The Indo-US nuclear deal hasmade a dramatic comeback, comebackfrom near certain death. Just when itwas being considered to have enteredits terminal phase, it made a dramaticturn around.

True, this is not the first time thatit did so. Like the proverbial cat, it alsoseems to have more than one life. Butthis time the comeback was even moredramatic and far more tumultuous.

Last time, it was in November last.The Left was determined to deny thenecessary go-ahead to the governmentof India, critically dependent on its sup-port, to approach the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) tonegotiate the India-specific SafeguardsAgreement, subsequent to the 123Agreement clinched with the US,towards opeartionalising this deal. Aftera show of uncharacteristic belligerence,virtually challenging the Left to dowhatever they can, Prime MinisterManmohan Singh just went out of gas,presumably under the pressure fromthe High Command goaded by the poll-phobic allies. Singh, in fact, made a pub-lic show of his surrender. His two pro-nouncements became all too famous."The nuclear deal is not the end of life"!"This is not a single-issue government".A meeting of the UPA-Left committeeto decide on the deal scheduled onNovember 16 was called off. Thatseemed to be end of the road. As far asthe deal was concerned.

But it was not to be! Suddenly, tothe consternation of many, includingthe junior constituents of the Left, themeeting was revived. The government

EDITORIAL

Volume 6 : Issue 3, Aug 2008 The Bulletin of the Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament & Peace

I. Editorial \ 1

II. Global Nuclear Disarmament: Challenges and Prospects \ 3

A. Toward the 2010 NPT Review Conference: Appeal for a Nuclear

Weapon-Free World

B. Nuclear Weapons and Future Justice by David Krieger

C. Looking Back: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Then and Now by

George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander

D. Japan and the Future of Nuclear Disarmament by Masako Toki

III. Nuclear Weapons and South Asia \ 15

Someone else's weapons by Zia Mian

IV. Indo-US Nuclear Deal \ 17

A. CNDP Condemns Intransigence of Indian Prime Minister on the

Deplorable Indo-US Nuclear Deal

B. Furious lobbying to clear the last lap by Praful Bidwai

C. Nuclear Deal, "National Interests" and Mainstream Indian Opposition

by P.K. Sundaram

D. The Unbearable Costs of Nuclear Power by Latha Jishnu

E. Left Parties' Statement on India-IAEA Safeguards

F. Pakistan's Letter to the Members of the IAEA Board and the NSG

G. Text of the Statement Delivered by Austrian Representative on August 1

at the IAEA BoG Meet at Vienna on the India-IAEA Draft Safeguards

Agreement

H. Decision Time on the Indian Nuclear Deal: Help Avert a

Nonproliferation Disaster

V. Book Review \ 36

Nuclear Power is Not the Answer by M. Channa Basavaiah

VI. CNDP in Action \ 46

Contents

2

was allowed to go ahead with theproviso that before approaching theIAEA Board of Governors to finallyseal the requisite agreement workedout with the IAEA Secretariat, itwould be placed before the commit-tee and its findings would be appro-priately factored in. While the negoti-ations were being concluded, the Lefthardened its stand. And the deallooked as good as dead, only awaitingthe formal cremation.

But things started changing inthe month of June and thereabout.Manmohan Singh started showingsome teeth. Tensions mounted.

To cut a long story short, in adramatic move, onboard a flight toJapan to attend the G-8 Summit, onJuly 7 Singh announced that Indiawould go to the IAEA BoG.

It was deliberately provocative,visibly out of tune with his statementon the previous day from the Indiansoil and, even more so, the missivesent by the External Affairs Ministeron the same day, just an hour or sobefore, to the Left inviting them for ameet on July 10 to discuss the issue.

Somewhat predictably, the Leftwas pushed to withdrawing its sup-port. The government became aminority government. Yet the DraftAgreement was almost immediatelysent to the BoG, again flouting acommitment made by the ExternalAffairs Minister.

Since then, the government hassurvived a trust vote (taken on July22), which saw large-scale cross-vot-ing. The ugly underbelly of Indiandemocracy stood exposed as neverbefore. If three BJP MPs tri-umphantly waving bundles of cur-rency notes, allegedly received asbribe to abstain from voting, on thefloor of the Lok Sabha was transmit-ted live by the TV cameras to theIndian houses; the Speaker of theLok Sabha was soon after expelled byhis parent party for breach of disci-pline. Neither has any precedence

even in the murky history of Indiandemocracy.

Be that as it may, on August 1,the Draft Agreement has beenapproved by the 35-member IAEABoG. Rather tamely, without anyvoting.

The IAEA approval had never-been in doubt, mor so, with strongbacking from France andRussia.Even then its passage withoutany voting was perhaps a welcomesurprise even for the GoI. Pakistan'sshow of bravado, with a sharp cri-tique of the Draft SafeguardsAgreement, just fizzled out underobvious US pressure. And PakistaniPrime Minister's routine clamour fora similar deal while visiting the US,just before the IAEA meet, was sim-ply ignored.

But the easy ride that Indiaenjoyed in the IAEA is perhaps moreapparent than real. We have carriedhere the statement by the Austrianrepresentative, which deserves aclose reading. It, rather significantly,says that the "decision [not toobstruct the Draft India- specificSafeguards Agreement] does in noway prejudge the decision on a possi-ble India-specific exemption in theNuclear Suppliers Group which willbe discussed in the appropriate fora."

From the 45-member NSG,India is asking for an "unconditionaland clean exemption". The exemp-tion here, unlike in the IAEA, willhave to be consensual. And evengun-boat diplomacy, or some civilianequivalent of it, has its limits. In themeanwhile, domestic oppositionwithin the US seems to be picking up.Howard Berman, the Chairman ofthe House of Representatives foreignaffairs committee, has stronglyobjected to such exemption.

Consequent to the IAEAapproval, the NSG is expected totake up the issue on August 21.

We have here carried three arti-cles and five statements/letters on

this issue to facilitate an in-depthunderstanding of the issue havingbeen examined from multiple angles,and also to provide an appraisal ofthe current stage of struggles againstthe deal.

The only point that bears repeti-tion here is that, as one of our con-tributors has drawn our attention to,"a frightening consensus in the[Indian] political mainstream" hasemerged as regards the (desirabilityof the) Bomb and also nuclear powerregardless of support or oppositionto the deal. That's a point the peacemovement has got to adequately fac-tor in.

Our intense engagement withthe deal must not, however, detractus from the broader goal of globalnuclear disarmament. With the nextNPT review meeting in 2010 fastapproaching, various strands of glob-al peace movements are girding uptheir loins to provide a vigorous pushtowards that final goal, notwithstand-ing the inherent flaws in the NPT.

Apart from the people's move-ments, a governmental move that hasdrawn considerable attention is therecent formation of an 'InternationalCommission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament' initi-ated by Australian Prime MinisterKevin Rudd and co-chaired by Japan,represented by Ms YorikoKawaguchi. But the credibility andsuccess of the move will largelydepend on how it sets its agenda.

We have an article specificallydealing with this promising develop-ment. And few other articles and anappeal on this broader issue.

We have an article also on SouthAsian nuclear disarmament and howand why the smaller countries musttake the lead given the roguish con-duct of the largest two.

And there is a review of a semi-nal work on nuclear power synopsis-ing its contents.

3

Future justice requires thatthe inhabitants of the future betreated justly and equitably.This implies that our currentsocial, economic and politicalrelations, both nationally andinternationally, must becomemore just and equitable. It alsoadds an explicit focus on thelonger-term consequences ofthese relations.

Many indigenous peopleslived with an ethic of consider-ing present impacts on the"seventh generation." Modernsocieties have been far lessrespectful of those who willfollow us on Earth, as theexpanding population of theplanet combined with ourgreed for natural resources andthe power of our technologies

has exponentially increased thehuman impact on Earth andfuture generations.

We need an ethic thatexpands our concept of justiceto generations yet unborn. Weneed to recognize and appreci-ate the extent to which ourdecisions and acts in the pres-ent have serious, potentiallyirreversible consequences forthe future. In the 1990s, theCousteau Society, led byrespected ocean explorerJacques Cousteau, developedand promoted A Bill of Rightsfor Future Generations.

Its five articles are:Article 1. Future generations

have a right to an uncontaminatedand undamaged Earth and to itsenjoyment as the ground of human

history, of culture, and of the socialbonds that make each generation andindividual a member of one humanfamily.

Article 2. Each generation,sharing in the estate and heritage ofthe Earth, has a duty as trustee forfuture generations to prevent irre-versible and irreparable harm to lifeon Earth and to human freedom anddignity.

Article 3. It is, therefore, theparamount responsibility of eachgeneration to maintain a constantlyvigilant and prudential assessment oftechnological disturbances and modi-fications adversely affecting life onEarth, the balance of nature, andthe evolution of mankind in order toprotect the rights of future genera-tions.

Article 4. All appropriate

II. Global Nuclear Disarmament: Challenges and Prospects

A. Toward the 2010 NPT Review ConferenceAppeal for a Nuclear Weapon-Free World *

Even now, in the 21stCentury, world peace and secu-rity are still threatened by26,000 nuclear weapons.

As the tragedies ofHiroshima and Nagasaki showus, nuclear weapons instantlydestroy countless lives, tormentpeople in future generations,and ruin civilizations.

The Hibakusha, the A-bomb survivors, continue towarn that humanity cannotcoexist with nuclear weapons.Never again should we createmore victims of nuclearweapons.

For the survival of thehuman race and for the futureof our children, let us achieve aworld free of nuclear weaponsthrough our actions in solidari-ty.

Towards the 2010 NuclearNon-Proliferation TreatyReview Conference, the nuclearweapons states are called tohonor the "unequivocal under-taking" of May 2000 to elimi-nate their nuclear weapons.

We call on the nuclearweapons states and all othergovernments to agree to com-mence and conclude negotia-

tions of a treaty, a nuclearweapons convention, to banand eliminate nuclear weaponswithout delay.

* This Appeal is issued onAugust 6, 2008, by the representatives

assembled inHiroshima from around the world

at the 2008 World Conference againstA & H Bombs. The signature drive isunder way worldwide, and the petitions

will be presented to the next NPTReview Conference to be held in Spring

2010 in New York.

B. Nuclear Weapons and Future JusticeDavid Krieger **

4

measures, including education,research, and legislation, shall betaken to guarantee these rights and toensure that they not be sacrificed forpresent expediencies and conven-iences.

Article 5. Governments, non-governmental organizations, andindividuals are urged, therefore,imaginatively to implement theseprinciples, as if in the very presenceof those future generations whoserights we seek to establish and per-petuate.

To enforce such a set ofrights for future generations,we need to create a criminalconceptualization that desig-nates the worst offenses againstthese rights - those that wouldforeclose the future altogetheror that would make life on theplanet untenable - as crimesagainst future generations.

Two areas of human activi-ty that would clearly fit into thiscategory of foreclosing thefuture are nuclear war and cli-mate change. Both have thepotential to destroy human lifeon our planet, along with muchother life.

ResponsibilitiesToward FutureGenerations

Rights cannot exist in avacuum. Along with rights,there must be concomitantresponsibilities, includingresponsibilities to ensure therights of future generations.On Nov. 12, 1997, the UnitedNations Educational, Scientificand Cultural Organizationsolemnly proclaimed theUNESCO Declaration on theResponsibilities of PresentGenerations Towards FutureGenerations. Two of its 12 arti-cles closely relate to preservinga human future and a future for

life on the planet:Article 3. Maintenance and per-

petuation of humankind - The pres-ent generations should strive to ensurethe maintenance and perpetuation ofhumankind with due respect for thedignity of the human person.Consequently, the nature and form ofhuman life must not be underminedin any way whatsoever.

Article 4. Preservation of lifeon Earth - The present generationshave the responsibility to bequeath tofuture generations an Earth whichwill not one day be irreversibly dam-aged by human activity. Each gener-ation inheriting the Earth temporar-ily should take care to usenaturalresources reasonably and ensure thatlife is not prejudiced by harmful mod-ifications of the ecosystems and thatscientific and technological progress inallfields does not harm life on Earth.

The declaration calls for"intergenerational solidarity."Such solidarity with future gen-erations requires that currentgenerations take responsibilityfor ensuring that the policies ofthose in power today will notlead to foreclosing the futurefor generations yet to be born.

Thus, the importance ofconceptualizing crimes againstfuture generations cannot beevaded by the people of thepresent. A strong example ofsuch crimes can be found inpolicies promoting the posses-sion, threat or use of nuclearweapons.

Nuclear WeaponsPossession asCriminal Behavior

The philosopher JohnSomerville coined a new termfor the potential of nuclearweapons: omnicide, the deathof all. He reasoned thathumans had moved from sui-cide to genocide to the poten-

tial of omnicide. The threat oruse of nuclear weapons consti-tutes the ultimate crime againstthe future, omnicide, includingthe destruction of the humanspecies.

In 1996, the InternationalCourt of Justice issued an advi-sory opinion on the legality ofthe threat or use of nuclearweapons: "The destructivepower of nuclear weapons can-not be contained in either spaceor time. They have the poten-tial to destroy all civilizationand the entire ecosystem of theplanet." The international courtfound that "the use of nuclearweapons would be a seriousdanger to future generations."Even setting aside the blasteffects of nuclear weapons, itfound, "Ionizing radiation hasthe potential to damage thefuture environment, food andmarine ecosystem, and to causegenetic defects and illness infuture generations."

The international courtunanimously concluded thatany threat or use of nuclearweapons that violated interna-tional humanitarian law wouldbe illegal. This meant that therecould be no legal threat or useof nuclear weapons that wasindiscriminate as between civil-ians and combatants, thatcaused unnecessary sufferingor that was disproportionate toa prior attack.

While there could be virtu-ally no threat or use of nuclearweapons that did not violateinternational humanitarian law,the international court alsofound on a split vote that "inview of the current state ofinternational law, and of theelements of fact at its disposal,the Court cannot concludedefinitively whether the threat

5

or use of nuclear weaponswould be lawful or unlawful inan extreme circumstance ofself-defense, in which the verysurvival of a State would be atstake."

In light of the above con-clusions, the international courtfound unanimously, "Thereexists an obligation to pursue ingood faith and bring to a con-clusion negotiations leading tonuclear disarmament in all itsaspects under strict and effec-tive international control."Thus, the international courtwas clear in reaffirming theobligation to nuclear disarma-ment in Article VI of theNuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty. Unfortunately, the polit-ical leaders of the nuclearweapons states have not ful-filled their obligations underinternational law.

Today, nine states in theworld are known to possessnuclear weapons: the U.S.,Russia, the U.K., France, China,Israel, India, Pakistan andNorth Korea. If we know thatnuclear war could foreclose thefuture and would be a crimeagainst future generations, doesthat make the possession ofnuclear weapons by these statesa crime against the future?

Arguably, possession alone,without use or threat of use, isnot a crime. But to take theinquiry one step deeper is itpossible to have possessionwithout at least the implicitthreat of use? In order to elim-inate the possibility of threat oruse of nuclear weapons, a stateat a minimum would need tohave a policy of "no first use"and to separate its warheadsfrom delivery vehicles so thatthere could be no inadvertentuse of the weapons.

While this would be betternuclear policy than one thatleaves open the possibility offirst use, it would not eliminatethe possibility of a second useof the weapons, which couldescalate a nuclear war, kill greatnumbers of innocent civilians,affect the health of children ofthe victims and even place thefuture of humanity at risk.Thus, the conclusion seemsinescapable that the possessionof nuclear weapons by a stateundermines future justice andconstitutes a continuing crimeagainst future generations.

The possession of nuclearweapons can be viewed as acrime of state, and this crimewould apply to the states pos-sessing nuclear weapons. Butbeyond state criminal activity,there should also be culpabilityfor the crime against the futureby the leading state and militaryofficials that support and pro-mote nuclear weapons posses-sion, as well as policies thatmake nuclear war more likelyand total nuclear disarmamentless likely. In addition, corpora-tions, corporate executives andscientists who contribute to themaintenance and improvementof nuclear weapons should alsobe considered culpable forcommitting a crime againstfuture generations.

It is fundamental to crimi-nal law that individuals haveculpability for crimes and thatindividual accountability not becovered over by state or corpo-rate culpability. At theNuremberg Trials followingWorld War II, the principle wasupheld that all individuals whocommit crimes under interna-tional law are responsible forsuch acts, even if they are highgovernment officials and

domestic law does not holdsuch acts to be crimes. Alongwith responsibility goes indi-vidual accountability for crimesagainst future generations.

The Need for a Taboo In the present global envi-

ronment, the possession ofnuclear weapons is not viewedas a crime against future gener-ations or even broadly as acrime against the present butrather as normal behavior bypowerful states. In addition, theexistence of these weapons inthe arsenals of some states cre-ates pressures for other statesto acquire such weaponry.

It is essential to establish anorm that the possession ofnuclear weapons is a crimeagainst future generations, acrime that can be preventedonly by the total elimination ofthese weapons. A taboo mustbe established that puts nuclearweapons in the same categoryof unacceptable behaviors ascannibalism, incest, slavery andtorture and that ostracizesthose who contribute to main-taining these weapons or whoset up obstacles to their elimi-nation.

There are some signs ofhope:� More than half the world,

virtually the entireSouthern Hemisphere, iscovered by nuclearweapons-free zones.

� Former high-level U.S. pol-icymakers, including for-mer Secretaries of StateHenry Kissinger andGeorge Shultz, formerSecretary of DefenseWilliam Perry and formerChairman of the SenateArmed ServicesCommittee Sam Nunn,

6

have spoken out in favor ofa world free of nuclearweapons.

� Norway's government pen-sion fund has set an exam-ple by divesting from com-panies providing compo-nents for nuclear weapons.

� Legal measures to return tothe International Court ofJustice are being taken tochallenge the lack ofprogress on nuclear disar-mament obligations.

� Leading scientists, includingthe late Nobel laureatesHans Bethe and JosephRotblat, are calling on scien-tists in all countries to ceaseworking on nuclearweapons and other weaponsof mass destruction.

� U.K. Secretary of State forDefence Des Browne has

proposed a conference ofthe five principal nuclearweapons states to addressthe technical challenges ofverifying nuclear disarma-ment.While these signs of hope

hold promise, far more needs tobe done to establish a tabooagainst the possession, threatand use of nuclear weapons thatwill result in a world withoutthem. Such organizations as theWorld Future Council, of whichI am a councilor, need to take aleadership role in promoting theconcept of future justice andcrimes against future genera-tions and in identifying thoseparticular crimes, such as nuclearwar and the antecedent posses-sion, threat or use of nuclearweapons, which are capable offoreclosing the future.

Among the tools needed tosucceed in passing on the worldintact to future generations isthe identification of crimesagainst future generations tounderpin the establishment oftaboos against such crimes.Also needed is a system ofaccountability to ostracize andotherwise punish individuals,regardless of their office, whoare engaged in the preparationor commission of such crimes.Future justice is not a possibili-ty in a world without a future.

** David Kriegar is the head of thenonprofit Nuclear Age Peace Foundation,

which calls for global nuclear disarmament,suggests criminalizing the mere possession

of nuclear weapons.[Source: http://www.miller-

mccune.com/article/434.]

C. Looking Back The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

Then and NowGeorge Bunn and John B. Rhinelander **

Less than a year afterdropping nuclear bombs onHiroshima and Nagasaki in1945, the United States adopt-ed a statute prohibiting thetransfer of its nuclear weaponsto any other country. It wasnot until 23 years later, howev-er, that countries began sign-ing an international treaty thatprohibited the transfer ofnuclear weapons by a countrythat had them to any othercountry, indeed "to any recipi-ent whatsoever."[1] On July 1,1968, the United States, theSoviet Union, the UnitedKingdom, and many other

countries signed the nuclearNonproliferation Treaty(NPT) at ceremonies inWashington, Moscow, andLondon. Subsequently, nearly190 countries have signed andratified the treaty aimed at pre-venting the spread of nuclearweapons from the few coun-tries that then had them to themany that did not and atreducing and eventually elimi-nating nuclear weapons fromthe world.

The 40th anniversary ofthe NPT provides an opportu-nity to re-examine the historyof the treaty's negotiation and

ask what lessons it offers fortoday.

