1162382657 theories of ethnic conflict management

7/29/2019 1162382657 Theories of Ethnic Conflict Management

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Theories and Practice ofTheories and Practice ofTheories and Practice ofTheories and Practice of

Ethnic Conflict Management in NigeriaEthnic Conflict Management in NigeriaEthnic Conflict Management in NigeriaEthnic Conflict Management in Nigeria

Orji NkwachukwuOrji NkwachukwuOrji NkwachukwuOrji Nkwachukwu****

Introduction

Like many multi-ethnic societies, one major hurdle which Nigeria has had to overcome

in its attempts to build a democratic and communal polity is the fact that competitive

politics in the country encourage recourse to divisive ethnic identities (Joseph 1987:43).

Mobilization of ethnic identities has become an important aspect of Nigerian politics

due to the mutual distrust that has grown over time among various ethnic groups in the

country. As van den Burghe (1973:222) observed:

people expect members of ethnic groups other than their own to be tribalists, i.e., to be

biased in favour of their fellow ethnics and against strangersMost people assume that all

others except those in the same circle of intimates (fellow kinsmen/tribesmen) will behave in

ways which further the other persons interests at the expense of oneself

Broadly speaking, ethnicity is in itself not a dangerous feature of plural societies.

However, it turns out to be problematic when it becomes, or is perceived as object

around which discriminatory practices and unjustified use of violence are organized

(Otite 1990). When ethnic identities are politicized it can result in inter-ethnic conflicts.

Inter-ethnic conflicts also occur when ethnic interests are challenged, identities

threatened, and/or communication sufficiently poor that differences cannot be

effectively addressed (Ross 2000:28). Ethnic conflicts tend to emerge at moments when

groups perceive that they are being excluded from access to what they consider to be

their right; be it linguistic, political, economic, administrative, commercial, religious etc

(Ibrahim 2003:45).

*Lectures at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Ebonyi State University,

Abakaliki-Nigeria. Currently a Ph.D. Candidate at the Department of Political Science, Central EuropeanUniversity, Budapest-Hungary.


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One can therefore argue, that violent inter-ethnic conflicts are inextricably linked to

perceptions of group domination (Osaghae 1992:219). A combination of two powerful

elements can be visibly seen to be at work in generating ethnic conflicts. One is identity:

the mobilization of people in communal identity groups based on race, religion, culture,

language. The other is resource distribution: the means of sharing the economic, social

and political resources within a society (Harris and Reilly 1998:9). Where perceived

imbalance in resource distribution coincides with ethnic identity differences, as in the

case of Nigeria, then the tendency for recurrence of inter-ethnic conflicts tends to be

very high.

In Nigeria, ethnic conflict is a highly significant social phenomena because of it

complexity and the social and political threats it pose to the society. The complexity of

ethnic conflict in Nigeria reflects on its mode of occurrence. In Nigeria, ethnic conflicts

occur along a tri-dimensional trajectory (Osaghae 2002, Nnoli 1978). The first is the

conflicts among the majority ethnic groups; the second is the conflicts between the

majority and the minority groups; while the third is the conflicts among the minority

groups.

The positive and constructive handling of ethnic conflicts can be regarded as ethnic

conflict management. This occurs when institutions and processes are created to deal

with ethnic differences better than the way it had been done in the past and in a way that

is likely to lead to continuous improvement. Ethnic conflict management involves a

developmental and transformative processes that entail changes in both the disputants


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expressed interests and their interpretation of the conflict. Ethnic conflict management

is characterized by many small steps that alter the relationship among the disputing

parties and improve how they deal with each other in the future; these steps can be slow,

but they generate measures that lower the intensity of conflict (Ross 2000).

The main logic of conflict management is therefore, that conflict cannot be eliminated,

but that they can be reduced or controlled more readily, by acknowledging and

institutionalizing differences rather than suppressing them. Institutionalization of ethnic

conflicts entails entrenching ethnic differences within a set of rules agreeable to

competing groups. This legal-constitutional strategy requires a constitutional democratic

form of governance to thrive. In Nigeria, constitutional democracy could not be

entrenched because the military dominated and controlled the reins of government for

almost three out of Nigerias four decades of independence. The subsequent section

briefly examines the nature of ethnic conflict management under the military.

