1983 evaluative voting behavior_an experimental examination

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University of Utah

Western Political Science Association

Evaluative Voting Behavior: An Experimental ExaminationAuthor(s): Bart R. SalisburyReviewed work(s):Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 36, No. 1 (Mar., 1983), pp. 88-97Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association

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EVALUATIVE VOTING BEHAVIOR:

AN EXPERIMENTAL EXAMINATIONBART R. SALISBURY

University f Washington

JOHN ANDERSON'S third-party andidacy for the presidency n1980 has re-kindled nterest n thebehavior oftheAmericanvoterwhenfaced withmore thantwocandidates.When more thantwocandidates are present, oters re forcedfrom heirnormalpattern

ofstraight reference oting o a morecomplexdecision-making rocess.This

processemploysboth thevoters'

preferencerankingof thecandi-

dates and thevoters'perceptionof each candidate's chance of winning.Furthermore,nmulti-candidate aces votersmust ontend notonlywithwhotheywould ike to see elected,but also withwhotheywouldnot iketosee elected. With three or more candidates present the voter cannotsimply ote forhis mostpreferred andidate- particularlyfthis ctioninanyway ncreases the ikelihoodof his eastpreferred andidatebeingelected.

The type of behavior described here is basicallythe same as thathypothesizedbyAnthonyDowns for electoral behavior in a multi-party

systemDowns, 1957: 47-48). This formof rationalbehavior seems un-common in American electionsbecause of a two-party raditionthatpervadestheelectoralprocessand because researchers nthis rea tend toconcentrate on general electionswhere two candidates are the norm,ignoringprimary lectionswhere multi-candidate aces are frequentlyseen. American electoral analysis,as a result, s less likelyto producesupporting videncefor n evaluativevotingbehaviorhypothesis.Whenonly two candidates are present, simple preference structuresprovesufficient ormakinga decision. When more than twoalternatives represent,the votermust carefully valuate informationpresent in the

electoral environment nd incorporatethis synthesis nto his decisionconcerningwhichcandidate to support.

The intent fthispaper is toexaminethestrategy oters mploywhenfaced with hree lternatives n an election.The hypothesis o be tested swhether r notvotersuse an evaluativeapproach whenthere are morethan two candidates. This involves the weighting of a normallypreference-basedvote witha subjectiveassessment of the voter's mostpreferred andidate'schanceofwinning. fthis hance ofwinningdropsfar enough, and the voter's first nd second preferencesare closely

ranked, hevoterwillcontemplate witching is voteto thesecondprefer-ence. The presence of more than two candidates allows the voterthisoption.

NOTE: am indebted toDonald McCrone forhisgenerousassistancewith hisproject nd toRuthRoss forherexcellenteditorialreview.








EvaluativeVoting ehavior 89

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS

The hypothesispresented will be investigated using a computer-assisted electionsimulation.The twomajor information lementsto beincorporated ntothe simulation re the candidates' issue positions ndpublicopinionpolls.' This analysiswill ookat theconditionsunderwhicha voter will or will not support his first referenceto see if evaluativevotingbehavior does occur.

The electionsimulationwillpresentthree simplified lectionsitua-tions.These situationswill be laid out over time as theywould be in anactualelection. n the firstituation, ollswill ndicate hat he voter'sfirstpreferencewillbe ina close race withhis second preference.Pollsin thesecond situationwill howthevoter's econdpreferencewell ahead ofthe

other wo andidates.The third ituationwillpresent closerace betweenthe voter'ssecond and thirdpreferenceswhile hisfirst reference osesground.

The threesituations ffer he voterdifferingnformational ontexts;if the voter exercises evaluative behavior each context will resultin apredictableoutcome. In the first ituation, he voter'smost preferredcandidate is viable and in a close race withthe second preference.Theproperdecisionunder these conditionswould be thecontinuedsupportofthevoter'smostpreferred andidate. In thesecondsituation hevoter'sbehavior s difficulto pinpointexactly.With his first reference sure

loserand thesecondpreference surewinner, he voterhas no reasontocast a ballot. It mightbe thatsome will vote regardless,and thatsomemight venvotefor heir econdpreference bandwagoning). n thethirdsituation he voter's irst referencehas no realchance ofwinning nd thesecond preference s in need of support. In this situationthe properdecision would be for the voter to abandon his firstpreferenceandsupporthis second preference.

