and European human rights law. Individuals with a genuine need for protection but without a valid ID are denied entry to Sweden, without being properly informed by the personnel checking the documents about their right to ask for asylum and without being referred to the competent authorities. For the sake of the argument, it is appropriate to clarify that, even if supposedly Denmark is a ‘safe country’, this doesn’t guarantee that asylum seekers denied entry in Sweden will get the protection they are entitled to (see MSS case) there and won’t be pushed further to the South by the Danish authorities as a result of the restrictive-policies “domino”. Thus, Sweden’s claim that persons affected by the ID checks “are already in safe countries and nothing prevents them to apply for asylum there” is rather weak. In addition, the fact that Sweden removes the right to a residence permit for “persons otherwise in need of protection”, namely those who don’t qualify as refugees and beneficiaries for subsidiary protection is also problematic. The 1951 Refugee Convention may not explicitly protect people fleeing their countries due to environmental disasters. Equally, Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive may not include in its wording, individuals who escape prolonged conflicts or civil disturbances in their country of origin. Yet there may be cases similar to those that have been so far adjudicated by Courts (i.e. Diakite) where individuals are eligible for protection. The point to be made here, is that until now Sweden has explicitly recognized the right to protection to certain groups of individuals, following human rights standards set by Courts. It now, though, reserves this right and practically limits the grounds on which applicants can claim protection. Equally, Sweden makes protection based on other, mainly humanitarian grounds dependent on whether possible return would entail a violation of its international obligations. This means that potential applicants falling under this category will have to rely either on their attorney’s abilities or, chiefly, on the decision-authorities’ discretion. It remains to be seen how the Swedish Migration Board and Swedish Courts will decide upon such cases. Taking the above into consideration, solidarity and cooperation between states can certainly be a solution towards more and better protection, yet lack of it cannot provide a legitimate basis for a protection respite. This, chiefly because of the following reason: the orthodox and legally acceptable way to give effect to solidarity amongst states in the EU would be for Sweden to initiate the application of the different solidarity mechanisms provided for, at EU level . In particular, Sweden and other EU states experiencing equivalent pressure may invoke instruments such as the Temporary Protection Directive, request technical assistance by the European Asylum Support Office, demand more EU funds to cope with the increased costs, confront other EU Member States for non-compliance with EU law through the Court of Justice, before diving into a renationalization of asylum policies with unclear consequences on individual rights. Undoubtedly, one has to acknowledge that a group of Member States – amongst them Sweden and Germany – tried , at a political level, to push the others on more fair sharing, but failed to get any results . Yet, as long as solidarity has been positivized in EU treaties, there are legal proceedings that can be followed and coerce compliance, if such positivization is

to have any legal implications for Member States, at all. Admittedly, this is politically more aggressive and would demand lengthy consultations. Nevertheless, it should still be appreciated, at least as a symbolic move. Instead , Sweden decided to coerce solidarity amongst Member States by compromising and ultimately de-solidarizing refugee protection , which can be hardly compliant with the letter and

spirit of Article 80 TFEU. Solidarity to control versus solidarity to protect To sum it up, by proposing the new legislative amendments in its asylum and border policies, Sweden does nothing but opting for more restrictive measures in order to reduce the number of protection seekers in its territory and shift responsibility. This is, as earlier suggested, not a new phenomenon, at the EU level. There is, however, a remarkable difference between Sweden and its predecessors. Sweden does not compete with the rest of the EU Member States. It competes with itself. Following the shift in focus from “minimum” to “common” standards that the development of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) has generated, evident in the Lisbon Treaty and the recast asylum legislation (RCD Article 4, APD Article 5), Sweden has consciously, over the past years, developed an asylum system that goes beyond what is, at minimum, required by international and EU law. Faced though with an increasing xenophobic sentiment within the society, in combination with the absence of coordination and common approaches to asylum in the EU , it gave in to the nationalist protectionism long embedded in the EU asylum and migration policies at large . Unsurprisingly, this won’t change much in reality. As it has been scholarly suggested, asylum legislation is but one determinant affecting the choice of destination made by a person seeking protection. Availability of social networks or language and history ties, for example, could be of far greater significance. Sweden is much aware of that, this is why the symbolic value of the message it seeks to convey, weighs more. On the other hand, in practice, even if the proposed amendments are of temporary nature, Sweden has set a precedent of backward stepping, no matter what a state has progressively achieved in terms of human rights protection and legal developments. At the same time, what such practices reveal is the dimension of EU solidarity, forged on the basis of narrowly economistic and nationalist grounds which unpacks CEAS inherent tension: security and control versus human rights protection, solidarity amongst Member States versus asylum. If the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, as enshrined in EU treaties is to have any legal implications whatsoever, Sweden’s recourse to existing solidarity

mechanisms should be prioritized, while lack of solidarity cannot justify shift of responsibility. Otherwise, EU asylum solidarity is merely equated with charity and political rhetoric, destined to remain a nice word yet, an empty legal concept.

NB—OTHERS

2nc – nb – brain drain

Indefinite renewal does NOT link – it’s the goldilocks equilibrium that BOTH enables just as many people to stay as long as they need to solve the U.S. market, while also encouraging them to remain sufficiently invested in foreign markets to avoid downsides – AND independently spurs foreign assistance that externally resolves the impact to the disad – BUT plan and perm trade offFaizer 17 (M. Akram Faizer, Professor of Law at Lincoln Memorial University's Duncan School of Law, J.D. University of Notre Dame Law School, B.A. International Relations, B.S. Physiology, McGill University, “America First: Improving a Recalcitrant Immigration and Refugee Policy,” Tennessee Law Review, Summer, 2017, 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 933, l/n)KMMMost importantly, it protects these migrants from the stigma of illegality that facilitates a backlash against their presence, which both isolates them and facilitates their exploitation by unscrupulous employers and human traffickers. 122 Although economic migrants lack the treaty and customary international law protections offered to refugees, the lack of international protection offered economic migrants is clearly an outdated relic. Although most economic migrants are currently absorbed into first-world societies by means of immigration and naturalization policies, that are altogether inadequate in light of the migration demand and the economic need for migrants in much of the developed world. Furthermore, in view of the population explosion that is expected in Africa, the Middle East and other regions of the global south, 123 migration demand will only increase over time. 124 Rich countries such as the U.S. have a choice. They can continue with the status quo, which means that the unauthorized migration problem will grow and remain unaddressed. This, in turn, will make President Trump's campaign proposal to build a wall on the Mexican border, over time, a relatively benign border security measure in a country that will have adopted a fortress-like mentality to exclude the outside world. To paraphrase the great French diplomat Talleyrand, this would be "worse than a crime. It [would be] a blunder." 125 The U.S. can encourage other rich countries to avoid this dystopia by recognizing and addressing the migration demand by means of a much- expanded temporary worker and [*956] residency program that allows migrants the opportunity to legally improve their living standards in developed-world countries on a temporary basis so that their skills and purchasing power are not forever lost to their countries of origin . I would advocate expanding the current number of 600,000 annual temporary work visas to 2-3 million per year and account for this by reducing the number of permanent residency green cards from the current one million per year to a negligible number. Those 2-3 million temporary visas are to be issued to both skilled and unskilled workers for a period of up to five years and the visa holders are to be given access to private sector jobs in the U.S. economy on terms that are equal with U.S. citizens. The visas, which are to be first offered to economic migrants currently working and living illegally in the U.S., are to be issued with strict conditions that visa holders are expected to repatriate at the end of the visa term unless good cause can be shown for one-year extensions. B. Refugees The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as a person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 126 Internally Displaced Persons are those who have been forced to flee their homes for the same reasons as refugees, but remain in their own country and have not crossed an international border. 127 To illustrate the difference, there are currently 22.5 million refugees and 65.6 million displaced persons worldwide. 128 Of the 22.5 million refugess that do cross international frontiers, the vast majority move to developing nations of the global south 129 with only 3.2 million [*957] awaiting asylum claims in developed first-world nations 130 This means that 86 percent of refugees under the UNHCR's mandate 131 currently reside in low to moderate income countries close to conflict areas. 132 The Refugee Convention requires signatory countries to, among other things, provide refugees with identification and travel papers, offer them the possibility of assimilation and naturalization, and most importantly, not refoule or forcibly return refugees to the country where they "would be threatened on account of . . . race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group[,] or political opinion". 133 Although developing-world nations typically fall short of the obligation to allow refugees the opportunity to assimilate and naturalize, 134 all signatories to the Refugee Convention are bound by the obligation of non-refoulement while the circumstances giving rise to refugee status continue. 135 The U.S. and other developed countries abide by this requirement largely because the refugees granted asylum into their jurisdictions are typically granted permanent residency with a means of subsequent naturalization. 136 [*958] This whole scheme is problematic. First, although developed countries like the U.S. do abide by the Refugee Convention's requirements of assimilation, naturalization, and non-refoulement, this is, by implication, premised upon doing the utmost to exclude refugees from their jurisdictions. 137 As Hathaway and Neve have written: Even though international law presently requires no more than the provision of rights-regarding temporary protection, Northern states, in law or in practice, have historically afforded refugees permanent status. As the interest-convergence between refugees and developed countries has disappeared, Northern states have sought to avoid the arrival of refugees by adopting policies of external deterrence. Because developed states have the logistical capacity to prevent the arrival of many, and sometimes most, refugees, they have been able to implement non-entrée practices that prevent refugees from even reaching their frontiers. Since legal duties arise only once refugees successfully access a state's jurisdiction, non-entrée practices are a relatively invisible, and hence politically expedient, means to ensure that refugees are never in a position to assert their legal right to protection. 138 Developed countries effectively prevent refugees from being able to file refugee claims. Hathaway and Neve write as follows: Specifically, most Northern states impose a visa requirement on the nationals of refugee-producing states, and penalize airlines and other transportation companies for bringing unauthorized refugees into their territories. By refusing to grant visas for the purpose of making a claim to asylum, Northern countries have been able to insulate themselves from many potential claimants of refugee status. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has expressed concern that visas are a serious obstacle to the admission to protection of refugees, and may in some instances [*959] put refugees at serious risk of refoluement, that is, of return to the country in which they assert they will be at risk of grave harm. 139 Resistance to honoring duties owed to refugees follows from a growing concern about migration-based demographic changes. 140 Hathaway and Neve explain that "the legal right of refugees to [evade typical] immigration control rules means that persons not of a state's choosing [can] effectively be entitled to [permanently] join its community" and effectuate permanent demographic changes. 141 This, in societies like the U.S. that have "a tradition of equating refugee status with the right to remain permanently . . . ," leads to fear of widespread and undesired social change. 142 Moreover, "even in those Northern states that have a long tradition of receiving immigrants, there is concern about the non-selective nature of the duty to admit refugees." 143 This is a problem not limited to the rich countries of the global north. 144 Many East Asian states, "including Brunei, China, Japan, and Malaysia, are preoccupied with avoiding the arrival of refugees of distinct cultural or ethnic backgrounds." 145 This presents refugee advocates with the reality that refugee admission consistent with the Refugee Convention's purposes and global refugee needs, requires eventual repatriation to address the legitimate concerns about unconsented to cultural change in receiving states. 146 Hathaway and Neve write: [i]t is presently politically unwise to insist that states permanently enfranchise all refugees. Such a stance holds refugees hostage to a major project of social transformation. We need instead to accommodate the need of refugees to flee with the prevalence of often narrow understandings of community inspired by the rise of ethnic nationalism and the demise of the Cold War interest-convergence. This accommodation will clearly not amount to a complete recognition of the right of the present inhabitants of states to exclude all outsiders. Yet the terms upon which refugees enter [*960] a foreign state could be qualified to prevent refugees from becoming pawns in the internal struggles of asylum states over the meaning of community. In particular, a solid and dependable system of refugee protection need not have any enduring impact on the receiving state's communal self-definition. It could instead be oriented to ensuring that, at least in most cases, refugees ultimately repatriate to their own country when conditions permit. 147 This is not to heartlessly violate the international law against refoulement. Rather: temporary protection can be structured in a way that recognizes and protects core human rights, encourages self-reliance, and preserves the social, political, and cultural identity of the refugee community. If return is made practicable by an empowering system of repatriation aid and development assistance, the solution-oriented protection system we propose has the potential to renew asylum capacity regularly. As a reasonable and principled compromise between the needs of refugees and the migration control objectives of host governments, temporary protection will encourage states to live up to their international protection responsibilities, rather than avoid them. This is because the repatriation of most, if not all, refugees sends a clear signal that the system is not just a "back door" route to permanent immigration. As it becomes understood that refugees are received on an extraordinary basis and that their presence does not require any fundamental adjustment to the host community's self-definition, the implied threat presently associated with the arrival of refugees can be defused. The failure to promote repatriation, on the other hand, is inconsistent with the logic of refugee status as a situation-specific trump on immigration control rules. Because refugees are admitted on the basis of necessity, it cannot legitimately be asserted that they should routinely be entitled to stay in the host state once the harm in their own country has been

