1

Innenpolitik and the

Origins of World War I1

Adam Levine-Weinberg

University of Chicago

Prepared for delivery at the 2012 International Studies Association Annual Convention,

San Diego, California: April 1-4, 2012.

1 The author would like to thank participants in the 2010 APSA Annual Meeting and members of the Program on

International Security Policy at the University of Chicago for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.

The author would especially like to thank Keren Fraiman, Chad Levinson, Sebastian Schmidt, John Stevenson, and

Felicity Vabulas for reading and commenting on multiple early drafts.

2

Abstract

Today, the majority of scholars in the historical community agree that Germany provoked World

War I. However, the question of why Germany did so is far more controversial. Unfortunately,

no existing explanation can adequately account for both 1) why serious conflicts of interest

developed between Germany and the other great powers; and 2) why these conflicts escalated to

war. In this paper, I provide a new Innenpolitik theory of war that can explain both steps. I argue

that domestic resource conflict leads to war by causing state leaders to engage in economic and

social imperialism, which in turn lead to arms races and windows of opportunity, increasing the

probability of war. I then apply the theory to the case of Germany prior to World War I. I

demonstrate that German leaders systematically implemented an aggressive foreign policy, in

order to reinforce the position of powerful German agrarian and business interests while

neutralizing working class demands for redistribution. I then show how these foreign policy

decisions directly led to the European arms race of 1910-1914 and the creation of a window of

opportunity, which Germany fatefully jumped through in the July Crisis.

3

Introduction

From time to time in modern world history, great power state leaders have provoked or

initiated wars despite recognizing in advance that doing so would risk the destruction of their

state, or at the least, destruction of the ruling regime. Whether temporary or longer-term, this

destruction of the state or regime—which I will call “loss of sovereignty”—constitutes the worst

possible outcome for states in the view of mainstream international relations theorists.2 This

leads to a puzzle. What could motivate leaders to undertake risky behavior when the stakes are

so high?

The dominant explanation for risky aggression and war initiation in the international

relations literature is “preventive war”.3 This literature claims that if a great power (particularly

the most powerful state in the system)4 faces deep and inevitable decline in military and/or

economic terms relative to a competitor, it will typically prefer the certainty of war now to the

possibility of war later under worse conditions. Due to inherent uncertainty about other states’

intentions (especially future intentions), this possibility of war cannot be eliminated.5 Therefore,

such a state has an incentive to engage in risky behavior, up to and including war initiation: the

hope being that victory will halt the relative decline. At the extreme, this is achieved by

eliminating the competitor state.

However, I argue that this risk-taking behavior can be better explained by Innenpolitik

(domestic policy) motivations. The rise of popular sovereignty over the past two hundred years

has greatly circumscribed the ability—and motivation—of leaders to practice realpolitik to

2 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 126; John J. Mearsheimer,

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001), p. 31. 3 Jack S. Levy, “Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War,” World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 1 (October,

1987), p. 82. 4 Some versions of the theory seek to generalize it beyond great powers.

5 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, pp. 31-36.

4

maximize the state's power or security in a straightforward way. Instead, leaders must primarily

concern themselves with the population's (economic) welfare, because economic well-being

determines in large part whether people will support or oppose the regime.

When a great power’s leaders foresee stagnation or decline in the state’s economic

prospects, they worry about their continued ability to 1) promote the favored sectors in the

population, while 2) maintaining at least passive consent from the rest.6 The former concern

induces economic imperialism: the acquisition of new resources through either conquest or the

opening of new markets. The latter concern induces social imperialism: the use of aggressive

foreign policy to rally the dominant groups or classes while appeasing or co-opting the rest of the

population.7 Clearly, both economic and social imperialism entail aggressive behavior. This can

take the form of war initiation or hard-line measures short of war. In the latter case, war is

nevertheless the typical result, because these measures provoke arms races and upward “spirals”.

The timing of Innenpolitik-motivated wars is usually determined by windows of opportunity8:

temporary power advantages, which increase the chances of success.

I test these two theories against each other as explanations of World War I.9 This case is

of interest based on three main criteria. First, Fritz Fischer’s pioneering work on World War I

and the subsequent debate resulted in a near-consensus within the historical community that

6 Presumably, the same concerns occur in lesser powers. However, their relative power disadvantage rules out

solving the problem through aggressive policies. 7 For a thorough intellectual history and analysis of imperialism (with some discussion of the variants discussed

here), see Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Theories of Imperialism, trans. P.S. Falla (Chicago: The University of Chicago

Press, 1980). The classic statement of the social imperialist thesis is probably Hans Ulrich-Wehler, Bismarck und

der Imperialismus (Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1969). Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire: 1871-

1918, trans. Kim Traynor (Leamington Spa, UK: Berg, 1985) esp. Ch. 6 discusses similar themes. For an application

to international relations, see Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, (Ithaca,

N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991). 8 Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,

1999), Ch. 4. 9 Numerous authors have explained World War I as a preventive war instigated by Germany. See references in

Levy, “Declining Power,” pp. 84-85, n. 8 and n. 9. Also see especially Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major

War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), Ch. 3-4.

5

Germany provoked that conflict.10

Second, the conflict led to what I have termed “loss of

sovereignty” for Germany. In the closing days of World War I, the November Revolution led to

the collapse of the regime and the permanent exile of the Kaiser. A punitive peace treaty was

subsequently imposed on Germany at Versailles. Third, as I will show in the paper, German

civilian and military leaders understood that they were taking a substantial risk.

In the following section, I lay out in greater detail the two theories to be compared in the

empirical sections. Next, I offer a few clarifications on how to evaluate evidence in light of

potential observational equivalence between the two candidate explanations compared here.

Then, I use a process-tracing approach to examine the causes of World War I and compare the

two candidate explanations for Germany’s decision to risk a war in light of the evidence. The

final section summarizes my findings and concludes with some theoretical implications and

suggestions for further research.

Preventive War vs. Innenpolitik

What are the distinguishing characteristics of preventive wars?11

The logic of preventive

war theory is very adequately summarized by Dale Copeland. He writes, “A state… superior in

military power but inferior in economic and especially potential power is more likely to believe

that, once its military power begins to wane, further decline will be inevitable and deep… Under

these circumstances, a dominant military power is likely to be pessimistic about the future and

more inclined to initiate major war as a ‘now-or-never’ attempt to shore up its waning

10

Keir A. Lieber, "The New History of World War I and What It Means for International Relations Theory,"

International Security, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Fall 2007), p. 156. See also, Fritz Fischer, Germany’s Aims in the First

World War, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967); Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions: German Policies from 1911 to 1914,

trans. Marian Jackson (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975). For a dissenting opinion that blames the war on Austria-

Hungary, see Samuel R. Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, (New York: St.