METHODOLOGY

SubjectsThe purposivesamples drawnfor thisstudyconsistof 183 students

from ntroductory-levelourses in politicalscience at the University fWashington,Seattle. The first ample (65 students)was taken WinterQuarter, 1981, and thesecond sample (118 students)was drawnWinterQuarter, 1982. Statistical omparisons of the two groups showed nodifferences n themajor variables of the study o the twogroups werecombined for the analysis.The population from whichthese samples

1As will be seen later in thispaper,

issuepositions

will serve as the basis forpreferenceranking he three andidates and thepollswill erve s information n the status feach

candidate at specifiedpointsduringthe election simulation.Choosing these informa-tionelements snota statement ftheirmportance na regularelectionenvironment;rather hat n the imited nformationnvironment fthe election imulation heywillprovidesufficientnformation o allow subjectsto differentiatehecandidates and toevaluate theirchances ofwinning.








90 WesternoliticalQuarterly

were drawn college students,18-24yearsofage) has a 72 percentvoterturnoutrate (Wolfinger nd Rosenstone,1980: 47).

Procedures

Each subjectwas givena handout describingthree candidates com-petingforan unspecified ffice. he candidates are describedaccordingtotheir ositions n five ssues.2Usingthecandidates' ssue statementshesubjectswere instructed o preferencerankthecandidateson a 7-pointscale (1 - least preferred o 7 - mostpreferred).

The computer-assistedlection imulation onsists fthepresentationof five eparate opinion polls takenduringa hypothetical lection cam-

paign.3These pollsreflected he actual structure f a publicopinionpoll,containingnformation bout candidate standings, ndecideds,and pos-siblepoll measurement rror. After ach poll subjectswere asked threequestions:

1. Ifthe lectionwereheldnow,which andidatewouldyouvotefor?

2. In light f the bove nformationouldyou go out andvote?3. Whatdo youfeelare yourmostpreferredandidates'shancesofwinning?4

Subjectswererandomly ssignedtoone of threegroupsat the timeof

the simulation.The three groups consistof a controlgroup and twoexperimentalgroups. The opinion polls for thecontrolgroup show thesubject'sfirst reference n a close race withhissecond preferencewhilehis thirdpreference oses ground. In the first xperimentalgroup thepollsshowthesubject's econd preference eadingthe field fcandidateswhile his first nd thirdpreferences ose ground. The situationforthesecond experimentalgroup is a close race, like that presented to thecontrolgroup,exceptthatthesubject's econd and thirdpreferences rebattling tout whilehis first referencefades.

Subjectswere notallowedto communicatewith ach otherduringthe

simulation.The simulation dministered s extremely imple in nature, acking

some of the more prevalentdecision-making ues of an actual election(e.g., party dentification, ersonal appearances, speeches, etc.). It is,however, ufficientlyomplex to involvethe subjectsand allow them todemonstrate valuativevotingbehaviorif t exists.

2The issues used forcandidate descriptions re welfare,housing, nflation, nergy, ndconsumerprotection.

3The subjects re toldthe first oll isconductedat thebeginning fthe electioncampaign,the fifth oll ust beforethe election tself, nd the remainingthreepolls are evenly

spaced between.4Subjects reaskedtoassess their irst reference's hanceofwinning ccording othe scale:

0, no chance at all; 1 to 49, chance is less than the othercandidates'; 50, chance is thesame as the other andidates'; 51 to99,chance is better han theother andidates';and100, surewinner.








Evaluative VotingBehavior 91

FINDINGS

An hypothesis f evaluativevotingbehaviorrequiresthatvoters ccu-

ratelynterpretnformation vailable to them n an election. n thesimu-lation this nformation omes in the form fopinion polls.To determinewhether ubjectscan make this nterpretation hey re asked to indicate,on a scale of 0 to 100,whattheyfelttheirfirst reference's hances ofwinningthe election are. The mean subjectivechance (MSC) foreachgroup,across the fivepoll sessions, s shown in Figure 1,along withthepoll standingof the subjects'first reference.For each group the MSCvaluecloselyfollows hepattern etbythe first reference's ollstanding.5The controlgroupevaluates theirfirst reference's hances after hefirstsession t 59.3,whichrisesto64.5 after essionthree, nd finallyettles t

61.3 after hefinal ession.Experimentalgroupsone and twobothshowconsistent eclines nMSC: groupone's evaluationdropping22.4 pointsfrombeginning o end and grouptwo'sfalling 0.9 points.An indicationofthesensitivityfthesubjects' valuationof a candidate's chances can be

FIGURE 1SUBJECT RERCTION TO POLL INFORMRTION

100- \ 100-

80-

N,-

80-

60-0--

40-

20

_\ -\

40-N\ \

- N - \

20 I0 1 2 3 4 5 01 2 3 4 5

EXPERIMENTAL EXPERIMENTRLGROUP ONE GROUPTWO

PERCENTVOTE. 1ST PREFERENCE--- ERN SUBJECTIVE CHRNCE-------- POLL STRNDING. 1ST PREFERENCE

5After hefirst oll session,where the standingsforthecandidates are the same foreachsubject, he MSC values are: controlgroup,59.3 points; experimentalgroupone, 55.2points; and experimentalgroup two, 57.9 points.There is no statistical ifferencebetweenthethree numbers.