Ethnic Conflict Management in Authoritarian Nigeria

Many scholars see a strong link between despotism, militarism and violent ethnic

conflicts in Nigeria (Horowitz 1985, Joseph 1999). They point to the fact that a common

strategy of conflict management in Nigeria during military rule was that the state

generally intervenes in ethnic conflict, adopting a violent, repressive, and non-

participatory approach (Mayowa 2001). These scholars associate this strategy with the

protracted military rule in Nigeria and the subsequent weakening or rather collapse of

the legal-institutional means of conflict management.


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Therefore, much of the violent ethnic clashes that occurred during the period of military

rule is seen as being generated by the state through militarism (Ibeanu 2000). Because

the military disregards clearly stipulated conditions laid down by the state for access to

resources, the contest for these resources turns out to be intense; leading to frosty

relations among competing ethnic groups. This state of affairs demonstrably worsened

the landscape of inter-ethnic relations in Nigeria by increasing inter-group

fear/suspicion among the ethnic communities, eroding the confidence of various ethnic

groups in the arbitration and mediation capacity of the state as well as by heightening

the stakes of inter-group struggles (Ibeanu 1999, 2000; Human Rights Watch 1995).

The outcome of the above development was increasing breakdown of ethnic conflict

management system in Nigeria. This manifested visibly in the open suppression of

group agitation, at times through state violence; disturbing inter-group clashes; as well

as challenge to state/regime legitimacy by ethnic groups (Gunther and Mughan 1993).

Based on the foregoing, it has been suggested that it is only a return to democracy that

will create opportunities for a carefully planned and constructive approach to ethnic

conflict management and improve the atmosphere for inter-ethnic relations in Nigeria

(Osaghae 2002, Harris and Reilly 1998).

In a democracy, it is expected that the existence of varied and conflicting interests in the

society will be acknowledged by democratic institutions set up to create a balance

between competition and consensus among groups. Thus, democracy is seen as a form

of government, which can directly channel ethnic conflicts into proper institutional


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outlet for peaceful resolution, ensuring that conflicts are expressed in accord with a

commonly accepted set of rules.

Ethnic Conflict Management in Nigeria since 1999

The success of democratic management of ethnic conflict depends on the extent to

which multi-ethnic democracies create specific institutional arrangements and practices

that would regulate interethnic conflicts. In Nigeria, for instance, the May 1999

transition from military to civilian rule, was accompanied by the democratic

legitimization of a number of inherited legal and institutional frameworks for ethnic

conflict management, and the enactment of some new ones. This section discusses the

institutional arrangements for ethnic conflict management inherited or enacted in

Nigeria since the emergence of democratic rule in 1999. These institutional

arrangements can be classified into three: the human rights, the multicultural, and the

power-sharing approaches.

The human rights approach

The most classical approach to ethnic conflict management in Nigeria since 1999 is the

human rights approach. The human rights approach to ethnic conflict management was

first introduced to Nigeria by the Willink Commission (Akinyele 1996). This approach

sees the enactment of a bill of rights, with its guarantee of equality, liberty and non-

discrimination in the constitution as a major way of allaying the fears of the minorities

and reducing the scope of discrimination against them. Since 1960, all Nigerian

Constitutions are embedded with the bill of rights. In the 1999 Constitution, the bill of

rights is contained in Chapter Three (sections 41-54) of the constitution. The human


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rights approach conceives Nigerian society in liberal terms. A liberal society is one

where all citizens are members of a common civic nation and where the state

endeavours to treat them in equal terms (Stanovcic 1992).

Although the human rights approach appears necessary for managing ethnic tensions in

democratic Nigeria, some scholars insist that it is not sufficient (Osaghae 1996). They

claim that the human rights approach as it is being practiced in Nigeria at the present,

concentrate solely on individual rights. These scholars therefore, argue for the need to

complement individual rights with group rights. Group rights regard ethnic and other

social groups in the society as deserving special attention, protection and justice in the

process of democratic competition. Proponents of group rights defend their argument by

claiming that ethnic conflicts arise from inequalities, discrimination, domination,

exclusion and injustices that attend inter-group competition for scarce social, economic

and political resources. As such, they maintain that ethnic conflicts can only be

effectively managed through the removal or at least toning-down of inequality,

discrimination and domination by protecting both individual and group rights.

