1 state-of-the-art reactor consequence analyses (soarca) regulatory information conference march 11,...
TRANSCRIPT
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State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses
(SOARCA)
Regulatory Information ConferenceMarch 11, 2008
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Agenda
• Opening Remarks and Overview • Sequence Selection • Accident Mitigation• Accident Analysis • Emergency Preparedness • Comments
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OPENING REMARKS
Dr. Farouk Eltawila, DirectorDivision of System Analysis
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
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Overview
• State-of-the-art more realistic evaluation of severe accident progression, radiological releases and offsite consequences
• Integrated and consistent analysis of pilot plants (Peach Bottom, Surry) for important sequences (e.g., SBO, ISLOCA) subject to probabilistic considerations
• Account for plant design and operational improvements, credit existing and newly developed mitigative measures and site specific emergency plans
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MotivationPlant Design and Operations Severe Accident
PhenomenologyEmergency Planning
1982 Sandia Siting Study
Total CDF:
1x10-4/yr to 1x10-5/yr
Alpha Mode Failure
Direct Containment Heating
Conservative Accident Progression - Large and fast radiological release
Generic (including bounding) EP modeling
2008
SOARCA
Improved Plant Performance
Total CDF:
1x10-5/yr to 1x10-6/yr
Additional Mitigative Measures
Alpha Mode Failure is remote & speculative
DCH resolved
Realistic accident progression analysis
Improved Site Specific EP Modeling
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SOARCA PROCESS
INITIALSEQUENCESELECTION
MELCORANALYSIS
SOURCETERM
MITIGATIVEMEASURESANALYSES
DETERMINECONTAINMENT
SYSTEMS STATES
STRUCTURALANALYSIS
SITE-SPECIFICINFORMATION MACCS2
ANALYSIS
RESULTS
METEOROLOGY
EMERGENCY PREPARDNESS
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SEQUENCE SELECTION
Richard Sherry, Senior Risk AnalystDivision of Risk Analysis
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
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• Full Power Operation
• Internal Initiated Events– SPAR model results– Comparison with licensee PRA– Discussions with licensee staff
• External Initiated Events
– Review of prior analyses
• IPEEE• NUREG-1150
– Discussions with licensee staff
Sequence Selection Process
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Sequence Groups
• Group core damage sequences that have similar initiating events, Sequence timing and equipment unavailability
• Initial Screening – CDF Initiating Events CDF > 1E-7– Sequences with CDF > 1E-8
• Sequences Evolution – Identify and evaluate dominant cutsets (~90% of CDF)
• Scenario grouping • Sequences refined by external events and mitigative
measures
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Final Sequence Groups
• Screen in sequence groups with group CDF > 10-6/RY
- or -
• Containment bypass sequence groups with group CDF > 10-7/RY
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Containment Systems Availability
• Availability of engineered systems that can impact post-core damage containment accident progression, containment failure and radionuclide release and not considered in Level 1 core damage SPAR model
• Surry and Peach Bottom
– Availability of containment systems based on support system status
• Sequoyah
– Availability of containment systems determined using extended Level 1 SPAR model
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Sequence GroupsPeach Bottom Atomic Power Station
• Peach Bottom Internal Events
– None (Dominant below the screening threshold was SBO)
• Peach Bottom External Events (Seismic)
– Long Term SBO (RCIC available early) (1x10-6 to 5x10-6 /yr)
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Sequence GroupsSurry Power Station
• Surry Internal Events – ISLOCA (7x10-7/yr)– SGTR (5x10-7/yr)
• Surry External Events (Seismic)
– Long-term SBO (TD-AFW available early) (1x10-5 to 2x10-5/yr) – Short-term SBO (TD-AFW failed) (1x10-6 to 2x10-6/yr)
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MITIGATIVE MEASURES
Robert Prato, Senior Program ManagerDivision of System Analysis
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
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Mitigative Measures Analysis
• Qualitative, sequence-specific systems and operational analyses
– Licensee identified mitigative measures from EOPs, SAMGs
– Other applicable severe accident guidelines
• Input into the MELCOR analyses
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Mitigative Measures Analysis Process
• Consider all mitigative measures
• Conduct sensitivity analyses to assess the effectiveness of different mitigative measures
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Mitigative Measures Analysis Process
• For each sequence grouping, identify the potential failure mechanisms and determine available mitigative measures
• Perform a system and an operational analysis based on the initial conditions and anticipated subsequent failures