100-

80-

PERCE 60-NTR

E

40-

20 i I I I0123451 2 3 4 5

CONTROLGROUP

-








92 Western oliticalQuarterly

seen in thecontrolgroup afterthe fourthpoll session. At thispointthesubject'sfirst referencehas dropped twopercentagepointsfrom the

previouspoll, nto tiewith he secondpreference. his dropof2 percentfromthe previous poll session resulted n a 7.2 point drop in MSC.How the subjectstreattheirfirst reference s thefirstndicationof

evaluativevotingbehavior.Figure 1 showsthe level of support giventothe subjects'first referenceforeach of the threegroups. The controlgroup supports ts first reference100 percent,with singleexceptionafter hefourth ession also probablydue to thefirst reference's rop inthepollsat thatpoint).The experimentalgroupsbothshowdecreases infirst reference upportover time. n experimentalgroup one this up-portdrops41 percentagepoints; nexperimental rouptwo t falls lmost

40 percentagepoints.Evaluativebehavior can not be shownsimply hroughthe oss of firstpreference upport,as in experimentalgroups one and two, t must becoupled withan increase in second preference upport. Figure 2 showsthe support subjects give to both their first nd second preferences.Without xception, decrease in first reference upport s mirrored nan increase n second preference upport,consistentwith hehypothesisbeing tested.

There is one furtherrequirementfor the hypothesisof evaluativebehaviorto be borne out- that hevotermake hissupportfelt ycasting

100-

80-

PER 60--CENTR 40-GE

20 -

0 I r_0 1 2 3CONTROLGR

FIGURE 2VOTE TRRNSFER TO SECOND PREFERENCE

-Io00- \ 100-

80-

60-

40--

20-

80-

60-

40-

20-

II

r II I

O

4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1tOUP EXPERIMENTRL EXPI

GROUP ONE GR

PERCENT VOTE. 1ST PREFERENCE-- PERCENT VOTE. 2ND PREFERENCE

/

//

//I I I .

/

I I I 12 3 4 5

ERIMENTALtOUP TWO

-









a ballot. This can be determined by asking the subjects theirvotingintentions,.e.,whether r nottheywill ctually asta ballot.Admittedly,

votingntentions re not the same as voting urnout, utthey an providean indicationof whether hesubjectsrealizethenecessity fvoting.Thesubjects n thecontrolgroup and experimentalgroup twoare facedwithsituations hatrequirethem o vote.The response n thecontrolgroup sanear unanimous decision to vote (Table 1). A similarresult s seen inexperimental rouptwo.Experimentalgroupone,wherethe need tovoteis notas great, hows consistent ecline npositive otingntentions. hesubjects n this xperiment eemto be awareofwhen t snecessary ovoteand when it is not.

TABLE 1. SUBJECT'S VOTING INTENTIONS

Poll Control Experimental ExperimentalSituation Group GroupOne GroupTwo

1 97.8% 96.6% 98.7%2 100.0 96.6 98.73 97.8 94.9 97.44 100.0 91.5 94.85 100.0 86.4 94.8

(n = 46) (n = 59) (n = 78)

If evaluative behaviorexiststhen a furtherhypothesis an be madethatthosesubjectswhose second preference s ranked close to theirfirstpreferencewould be among the first o switch heirvote. This would beexpected primarily ecause the more alike the first nd second prefer-ences are for the subject,the easier it would be to transfer upport ifconditionswarrant. Second preferencedistance has no impact on thecontrolgroup,sincethere s no reason for hem o switch heir ote Table2). In experimentalgroupsone and two,where voteswitchingsevident,themajorityf toccursamong subjectswhoranktheir econdpreference

no worse thanhalf-way etween the first nd lastpreference.Below thispointthere s little vidence ofvote switching.Two further bservations an be made from heresults nthis ection.