Martin’s, 1991). For a classic interpretation of the war as an accident, see Barbara W. Tuchman, The Guns of

August, (New York: Macmillan, 1962). 11

Jack Levy argues that we should instead speak of the “preventive motivation” as a contributing factor to war.

While this paper often uses the standard “preventive war” terminology, it compares the relative weight of preventive

and Innenpolitik motivations as a cause of great power war. Levy, “Declining Power,” p. 86

6

security.”12

A key assumption is that states are primarily motivated by the search for security or

survival. The anarchic and self-help nature of international politics makes relative military

power the surest guarantee of continued survival.13

States also realize that in the long run, their

military power is largely a function of their resources, both human and natural; these factors

determine their economic and military potential. Therefore, if a currently powerful state lacks

the resource base to maintain its position in the future, and fears that its rising competitor may

attack when it has become stronger,14

the declining state faces a powerful incentive to attack its

competitor now, while conditions are still relatively favorable. The timing of war is thus

motivated by the closing window of opportunity created by relative decline. Declining states

also engage in competitive behavior short of war (such as crisis and arms race initiation) if such

hard-line policies are seen as sufficient to prevent further relative decline. These hard line

policies may in turn lead to a war not initially intended.

The preventive war logic assumes that state leaders act in an intendedly rational manner

to further the national interest.15

This points to a distinction we should make. Jack Snyder

agrees that what he calls “preventive aggression” can sometimes be a rational response to a

state’s strategic situation. But he claims that in practice, arguments in favor of preventive war

typically rely upon a “paper-tiger image of the opponent”16

, which “is seen as an implacable foe

posing an immense security threat, yet at the same time as too weak, inert, or irresolute to

combat aggressive countermeasures.”17

Snyder argues that this “paper-tiger” image is usually a

myth generated in the process of coalition logrolling that is typical in cartelized political

12

Copeland, Origins, p. 20. 13

See for instance, Waltz, Theory, pp. 126, 168; Mearsheimer, Tragedy, pp. 32-36. 14

The traditional realist view is that this is always be the case. Fear is omnipresent in international relations due to

states’ uncertainty and mistrust about other states’ future intentions. See Stephen G. Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,”

International Organization Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-477; Mearsheimer, Tragedy, esp. pp. 42-46. 15

Copeland, Origins, p. 28 goes further and assumes complete rationality for theoretical purposes. 16

Snyder, Myths of Empire, pp. 25-26. 17

ibid., p. 5.

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regimes.18

Snyder’s discussion suggests that policymakers can suffer from deluding myths or

cognitive biases, which lead them to wrongly think that preventive war is a rational response to

the state’s environment.19

We should distinguish such explanations of war, grounded in bias,

from the hard core of preventive war explanations, which have a rationalist logic.

By contrast, the aggressor in an Innenpolitik explanation is motivated by the fear of

worsening internal conditions. While preventive war theory assumes that foreign policy

decisions are designed with “the national interest” in mind, the Innenpolitik explanation

presented here focuses on decision makers’ pursuit of sectional interests. I assume that in the

modern era—at least since the 1848 revolutions for most of the Western world—state leaders

have been dependent on the consent of the governed. Even so-called “totalitarian” regimes

require, at a minimum, the passive consent of the majority in order to function.20

But I also

assume that each regime owes its power to a particular portion of the population (hereafter

“favored sectors” or “favored groups”),21

and the government implements policies to promote

these group(s)’ interests—particularly economic interests.

The Innenpolitik explanation of war presented here derives its power from the conflict

between maintaining the consent of the full population and promoting the interest of the favored

sectors. Since outright repression of the majority is no longer viable,22

governments need to find

ways to promote the favored sectors’ interests without alienating the majority so far as to push it

into active subversion or revolution. When economic opportunities, on a national level, are

expected to expand at a steady rate for the foreseeable future, this conflict is usually tractable.

18

ibid., pp. 17-18. 19

Levy, “Declining Power,” p. 101 agrees that misperception is often associated with preventive war. 20

This in large part derives from advances in communication that tend to undermine the government’s monopoly on

information. This increases the danger to the government of subversion or outright rebellion. 21

I deliberately avoid the theoretically and ideologically loaded terms “ruling class” and “dominant class”. In this

regard, it should be noted that government favoritism need not be directed along class lines, strictly speaking. 22

See for instance the Staatsstreich strategy in considered by some in Germany circa 1900; below, p. 16. It was

rejected for being extremely impractical.

8

When “a rising tide lifts all boats”, it is possible to satisfy the majority even while distributing a

disproportionate benefit to the favored sectors. However, even with the benefit of economic

growth, leaders may find that the growth in national resources is outstripped by faster growing

demands for resources.

On the other hand, in the face of actual or expected stagnation in the economy, efforts to

secure benefits for the favored groups risk provoking more active opposition from the majority,

whose economic position is now actively being eroded by such discriminatory policies. Yet the

government cannot abandon its most stalwart base of support; doing so would spur the favored

groups to use their political and financial power to replace the government. The attempt to

negotiate a path between this Scylla and Charybdis tends to unleash two mutually reinforcing

processes that eventually lead to war: 1) economic imperialism; and 2) social imperialism.

These will be dealt with in turn.

Economic imperialism is the most straightforward method of securing benefits for the

favored sectors. The threat or actual use of military force stimulates economic expansion either

directly, by conquering new resources for the national economy, or indirectly, by opening up

new markets for exports and new sources of imports and improving terms of trade. If economic

imperialism is directed at the periphery—i.e. colonialism—the power disparity between the great

power colonizer and the colonized area rules out major war between the two. But if economic

imperialism is directed at another great power, war is nearly inevitable. Even if force is not used

immediately but only threatened, the threatened states will increase their military power to avoid

further demands of an economic or political nature.23

In order to maintain its superior bargaining

position, the threatening state must respond in kind; an arms race is thus a typical result. The

arms race in turn creates windows of opportunity and vulnerability. As one state or the other

23

In the meantime, threatened states may be forced to yield concessions.

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pulls ahead in the arms race, it gains an incentive to initiate war while conditions are favorable. 24

An economic imperialist state that initially only threatened the use of force, now uses its window

of opportunity to provoke or initiate war in pursuit of its economic goals.

Social imperialism is a two-pronged strategy to make the interests of the majority and the

interests of the favored sectors more compatible with each other. On the one hand, social

imperialist policies attempt to facilitate cooperation within the favored sectors through issue

manipulation. Whereas these groups do not necessarily see eye-to-eye on issues of domestic

policy, they typically can agree on an active nationalist policy. By making foreign policy the

dominant concern of popular politics, the government can create an improved basis for

cooperation between these groups, which constitute the main pillars of the regime’s support. On

the other hand, social imperialist policies attempt to broaden the basis of active support for the

regime, or at least to dampen active opposition, by promoting the perception of external threat.