brought to an end. 148 [*961] V. PROPOSAL FOR GREATER PROVISION OF TEMPORARY RESIDENCE PERMITS TO ADDRESS MIGRANT NEEDS The best approach to dealing with the immigration and refugee crisis would be for developed countries to take a more proactive approach to dealing with issues related to the Global Commons 149 such as climate change, state failure, and international crises. It will also require them to relieve the burden on developing nations and resettle a far greater number of refugees and displaced persons within their nations. These are not likely to be forthcoming responses from developed nations such as the U.S. if refugee and displaced person resettlement requires permanent residency provision. This is because active involvement to address global problems will be deterred should rich nations feel obliged to permanently resettle conflict victims . Similarly, with respect to resettlement in rich countries, the current provision of asylum status followed by permanent residency leads those countries to not only avoid the issue, but, as is their response to Haitian refugees, who sought asylum to the U.S. after the 1991 coup against former President Jean Bertrand Aristide and the January 12, 2010 magnitude seven earthquake that decimated the country, 150 actually devote hard and soft resources to effectively prevent asylum claims from being effectuated. 151 Although requiring the eventual repatriation will be difficult to administer, it will, if effectively and humanely done, provide political support to political moderates seeking international engagement and humanitarian resettlement. It will ideally stem the backlash against migrants that is evidenced by President Trump's suspension of the U.S. Refugee Assistance [*962] Program and his Administration's repeated and ill-advised attempts to ban travelers from seven majority-Muslim countries. 152 A. Temporary Residence Permits The current paradigm of granting permanent residency to migrants has the effect of encouraging developed democracies to prevent the entry of those most in need. This is because nativist opposition to migrants, which is legitimized by the political and cultural consequences of unauthorized migration and naturalization, is forcefully being effectuated to create a fortress-like approach to national sovereignty. By stepping-up assistance to all migrants, the U.S. can once again lead the community of nations on an issue of compelling importance to global well-being. This will only be forthcoming if its citizens can be assured that allowing for greater migration will not distort the political culture based on migrant permanent residency. Migrants are to be issued five-year temporary residency permits that will allow them to live, work, and travel as is the case with refugees resettled in the U.S. under the Refugee Admissions Program. 153 The temporary residency permits are to be renewed for one-year periods only if the migrant can show good cause or a significant hardship if repatriated. An obvious objection to this proposal is that it treats these individuals unequally compared to citizens and permanent residents . It also will require receiving states to devote more resources to deport unwilling migrants than is currently the case. However, all new policies meant to address a particular set of problems create new ones. Here, the problems engendered by the policy, though real, are altogether more defensible than the status quo. As we have seen,

assuring migrants de jure equality has had the perverse consequence of preventing them from accessing developed countries and improving their living standards. Although repatriation is harsh, it does not violate the Refugee Convention's prohibition against refoulement because the Convention

specifically authorizes repatriation to [*963] countries of origin when conditions are safe to do so. 154 The current paradigm of asylum-granting followed by permanent residency encourages states to disregard the Refugee Convention's purpose and spend great resources to prevent the entry of would-be refugee claimants. Examples of this include not only President Trump's temporary suspension of the U.S. Refugee Assistance Program, but Australia's decision to process and house refugees in the Micronesian state of Nauru to prevent refugees from effectuating asylum claims on Australian territory 155 and France's creating of an artificial international zone within Paris's De Gaulle Airport to prevent asylum seekers from making claims on French soil. 156 A similar pattern is at play with respect to economic migrants. The U.S.'s abject failure to address the issues of economic inequality and insecurity has led to the rise of populist, anti-immigration sentiment. 157 Britain's failure to address the issue since the 1990s led to the Brexit vote to withdraw from the E.U. 158 and France's

political polarization on the issue led to the evisceration of both major political parties and led Marine Le Pen succeeding to a run-off in the 2017 French Presidential election. 159 The rich-world is disregarding the obvious demand for migration and is harming global well-being by resorting to a fortress approach to avoid migration's demographic consequences. The current cumbersome and outdated immigration laws have the effect of incentivizing the uncertainty, exploitation, resentment, and backlash against immigrants because it forces most of the world's unskilled migrants and refugees into an unauthorized immigration paradigm. This leaves them vulnerable to criminal and economic exploitation by unscrupulous employers and traffickers. 160 [*964] Offering an expanded temporary residency program would provide substantial benefits for migrants, the receiving states, the sending states and overall global well-being . B. Changing Birthright Citizenship Laws Birthright citizenship in the U.S. stems from the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, which provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside." 161 This provision was ratified in 1868 and effectively reversed Dred Scott v. Sandford, 162 which concluded that African Americans born in the U.S., unless naturalized, cannot be U.S. citizens and therefore lack the right to sue for their freedom in federal court on diversity of citizenship grounds. 163 Although some argue that the "under the jurisdiction thereof" language might exempt the children of illegal migrants from birthright citizenship, 164 this is a minority position and is not the position adopted by the U.S. government, which currently grants U.S. citizenship to all those born in the U.S. except the children of foreign diplomats. 165 In Canada, birthright citizenship stems from the Citizenship Act, 166 which provides that all persons, with the exception of the children of diplomatic personnel or foreign government employees, are entitled to Canadian citizenship by law. 167 Other developed nations such as Australia, New Zealand, France, the [*965] United Kingdom and Ireland abandoned birthright citizenship. 168 With respect to the U.S. and Canada, though, birthright citizenship will have to be revisited with respect to migrants, be they illegal, temporary or refugees. For Canada, this will require nothing more than for the Parliament of Canada to enact an amendment to the Citizenship Act. 169 For the U.S., although purists may argue that this would require a constitutional amendment, the actual contours of the limitations on natural born citizenship and the "under the jurisdiction thereof" language have never been spelled out. 170 My proposal would be to have international migrants, prior to entry, permanently renounce the citizenship rights of any of their children born in the territorial U.S., on the ground that such births would not be under the U.S.'s jurisdiction for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. It would be, in effect, akin to the birth of a diplomat's child on U.S. territory, i.e. the child is not entitled to U.S. citizenship on the grounds his parents are not "subject to the jurisdiction" of the U.S. government. Although this would be a reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, I see nothing problematic with this approach because it would not be an improper denial of citizenship rights as was the case in Dred Scott, but a means of facilitating humanitarian migration. C. Preventing and Addressing State Failure and International Crises A more generous approach to migrants, in conjunction with a plan for repatriation, will encourage developed nations to spend greater resources addressing problems related to the Global Commons such as climate change , state failure and political instability in the developing world . This is because rich nations seeking to safely repatriate migrants will be encouraged to devote necessary resources to address these problems. Although superficially problematic, the repatriation requirement is a key component here because the current paradigm of limited asylum and permanent residency deters rich countries from the required international engagement level . For example, the U.S. and its European allies might have spent additional [*966] resources to address state failure in Libya and Syria if it did not fear the moral requirement to provide asylum with further involvement. The same applies with respect to economic migrants because the U.S. and other developed states would be forced to encourage economic development in sending-regions such as Central America and Mexico. Should rich countries collectively agree to adopt a dramatically increased temporary residency program, they will , in effect, be forced to devote additional resources to democratization and economic development in the developing world. For receiving states in Europe, Canada, and Australia, it will mean devotion of resources that are currently not spent . 171 For the U.S., it will most likely mean reallocation of resources from Israel and Turkey 172 to more vulnerable states with an emphasis on human development and job creation as opposed to military spending. It will also require states to take a more proactive approach to climate change and its concomitants, including political instability and state failure. Rich nations, including the U.S., however, have a moral obligation to take in a greater

number of global migrants in view of the migratory surge and coming population bulge in the developing world. 173 This will only be forthcoming with a

repatriation requirement that will force rich countries to strategically prevent and address international crises . D. Mitigating a Brain

Drain from the Developing World Another benefit of granting migrants temporary status as opposed to permanent residency is that it would mitigate the baneful consequences of " brain drain " from the developing world . 174 An ever-increasing [*967] number of persons with post-secondary education from developing nations now live permanently in rich-world countries. 175 To illustrate, African countries lose 20,000 skilled personnel to the developed world each year. 176 That means that Africa is continuously losing people who might improve public health and foster economic development, democratization, and government accountability. Although the solution to the brain-drain phenomenon is not simple and does not lie in closing off access to rich-world labor markets, it requires taking steps to ensure migrants remain invested in their countries of origin by providing them only temporary residency in developed nations as much as feasible . To conjecture, Mexico's economy and democracy would be better placed today if the Mexicans who migrated to the U.S. in previous generations had remained invested in Mexico's development. The same could be said of North and West Africans in France and South

Asians in the U.K. By limiting migrants to temporary visas, rich world governments can help foster democratization and economic development in the Global South that, in view of the population disparities between the Global North and South, would be an obvious improvement in global well-being.

2nc – nb – base

CP avoids base backlashFaizer 17 (M. Akram Faizer, Professor of Law at Lincoln Memorial University's Duncan School of Law, J.D. University of Notre Dame Law School, B.A. International Relations, B.S. Physiology, McGill University, “America First: Improving a Recalcitrant Immigration and Refugee Policy,” Tennessee Law Review, Summer, 2017, 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 933, l/n)KMM

President Trump's election was facilitated by the U.S. electorate 's backlash over the fact that the nation's demographics have changed dramatically due

to the country's failure to address the permanent residency of illegal migrants, many of whose children have become citizens based on the country's provision

of birthright citizenship. 13 President Trump could address his supporters' concerns and provide for a far better alternative to the status quo by adopting policies designed to encourage greater acceptance of migrants in conjunction with stricter border and immigration enforcement. This

is a needed change in view of the rise of right-wing populism as manifest by Trump's election, the United Kingdom's Brexit vote to leave the