The NPT'sNegotiating History

The NPT's history reallybegan in 1946. That year, theDepartment of State and someof the scientists who had madethe bomb drew up the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, which, withmajor revisions, became a for-mal U.S. proposal to the UnitedNations known as the BaruchPlan. It proposed that theUnited States turn over controlof all its enriched uranium,including that in any nuclear

7

weapons it had, to a new UNbody (over which the UnitedStates and the other permanentmembers of the SecurityCouncil would have a veto) andthat all countries in the worldshould be prohibited from pos-sessing their own nuclearweapons. The Soviet Unionopposed this plan, and the UNcommittee created to consider itgot nowhere.[2]

The next stab at controllingnuclear weapons proliferationcame in 1953 when PresidentDwight Eisenhower proposedto the UN General Assemblythe negotiation of a treaty thatwould seek to control nuclearactivities around the world andprevent, if possible, the spreadof nuclear weapons to addition-al countries. This led to negotia-tions that finally produced a use-ful treaty, though one that fellshort of what Eisenhower hadproposed. This treaty, theStatute of the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA)of 1956, authorized creation ofthe IAEA and gave it theresponsibility for providinginformation and assistance tocountries seeking to use nuclearenergy for peaceful purposesand for performing inspectionsof their nuclear facilities toensure that the operators did notdivert from peaceful purposes toweapons production the urani-um fuel used to run nuclearreactors and the plutonium thatwas produced in such reac-tors.[3]

The NPT negotiationsthemselves really got startedafter the unanimous approval ofa 1961 UN General Assemblyresolution on negotiation of atreaty that would ban countrieswithout nuclear weapons fromacquiring them and that would

require the inspections that theIAEA treaty only authorized. Inparticular, the resolution askedthe countries "possessingnuclear weapons" to "undertaketo refrain from relinquishingcontrol of nuclear weapons andfrom transmitting informationnecessary for their manufacture"to nations not possessingnuclear weapons. Second, it rec-ommended that states not pos-sessing nuclear weapons "under-take not to manufacture or oth-erwise acquire control of suchweapons." It urged nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states to "cooperate tothose ends."[4]

The same year markedanother step that had an impor-tant but indirect effect on thecreation of the NPT. AtPresident John Kennedy'srequest, Congress approved leg-islation establishing the ArmsControl and DisarmamentAgency (ACDA) to replace theState Department in theresearch, planning, and negotia-tion of arms control and disar-mament treaties. Soon after theACDA's creation, its leaderssought authority from Secretaryof State Dean Rusk andKennedy to negotiate with theSoviets an agreement intendedto prevent the spread of nuclearweapons to additional countries.This authority was granted afternegotiations within the U.S. gov-ernment and with U.S. allies pro-duced a modified draft treaty.

By forming an institutionseparate from the StateDepartment that would handlenegotiations regarding a treatysuch as this, Kennedy also creat-ed a means to sidestep opposi-tion in Foggy Bottom to theNPT and win support from oth-ers in the executive branch and

Congress. The StateDepartment had long supportedestablishment of a multilateralforce (MLF) composed of shipsowned by several NATO coun-tries, including the United States,armed with U.S. nuclearweapons and manned by offi-cers and sailors from the UnitedStates and other participatingNATO countries. Some StateDepartment officials had insist-ed that U.S. officers and sailorson MLF ships would retain con-trol of the U.S. nuclear weapons.However, other StateDepartment officials and someallies felt that the MLF effortwould be endangered if a newtreaty prohibited transfer ofcontrol of nuclear weapons toany other entity, such as an MLFship with officers and sailorsfrom countries not havingnuclear weapons or that had anMLF "board of directors" thatincluded many allies that did nothave nuclear weapons.

In 1962, Rusk showedSoviet Foreign Minister AndreiGromyko a simple U.S. draftnonproliferation agreementbased on the 1961 GeneralAssembly resolution, which theSoviets had not opposed. Thedraft did not mention the MLFbut would not have prohibited it.Gromyko rejected Rusk's pro-posal without even consultingMoscow. How much this actionwas based on Gromyko's knowl-edge that NATO members wereconsidering the MLF proposalwas not clear, but there had beenmany private discussions aboutthe MLF proposal amongNATO members. Leaks to rep-resentatives of non-NATOcountries seemed likely.

At the DisarmamentCommittee that followed thisRusk-Gromyko meeting,

8

Gromyko focused on a broadSoviet proposal for "general andcomplete disarmament," includ-ing complete nuclear disarma-ment, not on the GeneralAssembly nonproliferation reso-lution.[5] Given Gromyko'sreaction and the interest of WestGermany and others in the MLFproposal, negotiations to imple-ment the 1961 GeneralAssembly resolution calling foran NPT stalled for several years,but so did NATO-countrynegotiations to create an MLFarmed with nuclear weapons.

After the 1962 Cuban mis-sile crisis, U.S.-Soviet tensionsrelaxed somewhat, and seriousnegotiations to produce a banon nuclear weapons tests pro-duced U.S.-Soviet agreement onthe Limited Test Ban Treaty of1963 (limited because it did notban nuclear weapons testsunderground). Still, the possibil-ity of a successful negotiation ofan MLF agreement with U.S.allies seemed likely to make suc-cessful negotiation of an NPTwith the Soviets impossible.ACDA officials were concernedthat the United States would getneither an MLF nor an NPTunless some way to break thisstalemate could be found.

Indeed, it took three years offailure both in the MLF negotia-tions and the NPT negotiationsto produce a U.S. decision togive up on an MLF and pursuean NPT alone. Then, the ACDAwas authorized to try to negoti-ate with the Soviets a draft NPTwith a provision prohibiting thefive nations then having nuclearweapons (China, France, theSoviet Union, the UnitedKingdom, and the UnitedStates) from transferring controlover any of their nuclearweapons to anyone. As finally

negotiated, this provision alsocalled on these five nations notto "assist, encourage or induceany non-nuclear-weapon Stateto manufacture or otherwiseacquire nuclear explosiveweapons, or control over suchweapons or explosive devices."Moreover, the nations not hav-ing nuclear weapons that joinedthe treaty had to agree not toreceive or manufacture or "oth-erwise acquire nuclearweapons…and not to seek orreceive any assistance" in theirmanufacture.[6]

With this new U.S. formulain hand, U.S.-Soviet negotiationsover a draft NPT finally began inearnest in Geneva. Later, Ruskand Gromyko met in New Yorkto discuss further NPT negotia-tion possibilities, and it becameclear that the Soviets were nowinterested in such talks. InSeptember 1966, a U.S.-Sovietworking group, which includedone of the authors of this arti-cle, came up with three possibledrafts of an NPT prohibition onthe transfer of nuclear weaponsthat the Americans and theSoviets could present to theirgovernments.

President Lyndon Johnsonalso authorized ACDA negotia-tors to present a draft no-trans-fer treaty provision to the WestGerman government, probablythe most important U.S. ally inWestern Europe that the NPTwould ban from having nuclearweapons. Johnson had good rea-son to be concerned about thereaction of the West Germans.They had already done consider-able work related to buildingnuclear power reactors, andsome in the West German gov-ernment appeared to supportresearch into nuclear weaponsproduction, given that U.S.

nuclear weapons were stationedwith U.S. troops on WestGerman territory. The Britishand the French already hadnuclear weapons and would beaccepted as NPT nuclear-weapon states in the U.S.-Sovietstaff-proposed drafts. No otherU.S. allies then seemed both seri-ously interested in and clearlycapable of making nuclearweapons.

Fortunately, after furtherprolonged negotiations with theUnited States as well as withother NATO allies, the WestGermans finally came around.They signed the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state, thus obli-gating themselves not to acquirenuclear weapons. Without WestGermany's NPT promise not toacquire nuclear weapons, theSoviets would not have acceptedan NPT. The Soviets had alreadycomplained about U.S. nuclearweapons deployed with U.S.forces in West Germany,weapons that were guarded byU.S. troops. The Soviets werenot about to agree to a treatypermitting West Germany tocontrol any nuclear weapons.

These further negotiationswith the West Germans andother U.S. allies produced a con-sensus on a U.S. proposal to sub-mit to the Soviet negotiators.With changes resulting from fur-ther negotiations both with theSoviets and our interested allies,we produced a final draft of theNPT to present at the Geneva-based Eighteen NationDisarmament Committee andthe UN General Assembly in1968. This included provisionsrecommended by the eight non-aligned countries represented atthe Geneva disarmament con-ference, including India, such asArticle IV, which provides that

9

the NPT "shall" not be inter-preted as "affecting the inalien-able right" of all NPT parties "todevelop research, productionand use of nuclear energy forpeaceful purposes without dis-crimination."

The NPT TodayThe 1968 NPT permitted

the five states that had testednuclear weapons to keep theseweapons for the time being butobligated them under Article VIto negotiate to reduce and ulti-mately eliminate them. Thetreaty also prohibited otherstates-parties from acquiringnuclear weapons.[7] Forty yearsafter the signing of the NPT, it isa worldwide treaty joined bymore than 180 countries that donot have nuclear weapons aswell as the five that had testedthem by 1968. Russia has takenthe place of the Soviet Union asone of the five nuclear-weaponstates, and the 14 other formerSoviet republics that becameindependent have become non-nuclear-weapon states-parties tothe NPT.

Today, the most importantNPT provision that has notbeen well observed is Article VI,the obligation of the fivenuclear-weapon states "to nego-tiate in good faith on effectivemeasures relating to the cessa-tion of the nuclear arms race atan early day and to nuclear disar-mament."

In 2007, when she was theUnited Kingdom's foreign min-ister, Margaret Beckett called fornegotiators to take additionalsteps toward nuclear disarma-ment. She said, "The judgmentwe made 40 years ago [at theNPT's signing] that the eventualelimination of nuclear weaponswas in all our interests is just as

true today as it was then. Formore than 60 years, good man-agement and good fortune havemeant that nuclear arsenals havenot been used, but we cannotrely just on history to repeatitself."[8]

It is true that on occasionnuclear-weapon states havetaken advantage of NPT treatyreview conferences to reiteratetheir intention to seek nuclearreductions. Yet, no seriousnuclear-weapon reductions havetaken place that include all fivestates permitted by the NPT topossess nuclear weapons. TheBush administration has been noexception. Unlike previousadministrations, the currentadministration has made only asmall effort to negotiate nuclearweapons reductions with Russiaat a time when the two countriesstill control more than 95 per-cent of the nuclear weapons inthe world. The U.S.-Russiannuclear reduction treaty (theStrategic Offensive ReductionsTreaty) signed by the presidentsof the two countries during theBush administration calls for theremoval from active deploymentof some nuclear warheads, but itdoes not require their elimina-tion.

Instead of negotiatingagreed nuclear weapons reduc-tions, the Bush administrationhas announced a wide range ofpotential uses for nuclearweapons, greater than any pastU.S. administration seems tohave announced.[9] In addition,the administration did notaccept prior commitments byearlier U.S. administrations thatlimit the use of nuclear weaponsagainst non-nuclear-weaponcountries, including commit-ments that the United States willnot use nuclear weapons against

countries that have agreed thatthey will not acquire nuclearweapons.[10] In brief, the Bushadministration has done little tocarry out the U.S. obligation topursue "nuclear disarmament"mandated by Article VI.

Early this year, Congresspassed legislation calling for theexecutive branch to conduct athorough review of U.S. nuclearweapons policy by the end ofthe first year of the next admin-istration. This review, Congresssaid, must describe the new U.S.administration's "assessment ofthe role of nuclear forces in mil-itary strategy"; its"objectives…to maintain a safe,reliable and credible nuclear pos-ture"; and its views of the "rela-tionship among U.S. nucleardeterrence policy, targeting strat-egy, and arms control." Thiswould mark the first such re-examination since the Bushadministration's 2002 NuclearPosture Review, which stated anew U.S. policy of relatively freeuse of nuclear weapons againstcountries that are hostile to theUnited States even though theydo not have nuclearweapons.[11]

In addition, three importantstates (India, Israel, andPakistan) refused to join theNPT in 1968 when it wasopened for signature, and theyeventually produced nuclearweapons. Despite its refusal tojoin the NPT and its acquisitionof nuclear weapons, India hasbeen rewarded by the Bushadministration by a proposedU.S.-India agreement that, ifimplemented, would appear toviolate current U.S. law and beinconsistent with agreed interna-tional guidelines.

North Korea did join theNPT as a non-nuclear-weapon

10

state but later withdrew and test-ed a nuclear weapon thatappeared to be in part the prod-uct of its nuclear weaponsresearch activities conductedwhile it was an NPT state-party.Several countries, most promi-nently South Africa, abandonedtheir nuclear weapons-makingefforts and joined the NPT.

Negotiations to persuadeNorth Korea to give up itsnuclear weapons began in theClinton administration and, aftera long pause, were taken upagain by the Bush administra-tion. Several preliminary agree-ments have been signed.However, North Korea has notyet carried out its promise toeliminate its nuclear weapons.Iran, while a member of theNPT, has a uranium-enrichmentprogram that began in secrecy20 years ago and remainsambiguous as to its purpose:weapons, peaceful uses, or both.Negotiations with Iran remainstalemated.[12]

Conclusion The nuclear nonprolifera-

tion regime is at a crossroads. Ifit is to be saved and reinvigorat-ed, the next U.S. president musttake the lead at the start of hisadministration, January 20, 2009.

First, the president shouldoutline a plan to strengthen thenuclear nonproliferationregime to Congress, to the U.S.public, and to foreign leaders.We hope he will include theShultz-Perry-Kissinger-Nunnproposals in the Wall StreetJournal calling for deep cuts innuclear weapons around theworld.[13] This is, of course,one vision of what seriousplanning and successful negoti-ation of a nuclear weaponsreduction agreement pursuant

to Article VI could produce. Second, the next U.S. presi-

dent should propose early con-crete steps for U.S.-Russiancooperation and nuclear reduc-tions The United States shouldpropose additional reductionsbeyond SORT and the continua-tion of START verificationmeasures. It is self-evident thatpositive relations between theUnited States and Russia will becentral both to specific near-term actions and to the vision ofa world free of nuclear weapons.

Third, the next U.S. presi-dent should extend these talks toinclude the other nuclear-weapon states. At a time thatU.S.-Russian arms reductiontalks have effectively stalled out,it may seem disingenuous for thetwo countries that control morethan 95 percent of the nuclearweapons in the world to invitethe "Three" (China, France, andthe United Kingdom) to jointheir occasional nuclear weaponsreduction negotiations.However, early agreementsbetween Russia and the UnitedStates and then among the fivenuclear-weapon states on stepstoward nuclear disarmament areessential to satisfy the non-nuclear-weapon NPT membersthat these two countries arecomplying with their Article VIobligations. Significant compli-ance with this obligation isimportant to forestall furtherproliferation by non-nuclear-weapon countries and to keepsome of them from withdraw-ing from the NPT.

Fourth, the United Statesshould establish a serious dia-logue with China on nuclearweapons issues. This is essen-tial to steps that China and theUnited States, joined by others,should take in pursuit of

nuclear disarmament. Fifth, the next president

should appoint a nonprolifera-tion "czar" before inaugurationday. The czar would work withthe president-elect on his policypositions and be the leader ofthe president's effort to enactlegislation creating a new agencyto focus on nonproliferation andarms reduction negotiations. Inthe Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon,Carter, Reagan, and Clintonadministrations, the ACDA ledthe U.S. effort to negotiate anNPT and other importanttreaties to limit nuclear arms.The ACDA was separate fromthe State Department but underthe general direction of the sec-retary of state (but not the restof the State Department) as wellas the president.

Unfortunately, conservativesin Congress during the last yearsof the Clinton administrationsucceeded in abolishing theACDA and placing its employ-ees back in the StateDepartment. This meant thatthe personnel responsible fornegotiations to prevent thespread of nuclear weapons weremore likely to be influenced byState Department personnelresponsible for specific regionsof the world. State Departmentpersonnel focused on other sub-jects than preventing the spreadof nuclear weapons and onother regions than those wherethat spread is a matter of partic-ular concern. This happened inthe case of the recent U.S.-Indian agreement that was toprovide major nuclear assistanceto India despite its pursuit ofnuclear weapons, a pursuitwhich earlier U.S. administra-tions had tried hard to preventand then slow. In negotiating theU.S.-Indian agreement, State

11

Department officials overrodeor ignored established arms con-trol concerns in their eagernessto reach an unsound agreement.

Sixth, the 2006 U.S.-Indiannuclear agreement should be setaside. It seems to be stalled nowby political opposition withinIndia, and it will not likely comebefore the U.S. Congress forapproval this year. If it went intoforce one day, it could helpundermine the NPT regime.Instead, India should become akey actor in pursuit of the goalof a world free of nuclearweapons, a goal that formerPrime Minister Rajiv Gandhiurged so eloquently at the UN.

In conclusion, it should notbe forgotten that the NPT hasbeen the primary rulemaker thathas prevented the spread ofnuclear weapons around theworld. Many countries havenuclear research reactors and asufficient industrial base to atleast begin pursuing nuclear-weapon activities. Without join-ing the NPT, India, Israel, andPakistan have become nationswith nuclear weapons. NorthKorea, not well developedindustrially, produced fissilematerial for nuclear weaponsand then withdrew from theNPT. Libya, although a memberof the NPT, started develop-ment of nuclear weapons but,with efforts by other countriesto enforce the norm of the NPTand some financial assistance,was persuaded to stop thateffort. In the Middle East, wesaw Iraq pursuing nuclearweapons in the 1980s and 1990s.It took a UN-Iraq war to stopthat effort. Subsequently, theexistence of the NPT made itpossible for the UN SecurityCouncil to demand strict disar-mament requirements in a post-

war cease fire. We have seenwhat may be nuclear weapons-making efforts in Iran and Syria.Additional NPT members inthat region of the world, wherenon-nuclear sources of energysuch as oil are readily available,have expressed interest in build-ing nuclear power reactors. Doestheir nuclear interest go beyondpower reactors?

What would the world looklike if there were no NPT? It hasprovided the standard that hasrestrained many countries frompursuing nuclear weapons.Without it, would there be 20 or30 countries with nuclearweapons or pursuing nuclearweapons?

** George Bunn, the first general counsel forthe U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency, helped negotiate the nuclearNonproliferation Treaty and later became U.S.

ambassador to the Eighteen Nation DisarmamentCommittee. He is now at Stanford University's

Center for International Security and Cooperation.John B. Rhinelander is senior counsel at Pillsbury

Winthrop Shaw Pittman. He served as deputylegal adviser at the Department of State and legaladviser to the ABM Treaty/SALT I delegation.

ENDNOTES1. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

Nuclear Weapons (July 1, 1968), art. I(hereinafter NPT).

2. See, e.g., Lenice N. Wu, "TheBaruch Plan," in Encyclopedia of ArmsControl and Disarmament, ed. Richard

Dean Burns (New York: Charles Scribner'sSons, 1993), pp. 771, 774-783; George

Bunn, Arms Control by Committee:Managing Negotiations with the Russians

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992),pp. 59-61.

3. Bunn, Arms Control by Committee,pp. 85-92.

4. UN General Assembly Resolution1665, December 4, 1961 (the "Irish

Resolution").5. See Bunn, "The Nuclear

Nonproliferation Treaty: History andCurrent Problems," Arms Control Today,

December 2003, p. 5. 6. NPT, arts. I and II.

7. Bunn, Arms Control by Committee,

pp. 87-103; U.S. Arms Control andDisarmament Agency, Arms Control and

Disarmament Agreements: Texts andHistories of Negotiations (1980), pp. 82-83.

8. Margaret Beckett, Keynote address atCarnegie International NonproliferationConference, Washington, D.C., June 25,

2007. 9. Amy F. Woolf, "Nuclear Weapons

in the U.S. National Security Policy: Past,Present, and Prospects," CRS Report for

Congress, October 29, 2007, p. 10.10. Over the years, several presidents

have made commitments not to use nuclearweapons against non-nuclear-weapon statesparty to the NPT, for example the nuclear

nonuse protocol to the Treaty for theProhibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin

America of 1967, which the United Statessigned and ratified before the NPT. Similartreaties exist for several other regions of the

world. The protocols to these treaties have beensigned but not ratified by the United States.

See, e.g., George Bunn, "The Legal Status ofU.S. Negative Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States," Nonproliferation

Review, Spring-Summer 1997, p. 1. 11. See David Holloway, "Deterrence,

Preventive War, and Preemption," in U.S.Nuclear Weapons Policy/Confronting

Today's Threats, eds. George Bunn andChristopher Chyba (Washington, D.C.:

Brookings Institution Press and CISAC,2006), p. 34; Roger Speed and Michael

May, "Assessing the U.S. Nuclear Posture,"in U.S. Nuclear Weapons

Policy/Confronting Today's Threats, p. 248;George Bunn and Christopher Chyba, "U.S.

Nuclear Postures for a New Era," in U.S.Nuclear Weapons Policy/Confronting

Today's Threats, p. 297. 12. See William J. Broad, "Look

Who's Tough on Iran Now," The NewYork Times, News of the Week in Review,

June 1, 2008, p. 1. 13. George P. Shultz, William J.

Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "AWorld Free of Nuclear Weapons," The Wall

Street Journal, January 4, 2007, p. A15;George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry

Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, "Toward aNuclear-Free World," The Wall Street

Journal, January 15, 2008, p. A13. Seeinterview with Sam Nunn, "World Free of

Nuclear Weapons," Arms Control Today,March 2008, p. 6.

[Source:<http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_0

7-08/lookingback.asp>.]

12

Australia's PrimeMinister Kevin Rudd's entryin the visitors' book at theHiroshima Peace MemorialMuseum [in early June 2008]may not sound so astonish-ing or dramatic. His words --"Let the world resolveafresh, from the ashes of thiscity, to work together for thecommon mission of peacefor this Asia-Pacific century,and for a world wherenuclear weapons are nomore" -- sound like manyother entries written in thevisitors' book after peoplelearned the truth of theeffect of the use of nuclearweapons against humanity.