The multicultural approach

The human rights approach can be regarded as a minimalist institutional measure for

ethnic conflict regulation. Contrary to the human rights approach, there are more robust

approaches, which hope to institutionalize ethnicity (Bieber 2004). Institutionalization

of ethnicity entails the official recognition of ethnic groups in the democratic political

competition and representation of ethnic groups as ethnic groups in formal democratic

institutions such as the executive and legislative systems.


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The institutionalization of ethnicity became popular following the fundamental changes

that the classical model of liberal democracy experienced, especially since the 1970s.

Nation-states and ruling majorities in these democracies were pressurized, and they

became increasingly prepared, to respect the desire for special recognition and

separateness of small indigenous minorities, immigrants and foreign workers (Kymlicka

1995). This shift away from full assimilation, gave rise to a form of democracy

popularly known as multicultural democracy.

In Nigeria, certain aspects of multiculturalism has been has adopted into the ethnic

conflict management system (Onu 2004). These multicultural mechanisms address

ethnic tensions by attempting to separate the state from the stronghold of a particular

ethnic nationality, and also by recognizing the cultural rights of minorities (Van Den

Berghe 2002). Multicultural aspects of ethnic conflict management in Nigeria have

reflected mainly in language and educational policies (Oyetade 2003, Garuba nd, and

Aguolu 1979). Meanwhile, it important to note that the multicultural approach to ethnic

conflict management has not been strongly rooted in Nigeria. This is perhaps, because

more than the cultural issues, distributive questions are the fundamental sources of

ethnic tensions in Nigeria (Nnoli 1978 & 1994).

The power-sharing approach

Because distributional issues are at the root of ethnic conflicts in Nigeria, power-sharing

has come to constitute the core approach to ethnic conflict management in Nigeria. In

one of the constitutional conferences held in Nigeria, it was noted that:


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in a country like Nigeria with its diverse peoples and their corresponding diverse political,

cultural and economic endowments, true federalism must reflect a genuine attempt to regulate

relationship among the groups, as well as a reflection of these identifiable divergences within a

framework of national unityThe particular complexion which a countrys federal system takes

reflects its diversities, historical experiences and the disposition of its peoples at a particular

point in time, and each federating unit within a true federal system should have its powers and

functions demarcated and guaranteed in such a way as to strike a compromise between local

particularism and national integrationWe in Nigeria must evolve our own power-sharing

formula, take our own decisions and develop our own institutions anchored on our historical

experiences, since the problem of power-sharing had been responsible for much of the tensions,

emotions, conflicts, stresses and strains in most countries (Federal Republic of Nigeria1995:3).

Power-sharing is a set of principles that when carried out through practices and

institutions, provide every significant identity group or segment in a society

representation and decision-making abilities on common issues and a degree of

autonomy over issues of importance to the group (Sisk 1996:5). These principles

ensure a balance of power among competing ethnic groups by specifying not only how

the groups are to share power within the polity, but also by allocating power in such a

way as to make it exceedingly difficult for any group to dominate the others (Lijphart

1977, Nordlinger 1972).

Power-sharing can occur at three dimensions depending on whether the intention of

the political elites is to share power along political, territorial, or economic dimension

(Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). The political dimension stipulates the distribution of

political and bureaucratic offices among ethnic groups. The territorial dimension

defines the exercise of autonomy by the various levels of government on the basis of


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federalism or regional autonomy arrangements. While rules regarding the distribution of

economic resources controlled or mandated by the state among ethnic groups constitute

the economic dimension.

In the past two decades, a greater number of scholars have acknowledged the efficacy of

power-sharing as a positive instrument of ethnic conflict management (Binningsbo

2005, Bogaards 2002, Daftary 2001, Akinyele 2000, Hudson 1997, Koelble and

Reynolds 1996, Sisk 1996, MacDonald 1992, Steiner 1991, McRae 1991, Lijphart 1991

1985). In fact, one prominent Nigerian scholar eloquently states:

power-sharing arrangements, in which all groups are represented in government, has the

advantage of ensuring stability and of getting the parties that would otherwise be locked in

conflict to understand each others interests and develop a system of trust in governing the

country. Such arrangements have the additional advantage of establishing a basic level of

consensus in the management of the instruments of violence as all parties may be represented in

the key institutions that deal with security (cited in Abubakar 1998:170).

