146 croatian international relations review aflinnation …

146 CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW

Aflinnation of Statehood andTerritorial Integrity of Croatia (1)

Elected in the first multiparty elections in 1990to the Parliament of Croatia as a representative ofthe district ofDubrovnik, the author served as Presi-dent of the Parliamentary Committee for ForeignAffairs, 1990-1992.

Croatia's tradition of statehood extends backthrough the medieval period over thirteen centuries,and continued until the establishment by theVersailles Peace Treaty of the entity of the Slovenes-Croatians-Serbs (in essence what came to be theKingdom of Yugoslavia). The Croatians' experiencewith Serbia's Karadjordje dynasty during the inter-war period and with Tito in the second Yugoslaviaonly validated and strengthened traditional yearningof all Croatian to have their own state.

The creation of theBanovina of Croatia in1939, and even that of theIndependent State of Croatiain 1941 under adverse con-ditions' were expressions ofthat same desire shared byall Croatians. The affirma-tion of the golden thread ofCroatian statehood contin-ued subsequently during theCommunist period, where itwas expressed in the deci-sions taken by the ZAVNOH(State Anti-Fascist Councilfor the People's Liberationof Croatia) and in Croatia'sconstitutions, beginningwith that of 1946 and con-tinuing to the last constitu-tion, the 1974 Constitutionof the Socialist Republic ofCroatia. All these initiativesreflected the basic quest forCroatian independence, de-spite the fact that they weremanipulated from the topwith the intent, on the onehand, of creating the illusionof legality and of building

Hrvoje Kacic

legitimacy for Communist Yugoslavia and, on theother, of attracting support from the Croatian popu-lation.

This said, it is important to point out that theprovisions enshrined in the Constitution of the So-cialist Republic of Croatia guaranteed the right ofnations to self-determination - to include the rightto secede - and also guaranteed precisely determinedborders among the republics. This was to have a sig-nificant impact on Croatia's achieving diplomaticrecognition.

In order to understand fully Croatia's situa-tion during this crucial period of 1990-1992 - towhich the fate or collapse of the second, Commu-nist, Yugoslavia was also closely connected - it is

necessary to take into con-sideration the political situ-ation abroad, and especiallythat in Europe, as well as toassess the political balancewithin the former SocialistFederal Republic of Yugo-slavia (SFRY) itself.

In the present assess-ment, I wi IInot deal in greatdetail with the domestic po-litical situation. Rather, Iwill focus on the interna-tional political context overthe last several years, onewhose principal actors werenot favourably disposed tothe disintegration and col-lapse of even an artificially-created state (or the"Yugoslav tragedy" as it hasbeen called with good rea-son).

The article gives a historicaloverview of the political

developments leading to thebreak-up of Yugoslavia and,

subsequently, affirmation of theCroatian state and its territorialintegrity. The initial international

situation was not in favour ofCroatian independence since theinternational community intended

to preserve the common Yugoslavstate. After the Croatian (and

Siovenian) declaration ofindependence (1991) the EC andUN began to see the impossibility

of a Yugoslav state, a fact soonhighlighted by the aggressive

Belgrade's military intervention.Further, particular role of Germany

and diplomatic recognition ofCroatian state are discussedincluding an overview of the

developments concerning thefinal recognition of Croatian

territorial integrity.

Key words: Croatia, Yugoslavia

The InternationalBalance

To understand inter-national relations morecompletely, especially

]UNY - DECEMBER 1998

within the European context, would require an analy-sis in considerable detail of the Congresses of Viennaand Berlin, the Versailles and Rapallo Treaties, andthe league of Nations, as well as of the Monroe,Wilson, Truman, Kennedy, Nixon, and Reagan Doc-trines. In dealing with these very important prin-ciples, we will have to limit ourselves, however, onlyto those historical sources which have a direct bear-ing on an understanding of present-day internationalrelations, such as the United Nations Charter, theHelsinki Final Act, the basic documents of the Con-ference on Security and Cooperation in Europe(CSCE), and the 1989 Paris Charter. One is com-pletely justified in viewing these documents as thebasis for generally-accepted terms of reference andas the legal basis of the present-day interstate sys-tem in Europe, also taking into account, of course,the role of NATO and the European Union.

Here, I will address only one basic principlewhich was established by the Wilson Doctrine justbefore the end of World War I, and which even to-day is, still seen as the keystone of that doctrine,namely "the right of peoples to self-determination".This principle, and rightly so, found a prominentplace in the principles of the League of Nations and,later, in the United Nations Charter, as well as inCSCE documents.

This principle played determinant role in thenew framework after World War I as well as in theinternational process of deco Ionization.

