110 slides defending your network: identifying and patrolling your true network perimeter bill...

110 slides

Defending Your Network: Identifying and Patrolling

Your True Network Perimeter

Bill Cheswick

Chief Scientist, Lumeta Corp

110 slides

Pondering and Patrolling

PerimetersBill Cheswick

[email protected]

http://www.lumeta.com

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.lumeta.com/

3 of 110Patrolling the Perimeter

Talk Outline

• Outside: mapping the Internet

• A discussion of perimeter defenses

• Strong host security

• Mapping and understanding intranets

• The past and future of Microsoft host security:– my Dad’s computer

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The Internet Mapping Project

An experiment in exploring network connectivity


Motivations

• Highlands “day after” scenario

• Panix DOS attacks– a way to trace

anonymous packets back!

• Visualization experiments

• Curiosity about size and growth of the Internet

• Databases for graph theorists, grad students, etc.


Methods - data collection

• Single reliable host connected at the company perimeter

• Daily full scan of Lucent

• Daily partial scan of Internet, monthly full scan

• One line of text per network scanned– Unix tools

• Use a light touch, so we don’t bother Internet denizens


Methods - network discovery (ND)

• Obtain master network list– network lists from Merit, RIPE, APNIC, etc.– BGP data or routing data from customers– hand-assembled list of Yugoslavia/Bosnia

• Run a traceroute-style scan towards each network

• Stop on error, completion, no data– Keep the natives happy


Intranet implications of Internet mapping

• High speed technique, able to handle the largest networks

• Light touch: “what are you going to do to my intranet?”

• Acquire and maintain databases of Internet network assignments and usage


Related Work

• See Martin Dodge’s cyber geography page

• MIDS - John Quarterman

• CAIDA - kc claffy

• Mercator

• “Measuring ISP topologies with rocketfuel” - 2002– Spring, Mahajan, Wetherall

• Enter “internet map” in your search engine

http://portal.acm.org/results.cfm?query=%22P208053%22%20%3CIN%3E%20author&querydisp=%22Neil%20%20Spring%22%20%3CIN%3E%20author&coll=portal&dl=ACM&CFID=11111111&CFTOKEN=2222222

http://portal.acm.org/results.cfm?query=%22P347085%22%20%3CIN%3E%20author&querydisp=%22Ratul%20%20Mahajan%22%20%3CIN%3E%20author&coll=portal&dl=ACM&CFID=11111111&CFTOKEN=2222222

http://portal.acm.org/results.cfm?query=%22P64337%22%20%3CIN%3E%20author&querydisp=%22David%20%20Wetherall%22%20%3CIN%3E%20author&coll=portal&dl=ACM&CFID=11111111&CFTOKEN=2222222


TTL probes

• Used by traceroute and other tools

• Probes toward each target network with increasing TTL

• Probes are ICMP, UDP, TCP to port 80, 25, 139, etc.

• Some people block UDP, others ICMP


Advantages

• We don’t need access (I.e. SNMP) to the routers

• It’s very fast

• Standard Internet tool: it doesn’t break things

• Insignificant load on the routers

• Not likely to show up on IDS reports

• We can probe with many packet types


Limitations

• View is from scanning host only– Multiple scan sources gives a better view

• Outgoing paths only

• Level 3 (IP) only– ATM networks appear as a single node

• Not all routers respond– Some are silent– Others are “shy” (RFC 1123 compliant),

limited to one response per second


Data collection complaints

• Australian parliament was the first to complain

• List of whiners (25 nets)

• On the Internet, these complaints are mostly a thing of the past– Internet background radiation

predominates


Intranet uses of Don’t Scan list

• Hands off particular business partners

• Hands off especially sensitive networks– Hanging ATMs– 3B2s with broadcast storms– Wollongong software (!) on factory floor

computers

• Intranet vs. ISP customer networks


Visualization goals

• make a map– show interesting features– debug our database and collection

methods– hard to fold up

• geography doesn’t matter

• use colors to show further meaning

110 slides

Visualization of the layout algorithm

Laying out the Internet graph

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Visualization of the layout algorithm

Laying out an intranet


A simplified map, for the Internet layouts

• Minimum distance spanning tree uses 80% of the data

• Much easier visualization

• Most of the links still valid

• Redundancy is in the middle


Colored byAS number


Map Coloring

• distance from test host

• IP address– shows communities

• Geographical (by TLD)

• ISPs

• future– timing, firewalls, LSRR blocks


Colored by IP address!