Despite the wide acceptance the idea of power-sharing enjoys, yet, a major debate rages

among political scientists on what constitutes the best approach to power-sharing in

divided societies. In the debate, two contending approaches - consociationalism and

incentivism battle for analytical and prescriptive supremacy.

Consociationalism

Consociational approach to power-sharing was developed by Arend Lijphart in his

ground-breaking work: The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in

the Netherlands (1968) and elaborated in his later works (1969, 1977, 1985, 1991, 1996,

2002). Lijphart (1977) argues that democracy and inter-ethnic harmony can be achieved


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in deeply divided societies only if their type of government is consociational. He stress

the need for institutional designers to recognize the importance of ethnicity in the

political process and to make ethnic groups the building blocks of politics by

accommodating them in some sort of grand coalition or power-sharing government.

Consociational governance is characterized by two elements: executivepower-sharing

(which means the participation of the representatives of all significant groups in

political decision-making, especially at the executive level) andgroup autonomy (which

means that groups have authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the areas

of education and culture) (Lijphart 1996:859). The effectiveness of the principles of

executive power-sharing and group autonomy is guaranteed by two ingredients: the use

ofproportionality in political representation and mutual veto.

Incentivism

Donald Horowitz offers an alternative approach to power-sharing. He argues that if

really inter-ethnic tension arises from competition for the control and ownership of the

state, for group superiority, and for group prosperity, all measured in relative terms,

then the resolution of the tension will be more difficult to achieve than the

consociationalists envisaged. For him, progress in the area of ethnic conflict

management depends on the ability of institutional designers to create and maximize

incentives for moderate and cooperative behaviour.

Horowitz (2002:23) insists that the incentives for moderation and cooperation comes

mainly from the electoral system. For him, it is nature of the electoral reward system

that can motivate inter-group conflict or cooperation. Electoral system can promote


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inter-group cooperation through vote-pooling arrangements and the political

engineering of political parties.

While political engineering of political parties entails conscious creation of pan-ethnic

political parties by legislation, vote-pooling makes the parties to be marginally

dependent on the votes of groups other than their own for electoral success. It requires

the parties to attract votes from various groups in the society in order to win national

elections. Therefore, to secure across-group votes, politicians are compelled to behave

moderately (Horowitz 2002:23). Vote-pooling rule promotes inter-group pre-electoral

coalitions; coalitions that need to be forged in order to attract voters across group lines.

In theory, consociationalism and incentivism may appear mutually exclusive, but in

practice the two approaches compliment rather than contradict each other. Thus, while

the incentive approach call attention to the need to make political institutions lean

towards national integration, the consociational approach highlight the need to create

institutions that would ensure ethnic accommodation.

Power-sharing in Nigeria

The notion of power-sharing has been on the discourse of Nigerian politics since the

colonial era. The root of power-sharing in Nigeria lie in the administrative federalism,

implied in the gradual division of the country into two administrative units the

Northern and Southern Protectorates, between 1900 and 1914, by the British colonial

administration (Jinadu 2004). The dual administrative system in the Northern and

Southern Nigeria, together with the increasing intensity of nationalist agitation for


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independence, created a dynamic logic in Nigerian politics, in the form of ethno-

regional federal structure. Leaders of the various ethnic groups in Nigeria, saw in

federalism the strategic advantage of preserving some form of home-rule within their

respective homelands in the Nigerian State, while remaining in the federation.

The emergent federal system based on ethnic diversity, with its initial tri-polar

constituent units East, North and West, coinciding with the 3 dominant ethnic group

(namely the Igbo in the East, Hausa/Fulani in the North, and the Yoruba in the West),

provides the basis for the minority ethnic groups being dominated by these 3 major

groups, to mobilize and advocate for home-rule within the regions of Nigerian

Federation. The ethnic power-sharing structure of Nigerian federalism provided and

continues to provide a constitutional and political platform, within which ethnic groups

in the country articulate and present their demands (Jinadu 2004, Suberu and Diamond

2002). These demands have gone beyond issues of territorial autonomy to include the

quest for resource control as well as rotation and zoning of political offices.