However, although the principle of nationalself-determination was applied when the interna-tional community recognized Croatia and Slovenia,today it is no longer the keystone principle, nor is itdecisive, in international relations.

Significantly, President Bush's term in office,which coincided with the collapse of the Commu-nist system and the disintegration of the last two neo-colonialist states in Europe - the USSR and theSFRY - introduced and made part' of the UnitedStates' day-to-day conduct of foreign policy a newdoctrine which was diametrically opposed to theWilson Doctrine. Known as the Bush Doctrine, thelatter held that "States may neither be destroyed norcreated." That, in fact, meant that those countrieswhich were recognized in late eighties of the presentcentury present cannot be allowed to disappear or todisintegrate, and, by the same token, that one can-not allow new states to be born. All this is in linewith the very well known attitude of "the great pow-ers" in favor of preserving the status quo ante, whichis also the prevailing ethos of international relations,especially as conducted by the great powers of theworld. Confirmation of this way of thinking was

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evident in the United Nations' behavior, especiallywhen De Cuellar was its Secretary-General. Giventhis framework, it was not by accident that BudimirLoncar, the Foreign Minister of the SFRY - thenalready in its death-throes - sought to frighten andthreaten the world at the CSCE summit in Berlin on19 June 1991 by claiming that "The collapse ofYu-goslavia would be like a time-bomb in the middle ofEurope and could even now spark a chain reactionon the old continent, in which there are already forty-six ethnic conflicts."

De Cuellar's successor as Secretary-Generalof the United Nations, Butros Butros Ghali con-firmed his support for the maintenance of the statusquo during the initial period of his term by his evengreater insistence that the United Nations would nolonger be able to respect the principle of "nationalself-determination", since that would confront theinternational community with massive upheaval,given the fact that would lead to the emergence ofmore new states than the total of those which existat present, forcing the United Nations to cope with asituation in which there would be more than fourhundred states.

Looking at the international world order at theend of the twentieth century, one can conclude with-out exaggerating that the Slovenes and Croatianscaught one of the last trains of independence, al-though clearly also relying heavily on the principleof a nation's right to self-defense. At the same time,Croatia must be aware that, now that right has beentaken advantage of and used up, the contemporaryprinciples of the world order must take precedence,which in the case of Croatia is eminently pragmatic.The principle of national self-determination mustnow be treated as a historical category. Croatia mustadhere to the concept of the world's great powers tothe effect that this principle from the Wilson Doc-trine, despite its continuing presence in the UnitedNations Charter, has undergone a revision.

However, it was not only because of the evo-lution in the world's understanding of the right ofself-determination that Croatia's prospects forachieving the Croatian people's centuries-old desirefor an independent Croatia were daunting. Therewere also other obstacles:

1. Yugoslavia's standing and reputation around theworld which it achieved in 1948 as the first "dissi-dent" state by standing up to Stalin and theCominform and, subsequently, as a leader in the Non-Aligned Movement.

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2. The interests of the permanent members of theUnited Nations' Security Council.a. Great Britain and France. They were the main pa-trons of the creation of Yugoslavia - or Greater Serbia- following both world wars, and there was closediplomatic coordination among Belgrade, Londonand Paris. Of course, there is an additional reasonfor this sensitivity, for one cannot exclude the possi-bility of similar movements in Northern Ireland,Wales or, in Scotland and, as far as France is con-cerned, in Corsica and in its Basque region.b. The United States, as a result of its experience inVietnam has consistently followed a policy of avoid-ing becoming engaged militarily in crises which donot threaten directly its vital interests and in whichit cannot guarantee a successful and quick outcome.In the case of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia,the United States has taken advantage of its inertiaand indecisiveness, delivering the problem first to-ward the European Community and subsequentlysteering it toward the United Nations.c. Following the collapse of the "Eastern bloc" andthe voluntary but unavoidable dissolution of theWarsaw Pact - which accompanied the convulsionsof the USSR's economic collapse, Russia, using itsposition on the Security Council to ensure that de-velopments in and the lessons from the Balkans didnot spread to its Eurasian landmass, supportedYugoslavia's continued existence. The first Russianambassador to Croatia, Mr. Kerestezhants, acknowl-edged that formerly for Russia Belgrade was equiva-lent to Yugoslavia, as a result of which no attentionat all was paid to the other republics and peoples inthe former Yugoslavia. This was the case not only inRussia or in the former USSR, but also in most ofthe rest of the world and even in Europe. In addi-tion, the impact of Russia's also being Orthodox andof its traditional alliance with Serbia should not beunderestimated.d. China was also hesitating because of its ethniccomposition and its determination that while accept-ing the need for changes in its social structure by agradual adoption of market conditions it wouldfreeze the democratization of its political system.Above all China viewed the example of Croatia andSlovenia as an unwelcome precedent for the futureof Tibet and even Taiwan.