European Union, Marine Le Pen's reaching the second round of the French Presidential election, the success of the far right AFD Party in Germany, and the growth of far-right political parties in other mature democracies. 14 It is, moreover, a necessary policy change should rich countries seek to fulfill their humanitarian obligation to accommodate the current international migratory surge and avoid becoming [*938] unwelcoming hostages to a fortress-like mentality that demeans the Enlightenment and the idea of global human rights. 15 II. THE MIGRATION CRISIS AND ITS CAUSES The scale of global migration is massive. According to the Pew Research Center, if all of the world's international migrants, defined loosely as individuals living in a country different from their birthplace, were added together, they would constitute the world's fifth most populous country with 244 million residents. 16 This number has grown by 200% since 1960, which is larger than the 150% growth in world population during the same period. 17 The number becomes substantially larger if it were to include the children and grandchildren of international migrants. 18 Indeed, the Middle East has the fastest growing international migrant population, having grown from 25 million in 2005 to more than 54 million in 2015. 19 Of the nearly 250 million international migrants, only 16 million, or 8 percent, are international refugees. 20 This, however, understates the scale of worldwide displacement because more than two-thirds of the 60 million persons displaced from their homes due to war and other forms of conflict still reside in their birth countries. 21 To illustrate, the civil war in Syria has led to the displacement of more than 13.5 million people in a country that had a population of slightly more than 21 million before the current civil war. 22 Of these, nearly 6.4 million are internally displaced. 23 Columbia, with more than 7 million internally displaced citizens due to the just-ended civil war [*939] between the government and FARC rebels 24, has one of the world's highest rates of internally displaced people. 25 Although international displacement is a growing phenomenon, the evidence demonstrates that the vast majority, or 97% of the world's population, have not crossed an international border. The fact that there is such concern about global, as opposed to internal, migration, stems from the political and economic power of the major migration corridors' destination countries, such as the United States, which is the end route of the one-way migration corridor from Central America and Mexico to the United States. 26 The scale of this migration will substantially increase with population growth, 27 climate change, 28 and the geopolitical and economic consequences of American geopolitical retrenchment. 29 For example, in 2050, Africa's population will have increased to 2.4 billion persons, which is double today's population of 1.2 billion. 30 Similarly, the Arab world is experiencing a manifest youth bulge with more than two-thirds of the population less than thirty years of age. 31 Moreover, in view of the relatively small populations of most developed countries, international migrants and their families can greatly affect the demographic balance of receiving states. Several European countries, including Norway, Sweden, and Austria, have seen migrants as a proportion of their total populations increase by more than one [*940] percent in 2015 alone, largely due to a surge in migrants from Syria, Afghanistan, and Somalia. 32 Migration to the developed world will only increase in time for reasons of geopolitics, state failure, civil war, climate change, and the fact that more and more migrants, 80% of whom reside in the developing world, will find ways of reaching mature democracies such as the U.S. 33 III. RICH WORLD RECALCITRANCE AND ITS CAUSES A brief analysis of the international migration numbers affecting four rich countries--the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Canada--shall follow. This is hardly a representative grouping as Australia, New Zealand, and many countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Western Europe are sought-after destinations for many migrants. They are used as examples because they represent paradigmatic examples of, in the case of the U.S., U.K., and France, a backlash against migrants, and, in the case of Canada, an apparently more tolerant and accepting approach. Although greater acceptance of migrants can be partially achieved by enacting progressive legislation to address domestic socio-economic inequality and inter-generational immobility, much of the current backlash is explained by the fact that countries such as the U.S., the U.K, and France are situated on major world migratory routes 34 and these countries' failure to undertake effective repatriation has led to a populist backlash against the very idea of international migration. [*941] A. U.S. Migration The U.S. is a country of some 324 million persons with a net migration rate of 3.9 per 1,000 persons, which places it on the lower end of developed countries with respect to in-migration rates. 35 A right to immigration is not guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution, as no provision therein requires the admission of non-U.S. persons into U.S. territory. 36 That said, the U.S. Supreme Court has used the doctrine of field preemption to preclude state and local governments from attempting to either register or assist with the deportation of unauthorized migrants because the federal government has historically occupied the field of immigration and naturalization. 37 This means the federal government and not the states is supreme in the areas of immigration, asylum and deportation. The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause has also been of limited historical use to non-resident alien foreigners. 38 Indeed, the federal courts have historically been reluctant to effectively use this provision to protect racial minorities from what looks like invidious discrimination. 39 Although recent decisions by the Fourth and Ninth [*942] Circuit Courts of Appeal adjudicating President Trump's Executive Orders banning travel from seven majority-Muslim countries appear to demonstrate that green card holders are protected from arbitrary exclusion under the Equal Protection Clause, 40 the Supreme Court, which was set to review the second Executive Order until it was mooted by yet another version, has consistently held that the President has broad inherent executive power to exclude foreigners under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, 41 while Congress has enacted laws allowing for immigration and temporary residency as well as refugee resettlement. 42 The U.S. historically grants approximately one million legal immigrants green cards and 600,000 temporary worker visas on an annual basis. 43 This, in conjunction with the 100,000 or so refugee admissions annually, 44 is completely inadequate in view of the migration demand. This inadequacy, which could have forthrightly been addressed by a proactive temporary residency program, has resulted in an apparently insurmountable illegal [*943] immigration problem, as the U.S. is now home to nearly 11 million undocumented or unauthorized residents. 45 The U.S. has benefited from immigration in that its population is 72 million higher than it would be but for the enactment of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. 46 The increased population has corresponded with increased racial and ethnic diversity. To illustrate, the proportion of non-Hispanic whites dropped from 84% in 1965 to 62% and, as of 2015, continues to fall, largely because the Hispanic and Asian populations have grown during this time frame from 4% and 1% to 15% and 6%, respectively. 47 Because of lower fertility in the native-born population, a full 88% of future U.S. population growth will be attributable to immigration and the descendants of these immigrants. 48 This, however, places pressure on a country's absorptive capacity to integrate newcomers, especially when the majority of the population is relatively stagnant with respect to both population and economic productivity and fears cultural and economic displacement. 49 For example, enactment of the 1986 Simpson-Mazzoli Immigration Reform and Control Act, 50 which regularized the status of previously illegal migrants, was facilitated by U.S. economic and population growth, which was 3.5% and 1.7% respectively, under the Reagan Presidency when Islamic fundamentalism and geopolitical [*944] instability were unheard-of problems to most western citizens. 51 The success of President Trump's populist xenophobia is, in turn, attributable to the fact that economic and population growth in post-financial-crisis America are 1.5% and .75%, respectively, in a period of geopolitical instability and fear of political Islam. 52 Furthermore, compared to other developed nations, the U.S. has very high levels of income inequality as measured by a GINI index of 45.0, 53 and socio-economic intergenerational immobility as evidenced by the fact that between 50% and 60% of Americans' relative income is explained by that of their parents. 54 These are far higher measures of inequality than in the U.S's northern neighbor, Canada, which has been lauded for an altogether more welcoming approach to migrants. 55 That said, unlike Canada, which is surrounded by the U.S. and three major oceans, the U.S. is the destination point of a major migratory route from Central America and Mexico, which explains the unauthorized immigration problem. 56 The 11 million unauthorized immigrants, in conjunction with the fear of Islamic extremism and domestic economic insecurity, are the obvious explanations for domestic disquiet over the issue. Less discussed is how the substantial in-migration of developing-world residents has changed the nation's political culture in a manner that arguably explains much of the backlash that resulted in President Trump's election. This is due to both the [*945] Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 57 and the insufficiently-acknowledged migration incentives that have resulted in development of the above-referenced migration route. The former effectively ended preference for European immigrants and led to a marked uptick in racial minority immigration. 58 The latter is attributable to relatively strong economic performance in the U.S. compared to the economic and political crises that developed in Mexico and Central American in the 1980s. 59 To illustrate the political consequences, if the same proportion of white voters as compared to racial minority voters that voted for Jimmy Carter in his landslide loss to Ronald Reagan in 1980, voted for Barack Obama in 2012, the popular vote tally in the 2012 election would have been in Mitt Romney's favor. 60 Obama won reelection because the white vote fell from nearly 90% of the electorate in 1980 to approximately 73% in 2012 and continues to fall. 61 A full 73% of Asian Americans and 71% of Hispanics, who comprise 4.5% and 10% of the U.S. voting populations respectively, voted for President Obama in the 2012 presidential election. 62 This, in conjunction with the fact that African Americans overwhelmingly vote for the Democratic Party candidate, meant that President Obama was

able to win a decisive electoral college victory and earn more than 51% [*946] of the popular vote while winning only 39% of the white vote. 63 This is a disquieting phenomenon for nativists and conservatives. 64 Indeed, although much of President Trump's support is explained by his demotic characterization of unauthorized immigrants , it would be wrong to conclude that this fully explains his decisive

electoral college win. 65 His base expressed understandable disquiet over the previous failure of both major political parties to either enhance

border security to prevent continued unauthorized immigration or repatriate the undocumented migrants living in the country. 66 Mass migration has had serious political repercussions . A Pew Research Center study finds that half of Americans want immigration to be reduced and incorrectly blame immigrants for a disproportionate share of the nation's crime and economic problems . 67 This is in spite of the fact non-immigrants have nearly two and three times the incarceration rate of unauthorized and legal immigrants, respectively. 68 These perceptions vary by immigrants' region of origin, with Americans most likely to hold negative views about immigrants from Latin America and the Middle East. 69 Amid the uproar regarding President [*947] Trump's recent Executive Orders 70 suspending the U.S.'s refugee resettlement program and temporarily banning the entry of individuals from six majority Muslim countries, the political culture has conveniently forgotten how ungenerous the Obama Administration and all rich countries are on this issue. 71 For example, the Obama Administration admitted only 85,000 refugees for the fiscal year ending in September 2016 and planned on admitting only 110,000 for fiscal year 2017, 72 both of which are negligible numbers in view of the scale of the international refugee problem -- e.g. there are an estimated 16 million refugees worldwide 73 and the United States alone is home to approximately 11 million undocumented or illegal economic migrants. 74 The Obama Administration's response to these problems, namely, a refusal to abide by its own "red line" and intervene to stop the Syrian Genocide 75 and a belatedly issued Presidential Executive Order to designate a large subset of undocumented residents as non-deportable, 76 has proven to be both unworkable and counterproductive. The refugee surge that is affecting Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and the European Union 77 is most likely caused by the effects of global climate change in conjunction with the political consequences brought about by the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Obama Administration's decision to subsequently disengage from the Middle [*948] East. 78 With respect to unauthorized migration to the U.S., the Obama Administration's failure to obtain a bipartisan immigration compromise was largely attributable to the Democratic Party's failure to disentangle the demand for economic migration from the current immigration and naturalization paradigm as well as the Republican Party's reflexive nativism. This resulted in the issuance of an ineffective Executive Order on the issue, which was enjoined by the federal courts 79 and still had the parlous consequence of inciting a backlash on the right that facilitated Trump's election as President. How might the federal government have better anticipated and addressed the demand for unauthorized migrants? My argument is that it could have forthrightly been addressed by a proactive temporary residency and worker program, used in conjunction with development assistance provision to the sending states of Mexico and Central America. This would have minimized the incentives for unauthorized migration, protected guest workers from the perils of undocumented status and ensured the public that migration-based demographic changes are legitimate . The fact that neither political party pushed for such a program, all the while refusing to provide for either greater border enforcement or stepped-up deportation, facilitated the current populist backlash. Although the U.S. resettles more refugees than any other developed country 80 and has resettled more than 3 million persons since 1975, 81 its expected refugee resettlement number of 50,000 82 this year is relatively minuscule and inadequate in view of the total number of refugees and displaced persons worldwide. The fact that a non-existent threat from Syrian refugees was seized upon by the President to temporarily suspend the U.S. Refugee Assistance Program 83 evidences that the disquiet felt about Islam and unauthorized migration has superimposed itself onto the refugee [*949] crisis and demands a response. The response, however, should recognize that concerns about migration's consequences are legitimate while allowing for expanded migration so that the U.S. can maintain its moral authority as the world's leading nation and fulfill its obligation to help with the problems confronting international migrants. B. U.K. Migration In the U.K, the foreign-born population increased from 3.8 million in 1993 to over 8.7 million in 2015. 84 Anxiety about international migration is especially pronounced because London, which remains the world's financial and cultural center, 85 is the destination of choice for much of the world and is now only 45% white British. 86 European Union (E.U.) expansion has led to marked uptick in migration from poorer E.U. member states such as Poland, Portugal, and Romania. 87 For example, in 2016, on the eve of the Brexit vote, the U.K. received a record 250,000 citizens from other E.U. countries, while U.K.'s outmigration to the rest of the E.U. numbered only 117,000, a net migration of 133,000 that is consistent with the previous two years. 88 In 2016, approximately 3.6 million E.U. citizens resided in the U.K., 89 which is substantially higher than the 1.2 million Britons who reside in the rest of the E.U., 90 and annual total immigration reached a record 650,000 in the run-up to the Brexit vote. 91 Anxiety surrounding [*950] this migration paradigm explains the impetus behind the pro-Brexit vote to withdraw from the E.U. The migration numbers include an increase in the number of asylum seekers seeking refugee status to 41,280, a number that is disproportionately comprised of Iraqi and Iranian asylees. 92 Although net migration to the U.K remains relatively modest, the saliency of the issue, in conjunction with lower economic growth and lower living standards since the 2008-2009 financial crisis, explains not only the Brexit vote but hamstrings negotiations over the terms of Britain's eventual withdrawal from the E.U. 93 Although departure from the E.U. will likely not affect the status of non-Britons already residing legally in the U.K., it will enable the British government to regain some control of its borders because the U.K. will no longer be required to prospectively observe