First, hatexperimentalvotersrecognizethe timeconstraints f an elec-tion.During the preliminary hases of the simulation he subjectswerefairlyonsistent n their upportoftheir irst reference, egardless f theconditionspresented nthepolls.Toward the atterhalfofthe simulationthe subjectsexhibited vote switching o a greaterdegree, reflectingherestrictionsn alternatives hat hereduced timeframe mposes.Voters, twould seem, attemptto keep theiroptions open and do not commit

themselves o a particular ourse ofactionuntil heelection s almostuponthem.The second observation oncerns thecontinuedsupportreceivedby

thesubjects'first referencenthetwoexperimental roups. Ifvoters rerational ctors,whywouldthey ontinue tosupporttheirfirst referenceafterhe becomes an obvious loser? There are three possibilities hat








94 Western oliticalQuarterly

TABLE 2. VOTE SWITCHING AND SECOND PREFERENCE DISTANCE

DistanceBehind Poll Control Experimental Experimental

First reference Situation Group GroupOne GroupTwo

1-2points 1 0% 0% 0%(n = 20)* 2 0 8.0 10.7(n = 25)t 3 0 20.0 28.6(n = 28)t 4 5.0 24.0 39.3

5 0 24.0 53.63-4 points 1 0% 0% 0%

(n= 16)* 2 0 5.0 12.8(n = 20)t 3 0 15.0 20.5(n = 39)t 4 0 20.0 33.3

5 0 35.0 35.9

5-6 points 1 0% 0% 0%(n 10)* 2 0 7.1 0(n= 14)t 3 0 0 0(n = 11)t 4 0 0 18.2

5 0 0 18.2

*Number of subjects n ControlGroup subgroup.tNumber of subjects n Experimental Group One subgroup.tNumber of subjects n Experimental Group Two subgroup.

presentthemselves.The first s the difference etweenthe ranks of the

first nd secondpreferences. fthisdifferencesgreatenoughitwould beirrational orthesubject ogivehissupportto a candidatehedisapprovesofalmost s muchas his astpreferenceTable 2 provides upportforthiscontention). econd, individuals ssimilate nformationtdifferentates,hence a consensus on when a candidate becomes a sure loser is highlyunlikely.Finally, here s thesatisficationfcontinuing o supportone'sfirstpreference,even though it may amount to nothingmore than asymbolic ct.6

CONCLUSION

The intention f thispaper is to examine the behavior of the indi-vidualvoterwhenfaced with hreecandidates. The assumptions mplicitin thishypothesis re thatvoters,within he confinesof environmentalconstraints,re rationaldecision-makers; hatvotersconstruct nd usepreference tructuresn theirdecision-making; nd that votersacquireand assess information bout each candidate's chance of winningtheelection and use this information o weighttheirvoting decision. Acomputer-assistedlection imulation s used totest hishypothesis. heresultsshow definite valuativebehavior on behalf of the subjectsin-volved.A

significantercentageof

subjectsvoted for heir

highestanked

6These possibilitiesre supported byremarksmade in a follow-up nterview.Amongtheexplanationsgivenbythenon-switchersnexperimental roupsone and twofor tayingwith heir irst reference re: a definiteiking or heir irst reference; he"principle"of stayingwithone's first referenceregardlessof theconditions;and thebeliefthattheirfirst reference tillhas an outside chance ofwinning.









preferencewith the greatest ikelihoodof winning.7The subjectswereable criticallyo evaluate preferencepolls and to determine, n an indi-

vidual level,theirmostpreferred andidate's chance of winning.Also,when the situationpresenteda need for the subjectto vote,the subjectindicated thathe/shewould actuallycast a ballot.

The election simulation lso produced at least one other nterestingobservation:the voterappears to recognize the time constraints f anelection and senseswhenit becomes important o become seriousabout

decidingwhich andidatetosupport.Sincethispoint s close to the end ofthehypotheticalampaign nthesimulation,t wouldseemthat he trendtoward beginning electoral campaigns earlier may not produce thebeneficialresults desired because votersdo not make theirfinalvoting

decision until ate in the election.8Whydo Americanelectionsseem devoid of evaluative behavior?As

explained earlier,most studieson votingbehavior focuson generalelec-tions where votersare usuallyfaced withonlytwochoices. This allowsthemto vote onlyin a straightforward,reference-basedmanner (i.e.,choose thecandidatetheymostprefer).Evaluativebehavior can be more

readilyobserved in primary lections,where the slate of candidates isoften threeor more. Americanpresidentialelections offer t least tworecentexamples of evaluativevotingbehavior: Anderson's bid for thepresidency,mentioned previously,and George Wallace's third-party

campaign in 1968. Both candidatesdid wellin thepolls until about onemonthbefore the election,when both candidates began a downwardtrend Figure 3). As theelectiondate neared a proportionof voterswhosupportedthethird-partyandidates saw thattheirfirst referencewasnotlikely owin nd transferred heir upporttoone ofthetworemainingcandidates.9

One additionalpoint: publicopinionpollsmayhave an impacton thedecision-making rocess n a waynotpreviously ealized. Whileopinionpolls are byno means theonly nformation vailable duringan election

7A result onsistent ithrationalvotermodelsthatspecify ecision-makerseek tomaximizeheirxpected alue ntheirhoice fcandidates. orexamplesee Downs(1957),Edwards1954), nd Fishbein ndAjzen 1975).