• Determine the anticipated availability, capability and the time to implementation (e.g., TSC activation)
• MELCOR used to determine the effectiveness of the mitigative measures based on capability and estimated time of implementation
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Structural Analyses
Evaluate the behavior of containment structures under unmitigated severeaccident conditions to predict thefollowing performance criteria at the selected sites:
• Functional Failure Pressure - Leakage• Structural Failure Pressure - Rupture• Develop Leakage Rate and/or Leakage Area
as a Function of Internal Pressure
EL.92'-6"
EL.110'-0"
EL.134'-6"
EL.165'-0"
195'-0"
EL.234'-0"
EL.265'-4"
EL.290'-0"
EL.106'-6"
EL.116'-0"
EL.165'-0"
EL.200'-10"
EL.218'-10"
EL.84'-0"
GRADELEVEL
Drywell
Wetwell(Torus)
Reactor Bldg
Turbine Bldg
EL.92'-6"
EL.110'-0"
EL.134'-6"
EL.165'-0"
195'-0"
EL.234'-0"
EL.265'-4"
EL.290'-0"
EL.106'-6"
EL.116'-0"
EL.165'-0"
EL.200'-10"
EL.218'-10"
EL.84'-0"
GRADELEVEL
Drywell
Wetwell(Torus)
Reactor Bldg
Turbine Bldg
Peach Bottom “Mark I – Steel Containment”
Surry “Reinforced Concrete Containment”
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Peach Bottom LTSBO
• Effectiveness of Mitigative Measures– Batteries were available for ~ 4 hours – RCIC automatically started and prevented loss of
RCS inventory– Operator, by procedure, depressurizes at ~ 1 hr– Portable power supply ensures long-term DC to hold
SRV open and provide level indication (allow management of RCIC)
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Surry LTSBO
• Dominant containment dominant failure mode is leakage from cracking around the Equipment and/or Personnel Hatches
• Effectiveness of Mitigative Measures– Batteries were available for ~ 8 hours – TDAFW Pump automatically starts to makeup to the SGs– SG PORVs operable on DC power for 100 F/hr RCS cooldown– Portable power supply ensures long-term DC to provide level
indication (allow management of TDAFW) – Portable pump provided make up for RCP seal cooling
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Surry STSBO
• Dominant containment dominant failure mode is leakage from cracking (9 in2) around the Equipment and/or Personnel Hatches
• Effectiveness of Mitigative Measures– AC and DC power are unavailable – Mechanical failure of TDAFW Pump, fails to start– No instrumentation or RCS makeup– Portable pump provided containment spray within 8 hours
(spray operation terminated @ 15 hours)
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Surry SGTR
• Effectiveness of Mitigative Measures
– All ac and dc power supplies were available – All instrumentation was available– Plant response
• HPI, AFW initiate• Turbine stop valves close• Steam dump valves throttle and close
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SEQUENCE ANALYSIS
Randall Gauntt, Project ManagerSandia National Laboratories
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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Randolph Sullivan, CHPOffice of Nuclear Security and Incident Response
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Objective
• Realistically model emergency response during a severe accident
• Evolutionary improvement over past EP modeling
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Assumptions
• Emergency plans will be implemented• The public will largely obey direction from officials• Emergency workers will implement plans
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Technical Basis
• Site, State and local emergency plans• Site emergency classification procedures
– Aligned with accident progression from MELCOR
• State/local protective action procedures
– Precautionary protective actions modeled
• Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE)• Oak Ridge Evacuation Modeling System for
evacuation beyond EPZ (if necessary)
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Identify Cohorts
• ETE data:
– General public– “Tail” of public – Special needs
• Precautionary protective actions:
– Schools – Parks, beaches, etc.
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Identify Cohorts
• Non-evacuating (0.5%)• Shadow evacuation (10%)
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Speed of Travel
• Determined from ETE and OREMS• Modified in space and time
– “Bottle necks” identified– Free flowing areas identified– Road loading timing
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RegionPopulation
Non-Evacuating
EvacuatedNumber of
Vehicles
0-10 71,400 400 71,000 41,000
Example ETE
EPZ Evacuation Times
- 6.5 hours (from ETE)
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Speed of Travel
• MACCS2 does not allow input of road loading function
• Median speed of cohort assumed
– Speeds adjusted for areas of free flow or congestion
• Distance travelled assumed 50% more than radial• Median speed equals dist/time to clear
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Example Accident
• Long Term Station Blackout scenario• General Emergency is declared about 2 hours
after loss of all A/C power
– Evacuation starts at General Emergency– No precautionary evacuation of schools
(Site specific decision)
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Comments and Questions