3. The end of the Cold War, the withdrawal of theUSSR from the world's political stage as a "super-power" the voluntary dissolution of the Warsaw Pact,the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unsuccessful coupattempt in Moscow in August 1991 - which all oc-curred without the firing of a single shot - lulled

CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW

Europe into thinking that armed conflict would nolonger be possible in Europe, and that it was only apainful memory from the past. The Paris Charter,filled as it is with wonderful declarations about or-der in Europe as the Eastern Bloc was disappearing,is basically: flawed, however, since it does not pro-vide for penalties sanctions and for those who donot respect the Charter's principles and prescriptions.Clearly, Europe underestimated the possibility fortyrants such as Saddam Husayn or Idi Amin to stillemerge in Europe. 14. The international community saw the breakdownof the "Extraordinary" Congress of Yugoslavia'sLeague of Communists in January 1990 and the re-sults of the first democratic elections as part of agradual democratization process within the continu-ing framework of Yugoslavia and as the result of themeltdown of Communism. Within that context, thefact was ignored that power in Slovenia, Croatia,Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina had passednewly emerged to genuinely democratic politicalparties, while in Serbia and Montenegro the sametotalitarian Communist parties remained in power,only cynically "Communist" from their name.

5. In January 1991, Europe and the rest of the worldwere focused on the Gulf War. Only thus can oneexplain that the ultimatum from the leadership ofthe Serbian-dominated Yugoslav Army on January9, ordering the surrender of the Territorial DefenseForces' arms in Croatia and Slovenia, and the "Com-munique" by the Information Directorate of the Fed-eral Secretariat for National Defense on January 24were completely ignored by governments abroad andeven largely passed over by the world media. Eventhough there was talk at the time of a "quiet" mili-tary coup or of a creeping toward military rule, onecan take January 24, 1991 as the date when that oc-curred. It was on that day that the Yugoslav Armyannounced that it was the leading and the determin-ing force in the former Yugoslavia, and that it wasabove and outside any official political body in thestate, disregarding at this stage a role of SlobodanMilosevic his right-hand man Borisav Jovic mayhave played in shaping events.

6. During the first half of 1991, official positionsthroughout Europe toward the Yugoslav crisis wereidentical to those of France and Great Britain. Forexample, at the end of the European CommunitySummit on 7 April 1991 , Jacques Santer announcedthe European Community's agreed-upon positions.a. That the European Community has a duty to sup-


port Yugoslavia's unity and territorial integrity.b. That individual republics, with Slovenia andCroatia specifically mentioned, as integral parts ofYugoslavia, must not foster any illusions about theirprospects of joining Europe. That opportunity willbe available in the future only to Yugoslavia.c. That the European Community sees no reason tobecome involved in the SFRY's sensitive internalmatters.

7. The visit by the United States' Secretary of State,James Baker, to Belgrade in June 1991, his terse dis-cussions with the president of each of the republicsof the former Yugoslavia, and his statement beforehe departed, reflected the international community'sstand on the Yugoslav crisis, which Belgrade inter-preted as a "green light" to use armed force to bringunder control the "troublemakers" in Slovenia andCroatia.

8. On June 24,1991, the European Community an-nounced that it had approved a loan to Yugoslavia-read Belgrade - for 730 million ECUs, which thefederal president, Ante Markovic, viewed as a tri-umph for his personal policy. This initiative on thepart of the European Community can only be ex-plained as the resolute intention that all the relevantplayers should get the message that the EuropeanTwelve stood behind a "united" Yugoslavia. In for-mal terms, this was cast as support for the AnteMarkovic government but in real terms, at the sametime this also served as encouragement to Milosevicand the military and communist leadership, whowere now assured that they could use force and movetoward final armed confrontation without any fearof sanctions or responsibility or punishment.

9. The approaching of the Communist system's dis-integration in the world made additional initiativesfor political involvement of Croatian diaspora, theprocess of which became especially prominent inthe USA and other countries of the New World. It isdifficult to mention all the self-sacrificing and de-voted actions, or the help Croatian diaspora gave tothe "old country". Results of the first multi-partyelections marked the newest Croatian revival in thehomeland and we can freely say that Croats aroundthe world have also greeted it with great enthusi-asm.

Under the influence of such a process, Ameri-can officials like R. Dole, C. Pell, de Conto D' Amato,and many others, have been pleading for Croatia andusing their authority to criticize the official policy

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of the United States of America towards Yugoslaviaand Croatia. The year 1990 can be considered theyear of strong and efficient Croatian lobbying in theUSA.