But Rudd is different. He isthe first Australian prime minis-ter to visit the Hiroshima PeaceMemorial Museum. And heacted on his words in a way thatmany other visitors have not. Inlarge part as a reaction to hisvisit to Hiroshima, Ruddannounced the establishment ofa new nuclear disarmamentcommission on June 9 in aspeech at Kyoto University. Thecommission will be co-chairedby former Australian foreignminister, Gareth Evans. Ruddwent on to praise Japan's long-standing initiatives in thenuclear disarmament and non-proliferation arena, and calledfor Japan to take a significantrole in the commission.

The Australian proposalcomes at a critical time. Fifteenyears after the end of the ColdWar, more than 20,000 nuclearwarheads remain in the arsenalsof the nuclear powers, 10,000

of which are actively deployed.The Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT) regime faces thegreatest challenge in its 40-yearhistory. New proliferationthreats have emerged from Iranand North Korea. The possibleacquisition of nuclear materialor weapons by terrorist groupsand clandestine nuclear net-works poses a serious threat tothe international community.The Bush administration haspushed hard for new nuclearweapons, while China has beenmodernizing its nuclear arsenal.Moreover, because of theexpansion of missile defensesystems in Europe and Asia, anew arms race in these regionslooms.

The NPT regime cameclose to collapse at the 2005Review Conference, which mag-nified the divergence of opinionbetween nuclear haves andhave-nots with regard to treatyobligations. Against this back-drop, however, the globalnuclear disarmament movementhas regrouped and evenregained some of its previousmomentum. One of the mostprominent developments in thearea of nuclear nonproliferationand disarmament is the initiativeof four former high-rankingU.S. officials - George Shultz,William Perry, Henry Kissinger,and Sam Nunn - to establish aworld free of nuclear weapons.These realists who once sup-ported nuclear weapons havecome to understand that theexistence of nuclear weapons iscounterproductive to nationaland international security.

Rudd's new initiative repre-sents an international effort torealize this vision. The newcommission will assess progressmade toward the goal ofnuclear elimination, and whatstill needs to be done.Moreover, the commission willdevelop an action plan for thefuture to help pave the way fora successful NPT review con-ference in 2010. But this effortwill only succeed with the sup-port of the major nuclear pow-ers and more assertive stancesfrom non-nuclear powers likeJapan.

Australia plus JapanInitiative

Both Japan and Australiaare strong supporters ofnuclear nonproliferationregimes. In his speech in Kyoto,Prime Minister Rudd stated that"Japan and Australia workingtogether can make a differencein the global debate on prolifer-ation. We are uniquely qualified.Japan remains the only state tohave experienced the conse-quences of nuclear weapons.Japan today has a large nuclearpower industry. Australia hasthe largest known uraniumreserves in the world. We can,therefore, understand the con-cerns that countries bring tothis debate. And we share aview of the importance of theNPT."

Not surprisingly, then,Japanese Prime Minister YasuoFukuda initially welcomedRudd's proposal to establish anew nonproliferation and disar-mament commission. Given

D. Japan and the Future of Nuclear DisarmamentMasako Toki **

13

the leading role that it hasplayed in the global disarma-ment movement, however,Japan needs to do more to sup-port Australia's bold initiative.Every year since 1994, Japanhas submitted a draft resolutionon nuclear disarmament to theannual UN General Assembly.After the failure of the 2005NPT Review Conference, Japanredoubled its efforts and gaveits resolution the new title of"Renewed determinationtowards the total elimination ofnuclear weapons." Japan's draftresolutions have receivedalmost unanimous support. Inthe past few years only theUnited States, India, and NorthKorea voted against it.

Despite its declared policyfor nuclear disarmament, Japanis struggling between two seem-ingly contradictory securityprinciples. On the one hand,Tokyo is protected under theU.S. nuclear umbrella. On theother, the country strongly sup-ports the movement toward aworld free of nuclear weapons.Australia is in a similar position.In the current internationalsecurity environment, alliancewith the United States for bothcountries may well be necessary.But this security arrangementmay also constrain both coun-tries from taking a more vocalposition for nuclear abolition.For instance, neither countryhas officially supported a spe-cific time frame for disarma-ment backed by the countries ofthe Non-Aligned Movement.

Addressing ChallengesGiven the Rudd proposal,

the initiatives of Shultz andcompany, and growing supportfor these efforts, the worldstands at a rare and extraordi-

nary moment of opportunity topursue nuclear disarmament.But the major nuclear powersneed to take the first steps.

This February, UKSecretary of State for DefenseDes Browne introduced a tech-nical cooperation initiativebetween the UK's AtomicWeapons Establishment andthe Norwegian government todevelop technology to verifywarhead dismantlement. As anext step, the UK offered tohost a technical conference onnuclear disarmament verifica-tion before the 2010 NPTReview Conference.

However, this British ini-tiative will not mean verymuch if the United States andRussia don't engage in seriousnuclear reductions. Many chal-lenges related to global nuclearweapons and nuclear nonpro-liferation regime can be attrib-uted to the U.S. security policyover the last eight years. Achange of U.S. administrationcould be a turning point. Bothpresidential candidatesembrace binding and verifiablearms control treaties. TheUnited States and Russia,which possess almost 90 % ofworld nuclear weapons, needto reduce their arsenalsthrough such a treaty.

On the multilateral front, aComprehensive Nuclear TestBan Treaty (CTBT) and aFissile Material Cut-off Treaty(FCMT) are essential to capthe development of nuclearweapons both qualitatively andquantitatively. But the U.S.Senate voted not to supportthe CTBT in 1999, and theBush administration continuesto oppose the treaty.

The unstable regionalsecurity situations in the

Middle East, East Asia, andSouth Asia also negativelyaffect progress in nuclear dis-armament. The opaque inten-tions of Iran, complicated byits refusal to fully comply withInternational Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) and SecurityCouncil resolutions, suggestthat Iran may soon be able todevelop nuclear weapons.Speculation of a possible U.S.attack has increased as Irancontinues to defy demandsthat it halt its uranium enrich-ment program.

We have seen a variety ofdisarmament initiatives totackle these challenges. Theultimate influence of such ini-tiatives, including theAustralian proposal, remainsunclear. These initiatives couldcreate a norm against nuclearweapons and generate massiveopposition against nuclearweapons from civil society,which could eventually influ-ence the governments ofnuclear weapon states. In addi-tion, Japan and Australia couldwork more closely with theEU member states and non-nuclear NATO countriesincluding Canada. Since all ofthese countries support theCTBT, they may be able tocollectively apply pressure onthe United States to ratify thetreaty.

Nuclear disarmamentshould also be considered inthe context of enhancingregional and global peace andsecurity. In this regard, it isessential for Japan to increaseits efforts to enhance regionalsecurity in East Asia throughconfidence-building measuresand improving relations in theregion, especially with China.

14

Participation of CivilSociety

Civil society is a key to har-monizing the various disarma-ment efforts. Japan can be aleader in this respect. As theonly country that experiencedatomic bombings, Japan hasthe invaluable asset of thehibakusha, the survivors ofthe atomic bombings. Theiraverage age is now over 74. Itis important for the next gen-eration to come to understandthe importance of nuclear dis-armament by learning throughthe first-hand accounts of thehibakusha witnesses about theeffects of nuclear weapons onhuman beings.

Hiroshima and Nagasakiare vigorously setting up atomicbomb exhibitions and sendinghibakusha to share their testi-mony to many countries, espe-cially to the United States. Theyare not traveling all around theworld to dwell on the past butto talk about the future basedon their experience. Given theage of the hibakusha, the 2010NPT Review Conference maybe the last opportunity for themto see any development innuclear disarmament.Testimony based on the experi-ence of hibakusha, and theiraspiration to share the truth ofthe effect of the use of nuclearweapons on human beings, isone of the strongest and mostcompelling messages for aworld free of nuclear weapons.

There have been severalnoteworthy events in the histo-ry of civil society's involvementin nuclear disarmament. Forinstance, the World CourtProject, initiated in 1992, ledthe International Court ofJustice to issue its advisoryopinion regarding the legality of

the use and threat of use ofnuclear weapons in 1996. In theearly stages of the nuclear armsrace, a large number of peopleprotested against what werethen ubiquitous nuclear weapontests. Without these steadfastprotests from civil society theremight have not been a conclu-sion to the Comprehensive TestBan Treaty.

Civil society's activities fornuclear disarmament aretransnational. The question ishow influential and significantcivil society can be in makingprogress in nuclear disarma-ment. Civil society has partici-pated in the multilateral armscontrol processes in a variety ofways. The consistent activitiesby civil society could increasemomentum toward nuclear dis-armament and reframe thedebate over nuclear weaponspolicy.

What Tokyo ShouldDo

Tokyo should not miss thisopportunity to seize themoment and revitalize the dis-armament movement. Evenunder the nuclear umbrella,Japan should be more assertive.To break the dilemma of beingunder the umbrella and yet call-ing for disarmament, Japanmust spread the facts of theinhumanity of nuclear weaponsby sharing more of thehibakusha experience. This ini-tiative can be a great opportuni-ty to create a stronger momen-tum in nuclear disarmamentinvolving civil society.

Under the current U.S.administration, particularlyafter September 11, the UnitedStates has placed more empha-sis on "coalitions of the will-ing", unilateral initiatives, and

preemptive action, and less onformal multinational institu-tions shaped over the pastdecades. Due to Japan's increas-ing role in international securityand the U.S.-Japan alliance,Japan has faced an increasinglycomplicated dilemma in the lastfew years between its supportof multilateralism and itsreliance on the alliance with theUnited States.

However, with the comingchange in the U.S. administra-tion, which may see Washingtonrestore support for multilateralinstitutions, the next few yearscould provide a great opportu-nity for both Japan and theUnited States to explore a newway to work together tostrengthen multilateral nonpro-liferation and disarmamentregimes. Japan and the UnitedStates have been already work-ing together in the field of non-proliferation, counter-prolifera-tion, and even counter terror-ism. However, cooperation inthe field of nuclear disarma-ment has been virtually nil. Witha new U.S. president, perhapsone who unequivocally sup-ports CTBT, Japan and theUnited States may enter a newphase of cooperation tostrengthen the NPT regime andto achieve a goal of a world freeof nuclear weapons.

** Masako Toki is a research associ-ate at the James Martin Center for

Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey,California and a contributor to Foreign

Policy In Focus (www.fpif.org). The viewsexpressed in this article are purely personal

and do not necessarily reflect those of herorganization.

[Source:<http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5338>.]

15

A nuclear - weapons - freeSouthasia must be championed bythe smaller countries.

In May 1998, first Indiaand then Pakistan testednuclear weapons. War eruptedin the Kargil region ofKashmir a year later. This wasthe first war between twonuclear-armed states any-where in the world, and raisedthe prospect that the nextconflict would be a catastro-phe beyond reckoning. SinceKargil, both states have con-tinued to build nuclearweapons, to develop and testballistic missiles with rangesup to several thousand kilo-metres, and to accelerate theirbuild-up of conventionalarms.

The tests, war, crises andthe on-going arms race areonly the latest expressions ofa more than 60-year-long con-flict between Pakistan andIndia, which has plaguedefforts to build democraticand just societies in thesecountries and has hamperedthe progress of Southasia as awhole. A settlement of theKashmir dispute would helpease tensions, but would notnecessarily be enough forIndia and Pakistan either togive up their nuclear-weaponsstatus or to end their mutualhostility. The experience ofthe Cold War and the nearlytwo decades since its endmakes this abundantly clear.The US and Russia still have

thousands of nuclear weaponseach, despite the fact that theSoviet Union is no more. Thelogic of nuclear weapons hashad an enduring effect in pre-venting the establishment ofpeace in any meaningful sense.This suggests that the Indianand Pakistani nuclear stock-piles ensure that the future ofthe region will remain in jeop-ardy until these weapons areeliminated.

Nuclear war between Indiaand Pakistan would be a catas-trophe not only for the twocountries. Recent studies sim-ulating the effects of such aconflict have suggested thatthe use of 50 weapons by eachside could create enoughsmoke from burning cities totrigger a decade-long changein climate across much ofSouthasia - indeed, acrosslarge parts of the northernhemisphere. This would lead,in turn, to crop failures andwidespread famine. The casu-alties would be beyond imagi-nation.

Against the backdrop ofthe nuclear-weapons tests of1998, peace groups sprang upspontaneously in towns andcities across India andPakistan. Building on years ofwork by a handful of anti-nuclear activists in both coun-tries, these groups articulateddeep public concern about thegrave dangers posed bynuclear weapons, sought waysto educate and mobilise localcommunities, and reached out

to make common cause withother civil-society groupsworking on issues of sustain-able development and socialjustice. The need for aSouthasia-wide effort on pub-lic education and mobilisationfor nuclear disarmament inIndia and Pakistan was recog-nised by activists in bothcountries. They hoped that aSouth Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (SAN-WFZ) treaty, modelled onsuch agreements in LatinAmerica, the South Pacificand Southeast Asia (withAfrica and Central Asia on theblock), could offer a way tobuild regional consensusagainst nuclear weapons. Sucha treaty would forbid each sig-natory state from possessingor seeking to acquire nuclearweapons.

At its heart, this activismreflects a politics based onimagining and bringing about,from the ground up, aSouthasian community ofcountries sharing a particularset of values. It envisages thecountries of the region as notonly committed to peacefulco-existence, but also asrejecting the possession andthreat of use of nuclearweapons. The political path isone where the civil society inthe non-nuclear weaponsstates in Southasia (ie, SriLanka, Bangladesh, Nepal,Afghanistan, the Maldives andBhutan) campaign for respec-tive governments and others

III. Nuclear Weapons and South Asia

Someone else's weapons

Zia Mian **

16

in the region to negotiate aSANWFZ treaty. This combi-nation of popular and officialpressure would strengthennuclear-disarmament move-ments in India and Pakistan.

Peace zoneIt was back in January and

February 2001 that Admiral(retired) Laxminarayan Ramdasand Sandeep Pandey fromIndia, and A H Nayyar fromPakistan, as well as this writer,were asked by groups in SriLanka, Bangladesh and Nepalto travel to each country, tobegin a regional civil-societydialogue on a SouthasianNuclear-Weapons-Free Zone.This effort was by some meas-ures very successful. It showedthe feasibility and utility of sys-tematic interactions betweenpeace activists from India andPakistan with a large number ofcivil-society organisations,activists, scholars and govern-ment officials in the otherSouthasian countries. The inter-est generated by the visits, evi-dent from the large meetingsand extensive media coveragethat ensued, indicated a wide-spread concern in the regionabout the implications and chal-lenges created by the nuclearisa-tion of India and Pakistan.

In some places, people didseem to find the nuclear dan-gers facing the region some-what remote. The clearestexpression of this was in SriLanka, where many seemed tobe hearing about the devastat-ing effects of nuclearweapons for the first time.This could be due simply togeography; Sri Lanka is, afterall, far removed from anyplausible conflict between

Pakistan and India. But therecan also be no doubt thatthere are more pressing con-cerns for Sri Lankan civilsociety and policymakers,with the long civil war thereshowing few signs of ending.Nonetheless, even inColombo, there was enthusi-asm for a Southasia-widecivil-society initiative forpeace and disarmament,recognition that nuclearweapons posed a risk to thewhole region and support fora SANWFZ treaty.

While there were no dis-cussions with governmentofficials in Sri Lanka, welearnt that Sri Lanka hadsought to encourage talksbetween India and Pakistanon the matter of nuclearweapons. This is a positivesign, and suggests that a moreformal dialogue with govern-ment officials on the possibil-ities of the treaty could beworth pursuing. There wasstrong support from theBangladeshi civil society forthe idea of a SANWFZ treaty,and the need for the smaller,non-nuclear countries in theregion to lead the way. Thecontacts with governmentofficials suggested thatBangladesh could be encour-aged to consider workingtowards such a treaty. Thiswillingness reflects the histor-ical role that Bangladeshplayed in launching the ideaof SAARC as a regionalorganisation during the late1970s, and in hosting theorganisation's first summit in1985. Meanwhile, inKathmandu, there was con-cern about the impact of apossible nuclear war on the

northern parts of theSubcontinent, which wouldrope in Nepal. The possibilityof being affected by radioac-tive fallout was taken veryseriously. An important issueraised most directly in Nepal,but also elsewhere, was thatof overcoming the con-straints imposed by the largerand more powerful neigh-bours on political initiativesby smaller Southasian coun-tries.

While immediate domes-tic problems took priority ineach country, there was awidespread sense of urgencyregarding possible nuclear-armed confrontation betweenIndia and Pakistan. There waslikewise significant under-standing that, without peacebetween Pakistan and India,the Southasian region wouldremain unstable, and fail todevelop the structures of eco-nomic and political coopera-tion it needs to meet the peo-ple's needs. From nuclearweapons to energy, food secu-rity and climate change, thereis a growing array of prob-lems that need to be seen asregional in scope, and whichrequire collective regionalsolutions. These problems andtheir solutions will necessitateand generate the practice of aSouthasian politics - and withit, a Southasian identity.

** ZIA Mian directs the Projecton Peace and Security in South Asia at

Princeton University's Program onScience and Global Security.

[Source:<http://www.himalmag.com/shown

ews.php?news_id=1030>.]

17

IV. Indo-US Nuclear Deal

A. CNDP Condemns Intransigence of Indian Prime

Minister on the Deplorable Indo-US Nuclear Deal

June 23 2008

The Coalition for NuclearDisarmament and Peace(CNDP) - a national coalitionof organisations and individ-uals for nuclear disarmament- notes with great concern theIndian Prime Minister's obsti-nate insistence on goingahead with clinching of theIndia-specific agreement withthe IAEA. This will be a vitalintermediate step towardsoperationalising the Indo-USnuclear deal in the teeth ofstrong opposition withinIndia. The Prime Ministerwants to go ahead, tramplingupon democratic norms andvalues, regardless of allrational considerations, letalone ethical ones.

The CNDP reiterates itsconsistent and firm opposi-tion to the deal on the follow-ing grounds as pointed out

repeatedly in the past. The dealseverely undermines the prospects ofglobal nuclear disarmament by(selectively and arbitrarily) "legit-imising" India's nuclear statusand, in the process, the possessionof nuclear weapons by the existingnuclear weapon states - both"recognised" and "unrecognised" -and also the aspirations of otheractual and potential aspirants. Thedeal will promote the cause ofnuclear militarism and nuclear-weapon build-up in India againstthe interests of peace and the peo-ple in the region. It will furtherintensify the arms race betweenIndia and Pakistan - both nuclearand conventional. Pakistan, infact, made a strong plea for a sim-ilar deal. And the brusque refusalby the US, instead of dissuadingit, would only further inflame itspassions and thereby turn thenuclear mess in South Asia all themore dangerous .This deal is alsoan utterly reprehensible move to

bring India closer into the US orbitas a regional ally to facilitate theexecution of its global imperialambitions. Furthermore, the conse-quent shift in focus in favour ofhighly expensive nuclear power, ifthe deal comes into operation, willsignificantly distort India's energyoptions at the cost of efforts todevelop environmentally benign andrenewable sources of energy.

The CNDP, on this occa-sion, calls upon the Indianpeople to rise in protestagainst the intransigence ofthe Prime Minister and voicetheir strongest opposition tothe undemocratic move toimpose the deplorable deal onthe country.

Achin Vanaik Admiral LRamdas J Sriraman ND

Jayaparakash Amarjeet Kaur Sukla Sen

As the Bush administrationpushes the outer limits of thepolitical timeline for the pas-sage of the controversialnuclear cooperation deal withIndia in the United StatesCongress, two potential stum-bling blocks have becomeapparent in the process ofsecuring exemptions for theagreement from the toughexport rules of the Nuclear

Suppliers Group.One of the stumbling

blocks pertains to the UnitedStates' insistence on includingprescriptive language on non-proliferation concerns in thedraft it wants to circulateamongst NSG members, whoare due to meet on August 21.

The second potentialobstacle lies in the reservationsand misgivings that many of

the NSG's 45 member-stateshave about the deal and itsimplication for the globalnuclear regime.

An important step in thedeal's completion was achievedlast Friday, when the Board ofGovernors of the InternationalAtomic Energy Agencyapproved a special safeguards(inspections) agreement earliersigned by India with its secretari-

B. Furious lobbying to clear the last lap Praful Bidwai **

18

at. (India's attempt to get IAEAapproval was blocked until a fewweeks ago by strong domesticpolitical opposition, which wasundercut by the defection of theSamajwadi Party to the rulingcoalition's side.)

The two steps remaining inthe deal's completion are theNSG's unanimous support forunique exemptions for Indiafrom it export rules, and U.S.Congress ratification of a bilat-eral agreement signed last yearwith India, enabling nuclearcommerce with it, although ithas not signed the NuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty, buthas tested nuclear weapons.