Often, this is accomplished by increasing armament spending and provoking international crises;

both lead towards what Robert Jervis calls “spirals”.25

This decreases the state’s security, but

creates a real external threat, encouraging the population to rally around the flag. The effective

use of propaganda can also be used to inflate threats, and thereby accomplish the same goal.

All these aspects of social imperialist policies raise the likelihood of war. Raising the

salience of foreign policy issues, encouraging nationalist fervor, and fostering an exaggerated

perception of threat all tend to create or increase the power of domestic “war lobbies”: groups

that believe war (or aggressive measures short of war) will solve the state’s security, economic,

or social problems. This increases the attractiveness of war initiation, as well as crisis initiation

and arms racing. The latter two create upward spirals and periodic windows of opportunity

24

For analysis of windows of opportunity and vulnerability as a cause of war, see Van Evera, Causes of War, Ch. 4. 25

Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,

1976), Ch. 3, esp. pp. 62-67.

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which in turn lead to war. This mechanism is the most common route from social imperialism to

war; while economic imperialist goals often necessitate a direct resort to war, social imperialism

can generally achieve the desired integrative effect through aggressive behavior short of major

war. Leaders try to avoid the costs of major war if possible, but may lose control of the situation.

Evaluating Evidence

As Copeland recognizes, both “preventive” motives and domestically-oriented aggressive

motives can lead to war directly, or indirectly: e.g. via crises and arms-racing.26

Unfortunately,

this causes substantial observational equivalence between the two theories: for example, they

predict same timing for major wars (and the same rationale motivates the timing). Both the

preventive war and Innenpolitik explanations expounded above predict that war occurs when the

aggressor achieves a window of opportunity, so this cannot prove one theory superior to the

other. We can also try to distinguish between the two motives by looking at statements made by

leaders about their motivations. This evidence is important, but potentially unreliable: leaders

have an incentive to lie (or misrepresent) because neither “preventive” motivations nor pursuit of

sectional interests are generally considered legitimate reasons for provoking war. This leaves

two types of indirect evidence: the timing and character of hard-line measures short of war.

The timing of hard-line measures short of war is the most important type of evidence

available. While war itself is initiated based on windows of opportunity for both theories, this is

not the case for hard-line measures short of war. The preventive war theory predicts aggressive

behavior to occur only after relative decline has begun. Doing otherwise risks war breaking out

before the state’s relative power has peaked.27

By contrast, the Innenpolitik explanation expects

aggressive behavior to begin as soon as economic difficulties are foreseen, because this triggers

26

Copeland, Origins, pp. 42-46. 27

Since relative decline (which creates a closing window of opportunity) explains both the aggressive behavior and

its timing, there would be no reason to attack before the expected peak in power.

11

economic and social imperialism. We should expect an Innenpolitik-motivated state to be

proportionally more aggressive as the fear of economic stagnation and opportunity for economic

gain increase. This can occur before the state peaks in relative power; if we see aggression in

such a case, we can conclude that it is Innenpolitik-motivated.

The last type of useful evidence is the “character” of aggression. Preventive motives

should be associated with aggression directed specifically at the rising competitor(s), and the

goal should be more explicable in terms of security or relative power than economic interest or

ideology.28

By contrast, Innenpolitik motives should be associated with opportunistically-

directed aggression: whichever state presents the “easy mark” or the most unifying enemy for a

social imperialist strategy should be targeted. We therefore expect more variation over time in

the targets of aggression. Additionally, the goal of aggression should be something of economic

benefit or something particularly potent for nationalist purposes.29

Having explained how the

evidence will be evaluated, it is time to examine the roots of World War I.

World War I

Overview

The fundamental cause of World War I was tension in the political and social structures

of the Wilhelmine Empire. The Empire was what we might call a “partial democracy”. An

idiosyncratic feature of the constitution was that while the Reichstag was elected by universal

manhood suffrage, the Chancellor and other government ministers were appointed by the Kaiser

28

Ideology is important for choosing a potent “enemy” figure to present as a threat to the population as part of a

social imperialist strategy. 29

Obviously, this may lead us back into the realm of observational equivalence. For instance, a major economic

gain could reverse relative decline and thus be the proper target of preventive aggression. But in some cases, the

evidence can be fairly clear-cut (i.e. far more consistent with one explanation than the other). This is particularly the

case when the goal provides absolute but not relative gains. See Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and

Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press), esp. Ch. 2; Joseph M. Grieco,

“Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International

Organization, Vol 42, No. 3 (June, 1988), pp. 485-507.

12

and served at his pleasure. They did not sit in the Reichstag and were not directly associated

with political parties.30

Furthermore, the Reichstag had merely negative powers: only the non-

elective upper house—the Bundesrat—could initiate legislation.31

The Reichstag’s main lever

for influencing policy was its approval (or rejection) of the annual budget.32

The Reichstag’s

budgetary powers gave it just enough leverage that the chancellor could not simply govern

autocratically; the government had to cobble together parliamentary support for its measures.

This was typically done on an ad hoc basis.

Reichstag elections ran on a single member district runoff voting system; if no candidate

received a majority of votes at the general election, a runoff election between the two highest

vote-getters would be held roughly two weeks later.33

There was no procedure to change

electoral districts in the face of rapid population growth in urban areas compared to rural areas.

This imparted a discriminatory character to the electoral structure, as urban votes were diluted;

eventually, the largest district had nearly as many voters as the fifteen smallest districts

combined.34

The electoral structure allowed a proliferation of political parties, but gave them

incentives to work together: by forming temporary electoral alliances, parties could increase the

chances of their joint candidates advancing to the runoff (or winning outright).

In spite of the discriminatory electoral structure, the urban based SPD (German Social

Democratic Party) gained strength almost continuously after 1900. This made it more difficult

for the government to find majorities to pass the budget, since the SPD could not be brought into

30

David Blackbourn, The Long Nineteenth Century: A History of Germany, 1780-1918 (New York: Oxford

University Press, 1998), pp. 256-257. 31

Jonathan Sperber, The Kaiser’s Voters: Electors and Elections in Imperial Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1997), p. 2. 32

The Reichstag’s budgetary review powers did not fully extend to the army; army budgets were approved every

seven years: later reduced to five. 33

Stanley Suval, Electoral Politics in Wilhelmine Germany (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina

Press, 1985), p. 40. 34

V.R. Berghahn, Modern Germany: Society, Economy, and Politics in the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed. (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 19-20.