However, the Serbian lobby was also efficientduring that period. Regarding direct influence on thecourse of events in Croatia, in the middle of 1990,we also have to mention the role of Mrs. HelenDelich Bentley.

Kosovo crisis 1989/1990and Knin barricades

During the year of 1989, due to the repres-sion of Serbian authorities on the prevailing Alba-nian population in Kosovo, there soon were world-wide appeals to Yugoslav authorities, to stop the useofforce. Because of disrespect of human rights, Yu-goslavia was condemned from the USA congress andmany other parliament institutions in the world.

Helen Delich Benltey, member of the Houseof Representatives of the State of Maryland, was awell-known lobbyist for the interests of Yugoslavia.At the beginning of August 1990, she visitedBelgrade where she met Mr. Jovic, President ofSFRY, and Mr. Milosevic. The basic idea of her ad-vice and warnings to her Belgrade friends was toloosen their policy towards the population ofKosovo,and that iff or any reason Serbia was not able to com-ply with that request, it would certainly be in theinterest of Serbia to divert the attention of the worldpublic from Kosovo by generating some other cen-tres of crisis in the former Yugoslavia.

It was understandable that Serbian militaryleadership, which controlled a tremendously supe-rior military potential, thought the alternative sug-gestion of Mrs. Delich much more acceptable. Con-sequently, Jovic, met Raskovic, Babic, and Opacic,leaders of Serbs in Knin, without the presence ofany representative of Croatian government, (whichwas a deviation from the usual way of communica-tion), especially when it was made public that themeeting took place. On the next day, August 16, INAtroops were put on the highest level of alert, and onAugust 17, 1990, Serbs from the town of Knin putbarricades (beams) on roads in the areas of Knin,Gracac, and Obrovac, This was the beginning of theso-called "beam" revolution of which the role of theleader of the Serbian lobby in the USA, held by Mrs.Delich Bentley, should not be neglected.

The aim of this entire staging was to provokeintervention of Croatian police against local Serbs,who would then be protected by JNA for being"threatened". National groups, in this case Serbs,

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being threatened by "Ustasha-like" authorities inZagreb, was a frequently used delusion. In this waythe instrumental of certain categories of the popula-tion in those areas was achieved, even though thepossibility of some national groups being threatenedcould not be denied, this being the case in areaswhere a particular national group was a minority,rather than in areas where Serbs held absolute ma-jority, such as in Knin. Authorities in Knin, on alllevels, are under complete control of Serbs.

The fact that the "Knin barricades" - one ofwhose protagonists was partly Mrs. Delich Bentley,who was obsessed with assessments that Croatia eco-nomically could not exist as an independent state -did not offer a pretext for direct military confronta-tion and did not force a change in the democrati-cally elected government in Croatia, left a militaryoption as the main and the only solution forMilosevic.

Of course, in relying on enormous militarysuperiority, Belgrade chose the military solution fol-lowing indisputable assessments, coming from bothYugoslav Counter Intelligence and Yugoslav diplo-macy, that Europe and the world would idly toleratethe use of heavy weapons for the purpose ofpacifi-cation of those republics which chose parliamentdemocracy as the basic value of political activity.The only topic left open was when and under whichexcuse the Serbian Army would attack on democrati-cally elected governments in Croatia and Slovenia.

Belgrade's choice - war option

Slovenia was the first one to be attacked, butafter the 6-day war the Serbian Army facing defeat,restricted the creation of Serbo-slavia' to Yugosla-via, without Slovenia. On July 6, 1991 GeneralBlagoje Adzic paraphrased the adventure in Sloveniain his aggressive speech: "We lost a battle, but notthe war". Thorough personnel and other preparationsto regain the spoiled reputation of the Yugoslav Armywere hastily made.

Milosevic - Saddam of the Balkans - forwhom the British Guardian already in the Summerof 1991 said that he was "leading Serbian into a para-noia of wilderness" and who was described by TheNew York Times as a "Butcher of the Balkans" andmost certainly of the last communist regime in Eu-rope - adjusted his policy after the, 6-day war totheir realistic abilities as seen from the Belgrade per-spective. His slogans, "All Serbs in one state", serv-ing the protection of Serbian hood, are actually Nazi.Let us recall Hitler, with his "blunt und boden" theorystarted with Anshluss (Austria), continued with


Sudetes (the Czech Republic) and Danzig (Poland),after which Great Britain and France, although un-prepared, announced war on Hitler's Germany. Thisis the beginning of World War II.