E.U. citizenship rules. However, the reinstatement of national controls must be done in a manner that both respects Britain's national sovereignty and protects the rights of vulnerable international migrants. This will only be forthcoming if the British public is assured that migration will not irrevocably alter the nation's demographic composition, which, in turn, will only be feasible if migrants are admitted on a temporary basis, with a goal toward eventual repatriation. C. French Migration Perhaps no other developed nation has been so systematically traumatized by international migration as France, which has just seen both its major political parties roundly rejected in the first round of the country's presidential election in April 2017 and the extreme right-wing Presidential candidate, Marine Le Pen, succeed to a run off election against the eventual winner, President Emmanuel Macron, whose surprising success also represents a rejection of the political mainstream. 94 France, whose economy and population is of similar size to that of the U.K., suffers from higher unemployment [*951] and lower economic growth than its cross-Channel neighbor. 95 This is a potent mix for xenophobic authoritarianism. The National Front's slogan of "Two Million Unemployed is Two Million Immigrants Too Many" is paradigmatic. 96 Although France's net migration rate is a moderate 1.1 per 1,000 inhabitants per year, which is substantially below that of the U.S., 97 much of the French disquiet surrounding immigration is not about present immigration trends as much as the demographic consequences of previous decades of immigration, in conjunction with a fear of political Islam and a relatively stagnant domestic economy. President Emmanuel Macron's success requires not only a resuscitation of France's economy and the introduction of labor market reforms to allow for greater social mobility, but also a demonstration that E.U. membership does not inevitably mean loss of border control. This will most likely require France to revisit the E.U. migration rules and adopt a temporary visa program that assures the broader French public that migration does not irrevocably lead to permanent residency and social dislocation. D. Canadian Migration Canada, unlike the U.S., U.K., and France, has been far more generous to international migrants. To illustrate, Canada's foreign-born population of 20% and its net migration rate of 5.7 per 1,000 residents per year, places it at the top of the developed world regarding these metrics. 98 Moreover, unlike in the U.S. or Western Europe, the dynamics of Canadian democracy protect migrants from political scapegoating and populist xenophobia. All four major [*952] political national parties--the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, the New Democratic Party, and the Bloc Quebecois--take liberal positions on international migration. 99 The reasons for this are many. First, unlike the U.S. or Western Europe, Canada does not border a developing nation and is therefore not a destination on a major international migration route. 100 This enables it to have greater control than either the U.S. or Western Europe over who crosses its borders and avoid the same level of anti-migrant backlash. Second, Canada's immigrants and asylees, the vast majority of whom are legally admitted, 101 may be eligible for naturalization within only three years 102 and tend to reside in key marginal parliamentary constituencies in urban areas such as Greater Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. 103 As a result, immigrants in Canada are more likely to naturalize than those in America 104 and their votes tend to be more sought-after than those of the median voter. 105 That said, native-born Canadians do not have atypically positive attitudes to international migrants. 106 Canada's use of a points system to select immigrants based on their skills and education level belies a claim of [*953] humanitarianism 107 as it exacerbates the brain-drain problem suffered by much of the developing world. 108 Indeed, unlike the U.S, where immigrant children are typically raised in low-education households, one-third of Canada's high-education households have at least one immigrant parent. 109 What also distinguishes Canada from the U.S., the U.K, and France is that social mobility in Canada is substantially higher. 110 For countries such as the U.K, France, and the U.S., between 40 and 50 percent of income inequality is passed on across the generations. 111 For Canada, this number is less than 20 percent. 112 There are many reasons for this discrepancy, including the relative higher status of women, lower levels of social exclusion suffered by the poor and racial minorities, and the affordability and accessibility of quality education. 113 That said, notwithstanding Canada's more generous approach to international migrants, it is altogether too small of a country in view of the size of its labor force to successfully integrate more than a token number of migrants. Although it is a moral beacon to many, its policies, which favor attracting the high-skilled and educated, excludes the most vulnerable displaced persons. Indeed, based on survey evidence, it is unlikely that native-born Canadians would support a substantial uptick in the number of international migrants. 114 IV. DISTINGUISHING ECONOMIC MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES International migrants include economic migrants and refugees. Economic migrants lack protection under the Refugee Convention 115 [*954] and are largely absorbed into rich countries as both legal and unauthorized immigrants. Although many economic migrants work on temporary visas, these visas are largely unavailable to unskilled workers because the number of such visas available for unskilled workers is altogether negligible in view of the overall demand, 116 which, in turn, incentivizes unauthorized migration. Refugees, who are protected under the Refugee Convention, are entitled to file asylum claims in developed nations. 117 The rich-world's concern for refugees, however, is

altogether inadequate in view of refugee needs and the fact that most refugees are either internally displaced 118 or forced, for practical reasons, to migrate to unwelcoming developing nations as is the case with most Syrian, Eritrean, Somali and Rohingya refugees. 119 A. Economic Migrants The international community does not recognize a moral imperative to provide sanctuary for economic migrants. Refugees are entitled to claim protection under the Refugee Convention while economic migrants are excludable and deportable under international law, because there is no entitlement for migrants to seek asylum based on economic need. That said, the vast majority of global migration is attributable to people seeking to improve their quality of life. 120 Although economic migration is understandable in that it provides obvious material benefits to migrants, it imposes costs on the receiving countries and can, if not properly regulated, undermine social cohesion and increase racial and ethnic polarization. 121 As such, developed countries must evaluate economic migration not only based on concern for the migrants themselves, but also for their own citizens who struggle with the consequences of globalization and deserve a hearing as to migration-basedcultural and economic changes. Accordingly, my proposal is to recognize the economic benefits of migration to both the receiving states and the migrants themselves and to allow for broader acceptance of economic migration by means [*955] of an expanded guest worker and temporary residency program. This would allow migrants to legally reside and work productively, while assuring the native-born population that these migrants will neither access government services in perpetuity, nor naturalize and change the political culture .

Most importantly, it protects these migrants from the stigma of illegality that facilitates a backlash against their presence, which both isolates them and facilitates their exploitation by unscrupulous employers and human traffickers . 122 Although economic migrants lack the treaty and customary international law protections offered to refugees, the lack of international protection offered economic migrants is clearly an outdated relic. Although most economic migrants are currently absorbed into first-world societies by means of immigration and naturalization policies, that are altogether inadequate in light of the migration demand and the economic need for migrants in much of the developed world. Furthermore, in view of the population explosion that is expected in Africa, the Middle East and other regions of the global south, 123 migration demand will only increase over time. 124 Rich countries such as the U.S. have a choice. They can continue with the status quo, which means that the unauthorized migration problem will grow and remain unaddressed. This, in turn, will make President Trump's campaign proposal to build a wall on the Mexican border, over time, a relatively benign border security measure in a country that will have adopted a fortress-like mentality to exclude the outside world. To paraphrase the great French diplomat Talleyrand, this would be "worse than a crime. It [would be] a blunder." 125 The U.S. can encourage other rich countries to avoid this dystopia by recognizing and addressing the migration demand by means of a much-expanded temporary worker and [*956] residency program that allows migrants the opportunity to legally improve their living standards in developed-world countries on a temporary basis so that their skills and purchasing power are not forever lost to their countries of origin. I would advocate expanding the current number of 600,000 annual temporary work visas to 2-3 million per year and account for this by reducing the number of permanent residency green cards from the current one million per year to a negligible number. Those 2-3 million temporary visas are to be issued to both skilled and unskilled workers for a period of up to five years and the visa holders are to be given access to private sector jobs in the U.S. economy on terms that are equal with U.S. citizens. The visas, which are to be first offered to economic migrants currently working and living illegally in the U.S., are to be issued with strict conditions that visa holders are expected to repatriate at the end of the visa term unless good cause can be shown for one-year extensions. B. Refugees The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as a person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 126 Internally Displaced Persons are those who have been forced to flee their homes for the same reasons as refugees, but remain in their own country and have not crossed an international border. 127 To illustrate the difference, there are currently 22.5 million refugees and 65.6 million displaced persons worldwide. 128 Of the 22.5 million refugess that do cross international frontiers, the vast majority move to developing nations of the global south 129 with only 3.2 million [*957] awaiting asylum claims in developed first-world nations 130 This means that 86 percent of refugees under the UNHCR's mandate 131 currently reside in low to moderate income countries close to conflict areas. 132 The Refugee Convention requires signatory countries to, among other things, provide refugees with identification and travel papers, offer them the possibility of assimilation and naturalization, and most importantly, not refoule or forcibly return refugees to the country where they "would be threatened on account of . . . race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group[,] or political opinion". 133 Although developing-world nations typically fall short of the obligation to allow refugees the opportunity to assimilate and naturalize, 134 all signatories to the Refugee Convention are bound by the obligation of non-refoulement while the circumstances giving rise to refugee status continue. 135 The U.S. and other developed countries abide by this requirement largely because the refugees granted asylum into their jurisdictions are typically granted permanent residency with a means of subsequent naturalization. 136 [*958] This whole scheme is problematic. First, although developed countries like the U.S. do abide by the Refugee Convention's requirements of assimilation, naturalization, and non-refoulement, this is, by implication, premised upon doing the utmost to exclude refugees from their jurisdictions. 137 As Hathaway and Neve have written: Even though international law presently requires no more than the provision of rights-regarding temporary protection, Northern states, in law or in practice, have historically afforded refugees permanent status. As the interest-convergence between refugees and developed countries has disappeared, Northern states have sought to avoid the arrival of refugees by adopting policies of external deterrence. Because developed states have the logistical capacity to prevent the arrival of many, and sometimes most, refugees, they have been able to implement non-entrée practices that prevent refugees from even reaching their frontiers. Since legal duties arise only once refugees successfully access a state's jurisdiction, non-entrée practices are a relatively invisible, and hence politically expedient, means to ensure that refugees are never in a position to assert their legal right to protection. 138 Developed countries effectively prevent refugees from being able to file refugee claims. Hathaway and Neve write as follows: Specifically, most Northern states impose a visa requirement on the nationals of refugee-producing states, and penalize airlines and other transportation companies for bringing unauthorized refugees into their territories. By refusing to grant visas for the purpose of making a claim to asylum, Northern countries have been able to insulate themselves from many potential claimants of refugee status. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has expressed concern that visas are a serious obstacle to the admission to protection of refugees, and may in some instances [*959] put refugees at serious risk of refoluement, that is, of return to the country in which they assert they will be at risk of grave harm. 139 Resistance to honoring duties owed to refugees follows from a growing concern about migration-based demographic changes. 140 Hathaway and Neve explain that "the legal right of refugees to [evade typical] immigration control rules means that persons not of a state's choosing [can] effectively be entitled to [permanently] join its community" and effectuate permanent demographic changes. 141 This, in societies like the U.S. that have "a tradition of equating refugee status with the right to remain permanently . . . ," leads to fear of widespread and undesired social change. 142 Moreover, "even in those Northern states that have a long tradition of receiving immigrants, there is concern about the non-selective nature of the duty to admit refugees." 143 This is a problem not limited to the rich countries of the global north. 144 Many East Asian states, "including Brunei, China, Japan, and Malaysia, are preoccupied with avoiding the arrival of refugees of distinct cultural or ethnic backgrounds." 145 This presents refugee advocates with the reality that refugee admission consistent with the Refugee Convention's purposes and global refugee needs, requires eventual repatriation to address the legitimate concerns about unconsented to cultural change in receiving states. 146 Hathaway and Neve write: [i]t is presently politically unwise to insist that states permanently enfranchise all refugees. Such a stance holds refugees hostage to a major project of social transformation. We need instead to accommodate the need of refugees to flee with the prevalence of often narrow understandings of community inspired by the rise of ethnic nationalism and the demise of the Cold War interest-convergence. This accommodation will clearly not amount to a complete recognition of the right of the present inhabitants of states to exclude all outsiders. Yet the terms upon which refugees enter [*960] a foreign state could be qualified to prevent refugees from becoming pawns in the internal struggles of asylum states over the meaning of community. In particular, a solid and dependable system of refugee protection need not have any enduring impact on the receiving state's communal self-definition. It could instead be oriented to ensuring that, at least in most cases, refugees ultimately repatriate to their own country when conditions permit. 147 This is not to heartlessly violate the international law against refoulement. Rather: temporary protection can be structured in a way that recognizes and protects core human rights, encourages self-reliance, and preserves the social, political, and cultural identity of the refugee community. If return is made practicable by an empowering system of repatriation aid and development assistance, the solution-oriented protection system we propose has the potential to renew asylum capacity regularly. As a reasonable and principled compromise between the needs of refugees and the migration control objectives of host governments, temporary protection will encourage