13

coalition with the bourgeois parties (short of overturning the social system). The only alternative

was maintaining near-consensus amongst the parties of the center and right—those minimally

acceptable to the Kaiser and ruling strata as a whole—despite substantial economic conflict

between these groups. This led successive governments to engage in foreign adventures in an

attempt to unify these favored sectors. In the following pages, I first provide a description of the

overall economic and political situation and the options available to German leaders. I then

outline the key turning points in German policy, showing how attempts to further the interests of

agrarians and industrialists while maintaining the consent of the working class set Germany on

the course for world war in 1914.

Economic Growth and Fears of Stagnation in Imperial Germany

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the states that would unite to form Germany in

1871 were economically backward compared to the rest of Western Europe. By contrast, the

German economy far outstripped the British economy in industrial power (though not in

financial power) by the eve of World War I.35

This was a result of rapid growth throughout most

of the intervening period. However, while we might expect this economic growth to result in a

confident outlook across society, fear of economic stagnation was surprisingly widespread,

particularly in the years immediately prior to World War I. This fear drove much of Germany's

risk taking behavior during that time.

Economic worries in Imperial Germany had several sources. For one thing, the pace of

growth was very uneven, following a boom-bust pattern. During the Long Depression, which

lasted from 1873 and 1895, the German economy experienced a sharp deceleration in growth,

and some sectors of the economy saw rapid contraction.36

There was a severe recession in 1901

35

Ibid., pp. 1-3. 36

Wehler, The German Empire, pp. 32-34.

14

and a second recession lasting from late 1907 through 1908.37

Given this periodic economic

weakness in the past, it is perhaps understandable if many people worried about when the next

downturn would begin. Worries about future growth were exacerbated by overcapacity

throughout the German economy.38

Overcapacity in the two most favored sectors, agriculture

and heavy industry, was underwritten by the government through a system of tariffs and export

subsidies.39

Government policy privileged agrarians and industrialists, but this also led to an

inordinate fear of reforms that could curtail these privileges—and thus fear of the SPD.

This was complicated by a fairly high dependence on government orders in some sectors.

For example, while the series of Navy Laws to build up the German fleet helped support heavy

industry, steel producers and shipbuilders were threatened by a scheduled drop in the annual

building rate from four to two in 1912. Obviously, a 50% drop in government procurement

would lead to recession in most of the affected industries. As a result, Admiral Tirpitz was

confident that he could generate support for a revision in the Navy Law to three per year

beginning in 1912.40

Increased military spending could thus become a prophylactic for

economic fears. The exploitation of colonial resources in Africa took on a similar role in some

people's minds, although the colonies actually contributed very little to Germany's economy.41

Moreover, even when the economy was booming, large swaths of German society saw

little or no improvement to their living standards. While working class real wages rose by about

25% between 1895 and 1913, this was of course much slower than the overall rate of economic

growth. Annual income growth for the working class was around 1%, compared to 4% in most

37

Ibid., p. 43; Berghahn, Modern Germany, p. 3. 38

Wehler, p. 34. 39

Blackbourn, Long Nineteenth Century, pp. 315-317, 330, 341-345. Blackbourn does note that the influence of

"iron and rye" is sometimes overestimated. Particularly with respect to the agrarians, the German state would push

back when their demands were unacceptably high. 40

V.R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973), pp. 65-66. 41

Blackbourn, Long Nineteenth Century, p. 333.

15

other advanced economies.42

Furthermore, the number of workers in the lowest income group—

less than 900 marks per year— shrank by only 5% over that period, to 8.2 million in 1913.43

While there was some improvement overall, the vast majority of a worker's wages went to food

(with prices inflated by grain tariffs) and rent (where rapid urbanization had created persistent

shortages). On top of this, social stratification meant that there were very few opportunities for

advancement for most workers.44

Unlike the working class, agricultural interests were the beneficiaries of the government's

economic policies. However, whereas some industrial concerns reaped massive profits with the

government's help, many farmers (including the Junkers) were heavily indebted and struggled

with rising costs of production. The poor conditions for small peasants and farm workers can be

seen in the heavy rates of internal migration from rural areas into the cities.45

Despite the poor

conditions for the working class described above, large numbers of farmers saw better economic

opportunities in the cities than at home.

The main point to emphasize is that while economic statistics show explosive growth in

the two decades prior to World War I, the rise in national income was very unevenly distributed.

Moreover, there was no straightforward way for the government to rectify this imbalance.

Agricultural interests benefited from the imposition of higher grain tariffs after 1900, but this

increased the cost of living for the proletariat and thereby exacerbated social conflict and the

SPD's strength. Fear of increased SPD power and resulting demands for redistribution, fear of

another bust cycle, and worries about the closing of major export markets combined to produce

fears of stagnation amongst the political and economic leaders of Imperial Germany.

42

Wehler, The German Empire, p. 44. 43

Berghahn, Modern Germany, p. 8. 44

Ibid., pp. 9-15. 45

Blackbourn, Long Nineteenth Century, pp. 317-318; Wehler, The German Empire, p. 44.

16

Staatsstreich vs. Social Imperialism

A recurring theme in the politics of Imperial Germany is the coalition between heavy

industry and agriculture. Around the turn of the century, fear of the rising SPD and working

class led Finance Minister Johannes von Miquel to attempt a “gathering together” (Sammlung) of

these groups, reviving Bismarck’s so-called “marriage of iron and rye”.46

As electoral support

for the SPD began its ascent, elites considered two main strategies for reasserting their

hegemony. One option, Staatsstreich, entailed a violent suppression of the working class by the

army, accompanied by the revocation of universal male suffrage. This had the advantage of

constituting a permanent solution, if successful; however, it entailed a serious risk of civil war.

In this regard, leaders had to reckon with the potential unreliability of soldiers hailing from urban

areas, who might join the prospective revolution.47

Ultimately, leaders realized that it was no

longer possible to forcibly suppress half of the population.

The alternative was social imperialism: as explained above, this entailed rallying the

favored groups together while simultaneously appeasing or—if this was possible—co-opting the

working class. The Sammlung kept threatening to fall apart due to the conflicting interests of

agrarians and industrialists. Proponents of “the national idea” saw that foreign policy was one

sphere where the two groups could present a united front vis-à-vis the internationalist SPD.48

The potential drawback of the social imperialist strategy was that it risked perpetuating the

unstable sociopolitical situation. If enough voters did not buy into active nationalism, then the

Reichstag could continue to obstruct conservative policy initiatives. More subtly, the unifying

effect of a strong foreign policy could be (and was) undone by the divisive measures needed to

46

Eckart Kehr, “Anglophobia and Weltpolitik,” in Gordon A. Craig, ed. Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign

Policy: Essays on German History, trans. Grete Heinz (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1977), p. 38. 47

Berghahn, Approach of War, pp. 13-18. 48

Imanuel Geiss, German Foreign Policy, 1871-1914 (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 76.