Colored by geography


Colored by ISP


Colored by distancefrom scanning host


US militaryreached by ICMP ping


US military networksreached by UDP

110 slides

Yugoslavia

An unclassified peek at a new battlefield

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Un film par Steve “Hollywood” Branigan...

110 slides

fin

110 slides

Perimeter defenses


Perimeter defenses are a traditional means of

protecting an area without hardening each of the things

in that area


Why use a perimeter defense?

• It is cheaper– A man’s home is his castle, but most

people can’t afford the moat

• You can concentrate your equipment and your expertise in a few areas

• It is simpler, and simpler security is usually better– Easier to understand and audit– Easier to spot broken parts


Perimeter Defense of the US Capitol Building


Flower pots


Security doesn’t have to be ugly


Delta barriers


Parliament: entrance


Parliament: exit


What’s wrong with perimeter defenses

• They are useless against insider attacks


Edinburgh Castle

• fell through a hole in its perimeter

• fell to siege in three years in 16th century– ran out of food and

water

• Unsuccessful attack by Bonnie Prince Charlie in 1745

• Devastated in 1544 by the Earl of Hertford




• They provide a false sense of security– You still need to toughen up the inside, at

least some– You need to hire enough defenders




• They provide a false sense of security– You still need to toughen up the inside, at

least some

• They don’t scale well

The Pretty GoodWall of China

110 slides

Can we live without an intranet?

Strong host security


I can, but you probably can’t

• “Skinny-dipping” on the Internet since the mid 1990s

• The exposure focuses one clearly on the threats and proactive security

• It’s very convenient, for the services I dare to use

• Many important network services are difficult to harden


Skinny dipping rules

• Only minimal services are offered to the general public– Ssh– Web server (jailed Apache)– DNS (self chrooted)– SMTP (postfix, not sendmail)

• Children (like employees) and MSFT clients are untrustworthy

• Offer hardened local services at home, like SAMBA (chroot), POP3 (chroot)

• I’d like to offer other services, but they are hard to secure


Skinny dipping requires strong host security

• FreeBSD and Linux machines

• I am told that one can lock down an MSFT host, but there are hundreds of steps, and I don’t know how to do it.

• This isn’t just about operating systems: the most popular client applications are, in theory, very dangerous and, in practice, very dangerous.– Web browsers and mail readers have

many dangerous features


Lately, I have been cheating

• Backup hosts are unreachable from the Internet (which is a perimeter defense of sorts), and do not trust the exposed hosts

• Public servers have lower privilege than my crown jewels

• This means I can experiment a bit more with the exposed hosts


Skinny dipping flaws

• Less depth to the defense


Skinny dipping flaws

• Less defense in depth

• No protection from denial-of-service attacks


Hopes for Microsoft client security?

• I’ll talk about it at the end of the talk.

110 slides

Intranets

Networked perimeter defenses

110 slides

“Anything large enough to be called an ‘intranet’ is out

of control”

- me


Intranets have been out of control since they were invented

• This is not the fault of network administrators– The technology is amenable to abuse– Decentralization was a design goal of the

Internet

• CIO and CSOs want centralized control of their network

• The legacy information is lost with rapid employee turnover

• M&A breaks carefully-planned networking


Perimeter security gives a false sense of security

• “Crunchy outside, and a soft, chewy center”– Me

• I think 40 hosts is about the most that I can control within a perimeter.– Others can probably do better

• Internet worms are pop quizzes on perimeter security

110 slides

Intranets: the rest of the Internet


History of the Project and Lumeta

• Started in August 1998 at Bell Labs

• April-June 1999: Yugoslavia mapping

• July 2000: first customer intranet scanned

• Sept. 2000: spun off Lumeta from Lucent/Bell Labs

• June 2002: “B” round funding completed

• 2003: sales >$4MM

• After three years of a service offering, we built IPSonar so you can run it yourself.