states to live up to their international protection responsibilities, rather than avoid them. This is because the repatriation of most, if not all, refugees sends a clear signal that the system is not just a " back door " route to permanent immigration . As it becomes understood that refugees are received on an extraordinary basis and that their presence does not require any fundamental adjustment to the host community's self-definition, the implied threat presently associated with the arrival of refugees can be defused . The failure to promote repatriation, on the other hand, is inconsistent with the logic of refugee status as a situation-specific trump on immigration control rules. Because refugees are admitted on the basis of necessity, it cannot legitimately be asserted that they should routinely be entitled to stay in the host state once the harm in their own country has been brought to an end. 148 [*961] V. PROPOSAL FOR GREATER PROVISION OF TEMPORARY RESIDENCE PERMITS TO ADDRESS MIGRANT NEEDS The best approach to dealing with the immigration and refugee crisis would be for developed countries to take a more proactive approach to dealing with issues related to the Global Commons 149 such as climate change, state failure, and international crises. It will also require them to relieve the burden on developing nations and resettle a far greater number of refugees and displaced persons within their nations. These are not likely to be forthcoming responses from developed nations such as the U.S. if refugee and displaced person resettlement requires permanent residency provision. This is because active involvement to address global problems will be deterred should rich nations feel obliged to permanently resettle conflict victims. Similarly, with respect to resettlement in rich countries, the current provision of asylum status followed by permanent residency leads those countries to not only avoid the issue, but, as is their response to Haitian refugees, who sought asylum to the U.S. after the 1991 coup against former President Jean Bertrand Aristide and the January 12, 2010 magnitude seven earthquake that decimated the country, 150 actually devote hard and soft resources to effectively prevent asylum claims from being effectuated. 151 Although requiring the eventual repatriation will be difficult to administer, it will, if effectively and humanely done, provide political support to political moderates seeking international engagement and humanitarian resettlement. It will ideally stem the backlash against migrants that is evidenced by President Trump's suspension of the U.S. Refugee Assistance [*962] Program and his Administration's repeated and ill-advised attempts to ban travelers from seven majority-Muslim countries. 152 A. Temporary Residence Permits The current paradigm of granting permanent residency to migrants has the effect of encouraging developed democracies to prevent the entry of those most in need. This is because nativist opposition to migrants, which is legitimized by the political and cultural consequences of unauthorized migration and naturalization, is forcefully being effectuated to create a fortress-like approach to national sovereignty. By stepping-up assistance to all migrants, the U.S. can once again lead the community of nations on an issue of compelling importance to global well-being. This will only be forthcoming if its citizens can be assured that allowing for greater migration will not distort the political culture based on migrant permanent residency. Migrants are to be issued five-year temporary residency permits that will allow them to live, work, and travel as is the case with refugees resettled in the U.S. under the Refugee Admissions Program. 153 The temporary residency permits are to be renewed for one-year periods only if the migrant can show good cause or a significant hardship if repatriated. An obvious objection to this proposal is that it treats these individuals unequally compared to citizens and permanent residents. It also will require receiving states to devote more resources to deport unwilling migrants than is currently the case. However, all new policies meant to address a particular set of problems create new ones. Here, the problems engendered by the policy, though real, are altogether more defensible than the status quo. As we have seen, assuring migrants de jure equality has had the perverse consequence of preventing them from accessing developed countries and improving their living standards. Although repatriation is harsh, it does not violate the Refugee Convention's prohibition against refoulement because the Convention specifically authorizes repatriation to [*963] countries of origin when conditions are safe to do so. 154 The current paradigm of asylum-granting followed by permanent residency encourages states to disregard the Refugee Convention's purpose and spend great resources to prevent the entry of would-be refugee claimants. Examples of this include not only President Trump's temporary suspension of the U.S. Refugee Assistance Program, but Australia's decision to process and house refugees in the Micronesian state of Nauru to prevent refugees from effectuating asylum claims on Australian territory 155 and France's creating of an artificial international zone within Paris's De Gaulle Airport to prevent asylum seekers from making claims on French soil. 156 A similar pattern is at play with respect to economic migrants. The U.S.'s abject failure to address the issues of economic inequality and insecurity has led to the rise of populist, anti-immigration sentiment. 157 Britain's failure to address the issue since the 1990s led to the Brexit vote to withdraw from the E.U. 158 and France's political polarization on the issue led to the evisceration of both major political parties and led Marine Le Pen succeeding to a run-off in the 2017 French Presidential election. 159 The rich-world is disregarding the obvious demand for migration and is harming global well-being by resorting to a fortress approach to avoid migration's demographic consequences. The current cumbersome and outdated immigration laws have the effect of incentivizing the uncertainty, exploitation, resentment, and backlash against immigrants because it forces most of the world's unskilled migrants and refugees into an unauthorized immigration paradigm. This leaves them vulnerable to criminal and economic exploitation by unscrupulous employers and traffickers. 160 [*964] Offering an expanded temporary residency program would provide substantial benefits for migrants, the receiving states, the sending states and overall global well-being. B. Changing Birthright Citizenship Laws Birthright citizenship in the U.S. stems from the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, which provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside." 161 This provision was ratified in 1868 and effectively reversed Dred Scott v. Sandford, 162 which concluded that African Americans born in the U.S., unless naturalized, cannot be U.S. citizens and therefore lack the right to sue for their freedom in federal court on diversity of citizenship grounds. 163 Although some argue that the "under the jurisdiction thereof" language might exempt the children of illegal migrants from birthright citizenship, 164 this is a minority position and is not the position adopted by the U.S. government, which currently grants U.S. citizenship to all those born in the U.S. except the children of foreign diplomats. 165 In Canada, birthright citizenship stems from the Citizenship Act, 166 which provides that all persons, with the exception of the children of diplomatic personnel or foreign government employees, are entitled to Canadian citizenship by law. 167 Other developed nations such as Australia, New Zealand, France, the [*965] United Kingdom and Ireland abandoned birthright citizenship. 168 With respect to the U.S. and Canada, though, birthright citizenship will have to be revisited with respect to migrants, be they illegal, temporary or refugees. For Canada, this will require nothing more than for the Parliament of Canada to enact an amendment to the Citizenship Act. 169 For the U.S., although purists may argue that this would require a constitutional amendment, the actual contours of the limitations on natural born citizenship and the "under the jurisdiction thereof" language have never been spelled out. 170 My proposal would be to have international migrants, prior to entry, permanently renounce the citizenship rights of any of their children born in the territorial U.S., on the ground that such births would not be under the U.S.'s jurisdiction for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. It would be, in effect, akin to the birth of a diplomat's child on U.S. territory, i.e. the child is not entitled to U.S. citizenship on the grounds his parents are not "subject to the jurisdiction" of the U.S. government. Although this would be a reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, I see nothing problematic with this approach because it would not be an improper denial of citizenship rights as was the case in Dred Scott, but a means of facilitating humanitarian migration. C. Preventing and Addressing State Failure and International Crises A more generous approach to migrants, in conjunction with a plan for repatriation, will encourage developed nations to spend greater resources addressing problems related to the Global Commons such as climate change, state failure and political instability in the developing world. This is because rich nations seeking to safely repatriate migrants will be encouraged to devote necessary resources to address these problems. Although superficially problematic, the repatriation requirement is a key component here because the current paradigm of limited asylum and permanent residency deters rich countries from the required international engagement level. For example, the U.S. and its European allies might have spent additional [*966] resources to address state failure in Libya and Syria if it did not fear the moral requirement to provide asylum with further involvement. The same applies with respect to economic migrants because the U.S. and other developed states would be forced to encourage economic development in sending-regions such as Central America and Mexico. Should rich countries collectively agree to adopt a dramatically increased temporary residency program, they will, in effect, be forced to devote additional resources to democratization and economic development in the developing world. For receiving states in Europe, Canada, and Australia, it will mean devotion of resources that are currently not spent. 171 For the U.S., it will most likely mean reallocation of resources from Israel and Turkey 172 to more vulnerable states with an emphasis on human development and job creation as opposed to military spending. It will also require states to take a more proactive approach to climate change and its concomitants, including political instability and state failure. Rich nations, including the U.S., however, have a moral obligation to take in a greater number of global migrants in view of the migratory surge and coming population bulge in the developing world. 173 This will only be forthcoming with a repatriation requirement that will force rich countries to strategically prevent and address international crises. D. Mitigating a Brain Drain from the Developing World Another benefit of granting migrants temporary status as opposed to permanent residency is that it would mitigate the baneful consequences of "brain drain" from the developing world. 174 An ever-increasing [*967] number of persons with post-secondary education from developing nations now live permanently in rich-world countries. 175 To illustrate, African countries lose 20,000 skilled personnel to the developed world each year. 176 That means that Africa is continuously losing people who might improve public health and foster economic development, democratization, and government accountability. Although the solution to the brain-drain phenomenon is not simple and does not lie in closing off access to rich-world labor markets, it requires taking steps to ensure migrants remain invested in their countries of origin by providing them only temporary residency in developed nations as much as feasible. To conjecture, Mexico's economy and democracy would be better placed today if the Mexicans who migrated to the U.S. in previous generations had remained invested in Mexico's development. The same could be said of North and West Africans in France and South Asians in the U.K. By limiting migrants to temporary visas, rich world governments can help foster democratization and economic development in the Global South that, in view of the population disparities between the Global North and South, would be an obvious improvement in global well-being. CONCLUSION If immigration and asylum laws were amended to allow for a large increase in temporary residence permits to facilitate ingress and egress across international frontiers, migrants would not become illegal immigrants, but would instead be legal temporary residents with the ability to live, work, and pay taxes in destination countries. Because the policy will require eventual repatriation and would deny migrant children birthright citizenship, bipartisan support for accepting more migrants will likely be forthcoming. Continuing to incentivize repatriation to countries of origin by means of providing only temporary residence and work authorization without opportunity for permanent residency will definitely be problematic in that it will create an unequal residency paradigm that is anathema to liberal internationalists. That said, the current focus on equal permanent residency for all is causing more harm than good by effectively depriving the vast majority of migrants the physical security and economic opportunity that only rich-world nations can [*968] currently provide. It also disincentivizes rich countries from working within an international community to prevent and address international crises and undermines third-world democratization and economic growth by permanently depriving developing nations of crucial human capital. My proposal will strike some as both naïve and harsh. Naïve because it perhaps understates rich world countries' opposition to migrants, and harsh in that it contemplates and indeed advocates repatriating these migrants to their countries of origin and denies them the opportunity for either permanent residency or citizenship. Recognizing there are problems related to migrant repatriation, my proposal at least considers all relevant interests in seeking to advance global well-being. These interests are those of receiving states, which fear the demographic and backlash consequences of permanent migration, the sending states, who consistently lose human capital to the developed world, and most importantly, the migrants themselves, who are effectively disallowed access to developed countries under the current paradigm. Obviously, my proposal does not directly address the issues of economic insecurity and socio-economic immobility, which are the other obvious causes for nativism and hostility to migrants in much of the developed world. These problems should be addressed as a moral imperative regardless of how they affect attitudes to migrants. However, taking steps toward remediating inequality and providing for socio-economic and intergenerational mobility is a necessary but altogether

insufficient basis for changing attitudes to migrants. Recognizing my proposal is a mere starting point, my hope is that it will stimulate a needed conversation about changing the current approach, which inadvertently and unfortunately treats migrants as toxins pervading an interconnected world and denies the reality of global migration and how this phenomenon will grow with time, based on state failure, climate change, and uneven population and economic growth further. By expanding access to migration on the condition that it be for

no more than for a definite duration, developed countries can engender sufficient political support to greatly expand the number of migrant visas issued each year, address their citizens' legitimate concerns about migration's consequences and proactively deal with the problems that engender problematic levels of global migration . At the start of the previous century, my grandfather traveled from what was then Ceylon to the U.K. as an Imperial subject. Recognizing the benighted views of many Imperial administrators, including incorrect suppositions as to racial hierarchy, they saw individual [*969] British subjects as assets entitled to freedom of movement and residency. Although today's world has laudably rejected the legitimacy of both empire and ethnic superiority, my grandfather's descendants who hold Sri Lankan passports lack the same freedom of movement he took for granted. This is because first-world destination countries largely refuse to admit Sri Lankans because they fear that admission will irrevocably lead to illegal and unwelcome permanent residency. My hope is that changing our approach to global migration will encourage rich world citizens to welcome global migrants, facilitate migrants' ability to improve their lives and, in the end, improve global well-being.