17

pay for increased armaments. However, there was no better alternative, so social imperialism

became the basis for two decades of German policy.

Comments by the German architects of the Sammlung and Weltpolitik (world policy)

confirm that they were consciously following a social imperialist strategy. In an 1897 Ministry

of State meeting, Miquel opined, “We would… have to introduce questions of foreign policy into

the Reichstag, for in foreign affairs the sentiments of the nation would usually be united. Our

undeniable successes in foreign policy would make a good impression in the Reichstag debates,

and political divisions would thus be moderated.”49

Referring to naval building and colonial

expansion (Weltpolitik) Admiral Tirpitz argued in the same vein: “This great new national

undertaking and the economic gains connected with it will serve as potent palliatives against

educated and uneducated Social Democrats.”50

As expected, a major goal of these “national”

enterprises was to create a basis for unity amongst the other parties, in spite of their divergent

economic interests. It was additionally hoped that jingoistic rhetoric could gain the support of

some of the workers, in order to stem the rising Social Democratic tide. From the election

results shown in Table 1 below, one can understand the concern of successive governments, as

well as establishment parties and individual supporters of nationalism and conservatism.51

The

SPD share of the vote and of the Reichstag seats increased in each successive election, with the

exception of the 1907 “Hottentot” elections.

49

Quoted in J.C.G. Röhl, Germany without Bismarck: The Crisis of Government in the Second Reich, 1890-1900,

(Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1967), p. 252. 50

Quoted in Eckart Kehr, “The German Fleet in the Eighteen Nineties and Politico-Military Dualism in the Empire,”

in Gordon A. Craig, ed. Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy: Essays on German History, trans. Grete

Heinz (Berkeley, Cal.: University of California Press, 1977), p. 12. 51

As Geoff Eley has shown at length, the latter two categories should not be conflated. The radical right constituted

a “national opposition”; they opposed the conservative forces of Wilhelmine Germany, which they saw as unwilling

or unable to vigorously defend the state against its enemies, internal and external. See Geoff Eley, Reshaping the

German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck (With a New Introduction) (Ann Arbor,

Mich.: The University of Michigan Press, 1991).

18

Table 1: Reichstag Election Results, 1898-191252

1898 1903 1907 1912

% vote % seats % vote % seats % vote % seats % vote % seats

Party Grouping

SPD

27.2 14.1 31.7 20.3 28.9 10.8 34.8 27.7

Liberals (Left

Lib., Nat’l Lib.)

23.7 23.9 23.1 21.9 25.4 25.9 25.9 21.9

Catholic Center 18.8 25.7 19.7 25.2 19.4 26.4 16.4 22.9

Conservatives

(Free Cons.,

Cons., right wing

splinter groups)

19.2

23.2

16.1

21.7

15.8

25.2

12.7

15.1

Ethnic Minorities,

Guelphs

6.1 8.6 5.9 8.1 5.8 7.3 5.8 8.3

Other Splinter

Groups

5.1 4.5 3.5 2.8 4.7 4.3 4.5 4.0

What is significant for our purposes here is that the (Protestant) elites represented in the

liberal and conservative parties really did need to rally together and to strip some worker support

away from the SPD. Due to the peculiarities of the electoral system, parties could overcome

diminishing overall support by closer cooperation; note for instance how the liberal parties

garnered a larger share of votes in 1912 than in 1907, but gained significantly fewer seats. The

elections of 1907 saw a focus on colonial and foreign policy issues, catalyzing significant

cooperation within the favored groups,53

whereas this coalition had fallen apart by 1912, because

the government’s social and economic imperialist adventures had led to the thorny question of

how to pay for them; left liberals wanted an income tax, whereas the other elites opposed giving

the Reichstag this power.54

This economic conflict between agriculture, industry, and commerce

pushed the regime towards more aggressive solutions in hopes of rallying these favored groups

52

Adapted from Berghahn, Modern Germany, Table 41, p. 300; Eley, Reshaping, Appendix 2, p. 365. 53

Blackbourn, Long Nineteenth Century, p. 418; Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 57-58. 54

Berghahn, Approach of War, pp. 83-84.

19

together. This made war virtually inevitable. The next section analyzes several crucial episodes

to show how this came about.

Economic Conflict and the Road to War: 1890-1914

When Kaiser Wilhelm II dismissed Bismarck in 1890, ending the latter’s twenty-eight

years at the head of the Prussian and German governments, it marked a new departure for

German policy. Count Leo von Caprivi succeeded Bismarck, and initiated the first steps away

from Bismarck’s focus on political and diplomatic questions, concentrating his efforts instead on

economic issues.55

Caprivi initiated a pro-trade policy that tried to reorient the economy in favor

of the growing industrial sectors. The centerpieces of his legacy were the so called “Caprivi

tariffs”, which cut historically high grain tariffs in order to conclude favorable trade treaties with

other states, mainly in Eastern Europe. A secondary result was the reduction of food prices, thus

diminishing the cost of living for the proletariat.56

The effect on both workers and agrarians was

magnified by a collapse in world grain prices in 1892.57

Particularly significant was the tariff

agreement with Russia; after an eighteen month trade war, Germany allowed Russian grain onto

the German market, to the detriment of German agriculture. This was the price of valuable

access to Russian markets for German industry.58

The Caprivi tariffs caused uproar amongst German agrarians. The Junkers, Prussia’s

traditional elite, were not prepared to surrender their privileges so easily. The backlash led to

Caprivi’s dismissal in 1894. Agricultural interests then set about undoing the damage of the

Caprivi years: the occasion was the negotiations over the 1900 Navy Law. The Navy Laws, the

55

Klaus Hildebrand, “Reich—Nation-State—Great Power: Reflections on German Foreign Policy 1871-1945,”

1993 Annual Lecture to the German Historical Institute London (London: The German Historical Institute London,

1995), p. 9. 56

Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 6-7; Berghahn, Approach of War, p. 18. 57

Kehr, “Anglophobia and Weltpolitik,” p. 35. 58

Fischer, War of Illusions, p. 6.

20

first of which was passed in 1898, were the centerpiece of Tirpitz’s plan to gradually expand the

fleet—largely for social and economic imperialist purposes. The navy was initially seen as

another boon for German industry, and so agrarians long opposed what they called “the horrible

fleet”.59

The government needed agrarian support to pass the fleet bill, so the fleet could in turn

be used to 1) create nationalist issues around which to rally the population, and 2) open future

opportunities for economic imperialism in the colonial sphere.60

Eventually, Kehr notes, the

agrarians became reconciled to the fleet due to the integrative effect of an anti-British policy and

some political horse-trading: “the conservatives voted for the German battle fleet because, after

cautious tactical maneuvering, they were assured of an increase in grain tariffs as a compensation

for this considerable sacrifice.”61

This initial aggressive move came while Germany’s relative

power was still rising, and thus cannot be explained well by preventive motives.