Disregarding the achievements and traditionsof European civilization concerning human rightsand rights of minorities and national groups, in agree-ment with the principles and particular solutions ofthe Treaty of Paris, Milosevic's strategy contains thenationalistic slogan, which was the only means ofachieving a more perfidious goal: imposing Belgradecentralistic-unitarian government upon all republicsof the former Yugoslavia, except upon Slovenia.Milosevic could have never received support inSerbia if he had intended to restrict himself to theterritory of Serbia, Montenegro, and those areas inBosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia, where Serbswere in majority. Hypocritical Milosevic was surethat under the mask of Markovic's federal govern-ment, politically exploiting his role as "protector ofthe undivided Yugoslavia" and deluding Serbia andthe world, that he represented the same positions asthe rest of the world headed by the USA and espe-cially the relevant international institutions he wouldachieve his goals.

Milosevic used demagogy, deceptions, andalso force to convince that with the help of IN A andothers he would be able to impose his regime uponregions from Gevgelija to Varazdin, Umag and Pula.These were the appetites of those who representedthe idea of Great Serbia and unitarian Yugoslavia,as well as of the radicals when they began the con-quest, allegedly only to the line of Karlobag-Karlovac- Virovitica.

The United States of America gave Milosevic6 months, from June until December of 1991, to carryout his demonic ambitions. For the sake of histori-cal truth it is also necessary to put before the publicthat during the period when Milosevic had a greenlight to carry out his Greater Serbian intentions, therewere attitudes in relevant places which differed fromofficial policy, then conducted by the EC and theUSA. The author of these lines was a witness to thoseevents. In the political department of NATO in Brus-sels, already in mid-June 1991, a working modeltitled Europe's Lebanon was made in which it wassuggested in a drafted working paper that NATO andthe EC jointly should, among other lines, containthe following elements:quote

a) "identification of the aggressor in theYugoslav conflict and the condemnation of chang-ing borders between republics by force;

b) appeal to all democratic forces to oppose


the use of force and to search for a solution to theconflict by means of negotiations on the basis of prin-ciples and stipulations of the Helsinki Final Act andTreaty of Paris;

c) recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, andany other republic pronouncing independence, pro-vided that it guarantees rights of minorities withinthe borders established after World War II, aswell as the fulfilment of obligations form theHelsinski Final Act and Treaty of Paris;

d) beginning a diplomatic campaign for in-ternationalization of the conflict within the UN;

e) possibility of economic embargo on Serbiawith a remark put in brackets that it would becounter-productive to impose an arms embargo uponall Yugoslav republics, since Serbian militia andJNA, compared to other forces, were military betterequipped."

This initiative within NATO, which was notonly one of the most important, but also the onlyindisputable strong international military institution,was unfortunately blocked by some members ofNATO, led by Greece. The explanation was that thepolitical department of NATO was not allowed totake political stands before official political bodiesof its members had discussed certain questions, andbefore certain viewpoints had been accepted at thehighest levels of NATO.

In this way a precious and critical period ofsix to nine months was lost. At that moment, Frenchdiplomacy was flirting with WEU, and the USA waspassively observing and waiting for things to de-velop, unfortunately encouraging the aggressor byits inertness.

Having seen that they could not extend the"anti-bureaucratic revolution" to Ljubljana andZagreb by means of "peace and solidarity rallies"using the masses which had gathered at Gazimestan(Kosovo, in June 1989), the ruling circles in Belgrade- and especially Milosevic and the military's topleadership - were convinced that they could makethe disobedient Slovenes and Croatians submitthrough the use of force.

That juncture approached especially after theresults of the first democratic Elections in all therepublics of the former Yugoslavia (apart form Serbiaand Montenegro). It was only a question of when,and using what pretext for the benefit of world, notlocal, opinion.

In that complex context and, given the bal-ance of military power, the exploitation of the"precani" Serbs (i.e. those living outside Serbia)became a convenient means, as well as a stagedmotive.

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The Maturing ofthe European Community

The Declaration ofIndependence proclaimedunanimously by the Croatian Sabor (Parliament) onJune 25, 1991 (on the same day the Slovene Parlia-ment proclaimed Slovenia's independence) is of con-siderable historical significance and represents theinevitable and resolute, as well as the justified, ex-pression of the will and centuries-old aspirations ofthe Croatian people.

By so doing, Croatia became a legally-inde-pendent actor sui generis, notwithstanding the hos-tile stance of what remained of the federal govern-ing structure - and especially of the military estab-lishment - dominated by Milosevic's hypocriticalpolicy of maintaining a unified Yugoslavia, and theactivation of the federal government headed by AnteMarkovic and Budimir Loncar on the internationalscene with the intent of preserving Yugoslavia.