Power-sharing in Nigeria during the late colonial and early independence period was

largely informed by insights from consociationalism. The core elements of power-

sharing during this period include the group autonomy strategy of federalism in the

form of regionalism; strong desire for the application of proportionality principle in

representation; as well as a bicameral legislature, rigid constitution and the judicial

review of the constitutionality of legislations, all of which serve as mutual vote

mechanisms. However, after the civil war, power-sharing in Nigeria incorporated

several incentivist mechanisms. Prominent among these incentivist instruments are

vote-pooling and political engineering of political parties; federalism and states creation


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exercise that aims at splitting the homogenous majority groups and crosscutting the

countrys ethnic groups; and an increased centralization of the revenue allocation

system that intends to weaken the states and make them less attractive or viable as

prospective independent states (see Orji 2006, Suberu and Diamond 2002, Amuwo et.al

1998, Diamond 1982).

Power-sharing in Nigeria is anchored on the belief that under the unfavourable

circumstances of ethnic cleavages, a majoritarian system is highly inapplicable in

Nigeria, because the country cannot afford a winner takes all politics and the consequent

danger of creating a permanent minority. Joseph (1991:32) notes that:

the capacity for democratic politics in Nigeria appears to be rooted in the subtle awareness of the

danger represented by unchecked power, since that power in common thinking has to be used

for someones benefits and to anothers disadvantage, and there is a reasonable and even

probable chance that one will fall on the wrong side of that equation.

The strict application of majority rule, it is believed, will place a serious strain on unity

and peace in Nigeria.

Beginning in 1954, when the first really federal constitution was introduced in Nigeria,

the federal structure ensured that two or more ethnic-based political organizations share

political power at the center. This state of affairs contrasts with the situation in countries

like Ghana and Tanzania, where one nationalist party was able to achieve clear

predominance. In the 1954 cabinet, in which Nigerians were subordinate to colonial

representatives, the NCNC held six of the nine positions and the NPC the remaining

three. The portfolios were allocated on the basis of the parties performance in the

federal elections conducted in the three regions that year. After the subsequent 1957


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elections, the NPC became the dominant partner in the federal government, and its

deputy leader, Abubakar Tafawa Belewa, the first Prime Minister of Nigeria. This

government was the first case of a real grand coalition in Nigeria (Sklar 1963,

Mackintosh 1966).

Drawing on their experience in the all-party 1957-9 cabinet, some Nigerian politicians

began to call for a more robust power-sharing arrangement that would allow each of the

major parties unimpeded control of its region of strength, with an all-embracing or

whatLijphartians would label an overwhelming coalition at the centre (Mackintosh

1966:442). Although many prominent political figures in Nigerias first republic

favoured a less competitive system (if only for a transitional or probationary period),

such arrangement could not be well entrenched in the pre-civil war and immediate post-

civil war years due to the fact that they were not institutionalized. The Nigerian political

elites of those years gave priority to struggles to achieve decisive political advantage

over the need for inter-ethnic accommodation. However, subsequent generations of

Nigerian political elite began to take measures geared toward institutionalizing politics

of accommodation in the country.

The first major attempt to constitutionalize ethnic power-sharing in Nigeria came in

1979. Since 1979, Nigerian Constitutions have made special and specific provisions for

power-sharing. For instance, in the 1999 Constitution, elements of power-sharing can be

found in the following provisions:

1. The relationship between the government and the people Section 222. Political and economic objectives of the federation Sections 23 and 24


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3. The rights of citizens to freedom of movement and from discrimination Section 49 and Section 50.

4. Election of the president Section 141 and 1425. Appointment to specific public offices Sections 154, 178, 223 and 2256. Formation, constitution and rules of political parties Sections 228 and 229

The most elaborate and formal power-sharing arrangement contained in the Nigerian

Constitution is the federal character principle. The purpose of the federal character

principle is laudable. According to its framers, the federal character principle is

anchored on the:

distinctive desire of the peoples of Nigeria to promote national unity, foster national loyalty

and give every citizen of Nigeria a sense of belonging to the nation notwithstanding the

diversities of ethnic origin, culture, language or religion which may exist and which it is their

desire to nourish, harness to the enrichment of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Afigbo 1989:4).