Both Washington and NewDelhi are furiously lobbyingNSG members, keyCongressmen and variousinfluential interest-groups,including business associations,to complete the deal before theU.S. Congress adjourns onSeptember 26 prior to freshelections in November.

However, there is no una-nimity amongst experts andobservers that the nuclear dealcan clear the political deadlinefor the U.S. Congress even if itwins an NSG exemption.

The draft prepared for theNSG by the U.S., and recentlyshared with India, has donemultiple rounds between thetwo countries' capitals at differ-ent levels. The Indian govern-ment says that the text falls "farshort of India's expectations"because it contains languagewhich would be tantamount tothe NSG asking India to accedeto the NPT.

India has repeatedlydeclared that it cannot andwould never sign the NPT,under which it would have toaccept comprehensive or "full-

scope" safeguards, allowing theInternational Atomic EnergyAgency to inspect all its nuclearinstallations.

However, Washingtonargues that it would be difficultto secure a clean exemption forIndia from the NSG's nuclearcommerce rules unless itsmember-states' non-prolifera-tion concerns are adequatelyaddressed in keeping with aparticular clause of itsGuidelines.

India has long insisted on a"clean and unconditionalexemption" from NSG rules.But David Mulford, U.S.ambassador to India, told themedia yesterday that "uncondi-tional" is a "provocative word"and oversimplifies the manyissues and "many moving parts"involved in the process of seek-ing a "clean exemption".

How the differences mightbe resolved remains unclear.But it is plain that India has theupper hand in the dispute overthe language of the draft.

It is also clear that theIndian government has virtual-ly no room for manoeuvre onthe issue because of the com-mitments it has made to thecountry's Parliament rejectingany constraints whatever on itsmilitary nuclear programmeand, beyond the agreed IAEAsafeguards, on its civiliannuclear programme.

The second potential stum-bling block is likely to provemore troublesome. The India-specific safeguards agreementdid clear the IAEA Board ofGovernors on August 1, butmany of the 35 Governors, whoare also represented in the NSG,approved it with mixed feelings.

During the debate in theIAEA, more than 30 countries

spoke on the safeguards agree-ment for over five hours. Ofthe 19 countries who are alsomembers of the NSG, severalincluding the U.S., Russia, theUK, France, Brazil, Japan,Australia, Germany andFinland, supported the dealand said it is good for non-pro-liferation.

However, China, theNetherlands, Ireland,Switzerland, Austria, Norwayand New Zealand expressedreservations, in particular argu-ing that a one-off or uniqueexception should not be madefor India in the global non-pro-liferation order. Some of themsaid the deal undermines theNPT and will set a negativeexample to nuclear wannabes.

Japan, which backed thedeal in general terms at the G-8 summit last month, enteredspecific reservations anddemanded that India must signthe NPT and theComprehensive Test BanTreaty.

Visiting Japanese ForeignMinister Masahiko Koumuraalso reiterated that demandwhen he met his Indian coun-terpart a day before the 63rdanniversary of the atomicbombing of Hiroshima.

Among the non-NSGmembers of the Board ofGovernors who spoke, Iran,Egypt and Malaysia objected to"the double standards"involved in the deal in undulyfavouring an NPT not-signato-ry state. They are all membersof the Non-AlignedMovement, of which India wasa leader and founding member.

Pakistan originally circulat-ed a sharp critique of the safe-guards agreement, but with-drew most of its criticism at

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the BoG meeting, "evidentlyunder U.S. pressure", says aWestern diplomat, who insistedon anonymity.

Instead, in a turnaround,Pakistan welcomed the deal as a"historic precedent", whichaccommodates "the interests ofa non-NPT nuclear weaponsstate", implying that a similararrangement be offered to ittoo to promote "strategic bal-ance" in South Asia.

"It is regrettable that theIAEA allowed itself to be bul-lied by the U.S. to change itsown rules to accommodateAmerica's parochial concernsfavouring India," says AchinVanaik, professor of interna-tional relations and global poli-tics at Delhi University."Earlier, the IAEA rewrote itsown rules under Americanpressure to punish Iran, whichhad not violated its commit-ments under the NPT or theIAEA charter."

As the deal moves towardsdebate in the NSG, member-states which have expressedtheir reservations about oropposition to it are being keen-ly watched—and lobbied or

offered allurements or disin-centives.

If even one or a few of the10 NSG members object tospecial and unconditionalexemptions for India, the dealwill fall through. The NSGworks by consensus, and even asingle member can veto a deci-sion or resolution.

Not just the U.S., but evenIndia, is now using coercivediplomacy on some of theNSG member-states. "We havenever seen India using a 'withus or against us' approachbefore," says the Westerndiplomat quoted earlier."India's traditional style ofdiplomacy is based on invokingprinciples and rational argu-ments of a non-discriminatoryand universal kind."

But now, he adds, "India isleveraging its bilateral relationsin a crude fashion, warningcountries of unpleasant conse-quences if they don't supportIndia, an emerging economicgiant and a major military powerthat is also an ally of the U.S."

An avid supporter of thedeal from the Indian media hasdescribed India's diplomatic

approach as "pretty brutal".Pushing the nuclear deal

has taken a heavy toll of India'simage as a state which profess-es and largely practices non-coercive diplomacy and com-mands a degree of moralauthority because of the pro-gressive positions it used totake in the past.

"That is a sad comment onthe role India is playing to pro-mote its narrow military inter-ests and its strategic alliancewith the United States, and topreserve and expand its arsenalof mass-destruction weapons,"says Vanaik.

"It would be an evengreater disgrace", he adds, "ifthe NSG grants its approval tothe deal, subverting its ownrules. That would only showthat the world's elites have nocompunctions in capitulatingto crass coercive diplomacy inviolation of the principles andpolicies they advocate—even ifthat works against the interestsof global security and peace."

** Praful Bidwai is a veteran jour-nalist and author.

C. Nuclear Deal, "National Interests"

and Mainstream Indian OppositionP.K. Sundaram **

It is the Indian Left's concur-rence, rather than its disagreement,with the idea of a nuclear future(including nuclear weapons) thathas made its case weak andinaudible to the larger masses.

Contextualizing thedeal

While the remaining steps

on the Indo-US nuclear dealare now left for the NSG andthe US Congress, the domes-tic debate in India is still alivein political and intellectual cir-cles; though in the media ithas been turned more into acommodified entertainmentof cash-rich political dramaaround "national" and "com-

munity" interests. In acharged atmosphere pro-duced by both backers andopponents of the deal pitch-ing their positions in terms of"national interests", it wouldbe necessary not to lose sightof its broader meanings andimplications.

In its essence, the deal is

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about opening up of therestrictions over nuclear com-merce imposed on India inresponse to its 1974 "PeacefulNuclear Explosion". Thoughinitiated and facilitated by theUnited States, this move willprovide India access to inter-national markets in nuclearfuel, material and technology,in accordance to the (to bespecially laid down) safe-guards and guidelines of theIAEA and the NuclearSuppliers Group (NSG).While it might imply hugeimports from the US, the dealalso removes internationalfetters on nuclear trade withother countries includingRussia, France (and Canada)whose corporations would getmajor business orders fromIndia once the deal comesinto effect.

This deal comes at a timewhen our global nuclearfuture has reached a cross-road - in terms of nuclearenergy issues, nuclear tradeand nuclear disarmament.The nuclear power industry,after decades of withdrawaland recession in the wake ofaccidents of like Chernobyland, prior to that, Three MilesIslands, has been trying in therecent past to come out ofthe closet once again. Nuclearpower lost its charm also dueto consistent civil activism onissues related to radioactiverisks, associated with all itsstages of operation, from ura-nium mining to power plantsafety and security to theproblem of nuclear waste.The peace movements world-wide have also stressed theinextricable linkage of nuclearenergy technology to nuclearproliferation - a fact glossed

over by the profiteering com-panies and states aspiring forthe Bomb. Corporate interestsin the nuclear industry havebeen pushing internationallyto create a "nuclear renais-sance" in the recent past,including through huge dona-tions to both the Republicanand Democratic candidatesfor the forthcoming US elec-tions. India's shifting of itsenergy policy focus towardsnuclear power would encour-age further the other smallAsian and African countriesto go for nuclear power whichare under increasing influenceof the nuclear lobbies andalready have plans laid out ontheir tables.

On the strategic front, thealready truncated disarmamentand nonproliferation regime is atan equally crucial juncture.Weakened by the continuing denialof the original nuclear weaponstates to disarm themselves aspromised under Article VI of theNPT, and having the paradoxicalduty of keeping proliferation undercheck while at the same timespreading nuclear technology, theNPT based nonproliferationregime requires substantial over-haul in its 40th year. It is neces-sary for the world to bring the taskof disarming the existing weapon-states back on its agenda whileensuring nonproliferation throughmore strict verifications. Thiswould also imply discouragingnuclear energy as an option, whoseexperience in the last half centuryhas already proved its un-sustain-ability and economic non-viability,besides being an established prolif-eration route for new states.

However, doing thiswould entail putting curbs onthe US military industrialcomplex and its hegemonic

ambitions; this would alsomean closing shop for thenuclear retailers in the energysector. To avoid this, the UShas chosen some dangerousquick fixes - to increase itsmilitary preponderancethrough missile defence; todevise extra-regime punitiveactions or unilateral pre-emp-tion towards hostile countrieswith advanced "civilian"nuclear capabilities like Iran.On the top of all this, it hasdecided to award country-spe-cific concessions for access tonuclear infrastructure to astate which only a decade agoconducted nuclear tests intotal defiance of the concernsof its own people and inter-national opinion, but ispoised to become its ally inshaping the new nuclear andpolitical order of the world.This circumvention of non-proliferation principles is seenby the anti-war, anti-nuclearand peace movements world-wide as a total departure fromdisarmament goals. EarlierAmerica used to preach disarma-ment while amassing its ownnuclear stockpile; now it has noproblems with even others acquiringnuclear weapons provided theyqualify themselves as "good guys".By this new calculation, Indianbecomes a "responsible" nuclearpower while Iran faces war even asits weapon progamme remainsunproved.

At a time when the Indo-US deal is becoming a vehiclefor unscrupulously pushingthe entire world towards aninherently unsafe, uneconom-ic, and unsustainable energyfuture and a far more intensi-fied arms race, evaluating andcontesting this deal in termsof the illusive "national inter-

21

ests" seems patently short-sighted and opportunist.

The "NationalInterest" and theNuclear Deal

Ironic it may seem, but inthe supposedly flatteningworld there is an increasingemphasis on shaping foreignand domestic politics in termsof "national interests". In themainstream discourse oninternational relations, thereduction of internationalpolitics into a state-centricanarchy is accompanied by anequally insular view of exoge-nous state interests as primor-dial constant that are pursuedas "national interests". Thismonolithic view of states asprimary and unitary actorsconveniently overlooks themultiplicity of interacting fac-tors like state, society, class,gender and other identitiesthat constitute, perpetuateand continuously renegotiatethe world order - within andacross the politico-geographi-cal boundaries. Thus the"national interest" view of inter-national and domestic policy onlytends to naturalize the existingstate and in effect the power rela-tions within. From the radical fem-inists to the marxists, and relative-ly emancipatory trends like con-structivism have been challengingthe notion of "national interest" asa garb to defend the status quo.

In India, all the three sides inthe current nuclear debate - theIndian government, the oppositionBharatiya Janata Party (BJP), andthe Left forces - have been claimingto have "national interests" ontheir side. The ideas of strategicsovereignty and energy security arecommon to the arguments of all thethree. In actual terms, all the

three sides have been tryingto substantiate their claims byusing arguments, in piecemealfashion of course, borrowedfrom some faction or theother from within the nuclearestablishment.

The BJP's opposition isboth opportunistic and false.Had it been in power, it wouldhave been on the other side ofthe debate pushing the dealeven more vociferously thanthe Congress-led UPA. Itsmajor contention is that thedeal will put caps on India'stesting and strategic pro-gramme. This claim is plainfalse. On the contrary, byallowing India to channel allits uranium reserves forstrategic program whilefuelling "civilian" reactorswith imported uranium, thedeal provides a boost toIndian military nuclear capa-bilities by freeing indigenous-ly produced uranium exclu-sively for the "strategic" ones.On the question of explosivetesting to upgrade nuclearcapabilities, the deal has pro-visions for prolonged consul-tation before terminating co-operation, in which the USPresident would look intoexplanations related to India'sgeo-strategic requirements forsuch testing.

The Left has located itsopposition to the deal on twomajor issues: nuclear sover-eignty - independence andunhindered development ofIndia's civilian (and military)nuclear programmes, and, thepro-US foreign policy thrustprovided by the deal. The firstpoint about India's sovereign-ty to pursue a "strategic"nuclear programme is cruellyironic on the part of the Left

which should instead demanddenuclearization not only inIndia but of the whole world.As the Left's worst fearsabout provisions of the HydeAct would come true conceiv-ably only in case India goesfor further nuclear tests, it isnot difficult to see the Left'seagerness to keep India's rightto conduct tests intact - total-ly in line with the Congress orthe BJP. Also not understand-able is Left's aversion toIAEA safeguards on the"civilian" nuclear facilities.The safeguards are meant tocheck the diversion of sensi-tive dual-use technology ormaterial from civilian to mili-tary purposes and are defi-nitely not against the per-ceived "sovereignty" or can beseen as US intervention as it isthe IAEA's inspection in Iranthat has till now thwarted US'search for alibis to attack thatcountry.

In trying to prove itselfmore nationalist than the rul-ing class parties and to washaway the historic bourgeoismaligning of communists'internationalist positions, theLeft opposition is singing adangerous tune, a tune whichhampers any genuine Leftpolitics in India in the longrun. The Left wants us to for-get that this is an attempt, onits part, to sell the oppositionto the deal without going intothe tedious process of makingthe public aware of the reali-ties of nuclear future - whatelse would sell better than"national interest" in a post-colonial society?

On the issue of nuclearenergy, most of the time theLeft camp has chosen to pickup its arguments from within

22

the nuclear establishmentitself. From the very begin-ning, it has held that develop-ment of indigenous nuclearenergy capability is sacro-sanct; as opposition to thedeal, it has only argued that itwould impede India's ownnuclear plans and that the rid-ers of international coopera-tion in nuclear power wouldbe costly to our own civiliannuclear programme (consist-ing of three stages: Uranium-based, Fast Breeder andThorium-based Reactors). Itsargument has been that in theenergy deal, India has beenco-opted effectively as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State and itsreactors would have to gounder perpetual IAEA safe-guards. Its discontent on theIndia-IAEA safeguard agree-ment is based on the observa-tion that it does not providefor fuel supply guarantees orconcrete "corrective meas-ures" in case of any disrup-tion. In the first of the nowpublic UPA-Left communica-tions, the Left raised theseconcerns about "the self-reliance in the nuclear sector".

To the Left's chagrin,these questions would seemmisplaced and often also unin-formed if one looks at theshared mainstream premise ofmaintaining and strengtheningnuclear energy option. Theofficial logic would go some-thing like this: we are notbound to import material andtechnology only from US;other countries like Russia,France and Canada would alsocome closer; the access to ura-nium import would shortenour first-phase preparationsfor the three-stage pro-gramme that is delayed due to

shortage of uranium; fuel-supply guarantee would comefrom respective countriesfrom whom we would doimports; the IAEA doest not,can not and has not providedfuel supply to any other coun-try as it is only a regulatorybody; our voluntarily placedreactors might not go underperpetual safeguards as feared,since we can withdraw themfrom safeguards once we stopusing imported fuel. The fact isthat the deal does indeed providemost of these "positives". It isprecisely because of this thatwe have seen most of the sup-porters of the Left's position,either in media or among thescientific community, desert-ing the Left in their evaluationof the deal. It is instructive tonote that two very supportivecolumnists in The Hindu, likeSiddarth Varadrajan and N.Ravi, have both eventuallygone over to present differentassessments of the safeguardsagreement and the negotia-tions.

This has happenedbecause the Left has nevercome around to an unequivo-cal opposition to the nuclearenergy option. It did refer tothese aspects in the debate atlater points, but only as sec-ondary issues. Underlying thisequivocation is the fact thatthe Left has itself never man-aged to resolve this issue withany degree of rigour or hon-esty, with BuddhadebBhattacharjee in West Bengalcastigating environmentalistsfor opposing nuclear power inthe state and the CPI(M) stag-ing a defence of "nationalinterests" at the Centre by"opposing" the India-USnuclear deal.

When the Left is not rais-ing arguments borrowed fromthe nuclear establishment, ithas pointed to the stringsattached in the nuclear dealthat would make India's for-eign policy subservient to USinterests. On this count, theLeft has made arguments thathave found support in well-meaning circles. Although theHyde Act is a domestic USlegislation, it does seek togovern US attitude to the dealand stresses India's increasingcongruence with US foreignpolicy. However, as the US isnot the sole beneficiary ofthis deal, other countries likeRussia, France and UK havealso come out strongly in sup-port of the waiver and will ineffect provide Indian rulingclass relatively more space tomanoeuvre and promote whatthe Left calls India's "nationalsovereignty" in foreign affairs.

Also, one should look atthis orientation as a packageand not only in terms of for-eign policy statements.Intensified neoliberalapproach to development andinvestment, to which the Leftoffers only lip service opposi-tion and often supports inpractice, is bound to give asimilar tilt to India's foreignpolicy. Even on the Iran issue,the Left showed less determi-nation to stop the govern-ment when it came to vote. Itis not difficult to see that onseveral other US-sponsoredpolicy changes or neo-liberalturns, the Left had been farmore restrained in the fouryears of its support to the rul-ing UPA. Not only that, theLeft-front ruled state govern-ments have been more thanwilling to implement these

23

neoliberal policies - be itintroducing the SEZ Act inWest Bengal two years earlierthan the central Act, or theWest Bengal CM pushing fornuclear power plant in theecologically fragile location ofHaripur.

Even without the deal, Indiacould hardly be said to stand upagainst the US imperial dictates.At times, Indian ruling classesdo convey the impression ofpursuing a diversified foreignpolicy, like the recent statementagainst war on Iran or the latestfracas in the WTO; but essen-tially these posturing are tacticaltools to crack better bargainswith the US, not to defy it out-right. Moreover, on the issue ofprogressive foreign policy onecan rightfully argue that therecent tide of the 'Left' in LatinAmerica and other parts of theworld keeps operating undermore or less the same neoliberalframework while pursuing high-pitched anti-Americanism toclaim for itself a progressivemantle and to mute domesticdiscontent. Some reputed leftistscholars have pointed to this andargued that it may just be theCPI(M)'s attempt to win over itslost Left face in the wake ofNandigram.

Indian NuclearProgramme and theLeft

The Indian Left has sincethe very beginning supportedan independent, indigenousand robust nuclear pro-gramme. It has held theadvancement of nuclear tech-nology a hallmark of India'sprogress almost in the samemanner as the ruling classvoices of Nehru and Bhabha.On the question of independ-

ence of the programme, it hasactually posed itself as thereal and most reliable defend-er of India's scientificprowess. (And polemically,better defender than thedependent elite, who impedethe progress of the nation ondictates of their own and for-eign masters' interests!) Likethe ruling parties, the Left has alsoconsidered environmental, healthand security risks attached to thenuclear technology as mere caution-ary footnotes in the unstoppableturn of development to be met withadequate administrative measures.

This is true not only ofthe civilian nuclear pro-gramme but also of thestrategic nuclear weaponsproject. It is worthwhilereminding ourselves that theCPI(M) had actually congrat-ulated nuclear scientists fortheir achievement after 1998nuclear tests while condemn-ing BJP for its jingoism.

On the foreign policyfront, the Indian ruling classsuccessfully lulled the Leftinto consent by presenting itsnuclear ambition, in completedisregard to internationalanti-nuclear opinion, in thegarb of national sovereigntyand independence. Recall thatthe Indian state disregardedthe NPT and the CTBTprocesses decrying theirinherently discriminatorynature, only to launch its ownweapons programme. Whilenonproliferation obviouslydoes not by itself lead to dis-armament, it is surely a requi-site for a safer world - a nec-essary link to disarmament. Ina more general sense, giventhe enormous difficulties indismantling nuclear projectsand verifying disarmament, it

would always be better ifthere are fewer states to bechased for disarmament.

India could better ask fortotal and comprehensive dis-armament by simultaneouslystrengthening the non-prolif-eration regime. However, itchose otherwise and keptpeddling morally high-grounded pronouncementsabout discrimination and theputative meaninglessness ofnon-proliferation. Domesticand international scholarship,both pro and anti-nuclear, haspointed out that this postur-ing helped India "keep itsoptions open" and was part ofa well-thought strategy. Onthis count, the Indian Left hashistorically found commoncause with the ruling elitepurportedly to expose theimperialist double-speak ondisarmament - an exercisethat has been effectively andconsciously put to the dread-ed Bombs' service. That outof total 192 members of theUN, only Pakistan and Israel,apart from India, neversigned the NPT throws aninteresting light on the anti-imperialist spin provided tothis act of "valiant defiance".

This has continueddespite consistent appealsfrom its own well wishersassociated with the anti-imperialist, anti-nuclearcause.