The arrival of J. Poos, Hans van den Broek,and Gianni De Michelis just three days after Croatia'sdeclaration of independence, the Brijuni Declara-tion, numerous visits by parliamentary delegationsand official representatives of other states and inter-national organizations, the European Community'sdeclaration of August 27, 1991, and the October1991 UN Security Council Resolution 713 on Yu-goslavia were all indications that Croatia had be-come an independent actor and that it had establishedits sovereignty.

The first decision taken by the EuropeanCommunity's Arbitration Commission on Decem-ber, 7 1991 (which was chaired by Robert Badinter,who was the president of France's Constitution re-sponse to a request for clarification from LordCarrington, the President of the Conference on Yu-goslavia, and clearly noted the position in section 1(a) that, in accordance with the intent ofintemationallaw, "the existence or disappearance of a state is aquestion offact, and the effect of recognition by otherstate is of a declarative nature only".

It is worth quoting here the often-forgottensummary decision by the European Community'sArbitration Commission, which is expressed in threepoints:

* The SFRY is in the process of disintegrat-mg.

* It is up to the republics to settle the ques-tions of state succession, subject to the principlesand rules of international law, especially with re-gard to respecting human rights and the rights ofnational groups and minorities.

* Those republics which may wish to do so

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may form a new association which would containdemocratic institutions of their choice.

To Croatia, the European Community's dip-lomatic initiatives and other political steps takenaround the world appeared to be slow, bureaucratic,and ineffective. This is perhaps not a surprising re-action for a country which lacked everything exceptself-sacrifice and courage in its struggle to defendits native soil from aggression by a militarily muchmore powerful foe. Days seemed like weeks, andmonths like years, to those who experienced themartyrdom of the inhabitants of Vukovar, Osijek,Petrinja, Karlovac, Sunja, Slunj, Kojevo, Skabmja,Dubrovnik, and Cavtat. This notwithstanding, wemust assess objectively the facts, circumstances, andwhat was possible within the context of the interna-tional situation, and acknowledge that Croatia's rec-ognition by the European Twelve on January 15,1992, as well as by many other states, came morequickly than we could have expected or hoped forin the Summer and Autumn of 1991.

It is important to also assess what factors in-fluenced this chain of events.

The draft of the Hague "Convention on Yu-goslavia" contained the accepted and unchallengedoption that each republic of the former Yugoslavia,if it wished to, could become independent and thatact in and of itself was sufficient for recognition bythe European Community and, consequently, by theinternational community. The third section of thisdraft also contained a complete plan for the estab-lishment of joint economic and transportation rela-tions which took as their model relations at a some-what lower level of integration than was the casesamong the countries of the European Communityprior to Maastricht. A closer examination of the draftwas enough to convince anyone that accepting thoseproposals would not lead to a "Third Yugoslavia".

The British (Lord Carrington), Dutch (van denBroek), and French (Badinter) trio planned, in a prag-matic way, to impose that structure on all the repub-lics of the former Yugoslavia as part of a package ofcomprehensive solutions, accompanied by automaticdiplomatic recognition of the complete sovereigntyand independence of all those republics who re-quested that. However, this was meant to be onlyupon the conclusion of the conference. The Confer-ence on Yugoslavia, as it was envisioned by the Eu-ropean Community, under the chairmanship of LordCarrington, de facto was the requiem for Yugosla-via.

Belgrade's approach (that is Milosevic's ap-proach), however, was based on an assessment thatthe European Community would respect the "Bush

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Doctrine", especially in light of the frequent high-lighting by international players of the need to pre-serve a united Yugoslavia. Belgrade believed that,in the meantime, Croatia's resistance would be bro-ken using military force and that with a "faitaccompli" it could create a Greater Serbia. By add-ing a few cosmetic initiatives on transitioning to amarket economy; on the respect of human rights,etc., Milosevic believed he could create a "modemfederation" according to his vision; which would sat-isfy Europe while also serving the interests of aGreater Serbia. At the same time, such a Yugoslaviawas to be capable of withstanding the alleged"Vatican-Comintern" conspiracy against Yugoslaviaand, specifically; against Serbia.

Van den Broek and the other European lead-ers were convinced that political means backed upby threats of economic sanctions and various prom-ises, especially in the economic arena, would be suf-ficient to bring about a cease fire. This approach,however, was the main cause for the failure and in-effectiveness of the European Community in deal-ing with Yugoslavia. At the same time, Serbia's de-termination to "pacify" all its opponents by usingevery available means, including brute force, was tolead to a race against time.

The Croatian Sabor, having respected thethree-month moratorium on implementing the Dec-laration of Independence, passed on 8th October 1991a resolution cutting all its constitutional links to theother republics and autonomous provinces withwhom Croatia had established the SFRY.