This wasSupposedTo be aVPN

110 slides

This is useful, butcan we find hosts that have access

across the perimeter?


Leaks

• We call the leaks shown in the maps “routing leaks”

• Can we find hosts that don’t forward packets, but straddle the perimeter?

• Yes: we call them “host leaks”, and detecting them is Lumeta’s “special sauce”


How to find host leaks

• Run a census with ICMP and/or UDP packets

• Test each machine to see if it can receive a probe from one network, and reply on another

• Not just dual-homed hosts

• DMZ hosts, business partner machines, misconfigured VPN access


Leak Detection

Internet intranet

Mapping hostA

Test hostB

mittD

C

• A sends packet to B, with spoofed return address of D

• If B can, it will reply to D with a response, possibly through a different interface


Leak Detection

Internet intranet

Mapping hostA

Test hostB

mittD

C

• Packet must be crafted so the response won’t be permitted through the firewall

• A variety of packet types and responses are used

• Either inside or outside address may be discovered

• Packet is labeled so we know where it came from


Leaks are not always bad

• Depends on the network policy

• Often, outgoing leaks are ok

• Sometimes our test packets get through, but not the services you are worrying about

• “Please don’t call them leaks”

• Until this test, there was no way for the CIO to detect them, good or bad

• Patent pending…


We developed lot of stuff

• Leak detection (that’s the special sauce)

• Route discovery

• Host enumeration and identification

• Server discovery

• Lots of reports…the hardest part

• Wireless base station discovery

• And more…ask the sales people

• The “zeroth step in network intelligence”– me


Case studies: corp. networksSome intranet statistics

Min MaxIntranet sizes (devices) 7,900 365,000Corporate address space 81,000 745,000,000% devices in unknown address space 0.01% 20.86%

% routers responding to "public" 0.14% 75.50%% routers responding to other 0.00% 52.00%

Outbound host leaks on network 0 176,000% devices with outbound ICMP leaks 0% 79%% devices with outbound UDP leaks 0% 82%

Inbound UDP host leaks 0 5,800% devices with inbound ICMP leaks 0% 11%% devices with inbound UDP leaks 0% 12%% hosts running Windows 36% 84%


Some Lumeta lessons

• Reporting is the really hard part– Converting data to information

• “Tell me how we compare to other clients”

• Offering a service was good practice, for a while

• We have >70 Fortune-200 companies and government agencies as clients

• Need-to-have vs. want-to-have

110 slides

Microsoft client security

It has been getting worse


Case study:My Dad’s computer

• Windows XP, plenty of horsepower, two screens

• Applications:– Email (Outlook)– “Bridge:” a fancy stock market monitoring

system– AIM

• Cable access, dynamic IP address, no NAT, no firewall, outdated virus software, no spyware checker


This computer was a software toxic waste dump

• It was burning a quart of software every 300 miles

• The popups seemed darned distracting to me

• But he thought it was fine– Got his work done– Didn’t want a system administrator to

break his user interface somehow


Microsoft’s Augean Stables

• 3000 oxen, 30 years, that’s roughly one oxen-day per line of code in Windows


Windows MEActive Connections - Win ME

Proto Local Address Foreign Address State TCP 127.0.0.1:1032 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING TCP 223.223.223.10:139 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING UDP 0.0.0.0:1025 *:* UDP 0.0.0.0:1026 *:* UDP 0.0.0.0:31337 *:* UDP 0.0.0.0:162 *:* UDP 223.223.223.10:137 *:* UDP 223.223.223.10:138 *:*