Left and the NuclearFuture

Contrary to the commonperception that the left politi-cal parties in India are anti-nuclear and offer an alterna-tive vision to the political,economic, cultural and exis-tential crises of the nuclear

24

age, they accept developmentof nuclear technology as abenchmark of historicallynecessary progress.Unhindered technologicaladvancement here is consid-ered a sacrosanct process thatwould provide all the rightanswers to every problem andwill eventually take care ofeven the ironies caused in itsown unfolding. This is unmis-takably coterminous withpost-colonial India's violenttryst with "development" thatgives nuclear programmes thearrogance to move aheadeven without finding solu-tions to its front and back-endproblems starting from urani-um mining to radioactivewastes - and of course theweaponization potentialsinextricably associated withnuclear energy programmes.

The Left's protest against theIndo-US nuclear deal from thepremise of defending India's"nuclear sovereignty" and main-taining its self-reliance in nuclear

energy marks a frightening consen-sus in the political mainstream.Also on the other sustainabil-ity issues like the environmentand climate change, partieslike the Congress and the BJPfind a supporter in the Leftcrying hoarse over discrimina-tion by the US - which ineffect only means protectingIndia's "sovereign" right to beequally irresponsible. And inthe details of the nuclear deal,India is not only saved fromthis discrimination, it is beingcalled a "responsible" nuclearpower that deserves this!

The current juncture couldhave been used to put up acomprehensive resistance toforces pushing us into bothunsustainable and dangerousfutures. By offering a whole-some opposition to the backersof nuclear energy, we coulddebate and resist the entire setof policies that are devised forcapital-intensive energy policiesinstead of decentralized powergeneration processes - an

option that would be muchmore sustainable, safe, equitableand democratic. By limiting thediscussion merely to the stringspertaining to "national sover-eignty" attached to the deal butnot looking at how it affects ouroverall nuclear future and evensets a precedent for judgingnew nuclear weapon nations ontheir closeness to US strategicinterests rather than encourag-ing any comprehensive delegit-imization of the entire nuclearprocess, a major opportunityhas been lost. But will it beheard and realized within theLeft? Or is it that, after it hasproved itself a defender ofnational sovereignty and sav-iour from imperialism, it isplanning to resume its "nationbuilding" through Nandigramsand Haripurs?

** P.K. Sundaram is doing Ph.D.in Disarmament Studies, JNU, New

Delhi. He can be contacted at sundaram-cipod@gmail.com

D. The Unbearable Costs of Nuclear PowerLatha Jishnu **

"If we don't do it now, his-tory will not forgive us," saysone of the more melodramaticadvertisements released by theUPA government as it tries toconvince the nation about therationale -and urgency - for sign-ing the nuclear agreement withthe US. There is also AnilKakodkar, chief of the AtomicEnergy Commission, saying "thedeal is the most promising andviable way of bridging our ener-gy security for the future…"

Issued by the Ministry ofPetroleum and Natural Gas, the

campaign promotes simplisticnotions about nuclear energythat only add to the prevailingshibboleths on the subject. Oneof the biggest ironies is theblithe assurance by the govern-ment that the agreement wouldensure India's energy securityand independence by "endingthe technological isolation wehave suffered since Pokharan".

The claims about the agree-ment boil down to the follow-ing: a) it will reduce India'sdependence on oil and gas; b) itwill strengthen the country's

energy independence; c) andthat nuclear energy producesmore energy than any othersource and can be 'replenished'.

These claims have gonelargely unchallenged althoughthe Planning Commission is cat-egorical that nuclear will notaccount for more than 5-6 per-cent of the total energy even ifthere is a 20-fold increase in thegeneration capacity by 2032.More worrying is the fact thatsuch assertions are being madewhen there is growing evidencethat globally the nuclear industry

25

is going through an unprece-dented crisis. Soaring costs ofraw materials, special compo-nents, and of course, of urani-um, have put a huge questionmark over the viability ofnuclear power, specially sincethe cost of renewable energy,solar in particular, is showing adramatic drop. Across theworld, projects are facing hugecost overruns and inordinatedelays as the top names in thereactor business grapple with ahost of problems, from a sharpspike in prices for iron, steel andconcrete along with limited sup-plies of reactor parts and a crip-pling shortage of skilled man-power.

That's why the nuclearpower renaissance which hasbeen talked about for the past 4-5 years has yet to materialize.Among the more disquietingindications that the renaissancemay not even take place comesfrom the US itself. To date, not asingle reactor has been orderedin the US since 1978 - and fewutilities with nuclear plants areannouncing new projectsdespite the huge blandishmentsthat are being offered by the USEnergy Policy Act of 2005. Theincentives are more than gener-ous: loan guarantees up to 80percent of the project cost, pro-duction tax credits of $18 perMW for new nuclear capacity upto 2021 (this would amount toseveral hundred million dollars)and insurance protection up to$500 million against delays dur-ing construction.

Yet, several American utili-ties have announced that theyare rethinking their nuclear proj-ects or putting them in cold stor-age because the risks haveincreased considerably. Priceshave soared from around $

1,500/kW to over $6,000/kWand are still rising. This meansthat a 1,000-MW reactor whichcost around $ 1.5-2 billion threeyears ago now has a tag of $ 6billion - and is still rising.

In October, Moody'sInvestor Service estimated'overnight cost' of a new nuclearplant would be between $5,000and $6,000 per kilowatt-hour,but warned that these numberswere just guesses. "We believethe ultimate costs associatedwith building new nuclear gener-ation do not exist today and thatthe current cost estimates repre-sent best estimates, which aresubject to change," its report onnuclear generation said.

Overnight cost is the price ifa reactor were to be completedimmediately -five years is theminimum but plants take asmuch as a decade in some cases-while the total cost includesinterest and other costs incurredduring construction. John Rowe,chief executive of Chicago-based Exelon Corp., the largestnuclear operator in the US,admits that the economics ofnuclear power are daunting.News reports quote him thus:"Realistic expectations about the'renaissance' of nuclear powersuggest that it will unfold slowlyover time."

That's a diplomatic way ofputting it. Others have beenmore forthright. A telling exam-ple is that of MidAmericanEnergy Holdings, a power utilityowned by Warren Buffett'sBerkshire Hathaway. It shelvedits plan for setting up a nuclearplant, saying it no longer madeeconomic sense.

The story is no better inEurope where two showpieceprojects of nuclear technologyare battling huge cost and time

overruns apart from quality con-cerns that halted work for awhile. The twin plants atFlamanville in France andOlkiluoto3 in Finland are beingset up by the French giant Areva,which claims that its EPRdesign, a third-generation evolu-tion of the standard pressurisedwater reactor, will result in thesafest and most efficient nuclearplant ever built. But nothingmuch has gone right for eitherof these plants. The Olkiluoto 3reactor is two and a half yearsbehind schedule with costs dou-bling to just short of (Euro) €5billion. Both projects sufferfrom chronic quality problemsin construction.

There are other bottlenecksof a serious nature: shortages ofcontractors with nuclear certifi-cation, of skilled workers andkey components. Apart from theRussians, industry sources sayonly two companies, Japan SteelWorks and France's CreusotForge, part of Areva, can makecritical reactor parts such asmassive pressure vessels. Bothhave no spare capacity.

What does all this mean forIndia's "autonomous, independ-ent and sovereign" nuclearpower programme which, ironi-cally, would be heavily depend-ent on the infusion of foreignfunds, technology and fuel to getits projects moving again? Withgeneration capacity stuck at4,129 MWe or just 2.8 percent ofthe total after 30 years, the DAE,which had promised to set up20,000 MWe by 1987, is in abind. Today, the 17 reactorsoperated by the Nuclear PowerCorporation of India (NPCIL),the sole agency mandated to setup and operate nuclear plants,run at less than 50 percentcapacity for want of uranium

26

although the country hasenough reserves to fuel 10,000MWe. But mismanagement offuel supply operations is onlypart of the problems that havelanded the DAE in a mess.

The indigenous programmeof nuclear self-sufficiency hasclearly reached a cul de sac withall expansions plans put on holdand ongoing projects delayed by2-3 years. Unless it can catalyze'additionality' -the DAE's termfor infusion of foreign fundsand technology - there appearsto be no future for nuclear ener-gy in the country. Even its muchwhittled down target of 20,000MWe (from 43,000 MWe) by2020 seems a remote possibilitysince a minimum of 8,000 MWis expected to come from for-eign sources. And NPCIL's planto set up 700 MWe projects isnot yet on the drawing board.

Says M. V. Ramana, physicistand senior fellow at the Centrefor Interdisciplinary Studies inEnvironment andDevelopment, Bangalore: "Notonly are the claims made by thegovernment untenable but theeconomics are clearly unviable."Ramana, who has worked exten-sively on the economics ofnuclear power in India, warns:

"Electricity from nuclear powerstations, even if it is based ondomestic reactors, is moreexpensive than coal- basedpower stations because of thehigh capital cost of reactors.NPCIL's overnight constructioncosts of recently commissionedreactors like Tarapur III and IVand Kaiga III are around$1200/kW. Compare this withthe estimated cost of about$3750/kW for Olkiluoto-3 orFlorida utility Progress Energy'sestimate of $14 billion for twoAP-1000 designed byWestinghouse (which translatesto over $6000/kW) and it is easyto see that imported nuclearreactors will produce electricityat costs that would be simplyunaffordable."

NPCIL executive directorSudhinder Thakur though main-tains that costs are not compara-ble. "The cost in France and theUS and the cost in India arevastly different. The purchasingpower parity index is also appli-cable to nuclear reactors. Whenyou build a reactor here costscome down dramatically."

This is a pet thesis of thenuclear establishment whichsays the way out is to indigeniseas much of the reactor as is pos-

sible. Given the capabilitiesavailable here, this would bringdown costs of reactors drastical-ly. Areva is a front-runner in therace to build foreign reactors inIndia after the Russians who aresetting up two light water reac-tors in Kudankulam, TamilNadu. But as former chairmanof the Atomic EnergyCommission M R Srinivasanpoints out: "The only way aFrench reactor would be com-petitive in India is if a large partof the equipment is made inIndia, on the basis of technolo-gy transfer.

How feasible is that sinceAreva is pitching the new EPRreactor design as a flagship ofthe nuclear industry and is set onearning between (Euro) €2.5 bil-lion and €5 billion for each reac-tor? In the shadowy world ofnuclear energy where actualcosts are opaque, the illusion isalways more beguiling than thereality. But that is no reason whyIndians should be taken for aride on energy security.

** Latha Jishnu is Senior Editor ofthe Business Standard in Delhi.

July 11, 2008Press Statement

The Left parties haveissued the following state-ment on the IAEA SafeguardsAgreement

Why the Text wasHidden till Submissionto the IAEA?

The Left Parties had

opposed the operationalisationof the Indo-US Nuclear Dealafter the passage of the HydeAct. After the 123 agreementwas finalised, it was pointed outthat the agreement was in con-formity with the Hyde Act. TheLeft Parties had then asked theUPA Government not to takefurther steps to operationalisethe nuclear deal.

In the UPA-Left Committee,the UPA claimed that theyshould be allowed to proceedwith the IAEA SafeguardsAgreement, which would incor-porate uninterrupted fuel sup-plies and various correctivemeasures, which theGovernment had failed to securein the 123 agreement. The LeftParties were skeptical about

E. Left Parties’ Statement on India-IAEA Safeguards

27

these issues being resolved in theIAEA. The UPA refused toshow the negotiated text for thelast four months.

The text of the SafeguardsAgreement has now becomepublic. It is clear that the textwas hidden from the LeftParties and the Indian people inorder to suppress the fact thatIndia is about to bind its entirecivilian nuclear energy pro-gramme into IAEA safeguardsin perpetuity without gettingconcrete assurances for unin-terrupted fuel supply, right tobuild strategic reserves andright to take corrective steps incase fuel supplies are stopped.

IAEA Safeguards inPerpetuity withoutConcrete Fuel SupplyAssurance

The text of the draft"Agreement Between theGovernment of India and theInternational Atomic EnergyAgency for the Application ofSafeguards to Civilian NuclearFacilities"; the so-called 'India-specific Safeguards' agreementsent to the IAEA Board ofGovernors on July 9, 2008,makes it clear that the repeatedassurances made by the UPAGovernment in Parliament andoutside, on securing uninterrupt-ed fuel supply assurances andstrategic fuel reserves have notbeen fulfilled. There are no con-crete corrective measures in themain enforceable body of theAgreement, only a vague men-tion of "corrective measures" inthe preamble.

Under the Hyde Act, IAEAsafeguards are to be imposed onIndia's civilian nuclear facilities inperpetuity. The UPA govern-ment had repeatedly claimed thatIndia would put its civilian reac-

tors under safeguards under thestrictly reciprocal condition ofassured fuel supply. If fuel sup-ply was disrupted, as happenedin Tarapur, India would have theright to take corrective measures,including taking reactors out ofIAEA safeguards.

The key question thereforewith respect to IAEA safeguardsis: how to ensure that onceIndia's civilian reactors go undersafeguards in perpetuity, thecountry would not be black-mailed by the withholding ofnuclear fuel supplies, as theUnited States did in Tarapur fol-lowing Pokhran-I?

The preamble to theSafeguards Agreement notesthat India is offering its civiliannuclear facilities for IAEA safe-guards on the "essential basis"of "the conclusion of interna-tional cooperation arrange-ments creating the necessaryconditions for India to obtainaccess to the international fuelmarket, including reliable, unin-terrupted and continuous accessto fuel supplies from companiesin several nations, as well as sup-port for an Indian effort todevelop a strategic reserve ofnuclear fuel to guard against anydisruption of supply over thelifetime of India's reactors."The real point is that the pream-ble merely 'notes' India's inten-tions in these respects. IAEAhas neither any obligationregarding fuel supplies orbuilding strategic reserves nordoes this noting India's basisfor this offer give India anyadditional rights through thisagreement. Therefore to readinto this clause either a guaran-tee for fuel supplies or IAEA'ssupport for building upastrategic reserve is misleadingthe people.

"CorrectiveMeasures": Vague andIneffective

The preamble of the IAEAAgreement notes: "India maytake corrective measures toensure uninterrupted operationof its civilian nuclear reactors inthe event of disruption of for-eign fuel supplies." Neither the"corrective measures" nor theprecise relationship betweenthese "corrective measures" andthe in-perpetuity imposition isspelt out in any meaningfulterms in the text. This meansthat should India for any reasondecide to take the items subjectto the Agreement out of IAEAsafeguards on the contentionthat the "essential basis" nolonger applies, it will open itselfto the serious charge of violatingan international agreement. Inthis connection, it is worthremembering that although Indiaclaims the right, under the provi-sions of the 1963 Indo-USagreement on Tarapur, toreprocess the considerable quan-tities of Tarapur spent fuel thathave accumulated to India's greatinconvenience and expense, ithas not been able to enforce theclaimed right to reprocess, whichhas long been disputed by theUnited States.

As against the vagueness ofthe "corrective measures" figur-ing in the preamble, what is speltout clearly in the body of theagreement (Paragraph 32) is thatIndia can withdraw its facilitiesfrom safeguards only if it is (a)jointly agreed between India andIAEA, and (b) if these facilitiesare no longer usable for anynuclear activity. What does thismean? It can only mean thatIndia can withdraw any facility itwants out of IAEA safeguards

28

Following is the text of the let-ter from Pakistan to the member-states of the IAEA Board ofGovernors and the NuclearSuppliers Group about the Indo-USnuclear deal - the draft text of theproposed Safeguards Agreement

between India and the IAEA, to bemore specific.

[The Draft has been approvedby the IAEA BoG On August 1without any voting, though reserva-tions were voiced by some during thediscussions.]

PERMANENT MIS-SION OF PAKISTAN TOTHE INTERNATIONALORGANISATIONS, VIEN-NANo. UN-19/08/India 18 July 2008

F. Pakistan's Letter to the Members of the IAEA Board and the NSG

only if it strips it of all capabilityof producing nuclear energy andthat too only after the IAEAdetermines that "the facility is nolonger usable for any nuclearactivity relevant from the pointof view of safeguards."

Even if the Agreement isterminated by mutual consent,the termination of safeguards onthe items subject to theAgreement [these are materialand facilities as defined inParagraph 11(a)] would stay inplace in accordance withGOV/1621 till all the conditionsof GOV/1621 are met. Theconditions of GOV/1621 are sostringent that the rights and obli-gations of the parties continue toapply on all nuclear materials tillthey have been returned or all fis-sionable materials supplied orproduced goes out of the inven-tory - that is, until all the facilitiesand material, nuclear or non-nuclear, supplied to the countryunder these safeguards are eitherreturned or consumed or nolonger usable for any nuclearactivity. Therefore, this provisionwill not allow a single reactor tobe taken out of safeguards.

PreambularReferences Non-Enforceable

It is well established in inter-national law that the preamble is

a part of the treaty or interna-tional agreement and it can beused to give colour and tone tothe interpretation of the opera-tive part of the treaty/agree-ment. This does not howevermean that it can be used to cre-ate additional rights or obliga-tions that are not contained inthe clauses of theTreaty/Agreement.

The text of the IAEA DraftAgreement makes clear there areno corrective measures identifiedin the operative of the clauses ofthe Agreement. The mention ofcorrective measures is only in thepreamble and here too, no con-crete corrective measures havebeen defined. Unless there arespecific provisions in the opera-tive clauses, a phrase such as"corrective measures" inserted inthe preamble cannot createeither omnibus rights or obliga-tions outside the text of thetreaty. A similar example is forinstance the TRIPS Agreementin WTO. The preamble statesthat it recognizes "the underlyingpublic policy objectives ofnational systems for the protec-tion of intellectual property,including developmental andtechnological objectives".

However, can any countryuse the "public policy objectives"to override, for instance, theneed for providing product

patents as contained the body ofthe TRIPS agreement?

The way a facility can bewithdrawn from safeguards hasbeen spelt out in the main bodyof the draft agreement.Therefore, if the UPA govern-ment is trying to argue that thepreambular statement of "cor-rective measures" gives Indiasome kind of overriding rightover all clauses in the body ofthe Agreement, it is committinga deliberate fraud on the people.

The final arbiter with regardsto any interpretation of theAgreement and dispute settle-ment is the Board of Governorsof IAEA. The Board ofGovernors decision is final inthis regard and if India is held tobe non-compliant, even thoughit is not so by its own interpreta-tion, India can be referred to theSecurity Council for actionincluding sanctions. The Irancase is an example. Thoughmany countries including Indiahad publicly endorsed Iran'sright to the fuel cycle, it wasreferred to the Security Councilfor violation of its SafeguardsAgreement by the Board ofGovernors at US's instance.

[Source: <http://www.pugwashindia.org/article_detail.

asp?aid=147 >.]

29

Excellency,As you may be aware the

international Atomic EnergyAgency (IAEA) has recentlycirculated the draft text of aproposed SafeguardsAgreement between India andthe IAEA.

2. The Agreement is to beconsidered by the IAEABoard of Governors(BOG) and subsequentlyby the Nuclear Suppliersgroup (NSG). Evidentlyefforts are being made torush through the agree-ment through the IAEA-BOG and the NSG.

3. In this regards the follow-ing points need to be keptin view:-

(i) The Safeguards Agreementwas circulated to the BOGon 9 July 2008. Under itsrules, it can be considered,at the earliest, 45 days later,i.e., 25 August 2008.Consideration of theAgreement cannot beplaced on the Agenda forthe BOG meeting on 01August 2008.

(ii) There are no good techni-cal or substantive reasonsfor the BOG to waive the45 days rule. The politicalexigencies of either Indiaor the US are not suffi-cient reason for the BOGto waive the 45 days rulewhich is designed toenable BOG members tocarefully examine the con-tent and implications ofany Agreement so as toensure that it serves thepurpose of credible verifi-cation of non-diversionfor which it is being con-cluded.

(iii) On the contrary, the

unique and exceptionalcontents of the India-IAEA Agreement necessi-tates that time should beprovided to BOG mem-bers to carefully study theAgreement before it isconsidered for approval.

(iv) The requirement forapproval of a SafeguardsAgreement by the BOGshould not be considereda mere proforma exercise.Although the BOG hasnot sought to amend orreject previousAgreements, this was dueto their broad adherenceto the existing models forsuch Agreements (INF-CIRC 66/Rev.2, INF-CIRC 153 and voluntaryoffer agreements conclud-ed with the NPT nuclearweapon States). TheIndia-IAEA Agreementdoes not confirm to anyof these models. TheAgreement is a uniquehybrid reflecting provi-sions of various models.

(v) It therefore requires care-ful consideration, particu-larly because it is likely toset a precedent for otherStates which are notmembers of the NPT andhave military nuclear pro-grammes.

(vi) The draft accords recog-nition to India as a coun-try with "advancednuclear technology",despite the fact that thereis no agreed definition ofan "advanced nucleartechnology" state.