These 1902 tariffs, implemented in conjunction with the Sammlung, once again gave

German agrarians (particularly the Junkers who specialized in rye) a contrived advantage over

their Russian counterparts. Kehr goes so far as to describe it as “a brutal intervention into

Russia’s economy.”62

As a consequence, Russia refused to renew the 1894 tariff agreement that

had opened Russia for German industry.63

The upcoming loss of this export market threatened

the German economy’s future health. Around the same time, Russia became embroiled in the

Russo-Japanese War. Russia ultimately lost the war and was only with difficulty able to put

down revolutionary uprisings. German diplomacy in this period is very instructive, and shows

the primacy of economic over security concerns.

59

Kehr, “Anglophobia and Weltpolitik,” p. 27. 60

Eley, Reshaping, pp. 87-98, Ch. 6. 61

Kehr, Anglophobia and Weltpolitik,” p. 40. 62

ibid., p. 43. 63

Fischer, p. 9.

21

After the revolutionary developments in Russia seemed to have weakened that state, there

were calls for preventive war in Germany. Chief of the Prussian General Staff Schlieffen

suggested that now was the opportune moment to attack France and subject it to German

hegemony, as its Russian ally would be unable to assist in its defense.64

But Germany’s actions

demonstrated that its leaders were actually far more concerned with achieving economic gains.

Germany instigated a crisis over Morocco’s colonial status, in order to inflict a diplomatic defeat

on France and obtain modest colonial concessions. When neither objective was fulfilled,

Germany settled for “concessions on details of procedure.”65

Mommsen argues, “The Moroccan

venture of 1905 ended in disaster because it was not prosecuted with firm resolve but was merely

an attempt to keep the door open for the future.”66

Hillgruber agrees that “no one responsible for

Reich policy was planning for a war of conquest or a preventive war against France”.67

There are potential strategic explanations for the decision to back down in 1905: Tirpitz

argued that the navy was not ready yet, while Bülow and the Kaiser worried that the masses had

not been sufficiently prepared for war.68

But objectively—if security was the significant concern

for German leaders—these factors should have been far outweighed by the strategic opportunity.

Schlieffen himself noted, “The outcome of the war would depend on the French campaign and

not upon the Navy,” thus refuting Tirpitz’s argument.69

John Mearsheimer argues that this is the

sole instance in modern history of a great power failing to exploit an opportunity to increase its

64

Berghahn, Approach of War, p. 52, Copeland, Origins, p. 62. 65

Geiss, German Foreign Policy, pp. 102-105; Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 51-57. Even if the crisis had led to war

against France, this would only have been “preventive” war in a circuitous sense, since Germany was rising with

respect to France. Relative decline would only exist if the Franco-Russian allies were treated as a unit. Given the

preventive war literature’s realist foundations and realist insistence on the individual state as unit of analysis, this

would be a questionable interpretation. 66

Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Imperial Germany 1867-1918: Politics, Culture, and Society in an Authoritarian State,

trans. Richard Deveson (London: Arnold, 1995), p. 92. 67

Andreas Hillgruber, Germany and the Two World Wars, trans. William C. Kirby (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard

University Press, 1981), p. 16. 68

Copeland, Origins, p. 62, Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 56-57. 69

Quoted in Berghahn, Approach of War, p. 52.

22

relative power. “According to offensive realism,” he writes, “Germany should have gone to war

in 1905, because it almost surely would have won the conflict.”70

However, Germany was primarily motivated by economic imperialist goals, not security

imperatives, and in this respect she was quite successful. Germany’s failure to undertake a

preventive war did not signify a failure to act opportunistically. As we saw above, in 1904,

Russia was unwilling to keep its market open to German industry, in light of Germany’s 1902

tariffs that effectively excluded Russian rye from the German market. But as Russia’s situation

deteriorated during the war, her leaders became desperate for foreign capital and goods—as well

as Germany’s benevolent neutrality. Seeing no alternative, Russia reluctantly agreed in July,

1904, to a new trade agreement with Germany that was very advantageous to the latter. This

trade agreement entered into force in March 1906, for a twelve year term.71

The 1904-1905

episode should not be seen as a German failure to protect its security, but as a successful

economic imperialist venture. The measures Germany enacted short of war had no hope of

reversing relative decline, because while they helped secure a foundation for economic growth,

they were even more beneficial for Russia. The agreements with France and Russia here

conceded relative gains to both, compared to the likely outcome of war. This is very strong

evidence for the dominance of Innenpolitik over preventive motivations.

The next step on the road to war occurred in late 1908. Austria-Hungary’s annexation of

Bosnia-Herzegovina initiated a period of acute tension in European politics, as Russia threatened

to intervene to maintain its position in the Balkans. Germany did not instigate this episode, but

decided to strongly back its Austro-Hungarian ally because by this point it had burned its other

bridges: German aggression in 1905 ruled out friendly relations with Britain, France, and Russia

70

Mearsheimer, Tragedy, p. 216. 71

Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 9, 54; Geiss, German Foreign Policy, p. 99.

23

for the time being.72

But the decision to support Austria-Hungary backfired in the long run. The

Russian Minister of War had to admit that his army was in no position to fight. This led to a

massive reorganization and increase in the size of the Russian army.73

It was the resulting

increase in Russian power that created the closing window of opportunity Germany jumped

through in 1914. After 1908, the growth of Russian power meant that any Innenpolitik-

motivated aggression would have to be initiated sooner rather than later.

Another telling episode occurred following the second Moroccan crisis of 1911.74

One of

the government’s major goals during that crisis was to repair the splintered Sammlung by trading

Morocco for colonial concessions. But Foreign Minister Kiderlen-Wächter overplayed his hand,

encouraging radical nationalists to make extreme demands, in order to improve his bargaining

position vis-à-vis the Entente, a strategy he called “letting all the dogs bark”.75

This strategy was

more consistent with Innenpolitik than preventive motivations, insofar as Germany was prepared

to cede relative gains to the Entente in order to make modest absolute gains. When the

government settled for minor colonial concessions, the right was incensed.76

Tirpitz saw this as

the ideal opportunity to expand the navy yet again: “The greater our disgrace, the more vigorous

the indignations. The prospects of a supplementary law are improved thereby,” he wrote.77

Bethmann-Hollweg was appalled, as this would wreck any attempt at coming to a

political understanding with Britain, while raising the thorny question of how to pay for the

72

Geiss, German Foreign Policy, pp. 114-116; Berghahn, Approach of War, pp. 80, 138. 73

Hillgruber, Germany, p. 20; Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 61, 424. 74

On July 1, 1911, the Panther (a German warship) entered the port of Agadir, Morocco, protesting France’s

deployment of troops to the Moroccan interior in violation of the 1906 Algeciras agreement. Germany hoped to

gain colonial concessions from France, and also, as Fischer argues, create a nationalist issue for the 1912 elections,

aiming to replicate the success of the 1907 “Hottentot elections”. See Fischer, War of Illusions, Ch. 5. 75

Blackbourn, Long Nineteenth Century, p. 432. 76

Berghahn, Approach of War, pp. 102-103. 77

Quoted in Eckart Kehr, “Class Struggle and Armament Policy in Imperial Germany,” in Gordon A. Craig, ed.