The federal character clauses guarantee the representation of major ethnic groups in

specified political positions, in public service appointments, and in the allocation of

national resources and projects at the federal level to each of the state and local

governments.

The federal character principle was inscribed in Section 14(3) of the 1979 Nigerian

Constitution and repeated with appropriate modifications in other sections dealing with

the executive and legislative functions of the state governments. The federal character

clauses stipulates that:

The composition of the federal government or any of its agencies and the conduct of their affairs

shall be carried out in such a manner as to recognize the federal character of Nigeria and the

need to promote national unity and to command national loyalty. Accordingly, the predominance


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in that government or its agencies of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other

sectional groups shall be avoided.

Under section 157(3), section 197, and section 197(2) of the 1979 Nigerian

Constitution, the proportionality or quota principle, inherent in the federal character

clauses was extended to the appointments and promotions in the public services,

appointments of Chairpersons and members of the Boards of Directors of parastatals,

appointments and promotions in the armed forces, allocation of public revenue and

distribution of public projects, composition of a number of federal executive bodies, and

admission to federal secondary schools and federal universities.

Section 153 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution established the Federal Character

Commission, as a federal executive body, empowered in section 8(1) of the Third

Schedule of the Constitution to oversee and monitor the implementation of the federal

character clauses, as follows:

1. work out an equitable formula subject to the approval of the National Assemblyfor the distribution of all cadres of posts in the public service of the Federation and of

the States, the armed forces of the Federation, the Nigerian Police Force and other

security agencies, government-owned companies and parastatals of the States;

2. promote, monitor and enforce compliance with the principle of proportionalsharing of all bureaucratic, economic, media and political posts at all levels of

government;

3. take such legal measures, including prosecution of the head or staff of anyministry or government body or agency which fails to comply with any federal

character principle or formula prescribed by the Commission, and as provided for in

section 8(3) of the Schedule,


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4. Notwithstanding any provisions in any other law or enactment, the Commissionshall ensure that every public company or corporation reflects the federal character in

the appointment of its directors and senior management staff.

The application of the federal character principle in Nigeria has encountered several

difficulties. First, the federal character principle has led the political elites to place too

much emphasis on inter-state relationships without a corresponding attention to tensions

among ethnic groups within the states (Ikime 2002:67). Secondly, because the federal

character principle strives to give equal treatment to unequals, many people perceive the

policy as being discriminatory (Ayoade 1998:116). Thirdly, the interpretation of federal

character, which is based on state and ethnicity is seen by many as inadequate. Of

course, social divisions in Nigeria are not limited to ethnic and state; there are also

class, confessional, temporal and ideological divisions (Ayoade 1998:116). Finally, the

operation of the federal character principle in Nigeria tends to give more powers to the

politically dominant groups; creating wider power disparity between the stronger and

weaker groups, and thereby, subjecting the politically weaker groups to what Ayoade

(1998:117) calls double jeopardy.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to survey the ways in which Nigerian political leaders have

responded to the problem of ethnic conflict in the country. The paper discovered that

those charged with easing ethnic conflicts in Nigeria have relied greatly on the major

theories of ethnic conflict management. The paper has shown that Nigeria have

experimented with various forms ethnic conflict management strategies such as vote-


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pooling electoral system, autonomy deals with outlaying regions/ethnic groups, and the

parceling out of top political and bureaucratic posts with a view to accommodating

various groups which, if not brought more fully into the tent of national life, could bring

it down from outside.

One can therefore, say that Nigeria has provided a rich ground for scholars and

practitioners concerned with ethnic conflict management, to try out some of their

solutions. In many cases, the application of these palliatives to ethnic conflicts have led

to improvements, but in other cases, as in the case of federal character, it rather

complicates the entire situation. However, what one needs to understand is that ethnic

conflict management is usually a slow, but incremental process, which records modest,

yet steady progress. Therefore, intermittent occurrence of ethnic tensions in Nigeria

should not be construed as the failure of ethnic conflict management arrangements. This

is because, it is almost impossible to completely eliminate ethnic conflicts in a multi-

ethnic society like Nigeria.

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