Windows 2000

Proto Local Address Foreign Address State TCP 0.0.0.0:135 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING TCP 0.0.0.0:445 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING TCP 0.0.0.0:1029 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING TCP 0.0.0.0:1036 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING TCP 0.0.0.0:1078 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING TCP 0.0.0.0:1080 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING TCP 0.0.0.0:1086 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING TCP 0.0.0.0:6515 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING TCP 127.0.0.1:139 0.0.0.0:0 LISTENING UDP 0.0.0.0:445 *:* UDP 0.0.0.0:1038 *:* UDP 0.0.0.0:6514 *:* UDP 0.0.0.0:6515 *:* UDP 127.0.0.1:1108 *:* UDP 223.223.223.96:500 *:* UDP 223.223.223.96:4500 *:*


Windows XP, this laptop Proto Local Address Foreign Address State TCP ches-pc:epmap ches-pc:0 LISTENING TCP ches-pc:microsoft-ds ches-pc:0 LISTENING TCP ches-pc:1025 ches-pc:0 LISTENING TCP ches-pc:1036 ches-pc:0 LISTENING TCP ches-pc:3115 ches-pc:0 LISTENING TCP ches-pc:3118 ches-pc:0 LISTENING TCP ches-pc:3470 ches-pc:0 LISTENING TCP ches-pc:3477 ches-pc:0 LISTENING TCP ches-pc:5000 ches-pc:0 LISTENING TCP ches-pc:6515 ches-pc:0 LISTENING TCP ches-pc:netbios-ssn ches-pc:0 LISTENING TCP ches-pc:3001 ches-pc:0 LISTENING TCP ches-pc:3002 ches-pc:0 LISTENING TCP ches-pc:3003 ches-pc:0 LISTENING TCP ches-pc:5180 ches-pc:0 LISTENING UDP ches-pc:microsoft-ds *:* UDP ches-pc:isakmp *:* UDP ches-pc:1027 *:* UDP ches-pc:3008 *:* UDP ches-pc:3473 *:* UDP ches-pc:6514 *:* UDP ches-pc:6515 *:* UDP ches-pc:netbios-ns *:* UDP ches-pc:netbios-dgm *:* UDP ches-pc:1900 *:* UDP ches-pc:ntp *:* UDP ches-pc:1900 *:* UDP ches-pc:3471 *:*


FreeBSD partition, this laptop

Active Internet connections (including servers)Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address Foreign Address (state)tcp4 0 0 *.22 *.* LISTENtcp6 0 0 *.22 *.* LISTEN


Microsoft really means it about improving their security

• Their security commitment appears to be real

• It is a huge job

• Opposing forces are unclear to me

• It’s been a long time coming, and frustrating


Microsoft really means it about improving their security

• They need world-class sandboxes, many more layers in their security, and much safer defaults

• A Microsoft “terminal” will benefit millions of users


Windows OK

• Thin client implemented with Windows

• It would be fine for maybe half the Windows users– Students, consumers, many corporate

and government users

• It would be reasonable to skinny dip with this client– Without firewall or virus checking

software


Windows OK

• No network listeners– None of those services are needed, except

admin access for centrally-administered hosts

• Default security settings, all available on the control panel security screen

• Security settings can be locked


Windows OK

• Reduce privileges in servers and all programs

• Sandbox programs– Belt and suspenders


Windows OK (cont)

• There should be nothing you can click on, in email or a web page, that can hurt your computer– No portable programs are executed ever,

except…

• ActiveX from approved parties– MSFT and one or two others. List is

lockable


Office OK

• No macros in Word or PowerPoint. No executable code in PowerPoint files

• The only macros allowed in Excel perform arithmetic. They cannot create files, etc.


Vulnerabilities in OK

• Buffer overflows in processing of data (not from the network)

• Stop adding new features and focus on bug fixes

• Programmers can clean up bugs, if they don’t have a moving target– It converges, to some extent

110 slides

Defending Your Network: Identifying and Patrolling

Your True Network Perimeter

Bill Cheswick

Chief Scientist, Lumeta Corp

110 slides defending your network: identifying and patrolling your true network perimeter bill...

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