Economic Interest, Militarism, and Foreign Policy: Essays on German History, trans. Grete Heinz (Berkeley, Cal.:

University of California Press, 1977), p. 70.

24

increase.78

As Kehr relates, Bethmann-Hollweg’s counterintuitive response was to browbeat the

Minister of War into requesting a massive army expansion. This maneuver allowed Bethmann-

Hollweg to moderate the naval program with the excuse that money was needed for army

expansion as well. Prior to the crisis, the Ministry of War had a plan to slowly expand the army

over the course of ten years. This was jettisoned not to keep up in an arms race (which had

hardly begun by this point), but to undermine the proposed naval expansion.79

The 1912 army

expansion can ultimately be traced back to the social imperialist strategy of 1911.

This is by no means insignificant. Between the 1912 army expansion bill, and a

subsequent expansion in early 1913 (attributable primarily to bureaucratic politics) Germany

frightened the Entente powers into ratcheting up their military preparedness.80

Yet again,

aggressive moves by Germany—taken for non-security reasons—led to an increase in Entente

military strength that Germany could not match. One result was a massive increase in the size of

the French army as they introduced a three-year term of service. Even more importantly, France

provided a loan to Russia with the express intent of improving the rail network in western

Russia, which would cut down the time needed for Russian mobilization; an expansion of the

Russian army was also stipulated in the agreement.81

These preparations were expected to be

complete by 1916 or 1917, thus finalizing the window of opportunity for Germany.

Germany’s aggressive economic and social imperialist moves thus caused her relative

decline in military terms. And this was the type of decline that was most of concern to German

decision makers. They may have been abstractly worried about Russia’s population and natural

resources, but they were far more concerned about the projected completion of Russia’s strategic

78

Recall that tax questions had destroyed the Sammlung bloc that had successfully contested the 1907 elections. 79

Kehr, “Class Struggle,” pp. 70-71. 80

ibid., pp. 72-74. 81

Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 381-382 and esp. 424-432.

25

railways and army increases in 1917. The preventive war hypothesis ahistorically observes the

threat to German security posed by relative decline and deduces that preventive motivations must

account for the German decision to wage war. However, this decline was the result of the long

history of social and economic imperialist policies pursued by the government, and these policies

combined with the closing window of opportunity, implied war regardless of “preventive”

considerations. We now turn to a brief analysis of the July crisis, to see how this was the case.

The July Crisis and the Outbreak of War

Many treatments of the July crisis try to determine Germany’s “aim”, but this implicitly

entails two questionable assumptions. First, it assumes that there was a single aim; either the

leadership was unified in pursuing a particular goal, or a particular section of the leadership was

predominant and thus able to impose its goal on policy. Second, this assumes that the “aim” did

not change in the course of the crisis. A brief look at the course of events is sufficient to show

that neither of these assumptions is warranted, because German decision makers pursued several

aims at various points during the crisis. By the end of July, some decision makers were

motivated by preventive logic, but social and economic concerns were quite as important in

determining the course of events and the eventual decision for war.

Following the Sarajevo assassination, military and civilian leaders disagreed on how to

respond.82

The radical right, particularly the agrarian group, was eager for “preventive war”

against Russia. They were represented most directly in the leadership of the military, headed by

Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke.83

It should be noted, though, that the motivation

was not “preventive” in the sense used by contemporary scholars of international relations. The

agrarians realized that the twelve year trade agreement extorted from Russia during the Russo-

82

Imanuel Geiss, ed., July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War: Selected Documents, (New York: Charles

Scribner’s Sons, 1967), p. 61. 83

Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, p. 56.

26

Japanese war was expiring. Given Russia’s rebound in power since that time, it was clear that

the next trade agreement would be much less favorable to Germany.84

On the other hand, if

Germany could inflict a new defeat on Russia, German agricultural interests could once again

protect their economic position by dictating terms to Russia. To agrarians, the proposed war was

“preventive” in the sense that it would use a closing window of opportunity to prevent Russia

from negotiating a new [and fair] trade agreement in 1918, by which point Germany’s relative

power would have decreased. According to the definitions used here, their motivation was

economic imperialist, not preventive.

In any case, the military’s desire for war here was no different from previous crises,

which had all ended peacefully. This time, however, the military was supported by the Kaiser,

who was determined to make a stand.85

On the other hand, the civilian leadership, particularly

Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg and Foreign Minister Jagow, initially wanted to resolve the crisis

short of general war. Once again, the moderates prevailed; Germany implemented a policy

whereby she attempted to goad Austria-Hungary into issuing an ultimatum and then invading

Serbia, thus creating a fait accompli.86

Bethmann-Hollweg recognized the risk that a world war

would nevertheless result, calling the adventure a “leap into the dark”.87

However, the hope was

that the Triple Entente would be deterred from intervening by the speed of events and the

strength of German and Austro-Hungarian commitment. It should be emphasized that this goal

of localization was both genuine and reasonable; as Trachtenberg shows, it is wrong to claim that

German leaders already knew Russia would intervene.88

84

Berghahn, Approach of War, pp. 181-185. 85

Geiss, July 1914, pp. 62-63. 86

See the numerous documents in ibid., esp. Ch. 2-4. 87

Quoted for example in Hillgruber, p. 37; cf. comments by Bethmann-Hollweg in Geiss, July 1914, pp. 32-37. 88

Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, Ch. 2, esp. pp. 49-57; see also Berghahn, Approach of War, p. 193.