8This result sconsistentwithdata from he CPSR 1976 NationalElectionStudy.Forty-sixpercentof voters n the 1976 election did not reach a final decision untilaftertheRepublicanand DemocraticNationalConventions. Of these,slightly verhalfwaiteduntil hefinal woweeksof theelectionbeforedeciding. n regardto the1968presiden-tialelection a Gallup Opinionndex Report42, 1968) states that". . . one voter n foursaid that, ven twoweeks before theelection,he had not definitely'made up hismindhow he would vote" p. 7).

9In regardtoWallace,Steven Brams 1975: 95), notesthat In thefinal wo months f the

campaign, from the beginningof September to Election Day at the beginning ofNovember,polls indicated thathe [Wallace] lost tobothmajor party andidates)morethanone-third f his earlysupporters .. ." In regardtoAnderson,Schneider 1981:257), states hat People accepted theargumentthatAnderson could notwinand that,byvoting orhim, heymight e helping oelect the andidatethey ike east" page 257).For further iscussion fAnderson'scampaign alongthis ine see: Pomper,etal. (1981:84, 108).








96 WesternoliticalQuarterly

FIGURE 3

PRESIDENTIRL PREFERENCE POLL STRNDINGS.

JOHNANDERSONAND GEORGEWRLLACE30-

E 20-RCE

- -' "- -.-N - ,T .

G 10--E -

-.. _

WALLACE- --- RANDERSON

100 80 0 40 20 000 80 60 40 20 0DRYS BEFORE THE ELECTION

SOURCE- GALLUP OPINION INDEX (1968. 1980)

theyare increasingly ecoming the mostprevelant.Evidence has beenofferedby others thatpolls are not responsibleforbandwagon effects(with omeexceptions);butwhiletheymaynotproduce landslidewinnerstheydo have thepotential oshape losers,particularlynracescomposedofmore than twocandidates Fleitas,1971: 434-38; Gallup, 1972: 33-40;and Beniger, 1976: 22-38). Two or three inaccurate polls showing acandidate on a downward trendmight et thepatternfor theremainderof the election,creatinga loser where a contendermayhave existed.

The resultsof this tudy re not conclusive.They do, however, ndi-

catesome nterestingreas within hefield felection tudiesthatwarrantfurther nvestigation.More efforts re needed in understandingtherelationship etween thevoter nd the nformation e receives from heelectionenvironment.What information s important?How is it inter-preted?How is it ncorporated ntothedecision-making rocess?Theseare just a few of the questions thatneed to be answered before a fullunderstandingof thevotingprocesscan be achieved.

REFERENCES

Beniger, amesR. 1976)."WinninghePresidentialomination: ational ollsandState rimarylections,936-1972."ublic pinion uarterly,0 Spring):22-38.

Brams, teven1975).Game heoryndPolitics. ewYork:The Free Press.

Downs, Anthony1957). AnEconomic heoryfDemocracy, ew York: Harper &Row.








Evaluative VotingBehavior 97

Edwards,W. (1954). "The Theoryof Decision Making." Psychologicalulletin 1:380-417.

Fishbein,Martin, nd IcekAjzen (1975). Belief, ttitude,ntentionndBehavior:AnIntroductionoTheoryndResearch. eading,Mass.: Addison-Wesley ublishingCompany.

Fleitas,Daniel W. (1971). "Bandwagon and Underdog Effectsn Minimal nfor-mation Elections."American olitical cienceReview65 (une): 434-38.

Gallup, George (1972). The Sophisticatedoll Watcher's uide. Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonOpinion Press.

Pomper,Gerald M., et al. (1981). TheElection f1980: ReportsndInterpretations.Chatham,N.J.;Chatham House Publishers, nc.

Schneider,William

1981)."The November 4 Vote for President: What Did it

Mean?" In The American lections f1980, AustinRanney,ed. Washington,D.C.: AmericanEnterprise nstitutefor Public PolicyResearch: 212-62.

Wolfinger, aymondE., and StevenJ.Rosenstone 1980). WhoVotes?New Haven:Yale University ress.

1983 evaluative voting behavior_an experimental examination

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