President Trump , who has unequivocally opposed his country's current approach to both immigrants and refugees, might consider this proposal as a means to address his supporters' concerns and facilitate U.S. leadership on the issue.

2nc – nb – agenda

CP’s bipartisan and preserves PCFaizer 17 (M. Akram Faizer, Professor of Law at Lincoln Memorial University's Duncan School of Law, J.D. University of Notre Dame Law School, B.A. International Relations, B.S. Physiology, McGill University, “America First: Improving a Recalcitrant Immigration and Refugee Policy,” Tennessee Law Review, Summer, 2017, 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 933, l/n)KMMThe U.S. has benefited from immigration in that its population is 72 million higher than it would be but for the enactment of the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. 46 The increased population has corresponded with increased racial and ethnic diversity. To illustrate, the proportion of non-Hispanic whites dropped from 84% in 1965 to 62% and, as of 2015, continues to fall, largely because the Hispanic and Asian populations have grown during this time frame from 4% and 1% to 15% and 6%, respectively. 47 Because of lower fertility in the native-born population, a full 88% of future U.S. population growth will be attributable to immigration and the descendants of these immigrants. 48 This, however, places pressure on a country's absorptive capacity to integrate newcomers, especially when the majority of the population is relatively stagnant with respect to both population and economic productivity and fears cultural and economic displacement. 49 For example, enactment of the 1986 Simpson-Mazzoli Immigration Reform and Control Act, 50 which regularized the status of previously illegal migrants, was facilitated by U.S. economic and population growth, which was 3.5% and 1.7% respectively, under the Reagan Presidency when Islamic fundamentalism and geopolitical [*944] instability were unheard-of problems to most western citizens. 51 The success of President Trump's populist xenophobia is, in turn, attributable to the fact that economic and population growth in post-financial-crisis America are 1.5% and .75%, respectively, in a period of geopolitical instability and fear of political Islam. 52 Furthermore, compared to other developed nations, the U.S. has very high levels of income inequality as measured by a GINI index of 45.0, 53 and socio-economic intergenerational immobility as evidenced by the fact that between 50% and 60% of Americans' relative income is explained by that of their parents. 54 These are far higher measures of inequality than in the U.S's northern neighbor, Canada, which has been lauded for an altogether more welcoming approach to migrants. 55 That said, unlike Canada, which is surrounded by the U.S. and three major oceans, the U.S. is the destination point of a major migratory route from Central America and Mexico, which explains the unauthorized immigration problem. 56 The 11 million unauthorized immigrants, in conjunction with the fear of Islamic extremism and domestic economic insecurity, are the obvious explanations for domestic disquiet over the issue. Less discussed is how the substantial in-migration of developing-world residents has changed the nation's political culture in a manner that arguably explains much of the backlash that resulted in President Trump's election. This is due to both the [*945] Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1965 57 and the insufficiently-acknowledged migration incentives that have resulted in development of the above-referenced migration route. The former effectively ended preference for European immigrants and led to a marked uptick in racial minority immigration. 58 The latter is attributable to relatively strong economic performance in the U.S. compared to the economic and political crises that developed in Mexico and Central American in the 1980s. 59 To illustrate the political consequences, if the same proportion of white voters as compared to racial minority voters that voted for Jimmy Carter in his landslide loss to Ronald Reagan in 1980, voted for Barack Obama in 2012, the popular vote tally in the 2012 election would have been in Mitt Romney's favor. 60 Obama won reelection because the white vote fell from nearly 90% of the electorate in 1980 to approximately 73% in 2012 and continues to fall. 61 A full 73% of Asian Americans and 71% of Hispanics, who comprise 4.5% and 10% of the U.S. voting populations respectively, voted for President Obama in the 2012 presidential election. 62 This, in conjunction with the fact that African Americans overwhelmingly vote for the Democratic Party candidate, meant that President Obama was able to win a decisive electoral college victory and earn more than 51% [*946] of the popular vote while winning only 39% of the white vote. 63 This is a disquieting phenomenon for nativists and conservatives. 64 Indeed, although much of President Trump's support is explained by his demotic characterization of unauthorized immigrants, it would be wrong to conclude that this fully explains his decisive electoral college win. 65 His base expressed understandable disquiet over the previous failure of both major political parties to either enhance border security to prevent continued unauthorized immigration or repatriate the undocumented migrants living in the country. 66 Mass migration has had serious political repercussions . A Pew Research Center study finds that half of Americans want immigration to be reduced and incorrectly blame immigrants for a disproportionate share of the nation's crime and economic problems. 67 This is in spite of the fact non-immigrants have nearly two and three times the incarceration rate of unauthorized and legal immigrants, respectively. 68 These perceptions vary by immigrants' region of origin, with Americans most likely to hold negative views about immigrants from Latin America and the Middle East. 69 Amid the uproar regarding President [*947] Trump's recent Executive Orders 70 suspending the U.S.'s refugee resettlement program and temporarily banning the entry of individuals from six majority Muslim countries, the political culture has conveniently forgotten how ungenerous the Obama Administration and all rich countries are on this issue . 71 For example, the Obama Administration admitted only 85,000 refugees for the fiscal year ending in September 2016 and planned on admitting only 110,000 for fiscal year 2017, 72 both of which are negligible numbers in view of the scale of the international refugee problem -- e.g. there are an estimated 16 million refugees worldwide 73 and the United States alone is home to approximately 11 million undocumented or illegal economic migrants. 74 The Obama Administration's response to these problems, namely, a refusal to abide by its own "red line" and intervene to stop the Syrian Genocide 75 and a belatedly issued Presidential Executive Order to designate a large subset of undocumented residents as non-deportable, 76 has proven to be both unworkable and counterproductive. The refugee surge that is affecting Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and the European Union 77 is most likely caused by the effects of global climate change in conjunction with the political consequences brought about by the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the Obama Administration's decision to subsequently disengage

from the Middle [*948] East. 78 With respect to unauthorized migration to the U.S., the Obama Administration's failure to obtain a bipartisan immigration compromise was largely attributable to the Democratic Party's failure to disentangle the demand for economic migration from the current immigration and naturalization paradigm as well as the Republican Party's reflexive nativism . This resulted in the issuance of an ineffective Executive Order on the issue, which was enjoined by the federal courts 79 and still had the parlous consequence of inciting a backlash on the right that facilitated Trump's election as President. How might the federal government have better

anticipated and addressed the demand for unauthorized migrants? My argument is that it could have forthrightly been addressed by a proactive temporary residency and worker program, used in conjunction with development assistance provision to the sending states of

Mexico and Central America. This would have minimized the incentives for unauthorized migration, protected guest workers from the perils of undocumented status and ensured the public that migration-based demographic changes are legitimate. The fact that neither political party pushed for such a program, all the while refusing to provide for either greater border enforcement or stepped-up deportation, facilitated the current populist backlash . Although the U.S. resettles more refugees than any other developed country 80 and has resettled more than 3 million persons since 1975, 81 its expected

refugee resettlement number of 50,000 82 this year is relatively minuscule and inadequate in view of the total number of refugees and displaced persons worldwide. The fact that a non-existent threat from Syrian refugees was seized upon by the President to temporarily suspend the U.S. Refugee Assistance Program 83 evidences that the disquiet felt about Islam and unauthorized migration has superimposed itself onto the refugee [*949] crisis and demands a response. The response, however, should recognize that concerns about migration's consequences are legitimate while allowing for expanded migration so that the U.S. can maintain its moral authority as the world's leading nation and fulfill its obligation to help with the problems confronting international migrants. B. U.K. Migration In the U.K, the foreign-born population increased from 3.8 million in 1993 to over 8.7 million in 2015. 84 Anxiety about international migration is especially pronounced because London, which remains the world's financial and cultural center, 85 is the destination of choice for much of the world and is now only 45% white British. 86 European Union (E.U.) expansion has led to marked uptick in migration from poorer E.U. member states such as Poland, Portugal, and Romania. 87 For example, in 2016, on the eve of the Brexit vote, the U.K. received a record 250,000 citizens from other E.U. countries, while U.K.'s outmigration to the rest of the E.U. numbered only 117,000, a net migration of 133,000 that is consistent with the previous two years. 88 In 2016, approximately 3.6 million E.U. citizens resided in the U.K., 89 which is substantially higher than the 1.2 million Britons who reside in the rest of the E.U., 90 and annual total immigration reached a record 650,000 in the run-up to the Brexit vote. 91 Anxiety surrounding [*950] this migration paradigm explains the impetus behind the pro-Brexit vote to withdraw from the E.U. The migration numbers include an increase in the number of asylum seekers seeking refugee status to 41,280, a number that is disproportionately comprised of Iraqi and Iranian asylees. 92 Although net migration to the U.K remains relatively modest, the saliency of the issue, in conjunction with lower economic growth and lower living standards since the 2008-2009 financial crisis, explains not only the Brexit vote but hamstrings negotiations over the terms of Britain's eventual withdrawal from the E.U. 93 Although departure from the E.U. will likely not affect the status of non-Britons already residing legally in the U.K., it will enable the British government to regain some control of its borders because the U.K. will no longer be required to prospectively observe E.U. citizenship rules. However, the reinstatement of national controls must be done in a manner that both respects Britain's national sovereignty and protects the rights of vulnerable international migrants. This will only be forthcoming if the British public is assured that migration will not irrevocably alter the nation's demographic composition, which, in turn, will only be feasible if migrants are admitted on a temporary basis, with a goal toward eventual repatriation. C. French Migration Perhaps no other developed nation has been so systematically traumatized by international migration as France, which has just seen both its major political parties roundly rejected in the first round of the country's presidential election in April 2017 and the extreme right-wing Presidential candidate, Marine Le Pen, succeed to a run off election against the eventual winner, President Emmanuel Macron, whose surprising success also represents a rejection of the political mainstream. 94 France, whose economy and population is of similar size to that of the U.K., suffers from higher unemployment [*951] and lower economic growth than its cross-Channel neighbor. 95 This is a potent mix for xenophobic authoritarianism. The National Front's slogan of "Two Million Unemployed is Two Million Immigrants Too Many" is paradigmatic. 96 Although France's net migration rate is a moderate 1.1 per 1,000 inhabitants per year, which is substantially below that of the U.S., 97 much of the French disquiet surrounding immigration is not about present immigration trends as much as the demographic consequences of previous decades of immigration, in conjunction with a fear of political Islam and a relatively stagnant domestic economy. President Emmanuel Macron's success requires not only a