(vii) A most disturbing featureof the Agreement is thereference and reflection inthe Preamble to the India-U.S. Joint Statement of 18

July 2005. The Agreement(in preambular para 9,sub-para 2) specificallynotes India's "willingness"to "identify and separatecivilian and militarynuclear facilities". Thus,the IAEA-BOG is beingasked to recognize andaccept India's nuclearweapon status.

(viii) This preambular referenceis in itself unique, as simi-lar provisions do not existin other such Agreements.The Preamble prejudgesand contradicts the pur-pose of the Agreement,i.e., to ensure that peace-ful nuclear activities donot contribute to the pro-liferation of nuclearweapons. Thus, if theagreement is to confirmto the "guidance docu-ments" mentioned, thisreference to the Indo-USJoint Statement in the pre-ambular part of theAgreement should bedeleted.

(ix) Moreover, INFCIRC66/Rev.2 type agreementshave so far been "facilityspecific". This Agreementon the other hand isdescribed as an "umbrellaagreement". Facilities tobe safeguarded have notbeen listed. They will beadded to the safeguardAgreement as they arenotified by India. Thisraises valid questions.What is the purpose ofthe Agreement if thefacilities to be safeguardedare not known?

(x) Despite India's refusal toplace its Breeder Reactorsand its Thorium-basedprogramme under safe-

30

guards, the draft recog-nizes India's three-stagenuclear programme. Thisis gratuitous legitimizationof potential nuclear pro-liferation and contrary tothe IAEA's objectives.

(xi) Such concerns are com-pounded further by otherprovisions of theAgreement, especially (a)the ambiguous provisionsregarding conditions forthe termination of theSafeguards Agreement;(b) access for India to theInternational fuel mar-kets; and (c) unspecified"corrective measures"which India would beallowed to take to "ensureuninterrupted operationof its civilian nuclear reac-tors…", contravening thecontinuation of IAEAsafeguards in perpetuity.

(xii) As a consequence, Indiawould be able to acquirenuclear fuel for thedeclared civilian facilities,build up a "strategicreserve" for the life-timeof the reactors, and thenterminate safeguards anddivert part of the fuel forweapons purposes.

(xiii) The Agreement mayindeed provide an incen-tive to India to conductfurther nuclear weaponstesting, since future termi-nation of the SafeguardsAgreement, after Indiahas built up an adequatefuel reserve, wouldresolve India's problemsrelating to the shortage ofnuclear material for bothits civilian and its nuclearweapons programme.However, the agreementdoes not even provide

that further nuclear explo-sive testing would result inthe termination of peace-ful nuclear cooperationand the SafeguardAgreement.

(xiv) The reference to a"restricted document".GOV/1621 of August1972, as the yardstick fortermination is unsatisfac-tory. The BOG cannotapprove an agreementwith secret clauses. It isvital to expressly incorpo-rate the conditions for thetermination of the safe-guard Agreement.

(xv) There are some other pro-visions of the Agreementwhich raise concern. Forexample, paragraph 28provides for the suspen-sion of safeguards on"any parts of the facili-ties…..which are removedfrom maintenance orrepair" This could opendoor for nuclear fuel andadvanced technology pro-vided to India to bediverted for weapons pur-poses.

(xvi) The draft does not indi-cate if India is willing tosign an IAEA AdditionalProtocol in respect of itscivilian nuclear facilities.

(xvii) The legal and technicalaspects flowing from thedraft require in-depthexamination and theIAEA board ofGovernors (BoG) andNSG are required to care-fully weigh the conse-quences that may ensuefrom succumbing to"expediency" over "prin-ciples".

(xviii) The IAEA statute doesnot provide for differenti-

ation between memberstates on the basis ofpolitical consideration nordoes it allow for specialtreatment for a particularstate. Calling it an India-specific agreement istherefore unprecedented.Since the IAEA concludessafeguards agreementsbased on approved mod-els, it will be importantthat any safeguards agree-ment adopted by the BoGin respect of India shouldbe available as a model forother non-NPT states.

(xix) It is quite clear that theproposed agreement hasno utility in advancing thecause of non-prolifera-tion. On the contrary, itwill enable and encouragefurther proliferation. And,apart from the conse-quences for the non-pro-liferation regime, theagreement threatens toincrease the chances ofnuclear arms race in thesub-continent.

4. As is clear from the fore-going, the proposedIAEA-India agreementand the unjustified call foran exemption to Indiaalone from the NSG rulesis discriminatory and dan-gerous. It is important toresist the drive to steamrollthis agreement throughthis IAEA-BoG and theNSG. The short and longterm consequences of theagreement necessitate thattext be studied and anydecision thereon takenafter full deliberation. Theoverarching considerationin this respect should be touphold the principles ofnon-discrimination and

31

IAEA-BoG, August 1,2008 Agenda Item 1:Safeguards Agreement withIndia Statement delivered byAustria

Mr. Chairman,

The following statement isalso made in the name of theobserver states Costa Rica, theNetherlands and Norway.1. The strengthening of the

international non-prolifer-ation architecture is a pri-ority of our foreign andsecurity policies. We arefirmly committed to theNPT and to the IAEA asthe Treaty's indispensableverification authority. Aneffective, universallyapplied IAEA comprehen-sive safeguards systemremains the conerstone ofthe world's nuclear non-proliferation regime.Hence the universalizationof this verification systemis of utmost importance.

2. Against this background,as a matter of principle, wewelcome all safeguardagreements that enablemonitoring and inspection

of nuclear facilities thathad previously not beenunder the control of theAgency.

3. In general, the conclusionof an IAEA safeguardsagreement with India for asignificant part of India'scivilian nuclear sector musttherefore be welcomed.Placing these facilitiesunder IAEA controldemonstrates that theIAEA's safeguards havebecome a standard also forStates not party to theNPT. We underline ourhope that India will put thetotality of its civil nuclearfacilities under these safe-guards.

4. With regard to the draftagreement at hand, thereare a number of questions.Clearly, the proposedagreement is not a stan-dard text. We havereceived the text just a fewweeks ago and studied itthoroughly. We would liketo thank the Secretariat forclarifying some of thequestions raised by mem-ber states at the briefingon July 25. However, a

number of concernsremain:

5. The ninth tiret of thePreamble notes that "Indiamay take corrective meas-ures to ensure uninterrupt-ed operation of its civiliannuclear reactors in theevent of disruption of for-eign fuel supplies". Theterm "corrective meas-ures" is not defined in thedraft agreement, leavingthe text open for interpre-tation. We would like tothank the Secretariat for itsinterpretation that these"corrective measures"could not include the ter-mination of safeguards.Still, it remains of concernthat the agreement doesnot specify what amountsto a "disruption" of supplyand what kind of "correc-tive measures" could betaken by India. We havenot received a clear answerto the question what kindof measures could betaken in which specificcase.

6. Article 4 states that "Theapplication of safeguardsunder this Agreement is

equity as well as regionaland global peace and sta-bility.

5. Pakistan expresses thehope that, on the basis ofa close study of the docu-ment, other members ofthe BoG will join it inseeking appropriate

amendments to theAgreement when it is con-sidered in the BoG.

6. Please accept, Excellency,the assurances of myhighest consideration.

Ambassador/PermanentRepresentative

Ambassadors/PermanentRepresentatives of Member States of the

IAEA Board of Governors and MemberStates of the Nuclear Suppliers Group,

Vienna.

[Source:http://www.pugwashindia.org/

article_detail.asp?aid=149.]

G. Text of the Statement Delivered by Austrian

Representative on August 1 at the IAEA BoG Meet at

Vienna on the India-IAEA Draft Safeguards Agreement

32

intended to facilitateimplementation of rele-vant bilateral or multilater-al agreements to whichIndia is a party, which areessential to the accom-plishment of thisAgreement". It is uncom-mon that safeguards agree-ments testify to intentother than the obviousinterest in having theIAEA monitor [i.e.] thecorrect use of the civiliannuclear material. The ques-tion arises whether thisclause intends to create adirect link with otheragreements. It is the firmview of our delegationsthat safeguards must beconcluded for perpetuity.There can be no linkagewith other agreements andno provisions shouldenable any party to invokethis Article to terminatethe Safeguards Agreement.

7. . Article 13 states that"Upon entry into force ofthis Agreement, and adetermination by Indiathat all conditions con-ducive to the accomplish-ment of the objective ofthis Agreement are inplace, India shall file withthe Agency a Declaration,based on its sovereigndecision to place voluntar-ily its civilian nuclear facil-ities under Agency safe-guards in a phased man-ner". This paragraph hastwo significant implica-tions:

- First, all Members of theBoard of Governors areexpected to endorse thesafeguard agreement now.India, however, will at anundefined later stage

decide autonomouslywhether it actuallybecomes applicable.

- - Secondly, we are dealingwith an "empty shell"agreement since the enti-ties to be put under IAEAcontrol will by defined byIndia only at a later stagein a phased manner. Ourgovernments have posi-tively taken note of India'spolitical commitmentexpressed in INF-CIRC/731 that "facilitiesidentified as civilian in theSeparation Plan will beoffered for safeguards".We regret, however, thatthese relevant facilities arenot listed in the annex tothe present agreement in alegally binding way.

8. All these elements of thesafeguard Agreement fromour point of view diminishthe concept of compre-hensive verification that isat the heart of the NPT-system. Clearly, thereremain issues of concernfrom a non-proliferationperspective.

9. Our governments, howev-er, ultimately put trust inthe judgement of DG ELBaradei who has personal-ly endorsed the presentSafeguards Agreement as abasis for cooperation withIndia. It is also clear thatany questions in the con-text of the operation ofthe agreement could bediscussed at any time inthe BoG.

10. We continue to call onIndia to join the NPT asNon-Nuclear WeaponState without precondi-tions and express our con-viction that the NPT's fur-

ther universalization isessential in reaching ourfinal goal of a world freeof nuclear weapons.

11. Finally, we underline thatthe decision taken today bythe BoG only concerns thequestion of endorsementof a safeguards agreementbetween the IAEA andIndia. This decision doesin no way prejudge thedecision on a possibleIndia-specific exemptionin the Nuclear SuppliersGroup which will be dis-cussed in the appropriatefora.

12. Mr. Chairman I now haveconcluded the part of ourstatement also made in thename of the observerstates Costa Rica, theNetherlands and Norway.Finally and on an entirelynational note, Let merequest the secretariat toput on the record the fol-lowing clarification wedeem necessary in consid-eration of Austrain nation-al legislation: It is ourunderstanding that thequalification of nuclearenergy as "efficient, cleanand sustainable energysource…" made in thePreamble of theSafeguards Agreementreflects the point of viewof India and has no bear-ing on the assessment bythe BoG. Austria national-ly opposes such a qualifi-cation.

Mr Chairman, this con-cludes my statement. Thankyou.

33

August 15, 2008

Dear Foreign Minister:

Your government andother members of theNuclear Suppliers Group(NSG) are being asked toconsider the Bush administra-tion's proposal to exemptIndia from longstanding NSGguidelines that require com-prehensive IAEA safeguardsas a condition of supply.

As many of us wrote in aJanuary 2008 letter ("Fix theProposal for NuclearCooperation with India"http://legacy.armscontrol.org/pressroom/2008/NSGappeal.asp), India's commitmentsunder the current terms ofthe proposed arrangement donot justify making far-reach-ing exceptions to internation-al nonproliferation rules andnorms.

Contrary to the claims ofits advocates, the deal fails tobring India further into con-formity with the nonprolifera-tion behavior expected of themember states of the nuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty(NPT). Unlike 178 othercountries, India has notsigned the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty (CTBT). Itcontinues to produce fissilematerial and expand itsnuclear arsenal. As one ofonly three states never to havesigned the NPT, it has not

made a legally-binding com-mitment to achieve nucleardisarmament, and it refuses toallow comprehensive, full-scope International AtomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) safe-guards.

Yet the arrangementwould give India rights andprivileges of civil nucleartrade that have been reservedonly for members in goodstanding under the NPT. Itcreates a dangerous distinc-tion between "good" prolifer-ators and "bad" proliferatorsand sends out misleading sig-nals to the international com-munity with regard to NPTnorms.

We urge you to supportmeasures that would avertfurther damage to the alreadybeleaguered global nonprolif-eration and disarmamentregime.

Given that the NSG onlytakes decisions by consensus,your government has aresponsibility to consider thefollowing adverse implica-tions of the proposal.

1. Undermining theNuclear SafeguardsRegime

The proposed exemptionof India from the compre-hensive nuclear safeguardsstandard of supply threatensto further undermine thenuclear safeguards system.Given that India maintains a

nuclear weapons programoutside of safeguards, facility-specific safeguards on a fewadditional "civilian" reactorsprovide no serious nonprolif-eration benefits.

As part of the carefullycrafted final document of the1995 NPT Review andExtension Conference, allNPT states-parties endorsedthe principle of full-scopesafeguards as a condition ofsupply. A decision by theNSG to exempt India fromthis requirement would alsocontradict this important ele-ment of the NPT bargain.Furthermore, it is inappropri-ate for the member states ofthe NSG to take it uponthemselves to make a decisionon this matter for the 140-plus other members of theNPT.

Making matters worse,Indian officials have suggest-ed that it might cease IAEAscrutiny if fuel supplies arecut off, even if that is becauseit renews nuclear testing.NSG members should rejectsuch an interpretation. Yourgovernment has a solemnresponsibility to reject anyIndia-specific exemptionfrom NSG guidelines that ispremised on a safeguardsagreement that is in any wayinconsistent with the principleof permanent safeguards overall nuclear materials and facil-ities.

[The following is the text of a letter initiated by a working group affiliated with the Abolition2000 and endorsed by leading peace activists and prominent personalities all over the world, includ-ing India and USA, addressed to the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).]

H. Decision Time on the Indian Nuclear Deal

Help Avert a Nonproliferation Disaster

34

India also pledged on July18, 2005 to conclude an addi-tional protocol to its safe-guards agreement. Statesshould insist that India con-clude a meaningful AdditionalProtocol safeguards regimebefore considering whether itis appropriate whether andhow to make any India-specif-ic alteration to the NSGguidelines.

2. Possible Transferof SensitiveEnrichment andReprocessing Items

Unless rejected by theNSG, India's insistence onobtaining "full" nuclear coop-eration would undermineefforts to prevent the prolif-eration of technologies thatmay be used to producenuclear bomb material,including reprocessing andenrichment technologies anditems. Allowing transfers ofthese sensitive nuclear tech-nologies is extremely unwisegiven that IAEA safeguardscannot prevent such itemsfrom being replicated andused to advance India'sweapons program.

Recall that India detonat-ed a nuclear device in 1974that used plutonium harvest-ed from a heavy water reactorsupplied by Canada and theUnited States in violation ofearlier bilateral peacefulnuclear use agreements. U.S.officials have stated that theydo not intend to sell suchtechnology, but other statesmay. Virtually all NSG statessupport proposals that wouldbar transfers of these sensi-tive nuclear technologies tonon-NPT members. Indiamust be no exception.

3. Indirect Assistanceto India's NuclearWeapons Program

In the absence of a sus-pension of fissile material forweapons by India, foreignnuclear fuel supplies wouldfree up India's relatively limit-ed domestic supplies to beused exclusively in its militarynuclear sector, thereby indi-rectly contributing to thepotential expansion of India'snuclear arsenal. This wouldcontradict the spirit if not theletter of Article I of the NPT(which prohibits direct orindirect assistance to anotherstate's nuclear weapons pro-gram), and it would spur fur-ther arms racing in SouthAsia.

India's verbal commit-ment to support negotiationsof a global verifiable fissilematerial cut off treaty is ahollow gesture given the factthat states have failed to initi-ate negotiations on such atreaty for over a decade.

4. Facilitating IndianNuclear Testing

If, as Prime MinisterManmohan Singh said on July18, 2005, India would"assume the same responsibil-ities and practices" as othercountries with advancednuclear capabilities, it is rea-sonable to expect that Indiashould agree to a legally-bind-ing moratorium on nucleartest explosions. It would behighly irresponsible for CTBTsignatories not to establishCTBT signature as a basiccondition for NSG nucleartrade with India or any statethat has not yet signed thattreaty.

While Singh has reiteratedhis commitment to maintain-ing India's voluntary nucleartest moratorium, India hassought to avoid any furthercommitment to a test ban andhas sought to avoid the possi-bility of any penalty in theevent that it does resume test-ing. As Singh asserted mostrecently in his July 22 state-ment to the Lok Sabha, "Iconfirm that there is nothingin these agreements whichprevents us from furthernuclear tests if warranted byour national security con-cerns."

To reduce the impact offuel supply cut off if Indiawere to resume nuclear test-ing, Indian officials have gonefurther and are demanding aso-called "clean" and "uncon-ditional" exemption fromNSG guidelines and are seek-ing bilateral nuclear coopera-tion agreements that helpprovide India with strategicfuel reserves and/or lifetimefuel guarantees.

This flatly contradicts aprovision in the 2006 U.S.implementing legislation,which was championed bySen. Barack Obama andapproved by the U.S.Congress, that stipulates thatfuel supplies be limited to rea-sonable reactor operatingrequirements. It would alsocontradict the policy mandat-ed by the U.S. implementinglegislation that a nuclear testwould lead to the immediatecessation of all U.S. nuclearcooperation with India.

If nuclear testing is to bedeterred, meaningful penaltiesmust be available. If NSGstates do agree to supply fuelfor India's "civilian" nuclear

35

sector, they must avoidarrangements that wouldenable or encourage futurenuclear testing by India.Otherwise, you and your gov-ernment may become com-plicit in the facilitation of anew round of destabilizingnuclear tests.

In light of the above-mentioned flaws in the ill-conceived proposal toexempt India from certainNSG guidelines, we recom-mend that:� If NSG supplier states

should agree to supply fuel toIndia, they should establish apolicy that if India resumesnuclear testing, or if Indiaviolates or withdraws "civil-ian" facilities or materialsfrom international safeguards,all nuclear cooperation withIndia involving NSG mem-bers shall be terminated andunused fuel supplies fromNSG states shall bereturned. If NSG supplierstates should agree to supplyfuel to India, they should doso in a manner that is com-mensurate with ordinary reac-tor operating requirementsand not provide - individuallyor collectively - strategic orlifetime nuclear fuel reserves.

� NSG states should expresslyprohibit any transfer of sensi-tive plutonium reprocessing,uranium enrichment, or heavywater production items toIndia, whether inside or out-side bilateral nuclear coopera-tion agreements.

� NSG states should activelyoppose any arrangement thatwould give India any specialsafeguards exemptions or

would in any way be inconsis-tent with the principle of per-manent safeguards over allnuclear materials and facili-ties.

� Before India is granted awaiver from the NSG's full-scope safeguards standard, itshould join the other originalnuclear weapon states bydeclaring it has stopped fissilematerial production forweapons purposes and trans-form its nuclear test moratori-um into a meaningful, legally-binding commitment.

� NSG states should agree notto grant India consent toreprocess nuclear fuel suppliedby an NSG member state ina facility that is not underpermanent and unconditionalIAEA safeguards, and alsoagree that any material pro-duced in other facilities maynot be transferred to anyunsafeguarded facility.

� NSG states should agree thatall bilateral nuclear coopera-tion agreements between anNSG member state and Indiaexplicitly prohibit the replica-tion of any dual-use technolo-gy or use of such technology inany unsafeguarded Indianfacilities.

The Indian nuclear dealwould be a nonproliferationdisaster and a serious set-back to the prospects ofglobal nuclear disarma-ment, especially now. Forthose world leaders who areserious about ending thearms race, holding allstates to their internationalcommitments, andstrengthening the nuclearNonproliferation Treaty, it

is time to stand up and becounted.

Sincerely,

Daryl G. Kimball,Executive Director,Arms Control Association,

Washington, D.C.

Hideyuki BanCo-DirectorCitizens' Nuclear Information

Center (Tokyo, Japan)

Notes:1. See September 16, 2006

exchange on the floor of the Senatebetween Sen. Barack Obama and Sen.Richard Lugar, then Chairman of the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee,available from

<http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/record/2006/2006_S11021.pdf > and

<http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/record/2006/2006_S11022.pdf>. Also see

Sec. 103 (b) para 10 of the Henry J.Hyde United States-India PeacefulAtomic Energy Cooperation Act.

2. All UN members states arealso obligated to support UN Security

Council Resolution 1172, which calls onIndia and Pakistan to sign the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)stop producing fissile material for

weapons, and undertake other nuclearrisk reduction measures. All NSG stateshave a responsibility to uphold their obli-gations under UNSC 1172 by reiterat-

ing and actively encouraging India andPakistan to implement these and other

nuclear restraint measures.

36

Nuclear Power Is Not theAnswer, Helen Caldicott, TheNew Press, New York andLondon, 2006, pp: 221.