As soon as Milosevic realized that he wouldnot be able to achieve his objectives by using theEuropean Community's Conference on Yugoslaviaand that he would not be able to frustrate the Euro-pean Community's plans for the former Yugoslavia,Serbia began to obstruct any progress by the Con-ference on Yugoslavia, although Montenegrin presi-dent Momir Bulatovic on October 18, 1991, an-nounced at the Conference that Montenegro wouldaccept the draft resolution as envisioned by the Con-ference. Yugoslav diplomacy, in effect Serbia, how-ever, now became active in steering any further ne-gotiations on the Yugoslav crisis toward the UnitedNations, counting on Russia's favoritism, and thesupport of some non-aligned nations. The intentionall of this was to buy time and to prevent the diplo-matic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, with theaim of rescuing the notion of a third Yugoslaviawhich was envisioned along hegemonic lines.

During this critical period, many foreignpolicymakers were erroneous due to serious mistakesin their public statements, most often because of their


lack of understanding of what was happening in thisregion and, in particular, because they did not graspwhat kind of conflict this was. Thus, there were as-sessments claiming that in Yugoslavia was a "civilwar" or a "religious war" and there were declara-tions along the lines that "any solution which isreached by peaceful means will be accepted." How-ever, Belgrade always interpreted such calls for peaceas "let us continue the violence, since there is nosolution until the militarily weaker opponent is de-feated, which will result in a peace which the worldwill accept", as had been a true after the Tia-nan-men Square massacre in China.

Declarations by the United States that it hadvital interests in Macedonia by default implied thatit did not have such interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina,and thereby gave Serbia a clear signal that it wouldhave a free hand in the latter.

Time was a key factor in implementing theplans envisioned by the main players of the Euro-pean Conference. Due to Serbia's obstruction, theConference was unable to achieve the results whichthe member-states expected, while at the same timeviolence directed by Serbia and the Yugoslav Armyescalated into full-scale aggression against Croatia.The first appeals and calls for an end to the violenceand for measures to halt Serbia were starting to comefrom official sources in Austria, Germany, and theVatican, in no small part thanks to the great effortsby the Croatian diaspora.

Although it is not possible to scrutinize ex-actly at this stage how events developed day-by-daywithin the European Community, we do know thatthe positions of the twelve member-states towardSlovenia's and Croatia's declarations of indepen-dence were not all the same. A polarization withinthe European Twelve was evident very early. On oneside stood France, Great Britain, Greece, and Spain,that met Croatia's and Slovenia's desire for freedomand independence with unconcealed disfavor. Atfirst, Italy and the Netherlands also held positionsclose to these. On the other side, Germany, Belgium,and Denmark and, to a certain extent, Luxembourg,showed considerably more sympathy for Croatia'sand Slovenia's sovereignty and independence, whileIreland and Portugal took no stand.

Although European and international publicopinion firmly supported the need to maintain theunity of Yugoslavia up to June 1991, the first dissi-dent voice within the official European structure washeard in the first week of June 1991, when, just be-fore a meeting in Dresden, Germany's MartinBangemann, as Vice-President of the European Par-liament, reminded the European Ministers of For-

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eign Affairs that Germany's unification too wouldnot have happened if the "European dogma" aboutthe inviolability of borders had been followed to theletter. The right of people to self-determination mustalso be taken into account and, Bengemann addedon that occasion, "As far as the legitimate principleof non-interference in the internal affairs of indi-vidual states is concerned, we cannot conclude thata unified Yugoslav state must be preserved at allcosts ... Likewise, as we evolve our position, the Eu-ropean Community cannot exert its influence fromoutside only in favor of a unified Yugoslavia".

Germany Comes (Steps) Forward

Even after the very recent unification of thetwo Germanies, unified Germany as referred bymany western politicians remains "an economic gi-ant and a political dwarf'. However, Germany's eco-nomic power was a significant factor in internationalpolitics, particularly in Europe. Germany, in fact, wasthe fulcrum of the European Community and, alongwith France, the hub of European integration and ofthe political direction of the New Europe.

With the escalation of aggression againstCroatia and with the seizure of Croatian territory and,particularly, as a reaction to the terror and the at-tempt to destroy everything in the occupied territo-ries that was Croatian, Germany, together with Aus-tria, was the first to use its diplomacy in a resolutemanner to respond to the appeals from the Croatianand Slovene leaders, and was the first to take theinitiative to have Croatia and Slovenia recognizedas soon as possible.