27

This strategy was not at all consistent with a desire for preventive war. As Copeland

argues, a successful preventive war required Germany to do the following: 1) ensure that neither

Russia nor Austria-Hungary would back down, ending the pretext for war; 2) obtain the support

of the Social Democrats and the working class generally; and 3) if possible, keep Britain out of

the war.89

Yet by trying to engineer a fait accompli, Bethmann-Hollweg gave himself no time to

convince the SPD and working class to support war, if events quickly spiraled out of control

(violating condition 2). More importantly, there was a serious “risk” that Russia would back

down, denying Germany the pretext to go to war (violating condition 1). Were Germany

determined to provoke a continental war at this point, creating a fait accompli would have been a

poor choice, because this strategy was specifically designed to localize hostilities.90

Bethmann-Hollweg’s fait accompli strategy was designed at least in part to undermine

the military’s desire for an immediate war against Russia by providing a less drastic option that

still appealed to their proactive tendencies.91

But it also fulfilled social imperialist goals: a

successful local war could restore unity amongst German elites and thus hopefully reverse the

massive SPD gains of the 1912 Reichstag elections. (See Table 1, above) As Copeland points

out, Bethmann-Hollweg feared a major war would benefit the SPD, possibly leading to

revolutionary developments.92

However, since Bethmann-Hollweg’s goal was localization, this

in no way rules out domestic political motives on his part. In the end, this strategy depended on

a quick resolution of the conflict in order to be successful: hence Bethmann-Hollweg’s advocacy

of quick action from Austria-Hungary.93

But although the leaders of Austria-Hungary also

89

Copeland, Origins, p. 80. 90

Berghahn, Approach of War, pp. 189-190. 91

ibid., pp. 190-192. 92

Copeland, p. 60. 93

Telegram 239, Szögyény [Austria-Hungary’s ambassador to Germany] to Berchtold [Foreign Minister of Austria-

Hungary], July 6, 1914, in Geiss, ed., July 1914, pp. 79-80.

28

desired “a speedy decision of the controversy with Serbia, whether it be decided in a warlike or

peaceful manner”, the need to resolve political differences and the desire there to undertake

extensive diplomatic preparations (most notably, sending an ultimatum to Serbia) dramatically

delayed the process.94

It thus became clear over time that, due to Austria-Hungary’s procedure, localization of

the coming war was highly unlikely. There would be plenty of time for the other great powers to

intervene, and then Germany and Austria-Hungary would have to decide between backing down

and risking world war. But by this point, Bethmann-Hollweg was in a bind: “The Kaiser and the

military were unlikely to accept another diplomatic defeat. Soon they would be coming back

from their holidays to look at what Bethmann Hollweg had made of his blitz plan, and if it did

not work, they would take over to escalate the crisis into the sort of major war which they had

been advocating for some time.”95

As a general rule, Wilhelm II (and to a lesser extent, Moltke)

preferred to ignore the political realities of mass politics and underestimated the social unrest that

a major war would unleash.

This tilting of power away from the Chancellor and towards the military was not the only

factor driving Germany towards war in July 1914. Bethmann-Hollweg also recognized the

economic imperialist motive for war with Russia, seeing the latter's intransigence over the course

of the crisis as evidence that Russia would use its newfound strength to become more assertive in

her future relations with Germany. Bethmann-Hollweg also believed that “war against Russia

would be popular among all classes and would hence present an opportunity of overcoming the

internal problems of the monarchy.”96

This was not enough to justify provoking a major war

94

“Protocol of the Council of Ministers for Common Affairs, with Berchtold in the Chair,” July 7, 1914, in Geiss,

ed., July 1914, pp. 80-87. 95

Berghahn, Approach of War, p. 199. 96

ibid., p. 192.

29

from day one in light of the potential downsides, but once local war was definitely off the table;

he and his fellow ministers were not prepared to make a great effort to avoid general war. Their

recognition of preventive considerations surely also played a role at this point: now that war

seemed to be coming, there was no reason to shy away from it, since the conditions were as

favorable as they could ever be.97

Lastly, by late July, Bethmann-Hollweg found himself

domestically committed: during the long period of waiting required by his strategy, ultra-

nationalist circles had—probably with encouragement from the government—whipped

themselves into a frenzy and now stridently demanded war against Russia.98

Backing down at

this point would have raised the specter of a coup d’état.

Knowing that its window of opportunity was closing due to the Triple Entente’s increases

in military forces and preparedness, Germany used the Sarajevo crisis as a convenient

justification to unleash war. The dominant rationales can be found in an economic imperialist

goal (keep Russia weak in order to extort economic advantages from her) and a social imperialist

goal (provoke crises and small wars to unite the population around “national” ideas). These

latter two goals also explain the vast majority of Germany’s conduct in the years leading up to

war, especially as it related to crises. Germany’s aggressive behavior began when economic

problems were first foreseen, but before relative decline began (and was in fact a cause thereof),

thus indicating the primacy of Innenpolitik motives. Germany was also willing to concede

relative gains to its competitors in order to achieve absolute gains in the trade and colonial

spheres. The primacy of Innenpolitik is also supported by the character of German aggression;

which alternately targeted Britain, France, and Russia. Preventive motivations only came into

97

Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, pp. 91-92. 98

Fischer, War of Illusions, pp. 456, 500-501.

30

play at the last moment, and given the other considerations in favor of war, were probably not

decisive.

Conclusion

The evidence presented above casts significant doubt on the claim that World War I is a

paradigmatic case of preventive war. At the most, preventive logic constituted a secondary

motivation for German decision makers that helped tip the balance towards war in 1914. The

underlying conflict was a result of economic and social imperialism, which resulted in war when

German leaders recognized a closing window of opportunity to achieve their economic and

political goals.

Economic and social imperialism are fairly common strategies that governments adopt to

maintain consent of the population while continuing to promote the interest of favored groups,

especially when leaders foresee potential economic stagnation. Before World War I, the

foreseen economic problems were due to 1) the latent threat of SPD-inspired economic reforms

that would hurt agriculture and heavy industry, 2) the rise of Russia, which meant the end of

discriminatory advantages for German agriculture and industry in foreign trade, and 3) the

general fear of a new bust cycle. The German leadership used economic imperialism to bolster

the economy, particularly in trade relations with Russia and the building of a large navy

(undertaken in part to stimulate heavy industry). However, neither of these policies would pacify

the working class: hence the simultaneous need for social imperialism to bind the nation

together. The existence of a closing window of opportunity has been presented elsewhere as

evidence that World War I was “preventive”. But in fact, the window of opportunity only

explains the timing of war, not the deep causes thereof.

31

Since the theory presented here finds support in one important case, in the future scholars

should test this theory as an explanation of other major wars, particularly where scholars have

previously pointed to preventive motivations as a cause of the war. More broadly, the

conclusion reached here suggests that whereas realist theories of war at most allow that domestic

level variables can alter the style or timing of foreign policy,99

the opposite may be the case. In

the analysis presented above, a domestic condition (fear of economic stagnation) leads to war

through the mechanisms of economic and social imperialism, and systemic-level variables such

as relative power at most alter the style or timing of foreign policy. Future research, therefore,

should investigate other hypothesized systemic level causes of war. Perhaps we will find that

these, too, are intervening phenomena rather than primary causes of war.

99

Norrin M. Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, and Steven E. Lobell, “Conclusion: The State of Neoclassical

Realism,” in Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, eds., Neoclassical Realism, the State,

and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 282.