Dr. Helen Caldicott is atrained physician, and for thelast four decades involved inantinuclear activism. She isthoroughly versed in the sci-ence of nuclear energy. She isthe founder of Physicians forSocial Responsibility (PSR) andWomen's Action for NuclearDisarmament (WAND) a nom-inee for the Nobel Peace Prize,and the 2003 winner of theLannan Cultural FreedomPrize. She divides her timebetween Australia andWashington, D.C., where sherecently established theNuclear Policy ResearchInstitute (NPRI). The NPRI'smission is to facilitate a far-reaching, effective, ongoingpublic education campaign inthe mainstream media aboutthe often-underestimated dan-gers of nuclear weapons andpower programs and policies.She has written for numerouspublications and has authoredseven books. Nuclear Madness;Missile Envy; If You Love ThisPlant: A Plant to Heal the Earth;A Desperate Passion: AnAutobiography; The New NuclearDanger: George Bush's MilitaryIndustrial Complex and NuclearPower is Not the Answer. Dr.Caldicott's most recent book is WarIn Heaven (March 2007).

Dr. Helen Caldicott in herfirst book Nuclear Madnesswrote that, "As a physician, I

contend that nuclear technolo-gy threatens life on our planetwith extinction.

If present trends continue,the air we breathe, the food weeat, and the water we drink willsoon be contaminated withenough radioactive pollutants topose a potential health hazardsfar greater than any plaguehumanity has ever experienced."The present book under review,"Nuclear Power is Not theAnswer", thoroughly debunksthe claim of "nuclear power ren-aissance," and presents exhaus-tive evidence to refute the now-resurgent claim that nuclearpower is the solution to globalwarming.

In this book, Dr. Caldicottpresents her convincing case incarefully documented 10 chap-ters, each one covering a sepa-rate crucial issue about nuclearpower. She covers all the com-ponents - from the carbon emit-ted in the creation of nuclearpower to the cost of nuclearplants and the health risks andpossibility of accidents and ter-rorists' access. She also pointsout that, despite proponents'assurances, we still haven't devel-oped mechanisms to store thewaste materials for the necessarythousands of years, and thatstate-of-the-art nuclear planttechnology is still full of unre-solved problems. In order toovercome these potential longlasting problems Dr. Caldicott'sprovides sensible alternatives toswitch to wind and other benignrenewable energy sources.

The following is an account

of her chapter-wise arguments. In the first chapter titled "The

Energetic Costs of Nuclear Power"contends the US Governmentpropaganda (this is true evenwith respect to India) to sellnuclear energy in terms cleanand emission free green andgreen house gases if fraudulent.Although nuclear power plantsdo not release carbon dioxide(CO2), the primary greenhousegas, into the atmosphere causingglobal warming, nuclear industryin its various stages (nuclear fuelcycle) requires a vast infrastruc-ture, which uses huge fossilfuels.

First stage involves uraniummining and milling. The energyused to mine the uranium is fos-sil fuel. At this stage energyrequirement depends on thegrade of uranium ore. The lowerthe grade or ore the greater theusage of energy for extraction.The global high-grade uraniumores are finite. These reservesare estimated at only 3.5 milliontons.

Hence, dependence on low-grade uranium mining becomesinevitable and thus more ener-getic costs are involved in thisstage. The mining and millingprocess involves usage of bull-dozers, shovels, trucks andmilling machines all are run byfossil fuels. The author says "fuelis also needed during thisprocess to create steam andheated gases, and all the chemi-cals used in the mills must bemanufactured at other chemicalplants". Further, after extractionof yellow cake massive quanti-

V. Book Review

Nuclear Power Is Not the AnswerM. Channa Basavaiah**

37

ties mill tailings have to be sub-jected to remediation, which isgenerally not undertaken, mil-lion of tons of radioactive mate-rial is dumped on the ground,often on native tribal lands,emitting radioactive elements tothe air and water. If this singleremediation process is scrupu-lously followed the energeticprice of nuclear electricitybecomes unreasonable.

The second stage is the con-version of uranium-to-uraniumhexafluoride. The specific ener-getic costs involved in thisprocess amount 1.478 gigajoulesper kilogram of uranium. Thethird stage of uranium enrich-ment is also very energy con-suming process.

The specific energy expen-ditures at this stage include con-struction, operation, and main-tenance of the enrichment plant.The specific energetic costs ofenrichment are measured injoules per separative work unit(SWA). According to the author,"averaging the current world useof the two different processes -30% gaseous diffusion and 70%ultracentrifuge - the energeticcosts are 0.0055 petajoules per1,000 SWU." (A petajoule is 1million billion joules). Thefourth stage is fuel element fab-rication i.e. the enriched uraniumhexafluoride gas is made solidfuel pellets of uranium dioxide,which are used nuclear reactors.Again fossil fuel is used in thefabrication process, and theauthor points out that, "the spe-cific energy expenditure is0.00379 petajoules per ton ofuranium." The fifth stage is con-struction of reactors. Theserequire an immense aggregate ofgoods and services. The meanvalue of energetic costs at thisstage for one reactor according

to the author is 80 petajoules. The process of energetic

costs involved in the nuclearelectricity generation does notstop here strictly speaking thereare five more stages in nuclearcycle. These are decommission-ing and dismantling of reactors,cleanup of reactors, cooling upof tritium and carbon 14 water,disposal of radioactive wasteand transport of high level andintermediate waste and long-term storage for 240,000 years.All these stages involve hugeenergetic costs. The authormakes it very clear that, "lookingat the energetic costs of thenuclear fuel cycle just from min-ing the ore through reactor con-struction to dismantling of thereactor, without even assessingthe energy costs of storage andtransportation of radioactivewaste, the total energy debtcomes to approximately 240petajoules (24 million billionjoules)." As against this, accord-ing to the author "the construc-tion of and implementationprocess involved in a gas-firedplant require only one-tenththat amount - 24 petajoules - toproduce the same amount ofelectricity.

The second chapter titled"Paying for Nuclear Energy"brings out the true economiccosts of nuclear energy produc-tion. Not withstanding propa-ganda, nuclear power genera-tion world over is expensive.The industry falsely claimsnuclear power costs only 1.7cents per kilowatt-hour produc-tion compared to 2 cents forcoal and 5.7 cents for naturalgas. This calculation omits capi-tal costs from a pricing equation.The author quotes from areport, "Mirage and Oasis:Energy Choices in an Age of

Global Warming" (published bythe New EconomicsFoundation, London, 2005) andsays that the true costs ofnuclear power generation to bethree times the industry figure ifall costs, including capital ones,in the nuclear cycle are included.Dr. Caldicott terms nuclearenergy as "socialized electricity".The developed countries despitetheir firm belief in "free market"are not willing to apply its tenetsto nuclear energy. All the gov-ernments provide huge subsi-dies and handouts to nuclearindustry. This socialization ofnuclear electricity within capital-ist society has never been calledinto question, or have the gener-al public and their elected repre-sentatives critically scrutinized it.

Nuclear power dependsupon government subsidies atevery level. The US governmentspent a gargantuan $111.5 bil-lion on energy research anddevelopment between 1948-1998, allocating 60% or $70 bil-lion of this to nuclear industryalone. Over the same period,$26 billion was allocated to oil,coal, and natural gas; $12 billionwent to renewable energysources such as wind, hydro,geothermal, and solar power;and only $8 billion went to ener-gy efficiency technologies. TheOECD countries governmentsspent $318 billion by the year1992 specifically on nuclearenergy. Now new and increasedsubsidies are being given tonuclear energy production. The2005 US energy bill providescradle-to-grave subsidies fornuclear power. The industry willgain $13 billion in subsidies andtax breaks, including: $5.7 billionin production tax credits; $4.4billion in various subsidies-aconservative estimate that

38

includes research and develop-ment, tax breaks, loan guaran-tees, and risk insurance; $1.25billion from 2006 to 2021 and"such sums as necessary" from10116 to 2021 for a nuclearpower plant in Ohio to generatehydrogen for automobiles; $435million over three years fornuclear energy research develop-ment, including the Departmentof Energy's Nuclear Power 2010programme to build new nuclearpower plants and Generation IVprogramme to develop newreactor designs. Since the noinsurance company comes for-ward to insure nuclear industryand its personnel, the bill reau-thorizes the Price-AndersonAct, with its guarantee that tax-payers, not the industry, will pay98% of up to $600 billion gov-ernmental insurance in the eventof a worst case nuclear melt-down. The industry could notfunction if it had to cover itsown insurance.

Besides the above "direct"or "on-budget" subsides thenuclear power sector in the USis granted a number of "off-budget subsidies" which includetax exemptions, credits, defer-rals, rebates, preferential taxtreatment, market access restric-tions, regulatory support mecha-nisms, preferential planning con-sent, and access to naturalresources. Other subsidiesdeemed "shadow R&D"includes monies spent by publicinstitutions such as universitiesand nuclear physics institutionson extensive nuclear research.The author provides variousillustrations on these subsidies inher book. It should be remem-bered that economic theorystates that subsidies can be justi-fied when they lead to an overallincrease in social welfare. But

the environmental and healthrisks associated with radioactivewaste, accidents, and risk ofmeltdown, nuclear proliferation,and the threat of terrorismdecrease the overall contributionto social welfare provided bynuclear power. The UnitedNations EnvironmentProtection (UNEP) organiza-tion specifically dictates that theremoval of subsidies that areeconomically costly and harmfulto the environment and to thepeople represents a win-win pol-icy. It is hard to imagine a morepoignant case in point than thenuclear power industry.

The actual cost of nuclearenergy does not include the verysignificant toll it takes on humanhealth. The third chapter titled"Nuclear Power, Radiation, andDisease" is an extensive one,which deals with the hazards ofvarious forms of radiation onpublic health and environmentthroughout the nuclear cycle.Various types of radioactive ele-ments affect workers at uraniummining and milling sites.Uranium miners who workbelow the ground are at greatrisk. These are exposed to a highdegree of radioactive gas calledradon 220. Radon is a highly car-cinogenic alpha emitter, which,if inhaled, can decay in the lungand deposit in the air passages ofthe lung, irradiating cells thatthen become malignant. Thisprocess results in very high inci-dents of lung cancer.

It is reported that one fifthto on half of the uranium min-ers in North America, many ofwhom was Native Americans,has died and is continuing to dieof lung cancer.

This is a common phenom-enon in the all countries whereuranium mining is undertaken,

including Jadugoda in India.Another lethal uranium daugh-ter is radium 226, an alpha andgamma emitter with half-life of1,600 years. This has a notorioushistory in medical literature.Uranium miners are exposed touranium dust and thus radiumgets absorbed from the gut anddeposits in their bones. Uraniumitself also deposits in bone, andit too is carcinogenic. Uraniumore also emits gamma radiation.So the miners are also exposedto constant, whole-body radia-tion emitted by other uraniumdaughters, which irradiated theirbodies and continuously expos-es their reproductive organs.Uranium mining creates largeamount of debris/tailings,which is left lying in huge heapsadjacent to the mines.

These contain millions oftons of radioactive dirt, whichconstantly leaks radon 220 intoair and rain also leaks solubleradium 226 through the tailingpiles into underground waterand then finally into food chainof the aquatic life and terrestrialplants.

At the uranium enrichmentand fuel fabrication levels, work-ers are exposed to whole-bodygamma radiation from the byproducts of uranium decay. Themost serious aspect of enrich-ment is the material that is dis-carded uranium 238. This iscalled "depleted uranium" (DU)because it has been depleted ofits uranium 235. But it is notdepleted radioactivity. DU con-taminated ground water aroundenrichment facilities.

Now DU is extensively usedin military applications. In the1991 Gulf War, the US used 360tones of DU in the form ofanti-tank shells in Iraq, Kuwaitand Saudi Arabia. The invasion

39

of 2002 also resulted in hun-dreds of tones of DU by the USon the Iraqi soil.

The author considers that"in essence, the two Gulf Warshave been nuclear wars becausethey have scattered nuclearmaterial across the land, andpeople particularly children arecondemned to die of malignan-cy and congenital disease essen-tially for eternity. Becauseof theextremely long half-life of ura-nium238, the food, the air andthe water in the cradle of civi-lization have been forever con-taminated."

Dr. Caldicott criticallyexplains the process involve innuclear power generation atlength in this chapter. She saysthat at every nuclear reactorradioactive gases that leak fromfuel rods are routinely releasedor "vented" in to the atmos-phere. Nuclear power genera-tion process created over 200new radioactive elements thatdid not exist until uranium wasfissioned by man. A number ofnoble gases are emitted bynuclear reactors.

These are high-energygamma emitters, and they arereadily absorbed from the lungand enter the blood stream.These can induce significantmutations in the eggs and thesperm of the people living adja-cent to a reactor. The importantnoble gases include: Xenon 137,Krypton 90, Xenon 135, Xenon133, Krypton 85, Argon 39 andothers include Xenon 141, 143and 144. All these gases bio-con-centrate in the food chain, andirradiate the lung, lever, skeleton,and gastrointestinal tract, and actas potent carcinogens. Anotherimportant emitter from nuclearpower plant is Tritium. The bio-logical impact Tritium makes is

chromosomal breaks and aber-rations.

In animal experiments,Tritium has been shown toinclude a five-fold increase inovarian tumours in offspring ofexposed parents, while alsocausing testicular atrophy andshrinkage of the ovaries. It caus-es decreased brain weight in theexposed offspring and mentalretardation with an increasedincidence of brain tumours insome animals.

Increased parental mortalitywas observed in these experi-ments as well as a high incidenceof stunned and deformed foe-tuses. Thus the argument thatnuclear industry is "emissionfree" is a misnomer. In factnuclear industry has been collec-tively releasing millions of curiesannually.

This apart, the almightyproblem of nuclear industry isthe generation of radioactivewaste. Each 1000-megawattnuclear power plant generates 30tones of extremely potentradioactive waste annually. Eventhough nuclear power has beenin operation for 50 years, thenuclear industry has yet to deter-mine how safely to dispose ofthis deadly material, whichremains radioactive for tens ofthousands of years. Mostnuclear waste is confined inhuge cooling pools are in drystorage casks beside the reactors,leaking and seeping throughsoils in to aquifers, rivers, lakesand sees, where it enters andconcentrates in the food chainsof the plants, fish, animals andhumans.

Beside these, this chapterexamines several of the preciseradioactive materials that thenuclear fission process creates,with their specific health impli-

cations for human being. This section deals with

adverse health implications ofplutonium (a typical alpha emit-ter named after Pluto, the Greekgod of hell), Iodine 131,Strontium90 and Cesium137.

Lastly, the chapter alsoanalyses health and environmen-tal impact studies done on theThree Mile Island in the US andChernobyl in Ukraine nuclearreactor accidents.

In the fourth chapter titled"Accidental and Terrorist-InducedNuclear Meltdowns" Dr. Caldicottexplains that the nuclear powerplants are vulnerable to manyevents that could lead to acci-dents and meltdowns, includinghuman and mechanical errors,impacts from climate change,global warming and earth-quakes; and terrorist attacks. Sheprovides number of illustrationon mechanical and humanerrors in the US nuclear powerplants, based on the availabledata (which is not available topublic in the case of India), andproblems associated with agingreactors in the US. QuotingDavid Lochbaum, a nuclearengineer from the Union ofConcerned Scientists, whopoints out that, "Nuclear powerplants are like people: they havenumerous problems in theirinfancy and youth, they operaterelatively smoothly in early-to-middle life, and they start toshow of stress and manifestpathology as they age."

In thirteen-moth periodfrom March 7, 2000 to April 2,2001, eight nuclear power plantswere forced to shut down in theUS because of potentially seri-ous equipment failures associat-ed with aging of their mechani-cal parts. These are result offlaws in the aging management

40

programmes of the NationalRegulator Commission (NRC)of the US.

Two kinds of fundamentalflaws are being pointed out: 1).Looking in the wrong spots withright inspection techniques (ashappened at the Oconee Unit 3in South Carolina in February2001 and Quad Cities Unit 1 inIllinois in January 2002) and 2).Looking in the right spots withthe wrong inspection techniques(as happened with the Summernuclear power plant in SouthCarolina in October 2000 andIndian Point Unit 2 nuclearpower plant in New York inFebruary 2000). The author alsoprovides a case of near missmeltdown at the Davis-Bessereactor twenty-one miles south-east of Toledo, Ohio inFebruary 2002). This Chapteralso brings out flaws in theworking of the NRC in the US.

Despite the legal binding onthe part of the NRC to make itsrisk assessment studies onnuclear power plants public theNRC is not doing so. Moreover,the NRC acceding to industry'spressure it is issuing 20-yearextensions, after completing theoriginal stipulated period of 40years for existing nuclear powerplants. The author considers thisas a very dangerous trend, whichwould further increase themechanical and human errors inthe maintenance of nuclearpower plants.

In the next section of thechapter, the author explains pos-sible threats to nuclear powerplants as a result of naturalcalamities. She says that existingreactors designed before theadvent of global warming wasconsidered and hence they can-not sustain climatic changes.Global warming can induce

unpredicted and extreme weath-er events that could heat up therivers and lakes from whichnuclear power plants extracttheir cooling water. An adequatesupply of water itself may alsocease to exist as drought condi-tions take over. It was so happedin France in 2003 that the hotweather and lack of rainfallseverely reduced supplies ofcold river water, and when theriver levels fell, the Frenchpower company, Electricity deFrance, resorted to cooling itsnuclear power plants by hosingdown their outsides with gardensprinklers supplied by reservoirs.Many nuclear power plantsaround the world are located bythe sea and are susceptible to theeffects of tsunamis. In 2004, atsunami struck a reactor in India;although it did not induce amajor accident, it did cause adegree of damage. The height ofthe tsunami that originated offthe coast of Thailand inDecember 2004 was a massiveninety-eight feet.

There are a number ofreactors located in differentparts are just twelve feet abovethe sea levels. Further seriousearthquakes can also cause verysevere accidents in nuclearpower plants despite theirearthquake proof designs.

The last section of thechapter deals with security laps-es and the possible terroriststhreats and the resultant cata-strophic effects of nuclearpower plants as a result ofmeltdowns. The 9/11Commission Report revealedthat al Qaeda had consideredplans to attack nuclear powerplants. It was only because oftheir mistaken belief that theairspace around nuclear powerplants was "restricted" and that

planes violating that air spacewould be shot down beforeimpact that nuclear reactorswere not attacked. The authorcites the Time Magazine studysecurity situation at nuclearpower plants in the US. Thestudy states that even after9/11 security at nuclear plantsis virtually unchanged, eventhough these facilities consti-tute potential weapons of massdestruction and, as such, areinviting targets for terrorists.As quoted by the author thestudy states that there exist var-ious security lapses, whichcould result in the intrudersentering nuclear power plantsand cause damage/s and evenmeltdown of reactors. Notonly nuclear power plants butalso the external electricity sup-ply to reactors and the emer-gency diesel generators uponwhich the safe operation ofnuclear reactors depends arealso susceptible to terroristattack. These kinds of scenar-ios are also applicable to othercountries also. In EnglandGreenpeace commissioned aseries of three reports thatexamined the results of an aer-ial terrorist attack on thenuclear complex at Sellafield(comprises of nuclear reactors,reprocessing plants, and highlevel waste storage tanks con-taining 1550 cubic meters ofliquid waste plus tens of tonsof separated plutonium) saysthat an attack could cause aradioactive fireball over a milehigh. It would only take fourminutes for a plane to bediverted from its regular flightpath to the Sellafield nuclearcomplex in Cumbria and, inthe event of an attack, twenty-five times as much radiation asthat emitted from Chernobyl

41

would likely be released. The fifth chapter titled "Yucca

Mountain and the Nuclear WasteDisaster" brings out nuclearwaste disposal problems in theUS. In the last sixty-five years,nuclear industry, world over,has not taken responsibility forthe massive amounts of pro-foundly lethal radioactivewaste that has continued toproduce at an ever-increasingpace. In the US during the1970s it was assumed thatnuclear waste can be stored insalt domes in Lyons, Kansas,but it was abandoned as thesedomes could be accidentallypunctured by gas explorationholes. In 1982, the USCongress passed the NuclearWaste Policy Act, promising totake responsibility for thenuclear waste management. In1987 the Congress designatedYucca Mountain in Nevada asthe primary repository. Thestated requirement of a geolog-ical storage site is to preventleakage and seepage of wastefor at least 5,00,000 years. Inthe case of Yucca Mountain itcame to limelight that it cannotachieve 5,00,000 years leak-proof and seepage proof man-date due number of reasons.These include: 1).Contaminated water from cor-roded casks could seep in thegroundwater and spread intospring water irrigated areasused for farming and by pro-tected species; 2).

Yucca Mountain being avolcanic remnant may producevolcanic event again leading tomagma intrusion into the tun-nels where the waste is stored,melting the canisters and if thevolcanic event opens a path tothe surface, radioactivity couldbe spread around the land-

scape; 3). Yucca Mountain isalso located in an active earth-quake zone. In 1992 a major7.4 Richter measured quakeoccurred followed tow dayslater by an additional 5.2quake; 4). Yucca Mountain wasthought to be waterproof as itssoil must be dry to prevent cor-rosion. But much more waterinside was discovered thanoriginally estimated and thattoo with radioactive chorine 36contaminations, spill overeffect of atmospheric nucleartests conducted in 1950s and1960s nearing this site. ThusYucca Mountain is far too dan-gerous for a permanent homefor nuclear waste storage. Inaddition to these, YuccaMountain is located below theNellis Air Force Base, Nevadawhere new military jet aircraftsare tested, war exercises areheld and crashes happen thatmay have serious and unprece-dented consequences.