The German public as well as all relevant po-liticalleaders were able to identify the causes of theescalation of violence in former Yugoslavia evenearlier, thanks to the following factors:

1. The German community which had livedin former Yugoslavia - especially on the plains -had been subjected in the 1920s to an intensive colo-nization (predominantly by Serbs) in the towns andvillages which they had inhabited and on the fertilelands they had owned for centuries.

2. At the end of World War II, there were about500,000 ethnic Germans living in Srijem, Banat,Backa, and Eastern Slavonija. About half of themwere forced out, the other half killed. This extermi-nation was part of a Communist terror campaign,the same phenomenon which today is called euphe-mistically "ethnic cleansing". Most of the expelledethnic Germans moved to Austria and Germany.These events were not written down nor taught in

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the schools and, correctly, this contributed to the rec-onciliation process on which the New Europe isbased. Nevertheless, many Germans remained con-scious of what had happened, thanks in particular,to an oral tradition kept alive by relatives, descen-dants, and friends of those expelled.

3. The German public always looked verynegatively at Yugoslavia's Communist system, giventhe Germans' own direct experience with the tyr-anny and dictatorship of the East German regime.Even Tito's dissidence toward Moscow in 1948 didnot win for Yugoslavia any exoneration in Germanyfor the undemocratic nature of the Yugoslav system.In the 1970s, there was also the scandal surround-ing the Baader-Meinhof terrorist group, some ofwhose members evaded arrest by seeking asylum inYugoslavia. The Yugoslav police demanded the sur-render of five Croatian emigres who were living andworking in Germany as a condition for the extradi-tion back to Germany of these five proven Germanterrorists. Naturally, such an exchange was not ac-ceptable to Germany, and the Yugoslav authoritiesfacilitated the Baader-Meinhofterrorists' subsequentescape to the Middle East. The considerable public-ity which Yugoslavia received in the German mediaat the time contributed - and justifiably so - evenfurther to Yugoslavia's negative image.

4. Many of the German media's reporters -such as Karl Gustav Strohm, Viktor Meier, Hans-Petar Rullmann, and Johann Reismuller - knew theSlavic languages in use in Yugoslavia. They werethus able to travel the breadth of the former Yugo-slavia and to report with greater credibility and witha better grasp of events than their counterparts fromParis, London, and Washington, who sat in Belgradeand who sent back home an image exclusively asseen from their window in Belgrade.

5. It is well-known that the Yugoslav UDBA(secret police), with the help of Yugoslav diplomatsand consular representatives abroad, systematicallyorganized dozens of attacks against Croatianemigres. Most of these attacks occurred in Germanyand, in some of these cases, the German legal sys-tem correctly and with solid proof was able to dis-cover the motives for the attacks and to implicateofficial Yugoslav agencies in the assassinations.Moreover, these results were made public in Ger-many. On the contrary, in the case of the killing ofBruno Busic in Paris and of Maksim Krstulovic inLondon, the local police knew that they had beencarried out by Yugoslav agents, but did not pursuean investigation. In the case of the attempted assas-sination ofNikola Stedul (in Scotland) by Sindicic,


the Yugoslav secret operative in Great Britain, forexample, the latter was apprehended before the mo-tive for the attack had become clear. Sindicic wassentenced to fifteen years in prison, but only for apurely criminal act. Thus, the British public, as thatin France in the Bruno Busic case, was deprived ofthe full truth or of information about the criminalnature of some of the former Yugoslavia's govern-ment institutions.

1I

It is commonplace that interest and power arethe basic factors of politics. Although this is unde-niable, in this case it is not correct to assume thatGermany abandoned the well-established guidelinesadopted by the European Community because of itsown interests, such as the expansion of its spheresof influence. Alongside the initiative in German di-plomacy led by Foreign Minister Hans DieterGenscher (obviously working together with Chan-cellor Helmut Kohl), it is important also to stressthe following: Without detracting from the abilityand devotion of Germany's Foreign Minister and ofmany other German officials in their efforts to gaindiplomatic recognition for Croatia, Germany's di-plomacy could not have acted differently, since itwas responding to pressure from its entire publicopunon.

I believe that it is abundantly evident that pub-lic opinion in Germany as well as in Austria, Hun-gary, and Australia, for different reasons) on the is-sue of diplomatic recognition for Croatia andSlovenia was radically different from public opin-ion in Great Britain, France, and the United States,and especially from that in the Soviet Union and inthe vast majority of other countries.

The United States had relinquished the initia-tive on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia completelyto the European Community and, in November 1991,senior officials in the Bush Administration informedtheir German counterparts that the United States wasprepared to support any initiative which Germanymight undertake, assessing that this would contrib-ute to the development of freedom, peace, and de-mocracy. •

Second part of the articlewill follow in the next issue.

146 croatian international relations review aflinnation …

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