resuscitation of France's economy and the introduction of labor market reforms to allow for greater social mobility, but also a demonstration that E.U. membership does not inevitably mean loss of border control. This will most likely require France to revisit the E.U. migration rules and adopt a temporary visa program that assures the broader French public that migration does not irrevocably lead to permanent residency and social dislocation. D. Canadian Migration Canada, unlike the U.S., U.K., and France, has been far more generous to international migrants. To illustrate, Canada's foreign-born population of 20% and its net migration rate of 5.7 per 1,000 residents per year, places it at the top of the developed world regarding these metrics. 98 Moreover, unlike in the U.S. or Western Europe, the dynamics of Canadian democracy protect migrants from political scapegoating and populist xenophobia. All four major [*952] political national parties--the Liberal Party, the Conservative Party, the New Democratic Party, and the Bloc Quebecois--take liberal positions on international migration. 99 The reasons for this are many. First, unlike the U.S. or Western Europe, Canada does not border a developing nation and is therefore not a destination on a major international migration route. 100 This enables it to have greater control than either the U.S. or Western Europe over who crosses its borders and avoid the same level of anti-migrant backlash. Second, Canada's immigrants and asylees, the vast majority of whom are legally admitted, 101 may be eligible for naturalization within only three years 102 and tend to reside in key marginal parliamentary constituencies in urban areas such as Greater Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. 103 As a result, immigrants in Canada are more likely to naturalize than those in America 104 and their votes tend to be more sought-after than those of the median voter. 105 That said, native-born Canadians do not have atypically positive attitudes to international migrants. 106 Canada's use of a points system to select immigrants based on their skills and education level belies a claim of [*953] humanitarianism 107 as it exacerbates the brain-drain problem suffered by much of the developing world. 108 Indeed, unlike the U.S, where immigrant children are typically raised in low-education households, one-third of Canada's high-education households have at least one immigrant parent. 109 What also distinguishes Canada from the U.S., the U.K, and France is that social mobility in Canada is substantially higher. 110 For countries such as the U.K, France, and the U.S., between 40 and 50 percent of income inequality is passed on across the generations. 111 For Canada, this number is less than 20 percent. 112 There are many reasons for this discrepancy, including the relative higher status of women, lower levels of social exclusion suffered by the poor and racial minorities, and the affordability and accessibility of quality education. 113 That said, notwithstanding Canada's more generous approach to international migrants, it is altogether too small of a country in view of the size of its labor force to successfully integrate more than a token number of migrants. Although it is a moral beacon to many, its policies, which favor attracting the high-skilled and educated, excludes the most vulnerable displaced persons. Indeed, based on survey evidence, it is unlikely that native-born Canadians would support a substantial uptick in the number of international migrants. 114 IV. DISTINGUISHING ECONOMIC MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES International migrants include economic migrants and refugees. Economic migrants lack protection under the Refugee Convention 115 [*954] and are largely absorbed into rich countries as both legal and unauthorized immigrants. Although many economic migrants work on temporary visas, these visas are largely unavailable to unskilled workers because the number of such visas available for unskilled workers is altogether negligible in view of the overall demand, 116 which, in turn, incentivizes unauthorized migration. Refugees, who are protected under the Refugee Convention, are entitled to file asylum claims in developed nations. 117 The rich-world's concern for refugees, however, is altogether inadequate in view of refugee needs and the fact that most refugees are either internally displaced 118 or forced, for practical reasons, to migrate to unwelcoming developing nations as is the case with most Syrian, Eritrean, Somali and Rohingya refugees. 119 A. Economic Migrants The international community does not recognize a moral imperative to provide sanctuary for economic migrants. Refugees are entitled to claim protection under the Refugee Convention while economic migrants are excludable and deportable under international law, because there is no entitlement for migrants to seek asylum based on economic need. That said, the vast majority of global migration is attributable to people seeking to improve their quality of life. 120 Although economic migration is understandable in that it provides obvious material benefits to migrants, it imposes costs on the receiving countries and can, if not properly regulated, undermine social cohesion and increase racial and ethnic polarization. 121 As such, developed countries must evaluate economic migration not only based on concern for the migrants themselves, but also for their own citizens who struggle with the consequences of globalization and deserve a hearing as to migration-basedcultural and economic changes. Accordingly, my proposal is to recognize the economic benefits of migration to both the receiving states and the migrants themselves and to allow for broader acceptance of economic migration by means [*955] of an expanded guest worker and temporary residency program. This would allow migrants to legally reside and work productively, while assuring the native-born population that these migrants will neither access government services in perpetuity, nor naturalize and change the political culture. Most importantly, it protects these migrants from the stigma of illegality that facilitates a backlash against their presence, which both isolates them and facilitates their exploitation by unscrupulous employers and human traffickers. 122 Although economic migrants lack the treaty and customary international law protections offered to refugees, the lack of international protection offered economic migrants is clearly an outdated relic. Although most economic migrants are currently absorbed into first-world societies by means of immigration and naturalization policies, that are altogether inadequate in light of the migration demand and the economic need for migrants in much of the developed world. Furthermore, in view of the population explosion that is expected in Africa, the Middle East and other regions of the global south, 123 migration demand will only increase over time. 124 Rich countries such as the U.S. have a choice. They can continue with the status quo, which means that the unauthorized migration problem will grow and remain unaddressed. This, in turn, will make President Trump's campaign proposal to build a wall on the Mexican border, over time, a relatively benign border security measure in a country that will have adopted a fortress-like mentality to exclude the outside world. To paraphrase the great French diplomat Talleyrand, this would be "worse than a crime. It [would be] a blunder." 125 The U.S. can encourage other rich countries to avoid this dystopia by recognizing and addressing the migration demand by means of a much-expanded temporary worker and [*956] residency program that allows migrants the opportunity to legally improve their living standards in developed-world countries on a temporary basis so that their skills and purchasing power are not forever lost to their countries of origin. I would advocate expanding the current number of 600,000 annual temporary work visas to 2-3 million per year and account for this by reducing the number of permanent residency green cards from the current one million per year to a negligible number. Those 2-3 million temporary visas are to be issued to both skilled and unskilled workers for a period of up to five years and the visa holders are to be given access to private sector jobs in the U.S. economy on terms that are equal with U.S. citizens. The visas, which are to be first offered to economic migrants currently working and living illegally in the U.S., are to be issued with strict conditions that visa holders are expected to repatriate at the end of the visa term unless good cause can be shown for one-year extensions. B. Refugees The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee as a person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 126 Internally Displaced Persons are those who have been forced to flee their homes for the same reasons as refugees, but remain in their own country and have not crossed an international border. 127 To illustrate the difference, there are currently 22.5 million refugees and 65.6 million displaced persons worldwide. 128 Of the 22.5 million refugess that do cross international frontiers, the vast majority move to developing nations of the global south 129 with only 3.2 million [*957] awaiting asylum claims in developed first-world nations 130 This means that 86 percent of refugees under the UNHCR's mandate 131 currently reside in low to moderate income countries close to conflict areas. 132 The Refugee Convention requires signatory countries to, among other things, provide refugees with identification and travel papers, offer them the possibility of assimilation and naturalization, and most importantly, not refoule or forcibly return refugees to the country where they "would be threatened on account of . . . race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group[,] or political opinion". 133 Although developing-world nations typically fall short of the obligation to allow refugees the opportunity to assimilate and naturalize, 134 all signatories to the Refugee Convention are bound by the obligation of non-refoulement while the circumstances giving rise to refugee status continue. 135 The U.S. and other developed countries abide by this requirement largely because the refugees granted asylum into their jurisdictions are typically granted permanent residency with a means of subsequent naturalization. 136 [*958] This whole scheme is problematic. First, although developed countries like the U.S. do abide by the Refugee Convention's requirements of assimilation, naturalization, and non-refoulement, this is, by implication, premised upon doing the utmost to exclude refugees from their jurisdictions. 137 As Hathaway and Neve have written: Even though international law presently requires no more than the provision of rights-regarding temporary protection, Northern states, in law or in practice, have historically afforded refugees permanent status. As the interest-convergence between refugees and developed countries has disappeared, Northern states have sought to avoid the arrival of refugees by adopting policies of external deterrence. Because developed states have the logistical capacity to prevent the arrival of many, and sometimes most, refugees, they have been able to implement non-entrée practices that prevent refugees from even reaching their frontiers. Since legal duties arise only once refugees successfully access a state's jurisdiction, non-entrée practices are a relatively invisible, and hence politically expedient, means to ensure that refugees are never in a position to assert their legal right to protection. 138 Developed countries effectively prevent refugees from being able to file refugee claims. Hathaway and Neve write as follows: Specifically, most Northern states impose a visa requirement on the nationals of refugee-producing states, and penalize airlines and other transportation companies for bringing unauthorized refugees into their territories. By refusing to grant visas for the purpose of making a claim to asylum, Northern countries have been able to insulate themselves from many potential claimants of refugee status. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has expressed concern that visas are a serious obstacle to the admission to protection of refugees, and may in some instances [*959] put refugees at serious risk of refoluement, that is, of return to the country in which they assert they will be at risk of grave harm. 139 Resistance to honoring duties owed to refugees follows from a growing concern about migration-based demographic changes. 140 Hathaway and Neve explain that "the legal right of refugees to [evade typical] immigration control rules means that persons not of a state's choosing [can] effectively be entitled to [permanently] join its community" and effectuate permanent demographic changes. 141 This, in societies like the U.S. that have "a tradition of equating refugee status with the right to remain permanently . . . ," leads to fear of widespread and undesired social change. 142 Moreover, "even in those Northern states that have a long tradition of receiving immigrants, there is concern about the non-selective nature of the duty to admit refugees." 143 This is a problem not limited to the rich countries of the global north. 144 Many East Asian states, "including Brunei, China, Japan, and Malaysia, are preoccupied with avoiding the arrival of refugees of distinct cultural or ethnic backgrounds." 145 This presents refugee advocates with the reality that refugee admission consistent with the Refugee Convention's purposes and global refugee needs, requires eventual repatriation to address the legitimate concerns about unconsented to cultural change in receiving states. 146 Hathaway and Neve write: [i]t is presently politically unwise to insist that states permanently enfranchise all refugees. Such a stance holds refugees hostage to a major project of social transformation. We need instead to accommodate the need of refugees to flee with the prevalence of often narrow understandings of community inspired by the rise of ethnic nationalism and the demise of the Cold War interest-convergence. This accommodation will clearly not amount to a complete recognition of the right of the present inhabitants of states to exclude all outsiders. Yet the terms upon which refugees enter [*960] a foreign state could be qualified to prevent refugees from becoming pawns in the internal struggles of asylum states over the meaning of community. In particular, a solid and dependable system of refugee protection need not have any enduring impact on the receiving state's communal self-definition. It could instead be oriented to ensuring that, at least in most cases, refugees ultimately repatriate to their own country when conditions permit. 147 This is not to heartlessly violate the international law against refoulement. Rather: temporary protection can be structured in a way that recognizes and protects core human rights, encourages self-reliance, and preserves the social, political, and cultural identity of the refugee community. If return is made practicable by an empowering system of repatriation aid and development assistance, the solution-oriented protection system we propose has the potential to renew asylum capacity regularly. As a reasonable and principled compromise between the needs of refugees and the migration control objectives of host governments, temporary protection will encourage states to live up to their international protection responsibilities, rather than avoid them. This is because the repatriation of most, if not all, refugees sends a clear signal that the system is not just a "back door" route to permanent immigration. As it becomes understood that refugees are received on an extraordinary basis and that their presence does not require any fundamental adjustment to the host community's self-definition, the implied threat presently associated with the arrival of refugees can be defused. The failure to promote repatriation, on the other hand, is inconsistent with the logic of refugee status as a situation-specific trump on immigration control rules. Because refugees are admitted on the basis of necessity, it cannot legitimately be asserted that they should routinely be entitled to stay in the host state once the harm in their own country has been brought to an end. 148 [*961] V. PROPOSAL FOR GREATER PROVISION OF TEMPORARY RESIDENCE PERMITS TO ADDRESS MIGRANT NEEDS The best approach to dealing with the immigration and refugee crisis would be for developed countries to take a more proactive approach to dealing with issues related to the Global Commons 149 such as climate change, state failure, and international crises. It will also require them to relieve the burden on developing nations and resettle a far greater number of refugees and displaced persons within their nations. These are not likely to be forthcoming responses from developed nations such as the U.S. if refugee and displaced person resettlement requires permanent residency provision. This is because active involvement to address global problems will be deterred should rich nations feel obliged to permanently resettle conflict victims. Similarly, with respect to resettlement in rich countries, the current provision of asylum status followed by permanent residency leads those countries to not only avoid the issue, but, as is their response to Haitian refugees, who sought asylum to the U.S. after the 1991 coup against former President Jean Bertrand Aristide and the January 12, 2010 magnitude seven earthquake that decimated the country, 150 actually devote hard and soft resources to effectively prevent asylum claims from being effectuated. 151 Although requiring the eventual repatriation will be difficult to administer, it will, if effectively and humanely done, provide political support to political moderates seeking international engagement and humanitarian resettlement. It will ideally stem the backlash against migrants that is evidenced by President Trump's suspension of the U.S. Refugee Assistance [*962] Program and his Administration's repeated and ill-advised attempts to ban travelers from seven majority-Muslim countries. 152 A. Temporary Residence Permits The current paradigm of granting permanent residency to migrants has the effect of encouraging developed democracies to prevent the entry of those most in need. This is because nativist opposition to migrants, which is legitimized by the political and cultural consequences of unauthorized migration and naturalization, is forcefully being effectuated to create a fortress-like approach to national sovereignty. By stepping-up assistance to all migrants, the U.S. can once again lead the community of nations on an issue of compelling importance to global well-being. This will only be forthcoming if its citizens can be assured that allowing for greater migration will not distort the political culture based on migrant permanent residency. Migrants are to be issued five-year temporary residency permits that will allow them to live, work, and travel as is the case with refugees resettled in the U.S. under the Refugee Admissions Program. 153 The temporary residency permits are to be renewed for one-year periods only if the migrant can show good cause or a significant hardship if repatriated. An obvious objection to this proposal is that it treats these individuals unequally compared to citizens and permanent residents. It also will require receiving states to devote more resources to deport unwilling migrants than is currently the case. However, all new policies meant to address a particular set of problems create new ones. Here, the problems engendered by the policy, though real, are altogether more defensible than the status quo. As we have seen, assuring migrants de jure equality has had the perverse consequence of preventing them from accessing developed countries and improving their living standards. Although repatriation is harsh, it does not violate the Refugee Convention's prohibition against refoulement because the Convention specifically authorizes repatriation to [*963] countries of origin when conditions are safe to do so. 154 The current paradigm of asylum-granting followed by permanent residency encourages states to disregard the Refugee Convention's purpose and spend great resources to prevent the entry of would-be refugee claimants. Examples of this include not only President Trump's temporary suspension of the U.S. Refugee Assistance Program, but Australia's decision to process and house refugees in the Micronesian state of Nauru to prevent refugees from effectuating asylum claims on Australian territory 155 and France's creating of an artificial international zone within Paris's De Gaulle Airport to prevent asylum seekers from making claims on French soil. 156 A similar pattern is at play with respect to economic migrants. The U.S.'s abject failure to address the issues of economic inequality and insecurity has led to the rise of populist, anti-immigration sentiment. 157 Britain's failure to address the issue since the 1990s led to the Brexit vote to withdraw from the E.U. 158 and France's political polarization on the issue led to the evisceration of both major political parties and led Marine Le Pen succeeding to a run-off in the 2017 French Presidential election. 159 The rich-world is disregarding the obvious demand for migration and is harming global well-being by resorting to a fortress approach to avoid migration's demographic consequences. The current cumbersome and outdated immigration laws have the effect of incentivizing the uncertainty, exploitation, resentment, and backlash against immigrants because it forces most of the world's unskilled migrants and refugees into an unauthorized immigration paradigm. This leaves them vulnerable to criminal and economic exploitation by unscrupulous employers and traffickers. 160 [*964] Offering an expanded temporary residency program would provide substantial benefits for migrants, the receiving states, the sending states and overall global well-being. B. Changing Birthright Citizenship Laws Birthright citizenship in the U.S. stems from the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, which provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the State wherein they reside." 161 This provision was ratified in 1868 and effectively reversed Dred Scott v. Sandford, 162 which concluded that African Americans born in the U.S., unless naturalized, cannot be U.S. citizens and therefore lack the right to sue for their freedom in federal court on diversity of citizenship grounds. 163 Although some argue that the "under the jurisdiction thereof" language might exempt the children of illegal migrants from birthright citizenship, 164 this is a minority position and is not the position adopted by the U.S. government, which currently grants U.S. citizenship to all those born in the U.S. except the children of foreign diplomats. 165 In Canada, birthright citizenship stems from the Citizenship Act, 166 which provides that all persons, with the exception of the children of diplomatic personnel or foreign government employees, are entitled to Canadian citizenship by law. 167 Other developed nations such as Australia, New Zealand, France, the [*965] United Kingdom and Ireland abandoned birthright citizenship. 168 With respect to the U.S. and Canada, though, birthright citizenship will have to be revisited with respect to migrants, be they illegal, temporary or refugees. For Canada, this will require nothing more than for the Parliament of Canada to enact an amendment to the Citizenship Act. 169 For the U.S., although purists may argue that this would require a constitutional amendment, the actual contours of the limitations on natural born citizenship and the "under the jurisdiction thereof" language have never been spelled out. 170 My proposal would be to have international migrants, prior to entry, permanently renounce the citizenship rights of any of their children born in the territorial U.S., on the ground that such births would not be under the U.S.'s jurisdiction for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. It would be, in effect, akin to the birth of a diplomat's child on U.S. territory, i.e. the child is not entitled to U.S. citizenship on the grounds his parents are not "subject to the jurisdiction" of the U.S. government. Although this would be a reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, I see nothing problematic with this approach because it would not be an improper denial of citizenship rights as was the case in Dred Scott, but a means of facilitating humanitarian migration. C. Preventing and Addressing State Failure and International Crises A more generous approach to migrants, in conjunction with a plan for repatriation, will encourage developed nations to spend greater resources addressing problems related to the Global Commons such as climate change, state failure and political instability in the developing world. This is because rich nations seeking to safely repatriate migrants will be encouraged to devote necessary resources to address these problems. Although superficially problematic, the repatriation requirement is a key component here because the current paradigm of limited asylum and permanent residency deters rich countries from the required international engagement level. For example, the U.S. and its European allies might have spent additional [*966] resources to address state failure in Libya and Syria if it did not fear the moral requirement to provide asylum with further involvement. The same applies with respect to economic migrants because the U.S. and other developed states would be forced to encourage economic development in sending-regions such as Central America and Mexico. Should rich countries collectively agree to adopt a dramatically increased temporary residency program, they will, in effect, be forced to devote additional resources to democratization and economic development in the developing world. For receiving states in Europe, Canada, and Australia, it will mean devotion of resources that are currently not spent. 171 For the U.S., it will most likely mean reallocation of resources from Israel and Turkey 172 to more vulnerable states with an emphasis on human development and job creation as opposed to military spending. It will also require states to take a more proactive approach to climate change and its concomitants, including political instability and state failure. Rich nations, including the U.S., however, have a moral obligation to take in a greater number of global migrants in view of the migratory surge and coming population bulge in the developing world. 173 This will only be forthcoming with a repatriation requirement that will force rich countries to strategically prevent and address international crises. D. Mitigating a Brain Drain from the Developing World Another benefit of granting migrants temporary status as opposed to permanent residency is that it would mitigate the baneful consequences of "brain drain" from the developing world. 174 An ever-increasing [*967] number of persons with post-secondary education from developing nations now live permanently in rich-world countries. 175 To illustrate, African countries lose 20,000 skilled personnel to the developed world each year. 176 That means that Africa is continuously losing people who might improve public health and foster economic development, democratization, and government accountability. Although the solution to the brain-drain phenomenon is not simple and does not lie in closing off access to rich-world labor markets, it requires taking steps to ensure migrants remain invested in their countries of origin by providing them only temporary residency in developed nations as much as feasible. To conjecture, Mexico's economy and democracy would be better placed today if the Mexicans who migrated to the U.S. in previous generations had remained invested in Mexico's development. The same could be said of North and West Africans in France and South Asians in the U.K. By limiting migrants to temporary visas, rich world