Another important aspectof waste management not cov-ered in depth in the case ofYucca Mountain project is thetransportation of radioactivewaste from around the countryto this site on highways and byrail. It is estimated to take thir-ty years to move 70,000 metrictons of civilian and militaryspent fuel. Currently there is noprohibition on the shipping ofthis waste neither throughhighly populated areas nor dur-ing the periods of bad weatherlike severe snowstorms makingdriving hazardous. But it hasbeen predicted that as many asfifty accidents a year may result,three of them involving seriousrelease of toxic radiation thatwill contaminate the surround-ing environment. To make thetransportation further haz-

ardous, the author states that allthe eleven of the storage caskscurrently used by theDepartment of Energy (DOE)for radioactive waste transporthave been found to be defec-tive. Despite this grave con-cerns, the Bush Administrationis determined to proceed withthe Yucca Mountain Project.

In the chapter six of thebook titled "Generation IVNuclear Reactors" Dr. Caldicott,given the long-standing recordof lies and deception in pro-moting the safety and benefitsof nuclear power by the indus-try/governments seriouslyexpress her doubts aboutfuture/all new technologies inthe nuclear industry. Thenuclear industry classifies itsreactors according to "genera-tion". Generation - I reactorswere developed in the 1950sand 1960s. Some of these arestill in operation in the UnitedKingdom. The majority ofworld's operating nuclear reac-tors are designated asGeneration - II. These comeunder different varieties havefundamental design problems,some of which have been butrectified after the Chernobylaccident, other problemsremain unattended. TheGeneration - III reactors, slight-ly different from Generation -II, are operating only in the US.The Generation - III and a so-called III + designs represent"evolutionary changes" fromtheir predecessors despite thedangers associated with them.A newer Generation - IV "rev-olutionary" design is underdevelopment aim four objec-tives: sustainability, economics,safety and reliability and prolif-eration resistance and physicalprotection.

42

Dr. Caldicott debunks allthese notions and calls them as"base less today (the absurd)'too cheap to metre' (claim) wasfifty years ago." She goes on toexplain, "People with an inti-mate understanding of thenuclear industry are severelyopposed to a nuclear renais-sance" because of the unac-ceptable risks and most allother falsely claimed benefitsassociated with it. She quotesDavid Lochmann's (NuclearSafety Engineer for the Unionof Concerned Scientists) testi-mony before the HouseGovernment Reforms Sub-Committee on EnergyResources on the NextGeneration of Nuclear Power,who says that "It is inappropri-ate for the industry to talkabout Generation - IV reactorswhen neither the US nor therest of the world has aGeneration - I high level wastedisposal site, or has successful-ly operated even a Generation -III reactor." He recommendsthat before preceding towardsGeneration - IV the govern-ments must create a repositoryfor high level nuclear wastemanagement systems. Thechapter analysis false claims ofGeneration -IV reactors withscientific and technical data. Asthe critiques argue,"Generation - IV" is nothingbut a label created to sell theillusion to the public that acompletely new generation ofreactors in records is beingdeveloped, which is far from allthe problems which are plagu-ing current nuclear installa-tions. The primary goal of theGeneration - IV argument liesin the securing of fresh finan-cial means for nuclear research.

There is nothing like

"peaceful nuclear pro-grammes". Nuclear activitiesare inherently violent at all thestages. The seventh chapter titled"Nuclear Energy and NuclearWeapons Proliferation"establishesthe fact that the nuclear powergeneration and nuclearweapons development are likeseamy twins and thus they can-not be separated. Nuclear armssupermarket and disseminationof nuclear technology is vast,growing and dangerous. TheBritish counterintelligencegroup MI5 states that over 360private companies, universitydepartments, and governmentorganizations in eight coun-tries, including Israel, Syria,Pakistan, Iran, India, Egypt, thePakistan High Commission inLondon, and the United ArabEmirates (UAE), have beenprocuring nuclear technologyand equipment for use innuclear weapons construction.Front companies in Cyprus,Malta and the UAE in particu-lar are involved in the nuclearweapons trade.

The coming "renaissance"of the nuclear power industry,twenty-five countries and con-sortia will have access over aperiod of two decades toGeneration - IV reactorsfuelled by plutonium. If, asproposed by some, 2,000 newnuclear power plants are con-structed over the next decadeson the fallacious grounds ofcombating global warmingcommercially produced pluto-nium (most dangerous of allthe substances known) couldincrease to 20,000 metric tonsby 2050, dwarfing the currentamount in the world today andincreasing the potential danger(as little as one-millionth of agram is a carcinogenic dose)

from it enormously. Dr.Caldicott calls this "plutoniummadness". In 1994, theNational Academy of Sciencescalled the US and Russian mili-tary derived plutonium stock-piles alone "a clear and presentdanger to national and interna-tional security" because of thechance of any it falling intorogue hands. If a vastly largerstockpile is produced in somany places, it would be muchharder to secure or keep trackof. With sophisticated technol-ogy the minimum amount ofplutonium required to make abomb is 1 to 3 kilograms, how-ever the generally acceptedamount is 5 kg. of weaponsgrade plutonium and 8 kg. forreactors grade plutonium isrequired to make a bomb. Somuch of plutonium aroundwith inadequate security, thetemptation to do it would begreater.

Today eighteen countrieshave uranium enrichment facil-ities that enable them to pro-duce fuel for nuclear weapons.Nine of these countries arenow known to possess nuclearweapons. Seventy countrieshave small research reactors(under the legal auspices of theNuclear Non ProliferationTreaty-NPT), most of whichare fuelled with highly enricheduranium, a fuel also suitable fornuclear weapon production.These small research reactorsalso manufacture plutonium,making nuclear bomb materialsavailable at each end of theresearch reactor's operation.Mohammed ElBaradi, thedirector of the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency(IAEA) says these widely dis-tributed nuclear facilities are"latent bomb plants". He esti-

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mates that within a decade asmany as forty more countrieswill have the ability to makenuclear weapons, and this maybe an underestimate. With thissituation as background, Dr.Caldicott opines that, the Bushadministration has adoptedsome very provocative anddangerous policies-all of themin direct violation of the NPT-which inevitably have led andwill continue to lead to the pro-liferation of nuclear weaponsin other countries.

In the chapter eight titled"Nuclear Power and "RogueNations"Dr. Caldicott defines arogue nation as "a state thatpossesses nuclear weapons andthe ability to vaporize millionsof people within seconds".Today eight or nine countriesqualify as rogue nations. Thetwo countries at the head ofthe "rogue" nations pyramidare - the US and Russia. Thesetwo countries possess vastmajority of nuclear weapons inthe world - 97% of the totalarsenal of 30,000 bombs - andbecause these countries contin-ue to maintain thousands ofthese extraordinary weaponson "hair-trigger" alert. Yet wepersist in leaving them off therogue roster. As for thosecountries currently vying toadd nuclear capability to theirarsenals (to become roguestates), nuclear power plansoffer the perfect cover.

Most nuclear technologyassociated with nuclear powercan be diverted for use inweapons production: Thischapter examines how differ-ent countries built their nucleararsenals using various compo-nents of the nuclear fuel cycle.Israel developed a very largenuclear arsenal from plutoni-

um created in a reactor specifi-cally designated for that pur-pose, India created a nucleararsenal from heavy waternuclear power plants andPakistan developed nuclearweapons largely from uraniumenrichment facilities. Israel,India and Pakistan are the onlycountries in the world withnuclear capabilities not to havesigned the NPT. They havedeveloped their own clandes-tine nuclear arsenals, and theyhave never been subject toIAEA verification inspections.As such, they are truly roguenations, outlaws who choosenot to abide by internationallaw. North Korea has almostcertainly built at least twonuclear weapons using plutoni-um obtained from its researchnuclear reactors. Iran is pursu-ing a nuclear option it claims isfor commercial use only. Thecountry is a signatory to theNPT and, as far as known, is infull compliance with it. Butthere is no way to know whatIran's intentions are?

Dr. Caldicott considers thatthe US is directly responsiblefor all these developments. TheUS is most "roguish" of all andposes threat to world securityand peace. It is waging two ille-gal wars in Afghanistan andIraq, unconditionally supportsIsrael's right to do the sameagainst the defencelessPalestinians and Lebanese andis threatening additional con-flicts against Iran, Syria,Venezuela, and possibly NorthKorea.

In addition, the US claimsthe right and intent to pre-emp-tively use nuclear weapons if itwishes. The US is directlyresponsible for the sabotagingof the NPT Review

Conference at the UnitedNations in May 2005, to thedespair and disgust of the restof the world.

Being a signatory, the USviolated the provisions of theNPT by concluding 'nuclearcooperation' agreement withIndia. Thus the US actionshave become "biggest dis-grace" in the process of nuclearnon-proliferation and disarma-ment.

All through the book Dr.Caldicott makes fervent appealto free the planet from thescourge of the nuclear threatthat may destroy our planet. Inthe ninth chapter titled "RenewableEnergy: The Answer" she makesit very clear that "there is noneed to build new nuclearpower plants to provide for theprojected energy needs of thefuture… it would be possibleusing other forms of electricitygeneration to close down mostof the existing nuclear reactorswithin a decade. There isenough wind (power) betweenthe Rocky Mountains andMississippi River alone to sup-ply three times the amount ofelectricity that America needs."This chapter concentratesexclusively concentrates onrenewable sources of power.According 2004 figures Dr.Caldicott states that about 2%of electricity in the US camefrom renewables, where asnuclear power provided 20%.

However, if the hydropow-er electricity is included, about9% of electricity in the UScame from renewables, and18.60% came from renewablesworld wide in 2004. It is notthat alternatives are not avail-able but the politicians lack thepolitical will to explore thealternatives. She maintains that

44

main problem in the US is thepowerful lobby of fossil fueland nuclear industry prevailsover the energy policy decisionmaking of the federal govern-ment.

Dr. Caldicott to strengthenher argument towards alterna-tive energy sources quotes a2005 study "Nuclear Power:Economics and Climate-Protection Potential" byAmory Lovins of the RockyMountains Institute whichstates that "Globally, nuclearpower is being outstripped bythe other, better sources ofelectricity production. Globallymore electricity is now pro-duced by decentralized, lowcarbon or non-carbon com-petitors than from nuclearpower plants-about one-thirdfrom revewables (wind, bio-mass, solar) and two-thirdsthrough a very efficient formof energy production in whichelectricity is made from wasteheat emanating from industry-heat-and-power, or cogenera-tion." The study says that"decentralized capacity is pro-jected to increase 177 times by2010 and more of the central-ized thermal power generators(coal, gas, oil or nuclear) cancompete economically withwind power and certain otherrenewables." The study argues,"Most of the studies thatexamined the energy future,such as the oft-quoted 2003MIT study, fail to examine thefeasible economic alternativesto nuclear and large centralizedgeneration." Further, accordingto same study "the oft-madeclaim by nuclear energy propo-nents that "we need all energyoptions" has no analytical basisand is simply not true." Quitethe contrary, society cannot

afford all options, particularlythe options, which have cata-strophic consequences forlonger-periods to come.

Quoting The NewScientist, a well-known scien-tific journal published from theUK and the US, Dr. Caldicottargues that "although renew-able electricity technologies areheavily criticized by thenuclear, coal, and oil industriesand many politicians who lis-ten to industry propaganda,the combination of windpower, tidal power, micro-hydro, and biomass makerenewable power even morepractical. Wind power and bio-mass are now almost as cheapas coal, and wave power andsolar photo voltaics are rapidlybecoming competitive." Areport from the NewEconomic Foundation sup-ports these conclusions.Renewable energy is quick tobuild, abundant, and cheap toharvest, and it is safe, flexible,secure, and climate friendly.Renewable forms of energy, asstated in this chapter, areextremely effective carbon dis-placers per dollar. Nuclearpower thus contributes toglobal warming by divertingrenewable assets away from allenvironmentally sounder alter-natives such as wind power,solar power, geothermal ener-gy, biomass, and cogeneration,each of which produce very lit-tle if any carbon dioxide." Tocombat global warming therenewable sources alone arealternative. As the author saysthese are especially significantfor the US because it is theworld's most profligate con-sumer of energy. It also occu-pies number one position interms of electricity relation

CO2 emissions. Of the totalelectricity related CO2 emis-sions by the world countries,the US alone contributes 24%.Western Europe, and industri-alized Asia contributes 25%.Whereas the other 51% ofCO2 emissions emanate fromthe rest of world countries puttogether.

In the last part of thechapter, Dr. Caldicott analysestwo excellent alternativessources of energy-wind powerand solar power. Wind poweris already used extensively inEurope and is rapidly becom-ing the energy of the future. Itis cheap, fast to produce, andattractive to rural communities.In 2004 wind power globallyoutpaced nuclear power sixfold in annual capacity addi-tions and three fold in annualoutput additions.

Once again quoting AmoryLovins study she states that"Wind power is very attractiveit is benign, its developmenthas short lead times, its massproduction is economicallyvery efficient, its technologicaldevelopment is rapid, and it iseasy to site windmills on avail-able land. Furthermore, thespeedy deployment and lack ofregulatory fuss will always sup-port the growth of wind powercompared to the long lead timeand delay-prone, complex, andcontentious technology ofnuclear power, which couldexperience a meltdown or ter-rorist attack at any time."

Dr. Caldecott states"Hypothetically 10 trillion to20 trillion watts of solar powerprovided by photovoltaicscould take the place of all con-ventional energy sources cur-rently in use. Consequently, ithas been estimated that a

45

rather inefficient photovoltaicsarray covering half a sunny aremeasuring 100 square milescould meet all the annual USelectricity needs." Photovoltaiccells are becoming more effi-cient to produce and more effi-cient solar collectors. However,to create photovoltaic cells fos-sil-fuelled energy is required. Asolar roof collector would takeone to four years to recover theamount of energy that pro-duced it, but because it has lifeexpectancy of thirty years,87% to 97% of the electricity itproduces will not be inundatedby pollution-green house gasesor resource depletion. Solararrays can be easily located asthe ample space is available onrooftops, alongside roadways,or on unused desert landscapesbathed in sun.

The future production ofmassive numbers of solar col-lectors will require certain spe-cialized materials, all of whichare readily available, includingeven the rare minerals-indiumand tellurium. The "reliability,technological improvements,and market penetration ofconcentrated photovoltaicshave all advanced considerablyin thelast twenty years", saysthe author.

Whether renewables couldprovide a practical electricitysupply when wind power invarious places can be intermit-tent and solar power changesaccording to season, climate,and the like? Dr. Caldicottmaintains that various studieshave examined this "intermit-tency" problem related torenewables and solutionsabound, including geographicaggregation of wind genera-tors, improved weather fore-casting techniques, timely

extension of transmission anddistribution grids, transbound-ary (between states and coun-tries) of electricity exchange,and a mixture of renewableenergy technologies includinghydro, biomass, wind, solar,tidal, wave, geothermal, andcogeneration all interconnect-ed on the same grid. This mul-tiplicity will provide the fullpotential of renewables foradequate electricity produc-tion.

In the last chapter titled"What Individuals Can Do:Energy Conservation andEfficiency" Dr. Caldicottcomes with a number practica-ble suggestions that the indi-viduals can adopt to arrest theproblem of global warmingand drift towards unparalleledcatastrophe. She questions thatwhen the Europeans live thesame standard of life asAmericans with 50% less ener-gy per-capita than Americans,why cannot the Americans dothe same? Energy efficienttechnologies have been avail-able for many years, and theybecome sophisticated daily.Enough energy efficient meas-ures and technologies are cur-rently available to reduce elec-tricity demand between 11%and 23 % over the next fiveyears and between 25% and35% by 2020.

Dr. Caldicott quotes astudy performed in 2004 bySynapse Energy Economics,titled "A ResponsibleElectricity Future" whichcomes out with a number ofpracticable energy efficientmeasures as against the analy-sis done by the US EnergyInformation

Administration under theDepartment of Energy which

forecasts more than 50%increase in the electricity con-sumption in the US. TheSynapse study suggests policyinitiatives in the direction ofenergy efficiency, cogenera-tion, renewables, and naturalgas. What is required is, as Dr.Caldicott says, aggressive, con-certed, long-term public policyinitiatives will be required toimplement efficiency relateddecisions in the market and toalter the way that people buyand use electricity appliances.These decisions will be madeonly if governments take col-lective responsibility and con-duct massive educational cam-paigns to inspire commercialenterprises and the publicabout the importance of con-cerning energy and how to doit. Dr. Caldicott calls for theenactment of laws mandatingresponsible leaving and sug-gests individuals to adopt vari-ous measures of energy effi-ciency such as efficient lightfixtures, energy classifiedrefrigerators, solar hot-watersystems, weatherizing of hous-es, installing solar electricitygenerators on roofs.

Lastly she concludes thechapter by saying "It is up tothe individuals throughout theworld to choose a betterapproach to energy in thefuture. The nuclear option isneither desirable nor viable".But, as the Synapse studymakes it clear, "other optionsexist, and it is up to govern-ments and citizens to imple-ment them with urgency."

** M Channa Basavaiah teachesPolitical Science / International Relations

in the Osmania University, Hyderabad.

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VI. CNDP in Action

Public Meet on Indo-US Nuclear Deal in Delhi

A number of peace andsocial activists, journalists,intellectuals and representa-tives of many social organiza-tions attended a discussion onIndo-US Nuclear Deal organ-ized by the CNDP in NewDelhi on July 19, 2008. Thechief guest of the programmewas well known writer-activistMahashweta Devi and amongspeakers were Praful Bidwai,ND Jayaprakash, SandeepPandey, M V Ramana andAchin Vanaik. VeteranJournalist Prabhash Joshi, slat-ed to chair the programme,could not eventually attend onaccount of his ill health.

On this occasion,Mahashweta Devi emphasisedon the awareness programmesand campaigns among com-mon people against the dan-gers like nuclear deal and alsosuggested booklets be pub-lished on the issue exposingthe government and its readi-ness to surrender its sover-eignty to the USA. Callingyoung people and students to

come forward against the hypeof nuclear energy, she narrat-ed the Haripur episode ofWest Bengal where in 2006the government tried to ini-taite a nuclear power plant.

Achin Vanaik pointed outthat the Indo-US nuclear dealwas an US initiative, not anIndian one, and said that Indiawould be nothing, but a juniorstrategic partner of the'Empire Project' of the USA.Praful Bidwai explained whythe deal should be seen in thelight of Iraq war, which hadgiven a jolt to the global cam-paign for the American hege-mony. M V Ramana presenteda detailed view on the deal inhis presentation. He broughtout that other sources ofenergy would be better thanthe dangerous and expensivenuclear energy. Magasassayawardee peace activistSandeep Pandey expressed hisapprehensions that the dealwould prod China to expandits weaponry and causinginstability and insecurity in the

Asian sub-continent as well asin the whole world and there-by further damaging theprospects for global nucleardisarmament.

The discussion was fol-lowed by a vigorous and stim-ulating question-answer ses-sion. The distinguished par-ticipants included MukulSharma (AmnestyInternational-India), SumitChakravarty (Editor,Mainstream), Manisha Sethi(Forum for DemocraticInitiatives), A K Arun (Editor,Yuva Samvad), Javed Naqvi,Suhas Borkar Vineeta Bal andAnil Chaudhary (CNDP),Wilfred D'Costa (INSAF),Ajit Jha and Rajendra Ravi(NAPM), Madhuresh(CACIM), Manju Menon(Kalpaviksh), and a number ofstudents from the Lady SriramCollege.

Report filed by RajeshChandra

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48

CNDP

The Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace

(CNDP) is India’s national network of over 200

organisations, including grassroots groups, mass

movements and advocacy organisations, as well as

individuals. Formed in November 2000, CNDP

demands that India and Pakistan roll back their

nuclear weapons programmes. Our emphasis:

� No to further nuclear testing

� No to induction and deployment of nuclearweapons

� Yes to global and regional nuclear disarmament

CNDP works to raise mass awareness through

schools and colleges programmes, publications,

audio and visual materials, and campaigning and

lobbying at various levels.

CNDP membership is open is both individuals and

organisations. So if you believe nuclear weapons are

evil and peace is important, fill in the Membership

Form!

For Private Circulation Only

Published from CNDP, A-124/6, Katwaria Sarai, New Delhi - 110 016, Telefax: 26517814

E-mail: cndpindia@gmail.com, Website: www.cndpindia.org

Editors: Ilina Sen, Anil Chaudhary, Sukla Sen

Please mail your Draft/Cheque, drawn in favour

of “peace-cndp”, payable at New Delhi, to

CNDP A-124/6, Katwaria Sarai, New Delhi 110 016

Membership FormAnnual Membership Fee:

Students Rs. 20, Individuals Rs. 100,

Organisations Rs. 500

Name:

Organisation:

Address:

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