governments can help foster democratization and economic development in the Global South that, in view of the population disparities between the Global North and South, would be an obvious improvement in global well-being. CONCLUSION If immigration and asylum laws were amended to allow for a large increase in temporary residence permits to facilitate ingress and egress across international frontiers, migrants would not become illegal immigrants, but would instead be legal temporary residents with the ability to live, work, and pay taxes in destination countries. Because the policy will require eventual repatriation and would deny migrant children birthright

citizenship, bipartisan support for accepting more migrants will likely be forthcoming . Continuing to incentivize repatriation to countries of origin by means of providing only temporary residence and work authorization without opportunity for permanent residency will definitely be problematic in that it will create an unequal residency paradigm that is anathema to liberal internationalists. That said, the current focus on equal permanent residency for all is causing more harm than good by effectively depriving the vast majority of migrants the physical security and economic opportunity that only rich-world nations can [*968] currently provide. It also disincentivizes rich countries from working within an international community to prevent and address international crises and undermines third-world democratization and economic growth by permanently depriving developing nations of crucial human capital. My proposal will strike some as both naïve and harsh. Naïve because it perhaps understates rich world countries' opposition to migrants, and harsh in that it contemplates and indeed advocates repatriating these migrants to their countries of origin and denies them the opportunity for either permanent residency or citizenship. Recognizing there are problems related to migrant repatriation, my proposal at least considers all relevant interests in seeking to advance global well-being. These interests are those of receiving states, which fear the demographic and backlash consequences of permanent migration, the sending states, who consistently lose human capital to the developed world, and most importantly, the migrants themselves, who are effectively disallowed access to developed countries under the current paradigm. Obviously, my proposal does not directly address the issues of economic insecurity and socio-economic immobility, which are the other obvious causes for nativism and hostility to migrants in much of the developed world. These problems should be addressed as a moral imperative regardless of how they affect attitudes to migrants. However, taking steps toward remediating inequality and providing for socio-economic and intergenerational mobility is a necessary but altogether insufficient basis for changing attitudes to migrants. Recognizing my proposal is a mere starting point, my hope is that it will stimulate a needed conversation about changing the current approach, which inadvertently and unfortunately treats migrants as toxins pervading an interconnected world and denies the reality of global migration and how this phenomenon will grow with time, based on state failure, climate change, and uneven population and economic growth further. By expanding access to migration on the condition that it be for no more than for a definite duration, developed countries can engender sufficient political support to greatly expand the number of migrant visas issued each year, address their citizens' legitimate concerns about migration's consequences and proactively deal with the problems that engender problematic levels of global migration. At the start of the previous century, my grandfather traveled from what was then Ceylon to the U.K. as an Imperial subject. Recognizing the benighted views of many Imperial administrators, including incorrect suppositions as to racial hierarchy, they saw individual [*969] British subjects as assets entitled to freedom of movement and residency. Although today's world has laudably rejected the legitimacy of both empire and ethnic superiority, my grandfather's descendants who hold Sri Lankan passports lack the same freedom of movement he took for granted. This is because first-world destination countries largely refuse to admit Sri Lankans because they fear that admission will irrevocably lead to illegal and unwelcome permanent residency. My hope is that changing our approach to global migration will encourage rich world citizens to welcome global migrants, facilitate migrants' ability to improve their lives and, in the end, improve global well-being. President Trump , who has unequivocally opposed

his country's current approach to both immigrants and refugees, might consider this proposal as a means to address his supporters' concerns and facilitate U.S. leadership on the issue .

Ext Brain Drain DA -

The biggest thing is to answer the affirmative arguments – extend evidence already read and provide an impact calculus.

Next to Impact Calculus

(Explain how the impacts of this Disadvantage outweigh the affirmative’s disadvantages)

Prefer the negative impacts of the Wages DA to the negative impacts. Our impacts outweigh the affirmative’s on:

A. Probability – (explain in your own words)B. Time-Frame – (explain in your own words)C. Magnitude – (explain in your own words).

Ext Balkanization DA

The biggest thing is to answer the affirmative arguments – extend evidence already read and provide an impact calculus.

Next to Impact Calculus

(Explain how the impacts of this Disadvantage outweigh the affirmative’s disadvantages)

Prefer the negative impacts of the Balkinzation DA to the negative impacts. Our impacts outweigh the affirmative’s on:

A. Probability – (explain in your own words)B. Time-Frame – (explain in your own words)C. Magnitude – (explain in your own words).

Now to Case

Plan – Extend Procedural

Adv 1 - Extend Neg Args

Adv 2 - Extend Neg Args

Solvency – Extend Neg Args